“If the people cannot trust their government to do the job for which it exists
– to protect them and to promote their common welfare – all else is lost.”
– BARACK OBAMA, speech, Aug. 28, 2006
Economics Editor, AlterNet; Fellow, Campaign for America’s Future
Posted: September 12, 2010 02:52 PM
The Washington Post has published a very silly op-ed by Chrystia Freeland accusing President Barack Obama of unfairly “demonizing” Wall Street. Freeland wants to see Obama tone down his rhetoric and play nice with executives in pursuit of a harmonious economic recovery. The trouble is, Obama hasn’t actually deployed harsh words against Wall Street. What’s more, in order to avoid being characterized as “anti-business,” the Obama administration has refused to mete out serious punishment for outright financial fraud. Complaining about nouns and adjectives is a little ridiculous when handcuffs and prison sentences are in order.
Freeland is a long-time business editor at Reuters and the Financial Times, and the story she spins about the financial crisis comes across as very reasonable. It’s also completely inaccurate. Here’s the key line:
“Stricter regulation of financial services is necessary not because American bankers were bad, but because the rules governing them were.”
Bank regulations were lousy, of course. But Wall Street spent decades lobbying hard for those rules, and screamed bloody murder when Obama had the audacity to tweak them. More importantly, the financial crisis was not only the result of bad rules. It was the result of bad rules and rampant, straightforward fraud, something a seasoned business editor like Freeland ought to know. Seeking economic harmony with criminals seems like a pretty poor foundation for an economic recovery.
The FBI was warning about an “epidemic” of mortgage fraud as early as 2004. Mortgage fraud is typically perpetrated by lenders, not borrowers — 80 percent of the time, according to the FBI. Banks made a lot of quick bucks over the past decade by illegally conning borrowers. Then bankers who knew these loans were fraudulent still packaged them into securities and sold them to investors without disclosing that fraud. They lied to their own shareholders about how many bad loans were on their books, and lied to them about the bonuses that were derived from the entire scheme. When you do these things, you are stealing lots of money from innocent people, and you are, in fact, behaving badly (to put it mildly).
The fraud allegations that have emerged over the past year are not restricted to a few bad apples at shady companies– they involve some of the largest players in global finance. Washington Mutual executives knew their company was issuing fraudulent loans, and securitized them anyway without stopping the influx of fraud in the lending pipeline. Wachovia is settling charges that it illegally laundered $380 billion in drug money in order to maintain access to liquidity. Barclays is accused of illegally laundering money from Iran, Sudan and other nations, jumping through elaborate technical hoops to conceal the source of their funds. Goldman Sachs set up its own clients to fail and bragged about their “shitty deals.” Citibank executives deceived their shareholders about the extent of their subprime mortgage holdings. Bank of America executives concealed heavy losses from the Merrill Lynch merger, and then lied to their shareholders about the massive bonuses they were paying out. IndyMac Bank and at least five other banks cooked their books by backdating capital injections.
From Academy Award® nominated filmmaker, Charles Ferguson (“No End In Sight”), comes INSIDE JOB, the first film to expose the shocking truth behind the economic crisis of 2008. The global financial meltdown, at a cost of over $20 trillion, resulted in millions of people losing their homes and jobs. Through extensive research and interviews with major financial insiders, politicians and journalists, INSIDE JOB traces the rise of a rogue industry and unveils the corrosive relationships which have corrupted politics, regulation and academia.
Narrated by Academy Award® winner Matt Damon, INSIDE JOB was made on location in the United States, Iceland, England, France, Singapore, and China.
PIA MARIE T. CORDERO ALOUA, Plaintiff,
v.
AURORA LOAN SERVICES, LLC; LEHMAN BROTHERS BANK, FSB; QUALITY LOAN SERVICE CORPORATION; Does I-X, inclusive, Defendants.
Case No. 2:09-CV-00207-KJD-RJJ.
United States District Court, D. Nevada.
June 23, 2010.
ORDER
KENT J. DAWSON, District Judge. Currently before the Court is Defendants Aurora Loan Services, LLC, and Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB’s Motion to Dismiss (#15).[1] Plaintiff Pia Marie T. Cordero Aloua filed a Response and Opposition (#18) to Defendants’ Motion on October 5, 2009, to which Defendants filed a Reply (#19) on October 20, 2009.
I. Background
Plaintiff financed the real property located at 116 Peachy Court in Las Vegas, Nevada (“subject property”) on or about the 5th day of July, 2007. At that time, Plaintiff executed an adjustable rate loan (“first loan”) in the principal amount of $768,987.00 and a fixed-rate balloon loan (“second loan”) in the principal amount of $144,185.00. Lehman Brothers, which changed its name to Aurora Bank on April 24, 2009, was the original lender, and Aurora Loan Services (“ALS”) was appointed as the loan servicer on August 16, 2007. Plaintiff’s first loan, which was placed in the sub-prime category, was financed based upon a yearly adjustable interest rate of 9.375% and was to be paid to Lehman Brothers by monthly payments beginning in September 2007. Plaintiff avers that the sub-prime designation of her loan, which led to higher fees and interest, was in error because Plaintiff had verifiable income and a credit score sufficient to qualify for the traditional prime rate. Defendants aver that Plaintiff defaulted on her loans in December 2007, leading to foreclosure proceedings which were ultimately completed on July 14, 2008 through Quality Loan Service Corporation (“QLS”), the appointed substitute trustee. ALS claims to have acquired title to the subject property through said foreclosure proceedings. Plaintiff avers, however, that she did not default on her loans and that the foreclosure sale was carried out without serving the required notices and without giving Plaintiff the appropriate opportunity to avert the sale. On January 7, 2009, Plaintiff commenced this action in the District Court for Clark County, Nevada. The action was removed to this Court on February 2, 2009 on the basis of federal question and diversity jurisdiction. (See #1.) On September 2, 2009, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint against all Defendants, alleging the following causes of action: (1) intentional misrepresentation; (2) negligence per se under the federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”) and the federal Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”); (3) negligence; (4) rescission under TILA; (5) wrongful foreclosure; and (6) quiet title. On September 21, 2009, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint (#15). For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants the Motion to Dismiss in part and denies it in part.
II. Discussion
A. Motion to Dismiss
A court may dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). A properly pled complaint must provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands “more than labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). “Factual allegations must be enough to rise above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (internal citation omitted). In Iqbal, the Supreme Court recently clarified the two-step approach district courts are to apply when considering motions to dismiss. First, the Court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint; however, legal conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Id. at 1950. Mere recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory statements, do not suffice. Id. at 1949. Second, the Court must consider whether the factual allegations in the complaint allege a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 1950. A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff’s complaint alleges facts that allow the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. at 1949. Where the complaint does not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has “alleged—but not shown—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). When the claims in a complaint have not crossed the line from conceivable to plausible, plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
III. Analysis
A. Intentional Misrepresentation
Plaintiff alleges Defendants knowingly made false misrepresentations to Plaintiff, upon which Plaintiff justifiably relied to her detriment. To state a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation in Nevada, a plaintiff must allege that (1) defendant made a false representation; (2) defendant knew or believed the representation to be false; (3) defendant intended to induce plaintiff to rely on the misrepresentation; and (4) plaintiff suffered damages as a result of his reliance. Bartmettler v. Reno Air, Inc., 956 P.2d 1382, 1386 (Nev. 1998). Misrepresentation is a form of fraud where a false representation is relied on in fact. See Pacific Maxon, Inc. v. Wilson, 96 Nev. 867, 871 (Nev. 1980). Fraud has a stricter pleading standard under Rule 9, which requires a party to “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud.” FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). Pleading fraud with particularity requires “an account of the time, place, and specific content of the false representations, as well as the identities of the parties of the misrepresentations.” Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 764 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Morris v. Bank of Nev., 886 P.2d 454, 456 n.1 (Nev. 1994). The Ninth Circuit has held, however, that the stricter pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) “may be relaxed with respect to matters within the opposing party’s knowledge,” reasoning that “[i]n such situations, plaintiffs can not (sic) be expected to have personal knowledge of the relevant facts.” Neubronner v. Milken, 6 F.3d 666, 672 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1439 (9th Cir. 1987); Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 540 (9th Cir. 1989). Even under this relaxed version of Rule 9(b), however, “a plaintiff who makes allegations on information and belief must state the factual basis for the belief.” Id. Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants knowingly concealed the true nature of her credit score and defrauded her by placing her loan in the sub-prime category to charge higher commissions. Plaintiff also alleges, among other things, that Defendants misrepresented the fees charged and paid in association with her loan, as well as her eligibility to participate in a loan modification program. Taking these assertions as true, the Court finds Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim for fraud: Plaintiff alleges that Defendants intentionally misrepresented information to her, that she relied on these representations, and that she was damaged as a result.
B. Negligence per se
To state a claim for negligence per se, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he or she belongs to a class of persons that a statute was intended to protect; (2) defendant violated the relevant statute; (3) plaintiff’s injuries are the type against which the statute was intended to protect; (4) the violation was the legal cause of plaintiff’s injury; and (5) plaintiff suffered damages. See Anderson v. Baltrusaitus, 944 P.2d 797, 799 (Nev. 1997). Whether a particular statute establishes a standard of care in a negligence action is a question of law. Vega v. E. Courtyard Assocs., 24 P.3d 219, 221 (Nev. 2001). Plaintiff claims Defendants violated provisions of TILA, 15 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq., and RESPA, 12 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq., dealing with a lender’s disclosure duties. Defendants argue that the TILA claim is time barred because the statute of limitations has run. Section 1640(e) of TILA requires that claims be brought within one year of the date of the loan transaction. Interpreting this provision, the Ninth Circuit has held that while as a general rule the limitations period runs from the date the transaction is consummated, the doctrine of equitable tolling may, when appropriate, toll the limitations period until the borrower has had a reasonable opportunity to discover the facts giving rise to a TILA claim. King v. California, 784 F.2d 910, 915 (9th Cir. 1986). The Ninth Circuit has also held that the equitable tolling analysis is a factual one: the finder of fact must determine whether equitable tolling will prevent unjust results or maintain the integrity of the relevant statute. Id. Because these factual questions are yet to be resolved, the Court is unable to say at this stage in the litigation whether the statute of limitations has run. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s TILA claim on statute of limitations grounds is denied. Moreover, after reviewing the Complaint, the Court finds Plaintiff has adequately stated a TILA claim against Defendants. Plaintiff alleges Defendants (1) failed to disclose the identity of persons and entities who share the service fees and other charges for her loans; (2) failed to disclose the percentage of the loan amount paid to the nominal lender; and (3) failed to disclose relevant credit terms to enable Plaintiff to compare market rates and prevent unfair credit practices. (Dkt. #14, Compl. ¶ 26-28.) Taking these assertions as true, Plaintiff has stated a viable claim for relief under TILA. Plaintiff has failed, however, to sufficiently state a claim for negligence per se under RESPA. 12 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. As a general rule, RESPA does not create an express or implied private right of action. Collins v. FMHA-USDA, 105 F.3d 1366, 1367-68 (11th Cir. 1997); Bamba v. Resource Bank, 568 F. Supp. 2d 32, 34-35 (D.D.C. 2008); Morrison v. Brookstone, 415 F. Supp. 2d 801, 806 (S.D. Ohio 2005); McWhorter v. Ford Consumer Fin. Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1064 (N.D. Ga. 1997). A limited exception to this rule exists: a private right of action exists under RESPA when a specific statutory provision mentions such a right. See Bloom v. Martin, 865 F. Supp. 1377, 1384-85 (N.D. Cal. 1994). Although Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated several provisions of RESPA, the only section she references with any specificity is § 2605. Accordingly, because this section of the statute does not provide a private right of action, Plaintiff’s claim for negligence per se under RESPA fails.
C. Rescission
Plaintiff also alleges she is entitled to a rescission of the mortgage contract under TILA, 15 U.S.C. § 1635. Plaintiff is incorrect. Section 1635 of TILA establishes that lenders must notify borrowers of their right to rescind and outlines the penalties for failure to comply with this requirement. Nonetheless, § 1635 expressly states that these provisions do not apply to “residential mortgage transactions.” A residential mortgage transaction is defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1602(w) as a “transaction in which a mortgage . . . interest is created or retained against the consumer’s principal dwelling.” See also 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(24). This is precisely what Plaintiff’s mortgage contract entailed: the parties entered into a transaction in which Plaintiff attained financing from Defendants to acquire residential property. Because Plaintiff is not entitled to rescind the mortgage contract, her rescission claim under § 1635 fails as a matter of law and Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is granted as to Plaintiff’s rescission claims.
D. Wrongful Foreclosure
Plaintiff also alleges wrongful foreclosure. “An action for the tort of wrongful foreclosure will lie if the trustor or mortgagor can establish that at the time the power of sale was exercised or the foreclosure occurred, no breach of condition or failure of performance existed on the mortgagor’s or trustor’s part which would have authorized the foreclosure or exercise of the power of sale.” Collins v. Union Federal Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 662 P.2d 610, 623 (Nev. 1983). “The material issue of fact in a wrongful foreclosure claim is whether the trustor was in default when the power of sale was exercised.” Id. Here, Plaintiff affirmatively alleges that she was not in default of payment to the lender at the time the foreclosure occurred, and therefore, the representations as stated on the Notice of Default were false.[2] Taking these assertions as true, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately stated a claim for wrongful foreclosure against Defendants. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is denied as to Plaintiff’s wrongful foreclosure claim.
E. Negligence against QLS
To bring a negligence claim in Nevada, a plaintiff must show that (1) defendant owed a duty of care to plaintiff; (2) defendant breached that duty; (3) defendant’s breach was the actual and proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries; and (4) plaintiff was injured. Scialabba v. Brandise Constr., 921 P.2d 928, 930 (Nev. 1996). Liability based on negligence does not exist without a breach of duty. Bradshaw v. Blystone Equip. Co. of Nev., 386 P.2d 396, 397 (Nev. 1963). Plaintiff claims that Defendant QLS, “as trustee under the deed of trust, had a duty to Plaintiff to ensure that any party instructing it to conduct a foreclosure sale of the property actually owned and had rights under the note and deed of trust.” (See #14, Compl. ¶ 32.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant QLS’s failure to take the appropriate steps to comply with this duty was the actual and proximate cause of damages to Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 33-39.) At this point, because Plaintiff’s claim for wrongful foreclosure remains, the Court also finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled a claim for negligence.
F. Quiet Title
Finally, Plaintiff brings a claim of quiet title, arguing that because foreclosure was wrongful, Plaintiff remains the rightful owner of the subject property. Taking these assertions as true, Plaintiff has stated a claim for wrongful foreclosure against Defendants. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is denied as to Plaintiff’s quiet title claim.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (#15) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for intentional misrepresentation is DENIED.
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for negligence per se under TILA is DENIED.
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for negligence per se under RESPA is GRANTED.
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for negligence against QLS is DENIED.
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for rescission under TILA is GRANTED.
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for wrongful foreclosure is DENIED.
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for quiet title in DENIED.
[1] Defendant Quality Loan Service Corporation filed a Joinder (#22) to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss that is considered together with Defendant’s Motion herein. [2] If matters outside of the pleadings are submitted in conjunction with a motion to dismiss, Rule 12(b) grants courts discretion to either accept and consider, or to disregard such materials. See Isquith v. Middle S. Utils., Inc., 847 F.2d 186, 193 n.3 (5th Cir.1988). A court exercises this discretion by examining whether the submitted material, and the resulting conversion from the Rule 12(b)(6) to the Rule 56 procedure, may facilitate disposing of the action. Id. at 193 n.3. If the court elects to convert the motion, “[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Here, Defendants have attempted to provide evidence refuting Plaintiff’s no default claim, Plaintiff however, has not had an adequate opportunity to fully brief this issue. Accordingly, without opining whether Plaintiff’s claims may survive a summary judgment motion, the Court elects not to convert Defendants’ immediate Motion into one for summary judgment.
United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts, Eastern Division.
May 24, 2010.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION OF PROPERTY ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC. FOR RELIEF FROM THE AUTOMATIC STAY
FRANK J. BAILEY, Bankruptcy Judge
In the Chapter 13 case of debtor Simeon Moreno, Property Asset Management, Inc. (“PAM”), claiming to be the assignee of a mortgage originally given by the debtor to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) as nominee for lender GE Money Bank, moved for relief from the automatic stay to foreclose the mortgage. Moreno initially opposed the motion but then withdrew his objection, whereupon the Court granted the relief requested. Months later, at Moreno’s request, the Court vacated the order granting relief from stay and scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the Motion for Relief from Stay for the limited purpose of reconsidering whether PAM had an interest in the mortgage it sought to foreclose and, to that extent, standing to seek relief from stay.[1] Having held the evidentiary hearing and received proposed findings and conclusions, the Court now enters the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Findings of Fact and Procedural History
On January 23, 2007, Moreno executed a promissory note in the principal amount of $492,000, payable to lender GE Money Bank. GE subsequently endorsed the note in blank, whereupon possession of the note was transferred through a series of holders and ultimately to Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. (“LBHI”), who held the note when PAM filed its Motion for Relief from Stay and continues to hold it now.[2] LBHI, through one of its employees and through LBHI’s attorney, who not coincidentally also is PAM’s attorney in the present matter, produced the original note at the evidentiary hearing. PAM is not now a holder of the note or an entity for whose benefit another has held the note.
To secure the promissory note, Moreno gave a mortgage on the real property at 5 Maple Street, West Roxbury, Massachusetts (the “Property”) to MERS as nominee for GE (the “Mortgage”). The Mortgage specifies that MERS “is a separate corporation that is acting solely as a nominee for [GE] and [GE’s] successors and assigns. MERS is the mortgagee under this security instrument.” The Mortgage further provides that Moreno does hereby mortgage, grant and convey to MERS (solely as nominee for [GE] and [GE’s] successors and assigns) and to the successors and assigns of MERS, with power of sale, the [Property]. . . . Borrower understands and agrees that MERS holds only legal title to the interests granted by Borrower in this Security Instrument, but, if necessary to comply with law or custom, MERS (as nominee for [GE] and [GE’s] successors and assigns) has the right: to exercise any or all of those interests, including, but not limited to, the right to foreclose and sell the Property; and to take any action required of [GE] including, but not limited to, releasing and canceling this Security Instrument.
The Mortgage was duly recorded.
MERS administers an electronic registry to track the transfer of ownership interest and servicing rights in mortgage loans. With respect to certain loans of which its members are the beneficial owners, MERS also serves as mortgagee of record and holds legal title to the mortgages in a nominee capacity. MERS remains the mortgagee of record when beneficial ownership interests or servicing rights are sold from one member of the MERS system to another. When the beneficial interest in a mortgage loan is transferred from one member of the MERS system to another, MERS tracks the transfer through its internal records. When rights are transferred from a member of the MERS system to a non-member, MERS executes and records an assignment from MERS to the non-member.
To facilitate the execution of the assignments from MERS, MERS designates “certifying officers,” who are typically employees of MERS member firms. MERS authorizes these employees, through formal corporate resolutions, to execute assignments on behalf of MERS. On or about January 6, 2005, MERS, through a document entitled Corporate Resolution and issued by its board of directors, authorized Denise Bailey, an employee of Litton Loan Servicing L.P. (“Litton”), a member of MERS, to execute such assignments on behalf of MERS. In the language of the authorizing document (the “MERS Authorization”),[3] Ms. Bailey was authorized to, among other things, “assign the lien of any mortgage loan naming MERS as the mortgagee when the Member [Litton] is also the current promissory note-holder, or if the mortgage loan is registered on the MERS System, is shown [sic] to be registered to the Member”[4]; and Ms. Bailey was further authorized to “take any such actions and execute such documents as may be necessary to fulfill the Member’s servicing obligations to the beneficial owner of such mortgage loan (including mortgage loans that are removed from the MERS System as a result of the transfer thereof to a non-member of MERS).” In each instance, Bailey’s authority to act is dependent on the existence of a specified relationship of Litton, the MERS member for whom she is employed, to the loan in question.
The Moreno loan was entered into the MERS tracking database in the ordinary course of business. Thereafter, MERS tracked the beneficial interest in the loan. The beneficial interest was transferred from G.E. Money Bank to WMC Mortgage Corporation; then, on September 19, 2007, from WMC Mortgage Corporation to Aurora Bank FSB (formerly known as Lehman Brothers Bank FSB), and then, on July 30, 2008, from Aurora Bank FSB to LBHI. Aurora Bank was at all relevant times a wholly-owned subsidiary of LBHI.
With respect to the Moreno Mortgage, MERS remained the mortgagee of record until, on or about April 30, 2008, MERS, acting through Denise Bailey, assigned the Mortgage to PAM. At the time, Aurora Bank FSB was the beneficial owner of the loan. In executing the MERS assignment to PAM, Ms. Bailey purported to be acting under her MERS Authorization.
The MERS Authorization limited Ms. Bailey’s authority to act for MERS to matters with respect to which Litton was involved in at least one of the ways specified in the above-quoted language from the MERS Authorization. There is evidence, and I find, that Aurora Bank FSB had requested that Litton transfer the loan from MERS to PAM in anticipation of foreclosure. However, PAM has adduced no evidence that Litton had any specified connection to this loan at the time it executed this assignment. There is no evidence that Litton was then (or at any time) the servicer of the loan for Aurora Bank or that Litton was registered as servicer of the loan in the MERS system.[5] (PAM does not contend that Litton was the holder of the promissory note or the owner of the beneficial interest in the loan.)
Scott Drosdick, a vice-president of LBHI and witness for PAM at the evidentiary hearing, testified that Aurora Bank’s instruction to Litton to transfer the mortgage to PAM was later “ratified by LBHI.” Drosdick did not explain what he meant by this, precisely how and when this ratification occurred. Absent such evidence and clarification, this testimony is too vague to have any definite meaning; accordingly I give it no weight.
By a master servicing agreement dated February 1, 1999, LBHI engaged Aurora Loan Services, Inc., now known as Aurora Loan Services LLC (“ALS”), as master servicer of certain loans, including eventually the present Moreno loan. In turn, ALS engaged Litton to service certain loans, including eventually this same loan.
After Bailey executed the MERS assignment to PAM, Bailey executed another assignment of the same mortgage from MERS to LBHI. This second assignment was never recorded; nor is there evidence that it was ever delivered by MERS to LBHI.
Moreno filed a petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on October 13, 2008, commencing the present bankruptcy case. On November 13, 2008, LBHI, acting through its servicer Litton Loan Servicing, LP, filed a proof of claim in this case; the proof of claim asserts a claim, secured by real estate, in the total amount of $530,168.04, the same secured claim as PAM now seeks relief from stay to enforce by foreclosure. On the proof of claim form itself, Litton actually identifies the creditor claimant as simply “Litton,” but on an explanatory document attached to the proof of claim form, Litton states that the claim is filed by “Litton Loan Servicing, LP, as Servicing Agent for Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.” The proof of claim does not mention PAM or indicate in any way that the mortgage securing the claim is held by anyone other than LBHI.
On March 31, 2009, and at LBHI’s direction, PAM filed the present motion for relief from the automatic stay, seeking relief from the automatic stay to foreclose and to preserve its rights as to a potential deficiency. PAM intends and is obligated to remit the proceeds of the intended foreclosure sale to Aurora Loan Services LLC, as servicer for LBHI. Regarding ownership of the note and Mortgage, PAM stated in the motion only that it was the holder of a mortgage originally given by Moreno to MERS, that the mortgage secured a note given by Moreno to GE, and that MERS had assigned the mortgage to PAM. PAM did not indicate that LBHI was the current holder of the note or that it held the mortgage as nominee for the benefit of LBHI or of any other entity. The motion did not mention LBHI.
Moreno filed a response to the motion, in essence an objection, in which he expressly admitted PAM’s allegation that his prepetition arrearage was $39,442.49 and, by lack of denial, tacitly admitted that Moreno was some four months in arrears on his postpetition payments under the mortgage. By these allegations and admissions, PAM has established that Moreno is in default on his mortgage loan obligations; the Court rejects Moreno’s request for a finding that PAM has not established a default. The response made no issue of PAM’s standing to foreclose or to seek relief from stay and did not dispute PAM’s allegations regarding ownership of the note and Mortgage. In any event, before a hearing was held on the motion, Moreno, through counsel, withdrew his objection. Consequently, on April 28, 2009, and without a hearing or any review of apparent inconsistencies in the bankruptcy record concerning ownership of the mortgage and note, the court granted PAM relief from the automatic stay to foreclose and to preserve its rights as to a potential deficiency.
PAM had not yet foreclosed when, on December 2, 2009 and by new counsel, Moreno filed an adversary complaint against PAM and, with it, a motion for preliminary injunction. The complaint sought among other things (i) an order invalidating the mortgage on account of irregularities in its origination and (ii) a declaration that PAM was not the holder of the mortgage and note. In the motion for preliminary injunction, Moreno asked that the foreclosure be stayed, or that the automatic stay be reimposed, pending disposition of the adversary proceeding. On December 7, 2009, after a hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction, the Court found that the motion was, in part, essentially one to vacate the order granting relief from the automatic stay, vacated that order, and scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the motion for relief. The order specified that the sole issue at the evidentiary hearing would be PAM’s standing to seek relief from the automatic stay, all other issues under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) being deemed established. After discovery, the evidentiary hearing was held on April 8, 2010, and, with the submission of proposed findings and conclusions, the matter was then taken under advisement.
Discussion
As the party seeking relief from stay to foreclose a mortgage on the debtor’s property, PAM bears the burden of proving that it has authority under applicable state law to foreclose the mortgage in question and, by virtue of that authority, standing to move for relief from the automatic stay to foreclose. PAM contends that it has such authority and standing because, although it does not hold the promissory note that the mortgage secures, it does have title to the mortgage itself; and it holds that title as nominee of and for the benefit of the note holder, LBHI, and is foreclosing for LBHI. In these circumstances, PAM contends, a mortgagee has a right under Massachusetts law to foreclose for the benefit of the note holder and therefore standing to move for relief from stay to foreclose. The Debtor objects, arguing (among other things) that Massachusetts law prohibits foreclosure by one who holds only the mortgage and not the note it secures. I need not address the merits of this and other objections because, even if the theory is a valid one, it requires proof that PAM is the present title holder of the mortgage, and PAM has not carried its burden in this regard.
To show that it presently holds the mortgage, PAM must show a valid assignment of the mortgage from MERS to itself. PAM contends that it holds the mortgage by assignment from MERS. Accordingly, PAM must show that the assignment, which was executed for MERS by Denise Bailey, was within the scope of Bailey’s limited authority to act for MERS.
Ms. Bailey’s authority to act for MERS is defined in the MERS Authorization in seven enumerated paragraphs. In each, Ms. Bailey’s authority to act is dependent on the existence of a specified relationship of Litton, the MERS member by whom she is employed, to the loan in question. PAM has submitted no evidence of the existence of any such relationship. The beneficial owner of the loan at the time of the assignment was Aurora Bank FSB, but there is no evidence that Litton was at the time the servicer of the loan for Aurora Bank FSB or was registered with MERS as such. The Court does not find that Aurora Bank FSB had not retained Litton as its servicer; there is simply no evidence on the issue. But the burden is on PAM to prove that it had, and PAM has not adduced evidence to that effect.
Accordingly, by a separate order, the Court will deny PAM’s motion for relief from the automatic stay without prejudice to renewal upon proper proof.
[1] All other issues were resolved upon entry of the original order granting relief from stay. No cause has been adduced to revisit any but the narrow issue of standing.
[2] Moreno contends that LBHI, which is in bankruptcy proceedings of its own, may have sold its interest in the note through a court-approved sale in its bankruptcy case. However, Moreno does not contend that possession of the note has passed from LBHI to the alleged purchaser (or any nominee of the purchaser), and therefore the alleged possible sale is irrelevant, as possession undisputedly remains in LBHI. In any event, Moreno attempted to establish the fact of the alleged sale by designating certain documents on the docket of the LBHI case and asking the Court to take judicial notice of these and then to find them on its own and to determine from them whether the promissory note in question was among the assets transferred. Having found the alleged sale to be irrelevant, the Court declined to take judicial notice of the bankruptcy documents. However, the proffer also failed for two additional reasons: first, that Moreno did not take a position as to whether a sale did occur, only that the Moreno note may have been among those transferred in the sale; and second, even if the court had taken judicial notice as requested, it remained Moreno’s obligation, which he has not fulfilled, to produce the documents in question and to explain in the first instance how one would conclude from them that the asset in question was among those transferred.
[3] MERS Corporate Resolution, attached to Bailey Affidavit as Exhibit 1.
[4] The grammatical difficulty in this second clause is native to the authorizing document.
[5] The original affidavit of Scott Drosdick includes the following two sentences:
By Master Servicing Agreement dated February 1, 1999, LBHI engaged Aurora Bank FSB (f/k/a Lehman Brothers Bank FSB), to master service, among other things, the Loan [the Moreno loan]. In turn, Aurora Bank FSB engaged Litton pursuant to a Flow Subservicing Agreement dated October 1, 2007, to service the loan.”
By an amendment to the affidavit and in testimony, Drosdick later amended his affidavit to correct this passage by striking Aurora Bank FSB from the first sentence and in its place inserting Aurora Loan Services LLC. Drosdick did not expressly change the second sentence, but that sentence, which begins with the critical words “in turn,” would be nonsensical unless the same substitution—Aurora Loan Services LLC for Aurora Bank FSB—were also made in the second sentence. Therefore, though the second sentence might perhaps be read in isolation as evidence that Litton was servicing the loan for Aurora Bank FSB at the time when Bailey executed the assignment, that sentence cannot credibly be so construed.
NEW YORK (Reuters) – Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc (LEHMQ.PK) on Wednesday sued JPMorgan Chase & Co (JPM.N), accusing the second-largest U.S. bank of illegally siphoning billions of dollars of desperately-needed assets in the days leading up to its record bankruptcy.
The lawsuit filed in Manhattan bankruptcy court accused JPMorgan of using its “unparalleled access” to inside details of Lehman’s distress to extract $8.6 billion of collateral in the four business days ahead of Lehman’s September 15, 2008, bankruptcy, including $5 billion on the final business day.
JPMorgan was Lehman’s main “clearing” bank, in which it acts as a go-between in Lehman’s dealings with other parties.
According to the complaint, JPMorgan knew from this relationship that Lehman’s viability was fast weakening, and threatened to deprive Lehman of critical clearing services unless it posted an excessive amount of collateral.
“With this financial gun to Lehman’s head, JPMorgan was able to extract extraordinarily one-sided agreements from Lehman literally overnight,” the complaint said. “Those billions of dollars in collateral rightfully belong to the Lehman estate and its creditors.”
Lehman also said JPMorgan officials including Chief Executive Jamie Dimon decided to extract the collateral after learning from meetings with Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke and then-U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson that the government would not rescue Lehman from bankruptcy.
In the widely expected lawsuit, Lehman and its official committee of unsecured creditors are seeking $5 billion of damages, a return of the collateral and other remedies.
JPMorgan spokesman Joe Evangelisti called the lawsuit “meritless,” and said the bank will defend against it.
Any money recovered could increase the payout to creditors. Lehman has also sued Barclays Plc (BARC.L) to recover an $11.2 billion “windfall” from the takeover of U.S. assets.
In March, a bankruptcy judge approved an accord providing for JPMorgan to return several billion dollars of assets to Lehman’s estate, but giving Lehman a right to sue further.
Lehman collapsed after letting its balance sheet swell through exposure to commercial real estate, subprime mortgages and other risky sectors. With $639 billion of assets, Lehman was by far the largest U.S. company to go bankrupt.
EXAMINER REPORT
In his March report on Lehman’s bankruptcy, court-appointed examiner Anton Valukas said Lehman could raise a “colorable claim” against JPMorgan over the collateral demands.
He nevertheless said JPMorgan could raise “substantial defenses” under U.S. bankruptcy law.
Evangelisti contended that “as the examiner’s report makes clear, it was the ill-advised decisions of Lehman and its principals to take on perilous leverage and to double down on subprime mortgages and overpriced commercial real estate — and not conduct by our firm — that led to Lehman’s demise.”
Lehman, though, maintained that JPMorgan extracted the collateral to “catapult” itself ahead of other creditors.
“A century ago, John Pierpont Morgan used his position atop the world of finance to shore up a teetering firm and rescue the nation from the brink of financial collapse,” the complaint said, referring to the Panic of 1907.
“A century later, when the nation faced another epic financial crisis, Morgan’s namesake firm stripped a faltering Lehman Brothers of desperately needed cash,” it added.
The case is In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc et al, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New York, No. 08-13555.
Stop trying to get through the front door…use the back door…Get a Forensic Audit!
Not all Forensic Auditors are alike! FMI may locate exactly where the loan sits today.
This will make your lender WANT to communicate with you. Discover what they don’t want you to know. Go back in time and start from the minute you might have seen advertisements that got you hooked ” No Money Down” “100% Financing” “1% interest” “No income, No assetts” NO PROBLEM! Were you given proper disclosures on time, proper documents, was your loan broker providing you fiduciary guidance or did they hide undisclosed fees from you? Did they conceal illegal kickbacks? Did your broker tell you “Don’t worry before your new terms come due we will refinance you”? Did they inflate your appraisal? Did the developer coerce you to *USE* a certain “lender” and *USE* a certain title company?
If so you need a forensic audit. But keep in mind FMI:
DO NOT STOP FORECLOSURE
DO NOT NEGOTIATE ON YOUR BEHALF WITH YOUR BANK OR LENDER
DO NOT MODIFY YOUR LOAN
DO NOT TAKE CASES that is upto your attorney!
FMI does however, provide your Attorney with AMMO to bring your Lender into the negotiation table.
March 20 (Bloomberg) — The Federal Reserve Board removed an exemption it had given to six banks at the start of the crisis in 2007 aimed at boosting liquidity in financing markets for securities backed by mortgage- and asset-backed securities.
The so-called 23-A exemptions, named after a section of the Federal Reserve Act that limits such trades to protect bank depositors, were granted days after the Fed cut the discount rate by half a percentage point on Aug. 17, 2007. Their removal, announced yesterday in Washington, is part of a broad wind-down of emergency liquidity backstops by the Fed as markets normalize.
The decision in 2007 underscores how Fed officials defined the mortgage-market disruptions that year as partly driven by liquidity constraints. In hindsight, some analysts say that diagnosis turned out to be wrong.
“It was a way to prevent further deleveraging of the financial system, but that happened anyway,” said Dino Kos, managing director at Portales Partners LLC and former head of the New York Fed’s open market operations. “The underlying problem was solvency. The Fed was slow to recognize that.”
The Fed ended the exemptions in nearly identical letters to the Royal Bank of Scotland Plc, Bank of America Corp., Citigroup Inc., JPMorgan Chase & Co., Deutsche Bank AG, and Barclays Bank Plc posted on its Web site.
Backstop Liquidity
The Fed’s intent in 2007 was to provide backstop liquidity for financial markets through the discount window. In a chain of credit, investors would obtain collateralized loans from dealers, dealers would obtain collateralized loans from banks, and then banks could pledge collateral to the Fed’s discount window for 30-day credit. In Citigroup’s case, the exemption allowed such lending to its securities unit up to $25 billion.
“The goal was to stop the hemorrhaging of risk capital,” said Lou Crandall, chief economist at Wrightson ICAP LLC in Jersey City, New Jersey. “Investors were being forced out of the securities market because they couldn’t fund their positions, even in higher-quality assets in some cases.”
Using mortgage bonds without government-backed guarantees as collateral for private-market financing began to get more difficult in August 2007 following the collapse of two Bear Stearns Cos. hedge funds.
As terms for loans secured by mortgage bonds got “massively” tighter, haircuts, or the excess in collateral above the amount borrowed, on AAA home-loan securities rose that month from as little as 3 percent to as much as 10 percent, according to a UBS AG report.
Lehman Collapse
By February 2008, haircuts climbed to 20 percent, investor Luminent Mortgage Capital Inc. said at the time. After Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. collapsed in September 2008, the loans almost disappeared.
“These activities were intended to allow the bank to extend credit to market participants in need of short-term liquidity to finance” holdings of mortgage loans and asset- backed securities, said the Fed board’s letter dated yesterday to Kathleen Juhase, associate general counsel of JPMorgan. “In light of this normalization of the term for discount window loans, the Board has terminated the temporary section 23-A exemption.”
The “normalization” refers to the Fed’s reduction in the term of discount window loans to overnight credit starting two days ago from a month previously.
The Fed eventually loaned directly to securities firms and opened the discount window to primary dealers in March 2008. Borrowings under the Primary Dealer Credit Facility soared to $146.5 billion on Oct. 1, 2008, following the collapse of Lehman Brothers two weeks earlier. Borrowings fell to zero in May 2009. The Fed closed the facility last month, along with three other emergency liquidity backstops.
Discount Rate
The Fed also raised the discount rate a quarter point in February to 0.75 percent, moving it closer to its normal spread over the federal funds rate of 1 percentage point.
The one interest rate the Fed hasn’t changed since the depths of the crisis is the benchmark lending rate. Officials kept the target for overnight loans among banks in a range of zero to 0.25 percent on March 16, where it has stood since December 2008, while retaining a pledge to keep rates low “for an extended period.”
Removing the 23-A exemptions shows the Fed wants to get “back to normal,” said Laurence Meyer, a former Fed governor and vice chairman of Macroeconomic Advisers LLC in Washington. “Everything has gone back to normal except monetary policy.”
SHOCK & AWE …I’m betting! Thanks to Bloomberg for the lawsuit to DISCLOSE! Notice how both Bloomberg & Huffington are always the ones who go after the banksters…Because they probably don’t use the banksters to fund them!
By David Glovin and Bob Van Voris
March 19 (Bloomberg) — The Federal Reserve Board must disclose documents identifying financial firms that might have collapsed without the largest U.S. government bailout ever, a federal appeals court said.
The U.S. Court of Appeals in Manhattan ruled today that the Fed must release records of the unprecedented $2 trillion U.S. loan program launched primarily after the 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. The ruling upholds a decision of a lower-court judge, who in August ordered that the information be released.
The Fed had argued that disclosure of the documents threatens to stigmatize borrowers and cause them “severe and irreparable competitive injury,” discouraging banks in distress from seeking help. A three-judge panel of the appeals court rejected that argument in a unanimous decision.
The U.S. Freedom of Information Act, or FOIA, “sets forth no basis for the exemption the Board asks us to read into it,” U.S. Circuit Chief Judge Dennis Jacobs wrote in the opinion. “If the Board believes such an exemption would better serve the national interest, it should ask Congress to amend the statute.”
The opinion may not be the final word in the bid for the documents, which was launched by Bloomberg LP, the parent of Bloomberg News, with a November 2008 lawsuit. The Fed may seek a rehearing or appeal to the full appeals court and eventually petition the U.S. Supreme Court.
Right to Know
If today’s ruling is upheld or not appealed by the Fed, it will have to disclose the requested records. That may lead to “catastrophic” results, including demands for the instant disclosure of banks seeking help from the Fed, resulting in a “death sentence” for such financial institutions, said Chris Kotowski, a bank analyst at Oppenheimer & Co. in New York.
“Whenever the Fed extends funds to a bank, it should be disclosed in private to the Congressional oversight committees, but to release it to the public I think would be a horrific mistake,” Kotowski said in an interview. “It would stigmatize the banks, it would lead to all kinds of second-guessing of the Fed, and I don’t see what public purpose is served by it.”
Senator Bernie Sanders, an Independent from Vermont, said the decision was a “major victory” for U.S. taxpayers.
“This money does not belong to the Federal Reserve,” Sanders said in a statement. “It belongs to the American people, and the American people have a right to know where more than $2 trillion of their money has gone.”
Fed Review
The Fed is reviewing the decision and considering its options for reconsideration or appeal, Fed spokesman David Skidmore said.
“We’re obviously pleased with the court’s decision, which is an important affirmation of the public’s right to know what its government is up to,” said Thomas Golden, a partner at New York-based Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP and Bloomberg’s outside counsel.
The court was asked to decide whether loan records are covered by FOIA. Historically, the type of government documents sought in the case has been protected from public disclosure because they might reveal competitive trade secrets.
The Fed had argued that it could withhold the information under an exemption that allows federal agencies to refuse disclosure of “trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential.”
Payment Processors
The Clearing House Association, which processes payments among banks, joined the case and sided with the Fed. The group includes ABN Amro Bank NV, a unit of Royal Bank of Scotland Plc, Bank of America Corp., The Bank of New York Mellon Corp., Citigroup Inc., Deutsche Bank AG, HSBC Holdings Plc, JPMorgan Chase & Co., US Bancorp and Wells Fargo & Co.
Paul Saltzman, general counsel for the Clearing House, said the decision did not address the “fundamental issue” of whether disclosure would “competitively harm” borrower banks.
“The Second Circuit declined to follow the decisions of other circuit courts recognizing that disclosure of certain confidential information can impair the effectiveness of government programs, such as lending programs,” Saltzman said in a statement.
The Clearing House is considering whether to ask for a rehearing by the full Second Circuit and, ultimately, review by the U.S. Supreme Court, he said.
Deep Crisis
Oscar Suris, a spokesman for Wells Fargo, JPMorgan spokeswoman Jennifer Zuccarelli, Bank of New York Mellon spokesman Kevin Heine, HSBC spokeswoman Juanita Gutierrez and RBS spokeswoman Linda Harper all declined to comment. Deutsche Bank spokesman Ronald Weichert couldn’t immediately comment. Bank of America declined to comment, Scott Silvestri said. Citigroup spokeswoman Shannon Bell declined to comment. U.S. Bancorp spokesman Steve Dale didn’t return phone and e-mail messages seeking comment.
Bloomberg, majority-owned by New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg, sued after the Fed refused to name the firms it lent to or disclose loan amounts or assets used as collateral under its lending programs. Most of the loans were made in response to the deepest financial crisis since the Great Depression.
Lawyers for Bloomberg argued in court that the public has the right to know basic information about the “unprecedented and highly controversial use” of public money.
“Bloomberg has been trying for almost two years to break down a brick wall of secrecy in order to vindicate the public’s right to learn basic information,” Golden wrote in court filings.
Potential Harm
Banks and the Fed warned that bailed-out lenders may be hurt if the documents are made public, causing a run or a sell- off by investors. Disclosure may hamstring the Fed’s ability to deal with another crisis, they also argued.
Much of the debate at the appeals court argument on Jan. 11 centered on the potential harm to banks if it was revealed that they borrowed from the Fed’s so-called discount window. Matthew Collette, a lawyer for the government, said banks don’t do that unless they have liquidity problems.
FOIA requires federal agencies to make government documents available to the press and public. An exception to the statute protects trade secrets and privileged or confidential financial data. In her Aug. 24 ruling, U.S. District Judge Loretta Preska in New York said the exception didn’t apply because there’s no proof banks would suffer.
Tripartite Test
In its opinion today, the appeals court said that the exception applies only if the agency can satisfy a three-part test. The information must be a trade secret or commercial or financial in character; must be obtained from a person; and must be privileged or confidential, according to the opinion.
The court said that the information sought by Bloomberg was not “obtained from” the borrowing banks. It rejected an alternative argument the individual Federal Reserve Banks are “persons,” for purposes of the law because they would not suffer the kind of harm required under the “privileged and confidential” requirement of the exemption.
In a related case, U.S. District Judge Alvin Hellerstein in New York previously sided with the Fed and refused to order the agency to release Fed documents that Fox News Network sought. The appeals court today returned that case to Hellerstein and told him to order the Fed to conduct further searches for documents and determine whether the documents should be disclosed.
“We are pleased that this information is finally, and rightfully, going to be made available to the American public,” said Kevin Magee, Executive Vice President of Fox Business Network, in a statement.
Balance Sheet Debt
The Fed’s balance sheet debt doubled after lending standards were relaxed following Lehman’s failure on Sept. 15, 2008. That year, the Fed began extending credit directly to companies that weren’t banks for the first time since the 1930s. Total central bank lending exceeded $2 trillion for the first time on Nov. 6, 2008, reaching $2.14 trillion on Sept. 23, 2009.
More than a dozen other groups or companies filed friend- of-the-court briefs. Those arguing for disclosure of the records included the American Society of News Editors and individual news organizations.
“It’s gratifying that the court recognizes the considerable interest in knowing what is being done with our tax dollars,” said Lucy Dalglish, executive director of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press in Arlington, Virginia.
“We’ve learned some powerful lessons in the last 18 months that citizens need to pay more attention to what’s going on in the financial world. This decision will make it easier to do that.”
The case is Bloomberg LP v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 09-04083, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (New York).
To contact the reporters on this story: David Glovin in New York at dglovin@bloomberg.net; Bob Van Voris in New York at vanvoris@bloomberg.net.
This in combination with A.K. Barnett-Hart’s Thesis make’s one hell of a Discovery.
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES IN
SUBPRIME LITIGATION
Jennifer E. Bethel*
Allen Ferrell**
Gang Hu***
Discussion Paper No. 612
03/2008
Harvard Law School Cambridge, MA 02138
ABSTRACT
This paper explores the economic and legal causes and consequences of recent difficulties in the subprime mortgage market. We provide basic descriptive statistics and institutional details on the mortgage origination process, mortgage-backed securities (MBS), and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). We examine a number of aspects of these markets, including the identity of MBS and CDO sponsors, CDO trustees, CDO liquidations, MBS insured and registered amounts, the evolution of MBS tranche structure over time, mortgage originations, underwriting quality of mortgage originations, and write-downs of investment banks. In light of this discussion, the paper then addresses questions as to how these difficulties might have not been foreseen, and some of the main legal issues that will play an important role in the extensive subprime litigation (summarized in the paper) that is underway, including the Rule 10b-5 class actions that have already been filed against the investment banks, pending ERISA litigation, the causes-of-action available to MBS and CDO purchasers, and litigation against the rating agencies. In the course of this discussion, the paper highlights three distinctions that will likely prove central in the resolution of this litigation: The distinction between reasonable ex ante expectations and the occurrence of ex post losses; the distinction between the transparency of the quality of the underlying assets being securitized and the transparency as to which market participants are exposed to subprime losses; and, finally, the distinction between what investors and market participants knew versus what individual entities in the structured finance process knew, particularly as to macroeconomic issues such as the state of the national housing market. ex ante expectations and the occurrence of ex post losses; the distinction between the transparency of the quality of the underlying assets being securitized and the transparency as to which market participants are exposed to subprime losses; and, finally, the distinction between what investors and market participants knew versus what individual entities in the structured finance process knew, particularly as to macroeconomic issues such as the state of the national housing market.
Doubtless, historians will be going over the mammoth 2,200 page report from the Lehman bankruptcy examiner for years to come.
But we bloggers are writing the first draft now. And there’s plenty of good fodder on Lehman’s final days, including fresh details on its effort to get support from billionaire investor Warren Buffett.
Now, it’s well known that Lehman reached out to Buffett in its final months. The Journal’s Scott Patterson wrote about the Oracle’s decision to pass on Lehman in a story back in December.
But the level of detail provided by this report is pretty astounding. It offers a pretty amazing snapshot of Buffett’s conversation with Lehman CEO Dick Fuld as well as a remarkable window on how the Oracle negotiates during times of crisis.
The report really reads like a novel, so we’ll just give you the sections here:
Fuld and Buffett spoke on Friday, March 28, 2008. They discussed Buffett investing at least $2 billion in Lehman. Two items immediately concerned Buffet during his conversation with Fuld. First, Buffett wanted Lehman executives to buy under the same terms as Buffett. Fuld explained to the Examiner that he was reluctant to require a significant buy?in from Lehman executives, because they already received much of their compensation in stock. However, Buffett took it as a negative that Fuld suggested that Lehman executives were not willing to participate in a significant way. Second, Buffett did not like that Fuld complained about short sellers. Buffett thought that blaming short sellers was indicative of a failure to admit one’s own problems.
Following his conversation with Buffett, Fuld asked Paulson to call Buffett, which Paulson reluctantly did. Buffett told the Examiner that during that call, Paulson signaled that he would like Buffett to invest in Lehman, but Paulson “did not load the dice.” Buffett spent the rest of Friday, March 28, 2008, reviewing Lehman’s 10?K and noting problems with some of Lehman’s assets. Buffett’s concerns centered around Lehman’s real estate and high yield investments, lending?related commitments derivatives and their related credit?market risk, Level III assets and Lehman’s securitization activity. On Saturday, March 29, 2008, Buffett learned of a $100 million problem in Japan that Fuld had not mentioned during their discussions, and Buffett was concerned that Fuld had not been forthcoming about the issue. The problems Buffett saw in the 10?K along with Fuld’s failure to alert Buffett to the issue in Japan cemented Buffett’s decision not to invest in Lehman.
At some point in their conversations, Fuld and Buffett also discovered that there had been a miscommunication about the conversion price. Buffett was interested only in convertible preferred shares. Buffett told Fuld that he was willing to agree to a $40 conversion price per share, while Fuld thought Buffett was offering to buy in at “up? 40,” or 40% above the current market price, which would have been about $56 per share. On Friday, March 28, 2008, Lehman’s stock closed at $37.87. Fuld spoke to Lehman’s Executive Committee and several Board members about his conversations with Buffett. Lehman recognized that an investment by Buffett would provide a “stamp of approval.” However, Lehman already had better offers for its April capital raise, and Lehman did not think it could give a better deal to Buffett at the same time it gave a less attractive deal to others. On Monday, March 31, 2008, before Buffett could tell Fuld that he was not interested, Fuld called Buffett to say that Lehman could not accept his terms.
Last?Ditch Effort with Buffett
[Hugh “Skip” E. McGee, III, the head of Lehman’s Investment Banking Division] contacted [President David L. Sokol, president of Berkshire Hathaway’s MidAmerican Energy] again in late August or early September 2008 and outlined Lehman’s “Gameplan” for survival, specifically SpinCo. During a subsequent telephone call with Sokol, McGee explained the “good bank/bad bank” scenario and stated that Lehman would need an investor. Sokol believed the e?mail and call were intended to induce Sokol to pass that information on to Buffett, so Sokol briefed Buffett on SpinCo. Buffett thought the idea would not solve Lehman’s problems.
Sometime during the week prior to Lehman’s bankruptcy, McGee again reached out to Sokol with what both Sokol and McGee described to the Examiner as a “Hail Mary” pass. McGee asked, “Do you have any ideas to save us?” Sokol, who was bear hunting in Alaska at the time, told McGee that he did not.
Judging by the inclusion of the largely irrelevant bear hunting detail at the end, we can tell that this report was written by a frustrated novelist. (And they did an amazing job.) But what we find most remarkable is the insight these sections offer on how Buffett assesses companies.
It’s simple–but not easy–as he combines 10-K analysis with probing questions to management.
Are they willing to put their own money at risk? Are they being upfront? Are they giving investors the full story?
Michael Lewis’s new book, The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine,is already #1 at Amazon. Tonight he had some very cool interviews on 60 Minutes discussing how a few Wall Street outsiders made billions shorting real estate, his thoughts on Wall Street bonuses, and more. These videos are highly recommended now that the NCAA brackets are out and the tournaments are over until Thursday:
Quite a few observers, including this blogger, have been stunned and frustrated at the refusal to investigate what was almost certain accounting fraud at Lehman. Despite the bankruptcy administrator’s effort to blame the gaping hole in Lehman’s balance sheet on its disorderly collapse, the idea that the firm, which was by its own accounts solvent, would suddenly spring a roughly $130+ billion hole in its $660 balance sheet, is simply implausible on its face. Indeed, it was such common knowledge in the Lehman flailing about period that Lehman’s accounts were sus that Hank Paulson’s recent book mentions repeatedly that Lehman’s valuations were phony as if it were no big deal.
Well, it is folks, as a newly-released examiner’s report by Anton Valukas in connection with the Lehman bankruptcy makes clear. The unraveling isn’t merely implicating Fuld and his recent succession of CFOs, or its accounting firm, Ernst & Young, as might be expected. It also emerges that the NY Fed, and thus Timothy Geithner, were at a minimum massively derelict in the performance of their duties, and may well be culpable in aiding and abetting Lehman in accounting fraud and Sarbox violations.
We need to demand an immediate release of the e-mails, phone records, and meeting notes from the NY Fed and key Lehman principals regarding the NY Fed’s review of Lehman’s solvency. If, as things appear now, Lehman was allowed by the Fed’s inaction to remain in business, when the Fed should have insisted on a wind-down (and the failed Barclay’s said this was not infeasible: even an orderly bankruptcy would have been preferrable, as Harvey Miller, who handled the Lehman BK filing has made clear; a good bank/bad bank structure, with a Fed backstop of the bad bank, would have been an option if the Fed’s justification for inaction was systemic risk), the NY Fed at a minimum helped perpetuate a fraud on investors and counterparties.
Umm could we now say, we told you so?…Now on with Goldman and the rest of the dealers!
Huffington Post | Ryan McCarthy First Posted: 03-12-10 10:52 AM
** UPDATE: Scroll down to see Dylan Ratigan’s segment **
The arcane “accounting gimmick” employed by Lehman Brothers as the firm failed in 2007 and 2008, was like “a drug” propelling the bank to conceal the true nature of its financial health, according to bankruptcy documents released yesterday.
As news organizations pore through the 2,200 pages of documents released by Anton Valukas, the examiner in charge of sifting through the most expensive bankruptcy in history, new details have surfaced about possible criminal actions by Lehman executives.
An executive referred to by Lehman execs as the firm’s “balance sheet” czar — who later went on to become the firm’s COO — likely had knowledge of the firm’s highly creative accounting maneuvers, notes The New York Times. Here’s the NYT:
“I am very aware … it is another drug we [are] on,” Herbert McDade wrote in an April 2008 e-mail cited by the examiner’s report. At other times, he is described as calling for a limit to the number of Repo 105 transactions.
At the center of the controversy is a technique called “Repo 105,” under which Lehman was able to move $50 billion off of its balance sheet in the second quarter of 2008 alone, MarketWatch reports. Here’s more from Market Watch:
[Repo 105 is] essentially a type of secured loan and is booked that way in the accounts — leading to an increase in both assets and liabilities.
Lehman’s trick was to use a clause in the accounting rules to classify the deal as a sale, even though it was still obliged to repurchase the assets at a later date. That meant the assets disappeared from the balance sheet, and it could use the cash it received to temporarily pay down other liabilities…. [Repo 105] was crucial for maintaining the group’s credit rating as rating agencies and investors began to focus more on leverage and demanded lower risk.
In a series of e-mail messages cited by the examiner, one Lehman executive writes of Repo 105: “It’s basically window-dressing.” Another responds: “I see … so it’s legally do-able but doesn’t look good when we actually do it? Does the rest of the street do it? Also is that why we have so much BS [balance sheet] to Rates Europe?” The first executive replies: “Yes, No and yes. :)”
But these accounting techniques did not sit well with every Lehman executive. The Wall Street Journal passes along this nugget from the examiner’s report, which suggest that Ernst & Young, Lehman’s auditors, were not concerned about the firm’s use of Repo 105. Here’s the WSJ:
In May 2008, a Lehman Senior Vice President, Matthew Lee, wrote a letter to management alleging accounting improprieties;82 in the course of investigating the allegations, Ernst & Young was advised by Lee on June 12, 2008 that Lehman used $50 billion of Repo 105 transactions to temporarily move assets off balance sheet and quarter end.
The next day on June 13, 2008 Ernst & Young met with the Lehman Board Audit Committee but did not advise it about Lee’s assertions, despite an express direction from the Committee to advise on all allegations raised by Lee. Ernst & Young took virtually no action to investigate the Repo 105 allegations. Ernst & Young took no steps to question or challenge the non disclosure by Lehman of its use of $50 billion of temporary, off balance sheet transactions. Colorable claims exist that Ernst & Young did not meet professional standards, both in investigating Lee’s allegations and in connection with its audit and review of Lehman’s financial statements.”
The question will be how far anybody can prove the responsibility extended. The report says “colorable claims” could be made against some Lehman execs and against Ernst & Young, the accountants. And by colorable claims, it means evidence that’s strong enough to potentially get a jury to award damages.
UPDATE: On Friday’s Dylan Ratigan Show, the MSNBC host delved into the Lehman saga with former New York Governor Eliot Spitzer, breaking down the firm’s fraudulent meltdown in easily-understandable terms.
If you’ve read, are reading, or plan to read Andrew Ross Sorkin’s Too Big To Fail, you also need to pick up a copy of Hank Paulson’s memoir, On The Brink. Sorkin has the bankers’ story, in sordid yet compelling detail, of how they received the most generous bailout in the world financial history during fall 2008 – and set us up for great problems to come. Paulson tells us why, when, and how exactly he let them get away with this.
Hank Paulson does not, of course, intend to be candid. As I review in detail on The New Republic’s The Book site this morning, On The Brink is actually a masterpiece of misdirection and disinformation.
But still, he gives it all away – and if any details remain obscure, check them in Sorkin. Paulson honestly believes that the financial sector as constructed is productive, makes sense, and should continue to operate in roughly its current form.
Whether or not Paulson really understands the functioning of big banks in the US today is an interesting question – for example he never mentions how they treated customers during the boom, and there is not one word about the need for greater consumer protection moving forward. On the other hand, perhaps this omission tells us that he understands the game all too well – and is keen for it to continue.
Short-Selling Vs. Naked Short-Selling: An Explanation
In “Wall Street’s Naked Swindle,” Matt Taibbi examines how a scheme to flood the market with counterfeit stocks helped kill Bears Stearns and Lehman Brothers — and the feds have yet to bust the culprits. The scheme that helped do in two of the five major investment banks in the U.S. is known as naked short-selling — the sale of shares you don’t have or won’t deliver. Normal short-selling, however, is legal and good for the market: it lets investors bet against companies that they believe will decrease in value.
To help explain his story, Taibbi heads to the white board and breaks down the differences between the two: click above to watch him explain short-selling (our buyer: Wilford Brimley, broker: Count Chocula, short-seller: Hervé Villechaize), and below for a discussion of its evil twin, naked short-selling. — Rolling Stone
Wall Street’s Naked Swindle
A scheme to flood the market with counterfeit stocks helped kill Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers — and the feds have yet to bust the culprits
MATT TAIBBI Posted Oct 14, 2009 9:30 AM
On Tuesday, March 11th, 2008, somebody — nobody knows who — made one of the craziest bets Wall Street has ever seen. The mystery figure spent $1.7 million on a series of options, gambling that shares in the venerable investment bank Bear Stearns would lose more than half their value in nine days or less. It was madness — “like buying 1.7 million lottery tickets,” according to one financial analyst.
But what’s even crazier is that the bet paid.
At the close of business that afternoon, Bear Stearns was trading at $62.97. At that point, whoever made the gamble owned the right to sell huge bundles of Bear stock, at $30 and $25, on or before March 20th. In order for the bet to pay, Bear would have to fall harder and faster than any Wall Street brokerage in history.
The very next day, March 12th, Bear went into free fall. By the end of the week, the firm had lost virtually all of its cash and was clinging to promises of state aid; by the weekend, it was being knocked to its knees by the Fed and the Treasury, and forced at the barrel of a shotgun to sell itself to JPMorgan Chase (which had been given $29 billion in public money to marry its hunchbacked new bride) at the humiliating price of … $2 a share. Whoever bought those options on March 11th woke up on the morning of March 17th having made 159 times his money, or roughly $270 million. This trader was either the luckiest guy in the world, the smartest son of a bitch ever or…
Or what? That this was a brazen case of insider manipulation was so obvious that even Sen. Chris Dodd, chairman of the pillow-soft-touch Senate Banking Committee, couldn’t help but remark on it a few weeks later, when questioning Christopher Cox, the then-chief of the Securities and Exchange Commission. “I would hope that you’re looking at this,” Dodd said. “This kind of spike must have triggered some sort of bells and whistles at the SEC. This goes beyond rumors.”
Cox nodded sternly and promised, yes, he would look into it. What actually happened is another matter. Although the SEC issued more than 50 subpoenas to Wall Street firms, it has yet to identify the mysterious trader who somehow seemed to know in advance that one of the five largest investment banks in America was going to completely tank in a matter of days. “I’ve seen the SEC send agents overseas in a simple insider-trading case to investigate profits of maybe $2,000,” says Brent Baker, a former senior counsel for the commission. “But they did nothing to stop this.”
The SEC’s halfhearted oversight didn’t go unnoticed by the market. Six months after Bear was eaten by predators, virtually the same scenario repeated itself in the case of Lehman Brothers — another top-five investment bank that in September 2008 was vaporized in an obvious case of market manipulation. From there, the financial crisis was on, and the global economy went into full-blown crater mode.
Like all the great merchants of the bubble economy, Bear and Lehman were leveraged to the hilt and vulnerable to collapse. Many of the methods that outsiders used to knock them over were mostly legal: Credit markers were pulled, rumors were spread through the media, and legitimate short-sellers pressured the stock price down. But when Bear and Lehman made their final leap off the cliff of history, both undeniably got a push — especially in the form of a flat-out counterfeiting scheme called naked short-selling.
See the movie “Stock Shock” on DVD to learn more about this. trailer at www.stockshockmovie.com
The Experts: “In NY they call us the plumbers. We’re the plumbers of Wall Street…and Nobody wants to hear what the plumber has to say until the SHIT backs up in the livingroom”
If you really get into all, you might want to visit DeepCapture by Patrick Byrne it was a mind-blowing experience and opened my eyes to a “whole new world”. He takes it to another level with names.
Here is another video of Matt Taibbi explaining how Goldman Sachs makes money.
Washington, D.C., February 24, 2010: Although only bankers are aware of it, there is a second wave of economic disaster starting to build up that will make the earlier one pale into insignificance. Let us start out with MERS, shall we?
MERS = Mortgage Electronic Registration Inc.holds approximately 60 million American mortgages and is a Delaware corporation whose sole shareholder is Mers Corp. MersCorp and its specified members have agreed to include the MERS corporate name on any mortgage that was executed in conjunction with any mortgage loan made by any member of MersCorp. Thus in place of the original lender being named as the mortgagee on the mortgage that is supposed to secure their loan, MERS is named as the “nominee” for the lender who actually loaned the money to the borrower. In other words MERS is really nothing more than a name that is used on the mortgage instrument in place of the actual lender. MERS’ primary function, therefore, is to act as a document custodian. MERS was created solely to simplify the process of transferring mortgages by avoiding the need to re-record liens – and pay county recorder filing fees – each time a loan is assigned. Instead, servicers record loans only once and MERS’ electronic system monitors transfers and facilitates the trading of notes. It has very conservatively estimated that as of February, 2010, over half of all new residential mortgage loans in the United States are registered with MERS and recorded in county recording offices in MERS’ name
MersCorp was created in the early 1990’s by the former C.E.O.’s of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Indy Mac, Countrywide, Stewart Title Insurance and the American Land Title Association. The executives of these companies lined their pockets with billions of dollars of unearned bonuses and free stock by creating so-called mortgage backed securities using bogus mortgage loans to unqualified borrowers thereby creating a huge false demand for residential homes and thereby falsely inflating the value of those homes. MERS marketing claims that its “paperless systems fit within the legal framework of the laws of all fifty states” are now being vetted by courts and legal commentators throughout the country.
The MERS paperless system is the type of crooked rip-off scheme that is has been seen for generations past in the crooked financial world. In this present case, MERS was created in the boardrooms of the most powerful and controlling members of the American financial institutions. This gigantic scheme completely ignored long standing law of commerce relating to mortgage lending and did so for its own personal gain. That the inevitable collapse of the crooked mortgage swindles would lead to terrible national repercussions was a matter of little or no interest to the upper levels of America’s banking and financial world because the only interest of these entities was to grab the money of suckers, keep it in the form of ficticious bonuses, real estate and very large accounts in foreign banks. The effect of this system has led to catastrophic meltdown on both the American and global economy.
MERS, as has clearly been proven in many civil cases, does not hold any promissory notes of any kind. A party must have possession of a promissory note in order to have standing to enforce and/or otherwise collect a debt that is owed to another party. Given this clear-cut legal definition, MERS does not have legal standing to enforce or collect on the over 60 million mortgages it controls and no member of MERS has any standing in an American civil court.
MERS has been taken to civil courts across the country and charged with a lack of standing in reposession issues. When the mortgage debacle initially, and inevitably, began, MERS always routinely brought actions against defaulting mortgage holders purporting to represent the owners of the defaulted mortgages but once the courts discovered that MERS was only a front organization that did not hold any deed nor was aware of who or what agencies might hold a deed, they have routinely been denied in their attempts to force foreclosure. In the past, persons alleging they were officials of MERS in foreclosure motions, purported to be the holders of the mortgage, when, in fact, they not only were not the holder of the mortgage but, under a court order, could not produce the identity of the actual holder. These so-called MERS officers have usually been just employees of entities who are servicing the loan for the actual lender. MERS, it is now widely acknowledged by the courts, has no legal right to foreclose or otherwise collect debt which are evidenced by promissory notes held by someone else.
The American media routinely identifies MERS as a mortgage lender, creditor, and mortgage company, when in point of fact MERS has never loaned so much as a dollar to anyone, is not a creditor and is not a mortgage company. MERS is merely a name that is printed on mortgages, purporting to give MERS some sort of legal status, in the matter of a loan made by a completely different and almost always,a totally unknown entity.
The infamous collapse of the American housing bubble originated, in the main, with one Angelo Mozilo, CEO of the later failed Countrywide Mortgage.
Mozilo started working in his father’s butcher shop, in the Bronx, when he was ten years old. He graduated from Fordham in 1960, and that year he met David Loeb. In 1968, Mozilo and Loeb created a new mortgage company, Countrywide, together. Mozilo believed the company should make special efforts to lower the barrier for minorities and others who had been excluded from homeownership. Loeb died in 2003
In 1996, Countrywide created a new subsidiary for subprime loans.
Countrywide Financial’s former management
Angelo R. Mozilo, cofounder, chairman of the board, chief executive officer
David S. Loeb, cofounder, President and Chairman from 1969 to 2000
David Sambol, president, chief operating officer, director
Eric P. Sieracki, chief financial officer, executive managing director
Jack Schakett, executive managing director, chief operating officer
Kevin Bartlett, executive managing director, chief investment officer
Andrew Gissinger, executive managing director, chief production officer, Countrywide Home Loans[14]
Sandor E. Samuels, executive managing director, chief legal officer and assistant secretary
Ranjit Kripalani, executive managing director and president, Capital Markets
Laura K. Milleman, senior managing director, chief accounting officer
Timothy H. Wennes, senior managing director, president and chief operating officer, Countrywide Bank FSB
Anne D. McCallion, senior managing director, chief of financial operations and planning
Steve Bailey, senior managing director of loan administration, Countrywide Home Loans
The standard Countrywide procedure was to openly solicit persons who either had no credit or could not obtain it, and, by the use of false credit reports drawn up in their offices, arrange mortgages. The new home owners were barely able to meet the minimum interest only payments and when, as always happens, the mortgage payments are increased to far, far more than could be paid, defaults and repossessions were inevitable. Countrywide sold these mortgages to lower-tier banks which in turn, put them together in packages and sold them to the large American banks. These so-called “bundled mortgages” were quickly sold these major banking houses to many foreign investors with the comments that when the payments increased, so also would the income from the original mortgage. In 1996, Countrywide created a new subsidiary for subprime loans.
At one point in time, Countrywide Financial Corporation was regarded with awe in the business world. In 2003, Fortune observed that Countrywide was expected to write $400 billion in home loans and earn $1.9 billion. Countrywide’s chairman and C.E.O., Angelo Mozilo, did rather well himself. In 2003, he received nearly $33 million in compensation. By that same year, Wall Street had become addicted to home loans, which bankers used to create immensely lucrative mortgage-backed securities and, later, collateralized debt obligations, or C.D.O.s—and Countrywide was their biggest supplier. Under Mozilo’s leadership, Countrywide’s growth had been astonishing.
He was aiming to achieve a market share—thirty to forty per cent—that was far greater than anyone in the financial-services industry had ever attained. For several years, Countrywide continued to thrive. Then, inevitably, in 2007, subprime defaults began to rocket upwards , forcing the top American bankers to abandoned the mortgage-backed securities they had previously prized. It was obvious to them that the fraudulent mortgages engendered by Countrywide had been highly suceessful as a marketing program but it was obvious to eveyone concerned, at all levels, that the mortgages based entirely on false and misleading credit information were bound to eventually default. In August of 2007, the top American bankers cut off. Countrywide’s short-term funding, which seriously hindered its ability to operate, and in just a few months following this abandonment, Mozilo was forced to choose between bankruptcy or selling out to the best bidder.
In January, 2008, Bank of America announced that it would buy the company for a fraction of what Countrywide was worth at its peak. Mozilo was subsequently named a defendant in more than a hundred civil lawsuits and a target of a criminal investigation. On June 4th, 2007 the S.E.C., in a civil suit, charged Mozilo, David Sambol, and Eric Sieracki with securities fraud; Mozilo was also charged with insider trading. The complaint formalized a public indictment of Mozilo as an icon of corporate malfeasance and greed.
In essence, not only bad credit risks were used to create and sell mortgages on American homes that were essentially worthless. By grouping all of these together and selling them abroad, the banks all made huge profits. When the kissing had to stop, there were two major groups holding the financial bag. The first were the investors and the second were, not those with weak credit, but those who had excellent credit and who were able, and willing to pay off their mortgages.
Unfortunately, just as no one knows who owns the title to any home in order to foreclose, when the legitimate mortgage holder finally pays off his mortgage, or tries to sell his house, a clear title to said house or property cannot ever be found so, in essence, the innocent mortgage payer can never own or sell his house. This is a terrible economic time bomb quietly ticking away under the feet of the Bank of America and if, and when, it explodes, another bank is but a fond memory.
Readers wishing to find out if their title is secure should write to www.ChinkintheArmor.net, leave a comment on any article and ask for contact information for legal advice.
WHO Would have thunk? This is why some are in the poe house…Some of do have morals.
The Short Sales and Bank Fraud story continues to gain traction. After CNBC aired the story we brought them, dozens of other media outlets, bloggers and authorities have contacted me to discuss this topic.
Here is the story of how this fraud initially
came to our attention, along with the evidence
to back it up.
Last year, I was contacted by an experienced real estate agent in our network who negotiates many short sales. She had recorded a conversation between her and a supervisor in the loss-mitigation department at a major national lender, who she felt was trying to get her to do something illegal.
Here is the audio of that recording, along with the transcript. The names have been removed at the request of the agent to prevent backlash from the bank.
Quarterly Revenues Increase 44% and YTD Revenues Increase 29% Year over Year
Law Offices Of David J. Stern ESQ, P.A….
PLANTATION, Fla., Feb. 9 /PRNewswire-FirstCall/ — DJSP Enterprises, Inc. (Nasdaq: DJSP, DJSPW, DJSPU), one of the largest providers of processing services for the mortgage and real estate industries in the United States, today announced financial results for the three and nine month periods ending September 30, 2009 for its recently acquired processing operations. The operating results discussed in this press release reflect the separate operations of the acquired business for the periods presented on an adjusted basis, each of which occurred prior to the closing of the Business Combination with Chardan 2008 China Acquisition Corp on January 15, 2010.
Processing Operations Third Quarter Financial Highlights
Revenue for the quarter increased 44% to $73.0 million from $50.6 million in last year’s comparable period. For nine months, revenue increased 29% year over year to $189.8 million.
Adjusted Net income was $10.4 million in the third quarter. For the nine month period, adjusted net income was $32.4 million or $1.65* per share.
Adjusted EBITDA for the third quarter was $16.4 million, and for the nine months was $50.7 million.
*Calculated using treasury stock method assuming a common share price of $8.14; Assumes 19.62 million shares outstanding; Assumes adjusted net income for nine months ended September 30, 2009 of $32.4 million.
Subsequent to Quarter End
Chardan 2008 China Acquisition Corp. closed its business combination with DAL Group, LLC on January 15, 2010 and changed its name to DJSP Enterprises, Inc. and its NASDAQ symbols to DJSP, DJSPU and DJSPW.
Continue reading HERE (NOTE: MSN took this article down off it’s site) HMMMMMMMM I smell FISH! go to the others below!
…Are we being SCAMMED once again? New “Deed In Lieu” Program Gets Homeowners Six Months Mortgage Free And $1,000…
SHOW ME THE NOTE FIRST!
Citi recently agreed to give qualified borrowers six months in their homes before it takes them over. It will offer these homeowners $1,000 or more in relocation assistance, provided the property is in good condition. Previously, the bank had no formal process for serving borrowers who failed to qualify for Citi’s other foreclosure-avoidance programs like loan modification.
Many recall the BOGUS ASSIGNMENTS, FRAUDULENT MORTGAGE ASSIGNMENT TRANSFER VIDEOS I put out with the help from LYNN SZYMONIAK ESQ. of FraudDigest.com.
Lender Processing Inc. is the TIP of The Pyramid!! Please click the link to see their admission to this whole scheme of fraud in question. Big Brother has been watching!!! Anyone want shares NOW?? Goldman you just met with them 2/23…Heck your even worst! TOUCHÉ.
Regulatory Matters: Due to the heavily regulated nature of the mortgage industry, from time to time we receive inquiries and requests for information from various state and federal regulatory agencies, including state insurance departments, attorneys general and other agencies, about various matters relating to our business. These inquiries take various forms, including informal or formal requests, reviews, investigations and subpoenas. We attempt to cooperate with all such inquiries. Recently, during an internal review of the business processes used by our document solutions subsidiary, we identified a business process that caused an error in the notarization of certain documents, some of which were used in foreclosure proceedings in various jurisdictions around the country. The services performed by this subsidiary were offered to a limited number of customers, were unrelated to our core default management services and were immaterial to our financial results. We immediately corrected the business process and began to take remedial actions necessary to cure the defect in an effort to minimize the impact of the error. We subsequently received an inquiry relating to this matter from the Clerk of Court of Fulton County, Georgia, which is the regulatory body responsible for licensing the notaries used by our document solutions subsidiary. In response, we met with the Clerk of Court, along with members of her staff, and reported on our identification of the error and the status of the corrective actions that were underway. We have since completed our remediation efforts with respect to the affected documents. Most recently, we have learned that the U.S. Attorneys office for the Middle District of Florida is reviewing the business processes of this subsidiary. We have expressed our willingness to fully cooperate with the U.S. Attorney. We continue to believe that we have taken necessary remedial action with respect to this matter. continue reading …
“They messed up Title to Millions of Homes all over The US”
Continue reading…..The Huffington Post
is already #1 at Amazon. Tonight he had some very cool interviews on 60 Minutes discussing how a few Wall Street outsiders made billions shorting real estate, his thoughts on Wall Street bonuses, and more. These videos are highly recommended now that the NCAA brackets are out and the tournaments are over until Thursday:
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