By Fred Schulte Huffington Post Investigative Fund
Posted: 10/19/2010 01:00:00 AM MDT
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Nearly a dozen major banks and hedge funds, anticipating quick profits from homeowners who fall behind on property taxes, are quietly plowing hundreds of millions of dollars into businesses that collect the debts, tack on escalating fees and threaten to foreclose on the homes of those who fail to pay.
The investors, which include Bank of America and JPMorgan Chase, have purchased from local governments the right to collect delinquent taxes on several hundred thousand properties, many in distressed housing markets, the Huffington Post Investigative Fund has found.
In many cases, banks and hedge funds created new companies to do their bidding.
In exchange for paying overdue real-estate taxes, the investors gain legal powers to collect the debts and levy fees. At first, property owners may owe little more than a few hundred dollars, only to find their bills soaring into the thousands. Some jurisdictions tack on bills, such as for water, sewer and sidewalk repair.
Some states allow the investors to bill for up to 18 percent interest and a passel of legal fees and other charges. When property owners fail to make full payment, the investors can sue to foreclose — in some states within as little as six months.
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) moves under Article 11 of the Real Property Tax Law (RPTL) and within the limitations period set forth in RPTL § 1137 for an order setting aside a deed issued pursuant to a tax foreclosure proceeding under Article 11. The operative facts are uncomplicated and undisputed.
The central question presented in the instant matter are the rights, if any, Wilmington Finance and/or MERS gained under RPTL §I 125(a) by virtue of these references in the Mortgage.
To accept MERS’ argument would require the County to read every mortgage from A to Z to make sure there are no “Nominees” of the Lender entitled to notice of tax foreclosure in lieu of or in addition to the Lender.
Second, the Mortgage from which MERS derives its claim of right to statutory notice under RPTL § 1125 is by no means crystal clear as to what MERS’ involvement as “Nominee” requires after the recording of the mortgage. Indeed, MERS does not explain what role the “Nominee” plays in the recording of a mortgage, or thereafter, except perhaps as something akin to a power-of-attorney or agent, albeit with independent standing. If the later is the case, it is incumbent upon the “Nominee” to state its status as one due notice in the separate declaration of interest form required under section RPTL §1126, which the County does have a categorical duty to read.
According, the application of MERS shall be, and the same hereby is, denied.
Could this deposition hold the key to take all of MERS V3 & MERSCORP down!
There is not 1, 2 but 3 MERS, Inc. in the past.
Just like MERS et al signing documents dated years later from existence the Corporate employees do the same to their own corporate resolutions! Exists in 1998 and certifies it in 2002.
If this is not proof of a Ponzi Scheme then I don’t know what is… They hide the truth in many layers but as we keep pulling and peeling each layer back eventually we will come to the truth!
MERS et al has absolutely no supervision of what is being done by it’s non-members certifying authority PERIOD!
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
CHANCERY DIVISION – ATLANTIC COUNTY
DOCKET NO. F-10209-08
BANK OF NEW YORK AS TRUSTEE FOR
THE CERTIFICATE HOLDERS CWABS,
INC. ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATES,
SERIES 2005-AB3
Plaintiff(s),
vs.
VICTOR and ENOABASI UKPE
Defendant(s).
___________________________________________
VICTOR and ENOABASI UKPE
Counter claimants and
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
BANK OF NEW YORK AS TRUSTEE FOR
THE CERTIFICATE HOLDERS CWABS,
INC. ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATES,
SERIES 2005-AB3
Defendants on the Counterclaim,
and
AMERICA’S WHOLESALE LENDER;
COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC.;
MORGAN FUNDING CORPORATION,
ROBERT CHILDERS; COUNTRYWIDE
HOME LOANS SERVICING LP,
PHELAN, HALLINAN & SCHMIEG,
P.C.,
Third Party Defendants
——————–
Deposition of William C. Hultman, Secretary and Treasurer of MERSCORP
Does MERS have any salaried employees?
A No.
Q Does MERS have any employees?
A Did they ever have any? I couldn’t hear you.
Q Does MERS have any employees currently?
A No.
Q In the last five years has MERS had any
employees?
A No.
Q To whom do the officers of MERS report?
A The Board of Directors.
Q To your knowledge has Mr. Hallinan ever
reported to the Board?
A He would have reported through me if there was
something to report.
Q So if I understand your answer, at least the
MERS officers reflected on Hultman Exhibit 4, if they
had something to report would report to you even though
you’re not an employee of MERS, is that correct?
MR. BROCHIN: Object to the form of the
question.
A That’s correct.
Q And in what capacity would they report to you?
A As a corporate officer. I’m the secretary.
Q As a corporate officer of what?
Of MERS.
Q So you are the secretary of MERS, but are not
an employee of MERS?
A That’s correct.
etc…
How many assistant secretaries have you
appointed pursuant to the April 9, 1998 resolution; how
many assistant secretaries of MERS have you appointed?
A I don’t know that number.
Q Approximately?
A I wouldn’t even begin to be able to tell you
right now.
Q Is it in the thousands?
A Yes.
Q Have you been doing this all around the
country in every state in the country?
A Yes.
Q And all these officers I understand are unpaid
officers of MERS?
A Yes.
Q And there’s no live person who is an employee
of MERS that they report to, is that correct, who is an
employee?
MR. BROCHIN: Object to the form of the
question.
A There are no employees of MERS.
The government’s $182 billion bailout of insurance giant AIG should be seen as the Rosetta Stone for understanding the financial crisis and its costly aftermath. The story of American International Group explains the larger catastrophe not because this was the biggest corporate bailout in history but because AIG’s collapse and subsequent rescue involved nearly all the critical elements, including delusion and deception. These financial dealings are monstrously complicated, but this account focuses on something mere mortals can understand—moral confusion in high places, and the failure of governing institutions to fulfill their obligations to the public.
Three governmental investigative bodies have now pored through the AIG wreckage and turned up disturbing facts—the House Committee on Oversight and Reform; the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, which will make its report at year’s end; and the Congressional Oversight Panel (COP), which issued its report on AIG in June.
The five-member COP, chaired by Harvard professor Elizabeth Warren, has produced the most devastating and comprehensive account so far. Unanimously adopted by its bipartisan members, it provides alarming insights that should be fodder for the larger debate many citizens long to hear—why Washington rushed to forgive the very interests that produced this mess, while innocent others were made to suffer the consequences. The Congressional panel’s critique helps explain why bankers and their Washington allies do not want Elizabeth Warren to chair the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.
The most troubling revelation in this story is the astonishing weakness of the Federal Reserve and its incompetence as a faithful defender of the public interest.
The report concludes that the Federal Reserve Board’s intimate relations with the leading powers of Wall Street—the same banks that benefited most from the government’s massive bailout—influenced its strategic decisions on AIG. The panel accuses the Fed and the Treasury Department of brushing aside alternative approaches that would have saved tens of billions in public funds by making these same banks “share the pain.”
Bailing out AIG effectively meant rescuing Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Bank of America and Merrill Lynch (as well as a dozens of European banks) from huge losses. Those financial institutions played the derivatives game with AIG, the esoteric practice of placing financial bets on future events. AIG lost its bets, which led to its collapse. But other gamblers—the counterparties in AIG’s derivative deals—were made whole on their bets, paid off 100 cents on the dollar. Taxpayers got stuck with the bill.
“The AIG rescue demonstrated that Treasury and the Federal Reserve would commit taxpayers to pay any price and bear any burden to prevent the collapse of America’s largest financial institutions,” the COP report said. This could have been avoided, the report argues, if the Fed had listened to disinterested advisers with a less parochial understanding of the public interest.
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