Pity Shaun Donovan. The much beset upon Housing and Urban Development secretary has the thankless task of facilitating that long sought after agreement between the state attorneys general and the banks, the one that would finally put that nasty robo-signing scandal behind us. Long anticipated, it was supposed to be signed by Christmas (not).
The Obama administration came under fire Monday from U.S. Democratic lawmakers and liberal groups, who argued that a forthcoming settlement over alleged foreclosure abuses won’t do enough to penalize the banking industry.
Administration officials and state attorneys general are have been putting the finishing touches on a settlement with major banks of foreclosure-processing problems that erupted into public view in fall 2010.
Housing and Urban Development Secretary Shaun Donovan and Associate U.S. Attorney General Thomas Perrelli were meeting in Chicago on Monday with Democratic attorneys general to review potential settlement terms, according to a spokesman for Iowa Attorney General Tom Miller, who has been leading the talks.
The officials were scheduled to hold a separate conference call with Republican attorneys general later in the day, but no announcement of a settlement was expected this week.
NEW YORK (TheStreet) — Private antitrust litigation pitting some five million retailers against Visa , MasterCard , and 13 large banks, including Bank of America , CitigroupCapital One Financial , JPMorgan Chase , U.S. Bancorp , Wells Fargo , PNC Financial , Fifth Third Bancorp , SunTrust Banks , HSBC and Barclays Plc has slipped under the radar of many analysts and investors who follow those companies, but the case may deliver a multi-billion dollar shock to bank bulls in the coming months.
Estimates of the potential cost of a settlement of the antitrust case vary dramatically–from a few billion dollars into the hundreds of billions. At least as worrisome to the financial companies
Bringing the tally to a grand total of $142 + BILLION combined since 2008!!
right?
Reuters–
Mortgage finance giant Freddie Mac FMCC.OB said on Monday it would ask for an additional $1.5 billion from taxpayers due to losses stemming from the weak housing market.
The company reported a comprehensive loss in the second quarter of $1.1 billion. Despite income of $1 billion, the company registered a net worth deficit that it must ask the government to make up, bringing the total it has needed to seek to $66.2 billion.
I. Goldman Performed Increasingly Careful Due Diligence On Billions Of Dollars Of Subprime Mortgage Loans That It Purchased During 2005 And 2006, And Therefore Knew That Large Numbers Of Those Loans Were Defective.
II. Goldman Knew That Mortgage Loans And RMBS issued By Countrywide, New Century, And Fremont During 2005 And 2006 Had Declined Dramatically In Safety, Security, And Likelihood of Repayment.
If trust in capital markets is to return, investors must be able to believe due diligence has been conducted
by GRETCHEN MORGENSON 05:55 AM Jul 14, 2010
Investors who lost billions on boatloads of faulty mortgage securities have had a hard time holding Wall Street accountable for selling the things in the first place.
For the most part, banks have said they cannot be called out in court on any of this because they had no idea that so many of these loans went to people who lacked the resources to make even their first mortgage payment.
Wall Street firms were intimately involved in the financing, bundling and sales of these loans, so their defence rings hollow. They provided hundreds of millions of dollars in credit to dubious underwriters and some even had their own people on site at the loan factories. Many Wall Street firms owned mortgage lenders outright.
Because many of the worst lenders are now out of business, investors in search of recoveries have turned to the banks that packaged the loans into securities. But successfully arguing that Wall Street aided lenders in a fraud is tough under United States federal securities laws. This is largely a result of Supreme Court decisions barring investors from bringing federal securities fraud cases that accuse underwriters and other third parties as enablers.
Where there’s a will, however, there’s a way. And state courts are proving to be a more fruitful place for mortgage investors seeking redress, legal experts say.
Late last month, for example, Massachusetts Attorney-General Martha Coakley extracted US$102 million ($140 million) from Morgan Stanley in a case involving Morgan’s extensive financing of loans made by New Century, a notorious and now-defunct lender that was based in California.
Morgan packaged the loans into securities and sold them to clients, even after its due diligence uncovered problems with the underlying mortgages that New Century fed to the firm, Ms Coakley said. In settling the matter, Morgan neither admitted nor denied the allegations. The investigation is continuing.
On Friday, an investment management firm that lost US$1.2 billion in mortgage securities it bought for clients filed suit in Massachusetts state court against 15 banks, accusing them of abetting a fraud.
The firm, Cambridge Place Investment Management of Concord, Massachusetts, purchased US$2 billion in mortgage securities from the banks and it says the banks misrepresented the risks in the underlying loans – both in prospectuses and sales pitches (see box).
The complaint says the banks misled Cambridge Place by maintaining that the mortgages in the securities it bought had met strict underwriting requirements related to the borrowers’ ability to repay the loans. Cambridge also contends it relied on the banks’ claims of having conducted due diligence to verify the quality of the loans bundled into the securities.
I don’t know about you but this is an awful lot of dollars. Meanwhile they are cutting budgets in some places such as California and just last week in Chicago!
I’m still puzzled how no conflict of interest exist when MERS is named a defendant with the borrower in a foreclosure suit??
Well here is your answer COUNTIES!!!
Wednesday July 7, 2010
Reston-based company sued on fraud charges
Nevada law firm says Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems deprives counties of fees
A Nevada law firm has filed two civil lawsuits against Reston-based Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems alleging billions of dollars worth of fraud.
The suits, filed in Nevada and California district courts, claim the company has deprived county and state governments of revenue “used among other things to maintain county real property records, fund the judiciary, school systems and other government services.”
“They tout themselves as being a recording-fee avoidance scheme,” said attorney Robert R. Hager of Nevada law firm Hager & Hearne, which has filed the suits against MERS.
“If a loan is registered on the MERS system, it will save the financial institution involved in that loan from paying recording fees. MERS claims to have saved at least $2.4 billion in recording costs that would have otherwise gone to a county where the property is located. This system is depriving counties of fees legitimately owed them and contributing to the financial deficits that many local governments are currently experiencing,” he said.
MERS spokeswoman Karmela Lejarde on Friday called both suits “baseless” and pointed out that the attorney generals of both California and Nevada refused to accept them as false claims cases, essentially forcing Hager & Hearne to file civil suits.
“These same law firms have brought many other lawsuits against MERS and every one has failed,” she said. The MERS website further claims the MERS system is approved by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae, the Federal Housing Administration and Veterans Affairs, and the California and Utah housing finance agencies, as well as all of the major Wall Street rating agencies.
“The statement that any of our cases against MERS have failed is a lie,” Hager said. “It is true that we have other active cases involving them, but none have failed.”
According to its website, MERS “streamlines” the mortgage process for the mortgage banking industry by electronically registering mortgage loans for lending institutions. The company currently has about 2,500 clients or “members,” Lejarde said. The members list reads like a who’s who of the mortgage banking industry, including Bank of America, Countrywide Home Loans and Citimortgage, all three of which are named as co-defendants in the suits.
The MERS website also claims that since 1997, more than 63 million home mortgages have been registered on its system. “These include loans delivered to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae, all major conduits and state housing authorities,” the website states.
According to the company, once a loan is registered in its system, MERS acts as the mortgagee in all county land records for the lender and servicer, even though it does not actually own or lay any claim to any of the mortgages.
“Any loan registered on the MERS System is inoculated against future assignments,” the company website states, “because MERS remains the nominal mortgagee no matter how many times servicing is traded.”
The lawsuits claim this means that lenders are able to avoid recording fees every time individual mortgages are bought, traded and sold by banking institutions. As a byproduct, borrowers never know who actually holds their individual loans.
“Falsely recording MERS as the beneficiary on their deeds of trust creates an oversimplified, illusory and false chain of title that purports to justify payment of less money in recording fees; depriving the counties and the state from those fees …. [S]uch identification creates the illusion of a recorded chain of title whereby the actual creditors and/or loan beneficiaries remain hidden from public record,” the suits claim.
A Reno law firm has filed two lawsuits alleging fraud against a nationwide mortgage registration firm, and if those legal actions prevail, the firm and dozens of mortgage lenders could be liable to Nevada’s counties for billions of dollars in compensation and penalties.
Law partners Robert R. Hager and Treva J. Hearne, with Reno attorney Mark Mausert, have filed a case in Nevada and one in California against Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, which operates an electronic registry of mortgage loans in the United States. MERS serves as the mortgagee of record for lenders, investors and loan servicers in county land records, but doesn’t own any mortgages.
By using the firm’s names on deeds and other paperwork, the lenders are able to avoid county recording fees, according to the firm. MERS has no financial interest in the loans, but is listed as actual owner or surrogate for the owner on millions of deeds of trust, even as individual mortgages are repeatedly traded and packaged inside of mortgage pools.
The lawsuits argue that listing the firm as the owner of mortgages in which it has no interest in order to avoid filing fees and taxes that are legally required constitutes fraud.
“We look forward to holding these financial institutions and foreclosure mills responsible for their actions that have deprived the states and counties of much-needed revenue,” said Hager.
Karmela Lejarde, communications manager, for the Reston, Va.-based firm, noted that the attorneys general of two states declined to take on the cases as false claims suits pressed by the government, instead leaving the plaintiffs to pursue the civil suits in the court systems.
“The lawsuits are completely without merit,” Lejarde said. “…The suits were filed by the same lawyers who have brought countless lawsuits against MERS, and every single one of them has failed. The most recent (fraud case) actions are just the latest in a line of baseless claims.”
Christopher Peterson, a law professor and associate dean of the University of Utah Law School, has written articles and lectured about MERS’s activities. He said the firm being listed as proxy owner of more than half the nation’s mortgages is contrary to 200 years of American legal precedent.
NEW YORK (Reuters) – Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc (LEHMQ.PK) on Wednesday sued JPMorgan Chase & Co (JPM.N), accusing the second-largest U.S. bank of illegally siphoning billions of dollars of desperately-needed assets in the days leading up to its record bankruptcy.
The lawsuit filed in Manhattan bankruptcy court accused JPMorgan of using its “unparalleled access” to inside details of Lehman’s distress to extract $8.6 billion of collateral in the four business days ahead of Lehman’s September 15, 2008, bankruptcy, including $5 billion on the final business day.
JPMorgan was Lehman’s main “clearing” bank, in which it acts as a go-between in Lehman’s dealings with other parties.
According to the complaint, JPMorgan knew from this relationship that Lehman’s viability was fast weakening, and threatened to deprive Lehman of critical clearing services unless it posted an excessive amount of collateral.
“With this financial gun to Lehman’s head, JPMorgan was able to extract extraordinarily one-sided agreements from Lehman literally overnight,” the complaint said. “Those billions of dollars in collateral rightfully belong to the Lehman estate and its creditors.”
Lehman also said JPMorgan officials including Chief Executive Jamie Dimon decided to extract the collateral after learning from meetings with Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke and then-U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson that the government would not rescue Lehman from bankruptcy.
In the widely expected lawsuit, Lehman and its official committee of unsecured creditors are seeking $5 billion of damages, a return of the collateral and other remedies.
JPMorgan spokesman Joe Evangelisti called the lawsuit “meritless,” and said the bank will defend against it.
Any money recovered could increase the payout to creditors. Lehman has also sued Barclays Plc (BARC.L) to recover an $11.2 billion “windfall” from the takeover of U.S. assets.
In March, a bankruptcy judge approved an accord providing for JPMorgan to return several billion dollars of assets to Lehman’s estate, but giving Lehman a right to sue further.
Lehman collapsed after letting its balance sheet swell through exposure to commercial real estate, subprime mortgages and other risky sectors. With $639 billion of assets, Lehman was by far the largest U.S. company to go bankrupt.
EXAMINER REPORT
In his March report on Lehman’s bankruptcy, court-appointed examiner Anton Valukas said Lehman could raise a “colorable claim” against JPMorgan over the collateral demands.
He nevertheless said JPMorgan could raise “substantial defenses” under U.S. bankruptcy law.
Evangelisti contended that “as the examiner’s report makes clear, it was the ill-advised decisions of Lehman and its principals to take on perilous leverage and to double down on subprime mortgages and overpriced commercial real estate — and not conduct by our firm — that led to Lehman’s demise.”
Lehman, though, maintained that JPMorgan extracted the collateral to “catapult” itself ahead of other creditors.
“A century ago, John Pierpont Morgan used his position atop the world of finance to shore up a teetering firm and rescue the nation from the brink of financial collapse,” the complaint said, referring to the Panic of 1907.
“A century later, when the nation faced another epic financial crisis, Morgan’s namesake firm stripped a faltering Lehman Brothers of desperately needed cash,” it added.
The case is In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc et al, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New York, No. 08-13555.
This in combination with A.K. Barnett-Hart’s Thesis make’s one hell of a Discovery.
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES IN
SUBPRIME LITIGATION
Jennifer E. Bethel*
Allen Ferrell**
Gang Hu***
Discussion Paper No. 612
03/2008
Harvard Law School Cambridge, MA 02138
ABSTRACT
This paper explores the economic and legal causes and consequences of recent difficulties in the subprime mortgage market. We provide basic descriptive statistics and institutional details on the mortgage origination process, mortgage-backed securities (MBS), and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). We examine a number of aspects of these markets, including the identity of MBS and CDO sponsors, CDO trustees, CDO liquidations, MBS insured and registered amounts, the evolution of MBS tranche structure over time, mortgage originations, underwriting quality of mortgage originations, and write-downs of investment banks. In light of this discussion, the paper then addresses questions as to how these difficulties might have not been foreseen, and some of the main legal issues that will play an important role in the extensive subprime litigation (summarized in the paper) that is underway, including the Rule 10b-5 class actions that have already been filed against the investment banks, pending ERISA litigation, the causes-of-action available to MBS and CDO purchasers, and litigation against the rating agencies. In the course of this discussion, the paper highlights three distinctions that will likely prove central in the resolution of this litigation: The distinction between reasonable ex ante expectations and the occurrence of ex post losses; the distinction between the transparency of the quality of the underlying assets being securitized and the transparency as to which market participants are exposed to subprime losses; and, finally, the distinction between what investors and market participants knew versus what individual entities in the structured finance process knew, particularly as to macroeconomic issues such as the state of the national housing market. ex ante expectations and the occurrence of ex post losses; the distinction between the transparency of the quality of the underlying assets being securitized and the transparency as to which market participants are exposed to subprime losses; and, finally, the distinction between what investors and market participants knew versus what individual entities in the structured finance process knew, particularly as to macroeconomic issues such as the state of the national housing market.
Deal Journal has yet to read “The Big Short,” Michael Lewis’s yarn on the financial crisis that hit stores today. We did, however, read his acknowledgments, where Lewis praises “A.K. Barnett-Hart, a Harvard undergraduate who had just written a thesis about the market for subprime mortgage-backed CDOs that remains more interesting than any single piece of Wall Street research on the subject.”
A.K. Barnett-Hart
While unsure if we can stomach yet another book on the crisis, a killer thesis on the topic? Now that piqued our curiosity. We tracked down Barnett-Hart, a 24-year-old financial analyst at a large New York investment bank. She met us for coffee last week to discuss her thesis, “The Story of the CDO Market Meltdown: An Empirical Analysis.” Handed in a year ago this week at the depths of the market collapse, the paper was awarded summa cum laude and won virtually every thesis honor, including the Harvard Hoopes Prize for outstanding scholarly work.
Last October, Barnett-Hart, already pulling all-nighters at the bank (we agreed to not name her employer), received a call from Lewis, who had heard about her thesis from a Harvard doctoral student. Lewis was blown away.
“It was a classic example of the innocent going to Wall Street and asking the right questions,” said Mr. Lewis, who in his 20s wrote “Liar’s Poker,” considered a defining book on Wall Street culture. “Her thesis shows there were ways to discover things that everyone should have wanted to know. That it took a 22-year-old Harvard student to find them out is just outrageous.”
Barnett-Hart says she wasn’t the most obvious candidate to produce such scholarship. She grew up in Boulder, Colo., the daughter of a physics professor and full-time homemaker. A gifted violinist, Barnett-Hart deferred admission at Harvard to attend Juilliard, where she was accepted into a program studying the violin under Itzhak Perlman. After a year, she headed to Cambridge, Mass., for a broader education. There, with vague designs on being pre-Med, she randomly took “Ec 10,” the legendary introductory economics course taught by Martin Feldstein.
“I thought maybe this would help me, like, learn to manage my money or something,” said Barnett-Hart, digging into a granola parfait at Le Pain Quotidien. She enjoyed how the subject mixed current events with history, got an A (natch) and declared economics her concentration.
Barnett-Hart’s interest in CDOs stemmed from a summer job at an investment bank in the summer of 2008 between junior and senior years. During a rotation on the mortgage securitization desk, she noticed everyone was in a complete panic. “These CDOs had contaminated everything,” she said. “The stock market was collapsing and these securities were affecting the broader economy. At that moment I became obsessed and decided I wanted to write about the financial crisis.”
Back at Harvard, against the backdrop of the financial system’s near-total collapse, Barnett-Hart approached professors with an idea of writing a thesis about CDOs and their role in the crisis. “Everyone discouraged me because they said I’d never be able to find the data,” she said. “I was urged to do something more narrow, more focused, more knowable. That made me more determined.”
She emailed scores of Harvard alumni. One pointed her toward LehmanLive, a comprehensive database on CDOs. She received scores of other data leads. She began putting together charts and visuals, holding off on analysis until she began to see patterns–how Merrill Lynch and Citigroup were the top originators, how collateral became heavily concentrated in subprime mortgages and other CDOs, how the credit ratings procedures were flawed, etc.
“If you just randomly start regressing everything, you can end up doing an unlimited amount of regressions,” she said, rolling her eyes. She says nearly all the work was in the research; once completed, she jammed out the paper in a couple of weeks.
“It’s an incredibly impressive piece of work,” said Jeremy Stein, a Harvard economics professor who included the thesis on a reading list for a course he’s teaching this semester on the financial crisis. “She pulled together an enormous amount of information in a way that’s both intelligent and accessible.”
Barnett-Hart’s thesis is highly critical of Wall Street and “their irresponsible underwriting practices.” So how is it that she can work for the very institutions that helped create the notorious CDOs she wrote about?
“After writing my thesis, it became clear to me that the culture at these investment banks needed to change and that incentives needed to be realigned to reward more than just short-term profit seeking,” she wrote in an email. “And how would Wall Street ever change, I thought, if the people that work there do not change? What these banks needed is for outsiders to come in with a fresh perspective, question the way business was done, and bring a new appreciation for the true purpose of an investment bank – providing necessary financial services, not creating unnecessary products to bolster their own profits.”
Michael Lewis’s new book, The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine,is already #1 at Amazon. Tonight he had some very cool interviews on 60 Minutes discussing how a few Wall Street outsiders made billions shorting real estate, his thoughts on Wall Street bonuses, and more. These videos are highly recommended now that the NCAA brackets are out and the tournaments are over until Thursday:
is already #1 at Amazon. Tonight he had some very cool interviews on 60 Minutes discussing how a few Wall Street outsiders made billions shorting real estate, his thoughts on Wall Street bonuses, and more. These videos are highly recommended now that the NCAA brackets are out and the tournaments are over until Thursday:
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