Via: ForeclosureBlues

[ipaper docId=45961000 access_key=key-25jetsootin624fmjba1 height=600 width=600 /]

EXCERPT:

In submitting any future orders of reference said application shall include an affidavit from plaintiff indicating whether this loan is subject to a H.A.M.P. review and whether plaintiff is or is not prevented from proceeding with the instant foreclosure by reason of any applicable federal H.A.M.P. directives.

Read each below as some are worded differently…

[ipaper docId=45801709 access_key=key-1bx4piyyyebnoga2vmrr height=600 width=600 /]

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. SUCCESSOR BY MERGER TO
WELLS FARGO HOME MORTGAGE INC., Plaintiff,

against

Paul Meyers, MICHELA MEYERS, DAIMLER CHRYSLER
FINANCIAL SERVICES AMERICAS LLC, FORD MOTOR
CREDIT COMPANY, JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NA
LVNV FUNDING LLC, NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT
OF TAXATION AND FINANCE TOWN SUPERVISOR OF
THE TOWN OF BABYLON, and JOHN DOE, Defendants.

Steven J. Baum P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
900 Merchants Concourse
Westbury, New York 11590

Diana Lozada Ruiz
Attorney for Defendants
PO Box 604
Mineola, New York 11501
Patrick A. Sweeney, J.

EXCERPTS:

Meyers testified that the defendants were not in default but were struggling to pay the mortgage. She claimed that several representatives of the plaintiff told her that she could not apply for a modification until she
was three months late with payments. According to Meyers, she was told to default on the mortgage in order to apply for a modification. Meyers testified that she followed this advice, made a down payment and faxed over a hardship letter along with financial documentation. Meyers claimed that the plaintiff kept losing the documents and that she had to re-fax the information numerous times.

<SNIP>

In addition, the plaintiff has provided conflicting information regarding its denial of the
modification. Less than one month after the initial denial, the defendants received another
letter indicating that the plaintiff could not adjust the terms of the mortgage because the
investor on the mortgage declined the requested modification. Within a week, the defendants
were sent additional letters advising them of mortgage options and again directing them to
apply to the Home Affordable Modification Program. This is inconsistent as the plaintiff
takes the position that it cannot modify the loan without the approval of Freddie Mac but
offered no evidence as to whether the initial modification was approved by Freddie Mac
before it was sent to the defendants. Freddie Mac is not a party to this action and is not the
party seeking to foreclose the mortgage. The plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any good
faith basis for refusing to honor the terms of the trial modification or offering another similar
proposal. The defendants complied with the all the requirements of the trial modification
and have appeared at all the conferences in this action. The defendant Paul Meyers is
gainfully employed and the defendants are trying to avoid losing their home. Under these
circumstances, the Court finds that the plaintiff has acted in bad faith. In view of the Court’s
broad equitable powers, the Court finds that the appropriate remedy is to compel specific
performance of the original modification agreement proposed by the plaintiff and accepted
by the defendants (see e.g. EMC Mortgage Co v Gross, 289 AD2d 438 [2d Dept 2001]).

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that the plaintiff is directed to execute a final modification based upon the
terms of the original modification proposal, and it is further

ORDERED that the complaint to foreclose the mortgage is dismissed.

Read order below…

[ipaper docId=45744707 access_key=key-18vnftqsmu8sx1384r56 height=600 width=600 /]

Via: Anonymous

This is fascinating. It showed up on the American Banker site this morning, which is not readable without subscription.

Contrary to the statement that these ‘counselors’ do not “track” follow-up, I recently received a request to fill-in a follow up e-survey which was oddly pre-filled out stating erroneously that I had not disclosed the identity of my bank during my “counseling” session.

I forwarded it to SIGTARP, COP, and the President with the relevant questions.

So… Could it be that counsel-obtained info via Hope hotlines could corrupt HAMP performance data, and/or disadvantage borrowers in litigation/settlement?

http://www.collectionscreditrisk.com/news/lender-tie-to-borrower-aid-3004375-1.html

Excerpt from article:

Some industry experts have questioned why a nonprofit affiliated with servicers is receiving government funding to resolve disputes between borrowers and the same servicers who are denying modifications. Several distressed homeowners who contacted American Banker said servicers refuse to give explanations for denied mods. Many were put into trial mods at a reduced payment but were later denied and are now in worse shape because servicers demand that any arrearages be paid in full for the loan to become current.

ANITA A. VIDA, Plaintiff,
v.
ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B., a Delaware corporation formerly known as IndyMac Federal Bank, F.S.B., and FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, a Government Chartered Association formerly known as Fannie Mae, Defendants.

Civ. No. 10-987-AC.

United States District Court, D. Oregon, Portland Division.

December 13, 2010.

OPINION AND ORDER

JOHN V. ACOSTA, Magistrate Judge.

Introduction

Plaintiff Anita A. Vida (“Vida”) alleges claims for breach of contract and fraud, and seeks declaratory judgment cancelling the trust deed and reinstating her mortgage. Defendants OneWest Bank, FSB (“OneWest”) and Federal National Mortgage Association (“FNMA”) (collectively “Defendants”) move for dismissal of all claims. Defendants argue that Vida has failed to state a claim for relief on the following grounds: (1) Vida may not state a breach of contract claim arising under the Home Affordable Mortgage Program (“HAMP”) because it does not authorize a private right of action; (2) Vida has not pleaded her fraud claim with sufficient particularity; and (3) Vida’s allegation that she did not receive adequate notice of the foreclosure action is preempted by state law. Defendants assert generally that Vida has otherwise failed to state claims of breach of contract and fraud.

Continue Below…

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December 17, 2010, 11:29 AM ET

By Nick Timiraos

Bank of America helpfully sent out a letter last week informing a Brooklyn homeowner that the bank didn’t have all the documents needed to finalize a loan modification application.

“Our records indicate that we are still missing some of the required documents, or some of the documents were sent to us with missing or incorrect information,” said the form letter dated Dec. 6.

But there was one problem: the letter was addressed to the couple that sold the Brooklyn apartment in 1998. It arrived in the mailbox of a Wall Street Journal reporter who bought that apartment and has never had a mortgage on it.

It’s no secret that banks’ paperwork problems have plagued the Obama administration’s Home Affordable Modification Program, or HAMP, and the letter offers a glimmer into potential miscues. Borrowers frequently tell of sending and resending paperwork three or four times, while banks often say that modifications aren’t being completed because borrowers aren’t filing all the necessary documentation.

Bank of America says this letter was sent in error after a loan modification negotiator entered in the wrong nine-digit loan number and that the incident appears to have been “very isolated.” “It was simply someone going into a template [who] punched in the wrong number,” said a bank spokeswoman. “Obviously, we’re very sorry for the confusion.”

Congressional Oversight Panel Reviews Treasury’s Foreclosure Prevention Programs
HAMP On Track to Prevent Far Fewer Foreclosures Than Expected, but Treasury Can Still Take Steps to Help More Homeowners Avoid Foreclosure

WASHINGTON, D.C. — The Congressional Oversight Panel today released its December oversight report, “A Review of Treasury’s Foreclosure Prevention Programs.” In the eight months since the Panel’s last report on the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), Treasury has made minor tweaks to the program, but the changes have not resolved the Panel’s core concerns. The Panel now estimates that, if current trends hold, HAMP will prevent only 700,000 foreclosures – far fewer than the three to four million foreclosures that Treasury initially aimed to stop, and vastly fewer than the eight to 13 million foreclosures expected by 2012.

While HAMP’s most dramatic shortcoming has been its poor results in preventing foreclosures, the program has had other significant flaws. For example, despite repeated urgings from the Panel, Treasury has failed to collect and analyze data that would explain HAMP’s shortcomings, and it does not even have a way to collect data for many of HAMP’s add-on programs. Further, Treasury has refused to specify meaningful goals by which to measure HAMP’s progress, while the program’s sole initial goal – to prevent three to four million foreclosures – has been repeatedly redefined and watered down.

Treasury has failed to hold loan servicers accountable when they have repeatedly lost borrower paperwork or refused to perform loan modifications. Treasury has essentially outsourced the responsibility for overseeing servicers to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, but Freddie Mac in particular has hesitated to enforce some of its contractual rights related to the foreclosure process, arguing that doing so “may negatively impact our relationships with these seller/servicers, some of which are among our largest sources of mortgage loans.” Treasury bears the ultimate responsibility for preventing such conflicts of interest, and it should ensure that loan servicers are penalized when they fail to complete loan modifications appropriately.

It is too late for Treasury to revamp its foreclosure prevention strategy, but Treasury can still take steps to wring every possible benefit from its programs. Treasury should enable borrowers to apply for loan modifications more easily – for example, by allowing online applications. Treasury should also carefully monitor and, where appropriate, intervene in cases in which borrowers are falling behind on their HAMP-modified mortgages. Preventing redefaults is an extremely powerful way of magnifying HAMP’s impact, as each redefault prevented translates directly into a borrower keeping his home.

Treasury should acknowledge that HAMP will not reach the expected number of homeowners and should provide a meaningful framework for evaluating the program in the future. Treasury continues to state that HAMP will expend $30 billion in Troubled Asset Relief Program funding, yet the Panel’s estimate based on Congressional Budget Office figures is that HAMP will likely spend only around $4 billion. Had Treasury acknowledged this reality before its crisis authority expired, it could have reallocated the money to a more effective program. Now, that option is gone. Absent a dramatic and unexpected increase in HAMP enrollment, many billions of dollars set aside for foreclosure mitigation may well be left unused. As a result, an untold number of borrowers may go without help – all because Treasury failed to acknowledge HAMP’s shortcomings in time.

The full report is available at cop.senate.gov.

The Congressional Oversight Panel was created to oversee the expenditure of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds authorized by Congress in the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) and to provide recommendations on regulatory reform. The Panel members are former Senator Ted Kaufman; J. Mark McWatters; Richard H. Neiman, Superintendent of Banks for the State of New York; Damon Silvers, Policy Director and Special Counsel for the AFL-CIO; and Kenneth Troske, William B. Sturgill Professor of Economics at the University of Kentucky.

###

by Jean Braucher

This Article examines in detail the disappointing first year of the Obama Administration’s foreclosure mitigation effort, the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), including its premises, mechanics, slow start, and ultimately modest results. The Administration committed $75 billion to try to help three to four million struggling homeowners avoid foreclosure and reduce the spillover effects of the foreclosure crisis on the economy as a whole. After a year of operations, ending in March 2010, only about 230,000 borrowers had entered into permanent HAMP modifications, and even these were not necessarily truly permanent. Government agencies predicted a redefault rate of 40% or more because HAMP borrowers were typically left owing more on their homes than their value and with high and difficult-to-sustain debt burdens overall. HAMP is a compelling illustration that prevention is easier than cure; the challenges of getting relief to millions in a short period of time proved daunting. A partial front-end regulatory fix was adopted, applicable to future subprime home loans, but if policymakers and regulators are ever tempted again to ease up constraints on high-risk financial products such as subprime mortgages, they should remember the cautionary tale of HAMP.

Click on image below

Bank evicts, then offers Boca Raton couple a loan mod

By Kimberly Miller Palm Beach Post Staff Writer
Updated: 10:34 p.m. Saturday, Dec. 4, 2010
Posted: 10:27 p.m. Saturday, Dec. 4, 2010

In hours of congressional hearings last week, the nation’s banks were repeatedly condemned for dual-track loan modification systems that give hope to homeowners seeking lower monthly payments while at the same time foreclosing on their properties behind their backs.

“Unacceptable deficiencies,” is how the acting director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency put it. Failed oversight, ineffective practices and insufficient staffing were criticisms added by other top regulators and legislators.

Boca Raton resident James Strass­burger could have told lawmakers all that. He just wishes they were listening this year when One West Bank sold his home at foreclosure auction during negotiations for a loan modification.

Strassburger, 56, and his wife, Deborah, 58, who lived in their home for 19 years, were ordered out in May, holding two yard sales so they could squeeze into a rented apartment.

But the real kick in the gut came in August, six months after the auction, when they got a letter congratulating them for earning a trial loan modification. It was followed by a note alerting them to a hearing­ that would essentially give them their home back. Their mortgage payment was due Sept. 1, the letter reminded.

“This all could have been avoided. We could have been living our lives,” said James Strass­burger, a former business owner whose flooring jobs dropped off when the economy fell. “It’s not a good feeling. I don’t like seeing my wife cry.”

One West Bank said it was looking into the Strass­burgers’ case, but did not respond to a request for comment for this story.

Washington lawmakers began paying earnest attention to the nation’s foreclosure nightmare this fall as banks pulled back on their home repossessions after acknowledging assembly line-like processing systems had potentially illegal shortcomings.

Hastily prepared court documents, as well as the dual-track foreclosure and loan modification process, were discussed Wednesday in a hearing of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, and Thursday in the House Judiciary Committee.

Where exactly are these “trial payments” 🙂

U.S. Bank Natl. Assn.
v.
Mathon

2010 NY Slip Op 52082(U)
Decided on December 1, 2010
Supreme Court, Suffolk County
Spinner, J.

The issue of the claim of the forbearance/modification agreement, however, is an entirely different situation, one that is considerably troubling to this Court. Defendants assert (and Plaintiff does not in any way controvert) that on April 17, 2009, without the benefit of counsel, they executed a three page document entitled “Home Affordable Modification Trial Period Plan” which was propounded to them by Plaintiff. Indeed, a copy of the same is appended as Exhibit C to the Affidavit of Thomas E. Reardon. According to Defendants (and again, not controverted by Plaintiff), they timely remitted to Plaintiff the three payments of $ 1,736.00 required thereunder and in compliance therewith, followed with nine more monthly payments in the same amount. According to Defendants (and once again, not controverted by Plaintiff), they continued to send monthly payments of $ 1,736.00, doing so in compliance with a letter from Plaintiff’s servicer Chase Home Finance LLC dated June 1, 2009 and appended to their Order To Show Cause. In relevant part, this letter states, in bold face type, as follows;

“If you make all [3] trial period payments on time and comply with all applicable program guidelines, you will have qualified for a final modification. However, there may be a period of time between your last trial payment and your first modification payment as we finalize the documents and get them back from you. During that interval, you should make a continuation payment at the trial period amount, and an extra coupon has been provided for that purpose.That payment will be applied as a principal reduction payment on your loan after your final modification is effective.”

It is undisputed that Defendants sent thirteen payments to Chase Home Finance LLC totalling $ 22,568.00 in reliance upon both the aforementioned April 17, 2009 Trial Modification and the subsequent June 1, 2009 letter and further, that the same were accepted by Plaintiff, presumably under the terms and conditions dictated by Plaintiff. According to Defendants, they regularly inquired as to the status of the final modification and were variously informed that all documents had been received, the application was with underwriting and finally, underwriter had approved the final modification. Notwithstanding the continuing stream of payments from Defendants and the verbal representations made to them, Chase Home Finance LLC, by letter dated April 15, 2010 (two days shy of one year following execution of the Trial Modification) notified Defendants that a loan [*3]modification would not be offered to them due to their inability to meet the existing guidelines therefor. The reason stated for the denial was the inability to meet HAMP guidelines by modifying the payments to equal 31% of Defendants’ gross monthly income.

In opposition to the foregoing, the Affidavit of Thomas E. Reardon, Assistant Vice-President of Chase Home Finance LLC (Plaintiff’s servicing agent), plainly acknowledges the foregoing assertions by Defendants but states, in Paragraph 7, that “…Due to a combination of factors, however, including missing documents, the submission of stale financial data and a significant influx of Trial Plan applications, the Mathons’ Trial Plan was not reviewed by the underwriting department until on or about April 2, 2010.” The Affidavit does state that on June 30, 2010 the Mathons applied for a new modification but that they failed to supply all necessary documents for consideration. However, nowhere in Plaintiff’s submissions to this Court is there any substantiation of this claim nor is the issue of Defendants’ payments addressed. Too, there is no proof of any computation or other calculation explaining the basis for denial herein.

In further opposition to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff has submitted the Affidavit of Adam M. Marshall Esq., an associate in the firm of Cullen & Dykman LLP. Mr. Marshall states under oath, in Paragraph 9 thereof, that “Since the Mathons moved by Order to Show Cause to stay the foreclosure on August 12, 2010, further efforts have been made to provide the Mathons with a loan modification based on verifiable income. On October 12, 2010, Plaintiff withdrew its Motion for Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale. In addition, a new application for a loan modification was forwarded to the Mathons. However, the Mathons have abjectly refused to complete the application or supply the financial documents requested therein.” This Affidavit by counsel seems to be somewhat at odds with the averments of Mr. Reardon and is amply rebutted by Defendants’ motion papers. Defendants have appended a plethora of documents dating from April 30, 2010 through July 28, 2010 evidencing their application for a new modification (which appears to be a HAMP modification identical to the one that Plaintiff had just rejected) as well as their cooperation with the demands of Plaintiff regarding the same. Even so, while Defendants were assiduously attempting to re-negotiate a modification, Plaintiff was instructing its counsel to continue prosecution of the foreclosure action. It is painfully obvious to this Court that Defendants relied upon representations made by Plaintiff and acted affirmatively based upon those representations, all to their serious detriment.

There has been no disclosure by Plaintiff to this Court as to whether or not this loan in foreclosure is deemed to be “sub-prime” or “high cost” in nature. Moreover, no mandatory settlement conference has been held in this matter though same is plainly required pursuant to CPLR § 3408.

Continue reading below…

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Source: Strauss & Troy
Strauss & Troy Investigates HSBC Bank and Citi Mortgage

CINCINNATI, Dec. 1, 2010 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — The Cincinnati law firm of Strauss & Troy announced today that it is investigating HSBC Bank and Citi Mortgage for potential violations of state and federal law with regard to foreclosures initiated against homeowners participating in the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) and/or robo-signers who initiated foreclosure actions without adequately reviewing the filings. Strauss & Troy represents homeowners in a pending action against a bank for alleged violations of HAMP.

Individuals who have lost their homes in a foreclosure action or are currently in foreclosure initiated by HSBC or Citi Mortgage: (i) after making payments pursuant to a trial HAMP payment plan that was not made permanent, or (ii) as a result of robo-signers who initiated foreclosure actions without adequately reviewing the filings, may have a claim and are encouraged to contact attorneys Richard Wayne, William Flynn, or John Levy at (513) 621-2120, or by email at: rswayne@strausstroy.com, wkflynn@strausstroy.com or jmlevy@strausstroy.com for further information without any obligation or cost to you.

CONTACT:  Strauss & Troy
Richard Wayne, Esq.
William Flynn, Esq.
John Levy, Esq.
(513) 621-2120
1-800-669-9341
Cincinnati, Ohio  45202

COUNT I:

BREACH OF CONTRACT / BREACH OF DUTY OF GOOD FAITH
AND FAIR DEALING

COUNT II:

PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL, IN THE ALTERNATIVE

COUNT III:

VIOLATION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT,
RCW 19.86.010 ET SEQ

[ipaper docId=44324706 access_key=key-2hmeqvhev4ksjp3amyva height=600 width=600 /]

via: mlinc06

GMAC offers loan modification, accepts payments, and forecloses on homeowners, 5 months into the modification, despite GMAC representative admitting that homeowner was not at fault. Listen to the bank admit to missapplying payments, while foreclosing on Los Angeles, CA homeowners.

FIRST COUNT

Breach of Contract

SECOND COUNT

Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

THIRD COUNT

Fraud/Intentional Misrepresentation

FOURTH COUNT

Constructive Fraud/Negligent Misrepresentation

FIFTH COUNT

Negligent Processing of Loan Modifications and Foreclosures

SIXTH COUNT

Violation of the New York Deceptive Practices Act, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law 349, et.seq.

SEVENTH COUNT

Violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”), N.J.S.A. 56.8-1, et. seq.

EIGHTH COUNT

Violation of Constitutional Rights Under Color of State Law, 42 U.S.C. 1983

BRIAN COSTIGAN v. Citigroup

[ipaper docId=43749401 access_key=key-2hc2trj9ngfzph1d6b6s height=600 width=600 /]

By Lorraine Woellert and Clea Benson – Nov 18, 2010 7:26 PM ET

U.S. homeowners are dropping out of the Obama administration’s foreclosure prevention program at a faster rate than they are joining it, according to figures released today by the U.S. Treasury Department.

Borrowers aided by the Home Affordable Modification Program grew to nearly 520,000 in October, up 23,750 from a month earlier, the Treasury said in its monthly report. The increase was less than five percent. A total of 36,300 borrowers have dropped out of the plan for failing to make their payments, an increase of 24 percent from a month earlier.

At a congressional hearing earlier in the day, lawmakers said HAMP, which pays lenders to modify loans and reduce monthly payments for struggling borrowers, isn’t doing enough to help homeowners falling behind on their mortgages amid high unemployment and depressed real estate values.

“It’s safe to say that HAMP isn’t meeting its goal of preventing foreclosures,” Representative Maxine Waters, a California Democrat, said at a House Financial Services subcommittee hearing after the Treasury provided a preview of the report.

The Treasury and the Department of Housing and Urban Development issue monthly progress reports on HAMP, a $50 billion program authorized by Congress in 2009. The program was targeted to reach more than 3 million homeowners by paying mortgage servicers $1,000 to rewrite loan terms and $1,000 annually as long as the borrower participates, up to three years.

Testimony of Harold Lewis
Managing Director, CitiMortgage
Before the Committee on Financial Services
Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity
November 18, 2010

Excerpt:

As an additional quality control measure, Citi is currently reviewing approximately 10,000 affidavits that were executed in pending judicial foreclosures initiated prior to February 2010 to assure that these affidavits are substantively correct and properly executed. Citi expects that affidavits executed prior to the fall of 2009 will need to be re-filed.

Separately, Citi is also reviewing approximately 4,000 pending foreclosure affidavits in judicial states that were executed at our Dallas processing center and may not have been signed in the presence of a notary, to assure that these affidavits are substantively correct and properly executed. Citi expects that it will re-file these affidavits.

Lastly, as previously announced, Citi stopped referring new matters to the Florida law firm David Stern in September of 2010 and has since withdrawn all pending matters from that firm. As an added precaution and quality-control measure, Citi is transferring approximately 8,500 pending foreclosure files from the Stern law firm to new counsel. New affidavits for these cases will be prepared and re-filed by new counsel under Citi’s current procedures.

Continue reading…

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When the Obama administration launched its flagship foreclosure prevention program in early 2009, it pledged to spend up to $50 billion helping struggling homeowners. But the government has so far only spent a tiny fraction of that.

A recent Treasury Department report summarizing TARP spending put the total at $600 million through October.

Although the Treasury Department posts the maximum amount that could go to each mortgage servicer on its website, it doesn’t report the details of the spending. So we filed a Freedom of Information request for the data, and can now show for the first time exactly how much money has gone to each servicer. (A Treasury Department spokeswoman said they’re considering regularly releasing the information going forward.)

The program, which uses TARP money, tries to prevent foreclosures by paying mortgages servicers incentives to make loan modifications. The largest payout, $79 million, has gone to JPMorgan Chase. Next on the list is Bank of America with $45.1 million. That’s a drop in the bucket for BofA, which reported net servicing income of $780 million in the third quarter. (You can use our bailout tracker to see how much money has gone to each mortgage servicer. The figures, which come from our FOIA request, only go through August.)

With the government’s program showing signs of slowing down, the small payout so far shows that Treasury won’t come close to using the full $50 billion, said Guy Cecala, publisher of Inside Mortgage Finance. “It’s a joke, because everyone’s asking ‘is [the program] really worth the $50 billion we’ve committed?’” he said. “We’ll never spend anywhere near that.”

There are two main reasons why so little money has been paid out. First, there have been few modifications done through the program. The government only pays incentives for finalized modifications, not trials. For instance, even though $8.3 billion has been set aside for Bank of America, it won’t get that money unless it provides modifications.

Second, incentives are paid out over time. For instance, homeowners in the program receive a $1,000 reduction to their mortgage each year for five years if they stay current on the modified loan. The program is less than two years old, and few modifications were given during the first year.

Incentives are paid to three different groups: homeowners, investors, and banks and other companies who service the loans (The four biggest servicers of mortgages are also the U.S.’s largest banks: Bank of America, Wells Fargo, JPMorgan Chase and Citigroup.) So far, the servicers have kept most of the money paid out: $231.5 million all told. Investors (lenders and mortgage-backed securities investors) and homeowners have received $129.2 million and $34.7 million, respectively. Our database breaks those amounts down for each servicer.

It’s hard to estimate just how much Treasury will ultimately use of the $50 billion. One reason is that a portion of the modifications will default, so all the incentives for each modification will not be paid out. Of modifications completed a year ago, about 21 percent have already defaulted, according to Treasury data.

If a homeowner keeps up payments on a modified mortgage for the full five years, it could cost the government in the range of $20,000 over five years, according to a ballpark estimate provided by the Treasury spokeswoman. But many homeowners in the program are expected to default on their mortgages well before that.

The government has set aside billions of dollars from the TARP for other, related programs – but it also remains to be seen how much of that money will be spent. The government pays incentives for other ways of avoiding foreclosure, like short sales, but those programs started relatively recently. It’s also allocated $7.6 billion to 18 different states (plus Washington, D.C.) for local plans to avert foreclosure. Another $8.1 billion has been reserved for a plan to refinance homeowners in underwater mortgages into Federal Housing Agency loans.

Separate from the TARP, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, both under government control, also participate in the loan modification program. Administration officials have said Fannie and Freddie could pay up to $25 billion in incentives to their servicers and homeowners, but it’s also doubtful that whole amount will be spent. As the TARP inspector general recently noted, they’ve only paid out $451 million through September.

© Copyright 2010 ProPublica Inc. All rights reserved.

“JPMorgan CHASE is in the foreclosure business, not the modification business’.”  That, according to Jerad Bausch, who until quite recently was an employee of CHASE’s mortgage servicing division working in the foreclosure department in Rancho Bernardo, California.

I was recently introduced to Jerad and he agreed to an interview.  (Christmas came early this year.)  His answers to my questions provided me with a window into how servicers think and operate.  And some of the things he said confirmed my fears about mortgage servicers… their interests and ours are anything but aligned.

Today, Jerad Bausch is 25 years old, but with a wife and two young children, he communicates like someone ten years older.  He had been selling cars for about three and a half years and was just 22 years old when he applied for a job at JPMorgan CHASE.  He ended up working in the mega-bank’s mortgage servicing area… the foreclosure department, to be precise.  He had absolutely no prior experience with mortgages or in real estate, but then… why would that be important?

“The car business is great in terms of bring home a good size paycheck, but to make the money you have to work all the time, 60-70 hours a week.  When our second child arrived, that schedule just wasn’t going to work.  I thought CHASE would be kind of a cushy office job that would offer some stability,” Jerad explained.

That didn’t exactly turn out to be the case.  Eighteen months after CHASE hired Jared, with numerous investors having filed for bankruptcy protection as a result of the housing meltdown, he was laid off.  The “investors” in this case are the entities that own the loans that Chase services.  When an investor files bankruptcy the loan files go to CHASE’S bankruptcy department, presumably to be liquidated by the trustee in order to satisfy the claims of creditors.

The interview process included a “panel” of CHASE executives asking Jared a variety of questions primarily in two areas.  They asked if he was the type of person that could handle working with people that were emotional and in foreclosure, and if his computer skills were up to snuff.  They asked him nothing about real estate or mortgages, or car sales for that matter.

The training program at CHASE turned out to be almost exclusively about the critical importance of documenting the files that he would be pushing through the foreclosure process and ultimately to the REO department, where they would be put back on the market and hopefully sold.  Documenting the files with everything that transpired was the single most important aspect of Jared’s job at CHASE, in fact, it was what his bonus was based on, along with the pace at which the foreclosures he processed were completed.

“A perfect foreclosure was supposed to take 120 days,” Jared explains, “and the closer you came to that benchmark, the better your numbers looked and higher your bonus would be.”

CHASE started Jared at an annual salary of $30,000, but he very quickly became a “Tier One” employee, so he earned a monthly bonus of $1,000 because he documented everything accurately and because he always processed foreclosures at as close to a “perfect” pace as possible.

“Bonuses were based on accurate and complete documentation, and on how quickly you were able to foreclosure on someone,” Jerad says.  “They rate you as Tier One, Two or Three… and if you’re Tier One, which is the top tier, then you’d get a thousand dollars a month bonus.  So, from $30,000 you went to $42,000.  Of course, if your documentation was off, or you took too long to foreclose, you wouldn’t get the bonus.”

Day-to-day, Jerad’s job was primarily to contact paralegals at the law firms used by CHASE to file foreclosures, publish sale dates, and myriad other tasks required to effectuate a foreclosure in a given state.

“It was our responsibility to stay on top of and when necessary push the lawyers to make sure things done in a timely fashion, so that foreclosures would move along in compliance with Fannie’s guidelines,” Jerad explained.  “And we documented what went on with each file so that if the investor came in to audit the files, everything would be accurate in terms of what had transpired and in what time frame.  It was all about being able to show that foreclosures were being processed as efficiently as possible.”

When a homeowner applies for a loan modification, Jerad would receive an email from the modification team telling him to put a file on hold awaiting decision on modification.  This wouldn’t count against his bonus, because Fannie Mae guidelines allow for modifications to be considered, but investors would see what was done as related to the modification, so everything had to be thoroughly documented.

“Seemed like more than 95% of the time, the instruction came back ‘proceed with foreclosure,’ according to Jerad.  “Files would be on hold pending modification, but still accruing fees and interest.  Any time a servicer does anything to a file, they’re charging people for it,” Jerad says.

I was fascinated to learn that investors do actually visit servicers and audit files to make sure things are being handled properly and homes are being foreclosed on efficiently, or modified, should that be in their best interest.  As Jerad explained, “Investors know that Polling & Servicing Agreements (“PSAs”) don’t protect them, they protect servicers, so they want to come in and audit files themselves.”

“Foreclosures are a no lose proposition for a servicer,” Jerad told me during the interview.  “The servicer gets paid more to service a delinquent loan, but they also get to tack on a whole bunch of extra fees and charges.  If the borrower reinstates the loan, which is rare, then the borrower pays those extra fees.  If the borrower loses the house, then the investor pays them.  Either way, the servicer gets their money.”

Jerad went on to say: “Our attitude at CHASE was to process everything as quickly as possible, so we can foreclose and take the house to sale.  That’s how we made our money.”

“Servicers want to show investors that they did their due diligence on a loan modification, but that in the end they just couldn’t find a way to modify.  They’re whole focus is to foreclose, not to modify.  They put the borrower through every hoop and obstacle they can, so that when something fails to get done on time, or whatever, they can deny it and proceed with the foreclosure.  Like, ‘Hey we tried, but the borrower didn’t get this one document in on time.’  That sure is what it seemed like to me, anyway.”

According to Jerad, JPMorgan CHASE in Rancho Bernardo, services foreclosures in all 50 states.  During the 18 months that he worked there, his foreclosure department of 15 people would receive 30-40 borrower files a day just from California, so each person would get two to three foreclosure a day to process just from California alone.  He also said that in Rancho Bernardo, there were no more than 5-7 people in the loan modification department, but in loss mitigation there were 30 people who processed forbearances, short sales, and other alternatives to foreclosure.  The REO department was made up of fewer than five people.

Jerad often took a smoke break with some of the guys handing loan modifications.  “They were always complaining that their supervisors weren’t approving modifications,” Jerad said.  “There was always something else they wanted that prevented the modification from being approved.  They got their bonus based on modifying loans, along with accurate documentation just like us, but it seemed like the supervisors got penalized for modifying loans, because they were all about finding a way to turn them down.”

“There’s no question about it,” Jerad said in closing, “CHASE is in the foreclosure business, not the modification business.”

Well, now… that certainly was satisfying for me.   Was it good for you too? I mean, since, as a taxpayer who bailed out CHASE and so many others, to know that they couldn’t care less about what it says in the HAMP guidelines, or what the President of the United States has said, or about our nation’s economy, or our communities… … or… well, about anything but “the perfect foreclosure,” I feel like I’ve been royally screwed, so it seemed like the appropriate question to ask.

Now I understand why servicers want foreclosures.  It’s the extra fees they can charge either the borrower or the investor related to foreclosure… it’s sort of license to steal, isn’t it?  I mean, no one questions those fees and charges, so I’m sure they’re not designed to be low margin fees and charges.  They’re certainly not subject to the forces of competition.  I wonder if they’re even regulated in any way… in fact, I’d bet they’re not.

And I also now understand why so many times it seems like they’re trying to come up with a reason to NOT modify, as opposed to modify and therefore stop a foreclosure. In fact, many of the modifications I’ve heard from homeowners about have requirements that sound like they’re straight off of “The Amazing Race” reality television show.

“You have exactly 11 hours to sign this form, have it notarized, and then deliver three copies of the document by hand to this address in one of three major U.S. cities.  The catch is you can’t drive or take a cab to get there… you must arrive by elephant.  When you arrive a small Asian man wearing one red shoe will give you your next clue.  You have exactly $265 to complete this leg of THE AMAZING CHASE!”

And, now we know why.  They’re not trying to figure out how to modify, they’re looking for a reason to foreclose and sell the house.

But, although I’m just learning how all this works, Treasury Secretary Geithner had to have known in advance what would go on inside a mortgage servicer.  And so must FDIC Chair Sheila Bair have known.  And so must a whole lot of others in Washington D.C. too, right?  After all, Jerad is a bright young man, to be sure, but if he came to understand how things worked inside a servicver in just 18 months, then I have to believe that many thousands of others know these things as well.

So, why do so many of our elected representatives continue to stand around looking surprised and even dumbfounded at HAMP not working as it was supposed to… as the president said it would?

Oh, wait a minute… that’s right… they don’t actually do that, do they?  In fact, our elected representatives don’t look surprised at all, come to think of it.  They’re not surprised because they knew about the problems.  It’s not often “in the news,” because it’s not “news” to them.

I think I’ve uncovered something, but really they already know, and they’re just having a little laugh at our collective expense… is that about right?  Is this funny to someone in Washington, or anyone anywhere for that matter?

Well, at least we found out before the elections in November.  There’s still time to send more than a few incumbents home for at least the next couple of years.

I’m not kidding about that.  Someone needs to be punished for this.  We need to send a message.

Mandelman out.

@ MANDELMAN MATTERS

The Treasury Dept.’s mortgage relief program isn’t just failing, it’s actively funneling money from homeowners to bankers, and Treasury likes it that way.

August 25, 2010 |AlterNet / By Zach Carter

The Treasury Department’s plan to help struggling homeowners has been failing miserably for months. The program is poorly designed, has been poorly implemented and only a tiny percentage of borrowers eligible for help have actually received any meaningful assistance. The initiative lowers monthly payments for borrowers, but fails to reduce their overall debt burden, often increasing that burden, funneling money to banks that borrowers could have saved by simply renting a different home. But according to recent startling admissions from top Treasury officials, the mortgage plan was actually not really about helping borrowers at all. Instead, it was simply one element of a broader effort to pump money into big banks and shield them from losses on bad loans. That’s right: Treasury openly admitted that its only serious program purporting to help ordinary citizens was actually a cynical move to help Wall Street megabanks.

Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner has long made it clear his financial repair plan was based on allowing large banks to “earn” their way back to health. By creating conditions where banks could make easy profits, Getithner and top officials at the Federal Reserve hoped to limit the amount of money taxpayers would have to directly inject into the banks. This was never the best strategy for fixing the financial sector, but it wasn’t outright predation, either. But now the Treasury Department is making explicit that it was—and remains—willing to let those so-called “earnings” come directly at the expense of people hit hardest by the recession: struggling borrowers trying to stay in their homes.

This account comes secondhand from a cadre of bloggers who were invited to speak on “deep background” with a handful of Treasury officials—meaning that bloggers would get to speak frankly with top-level folks, but not quote them directly, or attribute views to specific people. But the accounts are all generally distressing, particularly this one from economics whiz Steve Waldman:

The program was successful in the sense that it kept the patient alive until it had begun to heal. And the patient of this metaphor was not a struggling homeowner, but the financial system, a.k.a. the banks. Policymakers openly judged HAMP to be a qualified success because it helped banks muddle through what might have been a fatal shock. I believe these policymakers conflate, in full sincerity, incumbent financial institutions with “the system,” “the economy,” and “ordinary Americans.”

Mike Konczal confirms Waldman’s observation, and Felix Salmon also says the program has done little more than delay foreclosures, as does Shahien Nasiripour.

Here’s how Geithner’s Home Affordability Modification Program (HAMP) works, or rather, doesn’t work. Troubled borrowers can apply to their banks for relief on monthly mortgage payments. Banks who agree to participate in HAMP also agree to do a bunch of things to reduce the monthly payments for borrowers, from lowering interest rates to extending the term of the loan. This is good for the bank, because they get to keep accepting payments from borrowers without taking a big loss on the loan.

But the deal is not so good for homeowners. Banks don’t actually have to reduce how much borrowers actually owe them—only how much they have to pay out every month. For borrowers who owe tens of thousands of dollars more than their home is worth, the deal just means that they’ll be pissing away their money to the bank more slowly than they were before. If a homeowner spends $3,000 a month on her mortgage, HAMP might help her get that payment down to $2,500. But if she still owes $50,000 more than her house is worth, the plan hasn’t actually helped her. Even if the borrower gets through HAMP’s three-month trial period, the plan has done nothing but convince her to funnel another $7,500 to a bank that doesn’t deserve it.

Most borrowers go into the program expecting real relief. After the trial period, most realize that it doesn’t actually help them, and end up walking away from the mortgage anyway. These borrowers would have been much better off simply finding a new place to rent without going through the HAMP rigamarole. This example is a good case, one where the bank doesn’t jack up the borrower’s long-term debt burden in exchange for lowering monthly payments

But the benefit to banks goes much deeper. On any given mortgage, it’s almost always in a bank’s best interest to cut a deal with borrowers. Losses from foreclosure are very high, and if a bank agrees to reduce a borrower’s debt burden, it will take an upfront hit, but one much lower than what it would ultimately take from foreclosure.

That logic changes dramatically when millions of loans are defaulting at once. Under those circumstances, bank balance sheets are so fragile they literally cannot afford to absorb lots of losses all at once. But if those foreclosures unravel slowly, over time, the bank can still stay afloat, even if it has to bear greater costs further down the line. As former Deutsche Bank executive Raj Date told me all the way back in July 2009:

If management is only seeking to maximize value for their existing shareholders, it’s possible that maybe they’re doing the right thing. If you’re able to let things bleed out slowly over time but still generate some earnings, if it bleeds slow enough, it doesn’t matter how long it takes, because you never have to issue more stock and dilute your shareholders. You could make an argument from the point of view of any bank management team that not taking a day-one hit is actually a smart idea.

Date, it should be emphasized, does not condone this strategy. He now heads the Cambridge Winter Center for Financial Institutions Policy, and is a staunch advocate of financial reform.

If, say, Wells Fargo had taken a $20 billion hit on its mortgage book in February 2009, it very well could have failed. But losing a few billion dollars here and there over the course of three or four years means that Wells Fargo can stay in business and keep paying out bonuses, even if it ultimately sees losses of $25 or $30 billion on its bad loans.

So HAMP is doing a great job if all you care about is the solvency of Wall Street banks. But if borrowers know from the get-go they’re not going to get a decent deal, they have no incentive to keep paying their mortgage. Instead of tapping out their savings and hitting up relatives for help with monthly payments, borrowers could have saved their money, walked away from the mortgage and found more sensible rental housing. The administration’s plan has effectively helped funnel more money to Wall Street at the expense of homeowners. And now the Treasury Department is going around and telling bloggers this is actually a positive feature of the program, since it meant that big banks didn’t go out of business.

There were always other options for dealing with the banks and preventing foreclosures. Putting big, faltering banks into receivership—also known as “nationalization”—has been a powerful policy tool used by every administration from Franklin Delano Roosevelt to Ronald Reagan. When the government takes over a bank, it forces it to take those big losses upfront, wiping out shareholders in the process. Investors lose a lot of money (and they should, since they made a lousy investment), but the bank is cleaned up quickly and can start lending again. No silly games with borrowers, and no funky accounting gimmicks.

Most of the blame for the refusal to nationalize failing Wall Street titans lies with the Bush administration, although Obama had the opportunity to make a move early in his tenure, and Obama’s Treasury Secretary, Geithner, was a major bailout decision-maker on the Bush team as president of the New York Fed.

But Bush cannot be blamed for the HAMP nightmare, and plenty of other options were available for coping with foreclosure when Obama took office. One of the best solutions was just endorsed by the Cleveland Federal Reserve, in the face of prolonged and fervent opposition from the bank lobby. Unlike every other form of consumer debt, mortgages are immune from renegotiation in bankruptcy. If you file for bankruptcy, a judge literally cannot reduce how much you owe on your mortgage. The only way out of the debt is foreclosure, giving banks tremendous power in negotiations with borrowers.

This exemption is arbitrary and unfair, but the bank lobby contends it keeps mortgage rates lower. It’s just not true, as a new paper by Cleveland Fed economists Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV and James B. Thomson makes clear. Family farms were exempted from bankruptcy until 1986, and bankers bloviated about the same imminent risk of unaffordable farm loans when Congress considered ending that status to prevent farm foreclosures.

When Congress did repeal the exemption, farm loans didn’t get any more expensive, and bankruptcy filings didn’t even increase very much. Instead, a flood of farmers entered into negotiations with banks to have their debt burden reduced. Banks took losses, but foreclosures were avoided. Society was better off, even if bank investors had to take a hit.

But instead, Treasury is actively encouraging troubled homeowners to subsidize giant banks. What’s worse, as Mike Konczal notes, they’re hoping to expand the program significantly.

There is a flip-side to the current HAMP nightmare, one that borrowers faced with mortgage problems should attend to closely and discuss with financial planners. In many cases, banks don’t actually want to foreclose quickly, because doing so entails taking losses right away, and most of them would rather drag those losses out over time. The accounting rules are so loose that banks can actually book phantom “income” on monthly payments that borrowers do not actually make. Some borrowers have been able to benefit from this situation by simply refusing to pay their mortgages. Since banks often want to delay repossessing the house in order to benefit from tricky accounting, borrowers can live rent-free in their homes for a year or more before the bank finally has to lower the hatchet. Of course, you won’t hear Treasury encouraging people to stop paying their mortgages. If too many people just stop paying, then banks are out a lot of money fast, sparking big, quick losses for banks — the exact situation HAMP is trying to avoid.

Borrowers who choose not to pay their mortgages don’t even have to feel guilty about it. Refusing to pay is actually modestly good for the economy, since instead of wasting their money on bank payments, borrowers have more cash to spend at other businesses, creating demand and encouraging job growth. By contrast, top-level Treasury officials who have enriched bankers on the backs of troubled borrowers should be looking for other lines of work.

Zach Carter is AlterNet’s economics editor. He is a fellow at Campaign for America’s Future, writes a weekly blog on the economy for the Media Consortium and is a frequent contributor to The Nation magazine.

Source: AlterNet

WHO IS TALKING ABOUT WHAT MATTERS?

Aren’t job losses and foreclosures as important as a “Ground Zero Mosque” (that has not been built, isn’t a mosque or even at ground zero?)

By Danny Schechter, Author of The Crime Of Our Time

We know we live in hard times that are on the verge of getting harder with 500,000 new claims for unemployment last week, a recent record. The stock market may be over for now as fear and panic drives small investors out. Big corporations hoard stashes of cash rather then hire workers.

Foreclosures are up, and the Administration’s programs to stop them are down, well below their stated goals, only helping 1/6th of those promised assistance.

And here’s a statistic for you: 300,000. That’s the number of foreclosure filings every month for the past 17 months. This year, 1.9 million homes will be lost, down from 2 million last year. Is that progress? In July alone, 92, 858 homes were repossessed.

At the same time, the number of cancelled mortgage modifications exceeded the number of successful ones. According to Ml-implode.com, last month, “the number of trial modification cancellations surged to 616,839, greatly outnumbering the 421,804 active permanent modifications.”

The Treasury Department admits its HAMP program did not meet expectations but justifies it on the grounds that it gave homeowners lower payments—thatr is, until they were tossed out of their homes. Critics call this “extend and pretend.”

And don’t think this is only a problem that affects the homeowners about to go homeless. The New York Times quotes Michael Feder, the chief executive of the real estate data firm Radar Logic to the effect that we are all at risk.

“My concern is that if we have another protracted housing dip, it’s going to bring the economy down,” Mr. Feder said. “If consumers don’t think their houses are worth what they were six months ago, they’re not going to go out and spend money. I’m concerned this problem isn’t being addressed.”

The larger point is that even if you believe the economy is already down, it can go lower. No one knows how to “fix it” either just as BP couldn’t plug the “leak” that, truth be told, is still oozing oil, and is 650 feet in scope.

So what are we doing about it? Are we demanding debt relief or a moratorium on foreclosures? Are we shutting down the foreclosure factories

Continue Reading…NewsDissector

By Michael Hudson | August 06, 2010

Fannie Mae executives bungled their stewardship of the federal government’s massive foreclosure-prevention campaign, creating a bureaucratic muddle characterized by “mismanagement and gross waste of public funds,” according to a whistleblower lawsuit by a former Fannie Mae executive and consultant.

Caroline Herron, a former Fannie vice president who returned to the mortgage giant in 2009 as a high-level consultant, claims that the homeowner-relief effort was marred by delays, missteps and executives preoccupied with their institution’s short-term financial interests.

“It appeared that Fannie Mae officers were focused on maximizing incentive payments available to Fannie Mae under various federal programs – even if this meant wasting taxpayer money and delaying the implementation of high-priority Treasury programs,” she claims in the lawsuit.

Herron alleges that Fannie Mae officials terminated her $200-an-hour consulting work in January because she raised questions about how it was administering the federal government’s push to help homeowners avoid foreclosure, known as the Home Affordable Modification Program, or HAMP.

Continue Reading…PublicIntegrity.org

Melanie Payne • Tellmel@news-press.com • July 22, 2010

1:10 A.M. — Nicole DePuy thought she was one of the lucky ones when she walked out of Harborside Event Center on Jan. 27 with a loan modification that would save her home from foreclosure.

After waiting hours to talk to her lender at the highly publicized event, the 40-year-old speech-language pathologist had been approved for a trial with the Home Affordable Modification Program.

Under the government-sponsored program called HAMP, DePuy’s mortgage payments were cut almost in half, dropping from $2,100 to $1,054.

And best of all, under the terms of the program, all foreclosure action would stop. The scheduled sale of DePuy’s Cape Coral home was prohibited under the terms of the agreement.

“I thought my problems were over,” DePuy said.

Nothing could be further from the truth. But DePuy didn’t know that until John Moffatt of Isla Blue Development LLC put a note on her door March 31 telling her to call about her property. Moffatt told DePuy the company he represented had purchased her home in a foreclosure sale at the courthouse.

DePuy called Bank of America to find out what happened and was told the bank had failed to notify the lawyer handling the foreclosure sale that DePuy was in the trial loan modification program.

Fort Myers attorney Robert D. Royston Jr. agreed to represent DePuy. He asked the court to set aside the sale “on the basis of the mistake by the plaintiff.”

Royston filed the contract showing the modification and the HAMP guidelines that read: “Foreclosure sales may not be conducted while the loan is being considered for a modification or during the trial period.”

The judge didn’t have an opportunity to read the pleadings.

“The judiciary is having difficulty given the volume to give the attention each case may require,” Royston said.

Because Isla Blue purchased the house fair and square, it belonged to it, the judge ruled.

Isla Blue could have kicked DePuy and her 11-year-old daughter out within days of the ruling, but she has been given until the end of the month to move.

Bank of America told me it would deal with this issue directly with DePuy. A customer advocate contacted her Tuesday, DePuy said, telling her she was looking into it.

DePuy’s story illustrates the pitfalls of homeowners going it alone when dealing with foreclosures. If DePuy had an attorney, the attorney would have seen the house was still on the foreclosure listings and taken action before the sale.

Martha Green, the executive assistant at the Home Ownership Resource Center, said that DePuy could have contacted the bank’s attorney herself and told the attorney she had worked out a modification. But going it alone, DePuy would not have known to do that.

The scary thing is that there are more than 1.2 million homeowners who have started a trial modification under the government’s “Making Home Affordable” plan. I hope it works better for them than it did for DePuy.

– For more columns and reader forums go to news-press.com/tellmel. Write to Tell Mel at 2442 Martin Luther King Jr. Blvd., Fort Myers, 33901. Call her at 344-4772. E-mail her at tellmel@ news-press.com.