Via: Max Gardner

Are You PSA Literate?

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We are pleased to present this guest post by April Charney.

If you are an attorney trying to help people save their homes, you had better be PSA literate or you won’t even begin to scratch the surface of all you can do to save their homes. This is an open letter to all attorneys who aren’t PSA literate but show up in court to protect their client’s homes.

First off, what is a PSA? After the original loans are pooled and sold, a trust hires a servicer to service the loans and make distributions to investors. The agreement between depositor and the trust and the truste and the servicer is called the Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA).

According to UCC § 3-301 a “person entitled to enforce” the promissory note, if negotiable, is limited to:

(1) The holder of the instrument;

(2) A nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the rights of a holder; or

(3) A person not in possession of the instrument who is entitled to enforce the instrument pursuant to section 3-309 or section 3-418(d).

A person may be a person entitled to enforce the instrument even though the person is not the owner of the instrument or is in wrongful possession of the instrument.

Although “holder” is not defined in UCC § 3-301, it is defined in § 1-201 for our purposes to mean a person in possession of a negotiable note payable to bearer or to the person in possession of the note.

So we now know who can enforce the obligation to pay a debt evidenced by a negotiable note. We can debate whether a note is negotiable or not, but I won’t make that debate here.

Under § 1-302 persons can agree “otherwise” that where an instrument is transferred for value and the transferee does not become a holder because of lack of indorsement by the transferor, that the transferee is granted a special right to enforce an “unqualified” indorsement by the transferor, but the code does not “create” negotiation until the indorsement is actually made.

So, that section allows a transferee to enforce a note without a qualifying endorsement only when the note is transferred for value.? Then, under § 1-302 (a) the effect of provisions of the UCC may be varied by agreement. This provision includes the right and ability of persons to vary everything described above by agreement.

This is where you MUST get into the PSA. You cannot avoid it. You can get the judges to this point. I did it in an email. Show your judge this post.

If you can’t find the PSA for your case, use the PSA next door that you can find on at www.secinfo.com. The provisions of the PSA that concern transfer of loans (and servicing, good faith and almost everything else) are fairly boilerplate and so PSAs are fairly interchangeable for many purposes. You have to get the PSA and the mortgage loan purchase agreement and the hearsay bogus electronic list of loans before the court. You have to educate your judge about the lack of credibility or effect of the lifeless list of loans as the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act specifically exempts Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities from its application. Also, you have to get your judge to understand that the plaintiff has given up the power to accept the transfer of a note in default and under the conditions presented to the court (out of time, no delivery receipts, etc). Without the PSA you cannot do this.

Additionally the PSA becomes rich when you look at § 1-302 (b) which says that the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by the code may not be disclaimed by agreement, but may be enhanced or modified by an agreement which determine the standards by which the performance of the obligations of good faith, diligence reasonableness and care are to be measured. These agreed to standards of good faith, etc. are enforceable under the UCC if the standards are “not manifestly unreasonable.”

The PSA also has impact on when or what acts have to occur under the UCC because § 1-302 (c) allows parties to vary the “effect of other provisions” of the UCC by agreement.

Through the PSA, it is clear that the plaintiff cannot take an interest of any kind in the loan by way of an “A to D” assignment of a mortgage and certainly cannot take an interest in the note in this fashion.

Without the PSA and the limitations set up in it “by agreement of the parties”, there is no avoiding the mortgage following the note and where the UCC gives over the power to enforce the note, so goes the power to foreclose on the mortgage.

So, arguing that the Trustee could only sue on the note and not foreclose is not correct analysis without the PSA.? Likewise, you will not defeat the equitable interest “effective as of” assignment arguments without the PSA and the layering of the laws that control these securities (true sales required) and REMIC (no defaulted or nonconforming loans and must be timely bankruptcy remote transfers) and NY trust law and UCC law (as to no ultra vires acts allowed by trustee and no unaffixed allonges, etc.).

The PSA is part of the admissible evidence that the court MUST have under the exacting provisions of the summary judgment rule if the court is to accept any plaintiff affidavit or assignment.

If you have been successful in your cases thus far without the PSA, then you have far to go with your litigation model. It is not just you that has “the more considerable task of proving that New York law applies to this trust and that the PSA does not allow the plaintiff to be a “nonholder in possession with the rights of a holder.”

And I am not impressed by the argument “This is clearly something that most foreclosure defense lawyers are not prepared to do.”?Get over that quick or get out of this work! Ask yourself, are you PSA adverse? If your answer is yes, please get out of this line of work. Please.

I am not worried about the minds of the Circuit Court Judges unless and until we provide them with the education they deserve and which is necessary to result in good decisions in these cases.

It is correct that the PSA does not allow the Trustee to foreclose on the Note. But you only get there after looking at the PSA in the context of who has the power to foreclose under applicable law.

It is not correct that the Trustee has the power or right to sue on the note and PSA literacy makes this abundantly clear.

Are you PSA literate? If not, don’t expect your judge to be. But if you want to become literate, a good place to start is by attending Max Gardner’s Mortgage Servicing and Securitization Seminar.

April Carrie Charney

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL
TRUST COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE
MORGAN STANLEY ABS CAPITAL
I INC. TRUST 2007-NC1 MORTGAGE
PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES,
SERIES 2007-NC1,

Plaintiff,

vs

LEIGAFOALII TAFUE WILLIAMS,
aka LEIGAFOALII TAFUE
KOEHNEN; PAPU CHRISTOPHER
WILLIAMS; REAL TIME
RESOLUTIONS, INC.; CAROLYN
RUTH KOEHNEN, AS TRUSTEE OF
THE CAROLYN R. KOEHNEN
REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST U/A,
DATED APRIL 14, 1986; and JOHN
DOES 1-5,

Defendants.

Excerpt:

Standing is a requirement grounded in Article III of the United States
Constitution, and a defect in standing cannot be waived by the parties. Chapman v.
Pier 1 Imports (US.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939,954 (9th Cir. 2011). A litigant must have
both constitutional standing and prudential standing for a federal court to exercise
jurisdiction over the case. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11
(2004). Constitutional standing requires the plaintiff to “show that the conduct of
which he complains has caused him to suffer an ‘injury in fact’ that a favorable
judgment will redress.” Id. at 12. In comparison, “prudential standing
encompasses the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal
rights.” Id. (citation and quotation signals omitted); see also Oregon v. Legal
Servs. Corp., 552 F.3d 965, 971 (9th Cir. 2009).

[…]

The basis of Plaintiffs standing to foreclose on the subject property
(at least as alleged in the Complaint) is a January 13,2009 assignment of the
Mortgage and Note from Home 123 to Plaintiff. The assignment, attached to the
Complaint, provides:

This Assignment, made this 13th day of January,
2009, by and between Home 123 Corporation, a
California corporation, hereinafter called the “Assignor”,
and Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as trustee
for Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc., MSAC 2007NC1,
whose principal place of business and post office
address is c/o Saxon Mortgage Services, Inc., 4708
Mercantile Dr. N., Forth Worth TX 76137-3605,
hereinafter called the “Assignee.”
WITNESSETH:
In consideration of the sum of ONE DOLLAR
($1.00) and other valuable consideration paid by the
Assignee, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged,
the Assignor does hereby, without recourse, sell, assign,
transfer, set over and deliver unto the Assignee, its
successors and assigns, the mortgage and note hereinafter
described ….CompI. Ex. 4.

The Williamses argue that this assignment cannot be valid because
Home 123 was in bankruptcy liquidation as of January 13,2009. Specifically,
Home 123 filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2007, Home 123 filed a liquidation
plan in March 2008, and the bankruptcy court confirmed the liquidation plan in
July 2008. In re New Century TRS Holdings, Inc., 407 B.R. 576, 579-80 (Bankr.
D. Del. 2009). Effective August 1, 2008, the liquidation plan:

was created with Alan M. Jacobs as trustee. Also on that
date, the Creditors’ Committee was dissolved; the Plan
Advisory Committee (the “PAC”) was formed; debtors’
officers and directors ceased serving and were replaced
by Jacobs; debtors’ assets were distributed to the
liquidating trust; and NCFC’s outstanding common and
preferred stock, as well as all notes, securities, and
indentures, were cancelled.

Id. at 585-86 (citations omitted). Given this liquidation, it appears that Home 123
could not have validly assigned the Mortgage and Note to Plaintiff on January 13,
2009. And in Opposition, Plaintiff presents no evidence (or even argument)
explaining how this January 13,2009 assignment is valid despite Home 123 ‘s
bankruptcy and liquidation. In fact, Plaintiff argues — without factual support —
that NC Capital Corporation (“NC Capital”) first bought the Note from Home 123
and Plaintiff subsequently received it through a securitized trust. See PI. ‘s Opp’n
at 20. And at the hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel inexplicably stated that discovery is
required to deternrine the Note’s assignment, even though all facts concerning any
valid assignment should certainly be known to Plaintiff without having to conduct
discovery. In other words, even Plaintiff, who is master of its Complaint and by all
accounts should know the basis of its claims, apparently disclaims the allegations
in the Complaint and at this time cannot establish its legal right to enforce the
Mortgage and Note.

The Complaint’s assertion that Plaintiff obtained the Mortgage and
Note through the January 13,2009 assignment is further called into doubt by the
fact that Plaintiff brings this action as “Trustee Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc.
Trust 2007-NCI Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-NC-I”–
suggesting (as Plaintiffnow argues) that Plaintiffmay have received the Mortgage
and/or Note through a Pooling and Servicing Agreement (“PSA”) in 2007. From
the evidence presented by the Williamses (Plaintiff presented no evidence on
standing in Opposition), Home 123 generally sold mortgages to its affiliate NC
Capital, who then resold the mortgages for inclusion into securitized trusts. See
Williamses’ Ex. Gat 4,-r,-r 9, 11. And NC Capital and Morgan Stanley ABS
Capital I Inc., with Plaintiff as trustee, entered into a PSA dated January 1, 2007.
See Williamses’ Ex. U. The PSA requires NC Capital to deliver to Plaintiff
assignments of mortgage for each mortgage loan, and for Plaintiff to certify
“receipt of a Mortgage Note and Assignment of Mortgage for each applicable
Mortgage Loan.” Id. at 41-42.

This evidence presents two problems for Plaintiff. First, if Plaintiff
did indeed obtain the Mortgage and Note through a 2007 PSA, then the 2007 PSA
is yet another reason why the January 13,2009 assignment is a nullity and the
Complaint’s assertion that Plaintiff obtained the Mortgage and Note from Home
123 is untrue. Second, the evidence presented does not actually establish that
Plaintiff received the Mortgage and Note through the PSA — there is no evidence
on the record establishing what mortgages were included in the PSA. Thus,
although Plaintiff might have obtained the Mortgage and Note through this PSA,
there is no evidence showing or even suggesting that this is indeed the case. As a
result, there is no evidence — at least on the record presented before the court —
creating a genuine issue of material fact that Plaintiffwas assigned the Mortgage
and Note on which it now seeks to foreclose.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the Williamses are not parties or
beneficiaries to the assignment such that they cannot challenge it. In making this
argument, Plaintiff relies on caselaw from this court rejecting that a
plaintiff/mortgagee can assert claims raising assignment irregularities and/or
noncompliance with a PSA. See Fed. Nat’! Mortg. Ass’n v. Kamakau, 2012 WL
622169, at *3-4 (D. Haw. Feb. 23, 2012) (relying on Velasco v. Sec. Nat’l Mortg.
Co., — F. Supp. 2d —-, 2011 WL 4899935, at *4 (D. Haw. Oct. 14,2011), to
reject “slander of title” claim challenging assignment of the note and mortgage
because where the borrower is not a party or intended beneficiary of the
assignment, he cannot dispute the validity of the assignment); Abubo v. Bank of
New York Mellon, 2011 WL 6011787, at *8 (D. Haw. Nov. 30,2011) (rejecting
claim asserting violation of a PSA because a third party lacks standing to raise a
violation of a PSA and noncompliance with terms of a PSA is irrelevant to the
validity of the assignment).

Plaintiffs argument confuses a borrower’s, as opposed to a
lender’s, standing to raise affirmative claims. In Williams v. Rickard, 2011 WL
2116995, at *5 (D. Haw. May 25,2011), — which involved the same parties in this
action and in which Lei Williams asserted affirmative claims against Deutsche
Bank — Chief Judge Susan Oki Mollway explained the difference between the two:

[Lei Williams is] confused about the doctrine of legal
standing. [Lei Williams] believers] that, because
Deutsche Bank and Real Time have not proven that they
have standing to enforce the loan documents, they lack
standing to seek summary judgment on the affirmative
claims asserted against them. Had Deutsche Bank or
Real Time filed affirmative claims to enforce the notes
and mortgages, they would have had to establish their
legal right to enforce those documents. However,
Williams has sued Deutsche Bank and Real Time, and
the banks are merely seeking a determination that they
are not liable to Williams for the claims Williams asserts
against them. The banks need not establish that they are
the legal owners of Williams’s loans before they defend
against Williams’s claims. “Standing” is a plaintiff’s
requirement, and Williams misconstrues the concept in
arguing that Defendants must establish “standing” to
defend themselves.

(emphasis added). In this action, the proverbial shoe is on the other foot —
Deutsche Bank asserts affirmative claims against the Williamses seeking to enforce
the Mortgage and Note, and therefore must establish its legal right (i.e., standing)
to do so. See, e.g., IndyMac Bank v. Miguel, 117 Haw. 506, 513, 184 P.3d 821,
828 (Haw. App. 2008) (explaining that for standing, a mortgagee must have “a
sufficient interest in the Mortgage to have suffered an injury from [the
mortgagor’s] default”). As explained above, Deutsche Bank has failed to do so.

The court therefore GRANTS the Williamses’ Motion to Dismiss.

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H/T Deontos

From Deadly Clear-

“One of the most important decisions for Borrowers Rights in the history of Hawaii has been made with this decision,” remarked Honolulu attorney Gary Dubin.  Honorable Judge J. Michael Seabright of the Hawaii United States District Court, today GRANTED the homeowners’ Motion to Dismiss the case filed against them in federal district court by Plaintiff Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2007-NC1 Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-NC1.

[…]

Honorable Judge J. Michael Seabright gets it!  And his ORDER was detailed.  In the Discussion, Judge Seabright notes an argument that homeowners have being trying to persuade the courts (especially at the lower state levels) to grasp: STANDING and JURISDICTION.

“Standing is a requirement grounded in Article III of the United States Constitution, and a defect in standing cannot be waived by the parties. Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (US.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939,954 (9th Cir. 2011). A litigant must have both constitutional standing and prudential standing for a federal court to exercise jurisdiction over the case. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004). Constitutional standing requires the plaintiff to “show that the conduct of which he complains has caused him to suffer an ‘injury in fact’ that a favorable judgment will redress.” Id. at 12. In comparison, “prudential standing encompasses the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights.” Id. (citation and quotation signals omitted); see also Oregon v. Legal Servs. Corp., 552 F.3d 965, 971 (9th Cir. 2009).”

Let’s continue – but we’ll get back to that injury issue later in the post…

[DEADLY CLEAR]

TIC-TOC…

SFGATE-

Chain of title – proof of who really owns a house – underpins the entire U.S. system of real estate.

Broken chain of title due to slipshod paperwork was a serious issue uncovered in the nationwide robosigning scandal and again last month in a city report that found San Francisco foreclosure paperwork riddled with errors.

Those revelations draw new attention to title companies, which insure a home’s clear title for both buyers and lenders.

“If there is not a clear chain of title in the foreclosure process, how can there be a clear chain of title for the person buying foreclosed property?” said San Francisco Assessor-Recorder Phil Ting, who commissioned the audit. “Given our report, it calls into question whether entities selling a foreclosure really have the right to transfer that property to somebody else.”

Read more: [SFGATE]

Georgetown University Law Center

Susan M. Wachter

University of Pennsylvania – The Wharton School – Real Estate Department

February 7, 2012

Georgetown Law and Economics Research Paper No. 1978264

Georgetown Public Law Research Paper No. 1978264

Abstract:     
Two parallel real estate bubbles emerged in the United States between 2004 and 2008, one in residential real estate, the other in commercial real estate. The residential real estate bubble has received a great deal of popular, scholarly, and policy attention. The commercial real estate bubble, in contrast, has largely been ignored.

This Article explores the causes of the commercial real estate bubble. It shows that the commercial real estate price bubble was accompanied by a change in the source of commercial real estate financing. Starting in 1998, securitization became an increasingly significant part of commercial real estate financing. The commercial mortgage securitization market underwent a major shift in 2004, however, as the traditional buyers of subordinated commercial real estate debt were outbid by collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). Savvy, sophisticated, experienced commercial mortgage securitization investors were thus replaced by investors who merely wanted “product” to securitize. The result was a noticeable decline in underwriting standards in commercial mortgage backed securities that contributed to the commercial real estate price bubble.

The commercial real estate bubble holds important lessons for understanding the residential real estate bubble. Unlike the residential market, there is almost no government involvement in commercial real estate. The existence of the parallel commercial real estate bubble presents a strong challenge to explanations of the residential bubble that focus on government affordable housing policy, the Community Reinvestment Act, and the role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Instead, the changes in commercial real estate financing closely mirror changes in the residential real estate financing, which shifted from regulated government-sponsored securitization to unregulated private securitization. This indicates that changes in the securitization market contributed to the problems in both the commercial and residential real estate markets.

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Credit Slips-

The first attack is on the credentials and former activities of the auditors. Given the deeply compromised background of the OCC foreclosure review auditors, this is a chutzpadik attack. The sad truth is that there isn’t a huge pool of people who can do this sort of audit. (Yes, takes it takes a thief and all that…) 

[CREDIT SLIPS]

This is an explosive video and the AG’s better listen carefully because titles are in serious jeopardy. Forget the settlement… HOW do they prepare to correct the DEFECTS in YOUR TITLE?

Watch the video and listen to how the “New Lender” is stealing assigning Your Home to themselves… I hope AG Kamala Harris follows up and why haven’t the AG’s conducted these investigations? Truly sad.

58% of conflicts with MERS.

by SFAssessoron Feb 15, 2012

Washington, D.C. – Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi and Congresswoman Jackie Speier sent a letter today to Attorney General Eric Holder requesting he direct the Justice Department’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force to examine whether any violations of Federal law occurred in the processing of foreclosures in San Francisco. 

The County of San Francisco’s Office of the Assessor-Recorder recently commissioned a report assessing compliance with applicable foreclosure laws by certain entities in the mortgage industry operating in San Francisco.

Below is the full text of the letter. 

February 17, 2012

The Honorable Eric H. Holder, Jr.
Attorney General
Robert F. Kennedy Department of Justice Building
950 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20530

Dear Attorney General Holder:

We are writing to request that you direct the Justice Department’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force to examine whether any violations of Federal law occurred in the processing of foreclosures in San Francisco.

The County of San Francisco’s Office of the Assessor-Recorder recently commissioned a report, which is enclosed, assessing compliance with applicable foreclosure laws by certain entities in the mortgage industry operating in San Francisco. The report, based on a review of a random sample of mortgage loans that entered into foreclosure between January 2009 and October 2011, found that 99 percent of the San Francisco mortgages reviewed showed irregularities in the foreclosure process, and 84 percent showed potential violations of California non-judicial foreclosure laws.  In addition, foreclosures involving mortgages that were part of the Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS), which are more likely to have been securitized, showed a high rate of conflicting information regarding the actual beneficiary, which raises questions about whether homeowners were denied their due process rights.  We find these findings very troubling. 

Because the report does not specify the mortgage servicers involved, it is not possible to determine whether affected borrowers can seek remedies under provisions in the multi-state mortgage settlement. However, even if some borrowers can seek redress through the settlement process, or through private rights of action, the irregularities and violations cited in the report convince us that further investigation at the Federal level is warranted to determine whether any violations of Federal civil and criminal laws might have occurred.

The Assessor-Recorder has already referred the report’s findings to California Attorney General, Kamala Harris, for her review.  We believe the severity of the report’s conclusions also warrant a thorough review at the Federal level by the Task Force. 

We appreciate the hard work of the Obama Administration and the state Attorneys General, including the helpful protections for borrowers secured by California Attorney General Kamala Harris, in achieving a multi-state mortgage settlement. We are hopeful that preserving the ability of the states and the Federal government to continue to pursue actions not covered by the terms of the settlement will ensure that homeowners who experienced losses unfairly, particularly where abusive practices were the cause, will be able to seek a remedy.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

best regards,

Nancy Pelosi
Democratic Leader

Jackie Speier
Member of Congress

Cc:           The Honorable Kamala Harris, Attorney General, State of California
                The Honorable Edwin M. Lee, Mayor, San Francisco, California
                The Honorable Phil Ting, Assessor-Recorder, City & County of San Francisco

The robosigning itself and similar lack of internal controls are the small potatoes. There are much more serious things in the SF City Assessor report.

Credit Slips-

* Report found 84 pct of San Francisco disclosures illegal

* High levels found across the country, experts say

REUTERS-

A report this week showing rampant foreclosure abuse in San Francisco reflects similar levels of lender fraud and faulty documentation across the United States, say experts and officials who have done studies in other parts of the country.

The audit of almost 400 foreclosures in San Francisco found that 84 percent of them appeared to be illegal, according to the study released by the California city on Wednesday.

“The audit in San Francisco is the most detailed and comprehensive that has been done – but it’s likely those numbers are comparable nationally,” Diane Thompson, an attorney at the National Consumer Law Center, told Reuters.

Across the country from California, Jeff Thingpen, register of deeds in Guildford County, North Carolina, examined 6,100 mortgage documents last year, from loan notes to foreclosure paperwork.

[REUTERS]

1. Introduction

The City and County of San Francisco’s Office of the Assessor-Recorder retained Aequitas Compliance Solutions, Inc. to review 382 residential mortgage loan transactions (the “subject loans”) that resulted in foreclosure sales that occurred from January 2009 through October 2011.1 Over this period, there were 2,405 foreclosure sales. The subject loans thus represent approximately 16% of the total. (See Appendix B – Methodology.)

We analyzed the subject loans to determine the mortgage industry’s compliance with applicable laws. Specifically, we focused our analysis on important topics relating to six Subject Areas:

• Assignments
• Notice of Default
• Substitution of Trustee
• Notice of Trustee Sale
• Suspicious Activities Indicative of
Potential Fraud
• Conflicts Relating to MERS

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Not so sure this is really up to the MERSCORP and MERS directors to approve this because this involves certain laws and also involving trusts etc…? Exactly how long ago did these loans close? How about the now DEFUNCT lenders?

Since they made up their own Law, they can change the Law when ever they want?

Excerpts from the bulletin..

Changes and clarifications to Rule 8 of the Rules of Membership (“Rules”) have been approved by the MERSCORP and MERS Boards of Directors and are effective as of July 22, 2011.

Effective July 22, 2011:
• No foreclosure proceeding may be initiated, and no Proof of Claim or Motion for Relief from Stay (Legal Proceedings) in a bankruptcy may be filed, in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS)
• The Certifying Officer must execute the assignment of the Security Instrument from MERS before initiating foreclosure proceedings or filing Legal Proceedings and promptly send the assignment of the Security Instrument for recording in the applicable public land records

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Affidavit of Professor Ira Mark Bloom for U.S. Bank v. Congress

A Must Read…

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By L. Randall Wray
Benzinga Columnist
December 23, 2010 12:43 PM

As I have written, when we peel back the layers of the real estate “onion” what we find is layer after layer of fraud. From the mortgage brokers to the appraisers and lenders, from the securitizers to the ratings agencies and accountants, from the trustees to the servicers, and from MERS (Mortgage Electronic Registry System) through to the foreclosures, what we find is a massive criminal conspiracy—probably the worst in human history. I realize that is a harsh claim but I cannot find any other words that fit.

In the old days, we used to hang horse thieves. The justification was that a man’s horse was necessary to his way of life, and in some cases, to his very survival. There can be little doubt that a home is equally important to maintenance of a middle class living standard today for most Americans. There is almost no calamity worse than loss of one’s home. It is the main asset that most Americans hold—essential to the educational success of one’s children, and to a comfortable retirement of our citizens. Americans typically borrow against their home equity to put their kids through college, to ease the financial distress caused by unexpected health care expenses, and to finance other large expenditures. The accumulated equity in the home is the only significant source of wealth for the vast majority of Americans. The home is necessary to one’s continuing connection to the neighborhood, school district, and network of friends. Theft of one’s house today is certainly equivalent to theft of a horse 150 years ago.

2 minor corrections: 1. There are now 66 Million mortgages in MERS 2. The First Edition of MERS Recommended Foreclosure Procedures was actually written in 1998. To see the First Ed. from 1998 go here towards the bottom.

L. Randall Wray

Professor of Economics and Research Director of the Center for Full Employment and Price Stability, University of Missouri–Kansas City

In part one of this series I showed that MERS recommended that mortgage servicers retain the “wet ink” notes that borrowers signed. These notes are required in 45 states to foreclose on a home. Not only does the foreclosing party need to physically hold the note, but the note must be properly endorsed and transferred every time a mortgage is sold. A clear chain of title must be demonstrated to make the note valid. This is to protect borrowers from fraud — no one can manufacture a note, claim to be a creditor, and then take a homeowner’s property. And this is especially important when mortgages are securitized and bought and sold a dozen times — if there is no clear chain of title, the borrower can never be sure who is really the creditor.

But, in fact, the notes were never transferred, there is no clear chain of paperwork, and in many cases the notes have “disappeared” so that when the servicers or MERS tries to foreclose, they must file “lost note affidavits” claiming rightful ownership even though they do not have evidence. They have also been caught using “robo-signers” to forge documents — and sometimes they have foreclosed on the wrong properties and even seized homes on which there was no mortgage. That is precisely why the law requires proper transfers of the note. Without that, the mortgage is a fraud and foreclosure is fraudulent.

By itself, all of this is a horrific scandal, involving up to 65 million mortgages — the number of mortgages registered at MERS, most of which presumably were subjected to MERS’s guidelines and extremely sloppy record-keeping. But like Shrek’s onion, it is much more complicated than that — with layer after layer of fraud piled on fraud. There are many angles to be explored, most of them too complex and arcane to be pursued in a short column. Here, in part two, I will discuss the implications for the securities that bundled the fraudulent mortgages registered at MERS. Not only did MERS defraud the counties out of their recording fees and the homeowners out of their homes, but it also helped to perpetrate securities fraud and federal tax fraud. Fortunately for the investors in these securities, the securitization process was fatally flawed, meaning that they can return to the issuing banks and demand their money back. But that implies, of course, that the banksters are hopelessly insolvent — on the hook for hundreds of billions of dollars.

Note this is incomplete but the basics:

Table Of Contents:

• Pg. 2. 2nd Supp. Note Deed Poll, Dated 11/072008, To The Note Deed Poll Dated 4/29/05
• Pg. 10. Bank of America Corporation on 1st July 2008 – Effective date of merger
• Pg. 15. Countrywide and Bank Of America Agreement And Plan Of Merger
• Pg. 116. Bank of America Corporation on 7th November 2008 – Debt Assumption
• Pg. 127. 6th Supp Trust Deed Dated 11/07/08, 11/07/08, Modifying The Prov. Of Trust Deed 5/01/98
• Pg. 138 3rd Supp. Trust Deed 11/07/08, To The Trust Deed Dated 8/15/05
• Pg. 148 UNAUDITED PRO FORMA CONDENSED FINANCIAL INFORMATION
• Pg. 163. Countrywide Financial Corporation on 30th June 2008 – Consolidated Balance Sheet for
• Pg. 282. First Supplemental Deed Poll Guarantee and Indemnity

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General Rules and Regulations
promulgated
under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934

Rule 17f-1 — Requirements for Reporting and Inquiry with Respect to Missing, Lost, Counterfeit or Stolen Securities

(a) Definitions. For purposes of this section:

(1) The term reporting institution shall include every national securities exchange, member thereof, registered securities association, broker, dealer, municipal securities dealer, government securities broker, government securities dealer, registered transfer agent, registered clearing agency, participant therein, member of the Federal Reserve System and bank whose deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation;

(2) The term uncertificated security shall mean a security not represented by an instrument and the transfer of which is registered upon books maintained for that purpose by or on behalf of the issuer;

(3) The term global certificate securities issue shall mean a securities issue for which a single master certificate representing the entire issue is registered in the nominee name of a registered clearing agency and for which beneficial owners cannot receive negotiable securities certificates;

(4) The term customer shall mean any person with whom the reporting institution has entered into at least one prior securities-related transaction; and

(5) The term securities-related transaction shall mean a purpose, sale or pledge of investment securities, or a custodial arrangement for investment securities.

(6) The term securities certificate means any physical instrument that represents or purports to represent ownership in a security that was printed by or on behalf of the issuer thereof and shall include any such instrument that is or was:

(i) Printed but not issued;

(ii) Issued and outstanding, including treasury securities;

(iii) Cancelled, which for this purpose means either or both of the procedures set forth in Sec. 240.17Ad-19(a)(1); or

(iv) Counterfeit or reasonably believed to be counterfeit.

(7) The term issuer shall include an issuer’s:

(i) Transfer agent(s), paying agent(s), tender agent(s), and person(s) providing similar services; and

(ii) Corporate predecessor(s) and successor(s).

(8) The term missing shall include any securities certificate that:

(i) Cannot be located or accounted for, but is not believed to be lost or stolen; or

(ii) A transfer agent claims or believes was destroyed in any manner other than by the transfer agent’s own certificate destruction procedures as provided in Sec. 240.17Ad-19.

(b) Every reporting institution shall register with the Commission or its designee in accordance with instructions issued by the Commission except:

(1) A member of a national securities exchange who effects securities transactions through the trading facilities of the exchange and has not received or held customer securities within the last six months;

(2) A reporting institution that, within the last six months, limited its securities activities exclusively to uncertificated securities, global securities issues or any securities issue for which neither record nor beneficial owners can obtain a negotiable securities certificate; or

(3) A reporting institution whose business activities, within the last six months, did not involve the handling of securities certificates.

(c) Reporting requirements–

(1) Stolen securities.

(i) Every reporting institution shall report to the Commission or its designee, and to a registered transfer agent for the issue, the discovery of the theft or loss of any securities certificates where there is substantial basis for believing that criminal activity was involved. Such report shall be made within one business day of the discovery and, if the certificate numbers of the securities cannot be ascertained at that time, they shall be reported as soon thereafter as possible.

(ii) Every reporting institution shall promptly report to the Federal Bureau of Investigation upon the discovery of the theft or loss of any securities certificate where there is substantial basis for believing that criminal activity was involved.

(2) Missing or lost securities. Every reporting institution shall report to the Commission or its designee, and to a registered transfer agent for the issue, the discovery of the loss of any securities certificate where criminal actions are not suspected when the securities certificate has been missing or lost for a period of two business days. Such report shall be made within one business day of the end of such period except that:

(i) Securities certificates lost, missing, or stolen while in transit to customers, transfer agents, banks, brokers or dealers shall be reported by the delivering institution by the later of two business days after notice of non-receipt or as soon after such notice as the certificate numbers of the securities can be ascertained.

(ii) Where a shipment of retired securities certificates is in transit between any transfer agents, banks, brokers, dealers, or other reporting institutions, with no affiliation existing between such entities, and the delivering institution fails to receive notice of receipt or non-receipt of the certificates, the delivering institution shall act to determine the facts. In the event of non-delivery where the certificates are not recovered by the delivering institution, the delivering institution shall report the certificates as lost, stolen, or missing to the Commission or its designee within a reasonable time under the circumstances but in any event within twenty business days from the date of shipment.

(iii) Securities certificates considered lost or missing as a result of securities counts or verifications required by rule, regulation or otherwise (e.g., dividend record date verification made as a result of firm policy or internal audit function report) shall be reported by the later of ten business days after completion of such securities count or verification or as soon after such count or verification as the certificate numbers of the securities can be ascertained.

(iv) Securities certificates not received during the completion of delivery, deposit or withdrawal shall be reported in the following manner:

(A) Where delivery of the securities certificates is through a clearing agency, the delivering institution shall supply to the receiving institution the certificate number of the security within two business days from the date of request from the receiving institution. The receiving institution shall report within one business day of notification of the certificate number;

(B) Where the delivery of securities certificates is in person and where the delivering institution has a receipt, the delivering institution shall supply the receiving institution the certificate numbers of the securities within two business days from the date of request from the receiving institution. The receiving institution shall report within one business day of notification of the certificate number;

(C) Where the delivery of securities certificates is in person and where the delivering institution has no receipt, the delivering institution shall report within two business days of notification of non-receipt by the receiving institution; or

(D) Where delivery of securities certificates is made by mail or via draft, if payment is not received within ten business days, the delivering institution shall confirm with the receiving institution the failure to receive such delivery; if confirmation shows non-receipt, the delivering institution shall report within two business days of such confirmation.

(3) Counterfeit securities. Every reporting institution shall report the discovery of any counterfeit securities certificate to the Commission or its designee, to a registered transfer agent for the issue, and to the Federal Bureau of Investigation within one business day of such discovery.

(4) Transfer agent reporting obligations. Every transfer agent shall make the reports required above only if it receives notification of the loss, theft or counterfeiting from a non-reporting institution or if it receives notification other than on a Form X-17F-1A or if the certificate was in its possession at the time of the loss.

(5) Recovery. Every reporting institution that originally reported a lost, missing or stolen securities certificate pursuant to this Section shall report recovery of that securities certificate to the Commission or its designee and to a registered transfer agent for the issue within one business day of such recovery or finding. Every reporting institution that originally made a report in which criminality was indicated also shall notify the Federal Bureau of Investigation that the securities certificate has been recovered.

(6) Information to be reported. All reports made pursuant to this Section shall include, if applicable or available, the following information with respect to each securities certificate:

(i) Issuer;

(ii) Type of security and series;

(iii) Date of issue;

(iv) Maturity date;

(v) Denomination;

(vi) Interest rate;

(vii) Certificate number, including alphabetical prefix or suffix;

(viii) Name in which registered;

(ix) Distinguishing characteristics, if counterfeit;

(x) Date of discovery of loss or recovery;

(xi) CUSIP number;

(xii) Financial Industry Numbering System (”FINS”) Number; and

(xiii) Type of loss.

(7) Forms. Reporting institutions shall make all reports to the Commission or its designee and to a registered transfer agent for the issue pursuant to this section on Form X-17F-1A. Reporting institutions shall make reports to the Federal Bureau of Investigation pursuant to this Section on Form X-17F-1A, unless the reporting institution is a member of the Federal Reserve System or a bank whose deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in which case reports may be made on the form required by the institution’s appropriate regulatory agency for reports to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(d) Required inquiries.

(1) Every reporting institution (except a reporting institution that, acting in its capacity as transfer agent, paying agent, exchange agent or tender agent for an equity issue, or registrar for a bond or other debt issue, compares all transactions against a shareholder or bondholder list and a current list of stop transfers) shall inquire of the Commission or its designee with respect to every securities certificate which comes into its possession or keeping, whether by pledge, transfer or otherwise, to ascertain whether such securities certificate has been reported as missing, lost, counterfeit or stolen, unless:

(i) The securities certificate is received directly from the issuer or issuing agent at issuance;

(ii) The securities certificate is received from another reporting institution or from a Federal Reserve Bank or Branch;

(iii) The securities certificate is received from a customer of the reporting institution; and

(A) Is registered in the name of such customer or its nominee; or

(B) Was previously sold to such customer, as verified by the internal records of the reporting institution;

(iv) The securities certificate is received as part of a transaction which has an aggregate face value of $10,000 or less in the case of bonds, or market value of $10,000 or less in the case of stocks; or

(v) The securities certificate is received directly from a drop which is affiliated with a reporting institution for the purposes of receiving or delivering certificates on behalf of the reporting institution.

(2) Form of inquiry. Inquiries shall be made in such manner as prescribed by the Commission or its designee.

(3) A reporting institution shall make required inquiries by the end of the fifth business day after a securities certificate comes into its possession or keeping, provided that such inquiries shall be made before the certificate is sold, used as collateral, or sent to another reporting institution.

(e) Permissive reports and inquiries. Every reporting insitution may report to or inquire of the Commission or its designee with respect to any securities certificate not otherwise required by this section to be the subject of a report or inquiry. The Commission on written request or upon its own motion may permit reports to and inquiries of the system by any other person or entity upon such terms and conditions as it deems appropriate and necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors.

(f) Exemptions. The following types of securities are not subject to paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section:

(1) Security issues not assigned CUSIP numbers;

(2) Bond coupons;

(3) Uncertificated securities;

(4) Global securities issues; and

(5) Any securities issue for which neither record nor beneficial owners can obtain a negotiable securities certificates.

(g) Recordkeeping. Every reporting institution shall maintain and preserve in an easily accessible place for three years copies of all Forms X-17F-1A filed pursuant to this section, all agreements between reporting institutions regarding registration or other aspects of this section, and all confirmations or other information received from the Commission or its designee as a result of inquiry.

FORM X-17F-1A MISSING.LOST.STOLEN.COUNTERFEIT

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October 6, 2010

The Honorable Timothy F. Geithner   .The Honorable Sheila Bair
Secretary                                                        . Chairman
Department of the Treasury           . Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
1500 Pennsylvania Avenue,          . NW 550 17th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20220                     . Washington, DC 20429

The Honorable Ben S. Bernanke                 .  The Honorable Mary Schapiro
Chairman                                                              . Chairman
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System    .Securities and Exchange Commission
20th Street and Constitution Ave,                                      .NW 100 F Street, NE
Washington, DC 20551 Washington, DC 20549

The Honorable John G. Walsh                                  .The Honorable Gary Gensler
Acting Comptroller of the Currency                     .Chairman
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency Commodity Futures Trading Commission
250 E St. SW                                                                    . 1155 21st St. NW
Washington, DC 20219                                                .Washington, DC 20581

The Honorable Ed DeMarco                                     .The Honorable Debbie Matz
Acting Director                                                             .Chairman
Federal Housing Finance Agency                         .National Credit Union Administration
1700 G Street,                                                               .NW 1775 Duke Street,
Washington, DC 20552                                              .Alexandria, VA 22314-3428

Dear Secretary Geithner and members of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC),

The FSOC is tasked with ensuring the financial stability of the United States, which includes identifying and addressing possible systemic risks. There is a well-documented wave of foreclosure fraud sweeping the country that presents such a risk. Bank of America and JP Morgan Chase have both suspended foreclosures in 23 states where that fraud could be uncovered and stopped by the courts. Connecticut has suspended foreclosures.

I write to encourage the FSOC to appoint an emergency task force on foreclosure fraud as a potential systemic risk. I am also writing to ask the members of the FSOC to use their regulatory authority to impose a foreclosure moratorium on all mortgages originated and securitized between 2005-2008, until this task force is able to understand and mitigate the systemic risk posed by the foreclosure fraud crisis.

So far, banks are claiming that the many forged documents uncovered by courts and attorneys represent a simple ‘technical problem’ with foreclosure processes. This is not true. What is happening is fraud to cover up fraud.

The mortgage lending boom saw the proliferation of predatory lending and mortgage fraud, what the FBI called at the time ‘an epidemic of mortgage fraud.’ Much of this was lender-induced.

When lenders – many of whom are now out of business – originally lent money to borrowers, they often did so knowing that the terms of the loans could not possibly be honored. They sought fees, not repayment. These lenders put people in predatory loans, they induced massive amounts of fraud, and Wall Street banks misrepresented these loans to investors when they moved through the securitization chain. They were stealing money from investors, and from homeowners.

Obviously these originators and servicers didn’t keep good records of who owed what to whom because the point was never about getting paid back, it was about moving as much loan volume as possible as quickly and as cheaply as possible. The banks didn’t keep good records, and there is good reason to believe in many if not virtually all cases during this period, failed to transfer the notes, which is the borrower IOUs in accordance with the requirements of their own pooling and servicing agreements. As a result, the notes may be put out of eligibility for the trust under New York law, which governs these securitizations. Potential cures for the note may, according to certain legal experts, be contrary to IRS rules governing REMICs. As a result, loan servicers and trusts simply lack standing to foreclose. The remedy has been foreclosure fraud, including the widespread fabrication of documents.

There are now trillions of dollars of securitizations of these loans in the hands of investors. The trusts holding these loans are in a legal gray area, as the mortgage titles were never officially transferred to the trusts. The result of this is foreclosure fraud on a massive scale, including foreclosures on people without mortgages or who are on time with their payments.

The liability here for the major banks is potentially enormous, and can lead to a systemic risk. Fortunately, the Dodd-Frank financial reform legislation includes a resolution process for these banks. More importantly, these foreclosures are devastating neighborhoods, families, and cities all over the country. Each foreclosure costs tens of thousands of dollars to a municipality, lowers property values, and makes bank failures more likely.

I appreciate your willingness to assess possible systemic risks to the country, and would again encourage you to suspend foreclosures until this problem is understood and its ramifications dealt with.

Sincerely,

Alan Grayson

Member of Congress

Letter to FSOC Calling for Foreclosure Halt

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Via: Max Gardner

From: b.daviesmd6605

THIS IS A GREAT LETTER FROM THE SENIOR COUNSEL AT THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY REGARDING FEDERAL PREEMPTION BY THE TRUSTEE OF A MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITY TRUST. THEY ARE NOT PREEMPTIVE BASED ON THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY AS THEY ARE NOT IN THE FUNCTION OF A LENDER. THIS IS EXCELLENT.

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