Eric T. Schneiderman, the attorney general of New York, has come under increasing pressure from the Obama administration to drop his opposition to a wide-ranging state settlement with banks over dubious foreclosure practices, according to people briefed on discussions about the deal.
In recent weeks, Shaun Donovan, the secretary of Housing and Urban Development, and high-level Justice Department officials have been waging an intensifying campaign to try to persuade the attorney general to support the settlement, said the people briefed on the talks.
Mr. Schneiderman and top prosecutors in some other states have objected to the proposed settlement with major banks, saying it would restrict their ability to investigate and prosecute wrongdoing in a variety of areas, including the bundling of loans in mortgage securities.
Bank of America Corp. (BAC) may settle a state and federal probe of foreclosure practices in a deal that lets New York proceed with an inquiry into securitizations, according to two people with direct knowledge of the talks.
The firm may pursue an accord with most of the 50 state attorneys general, even if it omits New York’s Eric Schneiderman and at least two other states who are opposed because a deal would impede related inquiries, said one of the people. Negotiations on a broad settlement stalled after Schneiderman indicated he wouldn’t let it block his probe into the bundling and sale of mortgages, said the people, who declined to be identified because talks are private.
If New Jersey has no clue to what a third world country looks like… it better brace itself because neighborhoods are going to be eyesores. Just imagine who’s taking care of the nearly 20% of Florida homes that are vacant?
This country is being run down the ground. Then again all they have to do is bulldoze!
NJ-
A New Jersey judge has ruled that four major banks can resume uncontested foreclosure actions in the state under court monitoring.
Bank of America, Citibank, JP Morgan and Wells Fargo were among six large lenders targeted by New Jersey’s Supreme Court last December.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4925-09T3
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST
COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE FOR LONG
BEACH MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST
2006-3,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CONSTANCE LAWRENCE MITCHELL
and GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE
CORPORATION,
Defendants,
and
JACQUELINE BETHEA,
Defendant-Appellant
EXCERPTS:
Deutsche Bank
could have established standing as an assignee, N.J.S.A. 46:9-9,
if it had presented an authenticated assignment indicating that
it was assigned the note before it filed the original complaint.
The only evidence presented by Deutsche Bank was to the
contrary. We reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand
for a hearing to determine whether or not, before filing the
original complaint, plaintiff was in possession of the note or
had another basis to achieve standing to foreclose, pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 12A:3-301.
Although our reversal of summary judgment resolves this
appeal, we think it important to note that the proofs presented
by plaintiff in support of summary judgment were inadequate. In
Ford, supra, we explained that “[a] certification will support
the grant of summary judgment only if the material facts alleged
therein are based, as required by Rule 1:6-6, on personal
knowledge.” 418 N.J. Super. at 599. We held that the trial
court should not have considered an assignment that was not
“authenticated by an affidavit or certification based on
personal knowledge.” Id. at 600.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, Deutsche Bank
provided a certification of an attorney dated January 22, 2009,
which stated that “[p]laintiff is the present holder of the Note
and Mortgage. A copy of the Assignment of Mortgage is attached
as Exhibit B.” The attorney certified that his knowledge was
based upon his “custody and review of the computerized records
of plaintiff which were made in the ordinary course of business
as part of plaintiff’s regular practice to create and maintain
said records and which were recorded contemporaneously with the
transactions reflected therein.” This attorney certification
does not meet the requirement of personal knowledge we
articulated in Ford. Attorneys in particular should not certify
to “facts within the primary knowledge of their clients.”7 See
Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment on R.
1:6-6 (2011); Higgins v. Thurber, 413 N.J. Super. 1, 21 n.19
(App. Div. 2010), aff’d, 205 N.J. 227 (2011).
In support of its motion for final judgment, Deutsche Bank
provided a certification of proof of amount due by a specialist
of JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., servicer for Deutsche Bank, dated
June 9, 2009, stating, in part, that “[p]laintiff is still the
holder and owner of the aforesaid obligation and Mortgage.”
However, this certification does not make any mention of the
assignment of the mortgage or how the signor knows that Deutsche
Bank became the holder of the note.
At oral argument in the trial court, plaintiff’s counsel
indicated that plaintiff had possession of the note prior to
obtaining the assignment. Deutsche Bank did not present any
certification based on personal knowledge stating that it ever
possessed the original note.
We vacate the sheriff’s sale, the final judgment and the
order granting summary judgment and remand to the trial court
for further proceedings in conformance with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4221-09T3
BANK OF NEW YORK AS TRUSTEE FOR
THE CERTIFICATE HOLDERS CWALT
2004 26T1,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
SARAH G. LAKS and EDWARD
EINHORN, her husband,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
PNC BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
Defendant.
___________________________________
Submitted May 23, 2011 – Decided August 8, 2011
EXCERPTS:
The defendants in an action to foreclose a residential mortgage appeal from the denial of their motion to vacate the judgment of foreclosure and dismiss the complaint without prejudice. We reverse and remand for entry of an order granting that relief.
[…]
Laks missed her May 2008 payment on the note and every monthly payment thereafter. On August 13, Countrywide Home Loans,3 plaintiff’s loan servicer, sent a notice of intention to foreclose to Laks by certified mail, return receipt requested. The notice of intention recited that Countrywide was acting on behalf of the owner of Laks’s promissory note, without identifying the owner. The notice of intention also warned that if Laks did not pay $21,279.64 to Countrywide within 30 days, then Laks’s noteholder, again not identified, would institute foreclosure proceedings against her. The notice concluded by advising Laks that if she did not agree that default had occurred or if she disputed the amount required to cure her default, she could contact Countrywide at an address and telephone number stated in the notice. Nowhere on the notice was Laks informed that plaintiff was the owner of her promissory note nor was she given plaintiff’s address. Three days before the foreclosure complaint was filed, MERS assigned Laks and Einhorn’s mortgage to plaintiff.
[…]
Thus, compliance with this notice provision is, in effect, a condition the lender must satisfy in order to either “accelerate the maturity of any residential mortgage obligation” or “commence any foreclosure or other legal action to take possession of the residential property which is the subject of the mortgage.” N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56(a). In fact, with narrow exceptions inapplicable here, “[c]ompliance with [N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56] shall be set forth in the pleadings of any legal action” to foreclose a residential mortgage. N.J.S.A. 2A:50- 56(f). The notice of intention must include specific information “state[d] in a manner calculated to make the debtor aware of the situation[.]” N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56(c).5 The information the Legislature has deemed essential to the Act’s purpose includes:
“the particular obligation or real estate security interest”; “the nature of the default claimed”; the debtor’s right to cure the default; what the debtor must do to cure; and the date by which it must be done to avoid the filing of a foreclosure complaint. N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56(c)(1)-(5). The notice also must advise the debtor of the consequences of a failure to cure —specifically, that the lender may take steps to terminate the debtor’s ownership of the property by filing a foreclosure action and that the debtor will be required to pay the lender’s court costs and counsel fees if the debtor does not cure.
N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56(c)(6)-(7). In addition to the foregoing information about rights, responsibilities and consequences, the Legislature has determined that the notice of intention must include three items of information that are best characterized as helpful to a debtor interested in curing default. The first two are advice to seek counsel from an attorney — including references to the New Jersey Bar Association, Lawyer Referral Service and Legal Services — and a list of programs providing assistance for those seeking to cure default. N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56(c)(9)-(10). The third, and the one critical in this case, is “the name and address of the lender and the telephone number of a representative of the lender whom the debtor may contact if the 9 A-4221-09T3 debtor disagrees with the lender’s assertion that a default has occurred or the correctness of the mortgage lender’s calculation of the amount required to cure default.” N.J.S.A. 2A:50- 56(c)(11).
There is no question that the notice of intention mailed to Laks did not provide the name or address of the lender as required by subsection (c)(11). The notice of intention named no entity other than the mortgage servicer, Countrywide.
Lets not forget some of the trusts in the settlement were established under Delaware law…
(Reuters) –
A day after New York’s attorney general called Bank of America Corp’s (BAC.N) $8.5 billion mortgage-backed securities settlement “unfair” and “inadequate”, another state attorney general hinted he may also oppose the deal.
Delaware Attorney General Beau Biden plans on filing a motion to intervene next week, said an attorney from his office on Friday.
WASHINGTON — New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman asked a state judge to reject a proposed $8.5 billion settlement agreement over soured loans between Bank of America and a group of investors, claiming in court documents that a separate bank representing the investors committed fraud for failing to ensure that the mortgage securities were created in accordance with state law and for failing to act in the investors’ best interest.
Bank of New York Mellon, the trustee representing the investors, “knowingly, repeatedly, and consistently” misled investors into thinking that the mortgage bonds were created properly, Schneiderman said in court documents. BNY Mellon also put its own interests before those of the investors it’s supposed to represent, he said.
In the past six months, an eerie feeling has settled in the offices of housing counselors and attorneys who confront the foreclosure crisis head-on and help distressed homeowners in New Jersey. The phone hasn’t been ringing any less than it did at the height of the storm, but what is about to hit may be greater than anything the group has seen so far.
Foreclosure filings are down 86 percent so far this year from last, owing in part to a December crackdown by the state’s chief justice that effectively halted proceedings by the country’s biggest mortgage lenders and service companies, according to court data. But lenders are waiting to file an estimated 28,500 foreclosures, and another 55,000 mortgage loans are currently more than 90 days delinquent, according to LPS Applied Analytics, a real estate data firm that tracks mortgage performance. At the current rate, it would take 49 years for banks to clear the logjam of mortgage loans that are currently in the foreclosure process or are more than 90 days delinquent, LPS found.
You’re either pregnant or you ain’t. Can’t be both!
Credit Slips-
Since last October, shortly after the robosigning scandal broke, I’ve been talking until I turned blue in the face about robosigning being the tip of the iceberg with mortgage problems and that the real issue was chain of title. Robosigning appeared to be an almost unexpected deposition by-product; the real goal in the depositions that uncovered the robosigning was exposing the backdating of mortgage endorsement. And that they did–the notaries’ whose seals were on the documents didn’t have their commissions when the assignments supposedly took place.
But why would anyone bother backdating mortgage assignments? …
Do you remember the brouhaha over testimony by a senior executive in Countrywide’s mortgage servicing unit last year? It called into question whether mortgages had been conveyed properly to securitizations, which in turn would impair Bank of America’s ability to foreclose.
Testimony in a New Jersey bankruptcy court case provides proof of the scenario we’ve depicted on this blog since September, namely, that subprime originators, starting sometime in the 2004-2005 timeframe, if not earlier, stopped conveying note (the borrower IOU) to mortgage securitization trust as stipulated in the pooling and servicing agreement….
As we indicated back in September, it appeared that Countrywide, and likely many other subprime orignators quit conveying the notes to the securitization trusts sometime in the 2004-2005 time frame. Yet bizarrely, they did not change the pooling and servicing agreements to reflect what appears to be a change in industry practice. Our evidence of this change was strictly anecdotal; this bankruptcy court filing, posted at StopForeclosureFraud provides the first bit of concrete proof. The key section:
As to the location of the note, Ms. DeMartini testified that to her knowledge, the original note never left the possession of Countrywide, and that the original note appears to have been transferred to Countrywide’s foreclosure unit, as evidenced by internal FedEx tracking numbers. She also confirmed that the new allonge had not been attached or otherwise affIXed to the note. She testified further that it was customary for Countrywide to maintain possession of the original note and related loan documents.
Fortune examined hundreds of foreclosure documents to determine the validity of mortgage securitizations after Bank of America debunked testimony about them last fall. The results raise more questions than they answer.
Are Countrywide mortgage-backed securities really mortgage-backed? Do banks even have the legal right to foreclose on certain homes?
Banks trying to foreclose on homeowners are hitting another roadblock, as some delinquent borrowers are successfully arguing that their mortgage companies can’t prove they own the loans and therefore don’t have the right to foreclose.
These “show me the paper” cases have been winding through the courts for several years. But in recent months, some judges have been siding with borrowers and stopping foreclosures after concluding that banks’ paperwork problems are more serious than previously thought and raise broader ethical questions.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1422-09T2
WACHOVIA BANK, N.A.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
GREGORY WRIGHT a/k/a
GREG WRIGHT, MRS. GREGORY
WRIGHT, his wife, and LAKES AT LARCHMONT
CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION,
Defendants,
and MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION
SYSTEMS, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
EXCERPT:
PER CURIAM
U.S. Bank National Association (US Bank), as successor in interest to defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), appeals from a Chancery Division order denying its request to vacate the default judgment against it and foreclosing the interest of MERS in residential realty.1 We affirm.
These facts are taken from the motion record. Defendant Gregory Wright purchased real property on Albridge Way in Mt. Laurel Township (the subject realty) on September 2, 2003. On December 2, 2005, Wright contracted with JP Morgan Chase, N.A. (Chase) for a mortgage and a line of credit secured by a second mortgage on the subject realty. On August 9, 2006, Wright refinanced the Chase debts and withdrew additional equitable value from the realty. He borrowed $210,000 from MERS through its agent, Accredited Home Lenders, Inc. (AHL). Inexplicably, the MERS mortgage was not recorded for over a year, until September 17, 2007.
THE BANK OF NEW YORK
MELLON-fka THE BANK OF
NEW YORK TRUSTEE UNDER
THE POOLING AND SERVICING
AGREEMENT SERIES 2004-24 CB,
v
GEORGE S. ELGHOSSAIN and
MONA C. ELGHOSSAIN,
Excerpt:
In today’s widespread foreclosure litigation, the specific fact pattern this court addresses appears not to have been squarely decided before: does a mortgage lender’s “servicer’s” Notice of Intent to Foreclose satisfy the statutory mandates that notice be provided by the lender and that the lender as well as the lender’s representative be identified in that notice. The lender and the lender’s representation must be identified in the notice. Having not done so here, the motion is deficient. The foreclosure complaint is dismissed without prejudice.
U.S. BANK NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE FOR
J.P. MORGAN ACQUISITION CORP.
2006-FRE2, ASSET BACKED PASSTHROUGH
CERTIFICATES, SERIES
2006-FRE2,
V.
ARTHUR SPENCER, MRS. ARTHUR
SPENCER, HIS WIFE; JOHN M.
ALFIS,
Argued: March 18, 2011
Decided: March 22, 2011
Amended: March 28, 2011
Honorable Peter E. Doyne, A.J.S.C.
John Habermann, Esq. appearing on behalf of the plaintiff, U.S. Bank National
Association, as trustee for J.P. Morgan Acquisition Corp. 2006-FRE2, asset backed passthrough
certificates, series 2006-FRE2 (Phelan Hallinan & Schmieg, PC).
Gary E. Stern, Esq. appearing on behalf of the defendant, Arthur Spencer (Gary E. Stern, Esq.).
EXCERPT:
Analysis
A. Standing
Defendant’s counsel argued plaintiff did not have standing to sue as there was a break in the chain of title by the U.S. Bank assignment. Counsel specified the Fremont Investment assignment was by Fremont to Fremont Investment; the U.S. Bank assignment was by Fremont to U.S. Bank. The break was said to occur when Fremont, and not Fremont Investment, assigned the note and mortgage to U.S. Bank. Defendant’s counsel contended no explanation or turnover of documentation justified plaintiff’s right to prosecute the current foreclosure proceeding.19 However, the U.S. Bank assignment was from MERS as nominee for FGC d/b/a Fremont and its successors and/or assigns. As Fremont Investment was an assignee of Fremont pursuant to the Fremont Investment assignment, there appears to be no break in title when the mortgage and note were transferred pursuant to the U.S. Bank assignment. Nevertheless, plaintiff has provided no documentation or support for its position it is the trustee for J.P. Morgan, and therefore has not established its right to sue on behalf of JP Morgan.
Of greater import was defendant’s counsel’s argument plaintiff did not have standing as there was no proof the named plaintiff ever took physical possession of the note. Plaintiff’s counsel countered the original note was forwarded to him upon request for the location of the note but was inadvertently returned by counsel to plaintiff. It is though surprising the reply did not set forth, competently, plaintiff possessed the note on filing of the complaint.20
Without establishing physical possession of the note, plaintiff may not be an entity which may foreclose pursuant to the first and second categories in section 301, namely, as a (1) holder of the instrument or (2) a nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the rights of the holder.21 N.J.S.A. 12A:3-301. As plaintiff has not alleged, let alone established, the loss of possession of the instrument or the instrument was paid or accepted by mistake and the payor or acceptor recovered payment or revoked acceptance, plaintiff may not be a party who may foreclose pursuant to the third category in section 301, namely, a person not in possession of the instrument who is entitled to enforce the instrument. N.J.S.A. 12A:3-301; 12A:3-309(a); 12A:3-418(d). Therefore, plaintiff failed to establish standing as it is not a person entitled to enforce the note.N.J.S.A. 12A:3-301.
Plaintiff has failed to establish standing as its relationship as trustee to JP Morgan was not set forth; more importantly, though, plaintiff has failed to establish it had or has physical possession of the note and/or failed to demonstrate the note was indorsed. As such, summary judgment for plaintiff is denied and the cross-motion for summary judgment is granted. Although both motions may have been decided on the basis of lack of standing alone, for purposes of completeness, the court also shall analyze whether the evidence presented in support of plaintiff’s motion was competent and thereafter whether plaintiff has set forth a prima facie case in foreclosure.
B. Admissibility of evidence
Defendant’s counsel correctly asserted no competent witness has brought forth admissible evidence. Yoder does not claim to be a person with personal knowledge. R. 1:6-6. Furthermore, the exhibits attached to the Yoder Cert. do not fall within the business records exception as Yoder does not claim be a person with actual knowledge or to have produced the exhibits by obtaining information from such a person.22 N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6). Therefore, the exhibits submitted on plaintiff’s behalf were inadmissiblehearsay and the court may not consider them. This is particularly perplexing as this issue was squarely put forth in defendant’s opposition and cross-motion, was not addressed in plaintiff’s reply, and follows shortly after the publication of Ford, supra.
As plaintiff has failed to justify the relief sought by competent, admissible evidence, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied. Lastly, the court shall analyze whether plaintiff has set forth a prima facie case in foreclosure.
C. Material issues in foreclosure proceeding
While plaintiff’s counsel conceded the circumstances surrounding the alleged default were “unfortunate,” he asserted it “did not create the fire to the premises nor . . . change the zoning of the subject property.” Plaintiff’s counsel set forth defendant failed to make payments pursuant to the executed note, and the mortgage was executed and recorded. However, as issues of fact remain concerning the fact-sensitive allegations of (1) unclean hands (2) breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing,23 and, (3) as restoration was not “feasible,” why the proceeds were not applied to the sums secured, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is further denied.24 Had defendant’s crossmotion for summary judgment been brought solely upon the allegations of unclean hands and breach of the duty of good-faith and fair dealing, the court would have denied the cross-motion and the matter would have proceeded in the normal course to further explore the facts underlying the defenses; however, summary judgment for defendant is appropriate on the basis of lack of standing.
Conclusion
Some are more empathetic than others to mortgagors who are no longer paying their contractual committed amount in a manner consistent with their obligations. Motions for summary judgment or oppositions to motions for summary judgment based on technical deficiencies or defenses are coming before the chancery courts at an ever increasing rate. This case, though, is distinct from the “run of the mill” motion where defendant’s attorney raises “technical objections” in an effort to delay the seemingly inevitable in an attempt to garner for clients as much time in the home as the law will
permit without paying outstanding obligations.
Here, not only has plaintiff failed to establish standing to bring the instant foreclosure action or present admissible evidence by a competent witness, defendant’s competent assertions have also given rise to fact-sensitive defenses.
Defendant’s crossmotion is granted as plaintiff has failed to establish standing and has failed to comply with the court’s January 25, 2011 order.25 Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied on three grounds: (1) lack of standing, (2) failure to present a prima facie case by presenting admissible evidence by a competent witness, (3) and defenses raised would be in need of further exploration.
The action is dismissed without prejudice.26 The court’s order shall be sent under separate cover.
19At oral argument defendant’s counsel argued there is a hole in the chain of title “big enough to drive a truck through.” Counsel alleged there was no documentation or support indicating the note was assigned by Fremont Investment. This was the same argument counsel made on the papers.
Abigail Field’s latest article is a must read. Forget the energizer bunny, this just keeps going and going…it does not stop.
from DailyFinance
When an LPS client has a mortgage that goes into default, Lofton explains, LPS starts managing the loan. In order to do that, the appropriate LPS employees are given login information for the bank’s database. As a security measure, each login is unique. That login grants access to the bank’s entire database of current and defaulted loans, so that the employee can address whatever problem exists. For example, if a payment that should have been applied to a defaulted mortgage was accidentally credited to a current mortgage, the LPS employee needs access to the current mortgage to fix the error.
When an employee can’t fix or reconcile data in an account, she is supposed to enlist the help of her supervisor, and if needed, her supervisor’s supervisor. Each manager also has unique login information, and each bank apparently has additional security protocols that LPS employees are supposed to follow. If the employees and supervisors were following the rules, all would be relatively well. But according to Lofton, they were not:
“…109. …most of the [LPS] Associate Team members had gained unauthorized access to the logins and passwords of their team associates and supervisors for all of the bank servicers’ computers.
110. With this unauthorized access to the Bank’s computers, the [LPS] associates could go into the banks computer files and manipulate the data….
112. I was particularly concerned that during “crunch” times …Team Associates were cutting corners….
116. When an employee cut corners, the employee left out one or more steps that should have been performed and had to make something up.
117. The problem caused by cutting corners might not come to light until six months down the road when an attorney asks questions about the billing record.”
The Complaint alleges that CitiMortgage accepted billions in government bailout money under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”) earmarked to help struggling homeowners avoid foreclosure. CitiMortgage, like other TARP-funded financial institutions, is contractually obligated to modify mortgage loans it services for homeowners who qualify under HAMP, a federal program designed to abate the foreclosure crisis by providing mortgage loan modifications to eligible homeowners.
According to the lawsuit, CitiMortgage systematically slows or thwarts homeowners’ requests to modify mortgages, depriving borrowers of federal bailout funds that could save them from foreclosure. The bank ends up reaping the financial benefits provided by TARP-funds and also collects higher fees and interest rates associated with stressed home loans.
[1] The assignment was executed by an individual identified as Laura Hescott who signed the assignment as an assistant vice-president of Washington Mutual Bank. Ms. Hescott has been identified as an employee of Lender Processing Services, Inc. (“LPS”), a servicer of default mortgages. The bona fides of the practices of this service provider have been the subject of increased judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., In re Taylor, 407 B.R. 618, 623 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2009).
The Supreme Court has recognized that “[s]erious questions have surfaced about the accuracy of documents submitted to courts by lenders and service-providers in support of foreclosure requests.” Administrative order 01-2010, 202 N.J.L.J. 1110 (December 27, 2010). The practice of signing and filing documents without any personal knowledge of the information, also known as “robo-signing,” implicates the “overriding concern about the integrity of the judicial process.” Id. at 1111. The order provides that “lenders and service providers who have filed more than 200 residential foreclosure actions in 2010 are required, within 45 days, to demonstrate the reliability and accuracy of documents and other submissions to the court in foreclosure proceedings.” Ibid. On remand, to the extent the order is applicable to plaintiff, plaintiff shall comply with its terms.
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, as Trustee for WaMu Series 2007-HEI Trust, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
TRACEY T. WILSON , his/her heirs, devisees and personal representatives, and his, her, their or any of their successors in right, title and interest and WILLIS J. WILSON, his/her heirs, devisees and personal representatives, and his, her, their or any of their successors in right, title and interest, Defendants-Appellants.
Docket No. A-1384-09T1.
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.
Submitted November 3, 2010.
Decided January 19, 2011.
Tracey T. Wilson, appellant pro se.
Respondent has not filed a brief.
Before Judges Carchman and Messano.
Not for Publication without the Approval of the Appellate Division.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants Tracey T. Wilson and Willis J. Wilson appeal from a final judgment of foreclosure in favor of plaintiff Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for WaMu Series 2007-HE1 Trust. While plaintiff submitted a supplemental affidavit to the trial judge allegedly confirming the assignment of the original mortgage to the named plaintiff, it failed to comply with N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6), and the affidavit should not have been considered.
These are the relevant facts. Plaintiff filed a foreclosure action against defendants. Defendants filed a response, which was accepted as an answer and challenged, among other things, the bona fides of a later assignment of the mortgage. In response, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, but the judge denied relief pending further information regarding the assignment. Thereafter, plaintiff filed a supplemental affidavit, executed by Janine Timmons, a manager of Washington Mutual Bank, attesting to the accuracy of facts “based on our computerized business records maintained in the ordinary course.” She claimed that the note and mortgage had been executed by defendants on December 14, 2006, and the note and mortgage had been sold to plaintiff on January 16, 2007; moreover, an assignment of mortgage was executed on October 31, 2007, two weeks after the filing of the foreclosure complaint on October 18, 2007.[1]
After receiving the supplemental affidavit, the motion judge struck defendants’ answer and permitted the foreclosure matter to proceed by default. Thereafter, a judgment was entered, and this appeal followed.[2]
On appeal, defendants assert that plaintiff’s affidavit regarding the assignment was hearsay and violates the Best Evidence Rule. In addition, defendants claim that they were denied discovery and finally, plaintiff was not a holder in due course.
Although defendants cite N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6), and claim that these were not valid business records, we have more fundamental concern about the substance of the Timmons affidavit. The affidavit makes reference to unidentified computerized business records supporting the verification of the facts attested to, but nothing more is set forth regarding the records other than that conclusory statement.
Recently, the Supreme Court reiterated the relevant factors that must be established by a proponent of documents pursuant to N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6). In New Jersey Div. of Youth and Fam. Servs. v. M.C. III, 201 N.J. 328 (2010), Justice Wallace, speaking for the Court, observed:
Under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, a party seeking to admit a hearsay statement pursuant to this rule must demonstrate that “the writing [was] made in the regular course of business,” the writing was “prepared within a short time of the act, condition or event being described,” and “the source of the information and the method and circumstances of the preparation of the writing must justify allowing it into evidence.” State v. Matulewicz, 101 N.J. 27, 29 (1985) (citation omitted).
[(Id. at 347).]
The affidavit submitted by Timmons falls far short of meeting this threshold showing. Nothing in her affidavit indicates any of the elements identified in either the rule or M.C.
Additional considerations are cause for concern. N.J.R.E. 1002 mandates that, “To prove the content of a writing or photograph, the original writing or photograph is required except as otherwise provided in these rules or by statute.”[3] Here, reference is made to computerized records, yet the record before the trial court or on appeal is devoid of any copies of such records to support the attestations of Timmons. See N.J.R.E. 1001(c) and Fed. Ev. Rule 1001(c) (requiring “original” computer data in the form of printouts or other readable output). Most important, no discovery was permitted to defendants. In such instance, plaintiff should not be allowed to “cut corners” to avoid meeting its burden.
We are satisfied that plaintiff failed to meet its burden to establish the bona fides of the alleged assignment to permit plaintiff to proceed on its foreclosure complaint. We take particular note of the fact that plaintiff has not responded to the appeal so that we are unable to have the benefit of its position on the issues raised by defendants.
We conclude that the appropriate course of action is a remand to the Chancery Division to resolve the issue of the bona fides of the assignment. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
Reversed and remanded.
[1] The assignment was executed by an individual identified as Laura Hescott who signed the assignment as an assistant vice-president of Washington Mutual Bank. Ms. Hescott has been identified as an employee of Lender Processing Services, Inc. (“LPS”), a servicer of default mortgages. The bona fides of the practices of this service provider have been the subject of increased judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., In re Taylor, 407 B.R. 618, 623 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2009).
The Supreme Court has recognized that “[s]erious questions have surfaced about the accuracy of documents submitted to courts by lenders and service-providers in support of foreclosure requests.” Administrative order 01-2010, 202 N.J.L.J. 1110 (December 27, 2010). The practice of signing and filing documents without any personal knowledge of the information, also known as “robo-signing,” implicates the “overriding concern about the integrity of the judicial process.” Id. at 1111. The order provides that “lenders and service providers who have filed more than 200 residential foreclosure actions in 2010 are required, within 45 days, to demonstrate the reliability and accuracy of documents and other submissions to the court in foreclosure proceedings.” Ibid. On remand, to the extent the order is applicable to plaintiff, plaintiff shall comply with its terms.
[2] Subsequent to the filing of the appeal, a notice of sheriff’s sale was published. The notice is not part of the record on appeal, and we have no further information regarding the status of the property.
[3] In their brief, defendants refer to the Federal Rules of Evidence. Those rules are not applicable here.
NEW YORK, Jan 25 (Reuters) – A lender need not show physical possession of a note on underlying debt in order to seek foreclosure of a mortgage that has been securitized, a New Jersey court ordered, departing from previous court rulings in the United States.
In the case decided on Jan. 7, Bank of America Corp (BAC.N) sought to foreclose on the home of Janett Alvarado of Bogota, New Jersey, but the note and mortgage for $292,000 had been lost by Washington Mutual Bank [WMPDC.UL] before the loan obligation was transferred to Bank of America.
Courts in the United States have been unwilling to allow banks to enforce their interests without showing that they possessed the physical note.
A Superior Court judge in New Jersey, Mary Thurber, ruled that Bank of America was entitled to enforce Alvarado’s note obligation and was entitled to summary judgment.
LASALLE BANK, N.A; CENLAR FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK FSB; FEIN, SUCH, KAHN AND SHEPARD, PC;
No. 09-1466.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Argued September 14, 2010.
Filed: January 12, 2011.
Lewis G. Adler (Argued), Woodbury, N.J. 08096, Roger C. Mattson, Woodbury, N.J. 08096, Attorneys for Appellant.
Andrew C. Sayles (Argued) Gregory E. Peterson, Connell Foley, Roseland, N.J. 08068, Attorneys for Appellee Fein, Such, Kahn and Shepard, P.C.
Daniel C. Green, Vedder Price, New York, N.Y. 10019, Chad A. Schiefelbein (Argued), Vedder Price, Chicago, IL 60601, Attorneys for Appellee LaSalle Bank.
Gregory A. Lomax, Christopher L. Soriano, Morgan J. Zucker, Duane Morris, Cherry Hill, N.J. 08003, Attorneys for Appellee Cenlar Federal Savings Bank.
Before: SLOVITER, BARRY, and SMITH Circuit Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
This appeal presents the question whether a communication from a debt collector to a consumer’s attorney is actionable under the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1).
RE: Emergent Amendments to Rules 1:5-6, 4:64-1 and 4:64-2
In light of irregularities in the residential foreclosure practice as reported in sworn deposition testimony in New Jersey and other states, the Court has adopted, on an emergent basis, amendments to Rules 1:5-6, 4:64-1 and 4:64-2. These amendments are effective December 20, 2010. The new rule and the amendments, along with the Order adopting them, appear with this notice. The Court’s Order also contains directions for counsel in pending uncontested residential foreclosure cases.
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