If the courts can’t address clear instances of fraud and injustice, how can they protect our citizens?

 New Deal 2.0-

It has been exactly 18 months since I deposed GMAC Mortgage’s prolific document signer, Jeffrey Stephan, in a case where I was defending a Maine homeowner in foreclosure. Stephan admitted to signing 8,000 to 10,000 foreclosure documents a month (that is about one a minute, if you do the arithmetic), including summary judgment affidavits used by courts as the basis for entering forclosure judgments. Stephan’s affidavits were sent by GMAC to courts all over the country. Obviously, and as Stephan admitted, he did not bother to read those affidavits. He also admitted that he had no idea as to whether the foreclosure affidavits that he signed were true. He didn’t even trouble himself to appear before a notary to be sworn, even though his affidavits said that he had done so. While Stephan admitted that he understood that judges were relying upon his affidavits to take away the homes of homeowners all over the country, he seemed serene and untroubled by his dishonesty in signing these false affidavits. (Conduct like this has since been awarded the slang term “robo-signing,” but I never use it because it fails to adequately describe the dishonesty and deception involved.)

[NEW DEAL 2.0]

A Denmark woman whose case touched off a national uproar over foreclosures with faulty paperwork may finally lose her home.

KJOnline-

By a 5-1 decision released this morning, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court upheld a lower court ruling that allowed loan servicer GMAC Mortgage, despite admittedly flawed practices involved in affadavit signing, to foreclose upon a home in Denmark purchased in 2003 by Nicolle M. Bradbury.

[KJONLINE]

Conway Daily Sun-

EFFINGHAM — A major Wall Street bank is apologizing to a Maine couple who allege that the bank wrongfully claimed ownership of their second home on Green Mountain Road in Effingham. But the apology rings hollow for the Drew family.

Apparently, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. confused a little red house, owned by Travis and Paula Drew, at 529 Green Mountain Road, for a no-longer-existent mobile home at 519 Green Mountain Road.

The structures were owned by different people even though they once shared the same lot. The confusion led the bank’s agents to change the locks on the Drews’ home and remove $14,000 worth of belongings from the property.

The Drews don’t live in the Effingham house. They live in Stow, Maine.

[CONWAY DAILY SUN]

For some these are documents and for others it represents families.

WSJ-

GMAC Mortgage LLC, the mortgage servicer that vaulted “robo-signing” into the headlines, says it has overhauled its foreclosure procedures.

The unit of Ally Financial Inc. has put each employee who works on foreclosures through an additional 40 hours of training, testing them on what they learned. Outside law firms that handle foreclosures for GMAC must answer questions about their own practices and are subject to on-site reviews.

The changes came after GMAC employee Jeffrey Stephan said in a deposition last year that he had signed off on as many as 10,000 foreclosure documents without proper review.

[WALL STREET JOURNAL]

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT

HSBC BANK USA, N.A., AS TRUSTEE UNDER THE POOLING AND
SERVICING AGREEMENT DATED AS OF DECEMBER 1, 2005, FREMONT
HOME LOAN TRUST 2005-E

v.

JANELLE GABAY

EXCERPT:

[¶1] Janelle Gabay appeals from a summary judgment entered in the District
Court (Bridgton, Powers, J.) in favor of HSBC Bank USA, N.A., as Trustee under
the Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated as of December 1, 2005, Fremont
Home Loan Trust 2005-E, on HSBC’s complaint for foreclosure and sale pursuant
to 14 M.R.S. §§ 6321-6325 (2010).1 Gabay argues that HSBC’s motion for
summary judgment should have been denied because HSBC’s statement of
material facts left unresolved genuine issues of material fact as to (1) whether
HSBC is the owner and holder, pursuant to a valid endorsement, of the promissory
note due to HSBC’s failure to present adequate evidence of such; (2) the order of
priority among creditors; (3) the sufficiency of identification of the court costs that
HSBC sought to collect; and (4) the identification of the premises to be foreclosed
upon. Because genuine issues of material fact exist, we vacate the judgment and
remand for further proceedings.

[…]

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

[¶8] We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine “whether
the parties’ statements of material facts and the referenced record evidence reveal a
genuine issue of material fact.” JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Harp, 2011 ME 5, ¶ 15,
10 A.3d 718. In so doing, we consider only the material facts set forth, and the
portions of the record referred to, in the statements of material facts. Salem
Capital Grp., LLC v. Litchfield, 2010 ME 49, ¶ 4, 997 A.2d 720. In summary
judgment practice, the court “is neither required nor permitted to independently
search a record to find support for facts offered by a party.” Levine v. R.B.K. Caly
Corp., 2001 ME 77, ¶ 9, 770 A.2d 653. A party’s motion for summary judgment
may not be granted if that party fails to properly put the material facts before the
court, “regardless of the adequacy, or inadequacy, of the nonmoving party’s
response.” Id. ¶ 5.

[¶9] HSBC contends that it need not properly identify which paragraph of a
supporting record reference is the basis for a particular statement of material fact
when (i) the supporting record is included in its entirety in the summary judgment
record, or (ii) the critical paragraph in the record has been cited to support a
different material fact. However, our rules require that each statement of material
fact must directly refer the court to “the specific portions of the record from which
each fact is drawn.” Id. ¶ 9; M.R. Civ. P. 56(h)(1), (4). We have repeatedly noted
the importance of applying the summary judgment rules strictly in the context of
mortgage foreclosures. See HSBC Mortg. Servs., Inc. v. Murphy, 2011 ME 59, ¶ 9,
19 A.3d 815; JPMorgan Chase Bank, 2011 ME 5, ¶ 15, 10 A.3d 718.

[¶10] “In residential mortgage foreclosure actions, certain minimum facts
must be included in a mortgage holder’s statement of material facts on summary
judgment.” HSBC Mortg. Servs., 2011 ME 59, ¶ 9, 19 A.3d 815; see also M.R.
Civ. P. 56(j). To support a summary judgment motion in a residential mortgage
foreclosure action, the mortgage holder must include, at a minimum, the following
facts in its statement of material facts, each supported by evidence of a quality that
could be admissible at trial:

(1) The existence of the mortgage, including the book and page
number of the mortgage, and an adequate description of the
mortgaged premises, including the street address, if any;

(2) Properly presented proof of ownership of the mortgage note and
the mortgage, including all assignments and endorsements of the note
and the mortgage;

(3) A breach of condition in the mortgage;

(4) The amount due on the mortgage note, including any reasonable
attorney fees and court costs;

(5) The order of priority and any amounts that may be due to other
parties in interest, including any public utility easements;

(6) Evidence of properly served notice of default and mortgagor’s
right to cure in compliance with statutory requirements;

(7) After January 1, 2010, proof of completed mediation (or waiver or
default of mediation), when required, pursuant to the statewide
foreclosure mediation program rules; and

(8) If the homeowner has not appeared in the proceeding, a statement,
with a supporting affidavit, of whether or not the defendant is in
military service in accordance with the Servicemembers Civil Relief
Act.

HSBC Mortg. Servs., 2011 ME 59, ¶ 9 n.6, 19 A.3d 815; Chase Home Fin. LLC v.
Higgins, 2009 ME 136, ¶ 11, 985 A.2d 508; see also M.R. Civ. P. 56(j) (providing,
among other things, that a summary judgment may not be entered in a foreclosure
action unless it is determined that “the plaintiff has properly certified proof of
ownership of the mortgage note and produced evidence of the mortgage note, the
mortgage, and all assignments and endorsements of the mortgage note and the
mortgage”).

[¶11] Our analysis focuses on the first, second, fourth, and fifth
requirements listed above. We begin our discussion with the second requirement.
A. Ownership and Endorsement of the Note

[¶12] As noted above, HSBC is required to include the following
properly-supported facts in its statement of material facts: “properly presented
proof of ownership of the mortgage note . . . , including all assignments and
endorsements of the note . . . .” HSBC Mortg. Servs., 2011 ME 59, ¶ 9 n.6, 19
A.3d 815; Chase Home Fin., 2009 ME 136, ¶ 11, 985 A.2d 508.

[¶13] In its statement of material facts, HSBC asserts that it is the “current
holder of the Note,” citing to paragraph seven of its complaint and to paragraph
four of the Lender affidavit. There are multiple deficiencies in this statement of
material fact as it concerns proof of ownership of the note.

[¶14] First, neither of the citations included to support the bare factual
statement that HSBC is the current holder of the note properly supports that factual
statement. The cited paragraph of the Lender’s affidavit refers only to HSBC’s
being the current holder of the mortgage. The cited paragraph of the complaint
asserts that “[HSBC] is the current holder of the Note and Mortgage by virtue of an
assignment dated on or about December 22, 2008.” However, the assignment
expressly referred to in that averment, which assignment was not attached to the
complaint but which is included in the summary judgment record, did not assign
the note to HSBC. The December 22, 2008, assignment, entitled “ASSIGNMENT
OF MORTGAGE,” assigned MERS’s interest in the mortgage, but not the note, to
HSBC.8

[¶15] While an averment in a complaint that a defendant has failed to deny
is generally deemed admitted, see M.R. Civ. P. 8(d), the statement in HSBC’s
complaint that it is the current holder of the note pursuant to the December 22,
2008, assignment is not sufficiently supported in the context of a residential
mortgage foreclosure proceeding. When, as here, the mortgage-holder must
strictly comply with the requirements of 14 M.R.S. §§ 6321-6325 and M.R. Civ. P.
56(j), the paragraph of HSBC’s complaint cited in support of HSBC’s statement of
material facts providing that it is the current holder of the note does not properly
support that fact.

[¶16] An additional deficiency in HSBC’s statement of material facts is that
HSBC failed to include any facts relating to “properly presented proof of . . . all
assignments and endorsements of the note.” Chase Home Fin., 2009 ME 136,
¶ 11, 985 A.2d 508. HSBC was required to provide such proof, as it is undisputed
that the note was originally executed and delivered to Fremont Investment. HSBC
suggests in its brief, but does not specify in its statement of material facts, that the
summary judgment record contains evidence of a valid endorsement of the note to
HSBC including (1) paragraph two of the Lender’s affidavit, which states that
HSBC holds the note pursuant to a special endorsement, and (2) a copy of the
purported endorsement itself, included in the record as a separate page
accompanying, but not discernably affixed to, a photocopy of the note. Because
the statement of material facts contains no fact concerning properly presented
proof as to any endorsement of the note, however, much less a statement supported
by proper record references, we will not independently search the record to find
such evidence, see id. ¶ 12 n.4; Levine, 2001 ME 77, ¶ 9, 770 A.2d 653, and HSBC
would not be entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

[¶17] Our statement that we will not, and trial courts should not,
independently search a record to find evidence to support a party’s claim when that
claim is insufficiently referenced in that party’s statement of material facts is no
mere technicality to make summary judgment practice more difficult. Certainly in
each individual case it can be argued, as HSBC argues here, that review of the
entire record, with the specific facts now identified in the brief on appeal,
demonstrates that there really is no material fact in dispute. Such arguments
illustrate the need to identify material facts with specific citations to the record in
the statement of material facts filed in the trial court. If an essential fact can be
stated, with a proper record reference, in a brief on appeal, that fact could have and
should have been stated, with a proper record reference, in the statement of
material facts filed in the trial court. Before easy identification by brief on appeal,
the information to make an inadequate statement of material facts complete may
have been locatable only by a search of a record of fifty, one hundred, or more
pages. Placing every material fact in the statement of material facts, with a proper
record citation, as the rules require, avoids the necessity for such a time-consuming
search. Trial courts, who may have to consider multiple motions for summary judgment
at a time, could be considerably burdened searching for facts through
hundreds of pages of records, if the rules requiring complete, properly supported
statements of material facts are not enforced on appeal.

[¶18] Because HSBC’s statement of material facts fails to properly present
proof of ownership of the mortgage note, including all assignments and
endorsements of the note, genuine issues of material fact regarding HSBC’s
ownership of the note exist, precluding entry of judgment as a matter of law.

[…]

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Portland Press Herald-

PORTLAND – The “robo-signing” foreclosure case of a Denmark woman represents such a serious attack on the integrity of the state’s judicial system that an investigation of the mortgage servicer’s practices is warranted, the woman’s lawyer argued before the Maine Supreme Judicial Court on Wednesday.

Nicolle Bradbury’s attorney, Thomas Cox, also said a lower court erred when it failed to find GMAC Mortgage in contempt because one of its employees signed a sworn document in support of foreclosure on her home without reviewing the relevant records. Cox, who discovered the flawed process, argued that it was part of a pattern and that the trial court should have considered remedial or punitive action against GMAC.

Cox said such affidavits affect all of the 1,152 foreclosure actions brought in Maine by GMAC over the past six years. He said GMAC was sanctioned in Florida for the same problems in 2006, but failed to reform its practices.

[PORTLAND PRESS]

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE, IN
TRUST FOR THE REGISTERED HOLDERS OF AMERIQUEST MORTGAGE
SECURITIES INC., ASSET-BACKED PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES,
SERIES 2006-R2

v.

DONALD P. PELLETIER et al.

EXCERPT:

[¶13] Although the Pelletiers have not yet tendered to the bank the proceeds
of the loan that they received from Ameriquest, the statute specifies that tender is
not required until the creditor has performed its obligations under the law.
15 U.S.C.S. § 1635(b). The facts established in this summary judgment record
indicate that the creditor—the bank—has not yet performed its obligation to
“return to the obligor any money or property given as earnest money,
downpayment, or otherwise.” Id. Thus, the Pelletiers were not yet required to
tender the proceeds to the bank, and the court did not err in imposing the remedy of
rescission on summary judgment. Further proceedings are necessary, however, to
define the scope of that remedy. Because the parties have not followed the process
specified by statute with precision and clarity, the court may “otherwise order[]”
appropriate procedures to give effect to the remedy of rescission. Id. Accordingly,
although we affirm the court’s judgment granting the Pelletiers’ request for
rescission, we remand the matter for the court to determine how this rescission
should be effectuated.

The entry is:

Summary judgment for the Pelletiers on the
foreclosure complaint affirmed. Remanded for
further proceedings to effectuate the rescission of
the January 18, 2006, agreements.

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© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT

BENEFICIAL MAINE INC.

v.

TIMOTHY G. CARTER et al.

[…]

[¶3] After the parties were unable to resolve the case through mediation, Beneficial moved for summary judgment and submitted a statement of material facts. See M.R. Civ. P. 56(h)(1). In support of its statement of material facts, Beneficial referred to two affidavits—one from Beneficial’s attorney, which clarified the priority of the Carters’ creditors, and one from Shana Richmond, Vice President of Administrative Services for HSBC Consumer Lending Mortgage Servicing, described in the affidavit as Beneficial’s “servicer.” Beneficial cited to Richmond’s affidavit, with its attached exhibits, as the sole evidentiary support for its allegations of its ownership of the note and mortgage, the Carters’ obligation on the note, the Carters’ default, and the amount that the Carters owed. Richmond’s affidavit states the following as the foundation for her factual assertions:

[…]

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© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

The Morning Sentinel-

A landmark legal case that spotlighted mishandled foreclosures by some of the country’s major lenders is likely to come before Maine’s highest court in September.

The Maine Supreme Judicial Court is expected to hear an appeal of a lower court ruling involving the mortgage servicer GMAC and its foreclosure practices.

Last September, a Maine District Court judge found that a GMAC official had signed a sworn statement supporting the foreclosure of a home owned by Nicolle Bradbury of Denmark, who had lost her job and stopped making mortgage payments. The official, however, hadn’t actually reviewed Bradbury’s foreclosure documents before signing.

Continue reading [THE MORNING SENTINEL]

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

WSJ–

Banks trying to foreclose on homeowners are hitting another roadblock, as some delinquent borrowers are successfully arguing that their mortgage companies can’t prove they own the loans and therefore don’t have the right to foreclose.

These “show me the paper” cases have been winding through the courts for several years. But in recent months, some judges have been siding with borrowers and stopping foreclosures after concluding that banks’ paperwork problems are more serious than previously thought and raise broader ethical questions.

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT

HSBC MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC.

v.

DANA S. MURPHY et al.

EXCERPT:

[¶12] In this case, the affidavits submitted by HSBC contain serious irregularities that make them inherently untrustworthy. The first Vadney affidavit, submitted by HSBC in conjunction with its second motion for summary judgment identifies Vadney as “a Vice President of HSBC Mortgage Services, Inc.,” and was dated and notarized on August 24, 2009. It asserts, among other things, that HSBC is the holder of the note and mortgage deed by virtue of an assignment dated December 11, 2006, and a confirmatory assignment of the note and mortgage dated August 24, 2009. Copies of both assignments are attached to the affidavit. The affidavit states that the confirmatory assignment was recorded in the Androscoggin County Registry of Deeds in Book 7775, Page 346. The copy of the confirmatory
assignment attached to the Vadney affidavit indicates that it was also dated and notarized on August 24, 2009, and then recorded at the Registry of Deeds on August 27, 2009, three days after the date Vadney signed the affidavit swearing that it had been recorded as of August 24, 2009.

[¶13] In addition, the confirmatory assignment from MERS, as nominee for Calusa Investments, LLC, to HSBC was also signed by Vadney. It indicates that Vadney signed the confirmatory assignment on behalf of MERS in her capacity as
its vice president. The summary judgment record is otherwise silent as to whether on August 24, 2009, Maria Vadney was simultaneously an officer of both MERS, the assignor, and HSBC, the assignee, as the affidavit and the confirmatory
assignment suggest.

[¶14] HSBC filed a second affidavit on October 1, 2009, signed by Maria Vadney on September 28, 2009, in support of its statement of supplemental facts filed in response to the Murphy’s opposing statement of material facts. The
affidavit contains a notary’s jurat dated September 24, 2009, four days before Vadney signed the affidavit.

[¶15] The Murphys, noting the discrepancies in the two Vadney affidavits and further observing that in both, the signature and jurat appear on a page separate from the body of the affidavit, urge us to infer that the texts of the affidavits submitted by HSBC were attached to the signature and jurat pages after those pages were executed. The Murphys further contend that if this inference is correct, “the potential for fraud is great with all these affidavits and near certain with the August 24th Vadney affidavit.”8

Continue below…

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Fannie Mae is adding the following fourteen jurisdictions (the new jurisdictions) to the mandatory retained attorney network:

Alaska, Idaho, Mississippi, Oregon,
Arkansas, Kansas, Nebraska, Utah
Delaware. Kentucky, New Mexico
District of Columbia, Maine, Nevada

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF  MAINE

GORDON T. JAMES

v.

U.S. BANK NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, as Trustee for
BAFC2006-1,

and

GMAC MORTGAGE LLC

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTION FOR RELIEF PURSUANT TO
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(G)

In this action in which the original plaintiff’s claims have been dismissed at its request, the original defendant, now counterclaimant and third-party plaintiff, Gordon T. James, seeks sanctions against U.S. Bank National Association (“USB”) and GMAC Mortgage LLC (“GMAC”) arising out of what he characterizes as “a fundamentally false summary judgment affidavit.” Defendant and Third Party Plaintiff Gordon T. James’ Memorandum in Support of Motion for Relief Pursuant to F[ed].R.Civ.P[.] 56(g) (“Motion”) (Docket No. 152) at 1. I grant the motion in part.

The rule invoked by James provides:

continue below…

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From a Maine House, a National Foreclosure Freeze

By DAVID STREITFELD
Published: October 14, 2010

DENMARK, Me. — The house that set off the national furor over faulty foreclosures is blue-gray and weathered. The porch is piled with furniture and knickknacks awaiting the next yard sale. In the driveway is a busted pickup truck. No one who lives there is going anywhere anytime soon.

Nicolle Bradbury bought this house seven years ago for $75,000, a major step up from the trailer she had been living in with her family. But she lost her job and the $474 monthly mortgage payment became difficult, then impossible.

It should have been a routine foreclosure, with Mrs. Bradbury joining the anonymous millions quietly dispossessed since the recession began. But she was savvy enough to contact a nonprofit group, Pine Tree Legal Assistance, where for once in her 38 years, she caught a break.

Her file was pulled, more or less at random, by Thomas A. Cox, a retired lawyer who volunteers at Pine Tree. He happened to know something about foreclosures because when he worked for a bank he did them all the time. Twenty years later, he had switched sides and, he says, was trying to make amends.

Suddenly, there is a frenzy over foreclosures. Every attorney general in the country is participating in an investigation into the flawed paperwork and questionable methods behind many of them. A Senate hearing is scheduled, and federal inquiries have begun. The housing market, which runs on foreclosure sales, is in turmoil. Bank stocks fell on Thursday as analysts tried to gauge the impact on lenders’ bottom lines.

All of this is largely because Mr. Cox realized almost immediately that Mrs. Bradbury’s foreclosure file did not look right. The documents from the lender, GMAC Mortgage, were approved by an employee whose title was “limited signing officer,” an indication to the lawyer that his knowledge of the case was effectively nonexistent.

Mr. Cox eventually won the right to depose the employee, who casually acknowledged that he had prepared 400 foreclosures a day for GMAC and that contrary to his sworn statements, they had not been reviewed by him or anyone else.

Continue reading…NYTIMES

.

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Be sure to catch the Full Depo of Renee Hertzler below after AP Alan Zibel’s article

Bank of America delays foreclosures in 23 states

Excerpt:

In addition to renewing it’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff has also filed a Motion for Entry of Protective Order pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 26 (c). This motion is likewise denied.

Rule 26(c) provides that “for good cause shown” a court may enter a protective order “which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense….” M.R.Civ. P. 26(c). Plaintiff seeks a protective order prohibiting the dissemination of discovery materials obtained in this case.” Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Protective Order at 7. As grounds for it’s motion, Plaintiff points to the embarrassment GMAC and it’s employees have suffered, and will continue to suffer, from the posting of excerpts from Stephan’s deposition transcript on an Internet blog. The court is not persuaded that the Plaintiff has shown the requisite “ good cause” to justify entry of a protective order in this case. See e.g. Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 789 (1^st Cir. 1988) (agreeing with Second Circuit in noting that “the party seeking a protective order has burden of  showing that good cause is not shown, the discovery materials in question should not receive judicial protection and therefore would be open to the public for inspection”) (citation omitted).

Stephan’s deposition was taken in advance a legitimate purpose, and the testimony elicited has directed probative value to dispute. Attorney Cox did not himself take action other that to share the deposition transcript with an attorney in Florida. That the testimony reveals corporate practices that GMAC finds embarrassing in not enough to justify issuance of a protective order. Further, Plaintiff has failed to establish that GMAC has been harmed specifically as a result of the dissemination of the June 7, 2010 deposition transcript, given that similarly embarrassing deposition from December 10, 2009 Florida deposition also appears on the Internet, and will remain even were this Court to grant Plaintiff’s motion. Accordingly, because Plaintiff has failed to satisfy it’s burden of persuasion under Rule 26(c), it’s Motion for Entry of Protective Order is denied.

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By Lynn E. Szymoniak, Esq. Ed., Fraud Digest (www.frauddigest.com) July 18, 2010

These are highlights from the deposition of Jeffrey B. Stephan, taken June 7, 2010, in a foreclosure case in Maine, Federal National Mortgage Association v. Nicole M. Bradbury, et al., Maine District Court, District Nine, Division of Northern Cumberland, Docket No. BRI-RE-09-65. The deposition was taken by Attorney Thomas Cox of Portland, Maine.

Jeffrey Stephan says his current title is team leader of the document execution team for GMAC. He estimates that he signs between 8,000 and 12,000 documents monthly. He supervises a team of 14 employees.

Mortgage Assignments and Affidavits in support of Summary Judgment signed by Stephan have been used by GMAC, FANNIE & FREDDIE in over 100,000 foreclosure cases.

“LPS” in the last line refers to Lender Processing Services in Jacksonville, Florida.

In a previous deposition, Stephan stated that the notaries who notarize his signature are often not actually present in the room with him when he signs documents.

Despite all of the mounting evidence and admissions, Jeffrey Stephan, Scott Anderson, Bryan Bly, Linda Green, Erica Johnson-Seck, Christina Trowbridge and the other “bank officers” employed by the companies serving the securitized
mortgage-backed trust industry will be back at their desks Monday morning, pens (or rubber stamps) in hand.

Page 16-17, Lines 17-25, 2-11

Q: What training have you received?

A: I received side-by-side training from another team leader to instruct me on how to review the documents when they are received from my staff.

Q: Who was that person?

A: That person, at the time, I believe, was a gentleman named Kenneth Ugwuadu. U-G-W-U-A-D-U. He is no longer with GMAC.

Q: How long did that training last?

A: Three days.

Q: Were there any written or printed training materials or manuals used as apart of that training?

A: No.

Page 20, Lines 19-24:

Q.: In your capacity as the team leader for the document execution team, do you have any role in the foreclosure process, other than the signing of documents?

A: No.

Page 54, Lines 12-25:

Q: When you sign a summary judgment affidavit, do you check to see if all of the exhibits are attached to it?

A: No.

Q. Does anybody in your department check to see if all the exhibits are attached to it at the time that it is presented to you for your signature?

A: No.

Q: When you sign a summary judgment affidavit, do you inspect any exhibits attached to it?

A: No.

Page 62-63, Lines 23-25, 2-6:

Q: Is it fair to say when you sign a summary judgment affidavit, you don’t know what information it contains, other than the figures that are set forth within it?

A: Other than the borrower’s name, and if I have signing authority for that entity, that is correct.

Page 69, Lines 2-20:

Q: Mr. Stephan, referring you again to the bottom line on Page 1 of Exhibit 1, it states: I have under my custody and control, the records relating to the mortgage transaction referenced below.

It’s correct, is it not, that you did not have in your custody any records of GMAC at the time that you signed a summary judgment affidavit?

A: I have the electronic record. I do not have papers.

Q: You have access to a computer, is that what you mean?

A: Yes.
(objections omitted)

Page 45, Lines 2-11:

Q: Mr. Stephan, do you recall testifying in your Florida deposition in December with regard to your employees, and you said, quote, they do not go into the system and verify that the information is accurate?

A: That is correct.

Page 41, Line 19:

Q: Do your employees have any direct communication with outside counsel?

A: Yes, through the LPS System.

Please click on Fraud Digest’s logo to read more articles like this.

Here is the Deposition Below:

Via: 4closurefraud

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