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Not all New York cases

Hat tip to Brian Davis for this deposition below.

JOHN KENNERTY a/k/a Herman John Kennerty has been employed for many years in the Ft. Mill, SC offices of America’s Servicing Company, a division of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. He signed many different job titles on mortgage-related documents, often using different titles on the same day. He often signs as an officer of MERS (“Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.”) On many Mortgage Assignments signed by Kennerty, Wells Fargo, or the trust serviced by ASC, is shown as acquiring the mortgage weeks or even months AFTER the foreclosure action is filed.

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RELATED:

MAESTRO PLEASE…AND THE WINNER OF THE “MOST JOB TITLES” CONTEST IS…

Judge Murphy deserves an applause for the great job of questioning all facts and making no assumptions.

SUPREME COURT – STATE OF NEW YORK
TRIAL TERM. PART 17 NASSAU COUNTY

PRESENT:
Honorable Karen V. Murphv
Justice of the Supreme Court

ONEWEST BANK, FSB
155 North Lake Avenue
Pasadena, CA 91101,
Plaintiff(s),

-against-

ALEXADER ROTH, MORTGAGE
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC.
AS NOMINEE FOR E*TRADE WHOLESALE
LENDING CORP., ET AL.,
Defendant(s).

Excerpts:

In this matter Plaintiff failed to establish that it is entitled to the relief sought. It is well settled that a foreclosure of a mortgage may not be brought by one who has no title to it and absent transfer of the debt, the assignment of mortgage is a nullity. (Kluge v. Fugazy, 145 A. 2d 537 538536 N. 2d 92 (2d Dept. , 1988)). While Plaintiff alleges that it is the holder of both the note and mortgage, the record before the Court suggests otherwise and raises factual issues as well as issues of credibility that can not be determined herein. (see .J Capelin Assoc. v. Globe Mfg. Corp. 34 N. 2d 338 341 313 N. 2d 776 357 N. 2d 478 (1974)).

The Complaint filed September 4, 2009 stated that Plaintiff is “the owner and holder of a note and mortgage being foreclosed.” Bald assertions of possession of the original note without more, in light of the conflicting evidence, is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case.

Furtermore, the assignment recorded on October 1 , 2009 specifically states that it is an “assignment of mortgage ” and makes no reference to the note. Thus, a question of fact exists as to whether the note was ever assigned or delivered to Plaintiff. It may well be that the note was neither assigned nor delivered to Plaintiff prior to commencement of this action and Plaintiff would then be without authority to bring this action.

A stamp on the copy of the note provided by Plaintiff appears to be an indorsement of the note in blan, by the original lender, and is not dated (U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Collymore, 68 A.D.3d 752 890 N. 2d 578 (2d Dept. , 2009)). Additional issues regarding the timing of that indorsement on the note and whether MERS, at the time it executed the Assignment of Mortgage had authority, let alone the abilty, to assign the note and/or whether, in fact the note had already been assigned at the time of the purported assignment of the mortgage exist (id).

ORDERED that movant shall serve a copy of this Order upon all parties, or their attorneys if represented by counsel and shall there after file affidavits of service with the County Clerk and it is further,

ORDERED that a copy of this Order and proof of service of same be anexed as exhibits to any future applications regarding the subject mortgage and note.

The foregoing constitutes the Order of this Court.

Dated: September 1 , 2010
Mineola, N.
NASSAU COUNTY
COUNTY CLERK’S

ONEWEST BANKS GET THE BOOT, MERS ASSIGNMENT MENTIONS NO NOTE

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By now, most have read the Deposition of the Infamous Erica Johnson Seck. This is the homeowner Israel Machado speaking out about his foreclosure.

Thank you Ice Legal!

By ROBBIE WHELAN

LOXAHATCHEE, Fla.—Israel Machado’s foreclosure started out as a routine affair. In the summer of 2008, as the economy began to soften, Mr. Machado’s pool-cleaning business suffered and like millions of other Americans, he fell behind on his $400,000 mortgage.

But Mr. Machado’s response was unlike most other Americans’. Instead of handing his home over to the lender, IndyMac Bank FSB, he hired Ice Legal LP in nearby Royal Palm Beach to fight the foreclosure. The law firm researched the history of Mr. Machado’s loan and found two interesting facts.

First, the affidavits IndyMac used to file the foreclosure were signed by a so-called robo-signer named Erica A. Johnson-Seck, who routinely signed 6,000 documents a week related to foreclosures and bankruptcy. That volume, the court decided, meant Ms. Johnson-Seck couldn’t possibly have thoroughly reviewed the facts of Mr. Machado’s case, as required by law.

Secondly, IndyMac (now called OneWest Bank) no longer owned the loan—a group of investors in a securitized trust managed by Deutsche Bank did. Determining that IndyMac didn’t really have standing to foreclose, a judge threw out the case and ordered IndyMac to pay Mr. Machado’s $30,000 legal bill.

Mr. Machado and his lawyer, Tom Ice, say they now want to convince the owners of the mortgage to cut Mr. Machado’s loan balance to between $150,000 and $200,000—the current selling price for comparable homes in his community near West Palm Beach. “The whole intent was to get them to come to the negotiating table, to get me in a fixed-rate mortgage that worked,” Mr. Machado said.

Continue reading…WALL STREET JOURNAL

.

The recent announcements by J.P. Morgan Chase and Ally Financial that they were freezing some foreclosures because of paperwork irregularities raises a key question: How many more mortgage companies employed “robo-signers?”

In a sworn deposition in July, Erica Johnson-Seck, an Austin, Tex.,-based vice president for bankruptcy and foreclosure for OneWest Bank, said she and her team of seven others sign 6,000 documents a week or about 24,000 a month without reading all of them.

Johnson-Seck estimated that she spent no more than 30 seconds to sign each document.

She explained that while she does not check everything, she does check some information, “which is why I said 30 seconds instead of two seconds.”

Continue reading…WASHINGTON POST

.

Please welcome Ericka Johnson Seck to the ROBO-SIGNER Hall of Sham!

MERS & LPS once again the “Common Thread”

Here is a list of her many Corporate Hats:

• Vice President of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. (MERS)
• Vice President of Deutsch Bank National Trust
• Vice President of Bank of New York
• Attorney in Fact of IndyMac
• Attorney in Fact of ONEWEST
• Attorney in  Fact of FDIC

I must confess, she was my first study because she signed two assignments for “one” of my properties using “two” different employers. 🙂 ‘<blush> I even created my very first youtube video in her honor (see below)!

Thanks to Judge Arthur Schack and Tom Ice from Ice Legal in Palm Beach County, we all became familiar with Erica for wearing too many corporate hats.

She is the “Robo-Signer” Judge Schack called out in three particular cases in NY and made her an instant foreclosure household name. I don’t think she ever emerged in NY soon after this. Also see the  HSCB v. Yasmin case.

Excerpt of DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST v. HARRIS

The Court is perplexed as to why the assignment was not executed in Pasadena, California, at 46U Sierra Madre Villa, the alleged “principal place of business” for both the assignor and the assignee. In my January 3 1, 2008 decision (Deutsche Bank National Tr (1st Canpuny v Maraj, – Misc 3d – [A], 2008 NY Slip Op 50176 [U]), I noted that Erica Johnson-Seck, claimed that she was a Vice President of MERS in her July 3,2007 INDYMAC to DEUTSCHE BANK assignment, and then in her July 3 1,2007 affidavit claimed to be a DEUTSCHE BANK Vice President. Just as in Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v Maraj, at 2, the Court in the instant action, before granting itn application for an order of reference, requires an affidavit from Ms. Johnson-Seck, describing her employment history for the past three years.

Further, the Court requires an explanation from an officer of plaintiff DEUTSCHE BANK as to why, in the middle of our national subprime mortgage financial crisis, DEUTSCHE BANK would purchase a non-perferforming loan from INDYMAC, and why DEUTSCHE BANK, INDYMAC and MERS all share office space at 460 Sierra Madre Villa, Pasadena, CA 91 107.

24,000 Monthly Documents executed by her team

Now Lets move on to this below… according to this deposition her office signs 24,000 mortgage related documents out of the this figure she signed about “750” a week making it approximately 3000 mortgage documents used in foreclosure cases. Anything from Affidavits of Debt, Lost Note Affidavits, Assignment of Mortgages, Declarations pretty much anything having to deal with Bankruptcy and Foreclosures.

This is what she signs without any notary present.

DEPOSITION OF ERICA JOHNSON SECK

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Below is a sale that happened in DC all in 1 single day! It appears she also puts properties in her name with her co-employees Roger Stotts and  Eric Friedman.

ROGER STOTTS  signs these as well and according to the depo above Indymac/Onewest is “NOT” the custodian as defined below. Why do they commit fraud?

FIRST VIDEO MADE OF DAVID J. STERN, ERICA JOHNSON-SECK BACK IN FEBRUARY 2010

JOHN KENNERTY, a/k/a HERMAN JOHN KENNERTY

JOHN KENNERTY a/k/a Herman John Kennerty has been employed for many years in the Ft. Mill, SC offices of America’s Servicing Company, a division of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. He signed many different job titles on mortgage-related documents, often using different titles on the same day. He often signs as an officer of MERS (“Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.”) On many Mortgage Assignments signed by Kennerty, Wells Fargo, or the trust serviced by ASC, is shown as acquiring the mortgage weeks or even months AFTER the foreclosure action is filed.

Titles attributed to John Kennerty include the following:

Asst. Secretary, MERS, as Nominee for 1st Continental Mortgage Corp.;

Asst. Secretary, MERS, as Nominee for American Brokers Conduit;

Asst. Secretary, MERS, as Nominee for American Enterprise Bank of Florida;

Asst. Secretary, MERS, as Nominee for American Home Mortgage;

Asst. Secretary, MERS, as Nominee for Amnet Mortgage, Inc. d/b/a American Mortgage Network of Florida;

Asst. Secretary, MERS, as Nominee for Bayside Mortgage Services, Inc.;

Asst. Secretary, MERS, as Nominee for CT Mortgage, Inc.;

Asst. Secretary, MERS, as Nominee for First Magnus Financial Corporation, an Arizona Corp.;

Asst. Secretary, MERS, as Nominee for First National Bank of AZ;

Asst. Secretary, MERS, as Nominee for Fremont Investment & Loan;

Asst. Secretary, MERS, as Nominee for Group One Mortgage, Inc.;

Asst. Secretary, MERS, as Nominee for Guaranty Bank;

Asst. Secretary, MERS, as Nominee for Homebuyers Financial, LLC;

Asst. Secretary, MERS, as Nominee for IndyMac Bank, FSB, a Federally Chartered Savings Bank (in June 2010);

Asst. Secretary, MERS, as Nominee for Irwin Mortgage Corporation;

Asst. Secretary, MERS, as Nominee for Ivanhoe Financial, Inc., a Delaware Corp.;

Asst. Secretary, MERS, as Nominee for Mortgage Network, Inc.;

Asst. Secretary, MERS, as Nominee for Ohio Savings Bank;

Asst. Secretary, MERS, as Nominee for Paramount Financial, Inc.;

Asst. Secretary, MERS, as Nominee for Pinnacle Direct Funding Corp.;

Asst. Secretary, MERS, as Nominee for RBC Mortgage Company;

Asst. Secretary, MERS, as Nominee for Seacoast National Bank;

Asst. Secretary, MERS, as Nominee for Shelter Mortgage Company, LLC;

Asst. Secretary, MERS, as Nominee for Stuart Mortgage Corp.;

Asst. Secretary, MERS, as Nominee for Suntrust Mortgage;

Asst. Secretary, MERS, as Nominee for Transaland Financial Corp.;

Asst. Secretary, MERS, as Nominee for Universal American Mortgage Co., LLC;

Asst. Secretary, MERS, as Nominee for Wachovia Mortgage Corp.;

Vice President of Loan Documentation, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.;

Vice President of Loan Documentation, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., successor by merger to Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. f/k/a Norwest Mortgage, Inc.

“If the people cannot trust their government to do the job for which it exists
– to protect them and to promote their common welfare – all else is lost.”
– BARACK OBAMA, speech, Aug. 28, 2006

Zach Carter

Economics Editor, AlterNet; Fellow, Campaign for America’s Future

Posted: September 12, 2010 02:52 PM

The Washington Post has published a very silly op-ed by Chrystia Freeland accusing President Barack Obama of unfairly “demonizing” Wall Street. Freeland wants to see Obama tone down his rhetoric and play nice with executives in pursuit of a harmonious economic recovery. The trouble is, Obama hasn’t actually deployed harsh words against Wall Street. What’s more, in order to avoid being characterized as “anti-business,” the Obama administration has refused to mete out serious punishment for outright financial fraud. Complaining about nouns and adjectives is a little ridiculous when handcuffs and prison sentences are in order.

Freeland is a long-time business editor at Reuters and the Financial Times, and the story she spins about the financial crisis comes across as very reasonable. It’s also completely inaccurate. Here’s the key line:

“Stricter regulation of financial services is necessary not because American bankers were bad, but because the rules governing them were.”

Bank regulations were lousy, of course. But Wall Street spent decades lobbying hard for those rules, and screamed bloody murder when Obama had the audacity to tweak them. More importantly, the financial crisis was not only the result of bad rules. It was the result of bad rules and rampant, straightforward fraud, something a seasoned business editor like Freeland ought to know. Seeking economic harmony with criminals seems like a pretty poor foundation for an economic recovery.

The FBI was warning about an “epidemic” of mortgage fraud as early as 2004. Mortgage fraud is typically perpetrated by lenders, not borrowers — 80 percent of the time, according to the FBI. Banks made a lot of quick bucks over the past decade by illegally conning borrowers. Then bankers who knew these loans were fraudulent still packaged them into securities and sold them to investors without disclosing that fraud. They lied to their own shareholders about how many bad loans were on their books, and lied to them about the bonuses that were derived from the entire scheme. When you do these things, you are stealing lots of money from innocent people, and you are, in fact, behaving badly (to put it mildly).

The fraud allegations that have emerged over the past year are not restricted to a few bad apples at shady companies– they involve some of the largest players in global finance. Washington Mutual executives knew their company was issuing fraudulent loans, and securitized them anyway without stopping the influx of fraud in the lending pipeline. Wachovia is settling charges that it illegally laundered $380 billion in drug money in order to maintain access to liquidity. Barclays is accused of illegally laundering money from Iran, Sudan and other nations, jumping through elaborate technical hoops to conceal the source of their funds. Goldman Sachs set up its own clients to fail and bragged about their “shitty deals.” Citibank executives deceived their shareholders about the extent of their subprime mortgage holdings. Bank of America executives concealed heavy losses from the Merrill Lynch merger, and then lied to their shareholders about the massive bonuses they were paying out. IndyMac Bank and at least five other banks cooked their books by backdating capital injections.

Continue reading…..The  Huffington Post

YOU AIN’T FOOLING THIS JUDGE! Dated 8/18/2010

Lets see how they produce the assignment from 2005!  We bet we already know!

Plaintiff subsequently purchased the aforementioned mortgage and note from Defendant. However, an Assignment of Mortgage from Defendant to Plaintiff has been lost and was never recorded. Plaintiff, as the current holder of the note, desires to foreclose on the subject mortgage.

However, Plaintiff cannot do so because of the break in chain of title.

the Clerk of the County of Suffolk be directed to record an Order reflecting the assignment of mortgage as Lancaster Mortgage Bankers as original assignor to Indymac Bank, FSB, as the assignee with an effective date-of December 20,2005. The Plaintiff interests originates from a mortgage from Hem-Ur Nekhet to Lancaster Mortgage Bankers, in the principal amount of $608,000.00, dated December 20,2005 and recorded on February 9,2006 in CRFN: 2006000079624. Plaintiff subsequently purchased the aforementioned mortgage and note from Defendant.

She goes on and hand writes the following:

Insufficient proof of ownership of mortgage to make up for lost assignment of mortgage, service was pursuant to BCC 306 on a corporation that is alleged to no longer be in operation and the proposed judgment says that the summons & complaint were filed in Suffolk County

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FDIC sues four former IndyMac executives

The agency accuses the managers of the defunct bank’s Homebuilder Division of acting negligently by granting loans to developers who were unlikely to repay the debts.

By E. Scott Reckard, Los Angeles Times
July 14, 2010

Launching a new offensive against leaders of failed financial institutions, federal regulators are accusing four former executives of Pasadena’s defunct IndyMac Bank of granting loans to developers and home builders who were unlikely to repay the debts.

The lawsuit by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. alleges that the IndyMac executives acted negligently and seeks $300 million in damages.

It is the first suit of its kind brought by the FDIC in connection with the spate of more than 250 bank failures that began in 2008. Regulators said it wouldn’t be the last.

“Clearly we’ll have more of these cases,” said Rick Osterman, the deputy general counsel who oversees litigation at the agency.

The FDIC has sent letters warning hundreds of top managers and directors at failed banks — and the insurers who provided them with liability coverage — of possible civil lawsuits, Osterman said. The letters go out early in investigations of failed banks, he added, to ensure that the insurers will later provide coverage even if the policy expires.

The four defendants in the FDIC lending negligence case, who operated the Homebuilder Division at IndyMac, collectively approved 64 loans that are described in the 309-page lawsuit.

They are:

•Scott Van Dellen, the division’s president and chief executive during six years ending in its seizure;

•Richard Koon, its chief lending officer for five years ending in July 2006;

•Kenneth Shellem, its chief credit officer for five years ending in November 2006;

•William Rothman, its chief lending officer during the two years before the seizure.

Through their attorneys, they vigorously denied the allegations.

“The FDIC has unfairly selected four hard-working executives of a small division of the bank … to blame for the failure of IndyMac,” said defense attorney Kirby Behre, who represents Shellem and Koon. “We intend to show that these loans were done at all times with a great deal of care and prudence.”

Defense attorney Michael Fitzgerald, who represents Van Dellen and Rothman, said no one at the company or its regulators foresaw the severity of the housing crash before it struck, and that IndyMac was one of the first construction lenders to pull back when trouble struck the industry in 2007.

Fitzgerald added that the FDIC thought Van Dellen trustworthy enough that it kept him on to run the division after the bank was seized.

The suit naming the IndyMac executives was filed this month in federal court in Los Angeles, two years after the July 2008 failure of the Pasadena savings and loan. The bank is now operated under new ownership as OneWest Bank.

IndyMac, principally a maker of adjustable-rate mortgages, was among a series of high-profile bank failures early in the financial crisis that were blamed on defaults on high-risk home loans and the securities linked to them.

But the majority of failures since then have been at banks hammered by losses on commercial real estate, particularly loans to residential developers and builders — and IndyMac had a sideline in that business as well through its Homebuilder Division.

The suit alleges that IndyMac’s compensation policies prompted the home-building division to increase lending to developers and builders with little regard for the quality of the loans.

“HBD’s management pushed to grow loan production despite their awareness that a significant downturn in the market was imminent and despite warnings from IndyMac’s upper management about the likelihood of a market decline,” the FDIC said in its complaint.

An investigation of IndyMac’s residential mortgage lending practices could lead to another civil suit, potentially naming higher-up executives, attorneys involved in the case said.

Continue reading… LA TIMES

Don’t we love New York!

This is another case for you all to learn from…Now again, shouldn’t their be a conflict of any documents where MERS is the nominee for any of these banks?

I think we are going to see lenders, servicers et al slowly begin to turn on MERS!

2010 NY Slip Op 51127(U)

IndyMAC BANK F.S.B., Plaintiff(s),
v.
LUDDY BRITO GARCIA, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., ACTING SOLELY AS A NOMINEE FOR STERLING NATIONAL MORTGAGE COMPANY, INC., SUBSIDIARY OF FEDERALLY CHARTERED BANK, ITS SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS, AND “JOHN DOE # 1” THROUGH “JOHN DOE # 10”, THE LAST TEN NAMES BEING FICTITIOUS AND UNKNOWN TO plaintiff, THE PERSONS OR PARTIES INTENDED BEING THE PERSONS OR PARTIES, IF ANY, HAVING OR CLAIMING AN INTEREST IN OR LIEN UPON THE MORTGAGED PREMISES DESCRIBED IN THE COMPLAINT, Defendant(s).

7282-2008

Supreme Court, Suffolk County.

Eschen, Frenkel & Weisman, LLP, 20 West Main Street, Bay Shore, New York 11706, Attorneys for Plaintiff.

Luddy Brito Garcia, 124 East 13th Street, Huntington Station, New York 11746, Defendant Pro Se.

PETER H. MAYER, J.

Upon the reading and filing of the following papers in this matter: (1) Notice of Motion by the plaintiff, dated June 2, 2009, and supporting papers; and now

UPON DUE DELIBERATION AND CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT of the foregoing papers, the motion is decided as follows: it is

ORDERED that plaintiff’s application (seq. # 002) for an order of reference in this foreclosure action is considered under 2009 NY Laws, Ch. 507, enacted December 15, 2009, and 2008 NY Laws, Ch. 472, enacted August 5, 2008, as well as the related statutes and case law, and is hereby denied without prejudice and with leave to resubmit upon proper papers, for failure to submit proper evidentiary proof, including an affidavit from one with personal knowledge, of a valid indorsement of the note or assignment of the mortgage, sufficient to establish the plaintiff’s ownership of the note and mortgage at the time the action was commenced; and it is further

ORDERED that the plaintiff shall promptly serve a copy of this Order upon the defendant-homeowner(s) at all known addresses and upon all other answering defendants, via first class mail, and shall promptly file the affidavit(s) of such service with the County Clerk and annex a copy of this Order and the affidavit(s) of service as exhibits to any motion resubmitted pursuant to this Order; and it is further

ORDERED that with regard to any scheduled court conferences or future applications by the plaintiff, if the Court determines that such conferences have been attended, or such applications have been submitted, without proper regard for the applicable statutory and case law, or without regard for the required proofs delineated herein, the Court may, in its discretion, dismiss this case or deny such applications with prejudice and/or impose sanctions pursuant to 22 NYCRR §130-1, and may deny those costs and attorneys fees attendant with the filing of such future applications.

By Order dated November 24, 2009, this Court scheduled a foreclosure settlement conference for December 23, 2009, which was adjourned to February 24, 2010. The defendant-homeowner, Luddy Brito Garcia, failed to appear at both. The plaintiff now seeks a default order of reference and requests amendment of the caption to substitute a tenant in the place and stead of the “Doe” defendants. For the reasons set forth herein, the plaintiff’s application is denied.

In this foreclosure action, the plaintiff filed a summons and complaint on January 3, 2008, which essentially alleges that Ms. Garcia defaulted in her payments of a mortgage, dated August 15, 2006, in the principal amount of $411,500.00, for the premises located at 124 East 13th Street, Huntington, New York. The original lender, Sterling National Mortgage Company, Inc., purportedly indorsed the promissory note to the plaintiff prior to the commencement of this action. According to the plaintiff, this indorsement made the plaintiff the lawful holder of the note and mortgage with standing to commence the action. Although the plaintiff’s affidavit in support indicates that the “original note with a proper indorsement is [now] in the plaintiff’s possession,” the plaintiff does not prove — or even assert — that the plaintiff actually possessed the note and mortgage at the time the action was filed.

Instead, citing Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v Coakley, 41 AD3d 674, 838 NYS2d 622 (2d Dept 2007), the plaintiff summarily argues that because the promissory note was indorsed to the plaintiff, the mortgage passed as an incident to the note. Under the circumstances presented herein, however, the plaintiff’s reliance on Coakley is misguided. In Coakley, the record showed that the promissory note had been indorsed by the original lender to another bank, who then indorsed it in blank and ultimately transferred and tendered it to the foreclosing plaintiff. On that particular record, the court found that at the time the action was commenced, the plaintiff was the lawful holder of the promissory note and of the mortgage, which had passed as an incident to the promissory note. In this case, however, the alleged “indorsement” appears to be on a separate page from the promissory note and, in any event, is clearly undated.

New York UCC §3-202 (1) states, in pertinent part, that “[i]f the instrument is payable to order it is negotiated by delivery with any necessary indorsement” (emphasis added). In addition, UCC §3-202(2) requires that “[a]n indorsement must be written by or on behalf of the holder and on the instrument or on a paper so firmly affixed thereto as to become a part thereof (emphasis added). Here, the purported indorsement is payable to order, but there is no evidence of delivery of the note prior to the action’s commencement. Furthermore, the alleged indorsement appears to be on a separate page, makes no specific reference to the subject note, and is, in any event, undated. As such, the so-called “indorsement” is, at best, unreliable and fails to support plaintiff’s claim that the “note and mortgage were assigned by a properly indorsed note prior to the commencement of this action” (see, Slutsky v Blooming Grove Inn, Inc., 147 AD2d 208, 542 NYS2d 721 [2d Dept 1989]). This is particularly true where, as here, the plaintiff’s affidavit in support of the motion fails to affirmatively state that the plaintiff did, in fact, possess the note and mortgage at the time the action was commenced. Without either proof of a proper written assignment of the underlying note or proper proof of the physical delivery of the note prior to the commencement of the foreclosure action, the plaintiff has failed to sufficiently show either the proper transfer of the obligation, or that the mortgage passed as an inseparable incident to the debt (see, U.S. Bank, N.A. v Collymore, 68 AD3d 752, 890 NYS2d 578 [2d Dept 2009]).

A plaintiff has no foundation in law or fact to foreclose upon a mortgage, unless the plaintiff has shown it has legal or equitable interest in such mortgage (Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Marchione, 69 AD3d 204, 887 NYS2d 615 [2d Dept 2009]; Katz v East-Ville Realty Co., 249 AD2d 243, 672 NYS2d 308 [1st Dept 1998]). A written assignment of the underlying note or the physical delivery of the note prior to the commencement of the foreclosure action would be sufficient to transfer the obligation, and have the mortgage pass as an inseparable incident to the debt (U.S. Bank, N.A. v Collymore, 68 AD3d 752, 890 NYS2d 578 [2d Dept 2009]). With regard to a written assignment, the execution date is generally controlling and a written assignment claiming an earlier effective date is deficient, unless it is accompanied by proof that the physical delivery of the note and mortgage was, in fact, previously effectuated (see, Bankers Trust Co. v Hoovis, 263 AD2d 937, 938, 694 NYS2d 245 [1999]). A retroactive assignment cannot be used to confer standing upon the assignee in a foreclosure action commenced prior to the execution of the assignment (Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v Gress, 68 AD3d 709, 888 NYS2d 914 [2d Dept 2009]; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Marchione, 69 AD3d 204, 887 NYS2d 615 [2d Dept 2009]).

Applying this analysis to the case before this Court, a statement by the plaintiff merely indicating that the original note is in plaintiff’s possession as of the making of a motion for an order of reference is insufficient to show that the plaintiff had standing to bring the action in the first instance (Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v Gress, 68 AD3d 709, 888 NYS2d 914 [2d Dept 2009]; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Marchione, 69 AD3d 204, 887 NYS2d 615 [2d Dept 2009]). Plaintiff’s failure to submit proper proof of a valid indorsement or assignment, and failure to otherwise prove that the plaintiff was the holder of the note and mortgage at the time the action was commenced, requires denial of the plaintiff’s motion for an order of reference.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Ryan Carter
Posted: 05/27/2010 04:23:20 PM PDT

Local lawmakers Thursday introduced an amendment to financial reform that would allow depositors at failed Pasadena-based Indymac Bank to recoup a collective $233 million in lost savings.

The amendment, called the Indy Act, would make a federal deposit insurance cap of $250,000 retroactive to the time IndyMac failed in July of 2008. At the time, deposit insurance was set for deposits up to $100,000. But as the financial crisis grew Congress only a few months later approved the heightened cap.

But the cap did not extend to institutions that failed before October 2008.

“The whole thing is about fairness,” said Rep. David Dreier, R-San Dimas, who along with Rep. Jane Harman, D-Venice, introduced the bill Thursday.

Source: www.pasadenastarnews.com

by Elizabeth MacDonald FoxBusiness

The Securities and Exchange  Commission is missing a bigger fraud while it chases the banks. Even though it knew about this massive, plain old fashioned accounting fraud back in 1998.
Instead, the market cops are probing simpler disclosure cases that could charge bank and Wall Street with not telling investors about their conflicts of interest in selling securities they knew were damaged while making bets against those same securities behind the scenes, via credit default swaps.
Those probes have gotten headlines, but there aren’t too many signs that this will lead to anything close to massive settlements or fines.

For instance, the SEC doesn’t appear to be investigating how banks frontloaded their profits via channel stuffing — securitizing loans and shoving paper securitizations onto investors, while booking those revenues immediately, even though the mortgage payments underlying those paper daisy chains were coming in the door years, even decades, later. Those moves helped lead to $2.4 trillion in writedowns worldwide.
The agency said it  believed banks were committing subprime securitization accounting frauds back in 1998 and claimed to be ‘probing’ them.
I had written about these SEC probes into potential frauds while covering corporate accounting abuses at The Wall Street Journal. The rules essentially let banks frontload into their revenue the sale of subprime mortgages or other loans that they then packaged and sold off as securities, even though the payments on those underlying loans were coming in the door over the next seven, 10, 20, or 30 years.
Estimating those revenues based on the value of future mortgage payments involved plenty of guesswork.

Securitization: Free Market Became a Free For All
The total amount of overall mortgage-backed securities generated by Wall Street virtually tripled between 1996 and 2007, to $7.3 trillion. Subprime mortgage securitizations increased from 54% in 2001, to 75% in 2006. Back in 1998, the SEC had warned a dozen top accounting firms that they must do a  better job policing how subprime lenders book profits from loans that are repackaged as securities and sold on the secondary market. The SEC “is becoming increasingly concerned” over the way lenders use what are called “gain on sale” accounting rules when they securitize these loans, Jane B. Adams, the SEC’s deputy chief accountant, said in a letter sent to the Financial Accounting Standards Board, the nation’s chief accounting rule makers.
At that time, subprime lenders had come under fire from consumer groups and Congress, who said banks were using aggressive accounting to frontload profits from securitizing subprime loans. Subprime auto lender Mercury Finance collapsed after a spectacular accounting fraud and shareholder suits, New Century Financial was tanking as well for the same reason.

SEC Knew About Subprime Fraud More than a Decade Ago
The SEC more than a decade ago believed that subprime lenders were abusing the accounting rules.
When lenders repackage consumer loans as asset-backed securities, they must book the fair value of profits or losses from the deals. But regulators said lenders were overvaluing the loan assets they kept on their books in order to inflate current profits. Others delayed booking assets in order to increase future earnings. Lenders were also using poor default and prepayment rate assumptions to overestimate the fair value of their securitizations.
Counting future revenue was perfectly legal under too lax rules.
But without it many lenders that are in an objective sense doing quite well would look as if they were headed for bankruptcy.
At that time, the SEC’s eyebrows were raised when Dan Phillips, chief executive officer of FirstPlus Financial Group, a Dallas subprime home equity lenders, had said the poor accounting actually levitated profits at lenders.
“The reality is that companies like us wouldn’t be here without gain on sale,” he said, adding, “a lot of people abuse it.”
But this much larger accounting trick, one that has exacerbated the ties that blind between company and auditor, is more difficult to nail down because it involves wading through a lot of math, a calculus that Wall Street stretched it until it snapped.

Impenetrably Absurd Accounting
These were the most idiotic accounting rules known to man, rules manufactured by a quiescent Financial Accounting Standards Board [FASB] that let bank executives make up profits out of thin air.
It resulted in a folie à deux between Wall Street and complicit accounting firms that swallowed whole guesstimates pulled out of the atmosphere.
Their accounting gamesmanship set alight the most massive off-balance sheet bubble of all, a rule that helped tear the stock market off its moorings.
The rules helped five Wall Street firms – Bear Stearns, Lehman Bros., Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs and Merrill Lynch – earn an estimated $312 billion based on fictitious profits during the bubble years.

Who Used the Rule?
Banks and investment firms including Citigroup, Bank of America and Merrill all used this “legit” rule.
Countrywide Financial made widespread use of this accounting chicanery (see below). So did Washington Mutual. So did IndyMac Bancorp. So did FirstPlus Financial Group, and as noted Mercury Finance Co. and New Century Financial Corp.
Brought to the cliff’s edge, these banks were either bailed out, taken over or went through bankruptcies.
Many banks sold those securitized loans to Enron-style off-balance sheet trusts, otherwise called “structured investment vehicles” (SIVs), again booking profits immediately (Citigroup invented the SIV in 1988).
So, presto-change-o, banks got to dump loans off their books, making their leverage ratios look a whole lot nicer, so in turn they could borrow more.
At the same time, the banks got to record immediate profits, even though those no-income, no-doc loans supporting those paper securities and paper gains were bellyflopping right and left.
The writedowns were then buried in obscure line items called “impairment charges,” and were then masked by new profits from issuing new loans or by refinancings.

Rulemakers Fight Back
The FASB has been fighting to restrict this and other types of accounting games, but the banks have been battling back with an army of lobbyists.
The FASB, which sets the rules for publicly traded companies, is still trying to hang tough and is trying to force all sorts of off-balance sheet borrowings back onto bank balance sheets.
But these “gain on sale” rules, along with the “fair value” or what are called “marked to market” rules, have either been watered down or have enough loopholes in them, escape hatches that were written into the rules by the accountants themselves, so that auditors can make a clean get away.
As the market turned down, banks got the FASB to back down on mark-to-market accounting, which had forced them to more immediately value these assets and take quarterly profit hits if those assets soured – even though they were booking immediate profits from this “gain on sale” rule on the way up.
Also, the FASB has clung fast to the Puritanism of their rulemaking by arguing a sale is a sale is a sale, so companies can immediately book the entire value of a sale of a loan turned into a bond, even though the cash from the underlying mortgage has yet to come in the door.

Old-Fashioned ‘Channel Stuffing’
This sanctioned “gain on sale” accounting is really old-fashioned “channel stuffing.”
The move lets companies pad their revenue and profit numbers by stuffing lots of goods and inventory (mortgages and subprime securities) into the system without actually getting the money in the door, and booking those channel-stuffed goods as actual sales in order to cook ever higher their earnings.
Sort of like what Sunbeam did with its barbecue grills in the ’90s.

Intergalactic Bank Justice League
Cleaning up the accounting rules is an easier fix instead of a new, belabored, top-heavy “Systemic Risk Council” of the heads of federal financial regulatory agencies, as Sen. Chris Dodd (D-Conn) envisions in financial regulatory reform.
An intergalactic Marvel Justice League of bank regulators can do nothing in the face of chicanery allowed in the rules.

Planes on a Tarmac
What happened was, banks and investment firms like Citigroup and Merrill Lynch who couldn’t sell these subprime bonds, or “collateralized debt obligations,” as well as other loan assets into these SIVs got caught out when the markets turned, stuck with this junk on their balance sheets like planes on a tarmac in a blizzard.
Bank of America saw its fourth-quarter 2007 profits plunge 95% largely due to SIV investments. SunTrust Banks’ earnings were nearly wiped out, a 98% drop in the same quarter, because of its SIVs.
Great Britain’s Northern Rock ran into huge problems in 2007 stemming from SIVs, and was later nationalized by the British government in February 2008.
Even the mortgage lending arm of tax preparer H&R Block used the move. Block sold its loans to off-balance-sheet vehicles so it could book gains about a month earlier than it otherwise would. Weee!
The company had $75 million of these items on its books at the end of its fiscal 2003 year. All totally within the rules.

Leverage Culture
The rampant fakery helped fuel a leverage culture that got a lot of homes put in hock.
Banks, for instance, started advertising home equity loans as “equity access,” or ways to “Live Richly” or as Fleet Bank once touted, “The smartest place to borrow? Your place.”
In fact, Washington Mutual and IndyMac got so excited by the gain on sale rules, they went so far as to count in profits futuristic gains even if they had only an “interest rate” commitment from a borrower, and not a final mortgage loan.
Talk about counting chickens before they hatch.

Closer Look at Wamu
Look at Wamu’s profits in just one year during the runup to the bubble. Such gains more than tripled in 2001 at Wamu, to just shy of $1 billion, or 22% of its pretax earnings before extraordinary items, up from $262 million, or 9%, in 2000.
But in 2001, Washington Mutual took $1.7 billion in charges, $1.1 billion of it in the final, fourth quarter, to reflect bleaker prospects for the revenue stream of all those servicing rights.
It papered over the hit with a nearly identical $1.8 billion gain on securitizations and portfolio sales.

Closer Look at Countrywide
The accounting fakery let Countrywide Financial Corp., the mortgage issuer now owned by Bank of America, triple its profit in 2003 to $2.4 billion on $8.5 billion in revenue.
At the height of the bubble, Countrywide booked $6.1 billion in gains from the sale of loans and securities. But this wasn’t cold, hard cash. No, this was potential future profits from servicing mortgage portfolios, meaning collecting monthly payments and late penalties.

MORTGAGE SERVICING COMPANIES

PREPARING “ REPLACEMENT” MORTGAGE ASSIGNMENTS

By Lynn E. Szymoniak, Esq., Ed. Fraud Digest, May 6, 2010

CALIFORNIA – ORANGE COUNTY

Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC

Tom Croft and others

CALIFORNIA – SAN DIEGO COUNTY

Chase Home Finance

FLORIDA – BROWARD COUNTY

Patricia Arango, Caryn Graham and others

Law Offices of Marshal Watson

FLORIDA – BROWARD COUNTY

Cheryl Samons, Beth Cerni and others

Law Offices of David Stern

FLORIDA – DUVAL COUNTY

Lender Processing Services

Valerie Broom, Margaret Dalton, Michele Halyard, Michael Hunt, Joseph

Kaminsky, Kathy Smith, Coleman Stokes and others

FLORIDA- HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY

Florida Default Law Group or Law Offices of Daniel Consuegra

FLORIDA – PALM BEACH COUNTY

Ocwen Loan Servicing

Scott Anderson, Oscar Taveras, Doris Chapman, Jonathan Burgess, Laura

Buxton and others

FLORIDA – PINELLAS COUNTY

Nationwide Title Clearing

Bryan Bly, Vilma Castro, Dhurato Doko, Jessica Fretwell and others

GEORGIA – FULTON COUNTY

Lender Processing Services

Linda Green, Korell Harp, Jessice Ohde, Linda Thoresen, Tywanna Thomas,

Cheryl Thomas, Christie Baldwin and others

MINNESOTA -DAKOTA COUNTY

Lender Processing Services

Liquenda Allotey, Topeka Love, Christine Anderson, Christine Allen, Eric Tate

OHIO – FRANKLIN COUNTY

Chase Home Finance

Christina Trowbridge, Whitney Cook and others

PENNSYLVANIA – ALLEGHANY COUNTY

Home Loan Services, Inc.

PENNSYLVANIA – MONTGOMERY COUNTY

GMAC (and Homecomings Financial)

Jeffrey Stephan, John Kerr and others

SOUTH CAROLINA – YORK COUNTY

America’s Servicing Company

John Kennerty, China Brown and others

TEXAS – COLLIN COUNTY

BAC Home Loan Servicing, f/k/a Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP

TEXAS – DALLAS COUNTY (COPPELL, TX)

American Home Mortgage Servicing

TEXAS – HARRIS COUNTY

Litton Loan Servicing, LP

Marti Noriega, Denise Bailey, Diane Dixon and others

TEXAS – TARRANT COUNTY

Saxon Mortgage Services

TEXAS – TRAVIS COUNTY

IndyMac Bank Home Loan Servicing

Brian Burnett, Kristen Kemp, Suchan Murray, Chamagne Williams and others

TEXAS – WILLIAMSON COUNTY

IndyMac Bank (years after IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. ceased to exist, many of the signers will sign as officers of IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. (the entity that should have made the assignment to the trust years ealier)

Erica A. Johnson-Seck, Dennis Kirkpatick, Eric Friedman and others

UTAH

SALT LAKE COUNTY

Select Portfolio Servicing

Luisa Alfonso, Bill Koch and others

Many mortgage-backed securitized trusts are missing critical documents needed to foreclose – i.e., the mortgage assignment. An excellent discussion of this is found in the decision of Massachusetts Land Court Judge Keith Long reaffirming a 2009 ruling (Ibanez) that invalidated foreclosures on two properties because the lenders did not hold clear title to the properties at the time of the foreclosure sale. Mortgage assignments were a key issue in Ibanez, a case that involved ineffective assignments to the Trust. Judge Long noted:

…the plaintiffs’ own securitization documents required mortgage assignments to be made to the plaintiffs in recordable form for each and every loan at the time the plaintiffs acquired them. Surely, compliance with this requirement would (and certainly should) have been a priority for an entity issuing securities dependent on recoveries from loans, such as these, known from the start to have a higher than normal risk of delinquency and default. U.S. BANK, N.A. v. Antonio Ibanez, et al., Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Land Court Dept., 08 MISC 384283 (KCL).

This Ibanez decision and many others deal with the issue of mortgage assignments prepared years after the closing date of the trust, usually when the Trustee or mortgage servicer has realized that the Trust does not have the assignment needed to foreclose or has a defective assignment – such as one issued in blank, unsigned and undated.

Many trusts and servicers try to replace the missing assignments, often with assignments executed within a few months of the foreclosure – and in many cases even after the foreclosure is filed or the home is sold (in non-judicial foreclosure states). The date and place of the Assignment often reveals whether the Assignment is actually a “replacement” – issued years after the Trust closed, and even years after the original lender supposedly making the Assignment disappeared into bankruptcy.

The servicer rarely identifies itself and discloses that this is an attempt to replace a missing assignment. It is, therefore, very useful to know that Mortgage Assignments notarized in the counties above are more often than not replacement Assignments prepared by or on behalf of the Trusts – by the servicers for the Trust or document preparation companies working for the servicers, or even law firm employees working for the Trust.

Please send corrections/additions to szymoniak@mac.com.

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Ok folks…here we have Eric & Erica.

We all know some of the many hats Erica Johnson-Seck wears…so whats a few more. Just like her,  Eric Friedman joins her with some signings and also gives Law Offices of David J. Stern Power Of Attorney via IndyMac.

N0tice how it may be the same person signing for all on the POA? Eric also signs documents for Florida Default Group now would this be a conflict? What makes of this POA since Eric’s signatures aren’t consistent and is an officer of other banks too?

Oh and they didn’t want notary Mai Thao to feel left out so they let “Mai”  in on it too.

• Notice original banks ceased operations before these were assigned.
• They “fabricated” these assignments to back date and record months after.
• Notice no addresses because their is none.
• IndyMac itself was ceased by the FDIC in 7/11/2008 and sold to OneWest 3/19/2009.

[ipaper docId=29139438 access_key=key-u0m7ieq9clym21cd31v height=600 width=600 /]

via b.daviesmd6605

SAME RESPONSES OBJECTIONS AND NO DOCUMENTS. IT IS THE GAME. HOPEFULLY WE CAN BREAK THIS GAME. WE ALL HAVE ERICA JOHNSON-SECKS DEPOSITION. JUST FOLLOW THE YELLOW BRICK ROAD.

[ipaper docId=28942482 access_key=key-q7xsg1ugun6de39c0wi height=600 width=600 /]

Here Mr. Davies points out some VERY IMPORTANT issues. This is NOT limited to OneWest/ IndyMac as we come to find out many of these “Non-Creditors” use almost the same verbiage over and over and over.

Take time to read this over because what you sign TODAY may not help you Tomorrow if you sign your rights away! Do NOT sign anything you do not understand and consult with an attorney ASAP. Mr. Davies is one highly intelligent man! Thank you for your fine work!

[scribd id=26821737 key=key-1fp04vkaavyupru2goxf mode=list]

Indymac Federal Bank Fsb Vs. Israel a. Machado :

In this depo you will see exactly how this Illegal FORECLOSURE FRAUD is fabricated, conspired, concealed, manipulated and fraud upon the courts.

Deposition_of_Erica_Johnson-Seck_Part_I

[ipaper docId=37528161 access_key=key-t6hhb0aqxj8gvgam8s7 height=600 width=600 /]

When will ALL this Bull Shit come to an END? Everything is a stage and all these “Non-Bank’s” are characters!

 Freedom of Information Act Requests Show OneWest Bank Misrepresentation

This in combination with A.K. Barnett-Hart’s Thesis make’s one hell of a Discovery.

 
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES IN
SUBPRIME LITIGATION

Jennifer E. Bethel*
Allen Ferrell**
Gang Hu***

Discussion Paper No. 612

03/2008

Harvard Law School Cambridge, MA 02138

This paper explores the economic and legal causes and consequences of recent difficulties in the subprime mortgage market. We provide basic descriptive statistics and institutional details on the mortgage origination process, mortgage-backed securities (MBS), and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). We examine a number of aspects of these markets, including the identity of MBS and CDO sponsors, CDO trustees, CDO liquidations, MBS insured and registered amounts, the evolution of MBS tranche structure over time, mortgage originations, underwriting quality of mortgage originations, and write-downs of investment banks. In light of this discussion, the paper then addresses questions as to how these difficulties might have not been foreseen, and some of the main legal issues that will play an important role in the extensive subprime litigation (summarized in the paper) that is underway, including the Rule 10b-5 class actions that have already been filed against the investment banks, pending ERISA litigation, the causes-of-action available to MBS and CDO purchasers, and litigation against the rating agencies. In the course of this discussion, the paper highlights three distinctions that will likely prove central in the resolution of this litigation: The distinction between reasonable ex ante expectations and the occurrence of ex post losses; the distinction between the transparency of the quality of the underlying assets being securitized and the transparency as to which market participants are exposed to subprime losses; and, finally, the distinction between what investors and market participants knew versus what individual entities in the structured finance process knew, particularly as to macroeconomic issues such as the state of the national housing market. ex ante expectations and the occurrence of ex post losses; the distinction between the transparency of the quality of the underlying assets being securitized and the transparency as to which market participants are exposed to subprime losses; and, finally, the distinction between what investors and market participants knew versus what individual entities in the structured finance process knew, particularly as to macroeconomic issues such as the state of the national housing market. 

March 15, 2010, 4:59 PM ET

Michael Lewis’s ‘The Big Short’? Read the Harvard Thesis Instead!

By Peter Lattman

Deal Journal has yet to read “The Big Short,” Michael Lewis’s yarn on the financial crisis that hit stores today. We did, however, read his acknowledgments, where Lewis praises “A.K. Barnett-Hart, a Harvard undergraduate who had just  written a thesis about the market for subprime mortgage-backed CDOs that remains more interesting than any single piece of Wall Street research on the subject.”

While unsure if we can stomach yet another book on the crisis, a killer thesis on the topic? Now that piqued our curiosity. We tracked down Barnett-Hart, a 24-year-old financial analyst at a large New York investment bank. She met us for coffee last week to discuss her thesis, “The Story of the CDO Market Meltdown: An Empirical Analysis.” Handed in a year ago this week at the depths of the market collapse, the paper was awarded summa cum laude and won virtually every thesis honor, including the Harvard Hoopes Prize for outstanding scholarly work.

Last October, Barnett-Hart, already pulling all-nighters at the bank (we agreed to not name her employer), received a call from Lewis, who had heard about her thesis from a Harvard doctoral student. Lewis was blown away.

“It was a classic example of the innocent going to Wall Street and asking the right questions,” said Mr. Lewis, who in his 20s wrote “Liar’s Poker,” considered a defining book on Wall Street culture. “Her thesis shows there were ways to discover things that everyone should have wanted to know. That it took a 22-year-old Harvard student to find them out is just outrageous.”

Barnett-Hart says she wasn’t the most obvious candidate to produce such scholarship. She grew up in Boulder, Colo., the daughter of a physics professor and full-time homemaker. A gifted violinist, Barnett-Hart deferred admission at Harvard to attend Juilliard, where she was accepted into a program studying the violin under Itzhak Perlman. After a year, she headed to Cambridge, Mass., for a broader education. There, with vague designs on being pre-Med, she randomly took “Ec 10,” the legendary introductory economics course taught by Martin Feldstein.

“I thought maybe this would help me, like, learn to manage my money or something,” said Barnett-Hart, digging into a granola parfait at Le Pain Quotidien. She enjoyed how the subject mixed current events with history, got an A (natch) and declared economics her concentration.

Barnett-Hart’s interest in CDOs stemmed from a summer job at an investment bank in the summer of 2008 between junior and senior years. During a rotation on the mortgage securitization desk, she noticed everyone was in a complete panic. “These CDOs had contaminated everything,” she said. “The stock market was collapsing and these securities were affecting the broader economy. At that moment I became obsessed and decided I wanted to write about the financial crisis.”

Back at Harvard, against the backdrop of the financial system’s near-total collapse, Barnett-Hart approached professors with an idea of writing a thesis about CDOs and their role in the crisis. “Everyone discouraged me because they said I’d never be able to find the data,” she said. “I was urged to do something more narrow, more focused, more knowable. That made me more determined.”

She emailed scores of Harvard alumni. One pointed her toward LehmanLive, a comprehensive database on CDOs. She received scores of other data leads. She began putting together charts and visuals, holding off on analysis until she began to see patterns–how Merrill Lynch and Citigroup were the top originators, how collateral became heavily concentrated in subprime mortgages and other CDOs, how the credit ratings procedures were flawed, etc.

“If you just randomly start regressing everything, you can end up doing an unlimited amount of regressions,” she said, rolling her eyes. She says nearly all the work was in the research; once completed,  she jammed out the paper in a couple of weeks.

“It’s an incredibly impressive piece of work,” said Jeremy Stein, a Harvard economics professor who included the thesis on a reading list for a course he’s teaching this semester on the financial crisis. “She pulled together an enormous amount of information in a way that’s both intelligent and accessible.”

Barnett-Hart’s thesis is highly critical of Wall Street and “their irresponsible underwriting practices.” So how is it that she can work for the very institutions that helped create the notorious CDOs she wrote about?

“After writing my thesis, it became clear to me that the culture at these investment banks needed to change and that incentives needed to be realigned to reward more than just short-term profit seeking,” she wrote in an email. “And how would Wall Street ever change, I thought, if the people that work there do not change? What these banks needed is for outsiders to come in with a fresh perspective, question the way business was done, and bring a new appreciation for the true purpose of an investment bank – providing necessary financial services, not creating unnecessary products to bolster their own profits.”

Ah, the innocence of youth.

Here is a copy of the thesis: 2009-CDOmeltdown