1st Fidelity Loan Servicing - FORECLOSURE FRAUD

Tag Archive | "1st Fidelity Loan Servicing"

QUI TAM| Schneider v. JP Morgan Chase Bank National Association et al – case asserts that JP Morgan Chase improperly took credits for loans hidden in a secret system of records known as RCV1, which were not being properly serviced as federally related mortgages

QUI TAM| Schneider v. JP Morgan Chase Bank National Association et al – case asserts that JP Morgan Chase improperly took credits for loans hidden in a secret system of records known as RCV1, which were not being properly serviced as federally related mortgages


SUMMARY

Laurence Schneider, principal investor in three companies, Mortgage Resolution Servicing LLP, S&A Capital Partners, Inc., and 1st Fidelity Loan Servicing, filed a False Claims Act case against JPMorgan Chase for fraudulent claims of consumer relief and the nation’s largest bank’s failure to comply with mortgage loan servicing requirements, under the National Mortgage Settlement, HAMP and Making Home Affordable Program.  The case asserts that JP Morgan Chase improperly took credits for loans hidden in a secret system of records known as RCV1, which were not being properly serviced as federally related mortgages.  As a result, JP Morgan Chase received credit against its multi-billion settlements with the United States Department of Justice that it never should have received.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE
STATES OF CALIFORNIA,
DELAWARE, FLORIDA, GEORGIA,
HAWAII, ILLINOIS, INDIANA, IOWA,
MASSACHUSETTS, MINNESOTA,
MONTANA, NEVADA, NEW
HAMPSHIRE, NEW JERSEY, NEW
MEXICO, NEW YORK, NORTH
CAROLINA, RHODE ISLAND,
TENNESSEE, VIRGINIA, AND THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.,

Plaintiffs,

Ex rel. LAURENCE SCHNEIDER,
Plaintiff-Relator,

v.

J.P. MORGAN CHASE BANK,
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, J.P.
MORGAN CHASE & COMPANY; AND
CHASE HOME FINANCE LLC,
Defendants.

Case. No. 1:14-cv-01047-RMC

Judge Rosemary M. Collyer

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

<excerpt>

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Defendant’s Fraud

3. Defendant Chase’s fraud arises out of its response to efforts by the United States
Government (“Government” or “Federal Government”) and the States (the “States”)1 to remedy
the misconduct of Chase and other financial institutions whose actions significantly contributed
to the consumer housing crisis.

4. Defendant’s misconduct resulted in the issuance of improper mortgages,
premature and unauthorized foreclosures, violation of service members’ and other homeowners’
rights and protections, the use of false and deceptive affidavits and other documents, and the
waste and abuse of taxpayer funds. Each of the allegations regarding Defendant contained
herein applies to instances in which one or more, and in some cases all, of the defendants
engaged in the conduct alleged.

5. In March 2012, after a lengthy investigation (in part due to other qui tam
plaintiffs) under the Federal False Claims Act, the Government, along with the States, filed a
complaint against Chase and the other banks responsible for the fraudulent and unfair mortgage
practices that cost consumers, the Federal Government, and the States tens of billions of dollars.
Specifically, the Government alleged that Chase, as well as other financial institutions, engaged
in improper practices related to mortgage origination, mortgage servicing, and foreclosures,
including, but not limited to, irresponsible and inadequate oversight of the banks’ quality control
standards.

6. These improper practices had previously been the focus of several administrative
enforcement actions by various government agencies, including but not limited to, the Office of
the Controller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Bank and others. Those enforcement actions
resulted in various other Consent Orders that are still in full force and effect.

7. In April 2012, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
approved a settlement between the Federal Government, the States, the Defendant and four other
banks, which resulted in the NMSA. The operative document of this agreement was the Consent
Judgment (“Consent Judgment” or “Agreement”). The Consent Judgment contains, among other
things, Consumer Relief provisions. The Consumer Relief provisions required Chase to provide
over $4 billion in consumer relief to their borrowers. This relief was to be in the form of, among
other things, loan forgiveness and refinancing. Under the Consent Judgment, Chase received
“credits” towards its Consumer Relief obligations by forgiving or modifying loans it maintained
as a result of complying with the procedures and requirements contained in Exhibits D and D-1
of the Consent Judgment.

8. The Consent Judgment also contains Servicing Standards in Exhibit A that were
intended to be used as a basis for granting Consumer Relief. The Servicing Standards were
tested through various established “Metrics” and were designed to improve upon the lack of
quality control and communication with borrowers. Compliance was overseen by an
independent Monitor.

9. The operational framework for the Servicing Standards and Consumer Relief
requirements of the NMSA was based on a series of Treasury Directives that were themselves
designed as part of the Making Home Affordable (MHA) program. The MHA program was a
critical part of the Government’s broad strategy to help homeowners avoid foreclosure, stabilize
the country’s housing market, and improve the nation’s economy by setting uniform and industry
wide default servicing protocols, policies and procedures for the distribution of federal and
proprietary loan modification programs.

10. Before the Consent Judgment was entered into, Chase sold a significant amount
of its mortgage obligations to individual investors. Between 2006 and 2010, the Relator bought
the rights to thousands of mortgages owned and serviced by Chase. Unbeknownst to the Relator,
these mortgages were saturated with violations of past and present regulations, statutes and other
governmental requirements for first and second federally related home mortgage loans.

11. After both the Consent Judgment was signed and the MHA program was in effect,
numerous borrowers, whose 2nd lien mortgages had been sold by Chase to the Relator, received
debt-forgiveness letters from Chase that were purportedly sent pursuant to the Consent
Judgment.

12. Relator, through his contacts at Chase, was made aware that 33,456 letters were
sent by Chase on September 13, 2012 to second-lien borrowers. On December 13, 2012 another
approximately 10,000 letters were sent, and on January 31, 2013 another approximately 8,000
letters were sent, for a total of over 50,000 debt-forgiveness letters. These letters represented to
the recipient borrowers that, pursuant to the terms of the NMSA, the borrowers were discharged
from their obligations to make further payments on their mortgages, which Chase stated, it had
forgiven as a “result of a recent mortgage servicing settlement reached with the states and federal
government.” None of these borrowers made an application for a loan modification as required
by the Consent Judgment. These letters were not individually reviewed by Chase to ensure that
Chase actually owned the mortgages or to ensure the accuracy and integrity of the borrower’s
information but instead were “robo-signed”; each of the letters sent out was signed by “Patrick
Boyle” who identified himself as a Vice President at Chase.

13. Relator’s experience with Chase’s baseless debt-forgiveness letters was not
unique. Several other investors were also affected by Chase choosing to mass mail the “robo-
signed” debt-forgiveness letters to thousands of consumers from its system of records in order to
earn credits under the terms of the Consent Judgment and to avoid detection of its illegal and
discriminatory loan servicing policies and procedures.

14. In addition to the debt forgiveness letters sent, and after both the Consent
Judgment was signed and the MHA program was in effect, numerous borrowers, whose 1st
mortgages had been sold by Chase to the Relator, had their 1st mortgages liens quietly released.

15. Relator, through his third party servicer, which was handling normal and
customary default mortgage servicing activities, was made aware that several lien releases were
filed in the public records on mortgage loans that were owned by Relator in the fall of 2013.
Through Relator’s subsequent investigation of the property records for 1st mortgage loans that
Chase had previously sold to Relator, scores of additional lien releases were also discovered.

16. During the course of Relator’s investigation of Chase’s servicing practices, he
discovered that Chase maintains a large set of loans outside of its primary System of Records
(“SOR”), which is known as the Recovery One population (“RCV1” or “RCV1 SOR”). RCV1
was described to the Monitor by Chase as an “application” for loans that had been charged off
but still part of its main SOR. However, once loans had been charged off by Chase, the accuracy
and integrity of the information pertaining to the borrowers’ accounts whose loans became part
of the RCV1 population was and is fatally and irreparably flawed. Furthermore, the loans in the
RCV1 were not serviced according to the requirements of Federal law, the Consent Judgment,
the MHA programs or any of the other consent orders or settlements reached by Chase with any
government agency prior to the NMSA.2

17. Chase’s practice of sending unsolicited debt-forgiveness letters to intentionally
pre-selected borrowers of valueless loans did not meet the Servicing Standards set out in the
Consent Judgment to establish eligibility for credits toward its Consumer Relief obligations.
This practice enabled Chase to reduce its cost of complying with the Consent Judgment and
MHA program, while at the same time enhancing its own profits through unearned Consumer
Relief credits and MHA incentives. Chase sought to take credit for valueless charged-off and
third-party owned loans instead of applying the Consumer Relief under the NMSA and MHA
2 By letter dated September 16, 2015 to Schneider’s counsel, in reference to Relator’s claim that
“Chase concealed from the Monitor and MHA-C both the existence of the RCV1 charged-off
and the way those loans were treated for purposes of HAMP solicitations and NMS metrics
testing”, Chase’s counsel stated that “Those allegations are wholly incorrect. Chase repeatedly
disclosed the relevant facts to both the Monitor and MHA-C.”

Schneider’s counsel requested that Chase provide all documents demonstrating the “relevant
facts” to support Chase’s statement. Chase has refused to provide said documents, citing
Chase‘s concerns with providing documents that it had previously provided to the U.S.
Government. While Chase has offered to allow Chase’s counsel to read such documents
“verbatim” to Schneider’s counsel, Schneider knows of no supportable reason why documents
previously disclosed to the U.S. Government should not be shared with Schneider in his capacity
as a Relator under the FCA. No privilege exists for such a claim and therefore Schneider has
rejected this limitation. Such documents, if they in fact exist, should be produced before such a
defense can be raised, particularly because Chase’s counsel has raised the issue of Rule 11
responsibilities.

18. The Servicing Standards and the Consumer Relief Requirements of the Consent
Judgment are set forth in Exhibits A and D of that document. The Consent Judgment is
governed by the underlying Servicer Participation Agreements of the MHA program, which
required mandatory compliance with the Treasury Directives under the MHA Handbook
(“Handbook”). Chase is required to demonstrate compliance with the Handbook’s guidelines in
the form of periodic certifications to the government. Chase ignored the requirements of
Exhibits A and D of the Consent Judgment, especially with respect to the RCV1 population of
loans. Therefore, Chase has been unable to service with any accuracy the charged-off loans it
owns and to segregate those loans that it no longer owns. As such, any certifications of
compliance with the Consent Judgment or the Services Participation Agreement (“SPA”) are
false claims.

19. Relator conducted his own investigations and found that the Defendants sent loan
forgiveness letters to consumers for mortgages that Chase no longer owns or that were not
eligible for forgiveness credit. Further, Chase continues to fail to meet its obligations to service
loans and to prevent blight as required by both the Consent Judgment and SPA. Chase’s
intentional failure to monitor, report and/or service these loans, and its issuance of invalid loan
forgiveness letters and lien releases, evidence an attempt to thwart the goal of the Consent
Judgment and the MHA program. The purpose of this scheme was to quickly satisfy the
Defendant’s Consumer Relief obligations as cheaply as possible, without actually providing the
relief that Chase promised in exchange for the settlement that Chase reached with the Federal
Government and the States. In addition, Chase applied for and received MHA incentive
payments without complying with the MHA mandatory requirements. In short, Chase decreased
its liabilities, increased its revenues, avoided its obligations, and provided little to no relief to
consumers.

20. The mere existence of RCV1 makes all claims by Chase that it complied with the
Servicing Standards and the Consumer Relief Requirements of the Consent Judgment false.
Likewise, the existence of RCV1 makes all claims by Chase that it complied with the SPA of the
MHA program false.

B. Damages to the Government Related to the NMSA

21. Exhibit E of the Consent Judgment provides for penalties of up to $5 million for
failure to meet a prescribed Metric of the Servicing Standards. Exhibit E, ¶ J.3(b) at E15.

22. Exhibit D of the Consent Judgment provides:

If Servicer fails to meet the commitment set forth in these Consumer Relief
Requirements within three years of the Servicer’s Start Date, Servicer shall pay an
amount equal to 125% of the unmet commitment amount, except that if Servicer
fails to meet the two year commitment noted above, and then fails to meet the
three year commitment, the Servicer shall pay an amount equal to 140% of the
unmet three-year Commitment amount.

Exhibit D, ¶10.d. at D-11.

23. The required payment set out in Exhibit D, ¶10.d is made either to the United
States or the States that are parties to the Consent Judgment. Fifty percent of any payment is
distributed to the United States. Consent Judgment, Exhibit E, ¶ J.c.(3)c. at E-16.

24. As explained in more detail below, Chase was required to certify that it was in
compliance with the Servicing Standards and the Consumer Relief Requirements. Many, if not
all, of the loans that Chase identified for credits against the $4 billion Consumer Relief
provisions were not eligible for the credit, because Chase did not comply with the Servicing
Standards or the Consumer Relief Requirements. Specifically, all loan modification programs
must be made available to all borrowers, who may then apply to determine eligibility. Hundreds
of thousands of borrowers’ accounts, in the RCV1 system of records, were not considered for all
eligible loss mitigation options (even though they could likely have qualified). Due to this
omission none of the loan modification programs qualified for Consumer Relief Credit. Thus,
Chase did not and does not qualify for any of the Consumer Relief Credit for which it applied.

25. For these reasons, each of Chase’s certifications to the Federal Government of
compliance represents a “reverse” false claim to avoid paying money to the Government.

26. Under the FCA a person is liable for penalties and damages who:

[k]nowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or
statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the
Government, or knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly avoids or
decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government.

31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G).

27. Under the FCA, “the term ‘obligation’ means an established duty, whether or not
fixed, arising from an express or implied contractual, grantor-grantee, or licensor-licensee
relationship, from a fee-based or similar relationship, from statute or regulation, or from the
retention of any overpayment.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(3).

28. Thus, under the FCA, Chase is liable for its false claims whether or not the
government fixed the amount of the obligation owed by Chase.

29. Under the FCA, “the term ‘material’ means having a natural tendency to
influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property.” U.S.C. §
3729(b)(3).

30. Under the “natural tendency” test Chase is liable for its false statements so long as
they reasonably could have influenced the government’s payment or collection of money. A
statement is false if it is capable of influencing the government’s funding decision, not whether it
actually influenced the government.

31. Each of Chase’s false certifications is actionable under 31 U.S.C. §
3729(a)(1)(G), because they represent a false record or statement that concealed, avoided or
decreased an obligation to transmit money to the Government.

32. The Federal Government and the States agreed to the NMSA with Chase, with the
understanding that Chase would meet its obligations under the Consent Judgment.

33. As set out in the Consumer Relief Requirements, the measure of the Federal and
State Governments’ damages is up to 140 percent of the credits that Chase falsely claimed met
the requirements of the Consent Judgment and up to $5 million for each Metric the Chase failed
to meet.

34. These damages are recoverable under the Federal Civil False Claims Act, 31
U.S.C. § 3729 et seq. (the “FCA”), and similar provisions of the State False Claims Acts of the
States of California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota,
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, the Commonwealths of Massachusetts and Virginia, and the District of
Columbia.

35. The Federal Government and the States are now harmed because they are not
receiving the benefit of the bargain for which they negotiated with Chase due to the false claims
for credit that have been made by the Defendant.

C. Damages to the Government Related to the HAMP

36. The Amended and Restated Commitment to Purchase Financial Instrument and
Servicer Participation Agreement between the United States Government and Chase provided for
the implementation of loan modification and foreclosure prevention services (“HAMP
Services”).

37. The value of Chase’s SPA was limited to $4,532,750,000 (“Program Participation
Cap”).

38. The value of EMC Mortgage Corporation’s (“EMC”) SPA (Chase is successor in
interest) was limited to $1,237,510,000.

39. As explained in more detail below, Chase must certify that it is in compliance
with the SPA and the MHA program and must strictly adhere to the guidelines and procedures
issued by the Treasury with respect to the programs outlined in the Service Schedules (“Program
Guidelines”). The Program Guidelines pursuant to the Treasury Directives are cataloged in the
MHA Handbook (“Handbook”). None of the loans that Chase and EMC identified and
submitted for payment against their respective Participation Caps were eligible for the incentive
payment, because neither Chase nor EMC complied with the SPA and Handbook guidelines.
Specifically, all loan modification programs must be made available to all borrowers, who must
then apply to determine eligibility. Hundreds of thousands of borrowers’ mortgage loan
accounts in the RCV1 system of records were not offered and thereby unable to be considered
for all eligible loss mitigation options (even though they likely could have qualified). Due to the
omission of the RCV1 population for any loss mitigation options, none of the modifications that
Chase provided qualified for HAMP incentives. Thus, Chase does not qualify for any of the
HAMP incentives for which it applied and received funds.
40. Therefore, Chase’s certifications of compliance and its creation of records to
support those certifications represent both the knowing presentation of false or fraudulent claims
for a payment and the knowing use of false records material to false or fraudulent claims.

41. Under the FCA, a person is liable for penalties and damages who:

(A) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for
payment or approval;

31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)
and
(B) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or
statement material to a false or fraudulent claim.

31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G).

42. Each of Chase’s false certifications is actionable under either 31 U.S.C. §
3729(a)(1)(A) and (B), because they represent a false or fraudulent claim for payment or
approval of a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim.
43. Under HAMP, the Federal Government entered into the Commitment with Chase,
with the understanding that Chase would meet its obligations under the SPA and related Treasury
directives. The Federal Government is now harmed because it is not receiving the benefit of the
bargain for which it negotiated with Chase due to the false claims for payment that have been
made by the Defendant.

[…]

Down Load PDF of This Case

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (0)

Ruiz v. 1st FIDELITY LOAN SERVICING, LLC, Minn: Court of Appeals “foreclosure by advertisement is void for failure to strictly comply with sections 580.02 and 580.032”

Ruiz v. 1st FIDELITY LOAN SERVICING, LLC, Minn: Court of Appeals “foreclosure by advertisement is void for failure to strictly comply with sections 580.02 and 580.032”


Doris Ruiz, Appellant,
v.
1st Fidelity Loan Servicing, LLC, Respondent.

No. A11-1081.
Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
Filed March 12, 2012.
 

Jonathan L. R. Drewes, Michael J. Wang, Drewes Law, PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for appellant.

David R. Mortensen, Christina Weber, Wilford, Geske & Cook, P.A., Woodbury, Minnesota, for respondent.

Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Cleary, Judge.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

LARKIN, Judge.

Appellant challenges the district court’s award of summary judgment for respondent, arguing that the district court erroneously concluded that respondent’s foreclosure by advertisement was valid despite respondent’s failure to strictly comply with certain statutory requirements. Because Minnesota Supreme Court precedent requires strict compliance with statutory requirements in a foreclosure by advertisement and because there are genuine issues of material fact regarding appellant’s unlawful-eviction claim, we reverse and remand.

FACTS

On June 30, 2005, appellant Doris Ruiz executed a mortgage on a duplex located in Minneapolis. By September 2008, appellant had failed to make payments on the underlying debt and defaulted on the mortgage. On September 21, 2009, the mortgage was assigned to respondent 1st Fidelity Loan Servicing, LLC. Respondent recorded the mortgage assignment on November 17. But the recording identified respondent as 1st Fidelity instead of 1st Fidelity Loan Servicing, LLC. Later, respondent initiated a foreclosure by advertisement.

Beginning on May 18, 2010, respondent published a notice of foreclosure sale for six consecutive weeks in a designated legal newspaper. On that same day, respondent filed a foreclosure-pendency notice with the Hennepin County Recorder and re-recorded the September 2009 mortgage assignment to accurately state respondent’s legal name as 1st Fidelity Loan Servicing, LLC. A foreclosure sale was held on November 30,[1] and respondent purchased the property. Appellant failed to redeem the property, and the redemption period expired on January 4, 2011.

After the redemption period expired, a real estate agent visited the property at respondent’s request. The agent concluded that although appellant continued to occupy the lower unit of the duplex, the upper unit was vacant. The agent executed an affidavit stating that the upper unit was dark and free of typical signs of occupancy, such as items in the window.

Based on the agent’s representations, respondent hired a handyman to change the locks to the upper unit. The handyman executed an affidavit stating that he changed the locks on the front and back doors. The affidavit states that he only saw a chair, a plant stand, and a few miscellaneous items in the unit; he did not observe a television, entertainment center, dishes in the kitchen, or any of the “usual items one would see in an occupied residence”; the items that were in the unit were disorganized; the counters were clear of items associated with residency such as soap dispensers; and no mail or newspapers were visible in the unit. Based on his observations, he concluded that no one resided in the upper unit.

After discovering that the locks to the upper unit had been changed, appellant called the real estate agent. The agent asserts that appellant was “quite angry” and would not allow him “to get a word in to the conversation.” The agent called appellant back and left her a voicemail, offering to provide her with a key to the upper unit. Appellant did not respond to the voicemail. Instead, appellant forcibly entered the upper unit, damaging the door and doorframe in the process.

Appellant filed suit against respondent on February 3, seeking a declaration that the foreclosure sale was “null and void” because respondent failed to strictly comply with the statutes that govern a foreclosure by advertisement. Appellant asserted three instances of inadequate compliance: failure to accurately record the September 2009 mortgage assignment prior to publication of the foreclosure notice; failure to record the foreclosure-pendency notice prior to publication of the foreclosure notice; and failure to provide appellant with a pre-foreclosure counseling notice. Appellant also asserted wrongful-eviction and quiet-title claims, seeking monetary damages on the wrongful-eviction claim and “[j]udgment quieting title to the Subject Property in [appellant]’s name” on the quiet-title claim. Respondent moved to dismiss, or in the alternative for summary judgment, all of appellant’s claims. Appellant moved for summary judgment on her invalid-foreclosure and quiet-title claims. The district court denied appellant’s motion but awarded summary judgment for respondent, dismissing all of appellant’s claims with prejudice. This appeal follows.

DECISION

“A motion for summary judgment shall be granted when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that either party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1993). “[T]here is no genuine issue of material fact for trial when the nonmoving party presents evidence which merely creates a metaphysical doubt as to a factual issue and which is not sufficiently probative with respect to an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case to permit reasonable persons to draw different conclusions.” DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 71 (Minn. 1997). “[T]he party resisting summary judgment must do more than rest on mere averments.” Id.

“[Appellate courts] review a district court’s summary judgment decision de novo. In doing so, we determine whether the district court properly applied the law and whether there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment.” Riverview Muir Doran, LLC v. JADT Dev. Grp., LLC, 790 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Minn. 2010) (citation omitted). “On appeal, the reviewing court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was granted.” Fabio, 504 N.W.2d at 761.

I.

Appellant argues that the foreclosure is void because respondent failed to strictly comply with certain statutory requirements. Respondent argues, and the district court agreed, that respondent substantially complied with the statutes and that substantial compliance is sufficient. We disagree.

In 1910, the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted a strict-compliance standard in foreclosure-by-advertisement proceedings, stating:

Foreclosure by advertisement is purely a statutory creation. One who avails himself of its provisions must show an exact and literal compliance with its terms; otherwise he is bound to profess without authority of law. If what he does failed to comply with the requirements of the statute, it is void.

Moore v. Carlson, 112 Minn. 433, 434, 128 N.W. 578, 579 (1910). The supreme court has recently reiterated this strict-compliance requirement, citing Moore for the principle that “[u]nder Minnesota law, a foreclosure by advertisement—non-judicial mortgage foreclosure—is only valid if the party seeking to foreclose the mortgage meets certain statutory requirements.” Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 492 (Minn. 2009). The legal question in Jackson was “what constitutes an assignment of a mortgage within the meaning of Minnesota’s foreclosure by advertisement statutory scheme.” Id. at 489. In resolving this question, the supreme court reviewed the history of Minnesota’s foreclosure-by-advertisement statutes and explained that:

Foreclosure by advertisement was developed as a non-judicial form of foreclosure designed to avoid the delay and expense of judicial proceedings. Because foreclosure by advertisement is a purely statutory creation, the statutes are strictly construed. We require a foreclosing party to show exact compliance with the terms of the statutes. If the foreclosing party fails to strictly comply with the statutory requirements, the foreclosure proceeding is void.

Id. at 494 (emphasis added) (quotations and citations omitted).

Jackson concluded with a statement that “[a]s a court that reviews and interprets the laws of this state, we must apply the foreclosure by advertisement statutes as they have been written by the legislature and as they have been applied and interpreted in the past.” Id. at 502-03. The supreme court’s statements regarding the strict-compliance standard, although dicta, are entitled to “great weight.” In re Wylde, 454 N.W.2d 423, 425 (Minn. 1990); see Simons v. Shiltz, 741 N.W.2d 907, 910 (Minn. App. 2007) (relying on dicta in a supreme court opinion), review denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 2008). Moreover, the statements provide no indication that the court is willing to depart from the standard that it adopted in 1910.

Despite the supreme court’s recent reiteration of the strict-compliance requirement, the district court accepted respondent’s arguments that substantial compliance with foreclosure-by-advertisement statutory requirements is nonetheless sufficient. The district court reasoned: “Although [appellant]’s reading of Jackson is technically correct, [appellant] does not take into account the entire context of decisions concerning foreclosure and real property, and that minor errors should not and do not invalidate a foreclosure.”

In concluding that substantial compliance is sufficient, the district court relied on Hudson v. Upper Mich. Land Co., 165 Minn. 172, 206 N.W. 44 (1925), Sieve v. Rosar, 613 N.W.2d 789 (Minn. App. 2000), and State by Spannaus v. Dangers, 368 N.W.2d 384 (Minn. App. 1985), review denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 1985). This reliance was misplaced. Although language in Hudson is inconsistent with the strict-compliance standard, see Hudson, 165 Minn. at 174, 206 N.W. at 45 (“Whether a sale on the foreclosure of a mortgage pursuant to a power of sale is void or voidable by reason of an irregularity in the proceedings depends upon the nature of the irregularity.”), Hudson does not provide a basis to reject the supreme court’s much more recent reiteration of the strict-compliance standard in Jackson. And Rosar and Dangers are factually distinguishable and therefore not on point. See Rosar, 613 N.W.2d at 793 (requiring only substantial compliance to effect a valid redemption after a foreclosure sale); Dangers, 368 N.W.2d at 386 (requiring only substantial compliance in condemnation proceedings).

The district court also reasoned that “[i]n the foreclosure and real property context, [appellant]’s reliance on Jackson and the standard of strict compliance is inflexible and does not correspond to the reality of the foreclosure process.” But the supreme court clearly requires strict compliance with the foreclosure-by-advertisement statutes, and “[t]he district court, like this court, is bound by supreme court precedent.” State v. M.L.A., 785 N.W.2d 763, 767 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. Sept. 21, 2010). We therefore review respondent’s foreclosure by advertisement for strict compliance with the relevant statutory requirements.

Recording of the Mortgage Assignment

Minn. Stat. § 580.02 (2010) requires that all assignments of a mortgage be recorded as “a condition precedent to the right to foreclose by advertisement.” Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 497. “[P]roceedings to foreclose a real estate mortgage by advertisement shall be deemed commenced on the date of the first publication of the notice of sale.” Minn. Stat. § 541.03, subd. 2 (2010).

The mortgage in this case was assigned to respondent in September 2009, and the assignment was recorded on November 17. But this recording inaccurately stated respondent’s legal name. The notice of foreclosure sale was published on May 18, 2010. On May 18, respondent once again recorded the September 2009 mortgage assignment to correct the inaccuracy in the first recording. Appellant argues that because respondent did not accurately record the mortgage assignment prior to publishing the notice of sale, the foreclosure is invalid. Respondent counters that the November 2009 recording was sufficient and that it only re-recorded the assignment “out of an abundance of caution.” But respondent offers no legal argument or authority indicating that the first recording was legally sufficient even though it inaccurately stated the assignee’s legal name. And the second recording was untimely under Minn. Stat. § 580.02. Because respondent failed to strictly comply with section 580.02, “the foreclosure proceeding is void.” Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 494.

Recording of the Notice of Pendency

A person foreclosing a mortgage by advertisement shall record a notice of the pendency of the foreclosure with the county recorder or registrar of titles in the county in which the property is located before the first date of publication of the foreclosure notice but not more than six months before the first date of publication.

Minn. Stat. § 580.032, subd. 3 (2010).

Appellant argues that respondent failed to satisfy this requirement, because it recorded the notice of pendency on the first date of publication. The district court disagreed, relying on a substantial-compliance standard. The district court reasoned that “[respondent] sent the Notice of Pendency for recording on May 14, 2010 by personal courier and attempted to have the Notice of Pendency recorded prior to the first date of publication.” But the date that respondent attempted to record the notice is irrelevant. See Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 494 (stating that the supreme court requires “a foreclosing party to show exact compliance with the terms of the statutes” (quotation omitted)). Because respondent failed to strictly comply with section 580.032, subd. 3, “the foreclosure proceeding is void.” Id.

Having concluded that respondent’s foreclosure by advertisement is void for failure to strictly comply with sections 580.02 and 580.032, we reverse the district court’s summary-judgment dismissal of appellant’s claims under these sections. And we remand for entry of judgment for appellant on these claims, as well as on her quiet-title claim. It is therefore unnecessary to review the district court’s dismissal of appellant’s claim that the foreclosure is void because respondent did not provide appellant with a pre-foreclosure counseling notice under Minn. Stat. § 580.021, subd. 2 (2010).

II.

Appellant argues that respondent wrongfully evicted her from the upper unit of the property, asserting that because the upper unit was not vacant, respondent was not authorized to change the locks to the unit. See Minn. Stat. § 582.031, subd. 1(a) (2010) (“If premises described in a mortgage or sheriff’s certificate are vacant or unoccupied, the holder of the mortgage or sheriff’s certificate or the holder’s agents and contractors may enter upon the premises to protect the premises from waste and trespass, until the holder of the mortgage or sheriff’s certificate receives notice that the premises are occupied.”). The district court granted summary judgment because “[a]lthough [appellant] denies that the Upper Unit was vacant, she does not adequately rebut [respondent]’s evidence. Essentially, [appellant]’s evidence is conclusory in nature, and she has not pointed to any specific, admissible facts in the record to overcome [respondent]’s assertions or the standard for summary judgment.” We disagree.

Appellant’s affidavit states: “When speaking with [respondent’s real estate agent] . . . in January 2011, I specifically told him that my family occupies both units in the duplex. . . . Upon the contractor’s entry into the property, furniture, clothes, and all normal items demonstrating occupancy would have been readily apparent to the intruding contractor.” Appellant also submitted utility bills showing gas and electricity usage at the unit. Appellant’s affidavit is no more conclusory than the affidavits that respondent submitted in support of summary judgment. Moreover, the real estate agent’s affidavit acknowledges that appellant informed him, before respondent changed the locks, that “her family had a right to have access to both upper and lower units.” On this record, there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the upper unit was “vacant or unoccupied” under Minn. Stat. § 582.031, subd. 1(a).

The district court also reasoned that “even if . . . there remains a genuine issue of material fact that is in dispute,” it could not “ignore the actions of [appellant] in this matter” in re-entering the upper unit because neither party is entitled to self-help. In arriving at this conclusion, the district court appears to have weighed the evidence, which is not permitted on summary judgment. See Fairview Hosp. & Health Care Servs. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 535 N.W.2d 337, 341 (Minn. 1995) (“It is axiomatic that on a summary judgment motion a court may not weigh the evidence or make factual determinations, but must take the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”). We therefore reverse the district court’s award of summary judgment to respondent on appellant’s wrongful-eviction claim and remand for further proceedings on this claim.

Reversed and remanded.

[1] The foreclosure sale was originally scheduled for June 30, 2010, but appellant filed an affidavit to postpone the sale for five months in exchange for reduction of the redemption period from six months to five weeks.

[ipaper docId=85681998 access_key=key-adh6gbkizd04l1635a7 height=600 width=600 /]

 

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (2)


Advert

Archives