The United States District Court for the North District of Georgia has certified a question to this Court regarding the 1995 Amendment to OCGA § 441-4-33. See Ga. L. 1995, p. 1076, § 1. The question is whether the 1995 Amendment
means that, in the absence of fraud, a security deed that is actually filed and recorded, and accurately indexed, on the appropriate county land records provides constructive notice to subsequent bona fide purchasers, where the security deed contains the grantor’s signature but lacks both an official and unofficial attestation (i.e., lacks attestation by a notary public and also an unofficial witness).
For the reasons that follow, we answer the certified question in the negative.
1. In October 2005, Bertha Hagler refinanced her residence through the predecessor-in-interest to U.S. Bank National Association (U.S. Bank) and granted the predecessor a first and a second security deed to her residence. The security deeds were recorded with the Clerk of the Fulton County Superior Court in November 2005, but the first security deed was not attested or acknowledged by an official or unofficial witness. According to the district court’s certification order:
Gordon, the Chapter 7 Trustee in Hagler’s bankruptcy case, sought to avoid or set aside the valid, but unattested, first security deed to the residence through the “strong-arm” power of Section 544 (a) (3) of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 544 (a) (3). Gordon argued that under the proper interpretation of § 44-14-33 of the Georgia Code, a security deed that is not attested by an official and unofficial witness cannot provide constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser even if it is recorded. U.S. Bank argued, in opposition, that a 1995 amendment to § 44-14-33 changed the law to enable an unattested security deed to provide constructive notice. Gordon argued in response that the 1995 amendment served only to recognize constructive notice from a security deed with a “latently” defective attestation, meaning an irregular attestation that appears regular on its face; a deed with a “patently” defective attestation, meaning an attestation that is obviously defective on its face, would not provide constructive notice.
The bankruptcy court ruled in Gordon’s favor, concluding that, under the 1995 Amendment, a security deed with a facially defective attestation would not provide constructive notice, while a security deed with a facially proper but latently defective attestation would provide constructive notice. See Gordon v. U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. (In re Hagler), 429 BR 42, 47-53 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2009). Concluding that the issue involved an unclear question of Georgia law and that no Georgia court had addressed the issue after the 1995 Amendment, the district court certified the question to this Court. We conclude that the bankruptcy court properly resolved the issue.
2. OCGA § 44-14-61 provides that “[i]n order to admit deeds to secure debt . . . to record, they shall be attested or proved in the manner prescribed by law for mortgages.” OCGA § 44-14-33 provides the law for attesting mortgages:
In order to admit a mortgage to record, it must be attested by or acknowledged before an officer as prescribed for the attestation or acknowledgment of deeds of bargain and sale; and, in the case of real property, a mortgage must also be attested or acknowledged by one additional witness. In the absence of fraud, if a mortgage is duly filed, recorded, and indexed on the appropriate county land records, such recordation shall be deemed constructive notice to subsequent bona fide purchasers.
The second sentence of this Code section was added by the 1995 Amendment.
3. We first address Gordon’s contention that the 1995 Amendment does not apply at all to security deeds. He contends that only the first sentence of § 44-14-33, which expressly deals with attestation, is applicable to security deeds through § 44-14-61 and that, because the 1995 Amendment addresses constructive notice, it does not apply to security deeds. We disagree. The General Assembly chose to enact the 1995 Amendment not as a freestanding Code provision but as an addition to a Code provision clearly referenced by § 44-14-61. Moreover, “[t]he objects of a mortgage and security deed . . . under the provisions of the Code are identical — security for a debt. While recognizing the technical difference between a mortgage and security deed hereinbefore pointed out, this court has treated deeds to secure debts . . . as equitable mortgages.” Merchants & Mechanics’ Bank v. Beard, 162 Ga. 446, 449 (134 SE 107)Fair v. State, 288 Ga. 244, 252 (702 SE2d 420) (2010), so the placement of the amendment makes complete sense. Indeed, no reason has been suggested why the General Assembly would want the same type of recording to provide constructive notice for mortgages but not for security deeds. Accordingly, we conclude that the 1995 Amendment is applicable to security deeds. (1926). The General Assembly is presumed to have been aware of the existing state of the law when it enacted the 1995 Amendment, see
4. Turning back to the certified question, we note that the “recordation” that is deemed to provide constructive notice to subsequent purchasers clearly refers back to “duly filed, recorded, and indexed” deeds. U.S. Bank argues that a “dulyin fact filed, recorded, and indexed, even if unattested by an officer or a witness. We disagree. filed, recorded, and indexed” deed is simply one that is
Construing the 1995 Amendment in harmony with other recording statutes and longstanding case law, we must reject U.S. Bank’s definition of “duly filed, recorded, and indexed.” Its definition ignores the first sentence of § 44-14-33, which provides that to admit a security deed to record, the deed must be attested by or acknowledged before an officer, such as a notary public, and, in the case of real property, by a second witness. See OCGA § 44-2-15 (listing the “officers” who are authorized to attest a mortgage or deed). Other statutes governing deeds and mortgages similarly preclude recording and constructive notice if certain requirements are not satisfied. See OCGA § 44-2-14 (“Before any deed to realty or personalty or any mortgage, bond for title, or other recordable instrument executed in this state may be recorded, it must be attested or acknowledged as provided by law.”); OCGA § 44-14-61 (“In order to admit deeds to secure debt or bills of sale to record, they shall be attested or proved in the manner prescribed by law for mortgages”). Indeed, U.S. Banks’ construction of the 1995 Amendment contradicts OCGA § 44-14-39, which provides that “[a] mortgage which is recorded . . . without due attestation . . . shall not be held to be notice to subsequent bona fide purchasers.”
Thus, the first sentence of § 44-14-33 and the statutory recording scheme indicate that the word “duly” in the second sentence of § 44-14-33 should be understood to mean that a security deed is “duly filed, recorded, and indexed” only if the clerk responsible for recording determines, from the face of the document, that it is in the proper form for recording, meaning that it is attested or acknowledged by a proper officer and (in the case of real property) an additional witness. This construction of the 1995 Amendment is also consistent with this Court’s longstanding case law, which holds that a security deed which appears on its face to be properly attested should be admitted to record, see Thomas v. Hudson, 190 Ga. 622, 626 (10 SE2d 396) (1940); Glover v. Cox, 137 Ga. 684, 691-694 (73 SE 1068) (1912), but that a deed that shows on its face that it was “not properly attested or acknowledged, as required by statute, is ineligible for recording.” Higdon v. Gates, 238 Ga. 105, 107 (231 SE2d 345) (1976).
We note that at the time the 1995 Amendment was considered and enacted, the appellate courts of this State had “never squarely considered” whether a security deed with a facially valid attestation could provide constructive notice where the attestation contained a latent defect, like the officer or witness not observing the grantor signing the deed. Leeds Bldg. Prods. v. Sears Mortg. Corp., 267 Ga. 300, 301 (477 SE2d 565) (1996). The timing of the amendment suggests that the General Assembly was attempting to fill this gap in our law as the Leeds litigation worked its way through the trial court and the Court of Appeals before our decision in 1996. See Gordon, 429 BR at 50. We ultimately decided in Leeds that, “in the absence of fraud, a deed which, on its face, complies with all statutory requirements is entitled to be recorded, and once accepted and filed with the clerk of court for record, provides constructive notice to the world of its existence.” 267 Ga. at 302. We noted that Higdon remained good law, because in that case the deed was facially invalid, did “not entitle [the deed] to record,” and “did not constitute constructive notice to subsequent purchasers.” Leeds, 267 Ga. at 302. Because we reached the same result as under the 1995 Amendment, we did not have to consider whether the amendment should be applied retroactively to that case. See id. at 300 n.1.
Our interpretation of the 1995 Amendment also is supported by commentators that have considered the issue. See Frank S. Alexander, Georgia Real Estate Finance and Foreclosure Law, § 8-10, p. 138 (4th ed. 2004) (stating that “[a] security deed that is defective as to attestation, but without facial defects, provides constructive notice to subsequent bona fide purchasers”); Daniel F. Hinkel, 2 Pindar’s Georgia Real Estate Law and Procedure, § 20-18 (6th ed. 2011) (without mentioning deeds with facial defects, explaining that the 1995 Amendment to § 44-14-33 and Leeds “provide that in the absence of fraud a deed or mortgage, which on its face does not reveal any defect in the acknowledgment of the instrument and complies with all statutory requirements, is entitled to be recorded, and once accepted and filed with the clerk of the superior court for record, provides constructive notice to subsequent bona fide purchasers”); T. Daniel Brannan & William J. Sheppard, Real Estate, 49 Mercer L. Rev. 257, 263 (Fall 1997) (without mentioning deeds with facial defects, stating that the 1995 Amendment to § 44-14-33 resolves “the issue that was before the court in [Leeds]”). As noted by the bankruptcy court, if Hinkel and the law review authors thought that the 1995 Amendment altered longstanding law with regard to deeds containing facial defects as to attestation, they surely would have said so. See Gordon, 429 BR at 52-53.
Finally, it should be recognized that U.S. Bank’s interpretation of the 1995 Amendment to § 44-14-33 “would relieve lenders of any obligation to present properly attested security deeds” and “would tell clerks that the directive to admit only attested deeds is merely a suggestion, not a duty,” and this would risk an increase in fraud because deeds no longer would require an attestation by a public officer who is sworn to verify certain information on the deeds before they are recorded and deemed to put all subsequent purchasers on notice. Gordon, 429 BR at 51-52. Moreover, while “it costs nothing and requires no special expertise or effort for a closing attorney, or a lender, or a title insurance company to examine the signature page of a deed for missing signatures before it is filed,” U.S. Bank’s construction would “shift to the subsequent bona fide purchaser and everyone else the burden of determining [possibly decades after the fact] the genuineness of the grantor’s signature and therefore the cost of investigating and perhaps litigating whether or not an unattested deed was in fact signed by the grantor.” Id. at 52.
For these reasons, we answer the certified question in the negative.
Certified question answered. All the Justices concur.
Harry Gardner, president of SigniaDocs, said the perfect infrastructure is one that manages all mortgage documents electronically, but the number of loans in the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems’ eRegistry is about 200,000, or “a small fraction of mortgages written in the last 10 years.”
“And by eMortgage, we mean truly paperless not some hybrid of some paper and some electronic documentation,” Gardener said. “Ten years ago, we were saying mainstream eMortgage documentation was three to five years away, and I’m happy to say that mainstream eMortgage documentation is now three to five years away.”
For you to understand the plan the financial institutions have you need to grasp the following. Will MERS patterns continue? Imagine the price you will pay when these files are hacked or manipulated.
Everyone knows by now that MERS was ‘invented’ to keep costs low for the banks, reduce the risk of record-keeping errors and make it easier to keep track of loans for the banks not the borrowers. By these actions, not only has MERS eliminated crucial chain in title documents, has proven in many court cases to assign absolutely nothing because it had no power to negotiate the note but also eliminated an enormous amount of county revenues.
Last week SFF wrote about the latest invention planned to coexist with MERS called SmartSAFE, which will be used for creating, signing, storing, accessing and managing the lifecycle of electronic mortgage documents. According to Wave’s eSignSystems Executive VP Kelly Purcell, “Mortgages are sold several times throughout the life of a loan, and electronic mortgages address the problem of the ‘lost note,’ while improving efficiency in the process.”
This goes a step forward of what MERS can do today.
Will this process eliminate recording paper mortgages/deeds from county records? Eliminate fees that counties in trouble desperately need? THIS IS VERY DANGEROUS.
Still with me? Finally, according to CUinsight, a sample eNote in the form of a MRG Category 1 classified SMARTDoc, was successfully delivered to Xerox’s BlitzDocs eVault, a virtual repository that connects directly to the MERS® eRegistry and eDelivery systems, where it was electronically signed and registered.
Adding the finishing touches to permit MERS access to future eNotes? I say this is the master plan.
Looking forward to what MA John O’Brien, the Essex County register of deeds, NC Register of deeds Jeff Thigpen and NY Suffolk County, former county clerk Ed Romaine’s approach is after they read what they plan on doing to land records. If they thought it was limited to the elimination of recording fees for assignments of mortgage, they are mistaken.
Questions remain as to why replace something that has been working for so long? Why continue with MERS, a system which has failed in many ways? MERS is under investigation for fraud is it not? Why in a time where mortgage fraud is wide spread, will anyone even trust using electronic devices to manage possibly future trillions of dollars worth?
Say farewell to a tradition that has been here for well over 300 years. Eliminating ‘paper’ will put promissory notes and mortgage related documents in great jeopardy. No computer system in the world is secure [PERIOD].
This is a direct quote from the Florida Banker’s Association Comments to the Supreme Court of Florida files September 30, 2009:
“It is a reality of commerce that virtually all paper documents related to a note and mortgage are converted to electronic files almost immediately after the loan is closed. Individual loans, as electronic data, are compiled into portfolios which are transferred to the secondary market, frequently as mortgage-backed securities.
The reason “many firms file lost note counts as a standard alternative pleading in the complaint” is because the physical document was deliberately eliminated to avoid confusion immediately upon its conversion to an electronic file. See State Street Bank and Trust Company v. Lord, 851 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). Electronic storage is almost universally acknowledged as safer, more efficient and less expensive than maintaining the originals in hard copy, which bears the concomitant costs of physical indexing, archiving and maintaining security. It is a standard in the industry and becoming the benchmark of modern efficiency across the spectrum of commerce—including the court system.”
Now if there is no issues surrounding what everyone is shouting from their roof tops, then why integrate a new software that was suppose to have been implemented already to “Improves Efficiency & Transparency of Electronic Mortgage Transactions” within MERS itself?
“During the foreclosure crisis of the last few years we saw many instances where the original and subsequent paperwork was lost, destroyed or misfiled when loans were bought and sold,” commented Kelly Purcell, Executive Vice President for Wave’s eSignSystems division. “Mortgages are sold several times throughout the life of a loan, and electronic mortgages address the problem of the ‘lost note,’ while improving efficiency in the process.”
“[A] forged deed is a nullity and vests no title in a grantee. [Cit.] As such, even a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of a forgery cannot acquire good title from a grantee in a forged deed, or those holding under such a grantee, because the grantee has no title to convey.”Brock v. Yale Mortgage Co
AURORA LOAN SERVICES, LLC
v.
JOHN MACELRAY VEATCH, ADMR., et al.
S10A1725.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
Decided: March 18, 2011.
HINES, Justice.
In this quiet title action, the trial court entered a final order ruling that fee simple title to the subject property was vested in John Macrelay Veatch (“Veatch”), as personal representative of the estate of Raymond Wesley Veatch, Jr., unencumbered by the security deed held by Aurora Loan Services, LLC (“Aurora”), and striking various deeds from the deed records of Fulton County. Aurora appeals, and for the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Elsie Veatch owned the subject property until her death in 1974; her sole heir was Raymond Wesley Veatch, Jr., Veatch’s father, who died on March 20, 2006. After his death, two forged deeds were recorded in the Fulton County deed records, purporting to convey title to the property to Antonio Simpson. One forged deed was styled “Quitclaim Deed,” purportedly executed on May 19, 2006 by Elsie Veatch, who had then been dead for 32 years; this purported deed was recorded on October 17, 2006. The other purported deed was styled “Executors Deed,” and was purportedly executed by Raymond Wesley Veatch, Jr., on March 15, 2006, a date on which he lay in a coma; it was recorded on November 6, 2006. After these forged deeds were executed and recorded, a warranty deed purportedly from Antonio Simpson to Darryl Matthews was recorded on November 8, 2006. Matthews then executed a security deed in favor of First Magnus Financial Corporation in connection with a loan for $187,500. The security deed was eventually assigned to Aurora.
On September 5, 2007, after Veatch discovered activity on the property and applied for, and was granted, letters of administration of the estate of Raymond Wesley Veatch, Jr., he filed in the Fulton County land records an affidavit stating that the Executor’s and Quitclaim deeds were false. He then filed in the superior court the present petition to quiet title. OCGA § 23-3-40 et seq. The trial court appointed a Special Master who concluded that Aurora was a bona fide purchaser for value. See Roop Grocery Co. v. Gentry, 195 Ga. 736, 745 (1) (25 SE2d 705) (1943). However, the trial court disagreed, finding that there was record notice that the forged deeds were fraudulent, and that in any event, a forged deed is a nullity and cannot convey title.
The trial court is correct. Aurora’s interest in the property is dependent upon the forged deeds made to Antonio Simpson. As the trial court noted, such a deed cannot convey title. “[A] forged deed is a nullity and vests no title in a grantee. [Cit.] As such, even a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of a forgery cannot acquire good title from a grantee in a forged deed, or those holding under such a grantee, because the grantee has no title to convey.” Brock v. Yale Mortgage Co., 287 Ga. 849, 852 (2) (700 SE2d 583) (2010). In that opinion, this Court specifically overruled prior precedent of this Court that extended “the bona fide purchaser for value doctrine to those acquiring title under a grantee in a forged deed.” Id. at 853 (2). Accordingly, it is of no moment whether the deed records provided notice of the forgeries at the time Matthews executed the security deed on which Aurora bases its claim; there was simply no title held by Simpson, Matthews, First Magnus Financial Corporation, or any subsequent assignee. Id. Accord, Second Refuge Church &c. v. Lollar, 282 Ga. 721, 726-727 (3) (550 SE2d 128) (2007). The trial court did not err in declaring title to be vested in Veatch, as personal representative of the estate of Raymond Wesley Veatch, Jr., unencumbered by the security deed held by Aurora.
March 14, 2011|By James H. Burnett III, The Miami Herald
Yoss LLP, the remnants of a once powerful and politically connected law firm at the center of Miami’s fire fee scandal several years ago, is closing.
The firm once known as Adorno & Yoss issued a statement Monday confirming that it will continue to provide legal services to its clients and conduct its regular business through March 31, in its Miami and Fort Lauderdale offices, but after that would go out of business permanently.
A lawyer accuses District Judge Donald Mosley and other judges of “predetermining” the outcome in foreclosure disputes in favor of the lenders, according to an appeal filed with the Nevada Supreme Court.
In the process, they have made a “mockery” of a program designed to rescue distressed homeowners, attorney Jacob Hafter says in court papers filed Wednesday.
A 2009 state law gives judges the authority to modify loans if lenders fail to abide by Nevada Foreclosure Mediation Program guidelines.
Hafter said Mosley — and by implication the high court — had previously discussed how Nevada courts would rule in these disputes. During a foreclosure hearing for Hafter client Carl Piazza, Mosley said he would never sanction a lender for bad faith by modifying a loan from the bench.
Foreclosure proceedings in courts nationwide have exposed a swamp of fraudulent documents, and in some cases — though perhaps far too few — those bad docs have sunk attempts by banks to take people’s homes.
In a reflection of how bad things have gotten, lenders are asking judges to “ratify” foreclosures done with robo-signed documents, the Palm Beach Post reported on Saturday. While such“ratification” would not, as a matter of law, mean much, the Post says, it might discourage people from challenging the foreclosures.
With luck, two recent developments may help really clean up the fraud in the Sunshine State. First, an appeals court has asked the Florida Supreme Court to clarify judges’ power to address the fraud, and second, the Florida Bar Association is finally taking a stand.
Asking for Power to Punish Foreclosure Fraud
A Palm Beach county homeowner fighting alleged foreclosure fraud has ended up before the Florida Supreme Court.
An appeals court last week requested that the high court consider the case of Greenacres homeowner Roman Pino as a matter of “great public importance.” The decision by the 4th District Court of Appeal in West Palm Beach was unusual as neither the bank nor the homeowner requested such a review.
“We conclude that this is a question of great public importance, as many, many mortgage foreclosures appear tainted with suspect documents,” the appeals court wrote in certification to the Supreme Court.
Should the case be accepted by the Florida Supreme Court and a decision rendered in favor of Pino, thousands of cases could be impacted as allegations of document fraud run rampant throughout the state.
JUDGE POLEN: I’m afraid I’m not following
that. David Stern’s client at the time was BNY
Mellon Bank, right?
MR. NIEVES: Yes.
JUDGE POLEN: Okay. And that’s evidence of
what, an assignment to a bank?
MR. NIEVES: Basically, the law firm
manufactured evidence for the client’s case.
JUDGE POLEN: Okay.
MR. NIEVES: It was signed and executed by
Cheryl Samons, who works for David Stern, and
executed the assignment solely for the litigation,
and, in the assignment, posed as an officer of a
different entity.
<SNIP>
MS. GIDDINGS: Well, Your Honor, if you look at
the allegations that they have made, almost all of
those allegations pertain to a different case.
They’re not this particular case. I don’t know what
that document — what occurred in that document. But
I think this court is probably going to have a number
of cases that come up before it where that issue
is — it may be at issue in subsequent proceedings.
And when you reopen — if you’re going to reopen
those cases, you have to make sure that you’re
reopening it for something that is material.
JUDGE FARMER: Fraud on the Court is not
material?
MS. GIDDINGS: Your Honor, fraud on the
Court —
JUDGE FARMER: Publishing false documents is
not material?
<SNIP>
MS. GIDDINGS: Because there was no affirmative
relief obtained in this case, Your Honor. And, in
fact, the relief was that Mr. Pino has been living in
the house for a long time, apparently without making
any payments. And I understand your concerns, Your Honor.
But I’m urging you to consider this case in the grand
scheme of things. If you allow courts to go back and
open up all of these cases, when it’s clear on the
face that there was no affirmative relief obtained,
or that the affirmative relief would not have been
material, then you’re going to create chaos in the
court system.
JUDGE FARMER: So, are you suggesting that this
fraud has been that widespread that it —
MS. GIDDINGS: Your Honor, I’m not
acknowledging that any fraud occurred. I think that
there is — we all know —
JUDGE FARMER: Why would we shrink — as a
court system, why would we shrink, no matter how many
cases it might involve, from looking out for attempts
to defraud courts to publish and utter and use false
instruments? Why wouldn’t we be most vigilant?
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
January Term 2011
ROMAN PINO,
Appellant,
v. THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON,
Appellee.
No. 4D10-378
[February 2, 2011]
EN BANC
WARNER, J.
excerpts:
The defendant in a mortgage foreclosure action filed by BNY Mellon appeals
a trial court’s denial of his motion under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.540(b) to vacate a voluntary dismissal. Th e notice was filed after the
defendant moved for sanctions against the plaintiff for filing what he alleged
was a fraudulent assignment of mortgage. Because the notice of voluntary
dismissal was filed prior to the plaintiff obtaining any affirmative relief from the
court, we affirm the trial court’s order.
BNY Mellon commenced an action to foreclose a mortgage against the
defendant. The mortgage attached to the complaint specified another entity,
Silver State Financial Systems, as lender and still another, Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, as mortgagee. The complaint alleged that BNY Mellon
owned and held the note and mortgage by assignment, but failed to attach a
copy of any document of assignment. At the same time, it alleged the original
promissory note itself had been “lost, destroyed or stolen.” The complaint was
silent as to whether the note had ever been negotiated and transferred to BNY
Mellon in the manner provided by law.1
<SNIP>
In response to this amendment, defendant moved for sanctions. He alleged
that the newly produced document of assignment was false and had been
fraudulently made, pointing to the fact that the person executing the
assignment was employed by the attorney representing the mortgagee, and the
commission date on notary stamp showed that the document could not have
been notarized on the date in the document. The defendant argued that the
plaintiff was attempting fraud on the court and that the court should consider
appropriate sanctions, s u c h as dismissal of the action with prejudice.
Concurrent with the filing of this motion, the defendant scheduled depositions
of the person who signed the assignment, the notary, and the witnesses named
on the document — all employees of Florida counsel for BNY Mellon — for the
following day. Before the scheduled depositions, BNY Mellon filed a notice of
voluntary dismissal of the action.
We conclude that this is a question of great public importance, as many, many mortgage foreclosures appear tainted with suspect documents.
We conclude that this is a question of great public importance, as many,
many mortgage foreclosures appear tainted with suspect documents. The
defendant has requested a denial of the equitable right to foreclose the
mortgage at all. If this is an available remedy as a sanction after a voluntary
dismissal, it may dramatically affect the mortgage foreclosure crisis in this
State. Accordingly we certify the following question to the Florida Supreme
Court as of great public importance:
For immediate release: Jan 03, 2011
Posted by: [Attorney General]
Contact: Molly Butters
Phone: 317-232-0168
Email: molly.butters@atg.in.gov
Best Practices sought to thwart foreclosure violations Zoeller petitions Indiana Supreme Court to set new requirements for lenders
INDIANAPOLIS – As the 50-state investigation continues into improper “robo-signing” foreclosure practices, Indiana Attorney General Greg Zoeller today filed a petition asking the Indiana Supreme Court to impose new procedures to ensure that borrowers’ legal rights are fully protected and mortgage lenders follow the law.
“When some mortgage lenders try to foreclose on distressed homeowners by filing foreclosure documents that are unverified, unauthenticated or riddled with errors, it not only violates the rights of the homeowners but it is also a fraud upon the court,” Zoeller said. “In Indiana, we are not going to wait for federal government action; we will forge ahead to craft our own solution.”
A foreclosure-prevention task force established by the Indiana Supreme Court developed a list of guidelines to provide assurances to lenders, servicers, courts and borrowers that state and federal laws are being followed for the protection of homeowners.
The Indiana Supreme Court’s task force included the Attorney General’s Office, judges, Supreme Court staff, legal services attorneys and private-practice attorneys for mortgage lenders. Zoeller’s office today filed in the Supreme Court a petition — called “Mortgage Foreclosure Best Practices” — that included all the task force proposed guidelines and added some wording to strengthen them.
The Supreme Court is likely to take the proposals under advisement and decide at a later date whether to adopt them as requirements that lenders and services would have to follow.
The proposed best practices developed by the task force would do the following:
· Require a mortgage lender seeking to foreclose to produce the original signed mortgage note when asked by the court – or other legal proof if the original cannot be located — and the chain of title proving that the lender has the right to enforce the note.
· Require that the court send a notice to the borrower of their legal right to a settlement conference with the lender; and require that the judge not take final action until the settlement-conference report has been filed with the court.
· Prohibit the mortgage lender from asking the borrower to waive his or her legal right to a settlement conference.
· Allow courts to impose monetary sanctions on lenders who fail to comply with the Best Practices. The petition notes that judges in Allen and St. Joseph counties have ordered sanctions of between $150 to $2,500 for similar violations.
Because of concerns that some distressed borrowers have not been given the full opportunity to pursue “loss mitigation” – alternatives to foreclosure, such as loan modification or a short sale – the Attorney General’s petition includes additional wording to strengthen the task force proposals. It would require the mortgage lender to show, by verified affidavit, that the lender complied with federal requirements concerning borrowers’ legal rights during foreclosure, including providing borrowers with reasons for a denial of modification or other loss mitigation. And it would prohibit a court from ordering a home foreclosed if the borrower is being evaluated for a loan modification under the federal Home Affordable Modification Program or similar programs.
If adopted by the Supreme Court, Zoeller’s petition also would make the task force proposals requirements rather than recommendations.
“By some estimates, a sizeable percentage of homeowners facing foreclosure are not represented by attorneys, so no one is looking out for the borrower’s interests except the court. We must ensure the process is fair,” Zoeller said.
“These proposed best practices would provide much-needed transparency to the foreclosure process, encourage appropriate investigation and disclosure by the servicer and lead to better enforcement of existing federal rules,” Zoeller added. “I hope the Supreme Court will adopt the recommendations and implement them in Indiana’s courts.”
Zoeller said he applauded the Indiana Supreme Court for its leadership on the problem and the members of the task force for their willingness to take the initiative in Indiana rather than waiting for federal action.
On October 13, Zoeller announced that Indiana and the other 49 states had launched an investigation into fraudulent and illegal practices in the mortgage-servicing industry. The multi-state investigation was sparked by admissions by some mortgage lenders’ employees that they signed foreclosure documents without reading or understanding them, and allowed those documents to be filed court without authenticating them. The practice is known as “robo-signing,” and the result of the lack of due diligence has been numerous mistakes and even complaints that potentially erroneous foreclosure actions were filed against homeowners, some of whom were not delinquent on their mortgage payments. The 50-state investigation, led by Iowa, is ongoing.
On November 16, Zoeller organized and led a civil justice summit at the University of Notre Dame on the legal, economic and social impact of mortgage foreclosures in Indiana and efforts by all three branches of state government to stop mortgage fraud and assist borrowers in avoiding foreclosure.
Zoeller warns homeowners not to use illegal for-profit “foreclosure rescue” consultants when nonprofit organizations offers foreclosure-prevention advice for free. Contact the Indiana Foreclosure Prevention Network (IFPN) toll-free at 1(877)GET-HOPE or www.877gethope.org for advice at no charge.
This is without question the most important decision so far in the war against the unlawful and fraudulent conduct of the originators, securitizers, out-source-providers, default servicers, and their so-called lawyers! The Judge articulates the business models we are dealing with better than anyone has done in any opinion, article or brief. I am sure your work contributed greatly to the education of the court and for that you should be highly commended. This Judge really and truly got it! It is the perfect outline of the transactional requirements and debunks every bogus argument that the other side has been advancing for year”.
O. MAX GARNDER III-
Dear Damian,
I have attached a sampling from my Amicus Brief filed on Friday, October 1, 2010 with the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in the landmark cases that are presently on appeal from the Massachusetts Land Court styled: U.S. Bank v. Ibanez and its companion case, Wells Fargo Bank v. LaRace.
My brief reveals groundbreaking evidence that Antonio Ibanez’s loan was most likely securitized twice – a hidden fact unknown until now.
Moreover, the Assignment of Mortgage allegedly conveying the Ibanez loan to U.S. Bank, executed by “robo-signer” Linda Green, violated the Pooling and Servicing Agreement and other Trust documents.
Finally I expose the fact that U.S. Bank, who bought the Ibanez property at foreclosure for $94,350, sold it on December 15, 2008 for $0.00. That’s right, they foreclosed on Ibanez’s property so that they could give it away!
With respect to Mark and Tammy LaRace, I am happy to report that through the efforts of Attorney Glenn F. Russell, Jr. and myself, the LaRaces moved back into their home in January of this year, two and a half years post-foreclosure!
My Amicus Brief reveals that Wells Fargo Bank’s own documents prove that they did not have the authority to foreclose on the LaRaces. Therefore, the Assignment of Mortgage, Power of Attorney, Affidavit, and Foreclosure Deed executed by “robo-signer” Cindi Ellis were all unauthorized.
Wells Fargo Bank’s recent statement that it does not have the same “document” problem that GMAC, JPMorgan Chase, and Bank of America have admitted to is simply not true. I have audited many, many foreclosure files where Wells Fargo Bank employees and their agents have manufactured false documents to prosecute wrongful foreclosures such as in the LaRaces’ case.
This is an action pursuant to RP APL Article 15 in which determination of its interest in real property, and to direct the Nassau County Clerk’s Office to accept a copy of a deed and mortgage for recording, insofar as the originals were misplaced and never recorded.
the Court seeks an explanation as to why the Affidavit of Merit is provided by a principal of the United General Title Insurance Company. What is the relationship of that company to Plaintiff? What authority does the affiant have to speak on behalf of Plaintiff? What is the basis of the affiant’s personal knowledge?
the Court questions whether or not MERS, as nominee for Am Trust Bank has standing to bring this action. A party who “claims an estate or interest in real property” may bring an action under Article 15 of the RPAPL. RPAPL ~1501(1). “The interest had by any mortgagee” is an interest in real property for purposes of bringing such an action. ~RPAPL1501(5). Is MERS a mortgagee for purposes of Article 15, or is MERS the mortgagee only for recording purposes? Can MERS bring this action without a Power of Attorney from the beneficial owner of the Mortgage?
Finally, the Court is reluctant to grant declaratory or other relief without evidence of the recorded interests in the Property from July 20 2007 and the current state of title.
In the Matter of the Foreclosure of Tax Liens by Proceeding In Rem Pursuant to Article 11 of the Real Property Tax Law by the County of Wayne Regarding 2007 Town/County Tax.
MERS claims that the proceedings and ensuing conveyances of 4664 Smith Road were defective, because MERS was not separately noticed. There are at least two difficulties with this claim. First, the argument assumes that the County has a duty to read the Mortgage to determine whether anyone else other than the Mortgagee had a cognizable property interest warranting statutory notice under RPTL §1125. This Court does not believe this is or should be the case. The County should not have to go behind a title search to determine whether any property interests are conveyed to third parties not a party to an instrument on file. To accept MERS’ argument would require the County to read every mortgage from A to Z to make sure there are no “Nominees” of the Lender entitled to notice of tax foreclosure in lieu of or in addition to the Lender. Indeed, RPTL §1126(A) provides a vehicle for someone like MERS to receive notice without requiring the County to read every mortgage to determine whether notice should be given.
Second, the Mortgage from which MERS derives its claim of right to statutory notice under RPTL §1125 is by no means crystal clear as to what MERS’ involvement as `’Nominee” requires after the recording of the mortgage. Indeed. MERS does not explain what role the “Nominee” plays in the recording of a mortgage, or thereafter, except perhaps as something akin to a power-ofattorney or agent, albeit with independent standing. If the later is the case, it is incumbent upon the “”Nominee” to state its status as one due notice in the separate declaration of interest form required under section RPTL § 1126, which the County does have a categorical duty to read.
According, the application of MERS shall be, and the same hereby is, denied.
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