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COMPLAINT | F.D.I.C. Sues WAMU Execs. and Wives For $900 Million

COMPLAINT | F.D.I.C. Sues WAMU Execs. and Wives For $900 Million


Via: Brian Davies

THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION, as RECEIVER of
WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK
,
Plaintiff,

v.

KERRY K. KILLINGER, STEPHEN J.
ROTELLA, DAVID C. SCHNEIDER,
LINDA C. KILLINGER, and ESTHER T.
ROTELLA
,
Defendants.

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CA Judge Grants ‘TRO, Serious Questions Respect To Fraud Claims” CRUZ v. WAMU

CA Judge Grants ‘TRO, Serious Questions Respect To Fraud Claims” CRUZ v. WAMU


Excerpt:

In his motion for a TRO, Plaintiff argues he has shown a likelihood of success on the merits
of his claims for violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200 and promissory
estoppel. The Court interprets Plaintiff’s argument regarding his claim for promissory estoppel as
applying to his claim for fraud. The elements of a fraud claim are false representation, knowledge of
falsity, intent to defraud, justifiable reliance, and damages
. Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d
1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff alleges in a verified Complaint and in his motion for a TRO that
a WAMU representative made a knowingly false statement to him with the intent to defraud, upon
which he justifiably relied, causing damages
. Accordingly, Plaintiff has at least raised serious
questions going to the merits with respect to his fraud claim
.

<SNIP>

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s application for a TRO is granted. Defendants and their
agents, employees, representatives, successors, partners, assigns, attorneys, and any and all acting in
concert or participation with them are enjoined from engaging in or performing any act to deprive
Plaintiff of ownership or possession of Plaintiff’s real property located at 919 Brass Way, Encinitas,
California 92024, including, but not limited to, proceeding with the non-judicial foreclosure sale
scheduled for March 18, 2011 and recording any deeds relating to the property. Defendants are
ordered to show cause, on or before March 22, 2011, why a preliminary injunction should not be
issued enjoining Defendants from taking such actions until termination of this case. A hearing shall
be held on Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction on March 24, 2011 at 2:30 p.m. in
Courtroom 10. This temporary restraining order shall remain in place for 14 days or until this Court
issues an Order on Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, whichever shall first occur. The
Court notes, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(1), the Court “may issue a preliminary
injunction only on notice to the adverse party.” Furthermore, the Court points out a TRO is binding
only upon parties and their officers, agents, and employees or those acting in concert with them “who
receive actual notice of [the TRO] by personal service or otherwise.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2).
Accordingly, Plaintiff shall forthwith serve a copy of this Order upon all Defendants.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 14, 2011

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OHIO JUDGMENT REVERSED FULL Payoff Rejected, Broken Entry (2), FDIC, as Receiver of WAMU v. TRAVERSARI

OHIO JUDGMENT REVERSED FULL Payoff Rejected, Broken Entry (2), FDIC, as Receiver of WAMU v. TRAVERSARI


Don’t you just love it when links and posts go missing for absolutely NO reason whatsoever!

REPOST-

Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., as Receiver of WAMU v. TRAVERSARI, 2010 Ohio 2406 – Ohio: Court of Appeals, 11th Dist., Geauga 2010
dinsfla | June 5, 2010 at 9:49 am |

2010-Ohio-2406

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as Receiver of Washington Mutual Bank, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Robert Traversari, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
No. 2008-G-2859.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eleventh District, Geauga County.

May 28, 2010.

Karen L. Giffen and Kathleen A. Nitschke, Giffen & Kaminski, L.L.C., 1300 East Ninth Street, #1600, Cleveland, OH 44114 and Donald Swartz, Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss, P.O. Box 580, Cincinnati, OH 45210-5480 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).

Edward T. Brice, Newman & Brice, L.P.A., 214 East Park Street, Chardon, OH 44024 (For Defendants-Appellants).

OPINION
COLLEEN MARY O’TOOLE, J.

{¶1} Appellants, Robert Traversari (“Traversari”) and B & B Partners (“B & B”), appeal from the August 5, 2008 judgment entry of the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas, granting summary judgment in favor of appellee, Washington Mutual Bank, and entitling appellee to a judgment and decree in foreclosure.

{¶2} In 1994, appellant Traversari borrowed $190,000 from Loan America Financial Corporation which was memorialized by a promissory note and further secured by a mortgage on property located at 9050 Lake-in-the-Woods Trail, Bainbridge Township, Geauga County, Ohio. Appellant Traversari obtained the loan individually and/or in his capacity as the sole member and principal of appellant B & B, a real estate based company. The mortgage at issue was subsequently assigned to appellee.

{¶3} On January 8, 2007, appellee filed a complaint in foreclosure against appellants and defendants, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., Charter One Bank, N.A., Jesse Doe, and Geauga County Treasurer. In count one of its complaint, appellee alleges that it is the holder and owner of a note in which appellant Traversari owes $149,919.96 plus interest at the rate of 7.75 percent per year from September 1, 2006, plus costs. In count two of its complaint, appellee alleges that it is the holder of a mortgage, given to secure payment of the note, which constitutes a valid first lien upon the real estate at issue. Appellee maintains that because the conditions of defeasance have been broken, it is entitled to have the mortgage foreclosed. Appellee indicated that appellant B & B may have claimed an interest in the property by virtue of being a current titleholder.

{¶4} Appellants filed an answer and counterclaim on February 16, 2007. In their defense, appellants maintain that appellee failed to comply with Civ.R. 10(D) and is estopped from asserting a foreclosure by its waiver of accepting payment. According to their counterclaim, appellants allege the following: on or about September 25, 2006, appellant Traversari sent a check in the amount of $150,889.96 to appellee for payment in full on the loan, which included the principal of $149.919.96 plus $970 of interest; on or about November 17, 2006, appellee issued a new home loan statement to appellant Traversari indicating the amount due was $5,608.95; appellant Traversari contacted appellee stating that a check had been sent for payment in full; appellee failed to respond; appellant Traversari mailed a check to appellee in the amount of $155,000; no stop payment was issued on the first check; because the house was vacant, appellant Traversari went to check the residence on December 26, 2006, and discovered that it had been broken into; an orange placard was placed on the premises indicating that a representative from appellee would secure the home; appellant Traversari immediately purchased new lock sets, secured the premises, and called and left a message for appellee to inform them to not enter the home; on December 31, 2006, electronic transmission was sent to appellee concerning the break-in and requested appellee to stop breaking into the home as well as to locate the two checks and to send a copy of a letter to a credit bureau; appellee did not respond; appellant Traversari then mailed a check from a separate account in the amount of the last payment demanded by appellee; appellee sent the $155,000 check back with a form letter to the address of the vacant property stating that personal checks were not accepted for payoff; appellee also rejected the $5,674.41 check; appellant Traversari then contacted appellee regarding the rejected checks; on January 11, 2007, appellant Traversari went to the home again, finding the kitchen door open, furnace running, new lock set taken out, garage door openers unplugged, and worse dings in the steel door; and appellant Traversari emailed appellee again, however, appellee indicated it could not give appellants any information because the case had been moved to foreclosure.

{¶5} Appellee filed a reply to appellants’ counterclaim on March 19, 2007, and an amended reply on September 6, 2007.

{¶6} According to the deposition of Maritza Torres (“Torres”), an employee of appellee in its senior asset recovery, loss prevention department, she was assigned to appellants’ case. Torres testified that appellee has no record of having received a check in the amount of $150,889.96 from appellant Traversari on September 25, 2006. However, she indicated that appellee received a check from appellant Traversari on September 30, 2006, in the amount of $102,538.74 (“Check #1?), which was returned to him due to appellee’s policy not to accept checks for early payoffs that are not certified funds.

{¶7} According to the deposition of Linda Rae Traversari (“Linda”), appellant Traversari’s wife, she is the handler of the family assets. Following the return of Check #1, appellee forwarded a delinquency letter to appellant Traversari in early November of 2006. Later that month, appellee sent a second default letter to him. Linda testified that on or around November 30, 2006, appellant Traversari sent another personal check for early payoff to appellee in the amount of $155,000 (“Check #2?). Appellee returned Check #2 with a letter explaining that noncertified funds are not accepted for early payoff. Linda stated that on January 2, 2007, appellant Traversari sent a third personal check via certified mail to appellee in the amount of $5,674.41 (“Check #3?). By the time appellee received Check #3, the loan had been referred to foreclosure. Check #3 was returned to appellant Traversari as “insufficient.”

{¶8} On March 14, 2008, appellee filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 56(b). Appellants filed a response on April 21, 2008.

{¶9} In its July 3, 2008 order, the trial court found, inter alia, that appellee was within its legal rights to reject the personal checks; appellee had the right to institute and maintain the foreclosure because appellants did not cure their default; and appellee had the right to enter the premises. Thus, the trial court indicated that appellee’s motion for summary judgment would be granted in its favor as to all issues and claims against appellants upon appellee’s presentation of an appropriate entry to be provided to the court.

{¶10} Appellee filed a “Motion For Submission Of Its Entry Granting Motion For Summary Judgment And Decree In Foreclosure” on July 11, 2008, and an amended entry on July 21, 2008. Appellants filed objections to appellee’s proposed amended entry the following day.

{¶11} Pursuant to its August 5, 2008 “Amended Entry Granting Summary Judgment And Decree In Foreclosure,” the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of appellee, entitling appellee to a judgment and decree in foreclosure. The trial court ordered, inter alia, that unless the sums found due to appellee are fully paid within 3 days from the date of the decree, the equity of redemption shall be foreclosed, the property sold, and an order of sale issued to the Sheriff directing him to appraise, advertise, and sell the property. The trial court further ordered that the proceeds of the sale follow the following order of priority: (1) to the Clerk of Courts, the costs of the action, including the fees of appraisers; (2) to the County Treasurer, the taxes and assessments, due and payable as of the date of transfer of the property after Sheriff’s Sale; (3) to appellee, the sum of $149,919.96, with interest at the rate of 7.75 percent per annum from September 1, 2006 to February 29, 2008, and 7.25 percent per annum from March 1, 2008 to present, together with advances for taxes, insurance, and costs; and (4) the balance of the sale proceeds, if any, shall be paid by the Sheriff to the Clerk of Court to await further orders. It is from that judgment that appellants filed the instant appeal, raising the following assignment of error for our review:

{¶12} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF DEFENDANTSA-PPELLANTS IN ITS ORDER GRANTING IN PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE’S FAVOR AS TO ALL ISSUES AND CLAIMS AND AGAINST DEFENDANTS, AND ITS AMENDED ENTRY GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DECREE IN FORECLOSURE TO PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE AGAINST DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.”

{¶13} In their sole assignment of error, appellants argue that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of appellee, and entitling appellee to a judgment and decree in foreclosure.

{¶14} “This court reviews de novo a trial court’s order granting summary judgment.” Hudspath v. Cafaro Co., 11th Dist. No. 2004-A-0073, 2005-Ohio-6911, at ¶8, citing Hapgood v. Conrad, 11th Dist. No. 2000-T-0058, 2002-Ohio-3363, at ¶13. “`A reviewing court will apply the same standard a trial court is required to apply, which is to determine whether any genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id.

{¶15} “Since summary judgment denies the party his or her `day in court’ it is not to be viewed lightly as docket control or as a `little trial.’ The jurisprudence of summary judgment standards has placed burdens on both the moving and the nonmoving party. In Dresher v. Burt [(1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 296,] the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the moving party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion and identifying those portions of the record before the trial court that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of fact on a material element of the nonmoving party’s claim. The evidence must be in the record or the motion cannot succeed. The moving party cannot discharge its initial burden under Civ.R. 56 simply by making a conclusory assertion that the nonmoving party has no evidence to prove its case but must be able to specifically point to some evidence of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C) that affirmatively demonstrates that the nonmoving party has no evidence to support the nonmoving party’s claims. If the moving party fails to satisfy its initial burden, the motion for summary judgment must be denied. If the moving party has satisfied its initial burden, the nonmoving party has a reciprocal burden outlined in the last sentence of Civ.R. 56(E) to set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. If the nonmoving party fails to do so, summary judgment, if appropriate shall be entered against the nonmoving party based on the principles that have been firmly established in Ohio for quite some time in Mitseff v. Wheeler (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 112 ***.” Welch v. Ziccarelli, 11th Dist. No. 2006-L-229, 2007-Ohio-4374, at ¶40.

{¶16} “The court in Dresher went on to say that paragraph three of the syllabus in Wing v. Anchor Media, Ltd. of Texas (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 108 ***, is too broad and fails to account for the burden Civ.R. 56 places upon a moving party. The court, therefore, limited paragraph three of the syllabus in Wing to bring it into conformity with Mitseff. (Emphasis added.)” Id. at ¶41.

{¶17} “The Supreme Court in Dresher went on to hold that when neither the moving nor nonmoving party provides evidentiary materials demonstrating that there are no material facts in dispute, the moving party is not entitled a judgment as a matter of law as the moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion, `and identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of fact on a material element of the nonmoving party’s claim.’ Id. at 276. (Emphasis added.)” Id. at ¶42.

{¶18} In the case at bar, the record establishes that appellant Traversari sent personal checks to appellee for payment on the loan at issue. However, appellee returned the checks with letters indicating they would not be accepted as payment because they were not certified, and foreclosure proceedings commenced.

{¶19} There is no genuine issue of material fact that appellants executed and delivered a note and mortgage to appellee. However, a genuine issue of material fact does exist with regard to the fact that appellant Traversari tendered the entire principal payment and appellee rejected it because the payment was made by personal check. See Chase Home Fin., LLC v. Smith, 11th Dist. No. 2007-P-0097, 2008-Ohio-5451, at ¶19. The dates and amounts of the personal checks are conflicting due to the testimony and/or evidence submitted by the parties.

{¶20} “A cause of action exists on behalf of a damaged mortgagor when, in conformity with the terms of his note, he offers to the mortgagee full payment of the balance of the principal and interest, and the mortgagee refuses to present the note and mortgage for payment and cancellation.” Cotofan v. Steiner (1959), 170 Ohio St. 163, paragraph one of the syllabus.

{¶21} Appellant Traversari did not place any conditions on the personal checks tendered to appellee. We note that “[t]he essential characteristics of a tender are an unconditional offer to perform, coupled with ability to carry out the offer and production of the subject matter of the tender.” Walton Commercial Enterprises, Inc. v. Assns. Conventions, Tradeshows, Inc. (June 11, 1992), 10th Dist. No. 91AP-1458, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 3081, at 5. (Emphasis sic.)

{¶22} “It is an implied condition of every contract that one party will not prevent or impede performance by the other. If he does prevent or impede performance, whether by his prior breach or other conduct, he may not then insist on performance by the affected party, and he cannot maintain an action for nonperformance if the promises are interdependent.” Fed. Natl. Mtge. Assns. v. Banks (Feb. 20, 1990), 2d Dist. No. 11667, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 638, at 8-9, citing 17 American Jurisprudence 2d, Contracts, Sections 425, 426.

{¶23} In the instant matter, paragraph 3 of the Open-End Mortgage provides:

{¶24} “3. Application of Payments. Unless applicable law provides otherwise, all payments received by Lender under paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be applied: first, to any prepayment charges due under the Note; second, to amounts payable under paragraph 2; third; to interest due; fourth, to principal due; and last, to any late charges due under the Note.”

{¶25} Here, there was no new note and mortgage, nor agreement for application of payments, when the mortgage at issue was subsequently assigned from Loan America Financial Corporation to appellee. Rather, it was the policy of appellee to require mortgagors to pay by certified check for any amounts over $5,000. According to appellee’s employee, Torres, she indicated that any amount over $5,000 not paid by certified funds puts the company at risk because it can take anywhere between 7 to 10 days for a personal check to clear. We note, however, that the mortgagee has up to 90 days to verify the sufficiency of the underlying funds before satisfying and releasing its recorded mortgage. R.C. 5301.36(B). In the instant case, it would have been reasonable for appellee to have either waited 7 to 10 days for appellant Traversari’s checks to clear or to have inquired with his bank, see, generally, Hunter Sav. Assn. v. Kasper (Sept. 25, 1979), 10th Dist. No. 78AP-774, 1979 Ohio App. LEXIS 11777, at 13, if there were sufficient funds before returning any of his 3 personal checks and commencing foreclosure proceedings.

{¶26} The lender in this case unilaterally refused the debtor’s payment by check due to itsinternal policy that an amount over $5,000 had to be made by certified check. The terms and conditions of the mortgage, however, do not impose such a requirement. Under paragraph 3 of the Open-End Mortgage, it appears the lender had an obligation to apply the payment tendered, by personal check or otherwise. Its refusal to present the check for clearance and apply the payment on the ground of internal policy appears to have violated the debtor’s rights.

{¶27} Construing the evidence submitted most strongly in favor of appellants, we must conclude that genuine issues of material fact remain. Again, a genuine issue of material fact exists with regard to the fact that appellant Traversari tendered the entire principal payment and appellee rejected it because the payment was made by personal check. Also, the dates and amounts of the personal checks are conflicting due to the testimony and/or evidence submitted by the parties. Thus, the trial court erred by granting appellee’s motion for summary judgment.

{¶28} For the foregoing reasons, appellants’ sole assignment of error is well-taken. The judgment of the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is ordered that appellee is assessed costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

Trapp, P.J., Rice, J., concur.

Defendants are not named parties to the instant appeal.

The matter was stayed. On November 26, 2008, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was substituted for appellee Washington Mutual Bank. This court instructed the Clerk of Courts to correct the docket by removing “Washington Mutual Bank” and substituting “Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as Receiver of Washington Mutual Bank” as appellee in this appeal. The stay order automatically dissolved on August 29, 2009.

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FDIC to sue 3 former WAMU executives for $1 Billion

FDIC to sue 3 former WAMU executives for $1 Billion


FDIC to seek $1B from former WaMu execs

Puget Sound Business Journal – by Kirsten Grind
Date: Friday, February 18, 2011, 2:41pm PST – Last Modified: Friday, February 18, 2011, 5:15pm PST

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. plans to file a civil suit against at least three former Washington Mutual executives, including former chief executive Kerry Killinger, seeking to collect more than $1 billion in damages, according to people familiar with the pending suit.

Killinger, former president and chief operating officer Steve Rotella and David Schneider, former president of the failed bank’s home loan division, all recently received legal notices informing them of the pending litigation, these people say.

The three executives were the highest-level officials in charge of WaMu’s mortgage operations. It’s unclear when or where the FDIC will file its suit.

Continue reading…Puget Sound Business Journal

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[NYSC] “Bona Fide Purchaser After Foreclosure, Inequitably Effected” WAMU v. EDWARD MURPHY

[NYSC] “Bona Fide Purchaser After Foreclosure, Inequitably Effected” WAMU v. EDWARD MURPHY


Excerpts:

Upon resolution of the jurisdictional issue raised by Murphy, he also seeks to add Luciano as a party defendant  because of his alleged “bona fide purchase” of the Millstone Road premises from the plaintiff after foreclosure. The application is granted and Luciano is added as a party defendant to this action because he is a necessary party in order for the Court to grant the proper and necessary relief in this lawsuit. CPLR §1001 provides that persons “who might be inequitably affected by a judgment” shall be made a party. Clearly, Luciano as the present owner of the Millstone Road premises may be “inequitably affected” by the jurisdiction question to be decided. Further, the events surrounding the dates of contract and sale of this property and the sale price are all issues requiring Court scrutiny as to Luciano’s claim to be a “bona fide purchaser” of the property for value.

Here, the closing on the sale of the Millstone Road premises occurred just 3 days prior to Murphy’s order to show cause seeking injunctive relief asserting the lack of knowledge of and Court jurisdiction over this foreclosure action. Obviously, any conversations, discussions, settlement negotiations or other communications between the plaintiff, Murphy and possibly Luciano concerning Murphy’s prospective actions as to this foreclosure action in which Luciano claims no knowledge as well as possible “bad faith” on the part of plaintiff are all issues which the Court needs to explore to assure the foreclosure process was fair and equitable.

Real Property Law §266 provides an innocent “bona fide purchaser” for value is protected in his/her title to property unless he/she had previous notice of the alleged fraud by the seller. See, Karan v. Hoskins. 22 AD3d 638, 803 NYS2d 666 (2nd Dept. 2005); Barnes v. West, 29 Misc3d 1230(A), WL 4941987 (2010). In the event, the Court finds that jurisdiction was not acquired over Murphy, Murphy’s remedy is to be put back into possession of the Millstone Road premises unless it has been purchased by a “bona fide” innocent and good faith purchaser, in which case Murphy’s remedy is limited to damages against the plaintiff.

<SNIP>

Finally, Murphy cannot be charged with equitable estoppel as his actions through his attorney have all been to avoid the very sale which the plaintiff conducted to Luciano. The Court in Bank of America, NA v 414 Midland Ave. Associates, LLC, AD3d ,911 NYS2d 157 (2nd Dept 2010) noted:

“Where an owner knows of a defect in title and fails to address it,
laches does not apply unless the facts are sufficient to constitute equitable
estoppel (see, Krakerv. Roll, 100 AD2d 424,433,474 NYS2d 527;
Washington Temple Church of God in Christ, Inc. v. Global Props &
Assoc., Inc., 15 Misc3d 1142[A], 2007 N.Y. Slip Op 51114[U], 2007 WL
1558884, aff’d. 55 AD2d 727, 865 NYS2d 641). Equitable estoppel arises when
a property owner stands by without objection while an opposing party asserts an
ownership interest in the property and incurs expense in reliance on that belief
(see, Andrews v. Cohen, 221 NY 148, 153, 116 NE 862). The property owner
must ‘inexcusably’ delay in asserting a claim to property knowing that ‘the
opposing party has changed his position to irreversible detriment’ ( Orange &
Rockland Utils v. Philwold Estates, 70 AD2d 338, 343,421 NYS2d 640,
mod. on other grounds 52 NY2d 253, 437 NYS2d 291, 418 NE2d 1310.”

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BOO-YAA!! NJ Appeals Court Reversal “LPS, LAURA HESCOTT, Assignment Fail, Affidavit Fail” DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY v. WILSON

BOO-YAA!! NJ Appeals Court Reversal “LPS, LAURA HESCOTT, Assignment Fail, Affidavit Fail” DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY v. WILSON


Excerpt from footnote:

[1] The assignment was executed by an individual identified as Laura Hescott who signed the assignment as an assistant vice-president of Washington Mutual Bank. Ms. Hescott has been identified as an employee of Lender Processing Services, Inc. (“LPS”), a servicer of default mortgages. The bona fides of the practices of this service provider have been the subject of increased judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., In re Taylor, 407 B.R. 618, 623 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2009).

The Supreme Court has recognized that “[s]erious questions have surfaced about the accuracy of documents submitted to courts by lenders and service-providers in support of foreclosure requests.” Administrative order 01-2010, 202 N.J.L.J. 1110 (December 27, 2010). The practice of signing and filing documents without any personal knowledge of the information, also known as “robo-signing,” implicates the “overriding concern about the integrity of the judicial process.” Id. at 1111. The order provides that “lenders and service providers who have filed more than 200 residential foreclosure actions in 2010 are required, within 45 days, to demonstrate the reliability and accuracy of documents and other submissions to the court in foreclosure proceedings.” Ibid. On remand, to the extent the order is applicable to plaintiff, plaintiff shall comply with its terms.

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, as Trustee for WaMu Series 2007-HEI Trust, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

TRACEY T. WILSON , his/her heirs, devisees and personal representatives, and his, her, their or any of their successors in right, title and interest and WILLIS J. WILSON, his/her heirs, devisees and personal representatives, and his, her, their or any of their successors in right, title and interest, Defendants-Appellants.

Docket No. A-1384-09T1.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Submitted November 3, 2010.

Decided January 19, 2011.

Tracey T. Wilson, appellant pro se.

Respondent has not filed a brief.

Before Judges Carchman and Messano.

Not for Publication without the Approval of the Appellate Division.

PER CURIAM.

Defendants Tracey T. Wilson and Willis J. Wilson appeal from a final judgment of foreclosure in favor of plaintiff Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for WaMu Series 2007-HE1 Trust. While plaintiff submitted a supplemental affidavit to the trial judge allegedly confirming the assignment of the original mortgage to the named plaintiff, it failed to comply with N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6), and the affidavit should not have been considered.

These are the relevant facts. Plaintiff filed a foreclosure action against defendants. Defendants filed a response, which was accepted as an answer and challenged, among other things, the bona fides of a later assignment of the mortgage. In response, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, but the judge denied relief pending further information regarding the assignment. Thereafter, plaintiff filed a supplemental affidavit, executed by Janine Timmons, a manager of Washington Mutual Bank, attesting to the accuracy of facts “based on our computerized business records maintained in the ordinary course.” She claimed that the note and mortgage had been executed by defendants on December 14, 2006, and the note and mortgage had been sold to plaintiff on January 16, 2007; moreover, an assignment of mortgage was executed on October 31, 2007, two weeks after the filing of the foreclosure complaint on October 18, 2007.[1]

After receiving the supplemental affidavit, the motion judge struck defendants’ answer and permitted the foreclosure matter to proceed by default. Thereafter, a judgment was entered, and this appeal followed.[2]

On appeal, defendants assert that plaintiff’s affidavit regarding the assignment was hearsay and violates the Best Evidence Rule. In addition, defendants claim that they were denied discovery and finally, plaintiff was not a holder in due course.

Although defendants cite N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6), and claim that these were not valid business records, we have more fundamental concern about the substance of the Timmons affidavit. The affidavit makes reference to unidentified computerized business records supporting the verification of the facts attested to, but nothing more is set forth regarding the records other than that conclusory statement.

Recently, the Supreme Court reiterated the relevant factors that must be established by a proponent of documents pursuant to N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6). In New Jersey Div. of Youth and Fam. Servs. v. M.C. III, 201 N.J. 328 (2010), Justice Wallace, speaking for the Court, observed:

Under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, a party seeking to admit a hearsay statement pursuant to this rule must demonstrate that “the writing [was] made in the regular course of business,” the writing was “prepared within a short time of the act, condition or event being described,” and “the source of the information and the method and circumstances of the preparation of the writing must justify allowing it into evidence.” State v. Matulewicz, 101 N.J. 27, 29 (1985) (citation omitted).

[(Id. at 347).]

The affidavit submitted by Timmons falls far short of meeting this threshold showing. Nothing in her affidavit indicates any of the elements identified in either the rule or M.C.

Additional considerations are cause for concern. N.J.R.E. 1002 mandates that, “To prove the content of a writing or photograph, the original writing or photograph is required except as otherwise provided in these rules or by statute.”[3] Here, reference is made to computerized records, yet the record before the trial court or on appeal is devoid of any copies of such records to support the attestations of Timmons. See N.J.R.E. 1001(c) and Fed. Ev. Rule 1001(c) (requiring “original” computer data in the form of printouts or other readable output). Most important, no discovery was permitted to defendants. In such instance, plaintiff should not be allowed to “cut corners” to avoid meeting its burden.

We are satisfied that plaintiff failed to meet its burden to establish the bona fides of the alleged assignment to permit plaintiff to proceed on its foreclosure complaint. We take particular note of the fact that plaintiff has not responded to the appeal so that we are unable to have the benefit of its position on the issues raised by defendants.

We conclude that the appropriate course of action is a remand to the Chancery Division to resolve the issue of the bona fides of the assignment. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

Reversed and remanded.

[1] The assignment was executed by an individual identified as Laura Hescott who signed the assignment as an assistant vice-president of Washington Mutual Bank. Ms. Hescott has been identified as an employee of Lender Processing Services, Inc. (“LPS”), a servicer of default mortgages. The bona fides of the practices of this service provider have been the subject of increased judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., In re Taylor, 407 B.R. 618, 623 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2009).

The Supreme Court has recognized that “[s]erious questions have surfaced about the accuracy of documents submitted to courts by lenders and service-providers in support of foreclosure requests.” Administrative order 01-2010, 202 N.J.L.J. 1110 (December 27, 2010). The practice of signing and filing documents without any personal knowledge of the information, also known as “robo-signing,” implicates the “overriding concern about the integrity of the judicial process.” Id. at 1111. The order provides that “lenders and service providers who have filed more than 200 residential foreclosure actions in 2010 are required, within 45 days, to demonstrate the reliability and accuracy of documents and other submissions to the court in foreclosure proceedings.” Ibid. On remand, to the extent the order is applicable to plaintiff, plaintiff shall comply with its terms.

[2] Subsequent to the filing of the appeal, a notice of sheriff’s sale was published. The notice is not part of the record on appeal, and we have no further information regarding the status of the property.

[3] In their brief, defendants refer to the Federal Rules of Evidence. Those rules are not applicable here.

Continue below…

[ipaper docId=47842733 access_key=key-1cexmkzyylre4e0r3lvv height=600 width=600 /]

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Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (2)

REUTERS | NJ mortgage ruling departs from other U.S. courts

REUTERS | NJ mortgage ruling departs from other U.S. courts


Tue Jan 25, 2011 7:58pm EST

* Lender need not show physical possession of note

* Homeowner challenge Bank of America’s foreclosure right

By Grant McCool

NEW YORK, Jan 25 (Reuters) – A lender need not show physical possession of a note on underlying debt in order to seek foreclosure of a mortgage that has been securitized, a New Jersey court ordered, departing from previous court rulings in the United States.

In the case decided on Jan. 7, Bank of America Corp (BAC.N) sought to foreclose on the home of Janett Alvarado of Bogota, New Jersey, but the note and mortgage for $292,000 had been lost by Washington Mutual Bank [WMPDC.UL] before the loan obligation was transferred to Bank of America.

Courts in the United States have been unwilling to allow banks to enforce their interests without showing that they possessed the physical note.

A Superior Court judge in New Jersey, Mary Thurber, ruled that Bank of America was entitled to enforce Alvarado’s note obligation and was entitled to summary judgment.

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[NYSC] JUDGE SCHACK Tears up WaMU’s Counsel For “Defective Verification, Phony NY House Counsel” WAMU v. PHILLIP

[NYSC] JUDGE SCHACK Tears up WaMU’s Counsel For “Defective Verification, Phony NY House Counsel” WAMU v. PHILLIP


Washington Mut. Bank v Phillip
2010 NY Slip Op 52034(U)
Decided on November 29, 2010
Supreme Court, Kings County
Schack, J.

Excerpts:

Further, the verification of the complaint was not executed by an officer of WAMU, but by Benita Taylor, a “Research Support Analyst of Washington Mutual Bank, the plaintiff in the within action” a resident of Jacksonville, Florida, on June 4, 2008. This is the same day that Ms. Maio claims to have communicated with “Mark Phelps, Esq., House Counsel.” I checked the Office of Court Administration’s Attorney Registry and found that Mark Phelps is not now nor has been an attorney registered in the State of New York. Moreover, the Court does not know what “House” employs Mr. Phelps. [*5]

Both Mr. Phelps and Ms. Maio should have discovered the defects in Ms. Taylor’s verification of the subject complaint. The jurat states that the verification was executed in the State of New York and the County of Suffolk [the home county of plaintiff’s counsel], but the notary public who took the signature is Deborah Yamaguichi, a Florida notary public, not a New York notary public. Thus, the verification lacks merit and is a nullity. Further, Ms. Yamaguchi’s notarization states that Ms. Taylor’s verification was “Sworn to and subscribed before me this 4th day of June 2008.” Even if the jurat properly stated that it was executed in the State of Florida and the County of Duval, where Jacksonville is located, the oath failed to have a certificate required by CPLR

<SNIP>

Ms. Maio should have consulted with a representative or representatives of plaintiff WAMU or is successors subsequent to receiving my November 9, 2010 order, not referring back to an alleged June 4, 2008 communication with “House Counsel.” Affirmations by plaintiff’s counsel in foreclosure actions, pursuant to Chief Administrative Judge Ann t. Pfau’s October 20, 2010 Administrative Order, mandates in foreclosure actions prospective communication by plaintiff’s counsel with plaintiff’s representative or representatives to prevent the widespread insufficiencies now found in foreclosure filings, such as: failure to review files to establish standing; filing of notarized affidavits that falsely attest to such review, and, “robosigning: of documents.

Continue below…

[ipaper docId=44531807 access_key=key-uu5pabt3w9drrxdehbs height=600 width=600 /]

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Colorado Couples Face Foreclosure Obstacles, One Has NO Mortgage, Another Has 3 Lenders Claiming Same Note

Colorado Couples Face Foreclosure Obstacles, One Has NO Mortgage, Another Has 3 Lenders Claiming Same Note


Foreclosure paperwork miscues piling up

.


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[NYBKC] WELLS FARGO ASSIGNMENT, STEVEN J. BAUM P.C. COUNSEL UNABLE TO ANSWER QUESTIONS IN SUPPORT

[NYBKC] WELLS FARGO ASSIGNMENT, STEVEN J. BAUM P.C. COUNSEL UNABLE TO ANSWER QUESTIONS IN SUPPORT


In re: TANDALA MIMS AKA TANDALA WILLIAMS, Chapter 7, Debtor.

Case No. 10-14030 (MG).

United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. New York.

October 27, 2010.

STEVEN J. BAUM, P.C., Amherst, NY, By: Phillip Mahony, Esq., Attorneys for Secured Creditor Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

LAMONICA HERBST & MANISCALCO, LLP Wantagh, NY, By: Salvatore Lamonica, Esq., Chapter 7 Trustee.

LAW OFFICE OF DAVID BRODMAN, Bronx, NY, By: David Brodman, Esq., Attorney for Debtor Tandala Mims.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.’S MOTION FOR TERMINATION OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY

MARTIN GLENN, Bankruptcy Judge

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”) moves the Court for an order lifting the automatic stay with regard to 1167 Grenada Place, Bronx, NY 10466 (the “Property”) pursuant to section 362(d) of the Bankruptcy Code (the “Motion”). Wells Fargo desires to exercise its rights under a mortgage (the “First Mortgage” or “Mortgage”) and promissory note (the “Note”), including, but not limited to, the foreclosure of the Property. (ECF Doc. # 9.) The Court held a hearing on the Motion on October 20, 2010 and took the matter under submission. The Court denies Wells Fargo’s motion to lift the automatic stay for the reasons enumerated below.

BACKGROUND

Tandala Mims, a/k/a Tandala Williams (the “Debtor”), filed a voluntary petition under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on July 27, 2010. (ECF Doc. # 1.) Wells Fargo contends that it is a secured creditor of the Debtor by an assignment of mortgage dated September 13, 2010, in the principal amount of $374,037.00 (the “Assignment”). The property is subject to two mortgages. The First Mortgage to Wells Fargo, dated May 10, 2004, indicates that the lender was Lend America, and was recorded in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (“MERS”), as nominee for Lend America.[1] Wells Fargo claims that the Debtor owes $355,398.13 on the First Mortgage. The Debtor also has a second mortgage with M&T Bank (the “Second Mortgage”), which when combined with the First Mortgage and lien, totals $389,647.13. In support of its standing to bring the Motion, Wells Fargo attaches (1) loan documents, including the First Mortgage and accompanying Note; (2) a copy of the Debtor’s Schedules A and D (the “Schedules”),[2] in which the Debtor lists Wells Fargo as a secured creditor with respect to the Property and (3) a lift-stay worksheet, dated September 16, 2010, pursuant to Local Rule 4001-1(c) (the “Worksheet”).

The Note attached to the Motion was originally made payable to Lend America. The last page of the Note, however, contains a stamped endorsement, “Paid to the Order of Washington Mutual Bank, FA, Without Recourse Lend America.” (ECF Doc. # 9, at Ex. 1.) No evidence is offered that Washington Mutual Bank ever assigned or transferred the Note to Wells Fargo or to any other party. Washington Mutual Bank was taken over by the FDIC on September 25, 2008, and its assets were sold to J.P. Morgan Chase (“Chase”) on that same date. Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., JP Morgan Chase Acquires Banking Operations of Washington Mutual (Sept. 25, 2008) (on file with FDIC). There is nothing in the record to indicate whether Chase acquired the Note and whether Chase, in turn, subsequently transferred the Note to Wells Fargo.

The Worksheet reflects that the Debtor’s total pre-petition and post-petition indebtedness to Wells Fargo on the Property, as of the petition date, was $355,398.13; that the Debtor’s last payment was received on June 4, 2010 (but was placed in a suspense account); and that the Debtor has missed six payments, from April 1, 2010 to September 1, 2010. In support of its claim that the Debtor lacks any substantial equity in the property, Wells Fargo attaches the Debtor’s Schedule A and Schedule D, which list the current value of the Property as $430,000. Assuming the accuracy of this figure, the Debtor would have exempt equity in the property.[3] The Debtor’s Schedules claim the property as exempt and states the Debtor’s intention to retain the property.

The signature on the Worksheet indicates that it was prepared by Craig C. Zecher, a Wells Fargo legal process specialist. Despite the fact that Wells Fargo did not obtain an assignment of the Mortgage until September 13, 2010, seven days before the lift-stay motion was filed on September 20, 2010, the Worksheet provides information about payment defaults dating back to April 1, 2010. Wells Fargo’s ability to certify the accuracy of the information provided in the Worksheet is questionable given its only recently acquired interest in the First Mortgage.[4]

Neither the Debtor’s counsel nor the chapter 7 trustee filed anything in response to the lift-stay motion.

DISCUSSION

The Court concludes that Wells Fargo lacks standing to request relief from the automatic stay.

A. Wells Fargo is Not a “Party in Interest” And Therefore Lacks Standing to Request Relief From the Automatic Stay

Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code imposes an automatic stay on all litigation against the Debtor, as well as “any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). Section 362(d) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that “[o]n request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall grant relief from the stay . . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (emphasis added). The term “party in interest” is nowhere defined in the Bankruptcy Code. However, the Supreme Court has suggested that when an undefined term is used in bankruptcy law, “[i]n determining the term’s scope—and its limitations—the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act `must ultimately govern.'” Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 645 (1974) (citing Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1966)).

Though courts have interpreted the “purposes of the Bankruptcy Act” differently, the Second Circuit explained in In re Comcoach, 698 F.2d 571, 573 (2d Cir. 1983), “[b]ankruptcy courts were established to provide a forum where creditors and debtors could settle their disputes . . . .” The Comcoach court went on to find that in order to invoke the court’s jurisdiction to obtain relief from the automatic stay, the moving party had to be either a creditor or a debtor.[5]Id. In support of this assertion, the court cited to the Bankruptcy Code’s legislative history “which suggests that, notwithstanding the use of the term `party in interest’, [sic] it is only creditors who may obtain relief from the automatic stay.” Id. (citing H.R.REP. NO. 95-595, (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.C. 5787, 6136 (“Creditors may obtain relief from the stay if their interests would be harmed by continuance of the stay.”)). It follows from the Second Circuit’s analysis that unless Wells Fargo qualifies as a “creditor,” it does not have standing to request relief from the automatic stay.

Section 101(10) of the Bankruptcy Code defines a “creditor” as an:

(A) entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor;

(B) entity that has a claim against the estate of a kind specified in section 348(d), 502(f), 502(g), 502(h) or 502(i) of this title; or

(C) entity that has a community claim.

11 U.S.C. § 101(10). This definition requires consideration of what constitutes a “claim,” which conveniently is also a defined term in section § 101(5) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(5)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code defines a “claim” as the “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured.” Even under this broad definition, Wells Fargo has not demonstrated its “right to payment” because, as discussed more fully below, it lacks the ability to seek the state law remedy of foreclosure. Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 84 (1991) (finding that a mortgage foreclosure was a “right to payment” against the debtor).

B. Wells Fargo Lacks Standing to Exercise any State Law Remedies

Within the context of a bankruptcy proceeding, state law governs the determination of property rights. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979) (noting that absent an actual conflict with federal bankruptcy law, Congress “has generally left the determination of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt’s estate to state law”); In re Morton, 866 F.2d 561, 563 (2d Cir. 1989). Under New York law “foreclosure of a mortgage may not be brought by one who has no title to it and absent transfer of the debt, the assignment of the mortgage is a nullity.” Kluge v. Fugazy, 145 A.D.2d 537, 538 (2d Dept. 1988) (citing cases); see also HSBC Bank USA, Nat. Ass’n v. Miller, 26 Misc.3d 407, 411-12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Sullivan County 2009). As the courts in Kluge and HSBC have recognized, this rule of law dates back over one hundred and forty years, when the New York Court of Appeals held:

[a]s a mortgage is but an incident to the debt which it is intended to secure the logical conclusion is that a transfer of the mortgage without the debt is a nullity, and no interest is acquired from the debt, and exist independently of it. This is the necessary legal conclusion, and recognized as the rule by a long course of judicial decisions. Merritt v. Bartholick, 36 N.Y. 44, 45 (1867). Because Wells Fargo has not offered evidence that it owns the original Note, Wells Fargo lacks standing to foreclose on the Mortgage and has therefore failed to demonstrate it is the holder of a “claim.”

According to N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 244, assignments in New York state may be effectuated by the delivery of the relevant note and mortgage. An assignment need not be evidenced by a written assignment. In re Conde-Dedonato, 391 B.R. 247, 251 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing Flyer v. Sullivan, 284 A.D. 697, 699 (1st Dept. 1954) (“Our courts have repeatedly held that a bond and mortgage may be transferred by delivery without a written instrument of assignment.”)). Delivery requires the physical transfer of the instrument from assignor to assignee. Bank of New York v. Mulligan, No. 29399-07, 2010 WL 3339452, at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Kings County Aug. 25, 2010).

Wells Fargo has not supplied the Court with any evidence that the Note was physically delivered or assigned pursuant to a written agreement. Here, the Note only indicates a transfer from Lend America to Washington Mutual Bank and not to Wells Fargo. Wells Fargo has not presented any evidence that it is in possession of the original Note, or that it received the Note via a valid written assignment. Arguably, Wells Fargo has proved that it is the title holder of the Mortgage, as of a date seven days before the filing of the Motion, but the Assignment of Mortgage does not include language assigning the Note along with the Mortgage. Had the assignor desired to assign the Note using the same instrument, it could have used different language to accomplish this end. MCKINNEY’S REAL PROPERTY LAW § 258 [Schedule O], contains a form “Assignment of Mortgage” which clearly assigns both the mortgage and the underlying debt. The form contains the following language:

Know that……, assignor, in consideration of …….. dollars, paid by…….., assignee, hereby assigns unto the assignee, a certain mortgage made by …….., given to secure payment of the sum of…….. dollars and interest, dated the …….. day of ………., recorded on the ……. day of ……., in the office of the…….. of the county of ………, in liber ……. of mortgages, at page …….., covering premises …….., together with the bond or obligation described in said mortgage, and the moneys due and to grow due thereon with the interest,

To have and to hold the same unto the assignee, and to the successors, legal representatives and assigns of the assignee forever. In witness whereof, the assignor has hereunto set his hand and seal this…… day of ……., nineteen hundred and ……. In presence of:

As one court recently cautioned, “[w]hile an assignor is not required to use statutory Form [sic] O, if it intends to assign the mortgage and the underlying debt, it is well advised to employ language that unambiguously does so.” Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. v. McRae, 894 N.Y.S.2d 720, 722 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Allegany County 2010). As Wells Fargo has failed to prove it owns the Note, it has failed to establish that it has standing to pursue its state law remedies with regard to the Mortgage and Property.

C. The Court Has Additional Reservations Regarding the Validity of the Mortgage Assignment

In support of its Motion, Wells Fargo annexed a copy of the Mortgage as Exhibit A to the Motion. While there is nothing that undermines the facial validity of the Mortgage, there are issues surrounding the Assignment from MERS, as nominee for Lend America, to Wells Fargo. The September 13, 2010 Assignment suggests that it may have been executed simply for purposes of enabling Wells Fargo to file a lift-stay motion. An assignment in anticipation of bringing a lift-stay motion does not in and of itself indicate bad faith. However, in the absence of a credible explanation, describing how, when and from whom Wells Fargo derived its rights, relief from the stay will not be granted. Second, MERS, as nominee for Lend America, and presumably its Assistant Vice President, John Kennerly, whose signature is on the assignment, have an address in Ocala, Florida. Kennerly’s signature on the Assignment was, however, notarized in South Carolina, the address shown on the Assignment for Wells Fargo. Did Kennerly personally appear before the notary as represented? If not, is the Assignment valid? When asked about these issues during the October 20, 2010 hearing, Wells Fargo’s counsel was unable to answer any questions about the supporting documents. All of these matters will need to be addressed if Wells Fargo renews its lift-stay motion. Under FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014(a), the Motion to lift the automatic stay created a contested matter. Under that Rule, “No response is required . . . unless the court directs otherwise.” Id. In the event a new lift-stay motion is filed, Debtor’s counsel and the chapter 7 trustee are directed to file a response.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, Wells Fargo’s motion to lift the automatic stay is DENIED without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

[1] The State of New York’s Banking Department website indicates that, “[o]n November 30, 2009, The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) withdrew the FHA approval of . . . [Lend America]. As a result, Lend America was prohibited from originating and underwriting new FHA-insured mortgages or participating in the FHA single family insurance program. Effective December 1, 2009, Lend America discontinued its mortgage origination operations. However, the company continues service [sic] mortgage loans.” IDEAL MORTGAGE BANKER D/B/A LEND AMERICA, http://www.banking.state.ny.us/lendamerica.htm (last visited October 21, 2010).

[2] The Schedules were attached to the Debtor’s petition. Schedule A lists Real Property and Schedule D lists Creditors Holding Secured Claims. (ECF Doc. # s 1, 9.)

[3] The Bankruptcy Code contains a set of federal exemptions and permits debtors to choose between either federal or state exemptions. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1). However, the Bankruptcy Code also permits individual states to “opt-out” of the federal exemption scheme. See e.g., In re Corio, 190 B.R. 498, 499 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995). Pursuant to N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 284, New York is one state that has opted-out from the federal exemption scheme. Consequently, the real property exemptions of CPLR § 5206 govern. Contained within CPLR § 5206(a) is New York’s homestead exemption, which provides that qualifying real property is exempt from “application to [satisfy] a money judgment” if the value of the real property does not “[exceed] fifty thousand dollars in value above liens and encumbrances, [and is] owned and occupied as a principal residence.” Qualifying real property under CPLR § 5206(a)(1) includes “a lot of land with a dwelling thereon.”

[4] The Worksheet states: “I certify that the information provided in this form and/or any exhibits attached to this form (other than the transactional documents attached as required by paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, immediately above) is derived from records, that were made at or near the time of the occurrence of the matters set forth by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge of those matters, were kept in the course of the regularly conducted activity; and were made by the regularly conducted activity as a regular practice.” The Worksheet was then signed by Craig C. Zecher, Legal Process Specialist. (ECF Doc. # 9.)

[5] The facts in Comcoach involved a bank, and therefore this language should not be read to exclude from the definition of a “party in interest” the United States Trustee or other corporate or corporeal entities specifically given standing in the Bankruptcy Code or applicable case law.

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WAMU ERIKA HERRERA “NOTARY” INVALID 2001-2005

WAMU ERIKA HERRERA “NOTARY” INVALID 2001-2005


I feel this is the beginning of this as well.

Hat Tip to a subscriber on this:

Erika Herrera CA Notary Public No. 1290845 Revocation Cert 9-29-10,

If Erika Herrera Notarized your foreclosure documents the foreclosure is illegal!!

Employed by Washington Mutual and acting as a Notary was not a legal Notary in California where she worked and notarized thousands of foreclosure documents. Please see attached and inform all of your members nationwide!

She has notarized documents including affidavits and assignments.

[ipaper docId=38474072 access_key=key-109r7e20m5mr3d6kyqag height=600 width=600 /]

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Posted in assignment of mortgage, Erika Herrera, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosures, Notary, notary fraud, wamu, washington mutualComments (0)

Handcuffs for Wall Street, Not Happy-Talk

Handcuffs for Wall Street, Not Happy-Talk


“If the people cannot trust their government to do the job for which it exists
– to protect them and to promote their common welfare – all else is lost.”
– BARACK OBAMA, speech, Aug. 28, 2006

Zach Carter

Zach Carter

Economics Editor, AlterNet; Fellow, Campaign for America’s Future

Posted: September 12, 2010 02:52 PM

The Washington Post has published a very silly op-ed by Chrystia Freeland accusing President Barack Obama of unfairly “demonizing” Wall Street. Freeland wants to see Obama tone down his rhetoric and play nice with executives in pursuit of a harmonious economic recovery. The trouble is, Obama hasn’t actually deployed harsh words against Wall Street. What’s more, in order to avoid being characterized as “anti-business,” the Obama administration has refused to mete out serious punishment for outright financial fraud. Complaining about nouns and adjectives is a little ridiculous when handcuffs and prison sentences are in order.

Freeland is a long-time business editor at Reuters and the Financial Times, and the story she spins about the financial crisis comes across as very reasonable. It’s also completely inaccurate. Here’s the key line:

“Stricter regulation of financial services is necessary not because American bankers were bad, but because the rules governing them were.”

Bank regulations were lousy, of course. But Wall Street spent decades lobbying hard for those rules, and screamed bloody murder when Obama had the audacity to tweak them. More importantly, the financial crisis was not only the result of bad rules. It was the result of bad rules and rampant, straightforward fraud, something a seasoned business editor like Freeland ought to know. Seeking economic harmony with criminals seems like a pretty poor foundation for an economic recovery.

The FBI was warning about an “epidemic” of mortgage fraud as early as 2004. Mortgage fraud is typically perpetrated by lenders, not borrowers — 80 percent of the time, according to the FBI. Banks made a lot of quick bucks over the past decade by illegally conning borrowers. Then bankers who knew these loans were fraudulent still packaged them into securities and sold them to investors without disclosing that fraud. They lied to their own shareholders about how many bad loans were on their books, and lied to them about the bonuses that were derived from the entire scheme. When you do these things, you are stealing lots of money from innocent people, and you are, in fact, behaving badly (to put it mildly).

The fraud allegations that have emerged over the past year are not restricted to a few bad apples at shady companies– they involve some of the largest players in global finance. Washington Mutual executives knew their company was issuing fraudulent loans, and securitized them anyway without stopping the influx of fraud in the lending pipeline. Wachovia is settling charges that it illegally laundered $380 billion in drug money in order to maintain access to liquidity. Barclays is accused of illegally laundering money from Iran, Sudan and other nations, jumping through elaborate technical hoops to conceal the source of their funds. Goldman Sachs set up its own clients to fail and bragged about their “shitty deals.” Citibank executives deceived their shareholders about the extent of their subprime mortgage holdings. Bank of America executives concealed heavy losses from the Merrill Lynch merger, and then lied to their shareholders about the massive bonuses they were paying out. IndyMac Bank and at least five other banks cooked their books by backdating capital injections.

Continue reading…..The  Huffington Post


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Posted in Bank Owned, citi, conspiracy, Economy, FED FRAUD, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, foreclosures, goldman sachs, hamp, indymac, investigation, jobless, lehman brothers, MERS, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC., OCC, racketeering, RICO, rmbs, Wall Street, wamu, washington mutual, wells fargoComments (0)

WHISTLE BLOWER | Report On Fraudulent & Forged Assignments Of Mortgages & Deeds In U.S. Foreclosures

WHISTLE BLOWER | Report On Fraudulent & Forged Assignments Of Mortgages & Deeds In U.S. Foreclosures


Pew family trusts which I am a beneficiary and/or remainderman have maintained
investments in various banks, mutual funds, and other entities that maintain
interests in various shares, mortgage backed securities and/or debt issuances and I
have been a shareholder in many mortgage companies including Fannie Mae,
Bear Stearns, JPMorganChase, Washington Mutual, MGIC, Ocwen and Radian,
many of which are members, owners and shareholders in Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, Inc. [MERS].

© 2010 Nye Lavalle, Pew Mortgage Institute
•10675 Pebble Cove Lane • Boca Raton, FL 33498
561/860-7632 • mortgagefrauds@aol.com

[ipaper docId=36753239 access_key=key-1xwnf3x33iwj6zod9965 height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in bear stearns, bogus, chain in title, concealment, conflict of interest, conspiracy, CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, foreclosures, forensic document examiner, forensic mortgage investigation audit, forgery, insider, investigation, Law Offices Of David J. Stern P.A., Lender Processing Services Inc., LPS, Max Gardner, MERS, MERSCORP, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC., Mortgage Foreclosure Fraud, neil garfield, notary fraud, note, OCC, R.K. Arnold, racketeering, RICO, robo signers, shapiro & fishman pa, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD, stopforeclosurefraud.com, trade secrets, Trusts, Violations, Wall StreetComments (0)

WaMu Will Face Trial in November Over $4 Billion of Low-Ranking Securities

WaMu Will Face Trial in November Over $4 Billion of Low-Ranking Securities


By Steven Church – Aug 25, 2010 4:20 PM ET

Washington Mutual Inc., the ex-owner of the biggest U.S. bank to fail, will face a November trial in an investor lawsuit over ownership of $4 billion in low-ranking debt known as trust-preferred securities, a judge said.

U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Mary F. Walrath in Wilmington, Delaware, scheduled a trial for Nov. 1, the first day of a confirmation hearing on WaMu’s reorganization plan. Lawyers for WaMu and investors, including Black Horse Capital LP and Lonestar Partners LP, agree the issue must be resolved before the company can end its bankruptcy and distribute more than $6 billion to creditors.

As the confirmation hearing continues in November, other critics of WaMu’s plan may want to use any facts or arguments presented by the investors to attack the reorganization proposal, Walrath said. Shareholders claim that the holding company’s bank should never have been seized by regulators and sold to JPMorgan Chase & Co. in 2008.

“Others may want to ride your coattails,” Walrath told an attorney for Black Horse at a court hearing yesterday. “The first day of confirmation will be yours.”

In July, a group of investors sued WaMu and JPMorgan over the way the trust-preferred securities were converted from debt- like investments into equity. The investors, who bought $1 billion of the trust-preferred securities, got preferred equity in WaMu when the exchange happened just before WaMu collapsed.

‘Rampant Fraud’

Continue reading…REUTERS

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, investigation, jpmorgan chase, Real Estate, Trusts, wamu, washington mutualComments (0)

Could WAMU/ JPMorgan Chase Foreclosures be invalid?

Could WAMU/ JPMorgan Chase Foreclosures be invalid?


This is going to raise questions on how this has been able to proceed without the finalizing of the sale.

You cannot have an omelet if the chicken hasn’t laid the egg yet!

  • Were the shareholders made aware that JPMC never finalized the deal?
  • How does this effect those who filed for Bankruptcy?
  • Why hasn’t the FDIC stepped up when they knew that this was on going and never finalized the sale?
  • What happens to those who have an assignment of mortgage from WAMU to JPMC?
  • Is JPMC currently servicing any of WAMU’ loans?
  • All the chain in title that are in question?
  • Bailout? What Bailout?

Thanks to Foreclosure Hamlet and 4closurefraud for this alert!

Via: 4ClosureFraud

This is very intriguing… Check out the the excerpts from the report below…

Game Changer?

WaMu sale hasn’t closed, document suggests

Next month will mark two years since federal regulators seized Washington Mutual and sold it to JPMorgan Chase for $1.9 billion. Now a document that appears to be from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation suggests the deal still hasn’t closed.

“Everyone is saying the sale is finalized,” said the shareholder, Farokh Lam, of Woburn, Mass. “It is not.

Lam noticed that on pages 7 and 9, the original WaMu purchase and sale agreement allows the FDIC to extend the settlement date. He says he asked about it, and the FDIC confirmed in phone calls and emails that the settlement date was set for Aug. 30, 2010, and could be extended further.

“Settlement Date” means the first Business Day immediately prior to the day which is one hundred eighty (180) days after Ban Closing, or such other date prior thereto as may be agreed upon by the Receiver and the Assuming Bank. The Receiver, in its discretion, may extend the Settlement Date.

It says: “The purpose of this amendment is to extend the time period for Final Settlement to August. 30, 2010.

WaMu’s final days were chronicled in depth by Puget Sound Business Journal Staff Writer Kirsten Grind in an award-winning series.

Does this mean that all the WAMU foreclosures being pushed through the courts by JPMorgan Chase using the FDIC Purchase and Sale Agreement are invalid?

Does it mean if they haven’t closed the deal THEY DO NOT OWN THE LOANS OR THEIR SERVICING RIGHTS?

Where are the windfall profits going after the foreclosure sale?

What if the agreement changes before it is finalized?

So many questions…

Pipe up in the comments and let me know what you think.

The way I see it is, if they haven’t finalized the deal, how can they foreclose on the homes?

[ipaper docId=36027673 access_key=key-5z7g1dy0c99oralt1p0 height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in discovery, fdic, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosures, investigation, jpmorgan chase, non disclosure, psa, securitization, servicers, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD, wamu, washington mutualComments (4)

POWER HOUSE NY AG ANDREW CUOMO goes after WAMU APPRAISAL FRAUD!

POWER HOUSE NY AG ANDREW CUOMO goes after WAMU APPRAISAL FRAUD!


2010 NY Slip Op 04868

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK BY ANDREW CUOMO, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
FIRST AMERICAN CORPORATION, ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.

406796/07, 1308.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First Department.

Decided June 8, 2010.

DLA Piper LLP (US), New York (Richard F. Hans, Patrick J. Smith, Kerry Ford Cunningham and Jeffrey D. Rotenberg of counsel), for appellants.

Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General, New York (Richard Dearing, Benjamin N. Gutman and Nicole Gueron of counsel), for respondent.

Before: Gonzalez, P.J., Saxe, Catterson, Acosta, JJ.

GONZALEZ, P.J.

This appeal calls upon us to determine whether the regulations and guidelines implemented by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) pursuant to the Home Owner’s Lending Act of 1933 (HOLA) (12 USC § 1461 et seq.) and the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) (Pub L 101-73, 103 STAT 183 [codified in scattered sections of 12 USC]), preempt state regulations in the field of real estate appraisal.

The Attorney General claims that defendants engaged in fraudulent, deceptive and illegal business practices by allegedly permitting eAppraiseIT residential real estate appraisers to be influenced by nonparty Washington Mutual, Inc. (WaMu) to increase real estate property values on appraisal reports in order to inflate home prices. We conclude that neither federal statutes, nor the regulations and guidelines implemented by the OTS, preclude the Attorney General of the State of New York from pursuing litigation against defendants First American Corporation and First American eAppraiseIT, LLC. We further conclude that the Attorney General has standing to pursue his claims pursuant to General Business Law § 349.

In a complaint dated November 1, 2007, plaintiff, the People of the State of New York, commenced this action against defendants asserting claims under Executive Law § 63(12) and General Business Law § 349, and for unjust enrichment. The complaint alleges that in Spring 2006, WaMu hired two appraisal management companies, defendant eAppraiseIT and nonparty Lender’s Service, Inc., to oversee the appraisal process and provide a structural buffer against potential conflicts of interest between WaMu and the individual appraisers. The gravamen of the Attorney General’s complaint asserts that defendants misled their customers and the public by stating that eAppraiseIT’s appraisals were independent evaluations of a property’s market value and that these appraisals were conducted in compliance with the Uniform Standards and Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP), when in fact defendants had implemented a system allowing WaMu’s loan origination staff to select appraisers who would improperly inflate a property’s market value to WaMu’s desired target loan amount.[1]

Defendants moved for dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211, asserting that the Attorney General is prohibited from litigating his claims because HOLA and FIERRA impliedly place the responsibility for oversight of appraisal management companies on the OTS, and asserting a failure to state a cause of action. Supreme Court denied defendants’ motion, finding that HOLA and FIRREA do not occupy the entire field with respect to real estate appraisal regulation and that the enforcement of USPAP standards under General Business Law § 349 neither conflicts with federal law, nor does it impair a bank’s ability to lend and extend credit. We affirm.

The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that Federal laws “shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding” (US Const, art VI, cl [2]), and it “vests in Congress the power to supersede not only State statutory or regulatory law but common law as well” (Guice v Charles Schwab & Co., 89 NY2d 31, 39 [1996], cert denied 520 US 1118 [1997]). Indeed, “[u]nder the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause (US Const, art VI, cl 2), the purpose of our preemption analysis is . . . to ascertain the intent of Congress” (Matter of People v Applied Card Sys., Inc., 11 NY3d 105, 113 [2008], cert denied ___ US ___, 129 S Ct 999 [2009]). Congressional intent to preempt state law may be established “by express provision, by implication, or by a conflict between federal and state law” (Balbuena v IDR Realty LLC, 6 NY3d 338, 356 [2006], quoting New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v Travelers Ins. Co., 514 US 645, 654 [1995]). Express preemption occurs when Congress indicates its “pre-emptive intent through a statute’s express language or through its structure and purpose” (Altria Group, Inc. v Good, 555 US ___, ___, 129 S Ct 538, 543 [2008]). Absent explicit preemptive language, implied preemption occurs when “[t]he scheme of federal regulation [is] so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it . . . [o]r the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject” (Rice v Santa Fe El. Corp., 331 US 218, 230 [1947]). Further, when “[a] conflict occurs either because compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility, or because the State law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,” the State law is preempted (City of New York v Job-Lot Pushcart, 213 AD2d 210, 210 [1995], affd 88 NY2d 163 [1996], cert denied 519 US 871 [1996] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

Here, defendants do not argue, nor have they directed this Court’s attention to any language within HOLA or FIRREA that establishes, that Congress expressly created these statutes to supersede state law governing the causes of actions asserted in the Attorney General’s complaint. Defendants also have not argued that there exists a conflict between federal and State laws or regulations. Rather, defendants assert that because Congress has legislated so comprehensively, and that federal law so completely occupies the home lending field, the Attorney General is precluded from bringing claims against them under the theory of field preemption. Thus, the necessary starting point is to determine whether HOLA and FIRREA so occupy the field that these two statutes preempt any and all state laws speaking to the manner in which appraisal management companies provide real estate appraisal services.

In 1933, Congress enacted HOLA “to provide emergency relief with respect to home mortgage indebtedness at a time when as many as half of all home loans in the country were in default” (Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v De la Cuesta, 458 US 141, 159 [1982] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). HOLA created a general framework to regulate federally chartered savings associations that left the regulatory details to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB). The FHLBB’s authority to regulate federal savings and loans is virtually unlimited and “[p]ursuant to this authorization, the [FHLBB] has promulgated regulations governing the powers and operations of every Federal savings and loan association from its cradle to its corporate grave” (id. at 145 [internal citations and quotation marks omitted]).

When Congress passed FIRREA in 1989, it restructured the regulation of the savings association industry by abolishing the FHLBB and vested many of its functions into the newly-created OTS (see FIRREA § 301 [12 USCA § 1461 et seq.] [establishing OTS], § 401 [12 USCA § 1437] [abolishing the FHLBB]). According to FIRREA’s legislative history

“[t]he primary purposes of the [FIRREA] are to provide affordable housing mortgage finance and housing opportunities for low- and moderate-income individuals through enhanced management of federal housing credit programs and resources; establish organizations and procedures to obtain and administer the necessary funding to resolve failed thrift cases and to dispose of the assets of these institutions . . . and, enhance the regulatory enforcement powers of the depository institution regulatory agencies to protect against fraud, waste and insider abuse”

(HR Rep 101-54 [I], at 307-308, reprinted in 1989 US Code Cong to Admin News, at 103-104). FIRREA was also designed “to thwart real estate appraisal abuses, [by] establish[ing] a system of uniform national real estate appraisal standards.

It also requires the use of state certified or licensed appraisers for real estate related transactions with the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Fannie Mac), the RTC, or certain real estate transaction [sic] regulated by the federal financial institution regulatory agencies” (HR Rep 101-54 (I), at 311, reprinted in 1989 US Code Cong to Admin News, at 107).

Further, 12 USCS § 3331, which was enacted as part of FIRREA, states that the general purpose of this statute, is

“to provide that Federal financial and public policy interests in real estate related transactions will be protected by requiring that real estate appraisals utilized in connection with federally related transactions are performed in writing, in accordance with uniform standards, by individuals whose competency has been demonstrated and whose professional conduct will be subject to effective supervision.”

The uniform standards described in 12 USCS § 3331, are defined in 12 USCS § 3339 which requires that the OTS, as a

“Federal financial institution[] regulatory agency . . . shall prescribe appropriate standards for the performance of real estate appraisals in connection with federally related transactions[2] under the jurisdiction of each such agency or instrumentality. These rules shall require, at a minimum — (1) that real estate appraisals be performed in accordance with generally accepted appraisal standards as evidenced by the appraisal standards promulgated by the Appraisal Standards Board of the Appraisal Foundation; and (2) that such appraisals shall be written appraisals.”

The Appraisal Standards Board (ASB) of the Appraisal Foundation promulgates the appraisal standards mandated by 12 USC § 3339 and are called USPAP. The Appraisal Foundation is a private “not-for-profit organization dedicated to the advancement of professional valuation [and] was established by the appraisal profession in the United States in 1987? (Welcome to The Appraisal Foundation [The Appraisal Foundation], https://netforum.avectra.com/eWeb/StartPage.aspx?Site=TAF [accessed May 27, 2010]). The ASB is responsible for “develop[ing], interpret[ing] and amend[ing]” USPAP (Welcome to The Appraisal Foundation, https://netforum.avectra.com/eWeb/ DynamicPage.aspx?Site=TAF & WebCode=ASB [accessed May 27, 2010]). However, “[e]ach U.S. State or Territory has a State appraiser regulatory agency, which is responsible for certifying and licensing real estate appraisers and supervising their appraisal-related activities, as required by Federal law” (State Regulatory Information [The Appraisal Foundation], https://netforum.avectra.com/eWeb/DynamicPage.aspx?Site=taf & WebCode=RegulatoryInfo [accessed May 27, 2010]; see also State Appraiser Regulatory Programs > State Contact Information [Appraisal Subcommittee], https://www.asc.gov/State-Appraiser-Regulatory-Programs/StateContactInformation.aspx [accessed May 27, 2010] [listing each State appraiser regulatory agency’s website]). Further, the OTS itself has determined that

“[i]t does not appear that OTS is required by title XI of FIRREA to implement an appraisal regulation that reaches all the activities of savings and loan holding companies, at least to the extent that those activities are unrelated to the safety and soundness of savings associations or their subsidiaries. Neither the language of Title XI nor its legislative history indicate that Congress intended title XI to apply to the wide range of activities engaged in by savings and loan holding companies and their non-saving association subsidiaries” (55 Fed Reg 34532, 34534-34535 [1990], codified at 12 CFR 506, 545, 563, 564 and 571).

Indeed, the OTS encourages financial institutions

“to make referrals directly to state appraiser regulatory authorities when a State licensed or certified appraiser violates USPAP, applicable state law, or engages in other unethical or unprofessional conduct. Examiners finding evidence of unethical or unprofessional conduct by appraisers will forward their findings and recommendations to their supervisory office for appropriate disposition and referral to the state, as necessary” (OTS, Thrift Bulletin, Interagency Appraisal and Evaluation Guidelines at 10 [November 4, 1994], http://files.ots.treas. gov/84042.pdf [accessed May 27, 2010]).

In looking at the legislative history it becomes clear that Congress intended to establish

“a system of uniform real estate appraisal standards and requires the use of State certified and licensed appraisers for federally regulated transactions by July 1, 1991. . . The key . . . lies in the creation of State regulatory agencies and a Federal watchdog to monitor the standards and to oversee State enforcement. . . It is this combination of Federal and State action . . . that . . . assur[es] . . . good standards are properly enforced (135 Cong Rec S3993-01, at S4004 [April 17, 1989], 1989 WL 191505 [remarks of Senator Christopher J. Dodd]).

Thus, we conclude that neither HOLA or FIRREA preempts or precludes the Attorney General from pursuing his claims.

Having rejected defendants’ general arguments for preemption under HOLA and FIRREA, “[t]he Court’s task, then, is to decide which claims fall on the regulatory side of the ledger and which, for want of a better term, fall on the common law side” ( Cedeno v IndyMac Bancorp, Inc., 2008 WL 3992304, *7, 2008 US Dist LEXIS 65337, *22 [SD NY 2008] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). Defendants assert that the Attorney General is preempted from pursuing his claims because subsequent to FIRREA’s passage, the OTS issued extensive regulations specifically addressing the composition and construction of appraisal programs undertaken by federal savings and loans.

It is well settled that “[a]gencies delegated rulemaking authority under a statute . . . are afforded generous leeway by the courts in interpreting the statute they are entrusted to administer” (Rapanos v United States, 547 US 715, 758 [2006]). Indeed, the OTS regulations “have no less pre-emptive effect than federal statutes” (Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 458 US at 153). 12 CFR 545.2, states that regulations promulgated by the OTS are “preemptive of any state law purporting to address the subject of the operations of a Federal saving association.” However, 12 CFR 560.2(a) limits the language of 12 CFR 545.2 by setting parameters to the OTS’ authority to promulgate regulations that

“preempt state laws affecting the operations of federal savings associations when deemed appropriate to facilitate the safe and sound operation of federal savings associations, to enable federal savings associations . . . to conduct their operations in accordance with the best practices of thrift institutions in the United States, or to further other purposes of the HOLA” (12 CFR 560.2[a]).

12 CFR 560.2(b) provides a non-exhaustive list of illustrative examples of the types of state laws preempted by 12 CFR 560.2(a). Further, 12 CFR 560.2(c) states that the following types of State law are not preempted

“to the extent that they only incidentally affect the lending operations of Federal savings associations . . . (1) Contract and commercial law; (2) Real property law; (3) Homestead laws specified in 12 U.S.C. 1462a(f); (4) Tort law; (5) Criminal law; and (6) Any other law that OTS, upon review, finds: (i) Furthers a vital state interest; and (ii) Either has only an incidental effect on lending operations or is not otherwise contrary to the purposes expressed in paragraph (a) of this section.”

The OTS advises that when a court is

“analyzing the status of state laws under § 560.2, the first step will be to determine whether the type of law in question is listed in paragraph (b). If so, the analysis will end there; the law is preempted. If the law is not covered by paragraph (b), the next question is whether the law affects lending. If it does, then, in accordance with paragraph (a), the presumption arises that the law is preempted. This presumption can be reversed only if the law can clearly be shown to fit within the confines of paragraph (c). For these purposes, paragraph (c) is intended to be interpreted narrowly. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of preemption” (61 Fed Reg 50951-01, 50966-50967 [1996]).

Defendants argue that the Attorney General’s challenges to defendants’ business practices are preempted because the conduct falls within 12 CFR 560.2(b)(5), which provides examples of loan-related fees “including without limitation, initial charges, late charges, prepayment penalties, servicing fees, and overlimit fees.” Defendants also assert that their alleged conduct is within 12 CFR 560.2(b)(9), which provides

“[d]isclosure and advertising, including laws requiring specific statements, information, or other content to be included in credit application forms, credit solicitations, billing statements, credit contracts, or other credit-related documents and laws requiring creditors to supply copies of credit reports to borrowers or applicants” (id.).

Lastly, defendants assert that their alleged conduct falls within 12 CFR 560.2(b)(10) which states that “[p]rocessing, origination, servicing, sale or purchase of, or investment or participation in, mortgages” is preempted.

The Attorney General’s complaint asserts that defendants engaged in conduct proscribed by Executive Law § 63(12)[3] and General Business Law § 349[4] . It further alleges that defendants unjustly enriched themselves by repeated use of fraudulent or illegal business practices, in that they allowed WaMu to pressure eAppraiseIT appraisers to compromise their USPAP-required independence and collude with WaMu to inflate residential appraisal values so that the appraisals would match the qualifying loan values WaMu desired.

Under the first prong of the preemption analysis, we find that this action brought pursuant to Executive Law § 63(12), General Business Law § 349(b) and on the theory of unjust enrichment is not preempted by 12 CFR 560.2(b)(5) because it involves no attempt to regulate bank-related fees. We also find, under the first prong of the preemption analysis, that there is no preemption pursuant to 12 CFR 560.2(b)(9) because these claims do not involve a state law seeking to impose or require any specific statements, information or other content to be disclosed. Although at least one case has held that claims similar to those asserted here were preempted (see Spears v Washington Mut., Inc., 2009 WL 605835 [ND Cal 2009]), we find under the first prong of the preemption analysis that 12 CFR 660.2(b)(10) does not preclude the Attorney General’s complaint because prosecution of the alleged conduct will not affect the operations of federal savings associations (FSA) in how they process, originate, service, sell or purchase, or invest or participate in, mortgages.

The question then becomes whether the Attorney General is nevertheless precluded from litigating his claims under the second prong of the preemption analysis. Because enjoining a real estate appraisal management company from abdicating its publicly advertised role of providing unbiased valuations is not within the confines of 12 CFR 560.2(c), we answer it in the negative.

Defendants argue the OTS’s authority under HOLA and FIRREA is not limited to oversight of a FSA and that its authority under these two statues extends over the activity regulated and includes the activities of third party agents of a FSA. Defendants assert that providing real estate appraisal services is a critical component of the processing and origination of mortgages and represents a core component of the controlling federal regime. Defendants cite 12 USC § 1464(d)(7)(D) and State Farm Bank, FSB v Reardon (539 F3d 336 [6th Cir 2008]) for support. 12 USC § 1464(d)(7) states, in pertinent part, that

“if a savings association . . . causes to be performed for itself, by contract or otherwise, any service authorized under [HOLA] such performance shall be subject to regulation and examination by the [OTS] Director to the same extent as if such services were being performed by the savings association on its own premises . . .”

Here, it is alleged eAppraiseIT and Lender’s Service, Inc., were hired by WaMu to provide appraisal services. However, defendants are incorrect in asserting that providing real estate appraisal services is an authorized banking activity under HOLA. In an opinion letter dated October 25, 2004, OTS concluded that it had the authority to regulate agents of an FSA under HOLA because

“[i]nherent in the authority of federal savings associations to exercise their deposit and lending powers and to conduct deposit, lending, and other banking activities is the authority to advertise, market, and solicit customers, and to make the public aware of the banking products and services associations offer. The authority to conduct deposit and lending activities, and to offer banking products and services, is accompanied by the power to advertise, market, and solicit customers for such products and services . . . A state may not put operational restraints on a federal savings association’s ability to offer an authorized product or service by restricting the association’s ability to market its products and services and reach potential customers . . . Thus, OTS has authority under the HOLA to regulate the Agents the Association uses to perform marketing, solicitation, and customer service activities” (2004 OTS Op No. P-2004-7, at 7, http://files.ots.treas.gov/560404.pdf, 2004 OTS LEXIS 6, at *15 [accessed May 27, 2010]).

State Farm Bank, FSB v Reardon (539 F3d 336 [6th Cir 2008]) follows this principle. In Reardon, the plaintiff, a FSA chartered by the OTS under HOLA, decided to offer, through its independent contractor agents, first and second mortgages and home equity loans in the State of Ohio. The Sixth Circuit concluded that although the statute at issue

“directly regulates [the plaintiff FSA’s] exclusive agents rather than [the FSA] itself . . . the activity being regulated is the solicitation and origination of mortgages, a power granted to [the FSA] by HOLA and the OTS. This is also a power over which the OTS has indicated that any state attempts to regulate will be met with preemption . . . [T]he practical effect of the [statute] is that [the FSA] must either change its structure or forgo mortgage lending in Ohio. Thus, enforcement of the [statute] against [the FSA’s] exclusive agents would frustrate the purpose of the HOLA and the OTS regulations because it indirectly prohibits [the FSA] from exercising the powers granted to it under the HOLA and the OTS regulations” (Reardon, 539 F3d at 349 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

Since appraisal services are not authorized banking products or services of a FSA, defendants have failed to show that the Attorney General is preempted from pursuing his claims under 12 USC § 1464(d)(7)(D). Consequently, under the second prong of the preemption analysis, the result of the Attorney General litigating his claims against a company that independently administers a FSA’s appraisal program would “only incidentally affect the lending operations of [the FSA]” (12 CFR 560.2[c]). Thus, defendants have failed to show that OTS’s regulations and guidelines preempt or preclude the Attorney General from pursuing his claims.

Defendants assert that Cedeno v IndyMac Bancorp, Inc. (2008 WL 3992304, 2008 US Dist LEXIS 65337 [SD NY 2008]) provides this Court with persuasive authority that the federal government and its regulators alone regulate the mortgage loan origination practices of FSAs including all aspects of the appraisal programs they utilize. In Cedeno, the Southern District found preemption precluded a private individual from maintaining a cause of action against a bank. It was alleged that the bank failed to disclose to the plaintiff that it selected appraisers, appraisal companies and/or appraisal management firms who would inflate the value of residential properties in order to allow the bank to complete more real estate transactions and obtain greater profits. This practice resulted in the plaintiff being misled as to the true equity in her home. The Southern District found that the conduct of the bank was

“directly regulated by the OTS: the processing and origination of mortgages, a loan-related fee, and the accompanying disclosure. The appraisals are a prerequisite to the lending process, and are inextricably bound to it. Because the plaintiff’s claim is not a simple breach of contract claim, but asks the Court to set substantive standards for the Associations’ lending operations and practices, it is preempted” (Cedeno, 2008 WL 3992304, *9, 2008 US Dist LEXIS 65337, at *28 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

Contrary to defendants’ assertions, we find that Cedeno is not applicable here because Cedeno does not reach the question as to whether HOLA, FIRREA or OTS’s regulations and guidelines are intended to regulate the conduct of real estate appraisal companies.

Annexed to the OTS’s October 25, 2004 opinion letter is a document entitled Appendix A — Conditions. In this document, OTS requires FSAs that wish to use agents to perform marketing, solicitation, customer service, or other activities related to the FSA’s authorized banking products or services to enter into written agreements that “(4) expressly set[] forth OTS’s statutory authority to regulate and examine and take an enforcement action against the agent with respect to the activities it performs for the association, and the agent’s acknowledgment of OTS’s authority” (2004 OTS Op No. P-2004-7, at 16, http://files.ots. treas.gov/560404.pdf, 2004 OTS LEXIS 6, at *37 [accessed May 27, 2010]). We note that defendants have neither asserted that such written agreements exist nor produced such documents.

Thus, we conclude that the Attorney General may proceed with his claims against defendants because his challenge to defendants’ allegedly fraudulent and deceptive business practices in providing appraisal services is not preempted by federal law and regulations that govern the operations of savings and loan associations and institution-affiliated parties.

Defendants assert that the Attorney General cannot rely upon a substantive violation of a federal law to support a claim under General Business Law § 349 because this is an improper attempt to convert alleged violations of federal law into a violation of New York law. Defendants claim that where a plaintiff seeks to rely upon a substantive violation of a federal law to support a claim under General Business Law § 349, the federal law relied upon must contain a private right of action.

However, the Attorney General is statutorily charged with the duty to “[p]rosecute and defend all actions and proceedings in which the state is interested, and have charge and control of all the legal business of the departments and bureaus of the state, or of any office thereof which requires the services of attorney or counsel, in order to protect the interest of the state” (Executive Law § 63[1]). Indeed, when the Attorney General becomes aware of allegations of persistent fraud or illegality of a business, he

“is authorized by statute to bring an enforcement action seeking an order enjoining the continuance of such business activity or of any fraudulent or illegal acts, [and] directing restitution and damages’ (Executive Law § 63 [12]). He is also authorized, when informed of deceptive acts or practices affecting consumers in New York, to bring an action in the name and on behalf of the people of the state of New York to enjoin such unlawful acts or practices and to obtain restitution of any moneys or property obtained’ thereby (General Business Law § 349 [b])” (People v Coventry First LLC, 13 NY3d 108, 114 [2009]).

It is well settled that “[o]n a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory’” (Wiesen v New York Univ., 304 AD2d 459, 460 [2003], quoting Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]). The Attorney General’s complaint alleges that defendants publicly claimed on their eAppraiseIT website that eAppraiseIT provides a firewall between lenders and appraisers so that customers can be assured that USPAP and FIRREA guidelines are followed and that each appraisal is being audited for compliance. The Attorney General charges that defendants deceived borrowers and investors who relied on their proclaimed independence by allowing WaMu’s loan production staff to select the appraiser based upon whether they would provide high values.

We find defendants’ assertions that the Attorney General lacks standing under General Business Law § 349 and that his complaint fails to state a cause of action are without merit.

Indeed, the Attorney General’s complaint references misrepresentations and other deceptive conduct allegedly perpetrated on the consuming public within the State of New York, and “[a]s shown by its language and background, section 349 is directed at wrongs against the consuming public” (Oswego Laborers’ Local 214 Pension Fund v Marine Midland Bank, 85 NY2d 20, 24 [1995]). Therefore, we find that the Attorney General’s complaint articulates a viable cause of action under General Business Law § 349, and that this statute provides him with standing.

Consequently, we conclude that defendants have failed to demonstrate that HOLA, FIRREA or the OTS’s regulations and guidelines preempt or preclude the Attorney General from pursuing the causes of action articulated in his complaint. We additionally find that the Attorney General has standing under General Business Law § 349. We have reviewed defendants’ remaining contentions and we find them without merit.

Accordingly, the order of the Supreme Court, New York County (Charles Edward Ramos, J.), entered April 8, 2009, which, insofar as appealed from as limited by the briefs, denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of federal preemption, should be affirmed, without costs.

All concur.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

[1] USPAP is incorporated into New York law and it prohibits a State-certified or State licensed appraiser from accepting a fee for an appraisal assignment “that is contingent upon the appraiser reporting a predetermined estimate, analysis, or opinion or is contingent upon the opinion, conclusion or valuation reached, or upon the consequences resulting from the appraisal assignment” (NY Exec Law § 160-y; 19 NYCRR 1106.1).

[2] 12 USC § 3350(4) states that “[t]he term federally related transaction’ means any real estate-related financial transaction which—(A) a federal financial institutions regulatory agency or the Resolution Trust Corporation engages in, contracts for, or regulates; and (B) requires the services of an appraiser.”

[3] Executive Law § 63(12) states, in pertinent part, that “[w]henever any person shall engage in repeated fraudulent or illegal acts or otherwise demonstrate persistent fraud or illegality in the carrying on, conducting or transaction of business, the attorney general may apply, in the name of the people of the state of New York . . . for an order enjoining the continuance of such business activity or of any fraudulent or illegal acts, directing restitution and damages. . .”

[4] General Business Law § 349(b) states, in pertinent part, that “[w]henever the attorney general shall believe from evidence satisfactory to him that any person, firm, corporation or association or agent or employee thereof has engaged in or is about to engage in any of the acts or practices stated to be unlawful he may bring an action in the name and on behalf of the people of the state of New York to enjoin such unlawful acts or practices and to obtain restitution of any moneys or property obtained directly or indirectly by any such unlawful acts or practices.”

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



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SEC KNEW ABOUT SUBPRIME ACCOUNTING FRAUD A DECADE AGO

SEC KNEW ABOUT SUBPRIME ACCOUNTING FRAUD A DECADE AGO


by Elizabeth MacDonald FoxBusiness

The Securities and Exchange  Commission is missing a bigger fraud while it chases the banks. Even though it knew about this massive, plain old fashioned accounting fraud back in 1998.
Instead, the market cops are probing simpler disclosure cases that could charge bank and Wall Street with not telling investors about their conflicts of interest in selling securities they knew were damaged while making bets against those same securities behind the scenes, via credit default swaps.
Those probes have gotten headlines, but there aren’t too many signs that this will lead to anything close to massive settlements or fines.

For instance, the SEC doesn’t appear to be investigating how banks frontloaded their profits via channel stuffing — securitizing loans and shoving paper securitizations onto investors, while booking those revenues immediately, even though the mortgage payments underlying those paper daisy chains were coming in the door years, even decades, later. Those moves helped lead to $2.4 trillion in writedowns worldwide.
The agency said it  believed banks were committing subprime securitization accounting frauds back in 1998 and claimed to be ‘probing’ them.
I had written about these SEC probes into potential frauds while covering corporate accounting abuses at The Wall Street Journal. The rules essentially let banks frontload into their revenue the sale of subprime mortgages or other loans that they then packaged and sold off as securities, even though the payments on those underlying loans were coming in the door over the next seven, 10, 20, or 30 years.
Estimating those revenues based on the value of future mortgage payments involved plenty of guesswork.

Securitization: Free Market Became a Free For All
The total amount of overall mortgage-backed securities generated by Wall Street virtually tripled between 1996 and 2007, to $7.3 trillion. Subprime mortgage securitizations increased from 54% in 2001, to 75% in 2006. Back in 1998, the SEC had warned a dozen top accounting firms that they must do a  better job policing how subprime lenders book profits from loans that are repackaged as securities and sold on the secondary market. The SEC “is becoming increasingly concerned” over the way lenders use what are called “gain on sale” accounting rules when they securitize these loans, Jane B. Adams, the SEC’s deputy chief accountant, said in a letter sent to the Financial Accounting Standards Board, the nation’s chief accounting rule makers.
At that time, subprime lenders had come under fire from consumer groups and Congress, who said banks were using aggressive accounting to frontload profits from securitizing subprime loans. Subprime auto lender Mercury Finance collapsed after a spectacular accounting fraud and shareholder suits, New Century Financial was tanking as well for the same reason.

SEC Knew About Subprime Fraud More than a Decade Ago
The SEC more than a decade ago believed that subprime lenders were abusing the accounting rules.
When lenders repackage consumer loans as asset-backed securities, they must book the fair value of profits or losses from the deals. But regulators said lenders were overvaluing the loan assets they kept on their books in order to inflate current profits. Others delayed booking assets in order to increase future earnings. Lenders were also using poor default and prepayment rate assumptions to overestimate the fair value of their securitizations.
Counting future revenue was perfectly legal under too lax rules.
But without it many lenders that are in an objective sense doing quite well would look as if they were headed for bankruptcy.
At that time, the SEC’s eyebrows were raised when Dan Phillips, chief executive officer of FirstPlus Financial Group, a Dallas subprime home equity lenders, had said the poor accounting actually levitated profits at lenders.
“The reality is that companies like us wouldn’t be here without gain on sale,” he said, adding, “a lot of people abuse it.”
But this much larger accounting trick, one that has exacerbated the ties that blind between company and auditor, is more difficult to nail down because it involves wading through a lot of math, a calculus that Wall Street stretched it until it snapped.

Impenetrably Absurd Accounting
These were the most idiotic accounting rules known to man, rules manufactured by a quiescent Financial Accounting Standards Board [FASB] that let bank executives make up profits out of thin air.
It resulted in a folie à deux between Wall Street and complicit accounting firms that swallowed whole guesstimates pulled out of the atmosphere.
Their accounting gamesmanship set alight the most massive off-balance sheet bubble of all, a rule that helped tear the stock market off its moorings.
The rules helped five Wall Street firms – Bear Stearns, Lehman Bros., Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs and Merrill Lynch – earn an estimated $312 billion based on fictitious profits during the bubble years.

Who Used the Rule?
Banks and investment firms including Citigroup, Bank of America and Merrill all used this “legit” rule.
Countrywide Financial made widespread use of this accounting chicanery (see below). So did Washington Mutual. So did IndyMac Bancorp. So did FirstPlus Financial Group, and as noted Mercury Finance Co. and New Century Financial Corp.
Brought to the cliff’s edge, these banks were either bailed out, taken over or went through bankruptcies.
Many banks sold those securitized loans to Enron-style off-balance sheet trusts, otherwise called “structured investment vehicles” (SIVs), again booking profits immediately (Citigroup invented the SIV in 1988).
So, presto-change-o, banks got to dump loans off their books, making their leverage ratios look a whole lot nicer, so in turn they could borrow more.
At the same time, the banks got to record immediate profits, even though those no-income, no-doc loans supporting those paper securities and paper gains were bellyflopping right and left.
The writedowns were then buried in obscure line items called “impairment charges,” and were then masked by new profits from issuing new loans or by refinancings.

Rulemakers Fight Back
The FASB has been fighting to restrict this and other types of accounting games, but the banks have been battling back with an army of lobbyists.
The FASB, which sets the rules for publicly traded companies, is still trying to hang tough and is trying to force all sorts of off-balance sheet borrowings back onto bank balance sheets.
But these “gain on sale” rules, along with the “fair value” or what are called “marked to market” rules, have either been watered down or have enough loopholes in them, escape hatches that were written into the rules by the accountants themselves, so that auditors can make a clean get away.
As the market turned down, banks got the FASB to back down on mark-to-market accounting, which had forced them to more immediately value these assets and take quarterly profit hits if those assets soured – even though they were booking immediate profits from this “gain on sale” rule on the way up.
Also, the FASB has clung fast to the Puritanism of their rulemaking by arguing a sale is a sale is a sale, so companies can immediately book the entire value of a sale of a loan turned into a bond, even though the cash from the underlying mortgage has yet to come in the door.

Old-Fashioned ‘Channel Stuffing’
This sanctioned “gain on sale” accounting is really old-fashioned “channel stuffing.”
The move lets companies pad their revenue and profit numbers by stuffing lots of goods and inventory (mortgages and subprime securities) into the system without actually getting the money in the door, and booking those channel-stuffed goods as actual sales in order to cook ever higher their earnings.
Sort of like what Sunbeam did with its barbecue grills in the ’90s.

Intergalactic Bank Justice League
Cleaning up the accounting rules is an easier fix instead of a new, belabored, top-heavy “Systemic Risk Council” of the heads of federal financial regulatory agencies, as Sen. Chris Dodd (D-Conn) envisions in financial regulatory reform.
An intergalactic Marvel Justice League of bank regulators can do nothing in the face of chicanery allowed in the rules.

Planes on a Tarmac
What happened was, banks and investment firms like Citigroup and Merrill Lynch who couldn’t sell these subprime bonds, or “collateralized debt obligations,” as well as other loan assets into these SIVs got caught out when the markets turned, stuck with this junk on their balance sheets like planes on a tarmac in a blizzard.
Bank of America saw its fourth-quarter 2007 profits plunge 95% largely due to SIV investments. SunTrust Banks’ earnings were nearly wiped out, a 98% drop in the same quarter, because of its SIVs.
Great Britain’s Northern Rock ran into huge problems in 2007 stemming from SIVs, and was later nationalized by the British government in February 2008.
Even the mortgage lending arm of tax preparer H&R Block used the move. Block sold its loans to off-balance-sheet vehicles so it could book gains about a month earlier than it otherwise would. Weee!
The company had $75 million of these items on its books at the end of its fiscal 2003 year. All totally within the rules.

Leverage Culture
The rampant fakery helped fuel a leverage culture that got a lot of homes put in hock.
Banks, for instance, started advertising home equity loans as “equity access,” or ways to “Live Richly” or as Fleet Bank once touted, “The smartest place to borrow? Your place.”
In fact, Washington Mutual and IndyMac got so excited by the gain on sale rules, they went so far as to count in profits futuristic gains even if they had only an “interest rate” commitment from a borrower, and not a final mortgage loan.
Talk about counting chickens before they hatch.

Closer Look at Wamu
Look at Wamu’s profits in just one year during the runup to the bubble. Such gains more than tripled in 2001 at Wamu, to just shy of $1 billion, or 22% of its pretax earnings before extraordinary items, up from $262 million, or 9%, in 2000.
But in 2001, Washington Mutual took $1.7 billion in charges, $1.1 billion of it in the final, fourth quarter, to reflect bleaker prospects for the revenue stream of all those servicing rights.
It papered over the hit with a nearly identical $1.8 billion gain on securitizations and portfolio sales.

Closer Look at Countrywide
The accounting fakery let Countrywide Financial Corp., the mortgage issuer now owned by Bank of America, triple its profit in 2003 to $2.4 billion on $8.5 billion in revenue.
At the height of the bubble, Countrywide booked $6.1 billion in gains from the sale of loans and securities. But this wasn’t cold, hard cash. No, this was potential future profits from servicing mortgage portfolios, meaning collecting monthly payments and late penalties.

Posted in bank of america, cdo, concealment, conspiracy, corruption, countrywide, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, S.E.C., scam, securitization, washington mutualComments (0)

SENATE FINDS MASSIVE FRAUD WASHINGTON MUTUAL: SPECIAL DELIVERY FOR WAMU VICTIMS!

SENATE FINDS MASSIVE FRAUD WASHINGTON MUTUAL: SPECIAL DELIVERY FOR WAMU VICTIMS!


Senate finds Massive FRAUD in SHam-MU! WaMu has allegedly defrauded hundreds of thousands of homeowners with unfair, deceptive and perhaps illegal lending policies and practices. Many of these homeowners are now facing the possibility of or are in foreclosure.

666 Pages with “Private” emails you’d like to read. Please be patient to upload.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[scribd id=31356428 key=key-2ds6hgs6mi4aixhlw07z mode=list]

 

Posted in concealment, conspiracy, corruption, credit score, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, forensic loan audit, forensic mortgage investigation audit, jpmorgan chase, scam, securitization, washington mutualComments (0)

Another "HOME RUN" in Nassau, NY! Judge awards FREE home to woman after mortgage records lost: NEWSDAY

Another "HOME RUN" in Nassau, NY! Judge awards FREE home to woman after mortgage records lost: NEWSDAY


Originally published: May 6, 2010 8:47 PM
By SID CASSESE  sid.cassese@newsday.com

The house at 517 Pinebrook

Photo credit: Newsday / Karen Wiles Stabile | The house at 517 Pinebrook Ct. in West Hempstead, which a judge awarded to Corliss Gittens, free of any liens and mortgages because nobody opposed the action. (May 6, 2010)

A Lakeview woman got an early birthday present when a Nassau County State Supreme Court Justice awarded her the house she lives in, free and clear of any liens and mortgages because nobody opposed the action.

Tuesday, Corliss Gittens, who turned 48 Friday, received the award of her six-room ranch-style house at 517 Pinebrook Ct. from Justice John Galasso.

Gittens bought the house from her parents in late 2000. But when she mailed monthly checks to the mortgage company, Homeside Lending, the checks were never cashed, said Hempstead lawyer Fred Brewington, who represents Gittens. In 2001, Gittens was told by Homeside Lending officials that it could not locate evidence of the mortgage in its records.

“She had a mortgage and a deed. She went to a closing and purchased the house,” said Brewington. “She never stopped trying to find out to whom she should pay the mortgage because the uncertainty was making her distraught.”

Eventually, Gittens learned Homeside ceased to exist, and its parent company, SR Investments, was sold to Washington Mutual in 2002. Washington Mutual was in turn acquired by JPMorgan Chase in 2008. All of the companies, as well as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, were named as respondents.

None opposed Gittens’ suit.

Brewington said he reached out to Chase on the issue, only to be told the bank knew nothing about it.

Michael Fusco, a spokesman for Chase in Manhattan, said the bank “has no comment at this time.”

Gittens did not want to be interviewed for the story, but Brewington quoted her as saying: “After so many years of existing in limbo, I am happy that I will have the resources of my property available to me.”

He said Gittens once sought a second mortgage, but failed to get it because no one could get any information on the existing one. He added that her case was filed to wipe out that mortgage.

County records show the 2009 property tax on the house as $7,667.44.

In his decision Galasso said: “The Court directs the Clerk of the County of Nassau in whose office the mortgage and note were presumably recorded on or about March 6, 2001, to mark the record of the debt secured by the mortgage canceled and discharged.”

County Clerk Maureen O’Connell said Thursday she got the order Thursday and will execute it immediately.

Posted in concealment, conspiracy, corruption, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, forensic mortgage investigation audit, jpmorgan chase, reversed court decision, securitization, washington mutualComments (0)

HARVARD LAW AND ECONOMIC ISSUES IN SUBPRIME LITIGATION 2008

HARVARD LAW AND ECONOMIC ISSUES IN SUBPRIME LITIGATION 2008


This in combination with A.K. Barnett-Hart’s Thesis make’s one hell of a Discovery.

 
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES IN
SUBPRIME LITIGATION
Jennifer E. Bethel*
Allen Ferrell**
Gang Hu***
 

Discussion Paper No. 612

03/2008

Harvard Law School Cambridge, MA 02138

 

 ABSTRACT

This paper explores the economic and legal causes and consequences of recent difficulties in the subprime mortgage market. We provide basic descriptive statistics and institutional details on the mortgage origination process, mortgage-backed securities (MBS), and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). We examine a number of aspects of these markets, including the identity of MBS and CDO sponsors, CDO trustees, CDO liquidations, MBS insured and registered amounts, the evolution of MBS tranche structure over time, mortgage originations, underwriting quality of mortgage originations, and write-downs of investment banks. In light of this discussion, the paper then addresses questions as to how these difficulties might have not been foreseen, and some of the main legal issues that will play an important role in the extensive subprime litigation (summarized in the paper) that is underway, including the Rule 10b-5 class actions that have already been filed against the investment banks, pending ERISA litigation, the causes-of-action available to MBS and CDO purchasers, and litigation against the rating agencies. In the course of this discussion, the paper highlights three distinctions that will likely prove central in the resolution of this litigation: The distinction between reasonable ex ante expectations and the occurrence of ex post losses; the distinction between the transparency of the quality of the underlying assets being securitized and the transparency as to which market participants are exposed to subprime losses; and, finally, the distinction between what investors and market participants knew versus what individual entities in the structured finance process knew, particularly as to macroeconomic issues such as the state of the national housing market. ex ante expectations and the occurrence of ex post losses; the distinction between the transparency of the quality of the underlying assets being securitized and the transparency as to which market participants are exposed to subprime losses; and, finally, the distinction between what investors and market participants knew versus what individual entities in the structured finance process knew, particularly as to macroeconomic issues such as the state of the national housing market. 

 continue reading the paper harvard-paper-diagrams

 
 

 

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Michael Lewis’s ‘The Big Short’? Read the Harvard Thesis Instead! “The Story of the CDO Market Meltdown: An Empirical Analysis.”

Michael Lewis’s ‘The Big Short’? Read the Harvard Thesis Instead! “The Story of the CDO Market Meltdown: An Empirical Analysis.”


March 15, 2010, 4:59 PM ET

Michael Lewis’s ‘The Big Short’? Read the Harvard Thesis Instead!

By Peter Lattman

Deal Journal has yet to read “The Big Short,” Michael Lewis’s yarn on the financial crisis that hit stores today. We did, however, read his acknowledgments, where Lewis praises “A.K. Barnett-Hart, a Harvard undergraduate who had just  written a thesis about the market for subprime mortgage-backed CDOs that remains more interesting than any single piece of Wall Street research on the subject.”

A.K. Barnett-Hart

While unsure if we can stomach yet another book on the crisis, a killer thesis on the topic? Now that piqued our curiosity. We tracked down Barnett-Hart, a 24-year-old financial analyst at a large New York investment bank. She met us for coffee last week to discuss her thesis, “The Story of the CDO Market Meltdown: An Empirical Analysis.” Handed in a year ago this week at the depths of the market collapse, the paper was awarded summa cum laude and won virtually every thesis honor, including the Harvard Hoopes Prize for outstanding scholarly work.

Last October, Barnett-Hart, already pulling all-nighters at the bank (we agreed to not name her employer), received a call from Lewis, who had heard about her thesis from a Harvard doctoral student. Lewis was blown away.

“It was a classic example of the innocent going to Wall Street and asking the right questions,” said Mr. Lewis, who in his 20s wrote “Liar’s Poker,” considered a defining book on Wall Street culture. “Her thesis shows there were ways to discover things that everyone should have wanted to know. That it took a 22-year-old Harvard student to find them out is just outrageous.”

Barnett-Hart says she wasn’t the most obvious candidate to produce such scholarship. She grew up in Boulder, Colo., the daughter of a physics professor and full-time homemaker. A gifted violinist, Barnett-Hart deferred admission at Harvard to attend Juilliard, where she was accepted into a program studying the violin under Itzhak Perlman. After a year, she headed to Cambridge, Mass., for a broader education. There, with vague designs on being pre-Med, she randomly took “Ec 10,” the legendary introductory economics course taught by Martin Feldstein.

“I thought maybe this would help me, like, learn to manage my money or something,” said Barnett-Hart, digging into a granola parfait at Le Pain Quotidien. She enjoyed how the subject mixed current events with history, got an A (natch) and declared economics her concentration.

Barnett-Hart’s interest in CDOs stemmed from a summer job at an investment bank in the summer of 2008 between junior and senior years. During a rotation on the mortgage securitization desk, she noticed everyone was in a complete panic. “These CDOs had contaminated everything,” she said. “The stock market was collapsing and these securities were affecting the broader economy. At that moment I became obsessed and decided I wanted to write about the financial crisis.”

Back at Harvard, against the backdrop of the financial system’s near-total collapse, Barnett-Hart approached professors with an idea of writing a thesis about CDOs and their role in the crisis. “Everyone discouraged me because they said I’d never be able to find the data,” she said. “I was urged to do something more narrow, more focused, more knowable. That made me more determined.”

She emailed scores of Harvard alumni. One pointed her toward LehmanLive, a comprehensive database on CDOs. She received scores of other data leads. She began putting together charts and visuals, holding off on analysis until she began to see patterns–how Merrill Lynch and Citigroup were the top originators, how collateral became heavily concentrated in subprime mortgages and other CDOs, how the credit ratings procedures were flawed, etc.

“If you just randomly start regressing everything, you can end up doing an unlimited amount of regressions,” she said, rolling her eyes. She says nearly all the work was in the research; once completed,  she jammed out the paper in a couple of weeks.

“It’s an incredibly impressive piece of work,” said Jeremy Stein, a Harvard economics professor who included the thesis on a reading list for a course he’s teaching this semester on the financial crisis. “She pulled together an enormous amount of information in a way that’s both intelligent and accessible.”

Barnett-Hart’s thesis is highly critical of Wall Street and “their irresponsible underwriting practices.” So how is it that she can work for the very institutions that helped create the notorious CDOs she wrote about?

“After writing my thesis, it became clear to me that the culture at these investment banks needed to change and that incentives needed to be realigned to reward more than just short-term profit seeking,” she wrote in an email. “And how would Wall Street ever change, I thought, if the people that work there do not change? What these banks needed is for outsiders to come in with a fresh perspective, question the way business was done, and bring a new appreciation for the true purpose of an investment bank – providing necessary financial services, not creating unnecessary products to bolster their own profits.”

Ah, the innocence of youth.

Here is a copy of the thesis: 2009-CDOmeltdown

Posted in foreclosure fraudComments (1)

Move Your Money…

Move Your Money…


Move your money to a community bank or a credit union…watch the videos.

[youtube=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Icqrx0OimSs]

[youtube=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8AmfNft0Eow]

Here is Arianna Huffington: Move Your Money: A New Year’s Resolution

Go HERE to see where to go to move your money in your area

Posted in bank of america, bear stearns, chase, citi, concealment, conspiracy, corruption, FED FRAUD, geithner, indymac, jpmorgan chase, Mortgage Foreclosure Fraud, onewest, wachovia, washington mutual, wells fargoComments (0)

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