Cross-Posted from Chink in the Armor

In 62 BC,  the Roman Senate was in a terrible state. They functioned more like a city council than as an imperial government.  The influx of wealth and slaves from the Carthaginian wars meant business was more about banking and finance than anything else.  Business men were more interested in state contracts and the financing of games than they were in trade,  true commerce and the building of true wealth.  It was all about pleasuring their egos and pandering to the hedonistic whims of the citizenry

Ruinous taxation impoverished the people compelling them to turn to the money lenders to meet their obligations and debt collection turned them into virtual,  if not absolute slaves.  This had the effect of concentrating the real wealth,  the land,  into fewer and fewer hands and the use of slaves in farming sent the landless poor to the larger cities which became populated with wretched human beings destitute of all moral and social development.

“At bottom,  usury was the cancer of the Republic.  […] seldom had a people sunk so low.  Bereft of religion,  morality and all the social virtues,  the dole-fed masses wallowed in vice.  Luxury begot brutality and brutality licence;  licence led to celibacy,  and childlessness became more and more prevalent.  To these degenerates,  licence, spelt liberty,  but to the plutocrats,  liberty spelt power,  profit,  and an unlimited scramble for wealth,  until money became the sole link between man and man.”[1]

Sound familiar?

On June 16, 1963, Thich Quang Duc,  a Buddhist monk sat down in the middle of the street in downtown Saigon,  poured gasoline over himself and his robes and calmly set himself on fire to protest the religious persecution under the Diem regime which was supported by the US Government.  The effect in South Vietnam was electric.  Citizens who had heretofore cowered in their homes in fear of the police began to stand up in defiance of the regime.

Three years later,  in May of 1966, Thich Nu Thanh Quang, a Buddhist nun, immolated herself in the city of Hue.  By the end of the month,  the US Consulate in Hue was set afire by angry mobs.  The affect in this country was almost as dramatic.  With brute force,  it brought home to the psyche of America that we were the bad guys.

Sound familiar?

Just over a week ago,  Tom Ball,  a 21 year Army veteran from Massachusetts  doused himself with gasoline and set himself on fire in front of the Cheshire County Courthouse in Keene,  NH.  In February last year,  Joe Stack flew his small plane into the IRS offices in Austin,  TX.  Just a few days ago,  James Verone walked up to a teller at a Gastonia, NC bank and handed her a note.  It said “This is a bank robbery, please only give me one dollar.”  He did it so he could get medical care.

Just this year,  on June 23^rd,  Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner told the House Small Business Committee that the Obama administration believes taxes on small business must increase.  “We’re not doing it because we want to do it, we’re doing it because if we don’t do it,   [ … we will] have to go out and borrow a trillion dollars over the next 10 years to finance those tax benefits for the top 2 percent, and I don’t think I can justify doing that.”

Ruinous taxation,  more money spent on games and pleasure than upon the creation of wealth,  money lenders driving people into virtual slavery with onerous debt;  a population bereft of religion and morality,  a vicious scramble for wealth and now money is the sole link between man and man.  Divorce,  broken families, eugenics and childlessness preached from street side bill boards,  the wealth drained from the nation so those in power can have just a little bit more,  a devastated middle class.

Sound familiar?

In 61 BC,  Rome was ripe for a man on a white horse.  On September,  29^th of that year,  that man arrived.  Pompey,  a victorious general from the wars against the terrorists (pirates) who were raiding the shipping lanes of the eastern Mediterranean rode into town to upset the power balance between  Porcius Cato and Licinius Crassus.  Pompey aligned himself with Crassus and it was a period of great political tension.  While all eyes were upon him,  Julius Caesar,  a member of the Populares party also arrived to stand for Consulship.  Cato denied Caesar the triumph he expected from his victories in Spain and added Caesar to his enemies.  In the ensuing struggle,  Crassus and Pompey agreed to support Caesar for Consulship in exchange for political favors and repeal of certain taxes.

With Cato out of the way,  it wasn’t long before the triumvirate were squabbling amongst themselves and a civil war between the forces and citizens loyal to Pompey and those loyal to Caesar broke out.  In early January of 49 BC,  Caesar “crossed the Rubicon” a shallow river in northeastern Italy forcing Pompey and  the rest of the Senate to flee Rome.  Caesar was victorious over Pompey in the ensuing civil war and he was never held accountable.

We haven’t seen our man on the white horse yet,  but is it too far fetched to imagine it will happen?  And when he comes,  can he unite or will there be terrific division between competing factions?  Could there be a military coup?  It isn’t so far fetched and to read this,  you can see it is something they are already thinking about.  If so,  would there be the counter coup? Add into that a cyclical view of history rather than a linear view and one can see historical pressures building up.

Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon and resolved the indecision and competing interests of Rome.  He did this by fashioning his military to become an instrument of his will.  His military was he and he was his military.  His was a struggle of an entire people yearning for something new.  Caesar was able to utilize all aspects of the empire: money,  trade,  propaganda and political manipulations as means to an end.  Lastly,  and perhaps most importantly,  he saw that in war,  as in peace,  opponents are equally fearful of each other and the first to set aside fears of the moment and act boldly has the best chance of victory.

Caesar saw that what Rome needed was a monarchial democracy;  freedom and democracy,  not licence and greed;  a strong hand to rend order out of chaos.  He destroyed the power of the money lenders by relieving the provinces of their money making governors and sent each of them at least 80,000 new citizens to promote democracy.  His vision for a new social order is best explained by quoting a speech he made to a group of mutinous soldiers at Placentia in 49 BC:

“For no society of men whatever can preserve its unity and continue to exist if the criminal element is not punished,  since,  if the diseased member does not receive proper treatment,  it causes all the rest,  even as in our own physical bodies to share  in its affliction.  […] For wherever the insolent element has the advantage wherever wrong-doing is unpunished,  there self restraint also goes unrewarded […]”[2]

At the root of it all is money as debt.  It nearly destroyed Rome and it is on the verge of destroying this country.  It is (one of) the duty (ies) of the sovereign to produce the coin of the realm.  In this country,  the sovereign,  which in this country is manifested by the central government in Washington DC, abdicated that power to a group of men for their private profit nearly 100 years ago.  Until this duty is reclaimed by the sovereign, just like Rome before the arrival of Julius Caesar,  the problems we face will not be solved.

Sound familiar?

_____________________________________________________________________________________

[2] Div’s Roman History,  translated by E. Cary (1916),  XLI,  29-30

Beneath this mask there is more than flesh. Beneath this mask there is an idea, and ideas are bulletproof. °oO°

[Source: gamefreak1398]

EXCERPT:

In this case, Plaintiff has not provided any evidence which shows that when MERS assigned the mortgage to Plaintiff, it also transferred the interest in the underlying note. According to the mortgage assignment contract, MERS held legal title to the mortgage. There is no language in the agreement which transfers interest in the note to MERS. Because MERS did not hold title to the underlying note, it could not transfer any rights to the underlying note when it assigned the mortgage to Plaintiff. See LPP Mortgage Ltd v. Sabine Properties No. 103648/10,2010 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4216, at*7 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. Sept. 1, 2010); Lamy , 824 N.Y.S.2d at 769 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk Co. 2006); HSBC Bank USA v. Miller, 26 Misc. 3d 407,411,889 N.Y.S.2d 430,433 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Co. 2009). Without a transfer of title to the underlying note, Plaintiff cannot foreclose on the property based on default payment and lacks standing under CPLR 5 321 1 (a)(3)

[…]

Therefore, it is
ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted; and it is further
ORDERED that this action is dismissed; and it is further
ORDERED that the clerk of the court directed to enter judgment accordingly.

Continue below…

[ipaper docId=45325850 access_key=key-5qh7l4hx944dyatash4 height=600 width=600 /]

I guess WELLS FARGOT…

This statement from Wells Fargo appears on NY TIMES 10/1/2010:

A Wells Fargo spokeswoman said “the affidavits we sign are accurate.”

SUPREME COURT – STATE OF NEW YORK
I.A.S. PART XXXVI SUFFOLK COUNTY

PRESENT:
HON, PAUL J. BAISLEY, JR., J.S.C.

INDEX NO.: 16038/2008
MOTION DATE: 11/24/2008
Plaintiff, MOTION NO.: 001 MI)

PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY:
STEVEN J. BAUM, P.C.
P.O. Box 1291
Buffalo, New York 14240- 1291

Wells Fargo v. Oleg Dmitriev

Plaintiffs application is defective because there is no “affidavit made by the party” of “the facts constituting the claim, the default and the amount due” as required by CPLR §3215(f). The proffered “affidavit of merit and amount due” of Jeffrey Stephan identifies him as “the Limited Signing Officer of GMAC MORTGAGE LLC, servicer,” but no proof of Mr. Stephan’s authority to execute such affidavit on behalf of plaintiff is offered. The proffered affidavit does not otherwise comply with the requirements of CPLR $2309(c) for an out-of-state affidavit. In addition, the facts and dates recited in the affidavit regarding the consolidated mortgage and consolidated note that are the subject of this floreclosure action are at variance with the underlying documents.

In light of the foregoing, the motion for an order of reference is denied, without prejudice to renewal on proper papers.

Proposed order of reference marked “not signed.”
Dated: March 16, 2009

Paul J. Baisley, JR
J.S.C.
–

[ipaper docId=37975402 access_key=key-281pa58f9x2mia6kmvxp height=600 width=600 /]

I go through hundreds of cases each week and I have been saving this one for a rainy day. We’ll it’s raining today.

SUPREME COURT – STATE OF NEW YORK I.A.S. PART XXXVI SUFFOLK COUNTY PRESENT: HON. PAUL J. BAISLEY, JR., J.S.C.

DATED: MAY 10. 2010

The Court is at a loss to understand how a purported “correcting assignment” can be executed eight days before the assignment it is purporting to correct. Moreover, the Court is at a loss as to the identity of the true holder of the mortgage at the time of the commencement of the action (irrespective of any arguments regarding the validity of the purported assignment(s) by MERS as nominee of the original mortgagee; see, for example, US Bank, N.A. II Collymore, 200 NY Slip Op 09019 [2d Dept 2009]), While it is well established that any issues as to a plaintiff’s standing to commence a foreclosure action are waived by the defendant-mortgagor’s failure to appear and answer (HSBC Bank v Dammond, 59 A03d 679 l2d Sept 2009]), the contradictory and conflicting submissions on this motion implicate far more than the more issue of “standing.” Indeed, the submissions appear to have been drafted with utter disregard for the facts, or for counsel’s responsibilities as an officer of the Court, and border on the fraudulent.

In the the circumstances, the motion, which is unsupported either factually or legally, is denied in all respects. Moreover, in light of the failure of the movant to establish that any party was in fact the holder of the mortgage (and the underlying note, see KLuge v Fugm:y, 145 AD2d [2d Sept 1988J) at the time of the commencement of this action – an omission that in the circumstances may not be corrected by mere amendment — the Court, on its own motion, hereby directs the plaintiff to show cause why the complaint should not be dismissed; and further directs Steven J. Baum, P.c. and Heather A. Johnson, Esq., the attorney of record for the plaintiff in this action and the scrivener of the affirmation referred to above, to appear before the undersigned on June 24, 2010 at II :00 a.m. to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed on plaintiff and/or its attorney(s) for frivolous conduct pursuant to 22 NYCRR §130-1.1 (c).

Dated: May 10. 2010

[ipaper docId=37796861 access_key=key-1qsedtbin3aqnf0ty1c1 height=600 width=600 /]

Further,it appears that there is a conflict of interest in that MERS is both a plaintiff and defendant, at least as far as the original caption shows.

EXCERPTS:

On November 7, 2007, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., (MERS), as nominee for Lend America, assigned the mortgage to Central Mortgage Company (CMC). The assignment states that November 10, 2006 mortgage was made by Defendant Caughman to MERS as nominee for Lend America.

The caption of the action lists MERS, ,as nominee for Lend America, as the plaintiff. Defendants are Sherri Caughman, MERS, as nominee for Lend America, John Doe and Jane Doe.

In this motion, plaintiff seeks an order striking Defendant Caughman’s answer; the appointment of a Referee to compute the amount due and owing and the amendment of the caption. The amended caption would substitute CMC as plaintiff, in place and instead of MERS, as nominee for Lend America. In the amended caption, Sherri Caughmann would remain as a defendant, MERS, as nominee for Lend America, would be added as a defendant and Mr. Caughman and Vicki Douglas were added as defendants.

In support of its motion, plaintiff argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because it has made out a prima facie case and that defendant’s answer does not show that there are any issues of fact which would warrant denial of its motion.

Defendants, in opposing the motion, contends that MERS has no standing, as a nominee, to bring action because its status as nominee is limited and does not give it the power to transfer or assign ownership rights in property on behalf of the party for which it is acting as nominee. They add that MERS has said that it is not in possession of the original promissory note and, as such it allegations are inconsistent with its exhibits. Thus, defendants conclude, this raises issues of fact.

Continuing, defendants conted that the mortgage and note involved here were issued in Violation of the Federal Truth in Lending Act in that plaintiff did not provide them with the disclosures required under 15USC1639(a)(1) and (a)(2)(A) and 12 CFR 226.32. These violations, say defendants, leaves them with a “continuing right” to rescind the deal, which they claim to do in their opposition.

Upon review, defendants’ motion is granted. Neither MERS nor CMC has shown that it had the mortgage and note at the time the action was commenced. Further,it appears that there is a conflict of interest in that MERS is both a plaintiff and defendant, at least as far as the original caption shows.

The parties are directed to appear before this court on May 4, 2010 at 9:30 am for a conference.

Dated: March 23, 2010

……………………
J.S.C.
Diary

[ipaper docId=37722059 access_key=key-1akzldm7itgz0kpme1z9 height=600 width=600 /]

RUSCALLEDA v. HSBC BANK USA

Glazy Ruscalleda and Jose Ruscalleda, Appellants,
v.
HSBC Bank USA, etc., Appellee.

No. 3D09-997.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed September 15, 2010.

John H. Ruiz and Karen Barnet-Backer, for appellants.

Shapiro & Fishman and Heidi J. Weinzetl (Boca Raton), for appellee.

Before WELLS, ROTHENBERG, and LAGOA, JJ.

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING OR CLARIFICATION.

ROTHENBERG, J.

Upon consideration of the appellee’s motion for rehearing or clarification, we withdraw our previous opinion filed on June 9, 2010, and substitute the following opinion in its stead.

This is an appeal of a final summary judgment in a mortgage foreclosure action entered in favor of plaintiff, HSBC Bank USA (“HSBC”), and against the defendants, Glazy Ruscalleda and Jose Ruscalleda. Based on the unique circumstances of this case, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The unique circumstances surrounding this case involve a rather confusing situation caused by two banks—the appellee, HSBC, and American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc. (“American Home Mortgage”)—because they were simultaneously attempting to foreclose the same mortgage. On October 8, 2008, American Home Mortgage filed a foreclosure action against the defendants.^{[ 1 ]} A week later, HSBC filed an action to foreclose the same exact mortgage. The complaint filed by HSBC falsely alleged that it was the current owner and holder of the mortgage and note, when, in reality, American Home Mortgage was still the holder of the note and mortgage.^{[ 2 ]} On October 28, 2008, due to the actions of American Home Mortgage and HSBC, the defendants, who were acting pro se at that time, filed an answer and affirmative defenses only in the foreclosure action filed by American Home Mortgage, which was the holder of the mortgage and note, because they mistakenly believed that the complaints involved the same foreclosure action.

After filing their pro se answer and affirmative defenses, the defendants retained counsel. Continuing in their mistaken belief, they did not inform their attorney of the action filed by HSBC. On November 13, 2008, counsel filed an amended answer and affirmative defenses on behalf of the defendants in the American Home Mortgage action, but took no action on the HSBC complaint.

Although the defendants did not file an answer in response to HSBC’s complaint, HSBC never moved for a default judgment.^{[ 3 ]} Instead, on January 22, 2009, HSBC moved for summary judgment, scheduling the hearing for March 24, 2009. When the defendants received the motion for summary judgment in the HSBC action, it sent the motion to their counsel. It was at that point, that the defendants and their counsel realized that two separate banks were attempting to simultaneously foreclose on the same mortgage, but that they only had been defending the initial action filed by American Home Mortgage.

On February 23, 2009, the defendants filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, the affidavit of Glazy Ruscalleda, and a motion to transfer the case to the division where the foreclosure action filed by American Home Mortgage was pending (“Motion to Transfer”). On February 25, 2009, the defendants filed a request for production, request for admissions, and notice of interrogatory. American Home Mortgage waited until the day before the scheduled hearing to file its notice of voluntary dismissal, although it had executed the assignment of mortgage almost three months earlier.

At the scheduled hearing, the trial court heard the arguments raised by HSBC in its motion for summary judgment and by defense counsel in his memorandum of law filed in opposition. Although it is undisputed that the defendants’ discovery was still pending, the trial court entered final summary judgment on the same day as the hearing, March 24, 2009, in favor of HSBC.^{[ 4 ]}

Based on the unique circumstances set forth above, we conclude that the order under review must be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings, with directions to allow the defendants to file an answer and affirmative defenses and to require HSBC to respond to the defendants’ discovery requests. The record clearly demonstrates that the defendants’ failure to file a timely answer and affirmative defenses in the action filed by HSBC was due to the confusion caused by American Home Mortgage and HSBC when they were simultaneously attempting to foreclose on the same exact mortgage in two different divisions of the circuit court.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

[ipaper docId=37553372 access_key=key-2hn44kayr0ix1ahp23yq height=600 width=600 /]

NY SUPREME COURT: FINAL DISPOSITION

Here, there are no allegations or evidence that MERS was the owner of the note such that it could assign it to LPP. Thus, the assignment from MERS was insufficient to confer ownership of the note to LPP and it has no standing to bring this action. Kluge v. F umz ~1, 45 AD2d at 538 (holding that the assignment of a mortgage without transfer of the debt is a nullity); Johnson v. Melnikoff, 20 Misc3d 1142(A), “2 (Sup Ct Kings Co. 2008), n. 2, afr, 65 AD3d 519 (2d Dept 20 1 Oj(noting that assignments by MERS which did not include the underlying debt were a legal nullity); m e Elect ro pic Registration Svstem v, Coakley, 41 AD3d 674 (2d Dept 2007)(holding that MERS had standing to bring foreclosure proceeding based on evidence that MERS was the lawful holder of the promissory note and the mortgage).

Thus, even assuming arguendo that the language of the assignment from MERS to LPP could be interpreted as purporting to assign not only the mortgage but also the note, such assignment is invalid since based on the record, MERS lacked an ownership interest in the note. $ee LaSalle Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Lamv, 12 Misc3d 1191(A), “3 (Sup Ct Suffolk Co. 2006) (noting that “the mortgage is merely an incident of and collateral security for the debt and an assignment of the mortgage does not pass ownership of the debt itself ’);

[ipaper docId=37137994 access_key=key-2kgxi389lto95oi00d3m height=600 width=600 /]

On June 23, 2009, MERS substituted MTC Financial Inc., d.b.a. Trustee Corps, as trustee. (See Id., Ex. B.) Trustee Corps recorded a notice of trustee’s sale (“NOS”) on or about September 15, 2009, indicating that it would sell the Property on October 5, 2009, (see Id., Ex. C), but Plaintiff claims to have never received notice of the NOS, (see id. ¶ 63).

The most obvious potential defect in this foreclosure stems from the fact that Trustee Corps was substituted as trustee after it recorded the NOD, but before it recorded the NOS. In Nevada, the power of sale cannot be exercised until one of two particular entities–the beneficiary or the trustee–or an agent thereof, records the NOD. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 107.080(2)(c). Trustee Corps was not such an entity when it recorded the NOD. Thus, unless Trustee Corps can provide evidence indicating that the beneficiary–Taylor–or the trustee–Equity Title–caused Trustee Corps to file the NOD, it may be liable for wrongful foreclosure.
Further complicating matters, some other unusual events occurred prior to the filing

[ipaper docId=36861562 access_key=key-2dltthz8x68xbfnhkc8z height=600 width=600 /]

Supreme Court of the State of New York, held
in and for the County of KINGS, at
the Courthouse located at 360 Adams
Street, Brooklyn, NY on the 2nd day of
June, 2010

“WHY an order should not be made dismissing the within action due to Plaintiffs lack of standing; together with such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and equitable;”

ORDERED, that pending the hearing . . of this motion, the Plaintiff Mortgage Electronic Registration System as Nominee for US Bank, N.A., and any of its attorneys, agents, successors and assignees, be and are hereby restrained from implementing or any way pursuing the closing of title on any third party sale of the premises known as 81 Woodbine Street, Brooklyn, NY 11221; and Plaintiff Mortgage Electronic Registration System as Nominee for US Bank, N.A., and any of its attorneys, agents, successors and assignees be and are hereby restrained from evicting Liborio Munoz and his family and any other occupants from the premises known as 81 Woodbine Street, Brooklyn, NY 11221.

[ipaper docId=36645881 access_key=key-12v2ajab40rvsj0bsv1b height=600 width=600 /]

This is an action pursuant to RP APL Article 15 in which determination of its interest in real property, and to direct the Nassau County Clerk’s Office to accept a copy of a deed and mortgage for recording, insofar as the originals were misplaced and never recorded.

• the Court seeks an explanation as to why the Affidavit of Merit is provided by a principal of the United General Title Insurance Company. What is the relationship of that company to Plaintiff? What authority does the affiant have to speak on behalf of Plaintiff? What is the basis of the affiant’s personal knowledge?

• the Court questions whether or not MERS, as nominee for Am Trust Bank has standing to bring this action. A party who “claims an estate or interest in real property” may bring an action under Article 15 of the RPAPL. RPAPL ~1501(1). “The interest had by any mortgagee” is an interest in real property for purposes of bringing such an action. ~RPAPL1501(5). Is MERS a mortgagee for purposes of Article 15, or is MERS the mortgagee only for recording purposes? Can MERS bring this action without a Power of Attorney from the beneficial owner of the Mortgage?

Finally, the Court is reluctant to grant declaratory or other relief without evidence of the recorded interests in the Property from July 20 2007 and the current state of title.

[ipaper docId=36625524 access_key=key-27n9yhwldi5upd4adt9n height=600 width=600 /]

MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. v. SAUNDERS

2010 ME 79

MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC.,
v.
JON E. SAUNDERS et al.

Docket: Cum-09-640.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: June 15, 2010.

Decided: August 12, 2010.

Michael K. Martin, Esq. Petruccelli, Martin & Haddow 50 Monument Square Portland, Maine 04101, Thomas A. Cox, Esq. (orally), PO Box 1314 Portland, Maine 04104, Attorneys for Belinda and Jon Saunders.

John A. Turcotte, Esq. (orally) Ainsworth, Thelin & Raftice, P.A. 7 Ocean Street PO Box 2412 South Portland, Maine 04116-2412, Attorneys for Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ.

GORMAN, J.

[¶ 1] Jon E. Saunders and Belinda L. Saunders appeal from entry of a summary judgment in the District Court (Bridgton, Powers, J.) in favor of Deutsche Bank National Trust Company^{[ 1 ]} on Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.’s (MERS) complaint for foreclosure and sale of the Saunderses’ home, pursuant to 14 M.R.S. §§ 6321-6325 (2009). The Saunderses contend that the court erred in granting summary judgment to the Bank because: (1) MERS did not have a stake in the proceedings and therefore had no standing to initiate the foreclosure action, (2) the substitution of parties could not be used to cure the jurisdictional defect of lack of standing and was therefore improper, and (3) there are genuine issues of material fact.

[¶ 2] We conclude that although MERS is not in fact a “mortgagee” within the meaning of our foreclosure statute, 14 M.R.S. §§ 6321-6325, and therefore had no standing to institute foreclosure proceedings, the real party in interest was the Bank and the court did not abuse its discretion by substituting the Bank for MERS. Because, however, the Bank was not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶ 3] In June of 2006, Jon Saunders executed and delivered a promissory note in the amount of $258,750 to Accredited Home Lenders, Inc. At the same time, both Jon and Belinda Saunders executed a mortgage document, securing that note, in favor of MERS, solely as “nominee for [Accredited] and [Accredited]’s successors and assigns.”

[¶ 4] When the Saunderses failed to make certain payments on the note, MERS filed a complaint for foreclosure in the District Court on February 4, 2009. The Saunderses filed an answer that denied the complaint’s allegations and asserted, among others, the affirmative defense of lack of standing. MERS moved for summary judgment on its complaint on May 27, 2009. In its accompanying statement of material facts, MERS asserted that it was the “holder” of both the mortgage and the note, but neither indicated whether real property secured the note nor identified the real property of the Saunderses. The Saunderses controverted MERS’s ownership of the note in their opposing statement of material facts, citing admissions that MERS had made pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 36 that the Bank was in fact the holder of the note. The parties also disputed whether the Saunderses had received proper notice, whether the Saunderses were in default, and the amount owed on the loan. The court denied summary judgment on September 9, 2009, stating only: “Motion for summary judgment is denied as to [MERS], as there are issues of material fact preventing same and [MERS] is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

[¶ 5] One day after the court denied that motion, the Bank moved pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 25(c) to substitute itself for MERS in the foreclosure proceedings and also filed a reply to the Saunderses’ additional statement of material facts. Just over one week later, the Bank, which was not yet a party, filed a motion to reconsider or amend the order denying MERS’s motion for summary judgment, pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 59(e), and a motion for further findings pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52(b).^{[ 2 ]} In support of its motions, the Bank filed: (1) an undated, two-page allonge indicating that Accredited transferred the note to the Bank, and (2) an assignment indicating that MERS had transferred any rights it had in the note or mortgage to the Bank. These transfers occurred on July 8, 2009, during the course of litigation. The Saunderses opposed both motions and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment arguing that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law because neither MERS nor the Bank could show that MERS held the note at the time the suit commenced.

[¶ 6] On November 18, 2009, the court granted the Bank’s motion for substitution of parties, denied the Saunderses’ cross-motion for summary judgment, and granted summary judgment to the Bank. On December 16, 2009, the court entered a judgment of foreclosure and sale. The Saunderses filed a timely appeal pursuant to M.R. App. P. 2 and 14 M.R.S. § 1901 (2009).

II. DISCUSSION

A. MERS’s Standing

[¶ 7] The Saunderses contend that MERS had no stake in the outcome of the proceedings and therefore did not have standing to institute foreclosure. We review the threshold “issue of a party’s status for standing to sue de novo.” Lowry v. KTI Specialty Waste Servs., Inc., 2002 ME 58, ¶ 4, 794 A.2d 80, 81. At a minimum, “[s]tanding to sue means that the party, at the commencement of the litigation, has sufficient personal stake in the controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy.” Halfway House Inc. v. City of Portland, 670 A.2d 1377, 1379 (Me. 1996) (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972)). Typically, a party’s personal stake in the litigation is evidenced by a particularized injury to the party’s property, pecuniary, or personal rights. See, e.g., Tomhegan Camp Owners Ass’n v. Murphy, 2000 ME 28, ¶ 6, 754 A.2d 334, 336; Stull v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 2000 ME 21, ¶ 11, 745 A.2d 975, 979; cf. Fitzgerald v. Baxter State Park Auth., 385 A.2d 189, 196 (Me. 1978).

[¶ 8] The relationship of MERS to the transaction between the Saunderses and Accredited—mortgagors and the original mortgagee—is “not subject to an easy description” or classification. See Landmark Nat’l Bank v. Kesler, 216 P.3d 158, 164 (Kan. 2009). Then Chief Judge Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals described the role and purpose of MERS thusly:

[MERS’s] purpose is to streamline the mortgage process by eliminating the need to prepare and record paper assignments of mortgage, as had been done for hundreds of years. To accomplish this goal, MERS acts as nominee and as mortgagee of record for its members nationwide and appoints itself nominee, as mortgagee, for its members’ successors and assigns, thereby remaining nominal mortgagee of record no matter how many times loan servicing, or the [debt] itself, may be transferred.

MERSCORP, Inc. v. Romaine, 861 N.E.2d 81, 86 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, C.J., dissenting). In Maine, we follow the title theory of mortgages; a mortgage is a conditional conveyance vesting legal title to the property in the mortgagee, with the mortgagor retaining the equitable right of redemption and the right to possession. See Johnson v. McNeil, 2002 ME 99, ¶ 10, 800 A.2d 702, 704. To determine whether MERS has standing in the present case, we must first examine what rights MERS had in the Saunderses’ debt and the mortgage securing that debt.

[¶ 9] In the note that Jon Saunders executed in favor of Accredited, there is no mention of MERS, and the Bank admitted in its statement of material facts that MERS never had an interest in the note. MERS is, however, included in the Saunderses’ mortgage document. The mortgage first defines MERS as:

(C) “MERS” is Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems, Inc. MERS is a separate corporation that is acting solely as a nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns. MERS is organized and existing under the Laws of Delaware, and has an address and telephone number of P.O. Box 2026, Flint, MI 48501-2026, tel. (888) 679-MERS. FOR PURPOSES OF RECORDING THIS MORTGAGE, MERS IS THE MORTGAGEE OF RECORD.

The remaining references to MERS in the mortgage document are in the subsequent sections conveying the mortgage and describing the property conveyed:

[Borrowers] mortgage, grant and convey the Property to MERS (solely as nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns), with mortgage covenants, subject to the terms of this Security Instrument, to have and to hold all of the Property to MERS (solely as nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns), and to its successors and assigns, forever.

. . . .

[Borrowers] understand and agree that MERS holds only legal title to the rights granted by [Borrowers] in this Security Instrument, but, if necessary to comply with law or custom, MERS (as nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns) has the right:

(A) to exercise any or all of those rights, including, but not limited to, the right to foreclose and sell the Property; and

(B) to take any action required of Lender including, but not limited to, releasing and canceling this Security Instrument.

. . . .

[Borrowers] grant and mortgage to MERS (solely as nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors in interest) the Property described [below].

Each reference to MERS within the Saunderses’ mortgage describes MERS solely as the “nominee” to the lender.

[¶ 10] The only rights conveyed to MERS in either the Saunderses’ mortgage or the corresponding promissory note are bare legal title to the property for the sole purpose of recording the mortgage and the corresponding right to record the mortgage with the Registry of Deeds. This comports with the limited role of a nominee. A nominee is a “person designated to act in place of another, usu[ally] in a very limited way,” or a “party who holds bare legal title for the benefit of others or who receives and distributes funds for the benefit of others.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1149 (9th ed. 2009); see also E. Milling Co. v. Flanagan, 152 Me. 380, 382-83, 130 A.2d 925, 926 (1957) (demonstrating the limited role of a nominee in a contract case). The remaining, beneficial rights in the mortgage and note are vested solely in the lender Accredited and its successors and assigns. The mortgage clearly provides that, by signing the instrument, the Saunderses were “giving [the] Lender those rights that are stated in this Security Instrument and also those rights that Applicable Law gives to Lenders who hold mortgages on real property.” (Emphasis added.) Not one of the mortgage covenants in the document, including the Saunderses’ obligations to make timely payments on the note, pay property taxes, obtain property insurance, and maintain and protect the property, is made to MERS or in favor of MERS. Each promise and covenant gives rights to the lender and its successors and assigns, whereas MERS’s rights are limited solely to acting as a nominee. The Bank argues that MERS’s status as a “nominee” for the lender and as the “mortgagee of record” within the document qualifies it as a “mortgagee” within 14 M.R.S. § 6321. We disagree.

[¶ 11] As discussed above, MERS’s only right is the right to record the mortgage. Its designation as the “mortgagee of record” in the document does not change or expand that right; and having only that right, MERS does not qualify as a mortgagee pursuant to our foreclosure statute, 14 M.R.S. §§ 6321-6325. Section 6321 provides: “After breach of condition in a mortgage of first priority, the mortgagee or any person claiming under the mortgagee may proceed for the purpose of foreclosure by a civil action . . . .” (Emphasis added.) It is a “fundamental rule of statutory interpretation that words in a statute must be given their plain and ordinary meanings.” Joyce v. State, 2008 ME 108, ¶ 11, 951 A.2d 69, 72 (quotation marks omitted); accord Hanson v. S.D. Warren Co., 2010 ME 51, ¶ 12, ___ A.2d ___, ___. The plain meaning and common understanding of mortgagee is “[o]ne to whom property is mortgaged,” meaning a “mortgage creditor, or lender.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1104 (9th ed. 2009). In other words, a mortgagee is a party that is entitled to enforce the debt obligation that is secured by a mortgage.^{[ 3 ]}

[¶ 12] In order to enforce a debt obligation secured by a mortgage and note, a party must be in possession of the note.^{[ 4 ]} See Premier Capital, Inc. v. Doucette, 2002 ME 83, ¶ 7, 797 A.2d 32, 34 (describing a note associated with a mortgage as a negotiable instrument). Pursuant to Maine’s adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, the only party entitled to enforce a negotiable instrument is:

(1) The holder of the instrument;

(2) A nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the rights of a holder; or

(3) A person not in possession of the instrument who is entitled to enforce the instrument pursuant to section 3-1309 or 3-1418, subsection (4). A person may be a person entitled to enforce the instrument even though the person is not the owner of the instrument or is in wrongful possession of the instrument.

11 M.R.S. § 3-1301 (2009). MERS does not qualify under any subsection of section 3-1301 because, on this record, there is no evidence it held the note, was in possession of the note, was purporting to enforce a lost, destroyed, or stolen instrument pursuant to 11 M.R.S. § 3-1309 (2009), or was purporting to enforce a dishonored instrument pursuant to 11 M.R.S. § 3-1418(4) (2009).

[¶ 13] Alternatively, the Bank asserts that because the mortgage document itself purported to give MERS the right to foreclose the mortgage, MERS was entitled to enforce the mortgage as the “mortgagee of record.” In other jurisdictions utilizing non-judicial foreclosure, MERS has been able to institute foreclosure proceedings based on its designation in the mortgage as the “mortgagee of record.” See, e.g., In re Huggins, 357 B.R. 180, 184 (Bankr. Mass. 2006) (concluding that MERS had standing to institute foreclosure proceedings pursuant to the statutory power of sale in Massachusetts); Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys. Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 500-01 (Minn. 2009) (approving MERS’s ability to commence foreclosure as the legal title holder of the mortgage in non-judicial foreclosure proceedings in Minnesota). These cases are inapposite because non-judicial foreclosures do not invoke the jurisdiction of the courts. Non-judicial foreclosures proceed wholly outside of the judiciary, typically utilizing local law enforcement to evict a mortgagor and gain possession of the mortgaged property.

[¶ 14] Here, MERS sought to foreclose on the Saunderses’ mortgage by filing a lawsuit, and, like any other plaintiff filing suit within our courts, must prove its standing to sue. Halfway House, 670 A.2d at 1379. Because standing to sue in Maine is prudential, rather than of constitutional dimension, we may “limit access to the courts to those best suited to assert a particular claim.” Lindemann v. Comm’n on Govtl. Ethics & Election Practices, 2008 ME 187, ¶ 8, 961 A.2d 538, 541-42 (quoting Roop v. City of Belfast, 2007 ME 32, ¶ 7, 915 A.2d 966, 968). In the present context, MERS, as the complaining party, must show that it has suffered an injury fairly traceable to an act of the mortgagor and that the injury is likely to be redressed by the judicial relief sought. See Collins v. State, 2000 ME 85, ¶ 6, 750 A.2d 1257, 1260 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)); see also Stull, 2000 ME 21, ¶ 11, 745 A.2d at 979.

[¶ 15] Nothing in the trial court record demonstrates that MERS suffered any injury when the Saunderses failed to make payments on their mortgage. When questioned directly at oral argument about what injury MERS had suffered, the Bank responded that MERS did not need to prove injury to foreclose, only that it was a “mortgagee.” As we have already explained, MERS is not a mortgagee pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 6321 because it has no enforceable right in the debt obligation securing the mortgage. In reality, the Bank was unable to suggest an injury MERS suffered because MERS did not suffer any injury when the Saunderses failed to make payments on their mortgage. See Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Neb. Dep’t of Banking & Fin., 704 N.W.2d 784, 788 (Neb. 2005) (stating that “MERS has no independent right to collect on any debt because MERS itself has not extended credit, and none of the mortgage debtors owe MERS any money”). The only right MERS has in the Saunderses’ mortgage and note is the right to record the mortgage. The bare right to record a mortgage is unaffected by a mortgagor’s default. The Bank admitted in its statement of material facts that Accredited had never assigned, transferred, or endorsed the note executed by Jon Saunders to MERS, and represented that Accredited had transferred the note directly to the Bank. Without possession of or any interest in the note, MERS lacked standing to institute foreclosure proceedings and could not invoke the jurisdiction of our trial courts.

B. Substitution of the Bank for MERS

[¶ 16] Having determined that MERS lacked standing, our next inquiry is whether the substitution of the Bank for MERS allowed the proceedings to continue. The Saunderses contend that the substitution of the Bank for MERS pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 25(c) was improper because: (1) MERS did not have standing, and a substitution of parties cannot be used to cure a jurisdictional defect; and (2) the Bank, as a non-party, cannot file a motion to substitute parties. The Bank argues that the substitution of parties cured any impropriety in MERS commencing the foreclosure proceedings and that M.R. Civ. P. 17(a) prohibits dismissal until there has been a reasonable time to substitute the real party in interest.^{[ 5 ]} We review the grant or denial of a party’s motion to substitute parties pursuant to both M.R. Civ. P. 17(a) and 25(c) for an abuse of the court’s discretion. See M.R. Civ. P. 25(c) (“In case of any transfer of interest, the action may be continued by or against the original party . . . .” (emphasis added)); Tisdale v. Rawson, 2003 ME 68, ¶ 17, 822 A.2d 1136, 1141 (stating that Rule 17 authorizes “a court to substitute an incorrectly named plaintiff with the real party in interest”); Bates v. Dep’t of Behavioral & Developmental Servs., 2004 ME 154, ¶ 38, 863 A.2d 890, 901 (“Judgmental decisions . . . in areas where the court has choices will be reviewed for sustainable exercise of the court’s discretion.”).

[¶ 17] Both Rule 17 and 25 are concerned with ensuring that the real party in interest is conducting the litigation. Rule 17 is used to correct an action that was filed and then maintained by the wrong party, or was filed in the name of the wrong party. See Tisdale, 2003 ME 68, ¶¶ 15-19, 822 A.2d at 1140-42 (approving the court’s substitution of the road commissioner as the plaintiff for an unincorporated association that lacked capacity to sue); Royal Coachman Color Guard v. Marine Trading & Transp., Inc., 398 A.2d 382, 384 (Me. 1979); 1 Field, McKusick, & Wroth, Maine Civil Practice § 17.1 at 348 (2d ed. 1970) (“The purpose of Rule 17(a) is to provide that the plaintiff in an action shall be the person who by the substantive law possesses the right to be enforced.”). Rule 25, in comparison, is used to substitute a second party for the original party when, in the course of litigation or pendency of an appeal, the original party’s interest ends or is transferred, or the original party becomes incompetent. See Estate of Saliba v. Dunning, 682 A.2d 224, 225 n.1 (Me. 1996) (noting the substitution of an estate, pursuant to Rule 25, for the plaintiff after his death during the pendency of the suit); Gagne v. Cianbro Corp., 431 A.2d 1313, 1315 n.1 (Me. 1981) (noting the Rule 25 substitution of Cianbro for the original defendant on appeal after the originally named defendant transferred its interest to Cianbro).

[¶ 18] The present case involves both situations: a suit brought by the wrong party and a transfer of interest mid-litigation. Although the court granted the Bank’s Rule 25(c) motion for substitution, the proper procedural vehicle for substitution in this case was Rule 17(a). See Bouchard v. Frost, 2004 ME 9, ¶ 8, 840 A.2d 109, 111 (indicating we may affirm a judgment on a ground not relied upon by the trial court). Our cases allow the Rule 17(a) substitution of plaintiffs when the correct party is difficult to determine or an understandable mistake has been made and the substitution “does not alter in any way the factual allegations pertaining to events or participants involved in th[e] suit.” Tisdale, 2003 ME 68, ¶¶ 18-19, 822 A.2d at 1142.

[¶ 19] Accredited, as the party entitled to enforce the rights granted in the mortgage, was the real party in interest at the time MERS instituted foreclosure proceedings. Five months after MERS filed for foreclosure, the Bank became the real party in interest when Accredited transferred the Saunderses’ mortgage and note to it. As we had not previously spoken on MERS’s standing to foreclose a residential mortgage, the prosecution of the case in its name is an understandable mistake to which Rule 17(a) can be applied. See Tisdale, 2003 ME 68, ¶ 19, 822 A.2d at 1142. Further, the transfer of interest did not alter the cause of action or create any prejudice to the Saunderses. MERS sought to foreclose on the Saunderses’ real property after they failed to make payments on the note, and the Bank now seeks to foreclose on the same mortgage for their failure to make payments on the same note. See id. (pointing to the unchanged facts and circumstances after substitution). In defending MERS’s motion for summary judgment, the Saunderses themselves argued that the Bank was the proper party to bring this action.^{[ 6 ]} The substitution of parties in this case was proper, and the court did not abuse its discretion by granting the Bank’s motion for substitution. See Bates, 2004 ME 154, ¶ 38, 863 A.2d at 901.

C. Summary Judgment

[¶ 20] Finally, the Saunderses contend that the court erred in granting summary judgment because of the flawed procedure that led to the court’s entry of foreclosure and sale and because there are genuine issues of material fact and summary judgment was inappropriate.^{[ 7 ]} We agree with both contentions.

[¶ 21] First, the procedure leading up to the summary judgment was fatally flawed. Except in certain circumstances not applicable here, substitution relates back to the date of the original complaint, and the effect of the substitution of parties was to treat the Bank as if it had been the party that commenced the litigation. See M.R. Civ. P. 17(a); 1 Field, McKusick, & Wroth, Maine Civil Practice § 17.1 at 349. As previously noted, the Bank filed a motion to alter or amend the order denying MERS’s motion for summary judgment, which the court granted. Our rules do not allow a motion to alter or amend pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 59(e)—or a motion for further findings of fact pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52(b)—in the absence of a final judgment. Because the denial of MERS’s motion for summary judgment in the present case was not a final judgment upon which the Bank could file its motion, the court erred by granting the motion. See Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Hart, 639 A.2d 107, 107 (Me. 1994) (stating the general rule that a “denial of a summary judgment motion does not result in a final judgment”). After substitution, the Bank should have filed its own independent motion for summary judgment with a statement of material facts and supporting affidavits. The Saunderses would then have had the opportunity to respond to the new motion and appropriately defend the foreclosure action against the real party in interest.

[¶ 22] Second, the summary judgment record does not support the Bank’s entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. See Chase Home Fin. LLC v. Higgins, 2009 ME 136, ¶ 10, 985 A.2d 508, 510. “We review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo,” and view “the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment has been entered to decide whether the parties’ statements of material facts and the referenced record evidence reveal a genuine issue of material fact.” Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc. v. Spaulding, 2007 ME 116, ¶ 19, 930 A.2d 1025, 1029; see also Salem Capital Grp., LLC v. Litchfield, 2010 ME 49, ¶ 4, ___ A.2d ___, ___. We consider “only the portions of the record referred to, and the material facts set forth, in the [M.R. Civ. P. 56(h)] statements to determine whether . . . the successful party was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Higgins, 2009 ME 136, ¶ 10, 985 A.2d at 510 (quotation marks omitted). Further, we have said that

[i]n the unique setting of summary judgment, strict adherence to the Rule’s requirements is necessary to ensure that the process is both predictable and just. Even when a hearing is held in a summary judgment motion, the only record that may be considered is the record created by the parties’ submissions.

Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Raggiani, 2009 ME 120, ¶ 7, 985 A.2d 1, 3; see also Camden Nat’l Bank v. Peterson, 2008 ME 85, ¶ 21, 948 A.2d 1251, 1257 (stating that a mortgagee seeking foreclosure must strictly comply with all the steps required by the foreclosure statute).

[¶ 23] In Higgins, we outlined the minimum facts, “supported by evidence of a quality that could be admissible at trial [that] must be included in the mortgage holder’s statement[] of material facts.” 2009 ME 136, ¶ 11, 985 A.2d at 510-11. Pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 6321, a party attempting to foreclose a mortgage must provide proof of the existence of a mortgage and its claim on the real estate and intelligibly describe the mortgaged premises, including the street address of the mortgaged property, if any, and the book and page number of the recorded mortgage. See also Higgins, 2009 ME 136, ¶ 11, 985 A.2d at 510-11 (explaining the remaining facts that must be submitted in the statements of material facts before foreclosure can proceed by summary judgment).

[¶ 24] The requirements of a street address and the book and page number were added to section 6321 after the commencement of foreclosure, but before the Bank filed its motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 59(e). See P.L. 2009, ch. 402, § 17 (effective June 15, 2009). The prior version of the statute, in effect at the time MERS filed for foreclosure, only required the complaint to “describe the mortgaged premises intelligibly.” 14 M.R.S. § 6321 (2008). As we explained in Higgins, amendments to the foreclosure statute apply to all summary judgment motions filed after their effective date, regardless of the date foreclosure proceedings commenced. 2009 ME 136, ¶ 11 n.2, 985 A.2d at 510.

[¶ 25] In the present case, even if the Bank’s motion to alter or amend were deemed procedurally sound, it would fail under either standard because it failed to include any mention of the location of the mortgaged property in its statement of material facts. While the book and page number—but not the mortgaged property’s address—were included in the affidavit supporting one of MERS’s original statements of material fact, facts not set forth in the parties’ statements of material facts are not part of the summary judgment record and not properly before us on appeal. See M.R. Civ. P. 56(h)(1); Higgins, 2009 ME 136, ¶ 12, 985 A.2d at 511 n.4. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Saunderses, the summary judgment record does not establish what property owned by the Saunderses actually secures the mortgage and the court erred by granting summary judgment to the Bank. See 14 M.R.S. § 6321 (2009); Higgins, 2009 ME 136, ¶ 13, 985 A.2d at 512.

III. CONCLUSION

[¶ 26] In summary, we hold that MERS could not institute this foreclosure action and invoke the jurisdiction of our courts because it lacks an enforceable right in the debt that secures the mortgage. Although MERS lacked standing in the present case, the jurisdictional flaw was corrected when the court appropriately granted the Bank’s motion for substitution. The court erred, however, in granting the Bank’s “renewed” motion for summary judgment, both because the Rules of Civil Procedure do not allow for reconsideration or amendment in the absence of a final judgment, and because the motion, even as amended, did not support a conclusion that the Bank was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The entry is:

Judgment vacated. Remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This copy provided by Leagle, Inc.