dinsfla - FORECLOSURE FRAUD - Page 3

Tag Archive | "dinsfla"

[NYSC] JUDGE SPINNER LETS U.S. BANK HAVE IT “HAMP FAIL” U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. v Mathon

[NYSC] JUDGE SPINNER LETS U.S. BANK HAVE IT “HAMP FAIL” U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. v Mathon


Where exactly are these “trial payments” 🙂


U.S. Bank Natl. Assn.
v.
Mathon

2010 NY Slip Op 52082(U)
Decided on December 1, 2010
Supreme Court, Suffolk County
Spinner, J.

The issue of the claim of the forbearance/modification agreement, however, is an entirely different situation, one that is considerably troubling to this Court. Defendants assert (and Plaintiff does not in any way controvert) that on April 17, 2009, without the benefit of counsel, they executed a three page document entitled “Home Affordable Modification Trial Period Plan” which was propounded to them by Plaintiff. Indeed, a copy of the same is appended as Exhibit C to the Affidavit of Thomas E. Reardon. According to Defendants (and again, not controverted by Plaintiff), they timely remitted to Plaintiff the three payments of $ 1,736.00 required thereunder and in compliance therewith, followed with nine more monthly payments in the same amount. According to Defendants (and once again, not controverted by Plaintiff), they continued to send monthly payments of $ 1,736.00, doing so in compliance with a letter from Plaintiff’s servicer Chase Home Finance LLC dated June 1, 2009 and appended to their Order To Show Cause. In relevant part, this letter states, in bold face type, as follows;

“If you make all [3] trial period payments on time and comply with all applicable program guidelines, you will have qualified for a final modification. However, there may be a period of time between your last trial payment and your first modification payment as we finalize the documents and get them back from you. During that interval, you should make a continuation payment at the trial period amount, and an extra coupon has been provided for that purpose.That payment will be applied as a principal reduction payment on your loan after your final modification is effective.”

It is undisputed that Defendants sent thirteen payments to Chase Home Finance LLC totalling $ 22,568.00 in reliance upon both the aforementioned April 17, 2009 Trial Modification and the subsequent June 1, 2009 letter and further, that the same were accepted by Plaintiff, presumably under the terms and conditions dictated by Plaintiff. According to Defendants, they regularly inquired as to the status of the final modification and were variously informed that all documents had been received, the application was with underwriting and finally, underwriter had approved the final modification. Notwithstanding the continuing stream of payments from Defendants and the verbal representations made to them, Chase Home Finance LLC, by letter dated April 15, 2010 (two days shy of one year following execution of the Trial Modification) notified Defendants that a loan [*3]modification would not be offered to them due to their inability to meet the existing guidelines therefor. The reason stated for the denial was the inability to meet HAMP guidelines by modifying the payments to equal 31% of Defendants’ gross monthly income.

In opposition to the foregoing, the Affidavit of Thomas E. Reardon, Assistant Vice-President of Chase Home Finance LLC (Plaintiff’s servicing agent), plainly acknowledges the foregoing assertions by Defendants but states, in Paragraph 7, that “…Due to a combination of factors, however, including missing documents, the submission of stale financial data and a significant influx of Trial Plan applications, the Mathons’ Trial Plan was not reviewed by the underwriting department until on or about April 2, 2010.” The Affidavit does state that on June 30, 2010 the Mathons applied for a new modification but that they failed to supply all necessary documents for consideration. However, nowhere in Plaintiff’s submissions to this Court is there any substantiation of this claim nor is the issue of Defendants’ payments addressed. Too, there is no proof of any computation or other calculation explaining the basis for denial herein.

In further opposition to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff has submitted the Affidavit of Adam M. Marshall Esq., an associate in the firm of Cullen & Dykman LLP. Mr. Marshall states under oath, in Paragraph 9 thereof, that “Since the Mathons moved by Order to Show Cause to stay the foreclosure on August 12, 2010, further efforts have been made to provide the Mathons with a loan modification based on verifiable income. On October 12, 2010, Plaintiff withdrew its Motion for Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale. In addition, a new application for a loan modification was forwarded to the Mathons. However, the Mathons have abjectly refused to complete the application or supply the financial documents requested therein.” This Affidavit by counsel seems to be somewhat at odds with the averments of Mr. Reardon and is amply rebutted by Defendants’ motion papers. Defendants have appended a plethora of documents dating from April 30, 2010 through July 28, 2010 evidencing their application for a new modification (which appears to be a HAMP modification identical to the one that Plaintiff had just rejected) as well as their cooperation with the demands of Plaintiff regarding the same. Even so, while Defendants were assiduously attempting to re-negotiate a modification, Plaintiff was instructing its counsel to continue prosecution of the foreclosure action. It is painfully obvious to this Court that Defendants relied upon representations made by Plaintiff and acted affirmatively based upon those representations, all to their serious detriment.

There has been no disclosure by Plaintiff to this Court as to whether or not this loan in foreclosure is deemed to be “sub-prime” or “high cost” in nature. Moreover, no mandatory settlement conference has been held in this matter though same is plainly required pursuant to CPLR § 3408.

Continue reading below…

[ipaper docId=44625358 access_key=key-20mvhocw7eyykamwxetq height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (3)

Virginia resident gets foreclosure notice on Port St. Lucie home she sold in 1994

Virginia resident gets foreclosure notice on Port St. Lucie home she sold in 1994


By Nadia Vanderhoof
TCPalm
Posted December 3, 2010 at 11:46 a.m.

PORT ST. LUCIE — About 10 p.m. the Saturday after Thanksgiving, Cathy Hammers abruptly was woken up by a continuous loud banging on the front door of her Virginia home.

With two kids in college and a third touring the country in a rock band, she thought law enforcement was at her door with bad news of a possible car accident involving a family member.

Instead, Hammers was served foreclosure papers by Texas-based Nationstar Mortgage and the Fort Lauderdale law firm of Marshall Watson on a Port St. Lucie home Hammers and her parents sold in 1994 — a property she hasn’t owned or seen in 15 years.

“He was ringing the door bell, banging real hard on the door … the dogs were going crazy,” Hammer said. “When I asked him who he was. He asked me if I was Cathy and told me I was being served foreclosure papers. He said he was a process server with ASAP Legal Services and then just took off.”

According to court documents filed in St. Lucie County, a quit claim deed and satisfaction of mortgage were filed by Hammers and her parents on the home at 2291 S.W. Susset Lane in 1994.

Treasure Coast legal experts say Hammers’ case could be one of the most unusual to occur within the 19th Judicial Circuit, which encompasses Martin, St. Lucie, Indian River and Okeechobee counties.

“When I talked to Marshall Watson, Sonya in their litigation department, and asked why I was being served foreclosure papers on a mortgage I did not sign, on a property I haven’t lived in for almost 20 years, she got snippety with me and asked if I had an attorney. Why would I need an attorney when they’ve made the mistake?” Hammers said.

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (1)

Countrywide, Bank Of America Agreement and Plan Merger 2008

Countrywide, Bank Of America Agreement and Plan Merger 2008


Note this is incomplete but the basics:

Table Of Contents:

  • Pg. 2. 2nd Supp. Note Deed Poll, Dated 11/072008, To The Note Deed Poll Dated 4/29/05
  • Pg. 10. Bank of America Corporation on 1st July 2008 – Effective date of merger
  • Pg. 15. Countrywide and Bank Of America Agreement And Plan Of Merger
  • Pg. 116. Bank of America Corporation on 7th November 2008 – Debt Assumption
  • Pg. 127. 6th Supp Trust Deed Dated 11/07/08, 11/07/08, Modifying The Prov. Of Trust Deed 5/01/98
  • Pg. 138 3rd Supp. Trust Deed 11/07/08, To The Trust Deed Dated 8/15/05
  • Pg. 148 UNAUDITED PRO FORMA CONDENSED FINANCIAL INFORMATION
  • Pg. 163. Countrywide Financial Corporation on 30th June 2008 – Consolidated Balance Sheet for
  • Pg. 282. First Supplemental Deed Poll Guarantee and Indemnity

[ipaper docId=44612785 access_key=key-1r5gobfvmuza3pv9k102 height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (1)

D.C. Appeals Court REVERSAL: “TENANT AT WILL VICTORY” Banks v. Eastern Savings Bank

D.C. Appeals Court REVERSAL: “TENANT AT WILL VICTORY” Banks v. Eastern Savings Bank


MATT BANKS, APPELLANT,
v.
EASTERN SAVINGS BANK, APPELLEE.

Nos. 08-CV-16, 08-CV-1281, 09-CV-427, 09-CV-428

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued November 19, 2010.

Decided December 2, 2010.

Aaron G. Sokolow, with whom Morris R. Battino was on the brief, for appellant.
Stephen O. Hessler for appellee.

Before WASHINGTON, Chief Judge, GLICKMAN, Associate Judge, and NEWMAN, Senior Judge.
Excerpt:
We recognize the “hypertechnical” nature of this regulation and understand that no administrative action was instituted against ESB for its late notification. Nevertheless, we are persuaded that our strict adherence to statutory notice procedures compels a similar result when applying RHC regulations that affect eviction proceedings. See Ayers, 666 A.2d at 52 (strictly construing “hypertechnical” service of process statutory provisions). Therefore, because ESB’s Notice to Quit or Vacate was defective, we reverse the judgment for possession.

[…]

The trial court erred when it ordered the removal of Banks’ lis pendens notice. We therefore reverse its order.

Continue below…

[ipaper docId=44596744 access_key=key-150wctvudvztwsrbx0e4 height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (0)

“GEORGIA FORECLOSURE FRAUD” NEW AG OLENS WANTS CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS!

“GEORGIA FORECLOSURE FRAUD” NEW AG OLENS WANTS CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS!


Excerpts from The Atlanta Journal-Constitution:

Newly elected state Attorney General Sam Olens said Wednesday he will push the General Assembly for the authority to launch criminal investigations of improper foreclosures.

[…]

The attorney general has the power to prosecute mortgage fraud, but apparently not foreclosure fraud. Olens said he wants to change that, and he also said he might ask the State Bar of Georgia, which licenses lawyers, to look into allegations of misconduct by real estate attorneys in the mortgage origination as well as foreclosure process.

“We’re still working on our legislative agenda now, and frankly, that’s part of it,” Olens said. A senior leader in the office’s criminal division asked Olens recently to press for jurisdiction to cover foreclosure fraud.

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (3)

DJSP, Ent. Receives NASDAQ Letters, Regain Compliance or De-Listed By 5/2011

DJSP, Ent. Receives NASDAQ Letters, Regain Compliance or De-Listed By 5/2011


EXCERPT of FORM 6K FILING:

On November 26, 2010, the Company received a letter from NASDAQ notifying it that for the prior 30 consecutive business days, the Company’s listed securities failed to maintain a minimum market value of  $50 million, consequently, a deficiency exists with regard to this requirement for continued listing pursuant to NASDAQ Listing Rule 5450(b)(2)(A) (the “MVLS Rule”).  NASDAQ further stated that in accordance with NASDAQ Listing Rule 5810(c)(3)(C), the Company will be provided 180 calendar days, or until May 25, 2011, to regain compliance with the MVLS Rule.  NASDAQ will deem the Company to have regained compliance if at any time before May 25, 2011 the market value of the Company’s listed securities closes at $15,000,000 or more for a minimum of ten consecutive business days .

These notifications do not impact the listing and trading of the Company’s securities at this time. However, the NASDAQ letters also state that, if the Company does not regain compliance with the MVPHS Rule by May 23, 2011 or the MVLS Rule by May 25, 2011, the Company will receive written notification from NASDAQ that the Company’s securities are subject to delisting. The Company is reviewing its options for regaining compliance with the MVLS Rule and MVPHS Rule and for remedying other future potential non-compliances with Nasdaq continued listing requirements, including the requirement to maintain a minimum bid price of at least $1.00 per share.  There can be no assurance that the Company will be able to regain compliance with the MVLS Rule, MVPHS Rule or other Nasdaq continued listing requirements in a timely fashion, in which case its securities would be delisted from Nasdaq.
© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (1)

FL 3rd DCA Appeals Court Reversal “PROVEST, LLC PROCESS SERVICE” BENNETT v. CHRISTIANA BANK & TRUST COMPANY

FL 3rd DCA Appeals Court Reversal “PROVEST, LLC PROCESS SERVICE” BENNETT v. CHRISTIANA BANK & TRUST COMPANY


BENNETT v. CHRISTIANA BANK & TRUST COMPANY

Debbie Bennett, Appellant, v. Christiana Bank & Trust Company, etc., Appellee.

Case No. 3D09-2653.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed December 1, 2010.

Joseph J. Pappacoda, (Fort Lauderdale) for appellant.
Florida Foreclosure Attorneys, PLLC, and Klarika J. Caplano, (Clearwater) for appellee.
Before SUAREZ, CORTIÑAS, and SALTER, JJ.

EXCERPT:

SALTER, J.
Debbie Bennett appeals the denial of her emergency motion to vacate a final foreclosure judgment. Based on the record and our conclusion that there was no personal service of process on Ms. Bennett, we reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

On November 20, 2008, Christiana Bank & Trust Company filed an action to foreclose the mortgage on Ms. Bennett’s home. The plaintiff’s attorneys, Golson Felberbaum Law Firm, hired Pro-Vest LLC, a process service company, to serve Ms. Bennett. Christopher P. Mas, a Pro-Vest employee, filed a verified return of service on December 29, 2008. The return indicated that individual service was accomplished on December 20 at 4:13 p.m. The return further indicated that “DEFENDANT REFUSED TO DISCLOSE MILITARY STATUS; PROPERTY IS NOT A MOBILE HOME. I asked the person spoken to if the person served is married and I received a negative reply.”

Continue Below…

[ipaper docId=44531544 access_key=key-zp6ehf374b3yo1todgv height=600 width=600 /]


© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (2)

WANTED: COUNTRYWIDE’S “I-PORTAL”,”C-SAD” INFORMATION

WANTED: COUNTRYWIDE’S “I-PORTAL”,”C-SAD” INFORMATION


Stop Foreclosure Fraud needs your help America in locating more information on any and all of the following tips received recently… We need to be educated on how it all works!

This is before the new BofA EQUATOR was put into place early 2010.

In no particular order:

  1. Any information on I-PORTAL SYSTEM “Partitions” this has to do with special levels of digitized files and documents. (This system  is where “original” loan files were scanned as soon as they arrived).
  2. Any Information on C-SAD, the database containing securitization information. CSAD database where the loss mitigation personnel would look up who the investor and master servicers were and what the level of delegation CW had for decision making on the modification or short sale requests, the credit file.
  3. The mainframe AS 400 system which was the ancient DOS database where the loan info, tax and insurance info, mortgage insurance info and foreclosure notes were kept.
  4. All “US Fax Numbers” that the borrowers are asked to fax in QWR, Short Sales, Loan Modification Departments BUT are redirected to INDIA.
  5. The Short Sale Process of 11 systems that one has to log into and out of independently.

As always your comments and email tips located on the header are appreciated.

*Keep in mind that the fax numbers go directly to INDIA and your fax is converted into a PDF, labeled and then uploaded into the I-Portal system from INDIA, giving access to CW employees in various locations to these files.

NO PAPER IS BEING SHUFFLED.


© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (7)

Strauss & Troy Investigates HSBC Bank and Citi Mortgage “ROBO SIGNERS, HAMP”

Strauss & Troy Investigates HSBC Bank and Citi Mortgage “ROBO SIGNERS, HAMP”


Source: Strauss & Troy
Strauss & Troy Investigates HSBC Bank and Citi Mortgage

CINCINNATI, Dec. 1, 2010 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — The Cincinnati law firm of Strauss & Troy announced today that it is investigating HSBC Bank and Citi Mortgage for potential violations of state and federal law with regard to foreclosures initiated against homeowners participating in the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) and/or robo-signers who initiated foreclosure actions without adequately reviewing the filings. Strauss & Troy represents homeowners in a pending action against a bank for alleged violations of HAMP.

Individuals who have lost their homes in a foreclosure action or are currently in foreclosure initiated by HSBC or Citi Mortgage: (i) after making payments pursuant to a trial HAMP payment plan that was not made permanent, or (ii) as a result of robo-signers who initiated foreclosure actions without adequately reviewing the filings, may have a claim and are encouraged to contact attorneys Richard Wayne, William Flynn, or John Levy at (513) 621-2120, or by email at: rswayne@strausstroy.com, wkflynn@strausstroy.com or jmlevy@strausstroy.com for further information without any obligation or cost to you.

CONTACT:  Strauss & Troy
Richard Wayne, Esq.
William Flynn, Esq.
John Levy, Esq.
(513) 621-2120
1-800-669-9341
Cincinnati, Ohio  45202

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (1)

Usage of Federal Reserve Credit and Liquidity Facilities “BAILOUT FUNDS”

Usage of Federal Reserve Credit and Liquidity Facilities “BAILOUT FUNDS”


This section of the website provides detailed information about the liquidity and credit programs and other monetary policy tools that the Federal Reserve used to respond to the financial crisis that emerged in the summer of 2007. These programs fall into three broad categories–those aimed at addressing severe liquidity strains in key financial markets, those aimed at providing credit to troubled systemically important institutions, and those aimed at fostering economic recovery by lowering longer-term interest rates.

The emergency liquidity programs that the Federal Reserve set up provided secured and mostly short-term loans. Over time, these programs helped to alleviate the strains and to restore normal functioning in a number of key financial markets, supporting the flow of credit to businesses and households. As financial markets stabilized, the Federal Reserve closed most of these programs. Indeed, many of the programs were intentionally priced to be unattractive to borrowers when markets are functioning normally and, as a result, wound down as market conditions improved. The programs achieved their intended purposes with no loss to taxpayers.

The Federal Reserve also provided credit to several systemically important financial institutions. These actions were taken to avoid the disorderly failure of these institutions and the potential catastrophic consequences for the U.S. financial system and economy. All extensions of credit were fully secured and are in the process of being fully repaid.

Finally, the Federal Reserve provided economic stimulus by lowering interest rates. Over the course of the crisis, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) reduced its target for the federal funds rate to a range of 0 to 1/4 percent. With the federal funds rate at its effective lower bound, the FOMC provided further monetary policy stimulus through large-scale purchases of longer-term Treasury debt, federal agency debt, and agency mortgage-backed securities (agency MBS). These asset purchases helped to lower longer-term interest rates and generally improved conditions in private credit markets.

The links to the right provide detailed information about the programs that were established in response to the crisis. Details for each loan include: the borrower, the date that credit was extended, the interest rate, information about the collateral, and other relevant terms. Similar information is supplied for swap line draws and repayments. Details for each agency MBS purchase include: the counterparty to the transaction, the date of the transaction, the amount of the transaction, and the price at which each transaction was conducted. The transaction data are provided in compliance with the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. The Federal Reserve will revise the data to ensure that they are accurate and complete.

No rules about executive compensation or dividend payments were applied to borrowers using Federal Reserve facilities. Executive compensation restrictions were imposed by statute on firms receiving assistance through the U.S. Treasury’s Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Dividend restrictions were the province of the appropriate supervisors and were imposed by the Federal Reserve on bank holding companies in that role, but not because of borrowing through the facilities discussed here.

Additional information about the Federal Reserve’s credit and liquidity programs is available on the Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet section.

Facilities and Programs

Source: federalreserve.gov

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (0)

Statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on Problems in Mortgage Servicing from Modification to Foreclosure, Part II

Statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on Problems in Mortgage Servicing from Modification to Foreclosure, Part II


Statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on Problems in Mortgage Servicing from Modification to Foreclosure, Part II; Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate; 538 Dirksen Senate Office Building
December 1, 2010

Chairman Dodd, Ranking Member Shelby and members of the Committee, thank you for requesting the views of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on deficiencies in mortgage servicing and their broader potential impact on the financial system. It is unfortunate that problems in mortgage servicing and foreclosure prevention continue to require the scrutiny of this Committee. While “robo-signing” is the latest issue, this problem is symptomatic of persistent shortcomings in the foreclosure prevention efforts of our nation’s largest mortgage servicers. As such, I believe that major changes are required to stabilize our housing markets and prevent unnecessary foreclosures.

The FDIC continues to review the mortgage servicing operations at banks we supervise and also those institutions that have purchased failed-bank loans under loss-share agreements with the FDIC. To date, our review has revealed no evidence that FDIC-supervised state-chartered banks directly engage in robo-signing, and it also appears that they have limited indirect exposure through third-party relationships with servicers that have engaged in this practice. However, we remain concerned about the ramifications of deficiencies in foreclosure documentation among the largest servicers, most of which we insure. We will continue to work with the primary supervisors of these servicers through our backup examination authority. In addition, we are coordinating our work with the State Attorneys General (AG) and the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force – a broad coalition of federal, state, and local law enforcement, regulatory, and investigatory agencies led by the Department of Justice – to support efforts for broad-based and consistent resolution of servicing issues.

The robo-signing and foreclosure documentation issues are the natural result of the misaligned incentives that pervade the entire mortgage process. For instance, the traditional, fixed level of compensation for loan servicing has been wholly inadequate to cover the expenses required to implement high-touch and specialized servicing on the scale needed in recent years. Misaligned incentives have led to significant underinvestment in the systems, processes, training, and staffing necessary to effectively implement foreclosure prevention programs. Similarly, many servicers have failed to update their foreclosure process to reflect the increased demand and need for loan modifications. As a result, some homeowners have received conflicting messages from their servicers and have missed opportunities to avoid foreclosure. The failure to effectively implement loan modification programs can not only harm individual homeowners, but the resulting unnecessary foreclosures put downward pressure on home prices.

As serious as these issues are, a complete foreclosure moratorium is ill-advised, as it would unduly prolong those foreclosures that are necessary and justified, and would slow the recovery of housing markets. The regrettable truth is that many of the properties currently in the foreclosure process are either vacant or occupied by borrowers who simply cannot make even a significantly reduced payment and have been in arrears for an extended time.

My hope is that the newly established Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) will take the lead in addressing the latest issues of foreclosure documentation deficiencies and proposing a sensible and broad-based approach to reforming mortgage servicer processes, promoting sustainable loan modifications and restoring legal certainty to the foreclosure process where it is appropriate and necessary.

In my testimony, I will begin with some background on the robo-signing and related foreclosure documentation problems and connect theses issues to other deficiencies in the mortgage servicing process. Second, I will discuss the FDIC’s efforts to address identified servicing problems within our limited jurisdiction. Finally, I will discuss the central role that I believe the FSOC can play in facilitating broad agreements among major stakeholder groups that can help resolve some of these issues.

I. Robo-Signing and Foreclosure Documentation Problems and Shortfalls in Mortgage Servicing

The FDIC is concerned about two related, but separate, problems relating to foreclosure documentation. The first is referred to as “robo-signing,” or the use of highly-automated processes by some large servicers to generate affidavits in the foreclosure process without the affiant having reviewed facts contained in the affidavit or having the affiant’s signature witnessed in accordance with State laws. Recent depositions of individuals involved in robo-signing have led to allegations of fraud based on contentions that these individuals signed thousands of documents without knowledge or verification of the information contained in the filed affidavits.

The second problem involves demonstrating the chain of title required to foreclose. Some servicers have not been able to establish their legal standing to foreclose because, under current industry practices, they may not be in possession of the necessary documentation required under state law. In many cases, a servicer is acting on behalf of a trustee of a pool of mortgages that have been securitized and sold to investors in a mortgage-backed securities (MBS) transaction. In MBS transactions, the promissory note and mortgage signed by the borrowers are held by a custodian on behalf of the securitization investors.

In many cases today, however, the mortgage held by the custodian indicates that legal title to the mortgage has been assigned from the original lender to the Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS), a system encompassing some 31 million active mortgage loans that was designed to facilitate the transfer of mortgage claims in the securitization process. Securitization often led to multiple transfers of the mortgage through MERS. Many of the issues raised about the authority of servicers to foreclose are a product of potential defects in these transfers and the requirements for proof of the servicer’s authority. Where MERS is involved, foreclosures have been initiated either by MERS, as the legal holder of the lien, or by the servicer. In both cases, the foreclosing party must show that it has possession of the note and that its right to foreclose on the mortgage complies with state law.

Robo-signing and chain of title issues may create contingent liabilities for mortgage servicers. Investors who contend that servicers have not fulfilled their servicing responsibilities under the pooling and servicing agreements (PSAs) argue that they have grounds to reassign servicing rights. In addition, concerns have been raised by investors as to whether the transfer of loan documentation in some private MBS securitization trusts fully conform to the requirements established under applicable trust law and the PSAs governing these transactions. While the legal challenges under the representations and warranties trust requirements remain in their early stages, they could, if successful, result in the “putback” of large volumes of defaulted mortgages from securitization trusts to the originating institutions. The FDIC has been working with the FRB and the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), in our backup capacity, to gather information from the large servicers to evaluate the potential financial impact of these adverse outcomes.

Long-Standing Weaknesses in Third-Party Mortgage Servicing

The weaknesses that have been identified in mortgage servicing practices during the mortgage crisis are a byproduct of both rapid growth in the number of problem loans and a compensation structure that is not well designed to deal with these loans. As recently as 2005, when average U.S. homes prices were still rising rapidly, fewer than 800,000 mortgage loans entered foreclosure on an annual basis.1 By 2009, the annual total had more than tripled to over 2.8 million, and foreclosures through the first three quarters of 2010 are running at an annualized pace of more than 2.5 million. Moreover, the proportion of foreclosure proceedings actually resulting in the repossession and sale of collateral appears to have increased even more rapidly over this period in some of the hardest-hit markets. Data published by the Federal Housing Finance Agency show that the percent of total homes sales in California resulting from foreclosure-related distressed sales increased more than eight-fold, to over 40 percent of all sales, between 2006 and 2008.2

The share of U.S. mortgage loans held or securitized by the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) and private issuers of asset-backed securities has doubled over the past 25 years to represent fully two-thirds of the value of all mortgages currently outstanding.3 One effect of this growth in securitization has been parallel growth in third-party mortgage servicing under PSA agreements. By definition, a large proportion of the mortgages sold or securitized end up serviced under PSAs.

The traditional structure of third-party mortgage servicing fees, put in place well before this crisis, has created perverse incentives to automate critical servicing activities and cut costs at the expense of the accuracy, reliability and currency of loan documents and information. Prior to the 1980s, the typical GSE mortgage pool paid a servicing fee of 37.5 basis points annually, or .375 percent of the outstanding principal balance of the mortgage pool. Since the 1980s, the typical servicing fee for prime loans has been 25 basis points. When Alt-A and subprime mortgages began to be securitized by private issuers in the late 1990s, the standard servicing fees for those loans were set higher, typically at 37.5 basis points for Alt-A loans and 50 basis points for subprime loans.

While this fee structure provided a steady profit stream for servicers when the number of defaulted loans remained low, costs rose dramatically with the rise in mortgage defaults in the latter half of the last decade. As a result, some mortgage servicers began running operating losses on their servicing portfolios. One result of a compensation structure that did not account for the rise in problem loans was a built-in financial incentive to minimize the investment in back office processes necessary to support both foreclosure and modification. The other result was consolidation in the servicing industry. The market share of the top 5 mortgage servicers has nearly doubled since 2000, from 32 percent to almost 60 percent.4 The purpose and effect of consolidation is to cut costs and achieve economies of scale, but also to increase automation.

Most PSAs allow for both foreclosure and modification as a remedy to default. But servicers have continuously been behind the curve in pursuing modification as an alternative to foreclosure. A survey of 13 mortgage servicers conducted by the State Foreclosure Prevention Working Group shows that the annual percent of all past due mortgages that are being modified has risen from just over 2 percent in late 2007 to a level just under 10 percent as of late 2009.5 At the same time, the percentage of past due loans entering foreclosure each year has also steadily risen over this same time period, from 21 percent to 32 percent.

One example of the lack of focus on loss mitigation strategies is the uncoordinated manner in which many servicers have pursued modification and foreclosure at the same time. Under such a “dual-track” process, borrowers may be attempting to file the documentation needed to establish their qualifications for modification and waiting for a favorable response from the servicer, even while that servicer is at the same time executing the paperwork necessary to foreclose on the property. While in some cases it may be reasonable to begin conducting preliminary filings for seriously past due loans in states with long foreclosure timelines, it is vitally important that the modification process be brought to conclusion before a foreclosure sale is scheduled. Failure to coordinate the foreclosure process with the modification process risks confusing and frustrating homeowners and could result in unnecessary foreclosures. As described in the concluding section, we recommend that servicers establish a single point of contact that can work with every distressed borrower and coordinate all activities taken by the servicer with regard to that particular case.

II. FDIC Efforts to Address Problems in Mortgage Servicing and Foreclosure Prevention

Since the early stages of the mortgage crisis, the FDIC has made a concerted effort to promote the early modification of problem mortgages as a first alternative that can spare investors the high losses associated with foreclosure, assist families experiencing acute financial distress, and help to stabilize housing markets where distressed sales have resulted in a lowering of home prices in a self-reinforcing cycle.

In 2007, when the dimensions of the subprime mortgage problem were just becoming widely known, I advocated in speeches, testimony and opinion articles that servicers not only had the right to carry out modifications that would protect subprime borrowers from unaffordable interest-rate resets, but that doing so would often benefit investors by enabling them to avoid foreclosure costs that could run as high as 40 percent or more of the value of the collateral. In addition, the FDIC, along with other federal regulators jointly hosted a series of roundtables on the issues surrounding subprime mortgage securitizations to facilitate a better understanding of problems and identify workable solutions for rising delinquencies and defaults, including alternatives to foreclosure.

More recently, the FDIC has been actively involved both in investigating and addressing robo-signing and documentation issues at insured depository institutions and their affiliates, ensuring that its own loss-share partners are employing best practices in their servicing operations, and implementing reforms that will better align the financial incentives of servicers in future securitization deals.

Supervisory Actions

The FDIC is exercising both its primary and backup authorities to actively address the issues that have emerged regarding banks’ foreclosure and “robo-signing” practices. The FDIC is the primary federal supervisor for nearly 5,000 state-chartered insured institutions, where we monitor compliance with safety and soundness and consumer protection requirements and pursue enforcement actions to address violations of law. While the FDIC is not the primary federal regulator for the major loan servicers, our examiners are working on-site under our backup authority as part of an interagency horizontal review team at 12 of the 14 major mortgage servicers along with their primary federal regulators. This interagency review is also evaluating the roles played by MERS and Lender Processing Services, a large data processor used by many mortgage servicers.

The FDIC is committed to active participation in horizontal reviews and other interagency efforts so we are able to have a comprehensive picture of the underlying causes of these problems and the lessons to be learned. The onsite reviews are finding that mortgage servicers display varying degrees of performance and quality controls. Program and operational deficiencies may be correctable in the normal course of business for some, while others may need more rigorous system changes. The level and adequacy of documentation also varies widely among servicers. Where chain of title is not sufficiently documented, servicers are being required to make changes to their processes and procedures. In addition, some servicers need to strengthen audit, third-party arrangements, and loss mitigation programs to cure lapses in operations. However, we do not believe that servicers should wait for the conclusion of the interagency effort to begin addressing known weaknesses in internal controls and risk management. Corrective actions on problems identified during a servicer’s own review or the examiners’ review should be addressed as soon as possible. We expect each servicer to properly review loan documents prior to initiating or conducting any foreclosure proceedings, to adhere to applicable laws and regulations, and to maintain appropriate policies, procedures and documentation. If necessary, the FDIC will encourage the use of formal or informal corrective programs to ensure timely action is taken.

Actions Taken as Receiver for Failed Institutions

In addition to our supervisory efforts, the FDIC is looking at the servicing practices of institutions acquiring failed institutions under loss-share agreements. To date there are $159.8 billion in loans and securities involved in FDIC loss share agreements, of which $56.7 billion (36 percent) are single family loans. However, the proportion of mortgage loans held by acquiring institutions that are covered by loss share agreements is in some cases very small. For example, at One West Bank, the successor to Indy Mac, only 8 percent of mortgages serviced fall under the FDIC loss share agreement.

An institution that acquires a single-family loss-share portfolio is required to implement a loan modification program, and also is required to consider borrowers for a loan modification and other loss mitigation alternatives prior to foreclosure. These requirements minimize the FDIC’s loss share costs. The FDIC monitors the loss-share agreements through monthly and quarterly reporting by the acquiring bank and semi-annual reviews of the acquiring bank. The FDIC has the right to deny or recover any loss share claim where the acquiring institution is unable to verify that a qualifying borrower was considered for loan modification and that the least costly loss mitigation alternative was pursued.

In connection with the recent foreclosure robo-signing revelations, the FDIC contacted all of its loss-share partners. All partners certified that they currently comply with all state and federal foreclosure requirements. We are in the process of conducting a Loan Servicing Oversight audit of all loss-share partners with high volumes of single-family residential mortgage loans and foreclosures. The FDIC will deny any loss-share payments or seek reimbursement for any foreclosures not compliant with state laws or not fully remediated, including noncompliance with the loss-share agreements and loan modification requirements.

Regulatory Actions to Reform Mortgage Securitization

We also are taking steps to restore market discipline to our mortgage finance system by doing what we can to reform the securitization process. In July of this year, the FDIC sponsored its own securitization of $471 million of single-family mortgages. In our transaction, we addressed many of the deficiencies in existing securitizations. First, we ensured that the servicer will make every effort to work with borrowers in default, or where default is reasonably foreseeable. Second, the servicing arrangements in these structured loan transactions have been designed to address shortcomings in the traditional flat-rate structures for mortgage servicing fees. Our securitization pays a base dollar amount per loan per year, regardless of changes in the outstanding balance of that loan. In addition, the servicing fee is increased in the event the loan becomes more complex to service by falling past due or entering modification or foreclosure. This fee structure is much less likely to create incentives to slash costs and rely excessively on automated or substandard processes to wring a profit out of a troubled servicing portfolio. Third, we provided for independent, third party oversight by a Master Servicer. The Master Servicer monitors the Servicer’s overall performance and evaluates the effectiveness of the Servicer’s modification and loss mitigation strategies. And, fourth, we provided for the ability of the FDIC, as transaction sponsor, the Servicer and the Master Servicer to agree on adapting the servicing guidelines and protocols to unanticipated and significant changes in future market conditions.

The FDIC has also recently taken the initiative to establish standards for risk retention and other securitization practices by updating its rules for safe harbor protection with regard to the sale treatment of securitized assets in failed bank receiverships. Our final rule, approved in September, establishes standards for disclosure, loan quality, loan documentation, and the oversight of servicers. It will create a comprehensive set of incentives to assure that loans are made and managed in a way that achieves sustainable lending and maximizes value for all investors. In addition, the rule is fully consistent with the mandate under the Dodd-Frank Act to apply a 5 percent risk-retention requirement on all but the most conservatively underwritten loans when they are securitized.

We are currently working on an interagency basis to develop the Dodd-Frank Act standards for risk retention across several asset classes, including requirements for low-risk “Qualifying Residential Mortgages,” or QRMs, that will be exempt from risk retention. These rules allow us to establish a gold standard for securitization to encourage high-quality mortgages that are sustainable for the long term. This rulemaking process also provides a unique opportunity to better align the incentives of servicers with those of mortgage pool investors.

We believe that the QRM rules should authorize servicers to use best practices in mitigating losses through modification, require compensation structures that promote modifications, and direct servicers to act for the benefit of all investors. We also believe that the QRM rules should require servicers to disclose any ownership interest in other whole loans secured by the same real property, and to have in place processes to deal with any potential conflicts. Some conflicts arise from so-called “tranche warfare” that reflects the differing financial interests among the holders of various mortgage bond tranches. For example, an investor holding the residual tranche typically stands to benefit from a loan modification that prevents default. Conversely, the higher rated tranches might be better off if a servicer foreclosed on the property forcing losses to be realized at the expense of the residual tranche. A second type of conflict potentially arises when a single company services a first mortgage for an investor pool and the second mortgage for a different party, or for itself. Serious conflicts such as this must be addressed if we are to achieve meaningful long-term reform of the securitization process.

Therefore, the FDIC believes it would be extremely helpful if the definition of a QRM include servicing requirements that, among other things:

  • grant servicers the authority and provide servicers compensation incentives to mitigate losses on residential mortgages by taking appropriate action to maximize the net present value of the mortgages for the benefit of all investors rather than the benefit of any particular class of investors;
  • establish a pre-defined process to address any subordinate lien owned by the servicer or any affiliate of the servicers; and
  • require disclosure by the servicer of any ownership interest of the servicer or any affiliate of the servicer in other whole loans secured by the same real property that secures a loan included in the pool.

Risk retention rules under the Dodd-Frank Act should also create financial incentives that promote effective loan servicing. The best way to accomplish this is to require issuers – particularly those who also are servicers – to retain an interest in the mortgage pool that is directly proportional to the value of the pool as a whole. Frequently referred to as a “vertical slice,” this form of risk retention would take the form of a small, proportional share of every senior and subordinate tranche in the securitization, creating a combined financial interest that is not unduly tilted toward either senior or subordinate bondholders.

III. The FSOC Should Play a Central Role in Developing Solutions

What started a few months ago as technical documentation issues in the foreclosure process has grown into something more serious and potentially damaging to the nation’s housing recovery and to some of our largest institutions. First, a transparent, functioning foreclosure process is unfortunately necessary to the recovery of our housing market and our economy. Second, the mortgage documentation problems cast a cloud of uncertainty over the ownership rights and obligations of mortgage borrowers and investors. Further, there are numerous private parties and government entities that may have significant claims against firms central to the mortgage markets.

While we do not see immediate systemic risk, the clear potential is there. The FSOC was established under the Dodd-Frank Act to deal with just this type of emerging risk. Its mandate includes identifying risks to financial stability and potential gaps in regulation and making recommendations for primary regulators and other policymakers to take action to mitigate those risks. As such, these issues represent just the type of problem the FSOC was designed to address. In addition, the difficulties that have been experienced to date in coordinating a government policy response speak to the need for central role by the FSOC in negotiating workable solutions with the major parties that have a stake in the outcome.

The FSOC is in a unique position to provide needed clarity to the market by coordinating consistent interpretations of what standards should be applied to establishing the chain of title for mortgage loans and recognizing the true sale of mortgage loans in establishing private securitization trusts. The constituent agencies that make up the FSOC also have their own authorities that can be used to provide clarity of this type. Examples include rulings on standards that determine the tax-exempt status of mortgage trusts and standards for the recognition of true sale in a failed bank receivership, which the FDIC recently updated in its safe harbor regulation.

We need broad agreements between representatives of the major stakeholders affected by this issue so that the uncertainties associated with this issue can be resolved as quickly as possible. Outlined below are some of the principles I believe should be part of any broad agreement among the stakeholders to this issue.

  1. Establish a single point of contact for struggling homeowners. Servicers should identify a single person to work with homeowners once it becomes evident the homeowner is in distress. This single point of contact must be appropriately authorized to provide current, accurate information about the status of the borrower’s loan or loan modification application, as well as provide a sign-off that all loan modification efforts have failed before a foreclosure sale. This will go a long way towards eliminating the conflicts and miscommunications between loan modifications and foreclosures in today’s dual-track system and will provide borrowers assurance that their application for modification is being considered in good faith.
  2. Expand and streamline private loan modification efforts to increase the number of successful modifications. To accomplish this end, servicers should be required to intervene with troubled borrowers from the earliest stages of delinquency to increase the likelihood of success in foreclosure mitigation. Modifications under such programs should significantly reduce the monthly payment through reductions in the interest rate and principal balance, as needed, to make the mortgage affordable over the long term. Analysis of modifications undertaken in the FDIC program at Indy Mac Federal Bank has shown that modifying loans when they are in the early stages of delinquency and significantly reducing the monthly payment are both factors that promote sustainable modifications that perform well over time. In exchange for the creation of highly-simplified modification programs, mortgage servicers should have a “safe harbor” that would give them assurance that their claims will be recognized if foreclosure becomes unavoidable. In addition, streamlined modification programs should be recognized as a best practice in adjudicating disputes with mortgage investors.
  3. Invest appropriate resources to maintain adequate numbers of well-trained staff. Broad agreements should require servicers to hire and train sufficient numbers of staff to professionally process applications for loan modifications. Further, servicers should be required to improve information systems to help manage and support the workload associated with loan modifications.
  4. Strengthen quality control processes related to foreclosure and loan servicing activities. Some servicers need to make fundamental changes to their practices and programs to fulfill their responsibilities and satisfy their legal obligations. Lax standards of care and failure to follow longstanding legal requirements cannot be tolerated. Regulators must vigorously exercise their supervisory tools to ensure that mortgage servicers operate to high standards. Servicers need to institute strong controls to address defective practices and enhance programs to regain integrity of their operations. Where severe deficiencies are found, the servicers should be required to have independent third-party monitors evaluate their activities to ensure that process changes are fully implemented and effective. Servicers must also fully evaluate and account for their risks relating to their servicing activities, including any costs stemming from weaknesses in their operations.
  5. Resolve the challenges created by second liens. Since the early stages of the mortgage crisis, second liens have been an obstacle to effective alternatives to foreclosure, including loan modification and short sales. We must tackle the second lien issue head on. One option is to require servicers to take a meaningful write-down of any second lien if a first mortgage loan is modified or approved for a short sale. All of the stakeholders must be willing to compromise if we are to find solutions to the foreclosure problem and lay the foundation for a recovery in our housing markets.

Conclusion

We must restore integrity to the mortgage servicing system. We need a mandate for dramatically simplified loan modifications so that unnecessary foreclosures can be avoided. Servicers need to establish a single point of contact to coordinate their communication with distressed borrowers. They also need to invest appropriate resources and strengthen quality control processes related to loan modification and foreclosure. We must finally tackle the second liens head on, by requiring servicers to impose meaningful write-downs on second lien holders when a first mortgage is modified or approved for a short sale.

This is the time for all parties to come together and arrive at broad agreements that will reduce uncertainty and lay the foundation for long-term stability in our mortgage and housing markets. The FSOC has a unique role to play in addressing the situation and can provide needed clarity on issues such as standards for recognizing true sale in securitization trusts.

Again, thank you for the opportunity to testify on this important issue. I look forward to your questions.


1 FDIC estimate based on data from the Mortgage Bankers Association data and the American Housing Survey.

2 “The Impact of Distressed Sales on Repeat-Transactions House Price Indexes,” FHFA, May 27, 2009, http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/2916/researchpaper_distress%5B1%5D.pdf

3 Source: Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds, Table L.218.

4 Source: Inside Mortgage Finance.

5 Analysis of Mortgage Servicing Performance,” Data Report No. 4, January 2010, State Foreclosure Prevention Working Group, http://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/ForeclosureReportJan2010.

Last Updated 12/1/2010 communications@fdic.gov

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (1)

Potential Liabilities for the Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS) and its Affiliates

Potential Liabilities for the Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS) and its Affiliates


By John Lux

Introduction

This article discusses some of the legal aspects of the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems or “MERS” with regard to its potential legal liabilities and how these liabilities may affect related public companies.

We maintain that the potential legal liabilities faced by these companies are very large and may seriously injure their stock prices. We believe that the affiliates of MERS may be held liable for MERS violations based on various legal theories, including conspiracy, and if the courts pierce the corporate veil of MERS.

A list of some of the companies that may be affected is found at the end of this analysis.

MERS

MERS is a private non-stock Delaware member corporation that operates an electronic registry to track servicing rights and ownership of mortgage loans in the United States. MERS acts as a so-called “straw man.” MERS clouds land records as the purported owner of mortgages transferred by lenders, investors and loan servicers. MERS maintains that it eliminates the need to file assignments in the county land records with the purpose of lowering costs for lenders. This naturally reduces county recording revenues from real estate transfers.

Legal Issues Faced by MERS

Not Qualified to do Business in Most States

MERS is not qualified to business in most of the states in which it operates. The problem here is that MERS has allowed itself to be the plaintiff in many hundreds of thousands of mortgage foreclosures in states where it is not qualified to do business and therefore has no standing to sue. Most, 95% or more of these cases, were uncontested and therefore resulted in the loss of the defendants home after a telephone hearing that lasted a few minutes.

Self-Appointment of Officers


© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (2)

FULL DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF COUNTRYWIDE BOfA LINDA DiMARTINI

FULL DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF COUNTRYWIDE BOfA LINDA DiMARTINI


EXCERPTS:

Q So the original —
5 A — and I’ve been to her office.
6 Q — the original was located in your office?
7 A Yes.
8 Q Where’s your office located?
9 A Simi Valley, California.
10 Q And has the original of this allonge remained in your
11 office until you appeared here today?
12 A We had sent it on to — to our attorneys. They were in
13 possession of it.
14 Q And again, who do you believe is the holder of the note
15 and mortgage here?
16 A Well, Countrywide — Bank of America — whatever we’re
17 calling ourselves these days, we are Bank of America now — we
18 originated this loan. It was originated via a broker and it’s
19 really always been a Countrywide loan. The investor is Bank
20 of New York. We are the servicer of the loan.
21 Q Now, when you say it’s really a Countrywide loan, wasn’t
22 it sold? Wasn’t this loan securitized and ultimately sold —
23 sold to this trust?
24 A Right, it would have been securitized and sold. They are
25 the investors of the loan. But we are the ones that would

<SNIP>

9 A Who is in possession of the note? We have the note in our
10 origination file.
11 Q So — so Bank of New York as trustee does not hold the
12 note, is that correct, or is not in possession of the note?
13 A The original note to my knowledge is in the origination
14 file.
15 Q Where is the — do you have it here today?
16 A No, I don’t have it with me here today.
17 Q So you don’t have the note?
18 A It’s in our office.
19 Q So it’s in your office, it’s not with this trust that owns
20 the — that’s supposedly holds the — or is the owner of this
21 note, is that correct?
22 A That’s correct.
23 Q And your testimony is that this allonge was never
24 submitted to — it was never in the possession of Bank of New
25 York as trustee for the certificate holder, is that correct?

<SNIP>

9 Q And this allonge, it’s a stand-alone document, correct?
10 It’s not attached to anything, is that correct?
11 A I’m not sure I’m understanding your question.
12 Q Was there anything — when you brought the original that’s
13 in front of you, did you remove it? Was it stapled to
14 something else?
15 A No, it wouldn’t have necessarily been stapled to something
16 else. There would have probably been other documents showing
17 the — you know, we would have shown her the note. We would
18 have reviewed all of that before.

Continue Below…

Down Load PDF of This Case

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (1)

WALLSTREET, BEWARE “MEGALEAKS” HEADING FOR YOU

WALLSTREET, BEWARE “MEGALEAKS” HEADING FOR YOU


WikiLeaks plans to release a U.S. bank’s documents

– Mon Nov 29, 6:52 pm ET

WASHINGTON (Reuters) – The founder of whistle-blower website WikiLeaks plans to release tens of thousands of internal documents from a major U.S. bank early next year, Forbes Magazine reported on Monday.

Julian Assange declined in an interview with Forbes to identify the bank, but he said that he expected that the disclosures, which follow his group’s release of U.S. military and diplomatic documents, would lead to investigations.

“We have one related to a bank coming up, that’s a megaleak. It’s not as big a scale as the Iraq material, but it’s either tens or hundreds of thousands of documents depending on how you define it,” Assange said in the interview posted on the Forbes website.

He declined to identify the bank, describing it only as a major U.S. bank that is still in existence.

Asked what he wanted to be the result of the disclosure, he replied: “I’m not sure. It will give a true and representative insight into how banks behave at the executive level in a way that will stimulate investigations and reforms, I presume.”

He compared this release to emails that were unveiled as a result of the collapse of disgraced energy company Enron Corp.

“This will be like that. Yes, there will be some flagrant violations, unethical practices that will be revealed, but it will also be all the supporting decision-making structures and the internal executive ethos … and that’s tremendously valuable,” Assange said.

“You could call it the ecosystem of corruption. But it’s also all the regular decision making that turns a blind eye to and supports unethical practices: the oversight that’s not done, the priorities of executives, how they think they’re fulfilling their own self-interest,” he said.

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (2)

[MUST READ] NOTICE OF RECORDED MERS et al REMOVAL

[MUST READ] NOTICE OF RECORDED MERS et al REMOVAL


Will leave the comments for you all if you wish on these recorded documents from public records.

NOTE: It appears these were done by pro se individuals.

YOU MUST CONSULT WITH AN ATTORNEY.

REPEAT:

DO NOT try this without consulting an attorney.

Excerpt:

WHEREAS TRUSTOR/GRANTOR STATES AND DECLARES that, in recognition of certain pertinent facts not limited to the fact that the Mortgage contained NO SIGNATURES showing an acceptance of the document by any other party, the above-described Mortgage is, at best, an unconscionable contract and, for that reason alone, said, Mortgage is not an enforceable instrument; and since no other party signed th document, no party would have standing to assert that said party has been damaged in any way, or that a “default” occurred, or that a “breach” occurred; AND…

AND ANOTHER


© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (6)

[VIDEO, RECORDING] GMAC MORTGAGE STEALS LA HOME

[VIDEO, RECORDING] GMAC MORTGAGE STEALS LA HOME


via: mlinc06

GMAC offers loan modification, accepts payments, and forecloses on homeowners, 5 months into the modification, despite GMAC representative admitting that homeowner was not at fault. Listen to the bank admit to missapplying payments, while foreclosing on Los Angeles, CA homeowners.


© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (1)

[NYSC] STEVEN J BAUM PC UNABLE TO LOCATE WELLS FARGO AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE TRANSFER OF ANY LOAN DOCUMENTS

[NYSC] STEVEN J BAUM PC UNABLE TO LOCATE WELLS FARGO AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE TRANSFER OF ANY LOAN DOCUMENTS


SUPREME COURT – STATE OF NEW YORK
I.A.S. PART XXXVI SUFFOLK COUNTY

Plaintiff, PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY:
STEVEN J. BAUM, P.C.

220 Northpointe Parkway, Suite G
Amherst, New York 14228

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,

-against-

SUNNY ENG, SHIRLEY ENG, HTFC
CORPORATION
, JANE ENG,

DEFENDANTS’ ATTORNEY:
LAW OFFICES OF CRAIG D. ROBINS
Woodbury, New York 11797
Defendants. 180 Froehlich Farm Blvd.
……………………………………………………….. X

Excerpts:

The Court notes that the same law firm, Steven J. Baum, P.C., represented both HTFC and Wells Fargo as plaintiffs.

Moreover, Mr. Wider avers that “Jeffrey Stephan,” who purportedly executed the assignment as “Limited Signing Officer” of HTFC Corporation, has never been an employee of HTFC and that such person was never authorized to act as a “Limited Signing Officer” on behalf of HTFC for any purpose.

Wells Fargo does not have standing to maintain and prosecute this action to foreclose defendants’ mortgage. Plaintiffs have failed to come forward with any evidence to substantiate its claims herein or to raise a triable issue of fact. Indeed, the affirmation of plaintiffs attorney, sworn to September 8, 2010, reflects that plaintiff has been unable to locate any documents substantiating plaintiffs “belief’ that “its servicer had the authority to execute any and all documents attendant to the transfer of the loan.”

Continue below to see both the Decision, Assignment in question…

ENG COM

[ipaper docId=44232303 access_key=key-faynnigo46v0go85gbf height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (2)

IL 7th Circuit Appeals Court: “WHERE’S THE NOTE” COGSWELL v. CITIFINANCIAL MORTGAGE

IL 7th Circuit Appeals Court: “WHERE’S THE NOTE” COGSWELL v. CITIFINANCIAL MORTGAGE


PATRICK L. COGSWELL and PATRICK M. O’FLAHERTY, doing business as THE PATRICK GROUP, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
CITIFINANCIAL MORTGAGE COMPANY, INCORPORATED, successor by merger to Associates Finance, Incorporated, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 08-2153.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued April 15, 2009. Decided October 5, 2010.

Before FLAUM, RIPPLE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge.

CitiFinancial Mortgage assigned its interest in a mortgage to two investors—doing business as “The Patrick Group”—but never delivered the original or a copy of the underlying note. When The Patrick Group tried to foreclose on the mortgage in Illinois state court, its action was dismissed because it could not produce the note. After an unsuccessful appeal, The Patrick Group filed this breach-of-contract lawsuit against CitiFinancial. The suit was removed to federal court, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of CitiFinancial.

We reverse. The district court based its summary-judgment decision primarily on a determination that CitiFinancial never agreed to deliver the note as part of the parties’ agreement to transfer the mortgage. But whether they agreed on this term is a question of fact, and The Patrick Group presented enough evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that it was a part of the parties’ agreement. The district court’s alternative basis for summary judgment—that CitiFinancial’s alleged breach did not cause The Patrick Group’s damages—was also erroneous. Under the circumstances of this case, the causation question should have been resolved in The Patrick Group’s favor as a matter of law; the state trial and appellate courts rejected The Patrick Group’s foreclosure action because without a copy of the note, it could not prove it was the holder of the debt the mortgage secured.

<SNIP>

In short, as a matter of law, The Patrick Group’s damages were caused by CitiFinancial’s failure to deliver an original or a copy of the note secured by the mortgage.[5] The open factual question is whether the parties’ agreement required CitiFinancial to do so, and on this the evidence is disputed. We therefore REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Continue reading below…

COGSWELL v. CITIFINACIAL

[ipaper docId=44166834 access_key=key-260e6bvt95alp1yb56zb height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (2)

FL 3rd DCA Appeals Court: “Process Service” OPELLA vs. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC

FL 3rd DCA Appeals Court: “Process Service” OPELLA vs. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC


No. 3D09-2921
Lower Tribunal No. 09-12657
________________
Steven Ray Opella,
Appellant,

vs.
Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC.,
Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Thomas S. Wilson, Jr., Judge.

Steven Ray Opella, in proper person.
Popkin & Rosaler, Brian L. Rosaler, Richard P. Cohn and Deborah Posner,
(Deerfield Beach), for appellee.

Before GERSTEN, WELLS, and LAGOA, JJ.WELLS, Judge.

Steven Ray Opella appeals from a final summary judgment of foreclosure
entered in favor of Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC., claiming that he was never
served with process. Because the record unequivocally confirms that Opella was
neither served with process nor waived service, we reverse.

We also direct the clerk to forward a copy of this opinion to the Florida Bar for
consideration of conduct in violation of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar.

OPELLA v. BAYVIEW

[ipaper docId=44090710 access_key=key-21vih0nl37kze5ce309q height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (3)

Indiana Appeals Court Reversal: LACY-McKINNEY v. TAYLOR, BEAN& WHITAKER MORTGAGE CORPORATION

Indiana Appeals Court Reversal: LACY-McKINNEY v. TAYLOR, BEAN& WHITAKER MORTGAGE CORPORATION


FLORENCE R. LACY-MCKINNEY, Appellant-Defendant,
v.
TAYLOR, BEAN & WHITAKER MORTGAGE CORP., Appellee-Plaintiff.

No. 71A03-0912-CV-587.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

November 19, 2010.

JOSEPH F. ZIELINSKI Indiana Legal Services, Inc. South Bend, Indiana, ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT.

CRAIG D. DOYLE, MARK R. GALLIHER AMANDA J. MAXWELL Doyle Legal Corporation, P.C. Indianapolis, Indiana, ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE.

OPINION

KIRSCH, Judge.

Florence R. Lacy-McKinney (“Lacy-McKinney”) appeals the trial court`s entry of summary judgment in favor of Taylor, Bean & Whitaker Mortgage Corp. (“Taylor-Bean”) on Taylor-Bean`s action to foreclose on Lacy-McKinney`s mortgage that was insured by the Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”).[1] On appeal, Lacy-McKinney raises two issues that we restate as:

I. Whether a mortgagee`s compliance with federal mortgage servicing responsibilities is a condition precedent that may be raised as an affirmative defense to the foreclosure of an FHA-insured mortgage; and

II. Whether the trial court erred when it entered summary judgment in favor of Taylor-Bean on its mortgage foreclosure action against Lacy-McKinney.

We reverse and remand.

At the time Taylor-Bean filed its complaint, the security interest in the subject mortgage was in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) “(solely as nominee for [Taylor-Bean] . . . and [Taylor-Bean`s] successors and assigns).” Appellant’s App. at 8. After MERS assigned the security interest to Taylor-Bean, Taylor-Bean filed an amended complaint. Lacy-McKinney initially argued that summary judgment in favor of Taylor-Bean must fail because Taylor-Bean had no interest in the Property at the time the original complaint was filed. Id. at 102-03. Lacy-McKinney does not raise this issue on appeal.

continue below…

[ipaper docId=44090700 access_key=key-6ibb3x2gq6zf7vuh0jp height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (1)

Battle of The Unauthorized Fraudulent Signature: DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY v. JP MORGAN, Ga: Court of Appeals 2010

Battle of The Unauthorized Fraudulent Signature: DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY v. JP MORGAN, Ga: Court of Appeals 2010


DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY,
v.
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N. A.

A10A1509.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Decided: November 19, 2010.

BARNES, Presiding Judge.

JP Morgan Chase Bank, N. A. commenced this action against Deutsche Bank National Trust Company f/k/a Banker’s Trust Company after the two banks conducted competing foreclosure sales of certain real property in DeKalb County. JP Morgan’s claim of title to the property was predicated on a 2004 security deed, while Deutsche Bank’s claim of title was predicated on a 2001 security deed. The case turned on the legal effect of a notarized warranty deed recorded in 2003 and on whether JP Morgan was a bona fide purchaser for value based upon the warranty deed. The trial court granted summary judgment to JP Morgan, concluding that JP Morgan’s interest in the property was superior to and not subject to any interest held by Deutsche Bank. We conclude that the uncontroverted evidence shows that the 2003 warranty deed was not a forgery, but was signed by someone fraudulently assuming authority, and that JP Morgan was a bona fide purchaser for value entitled to take the property free of any outstanding security interest held by Deutsche Bank. Thus, we affirm.

To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the undisputed facts, viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, warrant judgment as a matter of law. Our review of a grant of summary judgment is de novo, and we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from it in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Consumer Solutions Fin. Svc. v. Heritage Bank, 300 Ga. App. 272 (684 SE2d 682) (2009). See OCGA § 9-11-56 (c); Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 (405 SE2d 474) (1991). Guided by these principles, we turn to the record in the present case.

This case involves a dispute over the tract of real property located at 275 Haas Avenue, Atlanta, Georgia 30316 in DeKalb County (the “Property”). The Property was conveyed to Rebecca Diaz by warranty deed recorded in September 2001. On the same date, Diaz executed and recorded a security deed encumbering the Property in favor of People’s Choice Home Loan, Inc. (the “2001 Security Deed”). IndyMac Bank, F. S. B. acquired the 2001 Security Deed by assignment.

In July 2003, a notarized warranty deed from “Indy Mac Bank, F. S. B.” to Diaz was recorded which purported to reconvey the Property to Diaz in fee simple (the “Warranty Deed”). The Warranty Deed was executed by an individual named Pamela Whales, who identified herself as an Assistant Vice President of IndyMac. The Warranty Deed was attested by two witnesses, one of whom was a notary public.

The Property subsequently was deeded to various parties but ultimately to an owner who, in April 2004, executed and recorded a security deed encumbering the Property in favor of OneWorld Mortgage Corporation (the “2004 Security Deed”). Washington Mutual Bank F. A. acquired the 2004 Security Deed by assignment.

In June 2004, IndyMac assigned the 2001 Security Deed to Deutsche Bank. That same month, Deutsche Bank foreclosed upon the Property pursuant to the power of sale provision contained in the 2001 Security Deed. Deutsche Bank was the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale.

In December 2005, Washington Mutual also foreclosed upon the Property pursuant to the power of sale provision contained in the 2004 Security Deed. Washington Mutual was the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale. Thereafter, Washington Mutual was closed by the federal Office of Thrift Supervision, and JP Morgan succeeded to Washington Mutual’s interest in the Property under the terms of a purchase and assumption agreement.

Following the competing foreclosure sales, JP Morgan brought this action against Deutsche Bank for declaratory relief and attorney fees, alleging that its interest in the Property was superior to and not subject to any interest held by Deutsche Bank. Deutsche Bank answered and counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment that its interest in the Property was superior to and not subject to any interest held by JP Morgan.

The parties cross-moved for summary judgment on their declaratory judgment claims. JP Morgan argued that the 2001 Security Deed upon which Deutsche Bank predicated its interest in the Property had been canceled by the Warranty Deed as a matter of law. Alternatively, JP Morgan argued that the uncontroverted evidence showed that it qualified as a bona fide purchaser for value such that it was protected against any outstanding security interest in the Property held by Deutsche Bank. Deutsche Bank strongly disputed these arguments, contending that the Warranty Deed was facially irregular, had been forged, and failed to satisfy the statutory requirements for cancellation of a security deed. The trial court granted summary judgment to JP Morgan and denied it to Deutsche Bank. Deutsche Bank now appeals the trial court’s grant of JP Morgan’s motion for summary judgment.[1]

1. We affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of JP Morgan because the uncontroverted evidence shows that JP Morgan was afforded the protection of a bona fide purchaser for value, not subject to any outstanding security interest in the Property held by Deutsche Bank.

“To qualify as a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, a party must have neither actual nor constructive notice of the matter at issue.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Rolan v. Glass, 305 Ga. App. 217, 218 (1) (699 SE2d 428) (2010). “Notice sufficient to excite attention and put a party on inquiry shall be notice of everything to which it is afterwards found that such inquiry might have led.” (Citation and footnote omitted.) Whiten v. Murray, 267 Ga. App. 417, 421 (2) (599 SE2d 346) (2004). “A purchaser of land is charged with constructive notice of the contents of a recorded instrument within its chain of title.” (Citation and footnote omitted.) VATACS Group v. HomeSide Lending, (2005). Furthermore, the grantee of a security interest in land and subsequent purchasers are entitled to rely upon a warranty deed that is regular on its face and duly recorded in ascertaining the chain of title. See Mabra v. Deutsche Bank & Trust Co. Americas, 277 Ga. App. 764, 767 (2) (627 SE2d 849) (2006), overruled in part on other grounds by Brock v. Yale Mtg. Corp., ___ Ga. ___ (2) (Case No. S10A0950, decided Oct. 4, 2010). 276 Ga. App. 386, 391 (2) (623 SE2d 534)

On motion for summary judgment, JP Morgan argued that it was entitled to protection as a good faith purchaser because the notarized, recorded Warranty Deed purported to transfer the Property back to Diaz, thereby extinguishing the 2001 Security Deed, and there was no reason to suspect a defect in the Warranty Deed calling into question the chain of title. In contrast, Deutsche Bank argued that JP Morgan was not entitled to such protection because the Warranty Deed was facially irregular in that it misidentified the grantor and failed to comply with OCGA § 14-5-7 (b).

We agree with JP Morgan and reject the arguments raised by Deutsche Bank. The Warranty Deed was regular on its face and duly recorded. See OCGA § 44-5-30 (“A deed to lands must be in writing, signed by the maker, and attested by at least two witnesses.”). See also OCGA § 44-2-21 (a) (4), (b) (one of two required attesting witnesses may be a notary public). Also, the Warranty Deed on its face was executed in a manner that conformed with OCGA § 14-5-7 (b), which provides:

Instruments executed by a corporation releasing a security agreement, when signed by one officer of the corporation or by an individual designated by the officers of the corporation by proper resolution, without the necessity of the corporation’s seal being attached, shall be conclusive evidence that said officer signing is duly authorized to execute and deliver the same.

The Warranty Deed appeared to be executed by an assistant vice president of IndyMac, and thus by an “officer of the corporation.” Moreover, the only interest that IndyMac held in the Property prior to execution of the Warranty Deed was its security interest arising from the 2001 Security Deed, and reconveyance of the Property by way of a warranty deed was a proper way to release that security interest. See Clements v. Weaver, 301 Ga. App. 430, 434 (2) (687 SE2d 602) (2009) (grantor of quitclaim deed estopped from asserting any interest in property conveyed); Southeast Timberlands v. Haiseal Timber, 224 Ga. App. 98, 102 (479 SE2d 443) (1996) (physical precedently only). The Warranty Deed, therefore, facially complied with OCGA § 14-5-7 (b) and would appear to anyone searching the county records to serve as “conclusive evidence” that execution of the deed had been authorized by IndyMac.

(a) In opposing summary judgment, Deutsche Bank argued that the Warranty Deed was facially irregular because it improperly identified the grantor as “Indy Mac Bank, F. S. B.” rather than “IndyMac Bank, F. S. B.” But “a mere misnomer of a corporation in a written instrument . . . is not material or vital in its consequences, if the identity of the corporation intended is clear or can be ascertained by proof.” (Citation, punctuation, and emphasis omitted.) Hawkins v. Turner, 166 Ga. App. 50, 51-52 (1) (303 SE2d 164) (1983). It cannot be said that the mere placement of an additional space in the corporate name (i.e., “Indy Mac” versus “IndyMac”) made the identity of the corporation unclear. As such, the misnomer did not render the Warranty Deed irregular on its face.

(b) Deutsche Bank also argued that the Warranty Deed failed to comply with OCGA § 14-5-7 (b) because the phrase “when signed by one officer of the corporation” should be construed as requiring the signature of the corporate president or vice president. “The cardinal rule of statutory construction requires that we look to the intention of the legislature. And in so doing, the literal meaning of the statute prevails unless such a construction would produce unreasonable or absurd consequences not contemplated by the legislature.” Johnson v. State, 267 Ga. 77, 78 (475 SE2d 595) (1996). The words of OCGA § 14-5-7 (b) are unambiguous and do not lead to an unreasonable or absurd result if taken literally: any officer of the corporation has authority to sign the instrument releasing the security interest. There is no basis from the language of the statute to limit that authority to a subset of corporate officers such as a president or vice president.

It is clear that the legislature knew how to specify such a limitation when it chose to do so. In OCGA § 14-5-7 (a),[2] the legislature imposed a limitation on the specific types of corporate officers who could execute instruments for real estate conveyances other than those releasing security agreements. Consequently, we must presume that the legislature’s failure to include similar limiting language in OCGA § 14-5-7 (b) “was a matter of considered choice.” Transp. Ins. Co. v. El Chico Restaurants, 271 Ga. 774, 776 (524 SE2d 486) (1999).

Deutsche Bank further argued that the Warranty Deed failed to comply with OCGA § 14-5-7 (b) because the statute should be construed as requiring the instrument to expressly state that it was “releasing a security agreement,” and the Warranty Deed did not contain such express language. But nothing in the plain language of OCGA § 14-5-7 (b) imposes an express language requirement, “and the judicial branch is not empowered to engraft such a [requirement] on to what the legislature has enacted.” (Citation omitted.) Kaminer v. Canas, 282 Ga. 830, 835 (1) (653 SE2d 691) (2007).

(c) Given the facial regularity of the recorded Warranty Deed, there was no reason to suspect that it might be defective in some manner or that there might be a problem in the chain of title resulting from the deed. Nothing in the Warranty Deed would have excited attention or put a party on inquiry that the 2001 Security Deed might remain in full force and effect. Accordingly, the original grantee of the 2004 Security Deed (OneWorld Mortgage Corporation) was entitled to rely upon the facially regular Warranty Deed and was afforded the protection of a bona fide purchaser of the Property, entitled to take the Property free of the 2001 Security Deed. See generally Farris v. Nationsbanc Mtg. Corp., 268 Ga. 769, 771 (2) (493 SE2d 143) (1997) (“A bona fide purchaser for value is protected against outstanding interests in land of which the purchaser has no notice.”). Because OneWorld Mortgage Corporation had the status of a bona fide purchaser, subsequent holders of the 2004 Security Deed were likewise afforded that status, including Washington Mutual (now JP Morgan). See OCGA § 23-1-19 (“If one without notice sells to one with notice, the latter shall be protected[.]”; Murray v. Johnson, 222 Ga. 788, 789 (3) (152 SE2d 739) (1966); Thompson v. Randall, 173 Ga. 696, 701 (161 SE 377) (1931). Consequently, summary judgment was appropriate to JP Morgan on the issue of its status as a bona fide purchaser for value.

2. In opposing summary judgment, Deutsche Bank contended that even if JP Morgan qualified as a bona fide purchaser for value, there was a genuine issue of material fact over whether the Warranty Deed constituted a forgery, and thus over whether JP Morgan acquired good title to the Property. JP Morgan responded that the uncontroverted evidence showed that the Warranty Deed did not constitute a common law forgery, which occurs when someone signs another person’s name, since the Warranty Deed was signed by a person using her own name but who fraudulently assumed authority to act on behalf of IndyMac. JP Morgan further maintained that its status as a bona fide purchaser for value protected it against any fraud (rather than forgery) that might have been involved in the execution of the Warranty Deed.

The dispute between the parties centered on the assertions contained in the affidavit of Yolanda Farrow, which was filed by Deutsche Bank in opposition to summary judgment (the “Farrow Affidavit”). Farrow averred that she was a records keeper formerly employed by IndyMac and currently employed at IndyMac’s successor bank. Farrow further averred that her office maintained the IndyMac personnel records in an electronic database; that she had personal knowledge of the maintenance and upkeep of those records; and that she had personally researched and examined the records database for the person identified in the Warranty Deed as Pamela Whales, Assistant Vice President. Based upon her review of the records database, Farrow opined that to the best of her knowledge and belief, no one by that name was an employee or agent of IndyMac when the Warranty Deed was executed. Deutsche Bank maintained that the Farrow Affidavit served as circumstantial evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact over whether the Warranty Deed was a forgery.

[W]e have . . . long recognized that a forged deed is a nullity and vests no title in a grantee. As such, even a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of a forgery cannot acquire good title from a grantee in a forged deed, or those holding under such a grantee, because the grantee has no title to convey.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Brock, ___ Ga. at ___ (2). See also Second Refuge Church of Our Lord Jesus Christ v. Lollar, 282 Ga. 721, 726-727 (3) (653 SE2d 462 (2007). In contrast, a bona fide purchaser is protected against fraud in the execution or cancellation of a security deed of which he or she is without notice. See Murray, 222 Ga. at 789 (4).

We conclude that the Farrow Affidavit filed by Deutsche Bank was insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Warranty Deed was a forgery.

A recorded deed shall be admitted in evidence in any court without further proof unless the maker of the deed, one of his heirs, or the opposite party in the action files an affidavit that the deed is a forgery to the best of his knowledge and belief. Upon the filing of the affidavit, the genuineness of the alleged deed shall become an issue to be determined in the action.

OCGA § 44-2-23. While “forgery” is not defined in the statute, we have previously noted that the general principles espoused in the statute were “taken from the common law.” McArthur v. Morrison, 107 Ga. 796, 797 (34 SE 205)Intl. Indem. Co. v. Bakco Acceptance, 172 Ga. App. 28, 32 (2) (322 SE2d 78)Barron v. State, 12 Ga. App. 342, 348 (77 SE 214)Gilbert v. United States, 370 U. S. 650, 655-658 (II) (82 SC 1399, 8 LE2d 750) (1962) (discussing the common law of forgery); People v. Cunningham, 813 NE2d 891, 894-895 (N. Y. 2004) (same). On the other hand, (1899). Furthermore, we favor the construction of a statute in a manner that is in conformity with the common law, rather than in derogation of it. See (1984). Under the common law, a forgery occurs where one person signs the name of another person while holding out that signature to be the actual signature of the other person. See (1913) (“[T]o constitute forgery, the writing must purport to be the writing of another party than the person making it.“) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also

[w]here one executes an instrument purporting on its face to be executed by him as the agent of the principal, he is not guilty of forgery, although he has in fact no authority from such principal to execute the same. This is not the false making of the instrument, but merely a false and fraudulent assumption of authority.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Ga. Cas. & Surety Co. v. Seaboard Surety Co., 210 F. Supp. 644, 656-657 (N. D. Ga. 1962), aff’d, Seaboard Surety Co. v. Ga. Cas. & Surety Co., 327 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1964) (applying Georgia law). This common law distinction between forgery and a fraudulent assumption of authority has been discussed and applied in several Georgia cases. See Morgan v. State, 77 Ga. App. 164, 165 (48 SE2d 115) (1948); Samples v. Milton County Bank, 34 Ga. App. 248, 250 (1) (129 SE 170) (1925); Barron, 12 Ga. App. at 347-350.

In the present case, the Farrow Affidavit merely asserted that Whales, the individual who signed the Warranty Deed, was not an employee or agent of IndyMac. It is undisputed that the individual signing the Warranty Deed was in fact Whales. Hence, the Farrow Affidavit alleged a fraudulent assumption of authority by Whales, not a forgery, under the common law. See Georgia Cas. & Surety Co., 210 F. Supp. at 656-657; Morgan, 77 Ga. App. at 165; Samples, 34 Ga. App. at 250 (1); Barron, 12 Ga. App. at 347-350.

Arguing for a contrary conclusion, Deutsche Bank maintained that the cases applying the Georgia common law of forgery which have addressed the doctrine of a “fraudulent assumption of authority” have involved an admitted agent with some authority to act on behalf of its principle, but who exceeded that authority. Deutsche Bank asserted that the present case is thus distinguishable, since the Farrow Affidavit reflected that Whales had no authority to act as an agent of IndyMac in any capacity or under any circumstances.

We are unpersuaded. Nothing in the language or reasoning of the cases applying the doctrine of fraudulent assumption of authority suggests that the doctrine should be limited in the manner espoused by Deutsche Bank. See Georgia Cas. & Surety Co., 210 F. Supp. at 656-657;Morgan, 77 Ga. App. at 165; Samples, 34 Ga. App. at 250 (1); Barron, 12 Ga. App. at 347-350. Indeed, in Georgia Cas. & Surety Co., 210 F. Supp. at 652, 656-657, the district court did not hesitate to apply the doctrine, even though the court found that the individuals who had executed the corporate documents were “purely intruders” with “no contract of employment existing nor even in contemplation,” who lacked any authority whatsoever to act on behalf of the corporation as officers or otherwise.

For these reasons, the trial court correctly rejected Deutsche Bank’s contention that there was evidence that the Warranty Deed had been forged. Because the Farrow Affidavit at best showed a fraudulent assumption of authority by Whales as signatory to the Warranty Deed, JP Morgan, as a bona fide purchaser, was protected against the fraudulent actions alleged by Deutsche Bank. See Murray, 222 Ga. at 789 (4).

3. In opposing summary judgment, Deutsche Bank also maintained that the Warranty Deed could not cause the 2001 Security Deed to be canceled because the Warranty Deed failed to comply with the requirements of OCGA § 44-14-67 (b) (2). That statute provides in pertinent part:

(b) In the case of a deed to secure debt which applies to real property, in order to authorize the clerk of superior court to show the original instrument as canceled of record, there shall be presented for recording:

. . .

(2) A conveyance from the record holder of the security deed, which conveyance is in the form of a quitclaim deed or other form of deed suitable for recording and which refers to the original security deed[.]

According to Deutsche Bank, the Warranty Deed did not authorize the clerk of the superior court to cancel the 2001 Security Deed because the Warranty Deed made no express reference to the 2001 Security Deed, as required by this statute. As such, Deutsche Bank argued that, as a matter of law, the Warranty Deed could not effectuate the cancellation of the 2001 Security Deed and thereby extinguish Deutsche Bank’s interest in the Property.

Deutsche Bank’s argument was predicated on the false assumption that OCGA § 44-14-67 (b) provides the exclusive means for the cancellation or extinguishment of a security deed. But as previously noted, a bona fide purchaser for value is entitled to take property free of any outstanding security interest of which the purchaser had no actual or constructive notice. See Farris, 268 Ga. at 771 (2). And it would produce an anomalous result to interpret Georgia’s recording statutes, including OCGA § 44-14-67 (b), in a manner that would defeat the interests of a bona fide purchaser for value. See Lionheart Legend v. Northwest Bank Minn. Nat. Assn., 253 Ga. App. 663, 667 (560 SE2d 120) (2002) (noting that Georgia’s recording acts are intended to protect bona fide purchasers for value). It follows that because JP Morgan was a bona fide purchaser for value, it was entitled to take the Property free of the 2001 Security Deed, separate and apart from the procedures for cancellation by the clerk of the superior court set forth in OCGA § 44-14-67.

For these combined reasons, the trial court correctly concluded that the uncontroverted evidence of record showed that JP Morgan’s interest in the Property was superior to and not subject to any interest held by Deutsche Bank. The trial court, therefore, committed no error in granting summary judgment in favor of JP Morgan on its claim for a declaratory judgment.

Judgment affirmed. Blackwell, and Dillard, JJ., concur.

[1] Deutsche Bank does not appeal the trial court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment.

[2] OCGA § 14-5-7 (a) provides:

Instruments executed by a corporation conveying an interest in real property, when signed by the president or vice-president and attested or countersigned by the secretary or an assistant secretary or the cashier or assistant cashier of the corporation, shall be conclusive evidence that the president or vice-president of the corporation executing the document does in fact occupy the official position indicated; that the signature of such officer subscribed thereto is genuine; and that the execution of the document on behalf of the corporation has been duly authorized. Any corporation may by proper resolution authorize the execution of such instruments by other officers of the corporation.

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (1)

DOCX Linda Green Had NO AUTHORITY To Sign For MERS 10/08-10/09

DOCX Linda Green Had NO AUTHORITY To Sign For MERS 10/08-10/09


SFF first posted this back on August 26, 2010.

Linda Green is/was an employee of DocX a subsidiary of Lender Processing Services located in Alpharetta, Georgia. Her signature was forged on key sensitive documents relating to county land records.

Below is a document that Shapiro & Fishman filed as a CORRECTIVE ASSIGNMENT OF MORTGAGE.

What about the Satisfactions? In DOCX’s website they said:

“DOCX has built its solid reputation at not only managing large assignment projects, but satisfactions as well“.

  • Exactly how many documents were signed by Green’s name as VP for MERS between these dates?
  • Who do we contact to make this a nationwide recall alert like the recent “egg recall” containing salmonella?
  • Exactly who is being notified if there is any title issues on your homes?
  • Has there been a recall notice sent to County Recorders on this issue?
  • Are there more VP’s of MERS who had no authority to execute documents?

LPS DOCX LINDA GREEN SHAPIRO

[ipaper docId=44005903 access_key=key-28f23qvartvao40f2b0x height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (8)

Advert

Archives