The former chief executive of Freddie Mac may face a civil action as the government ramps up an investigation of disclosure practices at the mortgage finance giant and its sister company, Fannie Mae, people briefed on the investigation said.
The executive, Richard F. Syron, a former president of the American Stock Exchange and now an adjunct professor and trustee at Boston College, has received a so-called Wells notice from the Securities and Exchange Commission, an indication the agency is considering an enforcement action against him.
The SEC and the CFTC’s budgets are not provided by the federal budget. The agencies, as with the federal banking regulatory agencies, are funded by user fees. None of these agencies’ budgets contribute to the deficit. When these agencies fail to stop epidemics of “control fraud” the result can be a Great Recession and trillions of dollars in increased deficits. The asymmetry is so stark that anyone serious about deficits would make ensuring the effectiveness of the SEC, CFTC, and the banking regulatory agencies among their greatest priorities. Supposed deficit hawks in the House are also among the strongest proponents of cutting the SEC, CFTC, and banking regulatory agencies’ budget even though this cannot have any positive effect on deficits and is exceptionally likely to produce the next financial and economic crisis that will produce the next sharp increase in the federal deficit. This is significantly insane, and it is even more insane that no one seems to call them on their insanity.
The purported logic for slashing the SEC and CFTC budgets represents another form of insanity. The logic is that the SEC and the CFTC failed to prevent the epidemic of accounting control fraud that drove the current financial crisis, the Great Recession, and the growing budget deficit. That is true, but proves the opposite. The SEC and the CFTC failures were self-fulfilling prophecies by kindred ideologues of those now seeking to slash the SEC and CFTC budgets.
People close to the investigation cautioned that no decision has been reached on whether to bring civil charges, adding that new evidence still could emerge. Investigators are reviewing thousands of documents turned over to the SEC since it began its probe shortly after Lehman tumbled into bankruptcy in September 2008 and was sold off in pieces. Officials also have questioned a number of former Lehman executives, some of them multiple times, the people said.
But after zeroing in last summer on the battered real-estate portfolio and an accounting move known as Repo 105, SEC officials have grown more worried they could lose a court battle if they bring civil charges that allege Lehman investors were duped by company executives. The key stumbling block: The accounting move, while controversial, isn’t necessarily illegal.
By Joshua Gallu and Dawn Kopecki – Mar 11, 2011 6:45 PM ET
Fortress Investment Group LLC (FIG) Chief Executive Officer Daniel Mudd received notice from U.S. regulators that he may face claims for misleading investors about Fannie Mae’s exposure to subprime loans when he ran the mortgage firm during the financial crisis.
Mudd, who was ousted when Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were seized by regulators in September 2008, confirmed in a statement to Bloomberg News that he received the so-called Wells notice from the Securities and Exchange Commission today.
WASHINGTON D.C. – Oversight and Government Reform Committee Chairman Darrell Issa and Committee on the Judiciary Ranking Member Senator Chuck Grassley sent a letter today requesting additional information from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Chairman Issa and Senator Grassley seek to clarify how the SEC neglected to act on the seemingly obvious, significant conflicts of interest presented by then-General Counsel David Becker’s involvement in the Madoff case.
Notice of Delisting or Failure to Satisfy a Continued Listing Rule or Stan
Item 3.01 Notice of Delisting or Failure to Satisfy a Continued Listing Rule or Standard; Transfer of Listing. DJSP Enterprises, Inc. (the “Company”) today announced that it has notified The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC (“NASDAQ”) of its intent to voluntarily delist its ordinary shares, warrants, and units from the NASDAQ Global Market and deregister its ordinary shares, warrants, and units under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”). In connection therewith, the Company notified NASDAQ of its intention to file, on or about March 18, 2011, a Form 25 with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) to voluntarily delist the ordinary shares, warrants, and units. The ordinary shares, warrants, and units will continue to be listed through March 28, 2011 and will no longer be listed thereafter.
The Company also announced its intention to file a Form 15 with the SEC on or about March 28, 2011, in order to terminate the registration of the ordinary shares, warrants, and units under Section 12 of the Exchange Act and to terminate its reporting obligations under the Exchange Act.
A copy of the press release announcing the Company’s intention to delist and deregister the ordinary shares, warrants, and units is furnished as Exhibit 99.1 hereto and is incorporated herein by reference.
Item 9.01. Financial Statements and Exhibits (d) Exhibits.
Exhibit No. Descriptions
99.1 Press release, dated March 8, 2011.
(Reuters) – A top Freddie Mac (FMCC.OB) executive received notice the government may file charges against him for allegedly violating securities laws in the years leading up to the housing bust, according to a regulatory filing released on Thursday.
Executive Vice President Don Bisenius received a “wells notice” from the Securities and Exchange Commission that the agency is considering filing an enforcement action against him for possibly violating federal securities laws and related rules in 2007 and 2008.
The revelation comes just days after a former Freddie Mac chief financial officer Anthony Piszel also received a similar warning from the SEC. Piszel, who was the mortgage giant’s CFO between 2006 and 2008, was forced to resign earlier this month from CoreLogic Inc (CLGX.N), where he was working as the company’s chief financial officer.
Freddie Mac and sister entity Fannie Mae (FNMA.OB) have both been under investigation since September 2008 for their role in the mortgage crisis.
By Brady Dennis
Washington Post Staff Writer
Thursday, February 24, 2011; 12:18 AM
State and federal officials, who have been negotiating with financial firms over how to address widespread abuses in foreclosure practices, are moving closer to a settlement that could force banks to reduce the principal on mortgages for some borrowers who owe more than their homes are worth.
An official familiar with discussions between the government and the financial industry said the settlement also could require that banks increase their efforts to modify mortgages for distressed borrowers and pay penalties that could be used as restitution for homeowners who have wrongfully faced foreclosure.
“State attorneys general are working closely with a number of federal agencies on a potential settlement,” Geoff Greenwood, a spokesman for Iowa Attorney General Tom Miller (D), who is leading a 50-state investigation of the foreclosure mess, said in an interview Wednesday. He added, “We haven’t finalized anything, and we’re still working on some very complicated issues.”
Washington, D.C., Feb. 11, 2011 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged three former senior executives at IndyMac Bancorp with securities fraud for misleading investors about the mortgage lender’s deteriorating financial condition.
The SEC alleges that former CEO Michael W. Perry and former CFOs A. Scott Keys and S. Blair Abernathy participated in the filing of false and misleading disclosures about the financial stability of IndyMac and its main subsidiary, IndyMac Bank F.S.B. The three executives regularly received internal reports about IndyMac’s deteriorating capital and liquidity positions in 2007 and 2008, but failed to ensure adequate disclosure of that information to investors as IndyMac sold millions of dollars in new stock.
IndyMac Bank was a federally-chartered thrift institution regulated by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) and headquartered in Pasadena, Calif. The OTS closed the bank on July 11, 2008, and placed it under Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) receivership. IndyMac filed for bankruptcy protection later that month.
“These corporate executives made false and misleading disclosures about IndyMac at a time when the company’s financial condition was rapidly deteriorating. Truthful and accurate disclosure to investors is particularly critical during a time of crisis, and the federal securities laws do not become optional when the news is negative,” said Lorin L. Reisner, Deputy Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement.
According to the SEC’s complaints filed in U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, Perry and Keys defrauded new and existing IndyMac shareholders by making false and misleading statements about IndyMac’s financial condition in its 2007 annual report and in offering materials for the company’s sale of $100 million in new stock to investors. In early February 2008, IndyMac projected that it would return to profitability and continue to pay preferred dividends in 2008 without having to raise new capital. In late February 2008, Perry and Keys knew that contrary to the rosy projections released just two weeks earlier, IndyMac had begun raising new capital to protect IndyMac’s capital and liquidity positions. Specifically, Perry and Keys regularly received information that IndyMac’s financial condition was rapidly deteriorating and authorized new stock sales as a result. Yet they fraudulently failed to fully disclose IndyMac’s precarious financial condition in the 2007 annual report and the offering documents for the new stock sales.
The SEC further alleges that Perry knew that rating downgrades in April 2008 on bonds held by IndyMac Bank had exacerbated its capital and liquidity positions to the extent that IndyMac had no choice but to suspend future preferred dividend payments by no later than May 2, 2008. This material information was not disclosed in IndyMac’s ongoing stock offerings. Perry also failed to disclose in various SEC filings or a May 2008 earnings conference call that IndyMac would not have been “well-capitalized” at the end of its first quarter without departing from its traditional method for risk-weighting subprime assets and backdating an $18 million capital contribution.
According to the SEC’s complaint, Abernathy replaced Keys as IndyMac’s CFO in April 2008. He similarly made false and misleading statements in the offering documents used in selling new IndyMac stock to investors despite regularly receiving internal reports about IndyMac’s deteriorating capital and liquidity positions.
The SEC also alleges that in summer 2007 while serving as IndyMac’s executive vice president in charge of specialty lending, Abernathy made false and misleading statements about the quality of the loans in six IndyMac offerings of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) totaling $2.5 billion. Abernathy received internal reports each month revealing that 12 to 18 percent of IndyMac’s loans contained misrepresentations regarding important loan and borrower characteristics. However, the RMBS offering documents stated that nothing had come to IndyMac’s attention that any loan included in the offering contained a misrepresentation. The SEC alleges that Abernathy failed to ensure that the quality of IndyMac’s loans was accurately disclosed and failed to disclose that information had come to IndyMac’s attention about loans containing misrepresentations.
Abernathy agreed to settle the SEC’s charges without admitting or denying the allegations. He consented to the entry of an order that permanently restrains and enjoins him from violating Section 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act and requires him to pay a $100,000 penalty, $25,000 in disgorgement, and prejudgment interest of $1,592.26. Abernathy also consented to the issuance of an administrative order pursuant to Rule 102(e) of the SEC’s Rules of Practice, suspending him from appearing or practicing before the SEC as an accountant. He has the right to apply for reinstatement after two years.
The SEC’s complaint charges Perry and Keys with knowingly violating the antifraud provisions of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, and aiding and abetting IndyMac’s violations of its periodic reporting requirements under Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act and Rules 12b-20 and 13a-1 thereunder. Perry also is charged with aiding and abetting IndyMac’s reporting violations under Exchange Act Rules 13a-11 and 13a-13. The SEC’s complaint against Perry and Keys seeks permanent injunctive relief, an officer and director bar, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains with prejudgment interest, and a financial penalty.
The SEC acknowledges the assistance of the FDIC in this investigation.
# # #
For more information about this enforcement action, contact:
John M. McCoy III
Associate Regional Director, SEC’s Los Angeles Regional Office
(323) 965-4573
Kelly Bowers
Senior Assistant Regional Director, SEC’s Los Angeles Regional Office
(323) 965-3924
Donald W. Searles
Senior Trial Counsel, SEC’s Los Angeles Regional Office
(323) 965-4573
CoreLogic announced today that Anthony “Buddy” Piszel, chief financial officer (CFO), has resigned as CFO effective immediately. Piszel, who joined CoreLogic in January 2009, will stay on in a non-executive capacity through June 1, 2011 to assist in a smooth transition of his responsibilities.
Piszel has informed the company that he received a Wells notice from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) staff in connection with certain disclosure matters during Piszel’s tenure at his previous employer, Freddie Mac. Piszel served as chief financial officer of Freddie Mac from November 2006 to September 2008.
The Wells notice indicates that the SEC staff is considering recommending a civil enforcement action against Piszel. Under the SEC’s procedures, recipients of a Wells notice have the opportunity to respond in the form of a “Wells submission” in which they seek to persuade the SEC that no action should be commenced. Piszel has informed CoreLogic that he intends to make such a submission.
Two of my biggest concerns about the mortgage mess involve the conduct of lawyers at every stage, from creating the toxic securities to foreclosing on homes, and that so far the major players haven’t been held accountable for their actions in creating the crisis. Both concerns are neatly encapsulated by an enforcement action taken by the Securities and Exchange Commission at the end of last week.
On Friday, the SEC announced it is taking administrative action against David M. Tamman, a partner at Greenberg Traurig, a major international law firm. (Or at least, he was a partner: His page on the firm’s website has been removed.) The SEC is going after Tamman because it says he falsified a document that described securities he helped a client sell. That is, when the SEC asked Tamman for copies, it says he altered the real document and gave the SEC the fake.
While that conduct is egregious — and kudos to the SEC for going after him — it’s not that different than the ways many, many lawyers have behaved throughout this documentation debacle. For example, attorneys for multiple banks have been giving courts fraudulent documents in order to speed foreclosures, in many cases “robo-signing” the documents themselves. And consider the magnitude of the carelessness — it seems at least like malpractice to me — employed by the big firms involved in the securitization deals. How Did Thousands of Lawyers Miss the Problems?
TheIbanez decision in Massachusetts exposed the fact that the standard securitization deal violated a century of Massachusetts real estate law, and recently filed lawsuits against JPMorgan Chase (JPM) and Bank of America (BAC) hint at how far astray the big law firms went. And not just one firm — the scale of the problems alleged in those cases suggest the problem was systemic.
William K. Black
Assoc. Professor, Univ. of Missouri, Kansas City; Sr. regulator during S&L debacle
Posted: December 28, 2010 05:29 PM
The role of the criminal justice system with regard to financial fraud by elite bankers in 2011 is likely to reprise its role last decade — de facto decriminalization. The Galleon investigation of insider trading at hedge funds will take much of the FBI’s and the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) focus.
The state attorneys general investigations of foreclosure fraud do focus on the major players such as the Bank of America (BoA), but they are unlikely to lead to criminal liability for any senior bank officials. It is most likely that they will lead to financial settlements that include new funding for loan modifications.
The FBI and the DOJ remain unlikely to prosecute the elite bank officers that ran the enormous “accounting control frauds” that drove the financial crisis. While over 1000 elites were convicted of felonies arising from the savings and loan (S&L) debacle, there are no convictions of controlling officers of the large nonprime lenders. The only indictment of controlling officers of a far smaller nonprime lender arose not from an investigation of the nonprime loans but rather from the lender’s alleged efforts to defraud the federal government’s TARP bailout program.
What has gone so catastrophically wrong with DOJ, and why has it continued so long? The fundamental flaw is that DOJ’s senior leadership cannot conceive of elite bankers as criminals.
NEW YORK/WASHINGTON | Fri Dec 17, 2010 12:32pm EST
NEW YORK/WASHINGTON (Reuters) – Regulators have opened a new line of inquiry in their mortgage foreclosure probe and are asking big Wall Street banks about the beginning stages of mortgage securitization, two sources familiar with the probe said.
The Securities and Exchange Commission launched the new phase of its investigation by sending out a fresh round of subpoenas last week to big banks like Bank of America Corp, Citigroup Inc, JPMorgan Chase & Co, Goldman Sachs Group Inc and Wells Fargo & Co, the sources said.
The subpoenas focus on the earliest stage of the mortgage securitization process, said the sources, who requested anonymity because the probe is not public.
The sources said the SEC is asking for information about the role of so-called “master servicers” — specialized firms that oversee the selection and maintenance of the large pool of home loans that go into every mortgage-backed bond.
In many cases, Wall Street banks that underwrite mortgage-backed securities either own their own master servicing firms or are closely aligned with one.
Ginnie Mae is pleased to announce that it has joined with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (GSEs) in adopting the Mortgage Industry Standards Maintenance Organization’s (“MISMO”) Uniform Loan Delivery Dataset (“ULDD”) for delivering loan information to the agencies. The GSEs have been working on this effort; and, announced to their respective program participants that effective September 1, 2011, and forward, all loans delivered to the GSEs will be required to be transmitted to the GSEs using the ULDD specifications.
The mortgage finance industry supports the adoption of standards and common file formats, as they lead to higher quality data, less rework, and lower costs for all participants in the industry, including borrowers.
DALLAS–(BUSINESS WIRE)– Goldfarb Branham LLP is investigating whether certain officers and directors of Lender Processing Services, Inc. (NYSE: LPS) violated state and federal securities laws due to statements the company made about its home foreclosure procedures. Concerned LPS shareholders are urged to contact securities attorney Hamilton Lindley at 877-583-2855 or hlindley@goldfarbbranham.com about their rights and remedies.
“According to a class action complaint, LPS failed to disclose that its DocX subsidiary used ‘robo signers’ to falsify documents and that LPS engaged in improper fee shifting with foreclosure attorneys to hide these deceptive practices,” said securities lawyer Hamilton Lindley. “After a company press release commented on these allegations, LPS stock price plummeted 13 percent.”
Goldfarb Branham LLP lawyers have significant experience representing shareholders and whistleblowers in securities lawsuits nationwide. The firm may be retained without financial obligation or cost to its clients. Lender Processing Services investors who purchased stock before or between July 29, 2009 and October 4, 2010, and continue to hold their shares, should contact the firm at hlindley@goldfarbbranham.com or 877-583-2855 to learn about their rights.
This class action was commenced in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida on behalf of purchasers of LPS securities between July 29, 2009 and October 4, 2010 (the “Class Period”).
The Complaint alleges that during the Class Period the Company and certain of its executive officers violated federal securities laws by issuing material misrepresentations to the market concerning the Company’s business, operations and financial performance, thereby artificially inflating the price of LPS securities.
City of St. Clair Shores General Employees Retirement System
v
Lender Processing Services, Inc., Jeffrey S. Carbiener, Lee A. Kennedy, and Francis K. Chan
The complaint alleging violations of the federal securities laws by Lender Processing Services, Inc. and certain of its officers and/or directors. The class action was commenced in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida on behalf of purchasers of LPS securities between July 29, 2009 and October 4, 2010 (the “Class Period”) by Robbins Geller Rudman and Dowd LLP.
“Investment banks such as Goldman Sachs were not simply market-makers, they were self-interested promoters of risky and complicated financial schemes that helped trigger the crisis…They bundled toxic mortgages into complex financial instruments, got the credit rating agencies to label them as AAA securities, and sold them to investors, magnifying and spreading risk throughout the financial system, and all too often betting against the instruments they sold and profiting at the expense of their clients…The 2009 Goldman Sachs annual report stated that the firm ‘did not generate enormous revenues by betting against residential related products’…These e-mails show that, in fact, Goldman made a lot of money by betting against the mortgage market.”
(1) The term reporting institution shall include every national securities exchange, member thereof, registered securities association, broker, dealer, municipal securities dealer, government securities broker, government securities dealer, registered transfer agent, registered clearing agency, participant therein, member of the Federal Reserve System and bank whose deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation;
(2) The term uncertificated security shall mean a security not represented by an instrument and the transfer of which is registered upon books maintained for that purpose by or on behalf of the issuer;
(3) The term global certificate securities issue shall mean a securities issue for which a single master certificate representing the entire issue is registered in the nominee name of a registered clearing agency and for which beneficial owners cannot receive negotiable securities certificates;
(4) The term customer shall mean any person with whom the reporting institution has entered into at least one prior securities-related transaction; and
(5) The term securities-related transaction shall mean a purpose, sale or pledge of investment securities, or a custodial arrangement for investment securities.
(6) The term securities certificate means any physical instrument that represents or purports to represent ownership in a security that was printed by or on behalf of the issuer thereof and shall include any such instrument that is or was:
(i) Printed but not issued;
(ii) Issued and outstanding, including treasury securities;
(iii) Cancelled, which for this purpose means either or both of the procedures set forth in Sec. 240.17Ad-19(a)(1); or
(iv) Counterfeit or reasonably believed to be counterfeit.
(7) The term issuer shall include an issuer’s:
(i) Transfer agent(s), paying agent(s), tender agent(s), and person(s) providing similar services; and
(ii) Corporate predecessor(s) and successor(s).
(8) The term missing shall include any securities certificate that:
(i) Cannot be located or accounted for, but is not believed to be lost or stolen; or
(ii) A transfer agent claims or believes was destroyed in any manner other than by the transfer agent’s own certificate destruction procedures as provided in Sec. 240.17Ad-19.
(b) Every reporting institution shall register with the Commission or its designee in accordance with instructions issued by the Commission except:
(1) A member of a national securities exchange who effects securities transactions through the trading facilities of the exchange and has not received or held customer securities within the last six months;
(2) A reporting institution that, within the last six months, limited its securities activities exclusively to uncertificated securities, global securities issues or any securities issue for which neither record nor beneficial owners can obtain a negotiable securities certificate; or
(3) A reporting institution whose business activities, within the last six months, did not involve the handling of securities certificates.
(c) Reporting requirements–
(1) Stolen securities.
(i) Every reporting institution shall report to the Commission or its designee, and to a registered transfer agent for the issue, the discovery of the theft or loss of any securities certificates where there is substantial basis for believing that criminal activity was involved. Such report shall be made within one business day of the discovery and, if the certificate numbers of the securities cannot be ascertained at that time, they shall be reported as soon thereafter as possible.
(ii) Every reporting institution shall promptly report to the Federal Bureau of Investigation upon the discovery of the theft or loss of any securities certificate where there is substantial basis for believing that criminal activity was involved.
(2) Missing or lost securities. Every reporting institution shall report to the Commission or its designee, and to a registered transfer agent for the issue, the discovery of the loss of any securities certificate where criminal actions are not suspected when the securities certificate has been missing or lost for a period of two business days. Such report shall be made within one business day of the end of such period except that:
(i) Securities certificates lost, missing, or stolen while in transit to customers, transfer agents, banks, brokers or dealers shall be reported by the delivering institution by the later of two business days after notice of non-receipt or as soon after such notice as the certificate numbers of the securities can be ascertained.
(ii) Where a shipment of retired securities certificates is in transit between any transfer agents, banks, brokers, dealers, or other reporting institutions, with no affiliation existing between such entities, and the delivering institution fails to receive notice of receipt or non-receipt of the certificates, the delivering institution shall act to determine the facts. In the event of non-delivery where the certificates are not recovered by the delivering institution, the delivering institution shall report the certificates as lost, stolen, or missing to the Commission or its designee within a reasonable time under the circumstances but in any event within twenty business days from the date of shipment.
(iii) Securities certificates considered lost or missing as a result of securities counts or verifications required by rule, regulation or otherwise (e.g., dividend record date verification made as a result of firm policy or internal audit function report) shall be reported by the later of ten business days after completion of such securities count or verification or as soon after such count or verification as the certificate numbers of the securities can be ascertained.
(iv) Securities certificates not received during the completion of delivery, deposit or withdrawal shall be reported in the following manner:
(A) Where delivery of the securities certificates is through a clearing agency, the delivering institution shall supply to the receiving institution the certificate number of the security within two business days from the date of request from the receiving institution. The receiving institution shall report within one business day of notification of the certificate number;
(B) Where the delivery of securities certificates is in person and where the delivering institution has a receipt, the delivering institution shall supply the receiving institution the certificate numbers of the securities within two business days from the date of request from the receiving institution. The receiving institution shall report within one business day of notification of the certificate number;
(C) Where the delivery of securities certificates is in person and where the delivering institution has no receipt, the delivering institution shall report within two business days of notification of non-receipt by the receiving institution; or
(D) Where delivery of securities certificates is made by mail or via draft, if payment is not received within ten business days, the delivering institution shall confirm with the receiving institution the failure to receive such delivery; if confirmation shows non-receipt, the delivering institution shall report within two business days of such confirmation.
(3) Counterfeit securities. Every reporting institution shall report the discovery of any counterfeit securities certificate to the Commission or its designee, to a registered transfer agent for the issue, and to the Federal Bureau of Investigation within one business day of such discovery.
(4) Transfer agent reporting obligations. Every transfer agent shall make the reports required above only if it receives notification of the loss, theft or counterfeiting from a non-reporting institution or if it receives notification other than on a Form X-17F-1A or if the certificate was in its possession at the time of the loss.
(5) Recovery. Every reporting institution that originally reported a lost, missing or stolen securities certificate pursuant to this Section shall report recovery of that securities certificate to the Commission or its designee and to a registered transfer agent for the issue within one business day of such recovery or finding. Every reporting institution that originally made a report in which criminality was indicated also shall notify the Federal Bureau of Investigation that the securities certificate has been recovered.
(6) Information to be reported. All reports made pursuant to this Section shall include, if applicable or available, the following information with respect to each securities certificate:
(i) Issuer;
(ii) Type of security and series;
(iii) Date of issue;
(iv) Maturity date;
(v) Denomination;
(vi) Interest rate;
(vii) Certificate number, including alphabetical prefix or suffix;
(viii) Name in which registered;
(ix) Distinguishing characteristics, if counterfeit;
(x) Date of discovery of loss or recovery;
(xi) CUSIP number;
(xii) Financial Industry Numbering System (”FINS”) Number; and
(xiii) Type of loss.
(7) Forms. Reporting institutions shall make all reports to the Commission or its designee and to a registered transfer agent for the issue pursuant to this section on Form X-17F-1A. Reporting institutions shall make reports to the Federal Bureau of Investigation pursuant to this Section on Form X-17F-1A, unless the reporting institution is a member of the Federal Reserve System or a bank whose deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in which case reports may be made on the form required by the institution’s appropriate regulatory agency for reports to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(d) Required inquiries.
(1) Every reporting institution (except a reporting institution that, acting in its capacity as transfer agent, paying agent, exchange agent or tender agent for an equity issue, or registrar for a bond or other debt issue, compares all transactions against a shareholder or bondholder list and a current list of stop transfers) shall inquire of the Commission or its designee with respect to every securities certificate which comes into its possession or keeping, whether by pledge, transfer or otherwise, to ascertain whether such securities certificate has been reported as missing, lost, counterfeit or stolen, unless:
(i) The securities certificate is received directly from the issuer or issuing agent at issuance;
(ii) The securities certificate is received from another reporting institution or from a Federal Reserve Bank or Branch;
(iii) The securities certificate is received from a customer of the reporting institution; and
(A) Is registered in the name of such customer or its nominee; or
(B) Was previously sold to such customer, as verified by the internal records of the reporting institution;
(iv) The securities certificate is received as part of a transaction which has an aggregate face value of $10,000 or less in the case of bonds, or market value of $10,000 or less in the case of stocks; or
(v) The securities certificate is received directly from a drop which is affiliated with a reporting institution for the purposes of receiving or delivering certificates on behalf of the reporting institution.
(2) Form of inquiry. Inquiries shall be made in such manner as prescribed by the Commission or its designee.
(3) A reporting institution shall make required inquiries by the end of the fifth business day after a securities certificate comes into its possession or keeping, provided that such inquiries shall be made before the certificate is sold, used as collateral, or sent to another reporting institution.
(e) Permissive reports and inquiries. Every reporting insitution may report to or inquire of the Commission or its designee with respect to any securities certificate not otherwise required by this section to be the subject of a report or inquiry. The Commission on written request or upon its own motion may permit reports to and inquiries of the system by any other person or entity upon such terms and conditions as it deems appropriate and necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors.
(f) Exemptions. The following types of securities are not subject to paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section:
(1) Security issues not assigned CUSIP numbers;
(2) Bond coupons;
(3) Uncertificated securities;
(4) Global securities issues; and
(5) Any securities issue for which neither record nor beneficial owners can obtain a negotiable securities certificates.
(g) Recordkeeping. Every reporting institution shall maintain and preserve in an easily accessible place for three years copies of all Forms X-17F-1A filed pursuant to this section, all agreements between reporting institutions regarding registration or other aspects of this section, and all confirmations or other information received from the Commission or its designee as a result of inquiry.
—By the American Bankers Association, Corporate Trust Committee
Executive Summary
In this position paper, the Corporate Trust Committee is responding to current assertions that the obligations of trustees in asset-backed securities1 (?ABS?) are greater than the duties contractually undertaken by those trustees.
These assertions, which have been made by participants in the ABS market by investors, investment advisors, rating agencies and others2, fail to recognize the legal limitations on the duties of ABS trustees and have been made in response to both disappointing ABS investment performance and market issues arising from the current economic crisis. Although ABS investment performance has been disappointing, particularly with respect to certain residential mortgage-backed securities, and there were numerous market issues which gave rise to the current crisis, it is the position of the Committee that the contractual role of the trustee was not a contributing factor to either the investment performance or the market issues which may have caused or affected it.3 Moreover, in many instances, ambiguities or errors in the transaction documents governing impaired asset-backed securities have been construed in ways that were not contemplated or bargained for by the original transaction parties and that seek to alter the role and potential liability of trustees to a degree not warranted either by the contractual language or applicable statutory and common law. As a basic principle, the Committee acknowledges the need for more clarity in transaction documents generally going forward. However, the Committee’s position is that any issues that were neither contemplated by nor addressed in the documents governing current ABS transactions must be resolved in accordance with the legal contracts governing those transactions and generally accepted rules of contractual interpretation. Reliance on clear hindsight, even with the goal of protecting particular constituencies or investors generally, to impose duties retroactively on trustees that are clearly outside the range of duties undertaken in their contracts effectively abrogates those contracts and violates basic tenets of U.S. contract law.
GINNIE MAE MISMO
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