I would urge the AG’s investigating MERS to turn to MISMO next because it’s beginning to appear they are taking crucial parts away from MERS. Something is definitely up?
The major participants in the residential mortgage industry utilize the MIN. Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae all utilize the MIN. MISMO encourages the SEC to adopt the MERS Mortgage Identification Number (MIN) as the primary loan identifier for real estate finance ABS.
The Mortgage Bankers Association is going to take back management of its MISMO platform from MERS, according to a HousingWire source familiar with the plans.
The crossover will be complete Dec. 1 and a press release providing more details is said to be in the works.
An “unprecedented crackdown.” That’s how Commissioner David Stevens described a get-tough program that took place under him at the Federal Housing Administration from mid-2009 until April of this year. As part of the push, the FHA’s Mortgage Review Board issued more administrative actions against lenders in Stevens’ first year than it had in the prior eight years combined.
David Stevens arrived as a commissioner at the Federal Housing Administration in 2009 vowing to restore financial discipline to a government housing body facing the stresses of a post-crash world. A former mortgage banker himself, Stevens, now 54, bolstered the agency’s finances and pursued alleged wrongdoing at nonbank lenders including Berkshire Hathaway and Goldman Sachs & Co. affiliates.
One group the FHA did not feud with during Stevens’ tenure: top industry players, such as Bank of America Corp. and Wells Fargo & Co. A collection of emails between Stevens and the Mortgage Bankers Association may help explain why.
“E-signatures will reduce the volume of lost paperwork, reduce signature fraud, reduce the time required to close a loan, and may lead to lower borrower costs.”
MERS cannot even keep track of who owns what loan and with all the alleged fraudulent signatures originating from it’s certifying officers signing virtually any number of documents to land records… special caution to permit e-signatures that can easily be cut and pasted.
What if this ever gets “hacked”… nothing is bullet proof.
Lenders say ‘dual tracking’ protects their investment if the homeowner is unable to qualify for new loan terms. But regulators seeking to ban the practice say it lulls some borrowers into thinking they won’t have their homes taken away.
Harry Gardner, president of SigniaDocs, said the perfect infrastructure is one that manages all mortgage documents electronically, but the number of loans in the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems’ eRegistry is about 200,000, or “a small fraction of mortgages written in the last 10 years.”
“And by eMortgage, we mean truly paperless not some hybrid of some paper and some electronic documentation,” Gardener said. “Ten years ago, we were saying mainstream eMortgage documentation was three to five years away, and I’m happy to say that mainstream eMortgage documentation is now three to five years away.”
For you to understand the plan the financial institutions have you need to grasp the following. Will MERS patterns continue? Imagine the price you will pay when these files are hacked or manipulated.
Everyone knows by now that MERS was ‘invented’ to keep costs low for the banks, reduce the risk of record-keeping errors and make it easier to keep track of loans for the banks not the borrowers. By these actions, not only has MERS eliminated crucial chain in title documents, has proven in many court cases to assign absolutely nothing because it had no power to negotiate the note but also eliminated an enormous amount of county revenues.
Last week SFF wrote about the latest invention planned to coexist with MERS called SmartSAFE, which will be used for creating, signing, storing, accessing and managing the lifecycle of electronic mortgage documents. According to Wave’s eSignSystems Executive VP Kelly Purcell, “Mortgages are sold several times throughout the life of a loan, and electronic mortgages address the problem of the ‘lost note,’ while improving efficiency in the process.”
This goes a step forward of what MERS can do today.
Will this process eliminate recording paper mortgages/deeds from county records? Eliminate fees that counties in trouble desperately need? THIS IS VERY DANGEROUS.
Still with me? Finally, according to CUinsight, a sample eNote in the form of a MRG Category 1 classified SMARTDoc, was successfully delivered to Xerox’s BlitzDocs eVault, a virtual repository that connects directly to the MERS® eRegistry and eDelivery systems, where it was electronically signed and registered.
Adding the finishing touches to permit MERS access to future eNotes? I say this is the master plan.
Looking forward to what MA John O’Brien, the Essex County register of deeds, NC Register of deeds Jeff Thigpen and NY Suffolk County, former county clerk Ed Romaine’s approach is after they read what they plan on doing to land records. If they thought it was limited to the elimination of recording fees for assignments of mortgage, they are mistaken.
Questions remain as to why replace something that has been working for so long? Why continue with MERS, a system which has failed in many ways? MERS is under investigation for fraud is it not? Why in a time where mortgage fraud is wide spread, will anyone even trust using electronic devices to manage possibly future trillions of dollars worth?
Say farewell to a tradition that has been here for well over 300 years. Eliminating ‘paper’ will put promissory notes and mortgage related documents in great jeopardy. No computer system in the world is secure [PERIOD].
This is a direct quote from the Florida Banker’s Association Comments to the Supreme Court of Florida files September 30, 2009:
“It is a reality of commerce that virtually all paper documents related to a note and mortgage are converted to electronic files almost immediately after the loan is closed. Individual loans, as electronic data, are compiled into portfolios which are transferred to the secondary market, frequently as mortgage-backed securities.
The reason “many firms file lost note counts as a standard alternative pleading in the complaint” is because the physical document was deliberately eliminated to avoid confusion immediately upon its conversion to an electronic file. See State Street Bank and Trust Company v. Lord, 851 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). Electronic storage is almost universally acknowledged as safer, more efficient and less expensive than maintaining the originals in hard copy, which bears the concomitant costs of physical indexing, archiving and maintaining security. It is a standard in the industry and becoming the benchmark of modern efficiency across the spectrum of commerce—including the court system.”
Now if there is no issues surrounding what everyone is shouting from their roof tops, then why integrate a new software that was suppose to have been implemented already to “Improves Efficiency & Transparency of Electronic Mortgage Transactions” within MERS itself?
“During the foreclosure crisis of the last few years we saw many instances where the original and subsequent paperwork was lost, destroyed or misfiled when loans were bought and sold,” commented Kelly Purcell, Executive Vice President for Wave’s eSignSystems division. “Mortgages are sold several times throughout the life of a loan, and electronic mortgages address the problem of the ‘lost note,’ while improving efficiency in the process.”
Federal Housing Administration Commissioner David H. Stevens will become head of the Mortgage Bankers Association after he leaves his government post this month, the trade group said.
Stevens last week announced his intention to resign from the housing agency. He will join the Washington-based bankers group in May.
Michael D. Berman, chairman of the bankers group, called Stevens “uniquely qualified” for the job.
“He has had a tremendous impact at FHA,” Berman said in a statement today.
Ginnie Mae is pleased to announce that it has joined with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (GSEs) in adopting the Mortgage Industry Standards Maintenance Organization’s (“MISMO”) Uniform Loan Delivery Dataset (“ULDD”) for delivering loan information to the agencies. The GSEs have been working on this effort; and, announced to their respective program participants that effective September 1, 2011, and forward, all loans delivered to the GSEs will be required to be transmitted to the GSEs using the ULDD specifications.
The mortgage finance industry supports the adoption of standards and common file formats, as they lead to higher quality data, less rework, and lower costs for all participants in the industry, including borrowers.
Fed wants to strip a key protection for homeowners
Posted on Wednesday, December 1, 2010
By Tony Pugh | McClatchy Newspapers
WASHINGTON — As Americans continue to lose their homes in record numbers, the Federal Reserve is considering making it much harder for homeowners to stop foreclosures and escape predatory home loans with onerous terms.
The Fed’s proposal to amend a 42-year-old provision of the federal Truth in Lending Act has angered labor, civil rights and consumer advocacy groups along with a slew of foreclosure defense attorneys.
They’re not only asking the Fed to withdraw the proposal, they also want any future changes to the law to be handled by the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which begins its work next year.
In a letter to the Fed’s Board of Governors, dozens of groups that oppose the measure, including the National Consumer Law Center, the NAACP and the Service Employees International Union, say the proposal is bad medicine at the wrong time.
“At the depths of the worst foreclosure crisis since the Great Depression, we are surprised that the Fed has proposed rules that would eviscerate the primary protection homeowners currently have to escape abusive loans and avoid foreclosure: the extended right of rescission.”
Because the public comment period on the Fed’s proposal is still open until Dec. 23, a spokesman declined comment on the matter.
But in a September passage in the Federal Register, the Fed said the proposal was designed to “ensure a clearer and more equitable process for resolving rescission claims raised in court proceedings” and reflects what most courts already require.
How to report? One of the things we strongly recommend is that you look at the MISMO standards, the Mortgage Industry Standards Maintenance Organization, for definitions, for format, and I think this might address issues, for example, with HUD reported credit score. That if you like at the MISMO, we don’t simply look at one field for credit score. There’s a field for a number. There’s also then a field of whether it’s a vantage score, whether it comes from FICO, what vendor reported the score. So that there are a number of variables then that are really behind it, and if you simply then pick up all of these variables associated with the credit score the way we do, you can then use the information internal to then generate whatever percentile or whatever calculation you would like to do, but that that would not be put back on the lender to reenter data, to rekey it, but instead use what’s already out there in the industry. Also it would provide for easier changes later on, if any additions are needed.
What about a universal mortgage identifier? That has been brought up. We would strongly recommend that you look at the mortgage identification number that’s been put out by the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, MERS. It allows us to track mortgages throughout the system from application all the way to sale of servicing, sales of the secondary market and I think for these purposes it would allow us to really sort of track some of the under coverage that we do see in the HMDA data. We did some analysis and found that by throwing out all the correspondent loans, we are eliminating a number of loans that had no counterpart in the retail broker data.
What to make public? Well, we really think that’s your decision. In a sense that there are a number of data elements here that we would very much not want to make public as companies because of the limitations we face, but that certainly that’s an issue that the bureau and the Fed will have to face going forward is the tradeoff between risks of identity theft associated with some of these elements and that, but that’s really your decision to make rather than the industry, and to some degree, we would benefit, I think, in terms of what would explain what’s going on in the industry with a greater data release.
Finally on multifamily, we did an analysis and we think that HMDA already covers about 95 percent of the multifamily loans that are made. In contrast, though, it covers only about 60 percent or so of the dollar amount of the loans. So that if you look then at the average loan amount that’s in HMDA, it’s about $1.7 million for a multifamily loan. If you look at the average loan size of what’s missing, it’s about $19 million. So we don’t know how much effort really should be put into trying to capture this remaining 5 percent of really high dollar loans that are done for just an entirely different set of investors out there. So I think you really ought to look at what do you really want to do with the multifamily data? Do you really want to expand it or is there a questionable usefulness of what’s already there? Thank you.
Page 23359 -Is the approach to asset number identifier workable? Should we only require or permit one type of asset number for all asset classes? If so, which one would be most useful? It appears that our proposed naming convention of “[CIKnumber]-[Sequential asset number]” would be applicable to all asset classes. Does the use of an asset number alleviate potential privacy issues for the underlying obligor? Why or why not? What issues arise if the asset number is determined by the registrant? Would there be any issues with investors being able to specifically identify each asset and follow its performance through periodic reporting.
MISMO Response
MISMO does not believe that a single asset numbering system should be required across all asset classes. The industry infrastructure behind each asset class is supported by different systems and business processes. Each ABS participant industry (e.g. residential real estate finance) should be able to utilize an asset numbering system as efficiency and convention dictate, absent a compelling regulatory purpose.
In the mortgage sphere, the MERS Mortgage Identification Number (MIN) has been in use since 1997 and has been assigned to over 65 million loans. The MIN is a combination of a unique loan identifier for the originating lender plus the loan’s internal file number. It is available for residential, multifamily and commercial loans. It can attach to a mortgage as early as the application for a loan. The MIN is then used to track a loan throughout its life cycle, from application through monthly servicing activities until final loan payoff. It is used also used within the loss mitigation and Real Estate Owned (REO) processes. The MIN is well integrated within all facets of the real estate finance industry.
The adoption of a new, different, and/or conflicting numbering system would result in greater confusion, unnecessary system development costs, longer lead times for compliance and decreased transparency by making it more difficult for industry participants to track assets across multiple data and reporting systems. The real estate finance industry would be required to add the new asset number to all of its applications, databases, and file transfers between applications. In certain situations, a new asset number may have unintended consequences in the primary residential mortgage market. If a lender has to decide at the time of application whether to employ the MIN or some other loan numbering system based on the lender’s estimation that the borrower may not qualify for a conforming loan (loans meeting the criteria of Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac) or governmental mortgage (loans meeting the criteria of FHA, VA, or the Rural Housing Service), then the Proposal could unintentionally steer applicants to particular loan types. Alternatively, if a lender starts down one path and then needs to re-key an application, the chances for error increase.
The MIN is the only universally accepted identifier for loans in the mortgage industry across the entire lifecycle of the loan. The major participants in the residential mortgage industry utilize the MIN. Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae all utilize the MIN. MISMO encourages the SEC to adopt the MERS Mortgage Identification Number (MIN) as the primary loan identifier for real estate finance ABS.
As long as the proposed data elements cannot be associated with a specific individual, there should not be privacy concerns with this information being made publically available. In anticipation of this requirement, MERS has designed and will implement a public version of the MIN that issuers would use in their public disclosure file format that could not be used to identify an individual associated with the required data.
To address the possibility of duplicate loan identifiers across different ABS industries (e.g. real estate finance and credit cards), a unique identifier can be provided with file submissions to denote a particular asset class, avoiding the drastic impact of imposing a whole new numbering system on an industry.
MERS was created in 1995 under the auspices of the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA), as the mortgage industry’s utility, to streamline the mortgage process by using electronic commerce to eliminate paper. Our Board of Directors and shareholders are comprised of representatives from the MBA, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, large and small mortgage companies, the American Land Title Association (ALTA), the CRE Finance Council, title underwriters, and mortgage insurance companies.
Our initial focus was to eliminate the need to prepare and record assignments when trading mortgage loans. Our members make MERS the mortgagee and their nominee on the security instruments they record in the county land records. Then they register their loans on the MERS® System so they can electronically track changes in ownership over the life of the loans. This process eliminates the need to record assignments every time the loans are traded. Over 3000 MERS members have registered more than 65 million loans on the MERS® System, saving the mortgage industry hundreds of millions of dollars in the process. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and Veterans Administration (VA) approved MERS for government loans because they recognized the value to consumers. On table-funded loans, MERS eliminates the cost to the consumer of the mortgage assignment ($30 – $150). In addition, the MERS process ensures that lien releases are not delayed by eliminating potential breaks in the chain of title. Similar to the residential product, we also addressed the assignment problem in the commercial market with MERS® Commercial, on which is registered over $110 billion in Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS) loans.
More than 60 percent of existing mortgages have an assigned MIN, making a total of 65,000,000 loans registered since the inception of the system in 1997. The corresponding data for these mortgages is tracked on the MERS® System from origination through sale and until payoff. MERS therefore offers a substantial base of historical data about existing loans that can be harnessed to bring transparency to existing MBS products. Attached are letters from the MBA, FHA, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac on this point.
The Mortgage Foreclosure Maze: Securitization with a Twist
The cases and commentary, the blogs and discussions tend to focus on the legal details. Lawyers without
substantial knowledge of the securitization process attempt to shoehorn the resultant obfuscations into
often-arcane statutes and even more antiquated case law. The result is a bewildering array of conflicting
and confusing case law. Defendants “cannot see the forest for the trees”. This is the intended outcome:
the securitization process practiced by the numerous now defunct fly-by-night originator-securitizers
created a complex maze of internally contradictory documents that only a finance MBA can unravel.
So let us step back and focus on the bigger policy perspective and attendant questions commonly
asked—never definitively answered.
Why do servicers resist loan modifications when the clear economic consequences in terms of net
present value to the “lender” would appear to yield much better results than a foreclosure sale in a
distressed market, less costs of administration? Many focus upon the latter as the driver: the servicers
generate substantial fees in the foreclosure process. The government programs fix upon this aspect and
attempt to sway the servicers’ economic decision by offering a few thousand dollars for modification to
offset the benefits of foreclosure-related fees. But this has not worked—not at all. The reason is clear if
we step back two more steps.
At the inception, the securitizations were mass-produced models of complexity. They are a bewildering
assembly of “boiler plate” common to financings plus special twists that make each one a little different
from the next. These little twists make calculation of the specific payouts across dozens of the trusts
uncommonly difficult. Imagine a servicer with “rights” to service dozens of different trusts with complex
internal ladders of senior/junior tranches that drive re-allocation of payments from one group of
investor payees to another. These are often referred to as “waterfalls”. These waterfalls are driven by
“designed to fail” mortgage loans that go into default. The effect was intended, the triggers to default
were combinations of negative amortization, illusory teaser interest rates and last but not least a very
steep “cliff” that homeowners face when the current payment amounts hit a rest calculation 3-5 years after loan origination. Again the question arises as to why an originator would intentionally create a predictably defective loan. Again the answer lies buried among the boilerplate paragraphs in the seldom-read twists.
In the beginning, the trusts were constructed of ladders of “groups” of mortgage loans [promissory
notes] associated with “classes” of so-called mortgage-backed securities [“MBS”]. The various Classes
are commonly referred to as tranches—using finance terminology that usually referred to different
maturity classes in a conventional securitization pool. For example, a pool of “Group I” mortgage loans
were associated with a pool of “Class I” MBS. The two were theoretically matched: payments in from
homeowners were pooled and paid out to MBS investors. However, these “senior” Class I MBS payouts
were further “supported” by current payments received from mortgage loans associated with junior
classes of MBS. Some refer to this as “over-collateralization”. The investors themselves bought “notes”
issued by the special purpose vehicles [“SPVs”], which could either be affiliates of the originator/securitizer or the so-called trusts. The senior Class I MBS “notes” are payable as ARM investments with periodic payments set to match the full life of the associated mortgage loans. As noted above, the senior Class I MBS investors actually looked to forecast interest rates and the prospect of future payments out of all of the mortgage loans associated with the entire trust—all classes. In other words the senior investors’ returns are virtually guaranteed by all the payments of all the homeowners. There was little risk. These investors paid a premium for these senior classes to refect lack of risk due to over-collateralization, combined with an apparent solid expectation of rising interest rates. The underwriters set up these structures with a view to marketing. The underwriter could approach an investor and tout the safety of seniority and upside of interest rates. A guaranteed “IOU”. Although there were associated mortgage loans, these investors’ due diligence did not require investigation of the quality of the loans in the associated Group I mortgage loans. These investors looked to over-collateralization for payment. The MBS were marketed in this way. Nobody felt a need to look at the quality of these Group loans. That is why the worst loans, the predatory loans, the “air” loans [eg. falsified loans on non-existent condos located above the top story of a high rise] were concealed in the group I loan pool. The concealment was furthered by fairly consistent patterns of failure to file
“mortgage loan schedules” typically required by the securitization documents. These documents—
usually the Indenture—expressly provided for the filings of loan lists detailing aspects of the loans with
both Securities Exchange Commission [“SEC”] and (usually) the Delaware Secretary of State UCC
“financing statement” records. The failures to file loan lists—“missing loan schedules” are observable
from the docket of the SEC for every trust, in tandem with identification of the provision in the
Indentures where a “manually filed” exhibit is referenced. Any losses suffered by owners of these MBS
in 2007-2008 were due to unknowing panic sales or sales that were forced to meet margin requirements
elsewhere. There was no investor fraud associated with these senior classes.
Conversely, some investors in more junior classes received a different marketing pitch and product. For
argument’s sake, let’s say that the trust also included a pool of “Group III” mortgage loans. The Group III
loans are “salt of the earth” loans. These loans are straightforward 30 year fixed rate plain vanilla
conventional loans with no bells and whistles, good documentation, etc. [please note this is a premise
not necessarily a fact]. These Group III loans were superficially associated with junior Class III MBS. The
class III prospective buyers were directed by marketers to look to the associated “safe” mortgage loans
for recovery of investment—and interest. These investors either ignored, overlooked or were misdirected.
They did not take into account the impact of the over-collateralization benefits granted to the
senior Class I MBS holders. These investors needed to examine the quality of the toxic Group I loans that
purportedly supported the senior Class I holders. They did not. They did not even perform the due
diligence necessary to make the simplest of determinations—that in most cases the loan lists were
never filed with the government agencies that the SEC filings represented. These investors were the
teachers and other pension funds. The extent of the fraud on these investor managers was matched
only by their negligence/assumption of risk.
The foregoing sets the stage for the events 2007-8. The original toxic trusts began to really blossom in
2004. They took off. Massive outreach programs were launched to train mortgage loan broker personnel
how to aggressively market the Group I toxic and other loans to “anybody with a pulse”. They needed to
produce loans rapidly to feed the securitization and earn the tax-free SPV premiums. This is well-known.
By 2007, the earliest toxic loans were hitting the “cliff”—facing unsustainable dramatically higher
payment resets. Now the rest of the structure begins to kick in and the motivations of the then creators
and today’s servicers comes into focus.
The Group I loans that go into default cease current payments to the trust. However, the Class I MBS
investors MUST BE PAID. The waterfall kicks in. Current payments by Group III mortgage loan payers are,
in effect, diverted from paying Class III MBS teachers pensions to paying the holders of the Class I MBS
preferred “in the know” underwriter customers. The senior status of the Class I investors went into
effect. As the 2007-2008 debacle gains momentum, more group I mortgages fail and more current
payments are diverted from the Class III investors to Class I investors. Panic sets in and the entire MBS
structure comes under a cloud. In the know bottom feeders buy up Class I MBS for a fraction of their still
solid NPV. Class III investors are coming up short with worse times to come. These MBS sell for pennies.
These investors look to government buyout programs, insurance—anything to recoup.
The disintegration of the group I mortgages accelerates as all approach reset and the economy tanks.
Homeowners lose long-held jobs and must relocate to find new jobs. Their homes are now well below
water, no matter what the original loan to value ratio. They abandon homes to the foreclosure mills.
This is a well known scenario. But the unanswered question remains: What happens to the growing
volumes of incoming foreclosure proceeds? Who gets these monies?
The answer to this seeming imponderable is found in the servicing agreements. The servicer deposits all
receipts from current payments and foreclosure proceeds into a “collection account”. Payments are
made as per the terms of the MBS to the MBS investors from this account. However, the twist is that the
payments to the junior MBS classes, such as the Class III MBS, can be sourced exclusively from current
mortgage loan payments after the re-allocation of payments to the senior Class I MBS. By EOY 2008,
70% of the early 2004 Group I loans have defaulted—no current payments made. This 70% shortfall in
receipts available to the Class I holders is “made up” by shifted funds from Class III holders. At the same
time as the servicer is short-paying the Class III holders, the servicer is literally swamped with incoming
proceeds of foreclosure from all Groups—worst being toxic Group I mortgage loans. The terms of the
trust do not allow the servicer to distribute the foreclosure proceeds. The foreclosure proceeds instead
cause the servicer’s “collection account” balance to grow exponentially. The terms of the servicing
agreement, not surprisingly, contemplate this easily foreseeable eventuality.
Under older less aggressive securitizations and escrow arrangements a common benefit to servicers and
banks alike was the ability to retain the income from investment of the collection account balance. In
the “old days” this balance typically arose from timing differences between escrowed insurance and real
estate tax receipts versus payments to insurers and county governments. However, the same rules were
applied to these trusts. The balance of the entire trust’s loan amounts outstanding was and is shrinking.
Simultaneously the servicer’s related “collection account” is burgeoning with foreclosure proceeds.
Theoretically these proceeds must be held intact until the amounts are called upon to make distributions in the distant future to the Class I senior MBS holders. So after the Class III salt of the earth payers have themselves failed or refinanced, the proceeds might be needed. The servicer is stuck with large cash surpluses in the collection account. Once again by careful forethought the servicing agreement provides that the servicer may invest the proceeds of the surplus [foreclosure proceeds] in some worthwhile investment of several types typically set out in the servicing agreement. But there is no oversight and only in years’ far in the future will failed or fraudulent investments be felt by the Class I investors for whose purported benefit these sums are maintained. However, the servicer is expressly entitled to retain the entire income stream from this collapsed structure.
This series of events explains why servicers are REALLY anxious to foreclose—even if the decision
appears from the outside to make no sense. It explains why servicers have paid large sums for the
“servicing rights”—which most unknowing souls believe relates primarily to skimming fees. The true
incentive for the servicer is control over the ever-growing pool of foreclosure proceeds—similar to a life
estate. This is the last step on a long trail of American tears. It appears superficially to be legal but for
the original deceptions. That is why the worst trusts were made by fly by nights and they conveniently
file for bankruptcy. By connecting the servicers today to the original trust structure planning, the
servicers be deprived of their ill gotten gains and justice be done. This cycle will repeat itself absent
intercession by government.
Kevin P. Casey for The New York Times: Darlene and Robert Blendheim of Seattle are struggling to keep their home after their subprime lender went out of business.
By MIKE McINTIRE NYTimes
Published: April 23, 2009
Judge Walt Logan had seen enough. As a county judge in Florida, he had 28 cases pending in which an entity called MERS wanted to foreclose on homeowners even though it had never lent them any money.
MERS, a tiny data-management company, claimed the right to foreclose, but would not explain how it came to possess the mortgage notes originally issued by banks. Judge Logan summoned a MERS lawyer to the Pinellas County courthouse and insisted that that fundamental question be answered before he permitted the drastic step of seizing someone’s home.
Daniel Rosenbaum for The New York Times R. K. Arnold, MERS president, said the company helped reduce mortgage fraud and imposed order on the industry.
“You don’t think that’s reasonable?” the judge asked.
“I don’t,” the lawyer replied. “And in fact, not only do I think it’s not reasonable, often that’s going to be impossible.”
Judge Logan had entered the murky realm of MERS. Although the average person has never heard of it, MERS — short for Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems — holds 60 million mortgages on American homes, through a legal maneuver that has saved banks more than $1 billion over the last decade but made life maddeningly difficult for some troubled homeowners.
Created by lenders seeking to save millions of dollars on paperwork and public recording fees every time a loan changes hands, MERS is a confidential computer registry for trading mortgage loans. From an office in the Washington suburbs, it played an integral, if unsung, role in the proliferation of mortgage-backed securities that fueled the housing boom. But with the collapse of the housing market, the name of MERS has been popping up on foreclosure notices and on court dockets across the country, raising many questions about the way this controversial but legal process obscures the tortuous paths of mortgage ownership.
If MERS began as a convenience, it has, in effect, become a corporate cloak: no matter how many times a mortgage is bundled, sliced up or resold, the public record often begins and ends with MERS. In the last few years, banks have initiated tens of thousands of foreclosures in the name of MERS — about 13,000 in the New York region alone since 2005 — confounding homeowners seeking relief directly from lenders and judges trying to help borrowers untangle loan ownership. What is more, the way MERS obscures loan ownership makes it difficult for communities to identify predatory lenders whose practices led to the high foreclosure rates that have blighted some neighborhoods.
In Brooklyn, an elderly homeowner pursuing fraud claims had to go to court to learn the identity of the bank holding his mortgage note, which was concealed in the MERS system. In distressed neighborhoods of Atlanta, where MERS appeared as the most frequent filer of foreclosures, advocates wanting to engage lenders “face a challenge even finding someone with whom to begin the conversation,” according to a report by NeighborWorks America, a community development group.
To a number of critics, MERS has served to cushion banks from the fallout of their reckless lending practices.
“I’m convinced that part of the scheme here is to exhaust the resources of consumers and their advocates,” said Marie McDonnell, a mortgage analyst in Orleans, Mass., who is a consultant for lawyers suing lenders. “This system removes transparency over what’s happening to these mortgage obligations and sows confusion, which can only benefit the banks.”
A recent visitor to the MERS offices in Reston, Va., found the receptionist answering a telephone call from a befuddled borrower: “I’m sorry, ma’am, we can’t help you with your loan.” MERS officials say they frequently get such calls, and they offer a phone line and Web page where homeowners can look up the actual servicer of their mortgage.
In an interview, the president of MERS, R. K. Arnold, said that his company had benefited not only banks, but also millions of borrowers who could not have obtained loans without the money-saving efficiencies it brought to the mortgage trade. He said that far from posing a hurdle for homeowners, MERS had helped reduce mortgage fraud and imposed order on a sprawling industry where, in the past, lenders might have gone out of business and left no contact information for borrowers seeking assistance.
“We’re not this big bad animal,” Mr. Arnold said. “This crisis that we’ve had in the mortgage business would have been a lot worse without MERS.”
About 3,000 financial services firms pay annual fees for access to MERS, which has 44 employees and is owned by two dozen of the nation’s largest lenders, including Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase and Wells Fargo. It was the brainchild of the Mortgage Bankers Association, along with Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae, the mortgage finance giants, who produced a white paper in 1993 on the need to modernize the trading of mortgages.
At the time, the secondary market was gaining momentum, and Wall Street banks and institutional investors were making millions of dollars from the creative bundling and reselling of loans. But unlike common stocks, whose ownership has traditionally been hidden, mortgage-backed securities are based on loans whose details were long available in public land records kept by county clerks, who collect fees for each filing. The “tyranny of these forms,” the white paper said, was costing the industry $164 million a year.
“Before MERS,” said John A. Courson, president of the Mortgage Bankers Association, “the problem was that every time those documents or a file changed hands, you had to file a paper assignment, and that becomes terribly debilitating.”
Although several courts have raised questions over the years about the secrecy afforded mortgage owners by MERS, the legality has ultimately been upheld. The issue has surfaced again because so many homeowners facing foreclosure are dealing with MERS.
Advocates for borrowers complain that the system’s secrecy makes it impossible to seek help from the unidentified investors who own their loans. Avi Shenkar, whose company, the GMA Modification Corporation in North Miami Beach, Fla., helps homeowners renegotiate mortgages, said loan servicers frequently argued that “investor guidelines” prevented them from modifying loan terms.
“But when you ask what those guidelines are, or who the investor is so you can talk to them directly, you can’t find out,” he said.
MERS has considered making information about secondary ownership of mortgages available to borrowers, Mr. Arnold said, but he expressed doubts that it would be useful. Banks appoint a servicer to manage individual mortgages so “investors are not in the business of dealing with borrowers,” he said. “It seems like anything that bypasses the servicer is counterproductive,” he added.
When foreclosures do occur, MERS becomes responsible for initiating them as the mortgage holder of record. But because MERS occupies that role in name only, the bank actually servicing the loan deputizes its employees to act for MERS and has its lawyers file foreclosures in the name of MERS.
The potential for confusion is multiplied when the high-tech MERS system collides with the paper-driven foreclosure process. Banks using MERS to consummate mortgage trades with “electronic handshakes” must later prove their legal standing to foreclose. But without the chain of title that MERS removed from the public record, banks sometimes recreate paper assignments long after the fact or try to replace mortgage notes lost in the securitization process.
This maneuvering has been attacked by judges, who say it reflects a cavalier attitude toward legal safeguards for property owners, and exploited by borrowers hoping to delay foreclosure. Judge Logan in Florida, among the first to raise questions about the role of MERS, stopped accepting MERS foreclosures in 2005 after his colloquy with the company lawyer. MERS appealed and won two years later, although it has asked banks not to foreclose in its name in Florida because of lingering concerns.
Last February, a State Supreme Court justice in Brooklyn, Arthur M. Schack, rejected a foreclosure based on a document in which a Bank of New York executive identified herself as a vice president of MERS. Calling her “a milliner’s delight by virtue of the number of hats she wears,” Judge Schack wondered if the banker was “engaged in a subterfuge.”
In Seattle, Ms. McDonnell has raised similar questions about bankers with dual identities and sloppily prepared documents, helping to delay foreclosure on the home of Darlene and Robert Blendheim, whose subprime lender went out of business and left a confusing paper trail.
“I had never heard of MERS until this happened,” Mrs. Blendheim said. “It became an issue with us, because the bank didn’t have the paperwork to prove they owned the mortgage and basically recreated what they needed.”
The avalanche of foreclosures — three million last year, up 81 percent from 2007 — has also caused unforeseen problems for the people who run MERS, who take obvious pride in their unheralded role as a fulcrum of the American mortgage industry.
In Delaware, MERS is facing a class-action lawsuit by homeowners who contend it should be held accountable for fraudulent fees charged by banks that foreclose in MERS’s name.
Sometimes, banks have held title to foreclosed homes in the name of MERS, rather than their own. When local officials call and complain about vacant properties falling into disrepair, MERS tries to track down the lender for them, and has also created a registry to locate property managers responsible for foreclosed homes.
“But at the end of the day,” said Mr. Arnold, president of MERS, “if that lawn is not getting mowed and we cannot find the party who’s responsible for that, I have to get out there and mow that lawn.”
By Les Christie, staff writerMay 28, 2010: 7:58 AM ET
NEW YORK (CNNMoney.com) — Walking away from a mortgage you can still afford to pay has consequences; everyone knows that. Your credit score is shot and it can be impossible to get credit.
Some homeowners, no doubt, believe that the credit score hit is worth getting out from a deeply underwater mortgage. They may owe, say, $500,000 when their house value is only valued at $350,000. And, they figure, there’s no way it will ever be worth what they owe so it’s better to get out from underneath the burden.
After default, they reason, they can raise their FICO scores by paying all their bills on time and eventually finance another home purchase.
Don’t count on it.
While homeowners who default due to economic hardship, such as a job loss or divorce, normally must wait two to five years before buying a home again, walkaways may face double that time.
“It could be well over seven or eight years before [walkaways] are able to obtain a mortgage to buy a home again,” said Jay Brinkmann, chief economist for the Mortgage Bankers Association.
How foreclosure impacts your credit score
“Credit scores are only one component of a complete credit decision,” Brinkmann said. “[In these cases] credit scores are not a good indicator of their willingness to continue to pay their mortgage.”
But future underwriters will scrutinize their records very closely, and if they find no precipitating factors leading to the defaults — no job loss, no health issues –the repaired credit score won’t overshadow the black mark of a walkaway.
“If you made a strategic decision to default on paying your mortgage, it will work against you,” said Bill Merrell of the National Association of Review Appraisers and Mortgage Underwriters.
Merrell, who teaches underwriting, said banks are looking at several factors in determining whether to grant mortgages: the amount of money borrowers have in the bank; employment histories; payment history.
However, banks may be far more lenient if the default resulted from factors somewhat beyond the borrower’s control, such as from local economic problems. “They’ll give you more consideration if it’s job related,” he said. But, he added, banks look at strategic defaults “very negatively.”
That said, it’s not impossible to get a loan. Banks still want to make interest payments, so they might be willing to gamble with a walkaway.
“It might be a little more difficult for them to borrow, but [banks’] drive for market share — to profit from making loans — will trump that caution,” said Keith Gumbinger, of the mortgage information publisher HSH Associates. “I don’t think we’ll see a full denial.”
It’s hard to foresee the state of mortgage lending six or seven months from now, let alone seven or eight years into the future. So lenders may look at applications from one-time strategic defaulters and say, “Yes, they walked away but it’s a whole different market now,” according to Gumbinger.
Even so, lenders may require more from borrowers who walked away than those who didn’t.
“To the extent they could get a mortgage,” said Brinkmann, “they can count on needing a heavy down payment.”
The lenders may ask for 30% down or more. That would provide enough collateral cushion that the bank could get all or most of its money back in a foreclosure.
Strategic defaulters might also be charged higher interest rates, even above the levels other borrowers with similar credit scores would receive.
The originators/warehouse lenders knew *exactly* what they were doing. That’s why they were immediately assigned!
And look at the bonuses the instigators received as *rewards* for their actions.
And then they lied about AAA ratings to sucker in US and foreign investors, including municipalities and state governments that are now in critical economic positions, as well.
BY: CARRIE BAY DsNEWS.com
It’s hard to pinpoint just what brought the nation’s thriving residential real estate market to its knees. Everyone’s got an opinion, but trying to nail down the exact trigger in order to prevent a sequel is a difficult task. The Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) is attempting to do just that.
According to a study released Wednesday by the trade group, poor risk management habits, including insufficient data and incomplete performance metrics, coupled with a short-term focus and unrealistic optimism among senior business managers were all factors that contributed to the collapse of the U.S. housing and mortgage markets.
The study entitled, Anatomy of Risk Management Practices in the Mortgage Industry was conducted by Professor Cliff Rossi of the University of Maryland and sponsored by MBA’s Research Institute for Housing America (RIHA). It analyzes the risk management processes employed by mortgage lenders leading up to the housing crisis and discusses lessons learned for future risk managers.
Professor Rossi, who has more than 20 years’ experience within the mortgage industry and at regulatory agencies, says that as home prices increased, lenders were pressured to offer innovative products that could help borrowers afford a home. He found that the increase and expansion of risk layering that resulted, along with changes in borrower behaviors, left risk managers unable to offer reliable risk estimates.
“According to some empirical analysis, when market conditions changed, mortgage performance models proved unstable, with loans originated in 2006 defaulting at four times the rate of what a model prior to 2004 would have predicted,” Rossi explained. “Moving forward, it will be essential for the industry to develop early warning measures of the level of risk in new originations and less reliance on imprecise historical performance of new loan products.”
Rossi says that in addition to limited information available for proper risk assessment, corporate culture and cognitive biases also strongly influenced decision-making during the boom. He argues that one of the biggest black eyes to come out of the prosperous years leading up to the bust was the decline in senior management’s loss aversion, thanks to a lengthy period of strong home prices and low defaults, which in turn led to relaxed underwriting and again, higher levels of risk layering.
“The combination of informational limitations on risk managers and a governance structure and culture that may have tipped decisions in favor of business-driven strategies is central to explaining the increase in risk-taking that took place throughout the industry,” Rossi said. “As the industry is now compensating for the resulting losses through tighter underwriting standards and a lower appetite for risk, it will be vital for executive management to instill a culture where all employees are on guard for risks that exceed the risk appetite of the company.”
Key findings from the study include:
Subprime loan underwriting criteria along several risk attributes expanded between 1999 and 2006. In particular, combined loan-to-value ratios (LTVs) increased over time as the percentage of loans with silent second liens attached to the property also increased. At the same time, the percentage of loans with full documentation declined.
The relative lack of geographic and product diversification by a number of the largest mortgage lenders was rationalized by investment opportunity costs and relative value.
A false sense of security with new products originated prior to 2007 occurred as a result of better than average economic conditions coupled with a lack of information regarding subtle but real changes in borrower and counterparty behavior.
Cognitive bias toward risk management may have combined with management views on loss-taking to view risk managers as overly conservative and inefficient, which would explain senior management’s actions that ultimately placed their firms at risk.
Michael Fratantoni, MBA’s VP of research and economics, commented, “Today’s mortgage industry is operating under vastly different guidelines than just a few years ago and the survivors in the industry today are clearly the companies that did things right. There is room for debate on how best to proceed, but certainly building a stronger risk management framework around the mortgage industry will be critical.”
VIENNA, VIRGINIA–BASED MERS IS A great example of how technological solutions can work for the betterment of our industry. MERS’story is more typical, though, in terms of how long it took the company’s solution to become mainstream.
I’ve found that typically new technologies or new technology firms take five to seven years to become successful in this industry. Of course, it is difficult for startup companies to last that long, which is one of the main reasons there is such a high failure rate among these firms. From the start, MERS had widespread support from the Mortgage Bankers Association(MBA) and all the major mortgage companies. Originally, MERS wasn’t well-funded ($5.2 million), but in 1998 it was recapitalized with significant contributions fromMBA, FannieMae and Freddie Mac—mostly interms of a line of credit. Still, it took five to seven years until MERS wash and handling millions of loans. Today, it has handled more than 30 million loans and just launched it’s next endeavor, called the MERS® eRegistry. It’s a great success story overall.
MERS’ eRegistry for eNotes was started in March 2003 (see www.mersinc.org for details). Its purpose is to provide a“pointer” to the location of the eNote, and it holds the legal identity of the controller. Any lender can then find the vault where the eNote is stored, as well as who controls it.
MERS provides the very valuable solution of tracking the eNote’s location without trying to compete with the private industry for all of the other actions that occur around an eNote, such as storage in a vault. By MERS’ own admission, this solution will take years before it becomes mainstream.
[…]
Today, most of the aforementioned parties are shipping the documents at great cost through carriers such as Federal Express. With VLF, all such shipping and the manual handling of the traditional loan folder is eliminated. In fact, all the paper in the process is gone. Yes, this is a form of imaging that some mortgage companies are using today. However, it goes much further, in that it would be used by all parties involved with each loan. In addition, it would also store the electronic data file of the loan and do so in a Mortgage Industry Standards Maintenance Organization Inc . (MISMO) format.
I guess this isn’t that rare. Take a look what a $3,000 unpaid water bill can do if you DO NOT HAVE ANY MORTGAGE.
One raw day in early February, Vicki Valentine stood by helplessly as real estate investors snatched her West Baltimore home over what began with an unpaid city water bill of $362. Valentine lost the property after the city sold her debt to investors through a contentious and byzantine legal process called a tax sale. This little-known type of foreclosure can enrich investors as growing numbers of property owners struggle to pay their bills.
GINNIE MAE MISMO
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