Make sure you read this carefully…This is a transcript of an employee of Residential Funding Company who is in charge of record keeping of original documents. Don’t miss the full deposition down below.
Follow the assets, don’t get lost in the trail…
17 Q. Now, when you said you’re the Director of
18 Records Management for the Minnesota office?
19 A. Uh-huh.
20 Q. Are there other offices of Residential
21 Funding that maintain records that you are
22 not responsible for?
23 A. There are records services sites in Iowa and
24 in Pennsylvania.Those deal mostly with the
25 GMAC mortgage assets.
<snip>
11 Q. And what, if anything, is your responsibility
12 with regard to those records?
13 A. To track the physical paper for those
14 assets — or that asset.
15 Q. Are you what you consider to be the keeper of
16 the records for those documents?
17 A. Sure, yep.
5 Q. Okay. And then when somebody wants to view
6 specific records from your system, is that
7 something that you’re responsible for
8 obtaining as part of your day-to-day
9 responsibilities?
10 A. The people that report to me, yes, or the
11 vendor that — that we have retained to do
12 those functions, yes. I don’t do that
13 myself.
14 Q. Who’s the vendor that you retain to do that?
15 A. A company called ACS.
16 Q. ACS?
17 A. Yep.
18 Q. And what does ACS do with regard to the
19 records?
20 A. They fulfill the request. So if somebody
21 needs a credit folder or a legal folder, they
22 research where those documents are, obtain
23 the documents and then provide that requestor
24 with either the paper documents or images.
<snip>
21 Q. There’s a file folder that shows it came from
22 the outside vendor?
23 A. Yes. Their sticker is affixed to the front
24 of the folder, so I know it came from them.
25 Q. Okay. And then is there anything on the
1 documents themselves that show where they
2 came from?
3 A. No.
4 Q. And by the outside vendor, do you mean ACS?
5 A. No. Actually, the vendor that stores the
6 actual folder is Iron Mountain.
7 Q. So there’s a sticker on that file that shows
8 it came from Iron Mountain?
9 A. Correct, yes.
10 Q. Does Iron Mountain maintain your system or do
11 they just maintain hard copies of documents?
12 A. They maintain the hard copies of the
13 documents.
14 Q. Not any records on your computer system,
15 correct?
16 A. No.
17 Q. Is that correct?
18 A. Correct.
<snip>
18 Q. What’s the relationship between Residential
19 Funding Company, LLC and U.S. Bank National
20 Association?
21 A. In — in this instance, U.S. Bank is the
22 trustee on the security that this loan is in.
23 And RFC was the issuer of the security that
24 was created.
25 Q. Who was the issuer of the security?
1 A. RFC was the issuer of the security.
2 Q. Oh, RFC is what you call Residential Funding
3 Company?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. So RFC issued the security?
6 A. Right.
7 Q. Can you explain to me what that means?
8 A. No, I can’t.
9 Q. Okay. How do you know RFC issued the
10 security?
11 A. It’s the normal course of business as to how
12 our — our business works. RFC is in the
13 business of acquiring assets and putting them
14 together into securities to sell in the — in
15 the market.
16 MR. SHAW: I would like to
17 register a general objection to this line of
18 questioning. There’s not been a foundation
19 laid for Judy Faber being competent to reach
20 some of these conclusions that are being
21 stated on the record.
22 BY MR. HOLLANDER:
23 Q. So in this particular instance, do you have
24 any personal knowledge of the relationship
25 between RFC and U.S. Bank National
1 Association as trustee?
2 A. No.
3 Q. For whom is U.S. Bank National Association
4 acting as the trustee?
5 A. I believe it would be for the investors of
6 the — that have bought the securities.
7 Q. I’m sorry. Something happened with the phone
8 and I didn’t hear your answer. I’m sorry.
9 A. I believe it would be for the different
10 investors who have bought pieces of that
11 security that was issued.
12 Q. Are there different investors that have
13 purchased the Peter Cook note?
14 A. I don’t think I’m qualified to answer that.
15 You know, I can tell you from what my basic
16 understanding is from the process, but I’m
17 not an expert.
18 MR. SHAW: Once again, I’d like to
19 raise a continuing general objection that she
20 being — testifying with respect to what her
21 job is, and I believe you’re getting into
22 areas that is other than what her job is and
23 you’re asking for possibly even legal
24 conclusions here. So I would like to raise
25 that objection again.
SUPREME COURT – STATE OF NEW YORK
I.A.S. PART XIII SUFFOLK COUNTY
HON. MELVYN TANENBAUM
Justice
US BANK N.A.,
-against-
ORLANDO BORJA ET AL.,
ORDEREDthat this motion by plaintiff seeking an order granting summary judgment, amending the caption of the action and appointing a referee to compute the sums due and owing to plaintiff in this mortgage foreclosure action is granted.
The Court has repeatedly directed plaintiffs counsel, Steven J. Baum, P.c., to submit proposed orders of reference in proper form and counsel’s office has repeatedly failed to comply.
Accordingly, plaintiff’s counsel is hereby directed to submit a proposed order for the appointment of a referee in the forn required by this Court. Any further failure to comply with this order shall be deemed wilful.
Anyone can see the “Fiction” that was set into place from all the institutions in this article below. Each one of these named parties as a shareholder utilizes Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., yet Washington never mentions this MERS device.
All this talk of false and misleading loans blah blah blah …I mean grab the bull by it’s nuts and put these criminals behind bars. Not just seek refunds! This clean up should also seek Racketeering Indictments.
Congress Seeks Fannie, Freddie Exit as Banks Eat Soured Loans
By Dawn Kopecki – Sep 15, 2010 1:00 AM ET
U.S. lawmakers will grapple today with how to end the bailout of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac after two years and almost $150 billion, and who pays the bill for bad loans made during the housing boom.
Regulators who seized control of the two mortgage lenders in 2008 are under pressure to stem losses for taxpayers and recoup money from banks that sold faulty loans to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac — all without hindering the housing market’s recovery. Assistant Treasury Secretary Michael Barr and Edward DeMarco, acting director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, are scheduled to testify today on their progress at the House Financial Services Committee.
The Obama administration and Congress are weighing the future of the two companies as part of an overhaul of the U.S. housing finance system. Fannie Mae, based in Washington, and Freddie Mac, based in McLean, Virginia, lost $166 billion on guarantees of single-family mortgages from the end of 2007 through the second quarter, according to the FHFA. Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner has promised a comprehensive proposal by early next year.
“The biggest problem in the economy is that we have three or four million too many homes,” said Chris Kotowski, a banking analyst at Oppenheimer & Co. The solution “will take another two or three years to work out until we sop up the excess supply,” Kotowski said.
Loan Clean-Up
The clean-up includes seeking refunds from lenders who sold loans based on false or misleading information, and the two government-backed firms aren’t the only ones demanding buybacks. The Federal Reserve, private mortgage investors and mortgage insurers are combing through loan documents for faulty appraisals, inflated borrower incomes and missing documentation that would support a refund request.
As of the end of the second quarter 2010, Fannie Mae had $4.7 billion in outstanding repurchase requests, and Freddie Mac had $6.4 billion in outstanding repurchase requests. DeMarco said in his prepared testimony that outstanding repurchase requests continue to be “of concern.”
While US Bank cannot foreclose on the home, it can sue her to collect the debt she still owes.
Hough’s attorney, Henry Loeb of Somerville, said, “It’s a split decision. She is very happy about having the mortgage voided. But we thought there were decent arguments to have the entire loan voided.”
US BANK, N.A., Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
NIKIA HOUGH, Defendant-Appellant, and
MR. HOUGH, HUSBAND OF NIKIA HOUGH; NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS; COUNCIL ON AFFORDABLE HOUSING; TOWNSHIP OF PISCATAWAY; NEW JERSEY HOUSING AND MORTGAGE FINANCE AGENCY; STATE OF NEW JERSEY; and THE COMMONS AT PISCATAWAY, INC., Defendants.
No. A-5623-08T3.
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.
Argued January 12, 2010.
Reargued April 13, 2010.
Decided September 14, 2010.
Henry A. Loeb argued the cause for appellant (Blumberg & Rosenberg, P.A., attorneys; Mr. Loeb, on the brief).
Vladimir Palma argued the cause for respondent (Phelan Hallinan & Schmieg, PC, attorneys; Mr. Palma, on the brief).
Geraldine Callahan, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Office of the Attorney General (Paula T. Dow, Attorney General, attorney; Nancy Kaplen, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Ms. Callahan, on the statement in lieu of brief).
Before Judges Fuentes, Gilroy and Simonelli.
GILROY, J.A.D.
This is a real property foreclosure action. Plaintiff US Bank, N.A. seeks to foreclose upon defendant Nikia Hough’s residential condominium unit located in the Township of Piscataway (the Township). The condominium unit forms part of the Township’s affordable housing obligation and, as such, is subject to the Uniform Housing Affordability Controls (UHAC) adopted by defendant New Jersey Housing and Mortgage Finance Agency (HMFA), N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.1 to -26.26. Hough appeals from the June 12, 2009 order that denied her motion seeking to “void judgment of foreclosure and to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice.”
The primary question presented is whether a commercial lender, which makes a loan secured by a mortgage on an affordable housing unit in excess of the amount permitted by N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.8(b), is prohibited from seeking to foreclose the mortgage. We answer the question in the affirmative, holding that the mortgage is void pursuant to N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.18(e). Accordingly, we reverse.
I.
We briefly state the procedural history and facts leading to this appeal. On January 14, 2004, Hough purchased the condominium unit for $68,142.86. To fund part of the purchase price, Hough borrowed $61,329 from Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., and secured the loan by executing a mortgage in favor of Wells Fargo. Because the condominium formed a part of the Township’s affordable housing obligation, the deed contained the following restriction:
The owner’s right title and interest in this unit and the use, sale and resale of this property are subject to the terms, conditions, restrictions, limitations and provisions as set forth in Ordinance number 88-34, as amended, which Ordinance is entitled “An Ordinance Establishing and Creating Regulations Governing the Conduct of the Purchase and/or Rental of Affordable Housing in the Township of Piscataway[,”]. . . as well as those terms, conditions, restrictions, limitations, and provisions as set forth in the “Affordable Housing Plan of the Commons at Piscataway” dated April 3, 1991 which plan was filed in the Office of the Clerk of Middlesex County . . . on June 20, 1991. Both are on file with the Piscataway Township Department of Planning and Community Development.
The deed was recorded in the Middlesex County Clerk’s Office on March 15, 2004.
On March 25, 2005, Hough refinanced the condominium unit by borrowing $108,000 from Mortgage Lenders Network, USA, Inc. At the time of the mortgage transaction, the maximum allowable resale price of the condominium unit, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.6, was approximately $68,735.41.[ 1 ] Hough executed a promissory note in favor of Mortgage Lenders, secured by a mortgage on the condominium unit. The mortgage was recorded in the Middlesex County Clerk’s Office on April 14, 2005. Hough used the mortgage proceeds to satisfy the Wells Fargo purchase money mortgage then in the amount of $62,795.10, and for other personal unsecured debts, and real property tax liens. Hough netted $20,080.45 from the mortgage refinance. The new mortgage included the same affordable housing restriction contained in the January 14, 2004 deed. On February 1, 2007, Hough defaulted on the mortgage.
On June 12, 2007, Mortgage Lenders filed a complaint in foreclosure against Hough.[ 2 ] On July 20, 2007, Mortgage Lenders assigned the mortgage to plaintiff. On July 8, 2008, plaintiff filed an amended complaint adding as defendants: the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs (DCA), the Council on Affordable Housing (COAH), the Township, HMFA, and Hough’s condominium, The Commons at Piscataway, Inc. Plaintiff served Hough with the amended complaint and summons on August 13, 2008. Plaintiff entered default against defendants on September 18, 2008.
The Township filed an answer alleging priority over plaintiff’s mortgage based on the deed restriction. On December 15, 2008, plaintiff and the Township filed a consent order under which the Township withdrew its answer; and plaintiff agreed to prosecute the action subject to the affordable housing restriction referenced in the January 14, 2004 deed, to provide the Township with notice of any sheriff’s sale, and to request the court return the matter to the Office of Foreclosure as an uncontested action.
On January 26, 2009, plaintiff filed and served a notice for entry of final judgment. On March 9, 2009, plaintiff filed proofs in support of its request for entry of judgment. In the interim, Hough filed a motion seeking to void the judgment of foreclosure and to dismiss the complaint with prejudice, contending that the mortgage violated the UHAC regulations, as it secured a loan in excess of the amount permitted pursuant to N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.8(b).
On April 3, 2009, mistakenly believing that final judgment had already been entered, the trial court denied the motion, concluding that vacating the judgment would improperly bestow a benefit upon Hough because she had been aware of the affordable housing restrictions when she borrowed the money, paid off the Wells Fargo mortgage, and otherwise used or retained the balance of the mortgage proceeds. It is from this order that Hough appeals.
The order appealed from is not a final judgment. A “final judgment in an action to foreclose a real estate mortgage fixes the amount due under the mortgage and directs the sale of the real estate to raise funds to satisfy the amount due.” Eisen v. Kostakos, 116 N.J. Super. 358, 365 (App. Div. 1971). Accordingly, the order appealed from is interlocutory, as it is not final as to all parties and all issues. Janicky v. Pt. Bay Fuel, Inc., 396 N.J. Super. 545, 549-50 (App. Div. 2007). Nonetheless, because of the importance of the issue presented, we grant leave to appeal nunc pro tunc. Gill v. N.J. Dep’t of Banking & Ins., 404 N.J. Super. 1, 8 (App. Div. 2008).
Hough initially argued that we should reverse and declare only the mortgage void, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.18(e). In countering plaintiff’s assertion that she would receive a windfall if the court were to void the entire indebtedness, Hough contended that plaintiff’s assertion “ignore[d] that it is only [plaintiff’s] mortgage that is void under the COAH regulation at issue and not the [n]ote or therefore the underlying debt. Rather, the regulation unequivocally establishes a reasoned and non-confiscatory penalty for a violation of its requirement; a loss of the obligation’s secured status.”
Questioning whether N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.18(e) requires voiding only the mortgage or whether it also requires voiding the indebtedness, we invited the Attorney General to address the issue on behalf of the HMFA. Consistent with Hough’s initial assertion, the Attorney General argued it is only “the mortgage secured by the affordable property that offends the regulation and is void as against public policy.” Nonetheless, contrary to her initial position, Hough contended at re-argument that we should not only void the mortgage, but also declare the underlying indebtedness void as against public policy.
II.
The January 14, 2004 deed restriction placed lenders on constructive notice that the condominium unit was part of the Township’s Mount Laurel[ 3 ] affordable housing obligation subject to the UHAC regulations.[ 4 ] The amount of indebtedness that can legally be secured by a mortgage on an affordable housing unit is governed by N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.8, which provides:
(a) Prior to incurring any indebtedness to be secured by an ownership unit, the owner shall submit to the administrative agent a notice of intent to incur such indebtedness, in such form and with such documentary support as determined by the administrative agent, and the owner shall not incur any such indebtedness unless and until the administrative agent has determined in writing that the proposed indebtedness complies with the provisions of this section.
(b) With the exception of original purchase money mortgages, during a control period, neither an owner nor a lender shall at any time cause or permit the total indebtedness secured by an ownership unit to exceed 95 percent of the maximum allowable resale price of that unit, as such price is determined by the administrative agent in accordance with N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.6(c).
“Administrative agent” is defined in the regulations as meaning “the entity responsible for administering the affordability controls of this subchapter with respect to specific restricted units, as designated pursuant to N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.14.” N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.2.
The “maximum allowable resale price” of an affordable housing unit is determined in accordance with N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.6:
(c) The initial purchase price of a restricted ownership unit financed under [Urban Home Ownership Recovery Program] or [Market Oriented Neighborhood Investment Program] unit shall be calculated so that the monthly carrying costs of the unit, including principal and interest (based on a mortgage loan equal to 95 percent of the purchase price and the Federal Reserve HR15 rate of interest), taxes, homeowner and private mortgage insurance and condominium or homeowner association fees do not exceed 28 percent of the eligible monthly income of a household whose income does not exceed 45 percent of median income, in the case of a low-income unit, or 72 percent of median income, in the case of a moderate-income unit, and that is of an appropriate household size as determined under N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.4.
(d) The maximum resale price for a restricted ownership unit, if the resale occurs prior to the one-year anniversary of the date on which title to the unit was first transferred to a certified household, is the initial purchase price. If the resale occurs on or after such anniversary date, the maximum resale price shall be consistent with the regional income limits most recently published by COAH and calculated pursuant to [N.J.A.C.] 5:94-7.2(b). The administrative agent shall prove all resale prices, in writing and in advance of the resale, to assure compliance with the foregoing standards.
[N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.6.]
Lastly, the prohibition against securing loans in excess of the amount permitted by N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.8(b) with a mortgage against an affordable housing unit is enforced in part by N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.18(e), which provides:
Banks and other lending institutions are prohibited from issuing any loan secured by owner-occupied real property subject to the affordability controls set forth in this subchapter, if such loan would be in excess of the amounts permitted by the restriction documents recorded in the deed or mortgage book in the county in which the property is located. Any loan issued in violation of this subsection shall be void as against public policy.
[(Emphasis added).]
Hough contends that because N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.8(e) provides that “[a]ny loan issued in violation of [the regulation] shall be void as against public policy,” that the regulation prohibits plaintiff from seeking not only to foreclose upon the mortgage, but also from seeking to collect upon the underlying debt instrument. Plaintiff counters that because it has agreed with the Township that it will foreclose upon the condominium unit subject to the affordable housing restrictions, stipulating that any sheriff’s sale will not produce a sale price higher than the maximum resale price as determined by the UHAC regulations, and the property would be sold only to a qualified buyer as determined under those regulations, that we should affirm the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint. Plaintiff also contends that if we prohibit it from proceeding with its foreclosure action, Hough “would clearly have been unjustly enriched,” when, in fact, her own acts or omissions materially contributed to the mortgage refinance in violation of N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.8(b). In support of that contention, plaintiff cites N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.8(a), which requires an owner to give notice of intent to the administrative agent that the owner intends to incur an indebtedness secured by a mortgage on the affordable housing unit, other than a first purchase money mortgage loan. Plaintiff asserts the record is devoid of any evidence that Hough gave the required notice before she refinanced the property with Mortgage Lenders.
The HMFA, through the Attorney General, contends that N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.18(e) only requires the voiding of the mortgage as against public policy, contending that “[t]he regulation does not affect the underlying debt as that does not undermine the regulation’s purpose.” We agree with the HMFA’s interpretation of the regulation.
“[W]e `give great deference to an agency’s interpretation and implementation of its rules enforcing the statutes for which it is responsible.'” ZRB, LLC v. NJ Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 403 N.J. Super. 531, 549 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting In re Freshwater Wetlands Prot. Act Rules, 180 N.J. 478, 488 (2004)); see also DiMaria v. Bd. of Trustees of Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 225 N.J. Super. 341, 351 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 113 N.J. 638 (1988). “That deference stems from the recognition that agencies have specialized expertise and superior knowledge in the areas of law delegated by the Legislature.” Lourdes Med. Ctr. v. Bd. of Rev., 394 N.J. Super. 446, 458 (App. Div. 2007), rev’d. on other grounds, 197 N.J. 339 (2009).
The agency’s interpretation need not be the only permissible one or even the one that the court would have chosen had the question been first presented to it. Matturri v. Bd. of Trs. of Judicial Ret. Sys., 173 N.J. 368, 382 (2002). So long as the agency’s interpretation is not “plainly unreasonable,” it will prevail. Ibid. Nonetheless, “we are not `bound by the agency’s interpretation of the statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue.'” ZRB, supra, 403 N.J. Super. at 550 (quoting In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 658 (1999)).
Applying these principles, we conclude that HMFA’s interpretation of N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.18(e) is not “plainly unreasonable” because it supports the primary purpose of the UFAC regulations. Thus, plaintiff is only barred from seeking to foreclose upon the mortgage; it is not barred from seeking to collect upon the underlying obligation.
The Legislature enacted the New Jersey Fair Housing Act (FHA), N.J.S.A. 52:27D-301 to 329, to further the goals of the Supreme Court’s Mount Laurel decisions. The Court in Mt. Laurel I declared that the New Jersey Constitution “requires every developing municipality, through its land use ordinance, to provide a realistic opportunity for the construction of its fair share of the region’s low and moderate income housing needs.” In re Adoption of Unif. Hous. Affordability Controls by the N.J. Hous. and Mortgage Fin. Agency, 390 N.J. Super. 89, 92 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 192 N.J. 65 (2007); see alsoN.J.S.A. 52:27D-302a. In Mt. Laurel II, the Court mandated that “municipalities were required to address not only the housing needs of their own citizens, but also the housing needs `of those residing outside of the municipality but within the region that contributes to the housing demand within the municipality.'” In re Adoption of Unif. Hous. Affordability Controls, supra, 390 N.J. Super. at 93 (quoting Mt. Laurel II, supra, 92 N.J. at 208-09).
To implement the legislative process of the FHA, the Legislature established COAH, N.J.S.A. 52:27D-305a, and appointed the HMFA as the agency to “establish affordable housing programs to assist municipalities in meeting the obligation of developing communities to provide low and moderate income housing.” N.J.S.A. 52:27D-321. COAH and the HMFA are authorized to adopt and promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out their statutory charges. N.J.S.A. 52:27D-307.5 and N.J.S.A. 52:27D-321e, f, and g, respectively.
Pursuant to the FHA, the HMFA developed and now administers housing affordability controls. 36 N.J.R. 3655(a). The purpose of those controls is to “ensure the continuing affordability of housing receiving credit from [COAH] or receiving funding under the Neighborhood Preservation Balanced Housing . . . program.” Ibid. (citation omitted).
In adopting N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.18(e), the HMFA pronounced that it is against public policy for a commercial lender to issue a loan secured by an affordable housing unit for an amount in excess of 95% of the units’ maximum allowable resale price. The focus of the regulation is the use of an affordable housing unit as security for an excessive loan. Stated differently, if a lending institution is permitted to make a loan secured by a mortgage against an affordable housing unit in excess of 95% of the maximum resale price of the unit, default on the loan could result in foreclosure, thus leading to the loss of the affordable housing unit. This would countermand the public policy of ensuring that affordable housing units remain affordable and occupied by lower income households. Ibid. It is with this goal in mind that HMFA asserts that “it is the mortgage secured by the affordable property that offends the regulation and is void as against public policy. The regulation does not affect the underlying debt as that does not undermine the regulation’s purpose.”
We reject defendant’s contention that N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.18(e) requires voidance of both the mortgage and the underlying indebtedness. Such an interpretation would unduly enrich Hough, with Hough having contributed to the mortgage refinance. Regulations, like statutes, must be construed “to avoid . . . interpretations that lead to absurd or unreasonable results.” State v. Lewis, 185 N.J. 363, 369 (2005); see alsoCosmair, Inc. v. Dir., N.J. Div. of Tax., 109 N.J. 562, 570 (1988) (“[i]f a literal construction of the words of a statute be absurd, the act must be so construed as to avoid the absurdity. The court must restrain the words.”) (quoting State v. Clark, 29 N.J.L. 96, 99 (1860)).
We reverse the June 12, 2009 order that denied defendant’s motion seeking to dismiss plaintiff’s foreclosure complaint with prejudice. Plaintiff may file a separate action seeking to collect upon the unsecured underlying indebtedness.
1. The record contains a November 13, 2007 letter from the Township, advising that the maximum allowable resale price of the condominium unit on that date was $68,735.41. Although the record does not contain any evidence of the maximum allowable resale price as of the date of the mortgage transaction, Hough certified that it was lower than on November 13, 2007.
2. At time Hough executed the mortgage in favor of Mortgage Lenders, she executed the mortgage as a single person. The complaint also named “Mr. Hough” as a defendant as Mortgage Lenders did not know at the time of filing the complaint whether Hough had married subsequent to execution of the mortgage.
3. S. Burlington County NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158 (1983) (Mt. Laurel II); S. Burlington County NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808, 96 S. Ct. 18, 46 L. Ed. 2d 28 (1975) (Mt. Laurel I).
4. We note that the January 14, 2004 deed restriction does not conform to the mandatory deed form contained in the Appendixes to N.J.A.C. 5:80-26 that were later adopted on November 23, 2004, effective December 20, 2004. 36 N.J.R. 5713(a). The mandatory deed restrictions contained in the Appendixes prohibit a property owner from incurring an indebtedness secured by a mortgage upon the affordable housing unit as contained in N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.18(d)4iii and in N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.8(b). N.J.A.C. 5:80-26, Appendix A, Mandatory Deed Form for Ownership Units, Art. 4C. Plaintiff does not contest that it was on constructive notice that the property was an affordable housing unit, subject to the UHAC regulations.
NEW YORK July 21 (Reuters) – U.S. mortgage bond investors have quietly banded together to gain the long-sought power needed to challenge loan servicers over losses the investors claim resulted from violations in securities contracts.
A group holding a third of the $1.5 trillion mortgage bond market has topped the key 25 percent threshold for voting rights on 2,300 “private-label” mortgage bonds, said Talcott Franklin, a Dallas-based lawyer who is shepherding the effort.
Reaching that threshold gives holders the means to identify misrepresentations in loans, and possibly force repurchases by banks, Franklin said.
Banks are already grappling with repurchase demands from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the U.S.-backed mortgage finance giants.
The investors, which include some of the largest in the nation, claim they have been unfairly taking losses as the housing market crumbled and defaulted loans hammered their bonds. Requests to servicers that collect and distribute payments — which include big banks — to investigate loans are often referred to clauses that prohibit action by individuals, investors have said.
Since loan servicers, lenders and loan sellers sometimes are affiliated, there are conflicts of interest when asking the companies to ferret out the loans that destined their private mortgage bonds for losses, Franklin said in a July 20 letter to trustees, who act on behalf of bondholders.
“There’s a lot of smoke out there about whether these loans were properly written, and about whether the servicing is appropriate and whether recoveries are maximized” for bondholders, Franklin said in an interview.
He wouldn’t disclose his clients, but said they represent more than $500 billion in securities managed for pension funds, 401(k) plans, endowments, and governments. The securities are private mortgage bonds issued by Wall Street firms that helped trigger the worst financial crisis since the 1930s.
Franklin’s effort, using a clearinghouse model to aggregate positions, is a milestone for investors who have been unable to organize. Some have wanted to fire servicers but couldn’t gather the necessary voting rights.
“Investors have finally reached a mechanism whereby they can act collectively to enforce their contractual rights,” said one portfolio manager involved in the effort, who declined to be named. “The trustees, the people that made representations and warranties to the trust, and the servicers have taken advantage of a very fractured asset management industry to perpetuate a circle of silence around these securities.”
Laurie Goodman, a senior managing director at Amherst Securities Group in New York, said at an industry conference last week, “Reps and warranties are not enforced.”
Increased pressure from bondholders comes as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been collecting billions of dollars from lender repurchases of loans in government-backed securities. With Fannie and Freddie also big buyers of Wall Street mortgage bonds, their regulator this month used its subpoena power to seek documents and see if it could recoup losses for the two companies, which have received tens of billions in taxpayer-funded bailouts.
Some U.S. Federal Home Loan banks and at least one hedge fund are looking to force repurchases or collect for losses.
Investors are eager to scrutinize loans against reps and warranties in ways haven’t been able to before. Where 50 percent voting rights are required for an action, the investors in the clearinghouse have power in more than 900 deals.
Franklin said the investors are hoping for a cooperative effort with servicers and trustees. While he did not disclose recipients of the letter, some of the biggest trustees include Bank of New York, US Bank and Deutsche Bank.
A Bank of New York spokesman declined to say if the firm received the trustee letter. US Bancorp and Deutsche Bank spokesmen did not immediately return calls.
“You have a trustee surrounded by smoke, steadfastly claiming there is no fire, and what the letter gets to is there is fire,” the portfolio manager said. “And we are now directing you … to take these steps to put out the fire and to do so by investigating and putting loans back to the seller.”
Servicers are most likely to spot a breach of a bond’s warranty, Franklin said in the letter.
Violations could be substantial, he said. In an Ambac Assurance Corp review of 695 defaulted subprime loans sold to a mortgage trust by a servicer, nearly 80 percent broke one or more warranties, he said in the letter, citing an Ambac lawsuit against EMC Mortgage Corp.
The investors are also now empowered to scrutinize how servicers decide on either modifying a loan for a troubled borrower, or proceed with foreclosure, Franklin said. Improper foreclosures may be done to save costs of creating a loan modification, he asserted. (Editing by Leslie Adler)
Post staff for NYPOST Last Updated: 4:42 AM, July 5, 2010 Posted: 12:44 AM, July 5, 2010
Brooklyn’s battling Judge Arthur M. Schack has struck again, giving a Brooklyn homeowner an Independence Day gift — freedom from foreclosure.
The judge, who has steadfastly pressed banks in foreclosure cases to prove they own the troubled mortgage and has tossed cases when banks have failed to do so, has again dismissed a foreclosure case — this time because the lawyer on the case, Steven J. Baum, represented the mortgage broker, the bank that bought the loan and the industry registration service serving as the nominee of the loan.
But Baum’s conflict of interest wasn’t the case’s only problem.
Judge Schack, in his decision, also found that the bank, US Bank, never should have filed the foreclosure action because of an “ineffective assignment of the subject mortgage and note to it.” In other words, it sold the mortgage, and the mortgage was securitized, leaving the company simply as the servicer — but it decided to try and take back the Crown Heights home anyway.
The Post has reported that the actions of the Baum firm in foreclosure cases has caught the eye of the US Trustee, the arm of the Justice Department responsible for monitoring the Bankruptcy Court.
Baum, a Buffalo-based foreclosure mill that filed 12,551 foreclosure actions in New York last year, has been scolded by judges for bringing foreclosure cases without proper documentation.
In this case, a Baum lawyer, Elpiniki Bechakas, signed papers claiming to be an executive of Mortgage Electronic Registration System, or MERS, which was given certain rights to the mortgages by the broker, Fremont Investment and Loan, while simultaneously representing Fremont and US Bank, which filed the foreclosure in July 2009.
“The Court is concerned that the concurrent representation by [the Baum firm] of both assignor MERS, as nominee for Fremont, and assignee plaintiff US Bank is a conflict of interest,” Schack wrote.
A Florida state-court judge, in a rare ruling, said a major national bank perpetrated a “fraud” in a foreclosure lawsuit, raising questions about how banks are attempting to claim homes from borrowers in default.
The ruling, made last month in Pasco County, Fla., comes amid increased scrutiny of foreclosures by the prosecutors and judges in regions hurt by the recession. Judges have said in hearings they are increasingly concerned that banks are attempting to seize properties they don’t own.
The Florida case began in December 2007 when U.S. Bank N.A. sued a homeowner, Ernest E. Harpster, after he defaulted on a $190,000 loan he received in January of that year.
The Law Offices of David J. Stern, which represented the bank, prepared a document called an “assignment of mortgage” showing that the bank received ownership of the mortgage in December 2007. The document was dated December 2007.
But after investigating the matter, Circuit Court Judge Lynn Tepper ruled that the document couldn’t have been prepared until 2008. Thus, she ruled, the bank couldn’t prove it owned the mortgage at the time the suit was filed.
The document filed by the plaintiff, Judge Tepper wrote last month, “did not exist at the time of the filing of this action…was subsequently created and…fraudulently backdated, in a purposeful, intentional effort to mislead.” She dismissed the case.
Forrest McSurdy, a lawyer at the David Stern firm that handled the U.S. Bank case, said the mistake was due to “carelessness.” The mortgage document was initially prepared and signed in 2007 but wasn’t notarized until months later, he said. After discovering similar problems in other foreclosure cases, he said, the firm voluntarily withdrew the suits and later re-filed them using appropriate documents.
“Judges get in a whirl about technicalities because the courts are overwhelmed,” he said. “The merits of the cases are the same: people aren’t paying their mortgages.”
Steve Dale, a spokesman for U.S. Bank, said the company played a passive role in the matter because it represents investors who own a mortgage-securities trust that includes the Harpster loan. He said a division of Wells Fargo & Co., which collected payments from Mr. Harpster, initiated the foreclosure on behalf of the investors.
Wells Fargo said in a statement it “does not condone, accept, nor instruct counsel to take actions such as those taken in this case.” The company said it was “troubled” by the “conclusions the Court found as to the actions of this foreclosure attorney. We will review these circumstances closely and take appropriate action as necessary.”
Since the housing crisis began several years ago, judges across the U.S. have found that documents submitted by banks to support foreclosure claims were wrong. Mistakes by banks and their representatives have also led to an ongoing federal criminal probe in Florida.
Some of the problems stem from the difficulty banks face in proving they own the loans, thanks to the complexity of the mortgage market.
The Florida ruling against U.S. Bank was also a critique of law firms that handle foreclosure cases on behalf of banks, dubbed “foreclosure mills.”
Lawyers operating foreclosure mills often are paid based on the volume of cases they complete. Some receive $1,000 per case, court records show. Firms compete for business in part based on how quickly they can foreclose. The David Stern firm had about 900 employees as of last year, court records show.
“The pure volume of foreclosures has a tendency perhaps to encourage sloppiness, boilerplate paperwork or a lack of thoroughness” by attorneys for banks, said Judge Tepper of Florida, in an interview. The deluge of foreclosures makes the process “fraught with potential for fraud,” she said.
At an unrelated hearing in a separate matter last week, Anthony Rondolino, a state-court judge in St. Petersburg, Fla., said that an affidavit submitted by the David Stern law firm on behalf of GMAC Mortgage LLC in a foreclosure case wasn’t necessarily sufficient to establish that GMAC was the owner of the mortgage.
“I don’t have any confidence that any of the documents the Court’s receiving on these mass foreclosures are valid,” the judge said at the hearing.
A spokesman for GMAC declined to comment and a lawyer at the David Stern firm declined to comment.
Anyone can see the “Fiction” that was set into place from all the institutions in this article below. Each one of these named parties as a shareholder utilizes Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., yet Washington never mentions this MERS device.
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