MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT

HSBC BANK USA, N.A., AS TRUSTEE UNDER THE POOLING AND
SERVICING AGREEMENT DATED AS OF DECEMBER 1, 2005, FREMONT
HOME LOAN TRUST 2005-E

v.

JANELLE GABAY

EXCERPT:

[¶1] Janelle Gabay appeals from a summary judgment entered in the District
Court (Bridgton, Powers, J.) in favor of HSBC Bank USA, N.A., as Trustee under
the Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated as of December 1, 2005, Fremont
Home Loan Trust 2005-E, on HSBC’s complaint for foreclosure and sale pursuant
to 14 M.R.S. §§ 6321-6325 (2010).1 Gabay argues that HSBC’s motion for
summary judgment should have been denied because HSBC’s statement of
material facts left unresolved genuine issues of material fact as to (1) whether
HSBC is the owner and holder, pursuant to a valid endorsement, of the promissory
note due to HSBC’s failure to present adequate evidence of such; (2) the order of
priority among creditors; (3) the sufficiency of identification of the court costs that
HSBC sought to collect; and (4) the identification of the premises to be foreclosed
upon. Because genuine issues of material fact exist, we vacate the judgment and
remand for further proceedings.

[…]

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

[¶8] We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine “whether
the parties’ statements of material facts and the referenced record evidence reveal a
genuine issue of material fact.” JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Harp, 2011 ME 5, ¶ 15,
10 A.3d 718. In so doing, we consider only the material facts set forth, and the
portions of the record referred to, in the statements of material facts. Salem
Capital Grp., LLC v. Litchfield, 2010 ME 49, ¶ 4, 997 A.2d 720. In summary
judgment practice, the court “is neither required nor permitted to independently
search a record to find support for facts offered by a party.” Levine v. R.B.K. Caly
Corp., 2001 ME 77, ¶ 9, 770 A.2d 653. A party’s motion for summary judgment
may not be granted if that party fails to properly put the material facts before the
court, “regardless of the adequacy, or inadequacy, of the nonmoving party’s
response.” Id. ¶ 5.

[¶9] HSBC contends that it need not properly identify which paragraph of a
supporting record reference is the basis for a particular statement of material fact
when (i) the supporting record is included in its entirety in the summary judgment
record, or (ii) the critical paragraph in the record has been cited to support a
different material fact. However, our rules require that each statement of material
fact must directly refer the court to “the specific portions of the record from which
each fact is drawn.” Id. ¶ 9; M.R. Civ. P. 56(h)(1), (4). We have repeatedly noted
the importance of applying the summary judgment rules strictly in the context of
mortgage foreclosures. See HSBC Mortg. Servs., Inc. v. Murphy, 2011 ME 59, ¶ 9,
19 A.3d 815; JPMorgan Chase Bank, 2011 ME 5, ¶ 15, 10 A.3d 718.

[¶10] “In residential mortgage foreclosure actions, certain minimum facts
must be included in a mortgage holder’s statement of material facts on summary
judgment.” HSBC Mortg. Servs., 2011 ME 59, ¶ 9, 19 A.3d 815; see also M.R.
Civ. P. 56(j). To support a summary judgment motion in a residential mortgage
foreclosure action, the mortgage holder must include, at a minimum, the following
facts in its statement of material facts, each supported by evidence of a quality that
could be admissible at trial:

(1) The existence of the mortgage, including the book and page
number of the mortgage, and an adequate description of the
mortgaged premises, including the street address, if any;

(2) Properly presented proof of ownership of the mortgage note and
the mortgage, including all assignments and endorsements of the note
and the mortgage;

(3) A breach of condition in the mortgage;

(4) The amount due on the mortgage note, including any reasonable
attorney fees and court costs;

(5) The order of priority and any amounts that may be due to other
parties in interest, including any public utility easements;

(6) Evidence of properly served notice of default and mortgagor’s
right to cure in compliance with statutory requirements;

(7) After January 1, 2010, proof of completed mediation (or waiver or
default of mediation), when required, pursuant to the statewide
foreclosure mediation program rules; and

(8) If the homeowner has not appeared in the proceeding, a statement,
with a supporting affidavit, of whether or not the defendant is in
military service in accordance with the Servicemembers Civil Relief
Act.

HSBC Mortg. Servs., 2011 ME 59, ¶ 9 n.6, 19 A.3d 815; Chase Home Fin. LLC v.
Higgins, 2009 ME 136, ¶ 11, 985 A.2d 508; see also M.R. Civ. P. 56(j) (providing,
among other things, that a summary judgment may not be entered in a foreclosure
action unless it is determined that “the plaintiff has properly certified proof of
ownership of the mortgage note and produced evidence of the mortgage note, the
mortgage, and all assignments and endorsements of the mortgage note and the
mortgage”).

[¶11] Our analysis focuses on the first, second, fourth, and fifth
requirements listed above. We begin our discussion with the second requirement.
A. Ownership and Endorsement of the Note

[¶12] As noted above, HSBC is required to include the following
properly-supported facts in its statement of material facts: “properly presented
proof of ownership of the mortgage note . . . , including all assignments and
endorsements of the note . . . .” HSBC Mortg. Servs., 2011 ME 59, ¶ 9 n.6, 19
A.3d 815; Chase Home Fin., 2009 ME 136, ¶ 11, 985 A.2d 508.

[¶13] In its statement of material facts, HSBC asserts that it is the “current
holder of the Note,” citing to paragraph seven of its complaint and to paragraph
four of the Lender affidavit. There are multiple deficiencies in this statement of
material fact as it concerns proof of ownership of the note.

[¶14] First, neither of the citations included to support the bare factual
statement that HSBC is the current holder of the note properly supports that factual
statement. The cited paragraph of the Lender’s affidavit refers only to HSBC’s
being the current holder of the mortgage. The cited paragraph of the complaint
asserts that “[HSBC] is the current holder of the Note and Mortgage by virtue of an
assignment dated on or about December 22, 2008.” However, the assignment
expressly referred to in that averment, which assignment was not attached to the
complaint but which is included in the summary judgment record, did not assign
the note to HSBC. The December 22, 2008, assignment, entitled “ASSIGNMENT
OF MORTGAGE,” assigned MERS’s interest in the mortgage, but not the note, to
HSBC.8

[¶15] While an averment in a complaint that a defendant has failed to deny
is generally deemed admitted, see M.R. Civ. P. 8(d), the statement in HSBC’s
complaint that it is the current holder of the note pursuant to the December 22,
2008, assignment is not sufficiently supported in the context of a residential
mortgage foreclosure proceeding. When, as here, the mortgage-holder must
strictly comply with the requirements of 14 M.R.S. §§ 6321-6325 and M.R. Civ. P.
56(j), the paragraph of HSBC’s complaint cited in support of HSBC’s statement of
material facts providing that it is the current holder of the note does not properly
support that fact.

[¶16] An additional deficiency in HSBC’s statement of material facts is that
HSBC failed to include any facts relating to “properly presented proof of . . . all
assignments and endorsements of the note.” Chase Home Fin., 2009 ME 136,
¶ 11, 985 A.2d 508. HSBC was required to provide such proof, as it is undisputed
that the note was originally executed and delivered to Fremont Investment. HSBC
suggests in its brief, but does not specify in its statement of material facts, that the
summary judgment record contains evidence of a valid endorsement of the note to
HSBC including (1) paragraph two of the Lender’s affidavit, which states that
HSBC holds the note pursuant to a special endorsement, and (2) a copy of the
purported endorsement itself, included in the record as a separate page
accompanying, but not discernably affixed to, a photocopy of the note. Because
the statement of material facts contains no fact concerning properly presented
proof as to any endorsement of the note, however, much less a statement supported
by proper record references, we will not independently search the record to find
such evidence, see id. ¶ 12 n.4; Levine, 2001 ME 77, ¶ 9, 770 A.2d 653, and HSBC
would not be entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

[¶17] Our statement that we will not, and trial courts should not,
independently search a record to find evidence to support a party’s claim when that
claim is insufficiently referenced in that party’s statement of material facts is no
mere technicality to make summary judgment practice more difficult. Certainly in
each individual case it can be argued, as HSBC argues here, that review of the
entire record, with the specific facts now identified in the brief on appeal,
demonstrates that there really is no material fact in dispute. Such arguments
illustrate the need to identify material facts with specific citations to the record in
the statement of material facts filed in the trial court. If an essential fact can be
stated, with a proper record reference, in a brief on appeal, that fact could have and
should have been stated, with a proper record reference, in the statement of
material facts filed in the trial court. Before easy identification by brief on appeal,
the information to make an inadequate statement of material facts complete may
have been locatable only by a search of a record of fifty, one hundred, or more
pages. Placing every material fact in the statement of material facts, with a proper
record citation, as the rules require, avoids the necessity for such a time-consuming
search. Trial courts, who may have to consider multiple motions for summary judgment
at a time, could be considerably burdened searching for facts through
hundreds of pages of records, if the rules requiring complete, properly supported
statements of material facts are not enforced on appeal.

[¶18] Because HSBC’s statement of material facts fails to properly present
proof of ownership of the mortgage note, including all assignments and
endorsements of the note, genuine issues of material fact regarding HSBC’s
ownership of the note exist, precluding entry of judgment as a matter of law.

[…]

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Excerpts:

Q. Okay. And did it actually grant you
14 authority to sign as vice president anywhere in there?
15 A. The listing capacity on that assignment was
16 — is a clerical error. It needed to state “attorney in
17 fact.” This document grants the power as attorney in
18 fact.
19 Q. Okay. So —
20 A. But it does grant the authority to execute
21 the assignment of mortgage.
22 Q. Okay. So you are not vice president of
23 Wells Fargo Bank N.A.?
24 A. No.
25 Q. Okay. During your employment at Florida

1 Default Law Group, were there other companies that you
2 would execute assignments of mortgages on behalf of?
3 A. Yes. I believe there were others.
4 Q. And would you execute those assignments of
5 mortgages as attorney in fact or vice president?
6 A. I believe it varied. I do believe there were
7 other corporate resolutions that it did vary, the
8 capacity in which I signed.
9 Q. Okay. Do you recall specifically any of the
10 other entities that you would execute assignments of
11 mortgages on behalf of?
12 A. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems,
13 known as MERS.
14 Q. MERS?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And what was your capacity as — what was
17 your signing authority on behalf of MERS?
18 A. I believe it was as vice president and
19 assistant secretary. I’m not positive, but I believe it
20 was as vice president.
21 Q. All right. Are you currently — this grants
22 you authority to act as attorney in fact for Wells Fargo
23 Bank until December 31st, 2010.
24 Do you still then execute documents as
25 attorney in fact for Wells Fargo Bank?

1 A. No, I don’t.
2 Q. Okay. And when did you stop doing that?
3 A. It would have been when I left Florida
4 Default in October of 2008.
5 Q. Okay. So was the sole basis of your actions
6 to sign documents as attorney in fact for Wells Fargo
7 Bank out of your employment for Florida Default Law
8 Group?
9 MS. HILL: Object to form.
10 MR. GANO: Objection to the form.
11 A. I’m sorry. Can you rephrase it?
12 Q. Outside of working as an attorney for Florida
13 Default Law Group, did you execute assignments of
14 mortgages for Wells Fargo Bank pursuant to this for any
15 other types of actions not related to Florida Default
16 Law Group?
17 A. No.
18 MS. HILL: When you say “this,” you pointed.
19 For record, you are referring to?
20 MR. IMMEL: This Limited Power of Attorney.
21 MR. GANO: Exhibit A.
22 MR. IMMEL: Exhibit A.
23 Q. And have you ever been to Wells Fargo Bank’s
24 headquarters or any of their offices?
25 A. No. I don’t believe I have.

1 Q. Okay. Are you aware — did you have to apply
2 for the limited power of attorney status with Wells
3 Fargo?
4 A. No.
5 Q. Are you aware of how you were chosen as a
6 limited — to be appointed the limited power of
7 attorney?
8 A. No, I don’t.
9 Q. Okay. Did Wells Fargo Bank provide you any
10 formal training or, I guess, any sort of detailed job
11 responsibilities, or was just this limited power of
12 attorney provided to you?
13 MR. GANO: I’m going to object as far as that
14 going into any specific instructions regarding
15 particular files that she was working while at
16 Florida Default on behalf of the Plaintiff.
17 Q. Without divulging privileged information, if
18 you would limit the answer to that.
19 A. Instruction from Wells Fargo, no.
20 Q. Okay. Did you receive any compensation from
21 Wells Fargo Bank for your duties as an attorney in fact,
22 limited power of attorney?
23 MR. SMITH: You’re asking about her
24 personally?
25 MR. IMMEL: Yes, her personally.

1 A. No.
2 Q. No. Okay. Did you ever attend any board
3 meetings or executive meetings for Wells Fargo Bank?
4 A. No.
5 Q. For that matter, with regard to your signing
6 authority on behalf of MERS, was there any difference
7 between how you carried out your authority with being
8 able to sign documents on behalf of MERS versus Wells
9 Fargo Bank?
10 MS. HILL: I’m going to object to the form.
11 A. I’m sorry. Rephrase, please.
12 Q. Okay. In executing an assignment of mortgage
13 on behalf of Wells Fargo Bank pursuant to the Limited
14 Power of Attorney, when you would do that, did that
15 differ in any way from when you would execute them and
16 an assignment of mortgage on behalf of MERS?
17 A. No.
18 MS. HILL: Object to the form.
19 Q. Okay. Are you still — do you still have
20 signing authority on behalf of MERS?
21 A. I don’t know.
22 Q. You don’t know?
23 A. No, sir.
24 Q. Okay. Did MERS pay you for executing
25 assignments of mortgages?

1 A. No.
2 Q. Okay. Approximately, how many assignments of
3 mortgages would you execute on behalf of Wells Fargo
4 Bank?
5 A. I have no —
6 MS. HILL: Object to the form.
7 A. I don’t know.
8 Q. Okay. Going back to Exhibit A, it says that
9 Mark Wooton, Vice President of Loan Documentation,
10 granted this Limited Power of Attorney.
11 Did you ever meet Mark Wooton?
12 MS. HILL: I’m going to object to the form
13 only to the extent that Mark Wooton signed the
14 Limited Power of Attorney, I don’t know if signing
15 it is the same thing as granting it or if there is
16 a distinction. But to that extent, I’m objecting
17 to the question.
18 Q. Mark Wooton signed the Limited Power of
19 Attorney. Did you ever meet Mark Wooton?
20 A. Not that I recall.
21 Q. Okay. Are you aware of whether he was
22 authorized to sign this Limited Power of Attorney?
23 A. No. I don’t know.
24 Q. Okay. Did you report to anyone directly at
25 Wells Fargo Bank?

1 A. No.
2 Q. Did you receive directions to execute an
3 assignment of mortgage directly from Wells Fargo Bank?
4 MR. GANO: I’m going to object base upon
5 attorney-client privilege, any specific
6 instruction she obtained regarding this case or
7 any other cases.
8 Q. Without divulging privileged information.
9 A. We did have a procedure that under certain
10 circumstances, yes, we were directed to prepare the
11 assignments.
12 Q. Okay. Could you, I guess, describe the
13 procedure for when you would be directed, without
14 divulging attorney-client privileges?
15 A. Yes. When our client referred in the
16 mortgage referral.
17 Q. Okay.
18 A. It could be the owner or it could be the
19 servicer. In this particular case with Wells Fargo,
20 they sent in the referral. They indicated that they
21 were the servicer for the new owner, which I believe was
22 HSBC, and indicated that HSBC was the proper owner and
23 holder of the note.
24 In that event of record, Wells was the last
25 of-record owner and holder of the note; therefore, we

1 were to effectuate the assignment of mortgage prepared
2 and executed on behalf of Wells Fargo.
3 Q. Okay. What type of documents would you rely
4 upon to determine that aside from just the referral
5 stating that HSBC Bank was, I guess, the owner of the
6 note; what other documents would you rely upon to
7 ascertain that?
8 A. That HSBC was the owner?
9 Q. Yes.
10 A. We relied on our client’s referral indicating
11 that they had sold it to HSBC.
12 Q. Okay. Was there any other information that
13 you can recall?
14 A. Not that I recall.
15 Q. Okay. So going back to the referral, the
16 determination to execute an assignment of mortgage then
17 would be sent to you by Wells Fargo in a case like this
18 — in this case?
19 MR. GANO: Object to the form.
20 A. I’m sorry. I don’t quite understand that
21 question.
22 Q. Okay. Wells Fargo directed you to execute
23 the assignment of mortgage in this case?
24 MR. GANO: Again, I’m going to object based
25 upon any specific information given as

1 attorney-client privilege.
2 Q. Without divulging attorney-client privilege.
3 A. Under the procedure we had, yes.
4 Q. Okay.
5 A. Correct.
6 Q. Okay. And how would the referral — how was
7 the referral sent?
8 A. I’m not positive. It varied. I believe it
9 was electronic.
10 Q. Okay. And in situations where the — would
11 you ever rely upon the note to determine who to execute
12 an assignment of mortgage to?
13 A. Rely upon the note?
14 Q. The note, the promissory note.
15 A. A copy or the original?
16 Q. Copy, original, any fashion, the promissory
17 note?
18 A. No.
19 Q. Okay. So whether or not the note was lost at
20 the time of the referral would not impact your execution
21 of the assignment of mortgage?
22 A. No.
23 Q. Okay. How would you receive a promissory
24 note then from the plaintiff or whoever referred the
25 case to you?

1 A. Typically, they would mail the original
2 documents to our office.
3 Q. Do you recall if it would be mailed by any
4 sort of certified mail or return receipt; would you sign
5 for anything?
6 A. I don’t know. It didn’t come to me directly.
7 Q. And in cases such as this where Wells Fargo
8 would send the referral to you and state that they were
9 the servicer, what type of information would you review
10 to ascertain that they were, in fact, the servicer?
11 MR. GANO: Object to the form, and object to
12 any specific information, again, on this
13 particular referral.
14 Q. Without divulging privileged information.
15 A. We just relied on them indicating that they
16 were the servicer —
17 Q. Okay.
18 A. — who the plaintiff was to be.

See Deposition/Transcript below

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P RESEN T:
HON. ARTHUR M. SCHACK

HSBC BANK USA, N.A., AS INDENTURE TRUSTEE
FOR THE REGISTERED NOTEHOLDERS OF
RENAISSANCE HOME EQUITY LOAN TRUST
2005-3, RENAISSANCE HOME EQUITY LOAN
ASSET-BACKED NOTES, SERlES 2005-3,
Plaintiff,

– against –

CANDIDA VALENTIN, CANDIDE RUIZ, et. al.,

Excerpts:

Additionally, plaintiff HSBC must address, a third matter if it renews its application for an order of reference. In the instant action, as noted above, Scott Anderson, as Vice President of MERS, assigned the instant mortgage to HSBC on May 1, 2007. Doris Chapman, the Notary Public, stated that on May 1,2007, “personally appeared Scott Anderson, of 1661 Worthington Road, Suite 100, West Palm Beach, Florida 33409.” In HSBC Bank, N.A. v Cherry, 4t 3, I observed that:

Scott Anderson, in his affidavit, executed on June 15,2007, states he is Vice President of OCWEN. Yet, this June 13,2007 assignment from MERS to HSBC is signed by the same Scott Anderson as Vice President of MERS. Did Mr. Anderson change his employer between June 13,2007 and June 15,2007. The Court is concerned that there may be fraud on the part or HS I E , or at least malfeasance. Before granting an application for an order of reference, the Court requires an affidavit from Mr. Anderson describing his employment history for the past three years.

Plaintiff has failed to submit “proof of the facts” in “an affidavit made by the party.” The affidavit is submitted by Jessica Dybas, “a Foreclosure Facilitator of OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC, servicing agent and attorney in fact to the holder of the bond and mortgage sought to be foreclosed herein.” There must be an affidavit by an officer of HSBC or a servicing agent, possessing a valid power of attorney from HSBC for that express purpose. Additionally, if a power of attc mey is presented to this Court and it refers to pooling and servicing agreements, ihe Court needs a properly offered copy of the pooling and servicing agreements, to determine if the servicing agent may proceed on behalf of plaintiff. (EMC Mortg. Corp. v Batistu, 15 Misc 3d 1143 (A) [Sup Ct, Kings County 20071; Deutsche Bank Nut. Trust Co. v Lewis, 14 Misc 3d 1201 (A) [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 20061).

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RUSCALLEDA v. HSBC BANK USA

Glazy Ruscalleda and Jose Ruscalleda, Appellants,
v.
HSBC Bank USA, etc., Appellee.

No. 3D09-997.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed September 15, 2010.

John H. Ruiz and Karen Barnet-Backer, for appellants.

Shapiro & Fishman and Heidi J. Weinzetl (Boca Raton), for appellee.

Before WELLS, ROTHENBERG, and LAGOA, JJ.

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING OR CLARIFICATION.

ROTHENBERG, J.

Upon consideration of the appellee’s motion for rehearing or clarification, we withdraw our previous opinion filed on June 9, 2010, and substitute the following opinion in its stead.

This is an appeal of a final summary judgment in a mortgage foreclosure action entered in favor of plaintiff, HSBC Bank USA (“HSBC”), and against the defendants, Glazy Ruscalleda and Jose Ruscalleda. Based on the unique circumstances of this case, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The unique circumstances surrounding this case involve a rather confusing situation caused by two banks—the appellee, HSBC, and American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc. (“American Home Mortgage”)—because they were simultaneously attempting to foreclose the same mortgage. On October 8, 2008, American Home Mortgage filed a foreclosure action against the defendants.^{[ 1 ]} A week later, HSBC filed an action to foreclose the same exact mortgage. The complaint filed by HSBC falsely alleged that it was the current owner and holder of the mortgage and note, when, in reality, American Home Mortgage was still the holder of the note and mortgage.^{[ 2 ]} On October 28, 2008, due to the actions of American Home Mortgage and HSBC, the defendants, who were acting pro se at that time, filed an answer and affirmative defenses only in the foreclosure action filed by American Home Mortgage, which was the holder of the mortgage and note, because they mistakenly believed that the complaints involved the same foreclosure action.

After filing their pro se answer and affirmative defenses, the defendants retained counsel. Continuing in their mistaken belief, they did not inform their attorney of the action filed by HSBC. On November 13, 2008, counsel filed an amended answer and affirmative defenses on behalf of the defendants in the American Home Mortgage action, but took no action on the HSBC complaint.

Although the defendants did not file an answer in response to HSBC’s complaint, HSBC never moved for a default judgment.^{[ 3 ]} Instead, on January 22, 2009, HSBC moved for summary judgment, scheduling the hearing for March 24, 2009. When the defendants received the motion for summary judgment in the HSBC action, it sent the motion to their counsel. It was at that point, that the defendants and their counsel realized that two separate banks were attempting to simultaneously foreclose on the same mortgage, but that they only had been defending the initial action filed by American Home Mortgage.

On February 23, 2009, the defendants filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, the affidavit of Glazy Ruscalleda, and a motion to transfer the case to the division where the foreclosure action filed by American Home Mortgage was pending (“Motion to Transfer”). On February 25, 2009, the defendants filed a request for production, request for admissions, and notice of interrogatory. American Home Mortgage waited until the day before the scheduled hearing to file its notice of voluntary dismissal, although it had executed the assignment of mortgage almost three months earlier.

At the scheduled hearing, the trial court heard the arguments raised by HSBC in its motion for summary judgment and by defense counsel in his memorandum of law filed in opposition. Although it is undisputed that the defendants’ discovery was still pending, the trial court entered final summary judgment on the same day as the hearing, March 24, 2009, in favor of HSBC.^{[ 4 ]}

Based on the unique circumstances set forth above, we conclude that the order under review must be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings, with directions to allow the defendants to file an answer and affirmative defenses and to require HSBC to respond to the defendants’ discovery requests. The record clearly demonstrates that the defendants’ failure to file a timely answer and affirmative defenses in the action filed by HSBC was due to the confusion caused by American Home Mortgage and HSBC when they were simultaneously attempting to foreclose on the same exact mortgage in two different divisions of the circuit court.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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