The Principal – Agent Problem: Part I – RMBS Data Integrity
Back near the dawn of time when I was in business school, and the faculty was hard-pressed to find topics to fill up the curriculum, they introduced the Principal – Agent Problem. As future corporate managers and agents of the stockholders, I suppose they wanted to explain to us that our economic interests were not identical to those of the owners. This wasn’t exactly the most shocking news we had ever received, but that was all that was said about the issue, back then.
Of course, there is considerably more to this multi-faceted problem. According to Wikipedia, “The principal–agent problem arises when a principal compensates an agent for performing certain acts that are useful to the principal and costly to the agent, and where there are elements of the performance that are costly to observe,” primarily due to asymmetric information, uncertainty and risk.
Let’s look at the relationship between the RMBS bondholder…
This is an important ruling for bankruptcy attorneys and their clients in Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota and South Dakota, some of whom have been unable to lien strip as local judges waited for authority from above.
United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-6012
In re:
Michael James Fisette,
Debtor.
Michael James Fisette,
Debtor – Appellant,
v.
Jasmine Z. Keller,
Trustee – Appellee.
EXCERPT:
ISSUES
The issue on appeal is whether the bankruptcy court may confirm the debtor’s
plan which provides for the avoidance of two junior liens on the Debtor’s principal
residence. In particular, we consider whether: (1) 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) prevents a
debtor from modifying the rights of junior lienholders of liens on his principal
residence if the value of the residence is less than the amount owed to the senior
lienholder; and (2) if not, whether such modification is contingent upon the debtor’s
receipt of a Chapter 13 discharge.
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