“I’m not going to be here next week” is how Mr. Geeai greeted me on a delightfully cool morning last week, “so your readers are going to have to live without me. You can come and hang out, but you have to bring your own coffee.”
“Is this the annual Geeai family campout?’
“Indeed it is”, he replied. “Chris is coming up from California and we are all going to hang for a week. So you and your readers have to live without me next week.”
And then Mr. Geeai did something that really surprised me. With all of the emotion of a great white shark coming in for a kill he said, “Ok, that’s a knee cap buddy”. And then he formed his fingers into the shape of a pistol and unloaded on my kneecap. “Bang” he said, and looked at me with dead eyes, “That’s just for naming your boat what you did. It shows who you are and that’s worth a kneecap without any other consideration. Oh, I’m sorry, is that painful ? Good. Now, let’s talk about what your real punishment is going to be.”
It didn’t surprise me that he blew away the kneecap so much as the totally uncaring, nonchalant attitude he took towards the action. It was as if he were telling one of his tenants they were responsible for a late payment. Totally emotionless, you’re a mark in a book. ‘Oh, it says here I blow your kneecap off. *bang* Scratch that one, what’s next on the list?’ That’s not like him. I know him as a man of great compassion but all of that was gone as he thought of dealing with the ones responsible for ripping off the whole country for their personal aggrandizement.
There is a seething anger in this country and them that are responsible best take heed. If Mr. Geeai can seriously consider blowing off a kneecap … and then consider what might be appropriate punishment … then there is real trouble brewing. Mr. Geeai is as laid back as they come.
There was a MERS story this past week from www.wallstreetoasis.com. Wall Street Oasis bills themselves as a place where “monkeys” (their terms, not mine) from investment banks, hedge funds and private equity firms can come to relax, trade barbs & quips, rant, and generally find an outlet for the frustrations built from breathing the rarified air of corporate finance.
In order to comment on any of their blogs, you have to be a member and in order to become a member, you have to fill out an exhaustive series of questions such as, where did you go to school? Where did you get your MBA? What was your GPA? I was reminded of standing in the little boy’s room in grammer school competing with all of the other boys to see who could step the furthest away from the urinal and still arc a flow into the bowl. Doug Jones was the best at two steps away from the back wall, his closest competition was four but then Doug was the best athlete on the playground so we weren’t surprised. We were awed. Qualifications to become a member of Wall Street Oasis are just as meaningless as arcing a flow into the urinal if you ask me. I suppose some people are in awe just like I was with Doug Jones but I’ve grown up a bit since then. I digress.
Over 62 million mortgages are now held in the name of MERS, an electronic recording system devised by and for the convenience of the mortgage industry. A California bankruptcy court, following landmark cases in other jurisdictions, recently held that this electronic shortcut makes it impossible for banks to establish their ownership of property titles—and therefore to foreclose on mortgaged properties. The logical result could be 62 million homes that are foreclosure-proof.
Mortgages bundled into securities were a favorite investment of speculators at the height of the financial bubble leading up to the crash of 2008. The securities changed hands frequently, and the companies profiting from mortgage payments were often not the same parties that negotiated the loans. At the heart of this disconnect was the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, or MERS, a company that serves as the mortgagee of record for lenders, allowing properties to change hands without the necessity of recording each transfer.
MERS was convenient for the mortgage industry, but courts are now questioning the impact of all of this financial juggling when it comes to mortgage ownership. To foreclose on real property, the plaintiff must be able to establish the chain of title entitling it to relief. But MERS has acknowledged, and recent cases have held, that MERS is a mere “nominee”—an entity appointed by the true owner simply for the purpose of holding property in order to facilitate transactions. Recent court opinions stress that this defect is not just a procedural but is a substantive failure, one that is fatal to the plaintiff’s legal ability to foreclose.
That means hordes of victims of predatory lending could end up owning their homes free and clear—while the financial industry could end up skewered on its own sword.
California Precedent
The latest of these court decisions came down in California on May 20, 2010, in a bankruptcy case called In re Walker, Case no. 10-21656-E–11. The court held that MERS could not foreclose because it was a mere nominee; and that as a result, plaintiff Citibank could not collect on its claim. The judge opined:
Since no evidence of MERS’ ownership of the underlying note has been offered, and other courts have concluded that MERS does not own the underlying notes, this court is convinced that MERS had no interest it could transfer to Citibank. Since MERS did not own the underlying note, it could not transfer the beneficial interest of the Deed of Trust to another. Any attempt to transfer the beneficial interest of a trust deed without ownership of the underlying note is void under California law.
In support, the judge cited In Re Vargas (California Bankruptcy Court); Landmark v. Kesler (Kansas Supreme Court); LaSalle Bank v. Lamy (a New York case); and In Re Foreclosure Cases (the “Boyko” decision from Ohio Federal Court). (For more on these earlier cases, see here, here and here.) The court concluded:
Since the claimant, Citibank, has not established that it is the owner of the promissory note secured by the trust deed, Citibank is unable to assert a claim for payment in this case.
The broad impact the case could have on California foreclosures is suggested by attorney Jeff Barnes, who writes:
This opinion . . . serves as a legal basis to challenge any foreclosure in California based on a MERS assignment; to seek to void any MERS assignment of the Deed of Trust or the note to a third party for purposes of foreclosure; and should be sufficient for a borrower to not only obtain a TRO [temporary restraining order] against a Trustee’s Sale, but also a Preliminary Injunction barring any sale pending any litigation filed by the borrower challenging a foreclosure based on a MERS assignment.
While not binding on courts in other jurisdictions, the ruling could serve as persuasive precedent there as well, because the court cited non-bankruptcy cases related to the lack of authority of MERS, and because the opinion is consistent with prior rulings in Idaho and Nevada Bankruptcy courts on the same issue.
What Could This Mean for Homeowners?
Earlier cases focused on the inability of MERS to produce a promissory note or assignment establishing that it was entitled to relief, but most courts have considered this a mere procedural defect and continue to look the other way on MERS’ technical lack of standing to sue. The more recent cases, however, are looking at something more serious. If MERS is not the title holder of properties held in its name, the chain of title has been broken, and no one may have standing to sue. In MERS v. Nebraska Department of Banking and Finance, MERS insisted that it had no actionable interest in title, and the court agreed.
An August 2010 article in Mother Jones titled “Fannie and Freddie’s Foreclosure Barons” exposes a widespread practice of “foreclosure mills” in backdating assignments after foreclosures have been filed. Not only is this perjury, a prosecutable offense, but if MERS was never the title holder, there is nothing to assign. The defaulting homeowners could wind up with free and clear title.
In Jacksonville, Florida, legal aid attorney April Charney has been using the missing-note argument ever since she first identified that weakness in the lenders’ case in 2004. Five years later, she says, some of the homeowners she’s helped are still in their homes. According to a Huffington Postarticle titled “‘Produce the Note’ Movement Helps Stall Foreclosures”:
Because of the missing ownership documentation, Charney is now starting to file quiet title actions, hoping to get her homeowner clients full title to their homes (a quiet title action ‘quiets’ all other claims). Charney says she’s helped thousands of homeowners delay or prevent foreclosure, and trained thousands of lawyers across the country on how to protect homeowners and battle in court.
Criminal Charges?
Other suits go beyond merely challenging title to alleging criminal activity. On July 26, 2010, a class action was filed in Florida seeking relief against MERS and an associated legal firm for racketeering and mail fraud. It alleges that the defendants used “the artifice of MERS to sabotage the judicial process to the detriment of borrowers;” that “to perpetuate the scheme, MERS was and is used in a way so that the average consumer, or even legal professional, can never determine who or what was or is ultimately receiving the benefits of any mortgage payments;” that the scheme depended on “the MERS artifice and the ability to generate any necessary ‘assignment’ which flowed from it;” and that “by engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity, specifically ‘mail or wire fraud,’ the Defendants . . . participated in a criminal enterprise affecting interstate commerce.”
Ellen Brown wrote this article for YES! Magazine, a national, nonprofit media organization that fuses powerful ideas with practical actions. Ellen developed her research skills as an attorney practicing civil litigation in Los Angeles. In Web of Debt, her latest of eleven books, she shows how the Federal Reserve and “the money trust” have usurped the power to create money from the people themselves, and how we the people can get it back. Her websites are webofdebt.com, ellenbrown.com, and public-banking.com.
Old habits are hard to break, and in the United States of America, there are few “habits” as common as mortgage-fraud. In 2006, the world discovered that the U.S. housing market was the most-fraudulent market in history. However, since that time, even that level of fraud has been surpassed – by the U.S. housing market of 2010.
Incredibly, four years after learning that the U.S. housing market was the global fraud-capital, U.S. mortgage-fraud has continued to increase every year. There is simply too much material here to cover even a small portion. For inquisitive readers, I recommend doing a simple Google-search for “U.S. mortgage-fraud increasing”.
In addition to coming up with an endless list of articles covering the last four years, one of the first “results” which readers will encounter is a Reuters article from June. That article reported a large haul of fraudsters: 1,215 people were charged in numerous frauds, totaling $2.3 billion in losses for victims. Thanks to the “magic” of search-engines, readers will also encounter a further list (on the left side of the page) of the recent Reuters articles on “U.S. mortgage-fraud increasing”.
One of the more hilarious/disturbing search-results was a Reuters article from April 2009, where the U.S. Justice Department “urged Congress” to force U.S. banks to keep records of their mortgages. The Justice Department stated unequivocally that such record-keeping would make it much easier to crack-down on fraud.
Naturally, nothing has been done on that front – since the U.S. government likes mortgage-fraud. Here’s why. A Reuters article released today on U.S. mortgage-fraud reported the case of a run-down Chicago home, which sold for $25,000 in a foreclosure auction, and then was quickly “flipped” in a fraudulent transaction for $355,000.
Pull out your calculator, and you’ll discover that this phony transaction resulted in a (fraudulent) price-rise of more than 1,300%. Put another way, if there were 100 non-fraudulent transactions, each of which reported a 5% decline in prices, and we add in the one fraudulent “sale”, suddenly those 101 sales show a “rising” U.S. housing market, once averaged-out (instead of the falling market which exists in the real world).
Of course, with U.S. mortgage-fraud steadily increasing (even though total sales in this market have plummeted to a tiny fraction of their bubble-peak), obviously the rate of fraud is much higher than merely 1% of transactions. This is especially true given that the vast majority of offenders are “insiders”: “mortgage brokers, appraisers, real estate agents or loan officers”. In other words, the supposed “rising prices” which the Obama regime and media-parrots cited to conclude that the U.S. housing market had “stabilized”, were in fact nothing more than a fraud-induced mirage.
Equally disturbing, even in the FBI “crackdown” on mortgage-fraud, of the $2.3 billion in victim-losses, only a paltry $147 million was recovered – less than 10%. This is of tremendous significance to U.S. taxpayers, since their government has made them “guarantors” of all U.S. mortgage-debt – including this endless stream of fraudulent transactions.
Even the “detected” fraud is leading to losses of 90+% for taxpayers. Meanwhile, the much larger mountain of undetected fraud naturally means losses of virtually 100%. For readers who dispute the premise that mortgage-fraud is a “way of life” in the United States, I will simply refer them to a superb, PBS expose on the U.S.’s fraudulent markets.
“The Warning” is a PBS documentary which goes back to the roots of current, U.S. mortgage-fraud, during the years of the Clinton regime. Of principal note was the position of U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan Greenspan – who was adamant that “market fraud” should not even be illegal in the U.S. Greenspan’s position was that the market should be left alone to “resolve” this fraud “in its own way” (i.e. through the fraudsters taking every last dime of the “sheep”).
What more needs to be said when you have the government of the world’s largest economy taking the position that rather than being a “problem”, that mortgage-fraud was a “solution to problems” (i.e. the crashing U.S. housing market)? Let the fraudsters artificially pump-up the prices of U.S. homes through their phony transactions, et voila we have a “U.S. housing recovery”.
Indeed, regular readers will be familiar with my previous articles on the “MERS” registry system. This was a fraud-facilitation entity created by Wall Street bankers during the mid-1990’s. It’s entire purpose was to replace the mortgage record-keeping of individual, financial institutions – so that it would be much easier to engage in serial mortgage-fraud via “mortgage securitization”, as the U.S. financial crime syndicate commenced their housing-bubble crime-wave.
The “MERS” registry has been regularly rejected in numerous court-decisions for being woefully inadequate in its record-keeping. This has resulted in a number of U.S. homeowners who, instead of losing their property to foreclosure were handed free and clear title to their properties – because the MERS registry had failed to provide adequate documentation of title.
However, none of the previous documentation of fraud in this commentary can compare with the most-brazen admission of mortgage-fraud – by the banksters themselves. In a previous commentary, I referred to a Wall Street Journal article about yet another mortgage-fraud court case.
In that incident, the bankers of JP Morgan were asked to explain a mortgage document where, instead of a buyer’s name appearing, there were the words “Bogus Assignee”. The hilarious explanation of Michelle Kersch, the lawyer defending the case was that the “name” wasn’t an indication of a fraudulent transaction in-progress. Instead, “Bogus Assignee” was merely a generic term, or a “placeholder”, which had been used on “a few occasions”.
In other words, instead of using the five-letter word “buyer” as its generic term on loan documents, we are supposed to believe that the substition of the two words “Bogus Assignee” was merely a random choice of words, to which we should attach no meaning whatsoever.
For market participants, the message is simple: invest in a U.S. bank and you are investing in fraud. Invest in a U.S. home-builder, and you are investing in fraud. Even though home-builders have not been directly connected to this fraud, when you create the “supply” for a fraud-saturated market, you become equally affected by that fraud – irrespective of the fact that these entities did not participate in this crime-wave.
As I have already demonstrated previously, even without mortgage-fraud, the U.S. housing market was doomed to a much worse, much longer collapse – now that this market has clearly begun another slide. However, as we become more aware of the massive levels of fraud in this market, it would appear that I have been guilty of understatement.
Simply put, there is nothing more that the Bush regime, and its successor the Obama regime could have done to destroy the U.S. housing market. This matters not at all to the U.S. government, which clearly believes that fraud is “good for business”. This is the attitude of the Wall Street Oligarchs as well, who engage in serial-fraud as a basic ingredient of their “business model”.
The Oligarchs defraud a client or business partner (generally numerous times). If the fraud becomes so obvious that U.S. regulators can’t simply pretend it doesn’t exist (any longer), then the bankster is taken to court by the U.S. “regulator”. A sweetheart-settlement is reached where a) the banker isn’t required to admit any “wrong doing” (since U.S. officials don’t consider fraud a “crime”); and b) the fine levied against the Oligarch is generally only a tiny portion of the profits they obtained through the fraud.
The fact that U.S. mortgage-fraud continues to soar, four years after this fraud-saturated market was exposed tells us that the U.S. government is intentionally under-funding law enforcement in this area. Law enforcement officials must be extremely demoralized. Not only are they unable to obtain the necessary “resources” to properly police this crime-wave, but the “big players” (i.e. the Wall Street Oligarchs) are essentially “immune” to any law-enforcement actions.
Never in history, never in any other part of the world, and never in any other market have the words “caveat emptor” carried as much weight.
In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, any copyrighted work in this message is distributed under fair use without profit or payment for non-profit research and educational purposes only. GRG [Ref. http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml]
We are pleased to present this guest post by April Charney.
If you are an attorney trying to help people save their homes, you had better be PSA literate or you won’t even begin to scratch the surface of all you can do to save their homes. This is an open letter to all attorneys who aren’t PSA literate but show up in court to protect their client’s homes.
First off, what is a PSA? After the original loans are pooled and sold, a trust hires a servicer to service the loans and make distributions to investors. The agreement between depositor and the trust and the truste and the servicer is called the Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA).
According to UCC § 3-301 a “person entitled to enforce” the promissory note, if negotiable, is limited to:
(1) The holder of the instrument;
(2) A nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the rights of a holder; or
(3) A person not in possession of the instrument who is entitled to enforce the instrument pursuant to section 3-309 or section 3-418(d).
A person may be a person entitled to enforce the instrument even though the person is not the owner of the instrument or is in wrongful possession of the instrument.
Although “holder” is not defined in UCC § 3-301, it is defined in § 1-201 for our purposes to mean a person in possession of a negotiable note payable to bearer or to the person in possession of the note.
So we now know who can enforce the obligation to pay a debt evidenced by a negotiable note. We can debate whether a note is negotiable or not, but I won’t make that debate here.
Under § 1-302 persons can agree “otherwise” that where an instrument is transferred for value and the transferee does not become a holder because of lack of indorsement by the transferor, that the transferee is granted a special right to enforce an “unqualified” indorsement by the transferor, but the code does not “create” negotiation until the indorsement is actually made.
So, that section allows a transferee to enforce a note without a qualifying endorsement only when the note is transferred for value.? Then, under § 1-302 (a) the effect of provisions of the UCC may be varied by agreement. This provision includes the right and ability of persons to vary everything described above by agreement.
This is where you MUST get into the PSA. You cannot avoid it. You can get the judges to this point. I did it in an email. Show your judge this post.
If you can’t find the PSA for your case, use the PSA next door that you can find on at www.secinfo.com. The provisions of the PSA that concern transfer of loans (and servicing, good faith and almost everything else) are fairly boilerplate and so PSAs are fairly interchangeable for many purposes. You have to get the PSA and the mortgage loan purchase agreement and the hearsay bogus electronic list of loans before the court. You have to educate your judge about the lack of credibility or effect of the lifeless list of loans as the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act specifically exempts Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities from its application. Also, you have to get your judge to understand that the plaintiff has given up the power to accept the transfer of a note in default and under the conditions presented to the court (out of time, no delivery receipts, etc). Without the PSA you cannot do this.
Additionally the PSA becomes rich when you look at § 1-302 (b) which says that the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by the code may not be disclaimed by agreement, but may be enhanced or modified by an agreement which determine the standards by which the performance of the obligations of good faith, diligence reasonableness and care are to be measured. These agreed to standards of good faith, etc. are enforceable under the UCC if the standards are “not manifestly unreasonable.”
The PSA also has impact on when or what acts have to occur under the UCC because § 1-302 (c) allows parties to vary the “effect of other provisions” of the UCC by agreement.
Through the PSA, it is clear that the plaintiff cannot take an interest of any kind in the loan by way of an “A to D” assignment of a mortgage and certainly cannot take an interest in the note in this fashion.
Without the PSA and the limitations set up in it “by agreement of the parties”, there is no avoiding the mortgage following the note and where the UCC gives over the power to enforce the note, so goes the power to foreclose on the mortgage.
So, arguing that the Trustee could only sue on the note and not foreclose is not correct analysis without the PSA.? Likewise, you will not defeat the equitable interest “effective as of” assignment arguments without the PSA and the layering of the laws that control these securities (true sales required) and REMIC (no defaulted or nonconforming loans and must be timely bankruptcy remote transfers) and NY trust law and UCC law (as to no ultra vires acts allowed by trustee and no unaffixed allonges, etc.).
The PSA is part of the admissible evidence that the court MUST have under the exacting provisions of the summary judgment rule if the court is to accept any plaintiff affidavit or assignment.
If you have been successful in your cases thus far without the PSA, then you have far to go with your litigation model. It is not just you that has “the more considerable task of proving that New York law applies to this trust and that the PSA does not allow the plaintiff to be a “nonholder in possession with the rights of a holder.”
And I am not impressed by the argument “This is clearly something that most foreclosure defense lawyers are not prepared to do.”?Get over that quick or get out of this work! Ask yourself, are you PSA adverse? If your answer is yes, please get out of this line of work. Please.
I am not worried about the minds of the Circuit Court Judges unless and until we provide them with the education they deserve and which is necessary to result in good decisions in these cases.
It is correct that the PSA does not allow the Trustee to foreclose on the Note. But you only get there after looking at the PSA in the context of who has the power to foreclose under applicable law.
It is not correct that the Trustee has the power or right to sue on the note and PSA literacy makes this abundantly clear.
Are you PSA literate? If not, don’t expect your judge to be. But if you want to become literate, a good place to start is by attending Max Gardner’s Mortgage Servicing and Securitization Seminar.
All these problems came about the same time MERS came to existence…now tell me something? Isn’t this a tad of a coincidence these issues became at the same time sub-prime loans hit peak?
MERS was created in 1995 under the auspices of the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA), as the mortgage industry’s utility, to streamline the mortgage process by using electronic commerce to eliminate paper. Our Board of Directors and shareholders are comprised of representatives from the MBA, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, large and small mortgage companies, the American Land Title Association (ALTA), the CRE Finance Council, title underwriters, and mortgage insurance companies.
Our initial focus was to eliminate the need to prepare and record assignments when trading mortgage loans. Our members make MERS the mortgagee and their nominee on the security instruments they record in the county land records. Then they register their loans on the MERS® System so they can electronically track changes in ownership over the life of the loans. This process eliminates the need to record assignments every time the loans are traded. Over 3000 MERS members have registered more than 65 million loans on the MERS® System, saving the mortgage industry hundreds of millions of dollars in the process. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and Veterans Administration (VA) approved MERS for government loans because they recognized the value to consumers. On table-funded loans, MERS eliminates the cost to the consumer of the mortgage assignment ($30 – $150). In addition, the MERS process ensures that lien releases are not delayed by eliminating potential breaks in the chain of title. Similar to the residential product, we also addressed the assignment problem in the commercial market with MERS® Commercial, on which is registered over $110 billion in Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS) loans.
More than 60 percent of existing mortgages have an assigned MIN, making a total of 65,000,000 loans registered since the inception of the system in 1997. The corresponding data for these mortgages is tracked on the MERS® System from origination through sale and until payoff. MERS therefore offers a substantial base of historical data about existing loans that can be harnessed to bring transparency to existing MBS products. Attached are letters from the MBA, FHA, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac on this point.
Consultant, Writer, Senior Fellow with The Campaign for America’s Future
Posted: August 5, 2010 06:55 PM
The Justice Department and the Securities and Exchange Commission have broad powers to root out and punish financial fraud. The Interagency Financial Fraud Task Force, formed last November, is an Obama-era innovation that enhances the government’s ability to track down financial criminals. As we look back on the last two years’ revelations about Wall Street misbehavior, then, it seems reasonable to ask the question:
What’s a banker gotta do to get arrested in this town?
We’re not talking about the “show up with your attorney and we’ll work out a settlement” kind of arrest, either. We mean the pull-them-from-the-boardroom, handcuff-wearing, hands-on-the-police-car perp walk sort of arrest. Enforcement actions seem few and far between, and when they do come around the settlement is usually far too small to deter future crime.
But a review of 49 charges brought this year by the SEC shows that the majority of their targets were “ABB” — “anybody but bankers” — and that only eight charges were directly related to the fraud that trashed the economy. Most of those eight charges involved bit players, and penalties for the two major fraudsters involved were so light that they gave would-be malefactors no good reason to change their evil ways.
The SEC even charged a psychic with fraud after he claimed he could predict what would happen in the stock market. (Of course he was a fraud! A real psychic would’ve known they were investigating him and left town.)
Financial giants have figured out yet another way to profit from fraud. After devastating communities across the country with shady subprime loans, the mortgage industry has launched a new assault on America’s neighborhoods. Big banks are now outsourcing their foreclosure processing to shady law firms with a history of breaking the law for a quick buck. These foreclosure scammers forge documents, backdate signatures, slap families with thousands of dollars in illegal fees and even foreclosure on borrowers who haven’t missed a payment.
Andy Kroll lays out the insanity in a terrific piece for Mother Jones. “Foreclosure mills,” as they are known, have been around for years, but they’ve become a much bigger problem as the mortgage crisis has deepened. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac spurred the creation of these social beasts decades ago to help them process large volumes of foreclosures quickly and cheaply. Pretty soon big banks wanted in on the action, and bailout barons at Wells Fargo, Citigroup and Bank of America starting sending foreclosures to these scummy law firms by the thousands.
Banks opt to outsource dirty work like this for a reason. It takes weeks to process the legal work necessary to kick somebody out of their home, since cops and judges don’t want to give borrowers the boot without proof. If you can cut down that processing time, you can save a lot of money on legal bills. Foreclosure mills cut costs for banks by cutting corners—when they can’t compile the documentation needed to push families out of their homes right now, they simply fabricate the documents. Still worse, these guys illegally withhold documentation from borrowers seeking to negotiate loan modifications with their banks—effectively forcing borrowers out of their homes instead of allowing them to cut a deal with the bank. When borrowers actually do straighten things out with foreclosure mills, the scumbags slap them with huge illegal fees. Kroll details a foreclosure mill that erroneously tried to evict a Florida couple who had been paying their mortgage on time. When it became clear that the couple could not be kicked out of their home, the foreclosure mill tried to charge them $18,500 in fees for mistakes committed by the foreclosure mill and the bank. The foreclosure mill even invented two new people who it said lived in the home in order to demand four sets of legal processing fees instead of two.
If nobody holds you accountable, then lying, cheating and stealing are very profitable business models. That’s one reason why banks love sending this kind of work to foreclosure mills. While the foreclosure mills and their lawyers have been bombarded with lawsuits for their trickery, the banks are not directly involved in the funny business. So Citi, BofA, Fannie and Freddie get to cut their costs with shady practices, but they don’t have to shoulder the legal liability for them, even though they must surely know what goes on (if they don’t know, they’re being astonishingly negligent, and should be held responsible).
The foreclosure mill scandal is very similar to a game the banks played in the craziest days of the housing bubble. A few years back, banks outsourced much of the work that goes into issuing mortgages to third-party mortgage brokers. Banks knew that many of these brokers were up to no good, and routinely trained brokers how to steer borrowers into unaffordable subprime loans. Banks also lobbied regulators aggressively for the right to look the other way when brokers abused borrowers or committed fraud. For a few years, banks made big bucks as mortgage brokers turned out fraudulent loans by the truckload. When those loans started defaulting, the banks pleaded innocence and blamed the brokers for the social and economic fallout.
How the federal housing agencies—and some of the biggest bailed-out banks—are helping shady lawyers make millions by pushing families out of their homes.
LATE ONE NIGHT IN February 2009, Ariane Ice sat poring over records on the website of Florida’s Palm Beach County. She’d been at it for weeks, forsaking sleep to sift through thousands of legal documents. She and her husband, Tom, an attorney, ran a boutique foreclosure defense firm called Ice Legal. (Slogan: “Your home is your castle. Defend it.”) Now they were up against one of Florida’s biggest foreclosure law firms: Founded by multimillionaire attorney David J. Stern, it controlled one-fifth of the state’s booming market in foreclosure-related services. Ice had a strong hunch that Stern’s operation was up to something, and that night she found her smoking gun.
It involved something called an “assignment of mortgage,” the document that certifies who owns the property and is thus entitled to foreclose on it. Especially these days, the assignment is key evidence in a foreclosure case: With so many loans having been bought, sold, securitized, and traded, establishing who owns the mortgage is hardly a trivial matter. It frequently requires months of sleuthing in order to untangle the web of banks, brokers, and investors, among others. By law, a firm must execute (complete, sign, and notarize) an assignment before attempting to seize somebody’s home.
A Florida notary’s stamp is valid for four years, and its expiration date is visible on the imprint. But here in front of Ice were dozens of assignments notarized with stamps that hadn’t even existed until months—in some cases nearly a year—after the foreclosures were filed. Which meant Stern’s people were foreclosing first and doing their legal paperwork later. In effect, it also meant they were lying to the court—an act that could get a lawyer disbarred or even prosecuted. “There’s no question that it’s pervasive,” says Tom Ice of the backdated documents—nearly two dozen of which were verified by Mother Jones. “We’ve found tons of them.”
This all might seem like a legal technicality, but it’s not. The faster a foreclosure moves, the more difficult it is for a homeowner to fight it—even if the case was filed in error. In March, upon discovering that Stern’s firm had fudged an assignment of mortgage in another case, a judge in central Florida’s Pasco County dismissed the case with prejudice—an unusually harsh ruling that means it can never again be refiled. “The execution date and notarial date,” she wrote in a blunt ruling, “were fraudulently backdated, in a purposeful, intentional effort to mislead the defendant and this court.”
Stern has made a fortune foreclosing on homeowners. He owns a $15 million mansion, four Ferraris, and a 130-foot yacht.
More often than not in uncontested cases, missing or problematic documents simply go overlooked. In Florida, where foreclosure cases must go before a judge (some states handle them as a bureaucratic matter), dwindling budgets and soaring caseloads have overwhelmed local courts. Last year, the foreclosure dockets of Lee County in southwest Florida became so clogged that the court initiated rapid-fire hearings lasting less than 20 seconds per case—”the rocket docket,” attorneys called it. In Broward County, the epicenter of America’s housing bust, the courthouse recently began holding foreclosure hearings in a hallway, a scene that local attorneys call the “new Broward Zoo.” “The judges are so swamped with this stuff that they just don’t pay attention,” says Margery Golant, a veteran Florida foreclosure defense lawyer. “They just rubber-stamp them.”
But the Ices had uncovered what looked like a pattern, so Tom booked a deposition with Stern’s top deputy, Cheryl Samons, and confronted her with the backdated documents—including two from cases her firm had filed against Ice Legal’s clients. Samons, whose counsel was present, insisted that the filings were just a mistake. She refused to elaborate, so the Ices moved to depose the notaries and other Stern employees whose names were on the evidence. On the eve of those depositions, however, the firm dropped foreclosure proceedings against the Ices’ clients.
It was a bittersweet victory: The Ices had won their cases, but Stern’s practices remained under wraps. “This was done to cover up fraud,” Tom fumes. “It was done precisely so they could try to hit a reset button and keep us from getting the real goods.”
Backdated documents, according to a chorus of foreclosure experts, are typical of the sort of shenanigans practiced by a breed of law firms known as “foreclosure mills.” While far less scrutinized than subprime lenders or Wall Street banks, these firms undermine efforts by government and the mortgage industry to put struggling homeowners back on track at a time of record foreclosures. (There were 2.8 million foreclosures in 2009, and 3.8 million are projected for this year.) The mills think “they can just change things and make it up to get to the end result they want, because there’s no one holding them accountable,” says Prentiss Cox, a foreclosure expert at the University of Minnesota Law School. “We’ve got these people with incentives to go ahead with foreclosures and flood the real estate market.”
Stern’s is hardly the only outfit to attract criticism, but his story is a useful window into the multibillion-dollar “default services” industry, which includes both law firms like Stern’s and contract companies that handle paper-pushing tasks for other big foreclosure lawyers. Over the past decade and a half, Stern has built up one of the industry’s most powerful operations—a global machine with offices in Florida, Kentucky, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines—squeezing profits from every step in the foreclosure process. Among his loyal clients, who’ve sent him hundreds of thousands of cases, are some of the nation’s biggest (and, thanks to American taxpayers, most handsomely bailed out) banks—including Wells Fargo, Bank of America, and Citigroup. “A lot of these mills are doing the same kinds of things,” says Linda Fisher, a professor and mortgage-fraud expert at Seton Hall University’s law school. But, she added, “I’ve heard some pretty bad stories about Stern from people in Florida.”
While the mortgage fiasco has so far cost American homeowners an estimated $7 trillion in lost equity, it has made Stern (no relation to NBA commissioner David J. Stern) fabulously rich. His $15 million, 16,000-square-foot mansion occupies a corner lot in a private island community on the Atlantic Intracoastal Waterway. It is featured on a water-taxi tour of the area’s grandest estates, along with the abodes of Jay Leno and billionaire Blockbuster founder Wayne Huizenga, as well as the former residence of Desi Arnaz and Lucille Ball. (Last year, Stern snapped up his next-door neighbor’s property for $8 million and tore down the house to make way for a tennis court.) Docked outside is Misunderstood, Stern’s 130-foot, jet-propelled Mangusta yacht—a $20 million-plus replacement for his previous 108-foot Mangusta. He also owns four Ferraris, four Porsches, two Mercedes-Benzes, and a Bugatti—a high-end Italian brand with models costing north of $1 million a pop.
Despite his immense wealth and ability to affect the lives of ordinary people, Stern operates out of the public eye. His law firm has no website, he is rarely mentioned in the mainstream business press, and neither he nor several of his top employees responded to repeated interview requests for this story. Stern’s personal attorney, Jeffrey Tew, also declined to comment. But scores of interviews and thousands of pages of legal and financial filings, internal emails, and other documents obtained by Mother Jones provided insight into his operation. So did eight of Stern’s former employees—attorneys, paralegals, and other staffers who agreed to talk on condition of anonymity. (Most still work in related fields and fear that speaking publicly about their ex-boss could harm their careers.)
Andy Kroll is a reporter at Mother Jones. For more of his stories, click here. Email him with tips and insights at akroll (at) motherjones (dot) com. Follow him on Twitter here.
The US financial regulator’s own internal watchdog has widened his investigation of the civil fraud lawsuit brought against Goldman Sachs to include a focus on the timing of last week’s $550m (£356m) settlement.
By James Quinn
Published: 6:00AM BST 24 Jul 2010
David Kotz, inspector general of the Securities and Exchange Commission, has said he is looking into the timing of Goldman’s settlement with the regulator, coming as it did on the same day that the US passed its wide-ranging financial reform bill.
Mr Kotz’s investigation to date has focused on whether politics played a part in the SEC bringing the case against Goldman in the first place.
Arthur and Alberta Bailey are about to lose their home near New Orleans, and their mortgage company says one thing stands in the way of relief: The investors who own their mortgage won’t allow any modifications.
It’s a story heard again and again across the country as desperate homeowners try to participate in a federal program created to foster loan modifications and prevent foreclosures. Loan servicers say their hands are tied by Wall Street.
Federal officials, bank officers, housing counselors and investors themselves say that excuse is cited far more often than is justified. In fact, they say, few mortgage deals include such restrictions.
Consider the case of the Baileys. Litton, a subsidiary of Goldman Sachs, services their loan, and Litton’s contract with investors has no clear language banning modifications. In fact, documents show that over 115 other mortgages [1] from the same investment pool have already been modified.
Even the representative of investors in the Baileys’ mortgage says only the servicer can decide when to modify loans. While he couldn’t comment on an individual case, Bank of New York Mellon spokesman Kevin Heine says it’s “misinformation” to say that investors make these decisions.
Servicers can pass the buck because one mortgage often involves many different companies. During the housing bubble, banks often sold mortgages to investors on Wall Street so they wouldn’t have to keep the loans on their own books, freeing them to make even more loans and protecting them from those that went bad. They then hired servicers to handle the day-to-day work of collecting payments from homeowners – and to decide when to modify loans. Now loan servicers have been inundated with requests from homeowners trying to avoid foreclosure through the government’s $75 billion mortgage modification program. The Treasury Department estimates that 1.7 million homeowners should qualify for help.
For homeowners, it can be difficult to understand who is responsible for what. This confusion gives servicers a ready excuse for refusing modifications.
Indeed, nobody knows the exact extent to which servicers are passing blame on to investors. Some housing counselors estimate that 10 percent of the denials they see are attributed to investors; others say they see as many as 40 percent. Either way, tens of thousands of homeowners may be affected, their attempts to modify their mortgage wrongly denied.
The prevalence of such false claims by servicers is a “legitimate concern,” said Laurie Maggiano, the Treasury Department’s director of policy for the modification program. “It’s been very frustrating for us.”
Investors are also dismayed, saying servicers are not acting in their best interests. “This is one of those rare alliances where investors and borrowers are on the same page,” according to Laurie Goodman, senior managing director at Amherst Securities, a brokerage firm that specializes in mortgage securities. She says investors have “zero vote” in determining individual loan modifications and, instead of foreclosures, prefer sustainable modifications that lower homeowners’ total debt.
Investor-owned mortgages represent more than a third of trial and permanent modifications in the government’s program [2]. Under the program, servicers must modify the loans of qualified [3] borrowers unless contracts with investors prohibit the modification, or if calculations [4] determine that the investors won’t benefit from a modification. Investors’ contracts rarely prohibit modifications, and at times, ProPublica found, they have been blamed for denials even though other mortgages owned by the same investors have been modified.Even when contracts with investors do have restrictions, servicers don’t appear to be following federal requirements that they ask investors for waivers to allow modifications.
Such requests “never happen,” says David Co, a director at Deutsche Bank’s department that oversees 1,600 residential securities, the complex bundles of mortgages sold to investors.
Treasury’s Maggiano says the government is investigating investor denials and considering greater consequences for servicers that wrongfully deny modifications. Servicers’ compliance and accountability have been a major problem for the government’s program. Treasury has threatened penalties before, but it hasn’t yet issued any [5].
Whose decision is it?
“The very phrase ‘investor restriction,’ I think, is deliberately confusing,” says Joseph Sant, an attorney with Staten Island Legal Services, which represents homeowners in foreclosure. “What we’re talking about are not business entities or people, but inert documents.”
Typically, financial institutions set up mortgage-backed securities as a trust — legally their own entities — and then sell bonds from the trust to investors, which can range from mutual funds to pension funds. At the same time, they sign up trustees to manage the security and hire divisions of their own banks or other companies to act as servicers that work directly with homeowners.
While servicers often tell homeowners that investors decide whose loans can be adjusted, Heine, the spokesman for Bank of New York Mellon, one of the largest trustees that administer mortgage securities, says the responsibility to modify loans “falls squarely to the servicer.”
And the contracts that servicers often blame are usually not a roadblock. A report by John Hunt, a law professor at the University of California, Davis, looked at contracts [6] (PDF) that covered three-quarters of the subprime loans securitized in 2006 and found that only 8 percent prohibited modifications outright. Almost two-thirds of the contracts explicitly gave servicers the authority to make modifications, particularly for homeowners who had defaulted or would likely default soon. The rest of the contracts did not address modifications.
Jeffrey Gentes, an attorney at the Connecticut Fair Housing Center who works with hundreds of homeowners across the state, estimates that in 80 percent of the cases in which he has seen the servicing contracts, no language prevents modifications as the servicers have claimed.
Homeowners’ advocates say that when they successfully disprove a contractual restriction, the servicer just gives another reason for denying the modification. “The investor is cited first until the borrower can prove it otherwise,” says Kevin Stein, associate director of the California Reinvestment Coalition, which helps low-income people and minority groups get access to financial services.
Sant, the Staten Island attorney, says a servicer told one client that the contract with investors forbade extending the length of the mortgage, one key way monthly payments can be reduced through government’s program. But the government has addressed the objection, ruling that if a servicer can’t extend the length of a mortgage, it can still give a modification and just add a balloon payment to the end of the loan. Sant pushed back on the servicer’s attorney, who dropped that reason for denial and instead said the homeowner had failed the computer model [4] that determines eligibility. Sant currently is reviewing the case to determine how to proceed.
NEW YORK July 21 (Reuters) – U.S. mortgage bond investors have quietly banded together to gain the long-sought power needed to challenge loan servicers over losses the investors claim resulted from violations in securities contracts.
A group holding a third of the $1.5 trillion mortgage bond market has topped the key 25 percent threshold for voting rights on 2,300 “private-label” mortgage bonds, said Talcott Franklin, a Dallas-based lawyer who is shepherding the effort.
Reaching that threshold gives holders the means to identify misrepresentations in loans, and possibly force repurchases by banks, Franklin said.
Banks are already grappling with repurchase demands from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the U.S.-backed mortgage finance giants.
The investors, which include some of the largest in the nation, claim they have been unfairly taking losses as the housing market crumbled and defaulted loans hammered their bonds. Requests to servicers that collect and distribute payments — which include big banks — to investigate loans are often referred to clauses that prohibit action by individuals, investors have said.
Since loan servicers, lenders and loan sellers sometimes are affiliated, there are conflicts of interest when asking the companies to ferret out the loans that destined their private mortgage bonds for losses, Franklin said in a July 20 letter to trustees, who act on behalf of bondholders.
“There’s a lot of smoke out there about whether these loans were properly written, and about whether the servicing is appropriate and whether recoveries are maximized” for bondholders, Franklin said in an interview.
He wouldn’t disclose his clients, but said they represent more than $500 billion in securities managed for pension funds, 401(k) plans, endowments, and governments. The securities are private mortgage bonds issued by Wall Street firms that helped trigger the worst financial crisis since the 1930s.
Franklin’s effort, using a clearinghouse model to aggregate positions, is a milestone for investors who have been unable to organize. Some have wanted to fire servicers but couldn’t gather the necessary voting rights.
“Investors have finally reached a mechanism whereby they can act collectively to enforce their contractual rights,” said one portfolio manager involved in the effort, who declined to be named. “The trustees, the people that made representations and warranties to the trust, and the servicers have taken advantage of a very fractured asset management industry to perpetuate a circle of silence around these securities.”
Laurie Goodman, a senior managing director at Amherst Securities Group in New York, said at an industry conference last week, “Reps and warranties are not enforced.”
Increased pressure from bondholders comes as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been collecting billions of dollars from lender repurchases of loans in government-backed securities. With Fannie and Freddie also big buyers of Wall Street mortgage bonds, their regulator this month used its subpoena power to seek documents and see if it could recoup losses for the two companies, which have received tens of billions in taxpayer-funded bailouts.
Some U.S. Federal Home Loan banks and at least one hedge fund are looking to force repurchases or collect for losses.
Investors are eager to scrutinize loans against reps and warranties in ways haven’t been able to before. Where 50 percent voting rights are required for an action, the investors in the clearinghouse have power in more than 900 deals.
Franklin said the investors are hoping for a cooperative effort with servicers and trustees. While he did not disclose recipients of the letter, some of the biggest trustees include Bank of New York, US Bank and Deutsche Bank.
A Bank of New York spokesman declined to say if the firm received the trustee letter. US Bancorp and Deutsche Bank spokesmen did not immediately return calls.
“You have a trustee surrounded by smoke, steadfastly claiming there is no fire, and what the letter gets to is there is fire,” the portfolio manager said. “And we are now directing you … to take these steps to put out the fire and to do so by investigating and putting loans back to the seller.”
Servicers are most likely to spot a breach of a bond’s warranty, Franklin said in the letter.
Violations could be substantial, he said. In an Ambac Assurance Corp review of 695 defaulted subprime loans sold to a mortgage trust by a servicer, nearly 80 percent broke one or more warranties, he said in the letter, citing an Ambac lawsuit against EMC Mortgage Corp.
The investors are also now empowered to scrutinize how servicers decide on either modifying a loan for a troubled borrower, or proceed with foreclosure, Franklin said. Improper foreclosures may be done to save costs of creating a loan modification, he asserted. (Editing by Leslie Adler)
We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.
Video sends a message…
FORECLOSURE FRAUD …”The Greatest American Bank Robbery” A GREED STORY!
Last week a group called New York Communities for Change (NYCC) joined with New York City Comptroller John Liu and seven of New York’s largest unions to demand that Wall Street’s biggest banks reform their loan modification policies so families facing foreclosure will not lose their homes. If other groups follow that lead, we might make a big dent in the foreclosure crisis.
NYCC and its sister organization, Mutual Housing Association of New York, have been working with foreclosure victims neighborhoods like St. Albans in Queens, or Bed-Stuy in Brooklyn not far from Wall Street, where homeowners have been forced to make impossible choices: keep up their skyrocketing mortgage payments or provide their families with food and clothing.
Members of the group are angry at banks, who have been painfully slow to offer loan modifications, or simply refuse to lift a finger to help vulnerable families and neighborhoods to avoid foreclosure. Some banks often screw homeowners by sending numerous requests for already-submitted documents, and then foreclose on the hapless homeowner because the banks falsely claim that they never got those same documents!
The federal government’s attempt to solve the foreclosure crisis has failed. In 2009, 50,000 foreclosures swept New York state, with nearly half in NYC. Across the country the crisis is getting worse, not better. Katrina vanden Heuvel on July 15, in the Nation, reported that New York City foreclosures rose 16 percent in the first quarter of 2010 compared to the same period last year, with “…over 265,000 mortgages — 13 percent of the mortgages in New York State-are now past due or in the foreclosure process. Meanwhile, banks have made less than 12,000 permanent modifications in the state since May 2009.”
After several community meetings it became clear that many NYCC and union members need their mortgages modified because they are underwater or delinquent. The community and labor groups put together an action plan with Comptroller Liu, SEIU 32BJ & 1199, United Federation of Teachers, TWU, DC37, RWDSU, and the NY Hotel and Motel Trades Council.
To start they will send a letter to Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America and Wells Fargo, criticizing them for dragging their feet and demanding they do “everything possible” to avert foreclosures, including mortgage modifications.
At a July 13th, press conference, Michael Mulgrew, President, UFT, said he has brought the issue to the pension funds and they will consider all options. John Samuelsen, President, TWU Local 100 said that “since he was on the board of the city pension fund, he would ask that the bank’s response be one of the ways in which they evaluate where they put their money.” NYCC member, Jean-Andre Sassine, caught in the mortgage bind, said, “if the big banks won’t listen to homeowners, we thought that they should hear from some of their biggest investors — the city, the unions and their pension funds.”
If the banks fail to act, all parties involved could move their pension funds and bank deposits to other institutions. That is why the groups call their plan the Move Your Money campaign.
They claim it will not only modify foreclosures and save homes, it will hold big banks accountable to the community where they take deposits and profit from government supported loans. After foreclosures, neighbors who remain behind suffer from declining property values, and local and state revenues plummet, contributing to a stagnant economy and high unemployment. The coalition is demanding answers by September 1.
Thus far the Obama administration plan — which relies on a voluntary mortgage modification program — has not worked, forcing New Yorkers to take matters into their own hands.
The groups put Wall Street on notice that unless the banks increase the number of modifications, including principal write-downs, expedite the modification process and stop foreclosure proceedings while applications are being reviewed, the group will increase the pressure. “This is just the first step in a campaign to win loan modifications that stop preventable foreclosures. We’re saying it loud and clear – if the banks won’t listen, it’s time to move our money,” Jon Kest, NYCC’s executive director.
What happened to ACORN?
It is a rare showing of both money and people power, with the unions representing over 500,000 working families. NYCC is a coalition of low- and moderate-income working families fighting for social and economic justice throughout New York State and includes some of the leaders and organizers from the now defunct ACORN. The group also uses many of the same tactics and strategies. NYCC’s members and leaders hope the action taken by New York City’s Comptroller and labor leaders will lead to a dramatic shift in how the banks deal with borrowers.
Civic leaders across the country should follow the coalition’s lead. Either big banks become part of the solution or the rest of us will have to Move the Money.
You can buy a copy of John Atlas’s new book about ACORN, which tells the whole Acorn story at Amazon or Vanderbilt University Press or in most local book stores.
Any News Media Outlet…do you think maybe getting an interview with Sen Bernie Sanders to tell the truth the whole truth and nothing but the TRUTH?
He GETS IT!
Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-VT) discusses greed and the foreclosure crisis, and calls for a “new Wall Street” during a recent conversation at Brave New Studios in Culver City, CA. Produced by Brave New Foundation. We must put a human face on the foreclosure crisis affecting millions of families. Go to
FightingForOurHomes.com
Host of MSNBC’s “The Dylan Ratigan Show”
Posted: June 24, 2010 12:04 PM Huffington Post
The dire straits of the middle class of America has made it near impossible for our politicians to keep up the pretense that our current government truly works for the “people.” Between the multiple overt and secretive bailouts, the massive bonuses and the circular use of our tax money to lobby for these continued handouts, you can no longer hide from the evidence.
When Senator Durbin said “The banks… frankly own this place,” you realize it was not in jest.
Couple this with recent protections handed by the Supreme Court to corporations to directly influence elections and it can make things seem hopeless for those not on Wall Street or their chosen politicians. Favored CEOs and now even foreign countries get all the printed money they need, leaving us paying both our bills and theirs.
And now nearly a quarter of all Americans are currently underwater in their mortgage because of that steadfast honor.
If you are one of them, chances are you didn’t do anything wrong. Almost all of you were not subprime borrowers or speculators, but merely people buying a house that they thought they could afford at the time. You were just unlucky in that you bought a house during a time when an outdated Wall Street and their complicit politicians decided to use housing to regain the income they lost due to the Schwabs and Etrades of the internet age.
Now you are struggling to make the same payments on this mortgage on your now overpriced home even in light of a crashing economy and massive deflation, all while the government does everything in its power to help Wall St. keep the bonuses coming.
Well, it is becoming time to take matters into your own hands… I suggest that you call your lender and tell them if they don’t lower you mortgage by at least 20%, you are walking away. And if they don’t agree, you need to consider walking away.
That is because you probably are a good person. But your mortgage is a business deal, and it is not immoral to walk away from a business deal unless you went in to the deal with the intention of defaulting.
As part of the deal for your house, your mortgage holder gets interest payments from you and they also use the note to your house for their capital reserves. In return, they take the risk of a foreclosure. In many states, you paid extra to have a non-recourse loan where the lender just gets the house back if you stop paying — your interest rate would’ve been much lower if you were held personally liable like a student loan. But if you still feel bad, then donate the money saved to charity instead of to their bonuses. And when someone tries telling you why it is so wrong, here are some answers:
– Yes, it might seem selfish, but you are actually going to help fix our country the right way, through the use of pure capitalism. There are 3 parties involved in your mortgage — the mortgage holders, the servicing bank and you. You probably want to stay in your house. Most of the people who actually own your mortgage also want you to stay in your house, preferring a mortgage reduction that you keep paying instead of the total loss of a foreclosure. But the major banks (BofA, Wells Fargo, JP Morgan, Citi, etc.) that underwrite and service the loans don’t care about either of you. They (with the aid of their government) just care about hiding their true financial condition for long as possible so they can continue to bonus themselves outrageously. The credible threat of you walking away from your mortgage en masse is the only market-based solution that will force these banks to work with the mortgage holders on your behalf.
– No, you will not “hurt” your neighbors — certainly not near the scale of the banksters. Chances are someone just as nice will you will move in and (unlike you) pay a fair, non-inflated price for the house. Encourage your neighbors to fight back against the banks and ask for their own mortgage reductions as well.
– Yes, it might make getting a loan harder for everyone. Considering the spate 0% down NINJA loans over the past decade, that probably isn’t a bad thing.
– Yes, it might hurt your credit. But with time, people bounce back from having foreclosures on their record. Search online and then talk to a lawyer about the repercussions, which vary by state.
– No, the banks won’t necessarily pass the losses on to customers. They already make a lot of money. If costs are passed on to every consumer without banks competing on price, that’s a sign of illegal collusion or a monopoly. Let’s fix that instead of just letting banks ruin our lives. They might, however, not all make $145 billion in bonuses next year doing something fundamentally so easy that it is an unpaid job in Monopoly.
Instead of claw backs for the past theft and strong financial reform for the future, they choose to cover-up the gross misuse of our tax money, making our country worse by helping the criminals on the backs of the most honest.
But thankfully, in this country we still have the tools to fight back and regain our country. Our vote, our voice, our laws and what we choose to do with every penny we have that doesn’t go to taxes are the benefits of our hard-fought freedom, and in this battle we must use them all to fight back. It’s time for the citizens to once again own this place.
Recent Comments