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15 Texans File Class action suit against Bank of America

15 Texans File Class action suit against Bank of America

By Lani Rosales on July 15, 2010 |

Here at AG, we’ve written about how Bank of America has foreclosed on homes by continuing the foreclosure process even after the home was successfully sold to a new buyer who didn’t even have a loan through Bank of America and we’ve covered how they have foreclosed on addresses they never even had a loan on despite dispute and direct correspondence.

AG columnist, Russell Shaw has remained our most vocal advocate for homeowners and agents having to battle Bank of America. His “Bank of America retard division for short sales” article that outlines the unfair, irrational and possibly illegal behavior of Bank of America remains one of the most read articles here at AG on most days, almost a year after it was originally published.

In steps the Texans

We’ve awaited the day that someone stood up to the documented abuses in a fashion that would impact Bank of America’s bottom line, and today, a group of homeowners are no longer taking it lying down. In true Texas fashion, a class action complaint was just filed and a jury trial has been demanded. Today,
the Texas Housing Justice League joins the 15 homeowners in the suit against Bank of America and its subsidiary BAC Home Loans Servicing.

Interestingly, the claim is using RESPA (Real Estate Settlement and Procedures Act) as grounds for the complaint. The other eight claims are as listed below:

  • Count Two: Breach of Contract – Loan Modification Agreement
  • Count Three: Breach of Contract – Forbearance Agreement
  • Count Four: Breach of Contract-Promissory Note and Deed of Trust
  • Count Five: Violation of the Texas Property Code
  • Count Six: Breach of Oral Contract-HAMP Trial Modification
  • Count Seven: Unreasonable Collection Efforts
  • Count Eight: Intentional Misrepresentation
  • Count Nine: Texas Debt Collection Act

About the plaintiffs:

According to the Texas Housing Justice League, “Plaintiffs are and represent people who purchased their first homes between 1994 and 2006, usually with loan assistance from the Federal Housing Administration and the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. Their loans were all serviced by Defendant BAC, which is a wholly owned subsidiary of Defendant Bank of America, N.A.”

They continue, by noting that “The lawsuit complains not of poor customer service by BAC, but of a systematic home loan servicing scheme that includes hours of telephone runaround, misleading and inconsistent information, lost correspondence, verbal abuse, and extensive delay, all of which have documented costs not only in terms of money, but in health. The facts in this case reveal the harsh reality that underlies the loan servicer’s press statements about loan modifications and forbearance agreements following collapse of the U.S. housing market.”

A suitable summary of the suit:

Denver Realtor, Kristal Kraft says, “In the interest of time, I will now use only the keywords describing the gripes against Bank of America as accused by the Texas Homeowners.

Scheme, misleading, inconsistent, lost correspondence, verbal abuse, extensive delay, money, health, harsh, shuffled, no resolution, dysfunctional, barrage of misinformation, misdirection, deliberate inactivity, abuse, harassment, yo-yo. blocked at every turn, labyrinth of transfers, hundreds of hours on the telephone, transferred, never speak to same person again, contradictions, complaints meet with resistance, no supervisors available, unaccountable departments, asked to sign same documents three, four or even five times, negotiators who would not return telephone calls, not isolated incidents, pattern and practice by Bank of America.’

What will happen next?

One of the Plaintiff’s lawyers, Robert Doggett said on, “It would be hard to imagine that Bank of America and BAC will fight the facts of the case; the question will likely be whether they can get away with it. The servicer will likely claim that poor “customer service” is something that must be accepted like a slow waiter or a bad movie. The difference is of course that homeowners are not merely customers that should expect to be mistreated and lied to — homeowners have a contract with the holder of their home loan and these servicers are the agents for the holder — and moreover, servicing a home loan is not in the realm of someone forgetting your fries or being tricked into seeing Gigli.”

For the full claim, click here.

[ipaper docId=34367809 access_key=key-22j3ru34s5q8ixwyzrmc height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in bank of america, class action, respa, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD, Violations6 Comments

NEVADA is on a ROLL! ALOUA v. AURORA LOAN SERVICES, LLC, Dist. Court, D. Nevada 2010

NEVADA is on a ROLL! ALOUA v. AURORA LOAN SERVICES, LLC, Dist. Court, D. Nevada 2010


Case No. 2:09-CV-00207-KJD-RJJ.

United States District Court, D. Nevada.

June 23, 2010.


KENT J. DAWSON, District Judge. Currently before the Court is Defendants Aurora Loan Services, LLC, and Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB’s Motion to Dismiss (#15).[1] Plaintiff Pia Marie T. Cordero Aloua filed a Response and Opposition (#18) to Defendants’ Motion on October 5, 2009, to which Defendants filed a Reply (#19) on October 20, 2009.

I. Background

Plaintiff financed the real property located at 116 Peachy Court in Las Vegas, Nevada (“subject property”) on or about the 5th day of July, 2007. At that time, Plaintiff executed an adjustable rate loan (“first loan”) in the principal amount of $768,987.00 and a fixed-rate balloon loan (“second loan”) in the principal amount of $144,185.00. Lehman Brothers, which changed its name to Aurora Bank on April 24, 2009, was the original lender, and Aurora Loan Services (“ALS”) was appointed as the loan servicer on August 16, 2007. Plaintiff’s first loan, which was placed in the sub-prime category, was financed based upon a yearly adjustable interest rate of 9.375% and was to be paid to Lehman Brothers by monthly payments beginning in September 2007. Plaintiff avers that the sub-prime designation of her loan, which led to higher fees and interest, was in error because Plaintiff had verifiable income and a credit score sufficient to qualify for the traditional prime rate. Defendants aver that Plaintiff defaulted on her loans in December 2007, leading to foreclosure proceedings which were ultimately completed on July 14, 2008 through Quality Loan Service Corporation (“QLS”), the appointed substitute trustee. ALS claims to have acquired title to the subject property through said foreclosure proceedings. Plaintiff avers, however, that she did not default on her loans and that the foreclosure sale was carried out without serving the required notices and without giving Plaintiff the appropriate opportunity to avert the sale. On January 7, 2009, Plaintiff commenced this action in the District Court for Clark County, Nevada. The action was removed to this Court on February 2, 2009 on the basis of federal question and diversity jurisdiction. (See #1.) On September 2, 2009, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint against all Defendants, alleging the following causes of action: (1) intentional misrepresentation; (2) negligence per se under the federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”) and the federal Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”); (3) negligence; (4) rescission under TILA; (5) wrongful foreclosure; and (6) quiet title. On September 21, 2009, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint (#15). For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants the Motion to Dismiss in part and denies it in part.

II. Discussion

A. Motion to Dismiss

A court may dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). A properly pled complaint must provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands “more than labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). “Factual allegations must be enough to rise above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (internal citation omitted). In Iqbal, the Supreme Court recently clarified the two-step approach district courts are to apply when considering motions to dismiss. First, the Court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint; however, legal conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Id. at 1950. Mere recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory statements, do not suffice. Id. at 1949. Second, the Court must consider whether the factual allegations in the complaint allege a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 1950. A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff’s complaint alleges facts that allow the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. at 1949. Where the complaint does not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has “alleged—but not shown—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). When the claims in a complaint have not crossed the line from conceivable to plausible, plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

III. Analysis

A. Intentional Misrepresentation

Plaintiff alleges Defendants knowingly made false misrepresentations to Plaintiff, upon which Plaintiff justifiably relied to her detriment. To state a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation in Nevada, a plaintiff must allege that (1) defendant made a false representation; (2) defendant knew or believed the representation to be false; (3) defendant intended to induce plaintiff to rely on the misrepresentation; and (4) plaintiff suffered damages as a result of his reliance. Bartmettler v. Reno Air, Inc., 956 P.2d 1382, 1386 (Nev. 1998). Misrepresentation is a form of fraud where a false representation is relied on in fact. See Pacific Maxon, Inc. v. Wilson, 96 Nev. 867, 871 (Nev. 1980). Fraud has a stricter pleading standard under Rule 9, which requires a party to “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud.” FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). Pleading fraud with particularity requires “an account of the time, place, and specific content of the false representations, as well as the identities of the parties of the misrepresentations.” Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 764 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Morris v. Bank of Nev., 886 P.2d 454, 456 n.1 (Nev. 1994). The Ninth Circuit has held, however, that the stricter pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) “may be relaxed with respect to matters within the opposing party’s knowledge,” reasoning that “[i]n such situations, plaintiffs can not (sic) be expected to have personal knowledge of the relevant facts.” Neubronner v. Milken, 6 F.3d 666, 672 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1439 (9th Cir. 1987); Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 540 (9th Cir. 1989). Even under this relaxed version of Rule 9(b), however, “a plaintiff who makes allegations on information and belief must state the factual basis for the belief.” Id. Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants knowingly concealed the true nature of her credit score and defrauded her by placing her loan in the sub-prime category to charge higher commissions. Plaintiff also alleges, among other things, that Defendants misrepresented the fees charged and paid in association with her loan, as well as her eligibility to participate in a loan modification program. Taking these assertions as true, the Court finds Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim for fraud: Plaintiff alleges that Defendants intentionally misrepresented information to her, that she relied on these representations, and that she was damaged as a result.

B. Negligence per se

To state a claim for negligence per se, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he or she belongs to a class of persons that a statute was intended to protect; (2) defendant violated the relevant statute; (3) plaintiff’s injuries are the type against which the statute was intended to protect; (4) the violation was the legal cause of plaintiff’s injury; and (5) plaintiff suffered damages. See Anderson v. Baltrusaitus, 944 P.2d 797, 799 (Nev. 1997). Whether a particular statute establishes a standard of care in a negligence action is a question of law. Vega v. E. Courtyard Assocs., 24 P.3d 219, 221 (Nev. 2001). Plaintiff claims Defendants violated provisions of TILA, 15 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq., and RESPA, 12 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq., dealing with a lender’s disclosure duties. Defendants argue that the TILA claim is time barred because the statute of limitations has run. Section 1640(e) of TILA requires that claims be brought within one year of the date of the loan transaction. Interpreting this provision, the Ninth Circuit has held that while as a general rule the limitations period runs from the date the transaction is consummated, the doctrine of equitable tolling may, when appropriate, toll the limitations period until the borrower has had a reasonable opportunity to discover the facts giving rise to a TILA claim. King v. California, 784 F.2d 910, 915 (9th Cir. 1986). The Ninth Circuit has also held that the equitable tolling analysis is a factual one: the finder of fact must determine whether equitable tolling will prevent unjust results or maintain the integrity of the relevant statute. Id. Because these factual questions are yet to be resolved, the Court is unable to say at this stage in the litigation whether the statute of limitations has run. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s TILA claim on statute of limitations grounds is denied. Moreover, after reviewing the Complaint, the Court finds Plaintiff has adequately stated a TILA claim against Defendants. Plaintiff alleges Defendants (1) failed to disclose the identity of persons and entities who share the service fees and other charges for her loans; (2) failed to disclose the percentage of the loan amount paid to the nominal lender; and (3) failed to disclose relevant credit terms to enable Plaintiff to compare market rates and prevent unfair credit practices. (Dkt. #14, Compl. ¶ 26-28.) Taking these assertions as true, Plaintiff has stated a viable claim for relief under TILA. Plaintiff has failed, however, to sufficiently state a claim for negligence per se under RESPA. 12 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. As a general rule, RESPA does not create an express or implied private right of action. Collins v. FMHA-USDA, 105 F.3d 1366, 1367-68 (11th Cir. 1997); Bamba v. Resource Bank, 568 F. Supp. 2d 32, 34-35 (D.D.C. 2008); Morrison v. Brookstone, 415 F. Supp. 2d 801, 806 (S.D. Ohio 2005); McWhorter v. Ford Consumer Fin. Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1064 (N.D. Ga. 1997). A limited exception to this rule exists: a private right of action exists under RESPA when a specific statutory provision mentions such a right. See Bloom v. Martin, 865 F. Supp. 1377, 1384-85 (N.D. Cal. 1994). Although Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated several provisions of RESPA, the only section she references with any specificity is § 2605. Accordingly, because this section of the statute does not provide a private right of action, Plaintiff’s claim for negligence per se under RESPA fails.

C. Rescission

Plaintiff also alleges she is entitled to a rescission of the mortgage contract under TILA, 15 U.S.C. § 1635. Plaintiff is incorrect. Section 1635 of TILA establishes that lenders must notify borrowers of their right to rescind and outlines the penalties for failure to comply with this requirement. Nonetheless, § 1635 expressly states that these provisions do not apply to “residential mortgage transactions.” A residential mortgage transaction is defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1602(w) as a “transaction in which a mortgage . . . interest is created or retained against the consumer’s principal dwelling.” See also 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(24). This is precisely what Plaintiff’s mortgage contract entailed: the parties entered into a transaction in which Plaintiff attained financing from Defendants to acquire residential property. Because Plaintiff is not entitled to rescind the mortgage contract, her rescission claim under § 1635 fails as a matter of law and Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is granted as to Plaintiff’s rescission claims.

D. Wrongful Foreclosure

Plaintiff also alleges wrongful foreclosure. “An action for the tort of wrongful foreclosure will lie if the trustor or mortgagor can establish that at the time the power of sale was exercised or the foreclosure occurred, no breach of condition or failure of performance existed on the mortgagor’s or trustor’s part which would have authorized the foreclosure or exercise of the power of sale.” Collins v. Union Federal Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 662 P.2d 610, 623 (Nev. 1983). “The material issue of fact in a wrongful foreclosure claim is whether the trustor was in default when the power of sale was exercised.” Id. Here, Plaintiff affirmatively alleges that she was not in default of payment to the lender at the time the foreclosure occurred, and therefore, the representations as stated on the Notice of Default were false.[2] Taking these assertions as true, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately stated a claim for wrongful foreclosure against Defendants. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is denied as to Plaintiff’s wrongful foreclosure claim.

E. Negligence against QLS

To bring a negligence claim in Nevada, a plaintiff must show that (1) defendant owed a duty of care to plaintiff; (2) defendant breached that duty; (3) defendant’s breach was the actual and proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries; and (4) plaintiff was injured. Scialabba v. Brandise Constr., 921 P.2d 928, 930 (Nev. 1996). Liability based on negligence does not exist without a breach of duty. Bradshaw v. Blystone Equip. Co. of Nev., 386 P.2d 396, 397 (Nev. 1963). Plaintiff claims that Defendant QLS, “as trustee under the deed of trust, had a duty to Plaintiff to ensure that any party instructing it to conduct a foreclosure sale of the property actually owned and had rights under the note and deed of trust.” (See #14, Compl. ¶ 32.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant QLS’s failure to take the appropriate steps to comply with this duty was the actual and proximate cause of damages to Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 33-39.) At this point, because Plaintiff’s claim for wrongful foreclosure remains, the Court also finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled a claim for negligence.

F. Quiet Title

Finally, Plaintiff brings a claim of quiet title, arguing that because foreclosure was wrongful, Plaintiff remains the rightful owner of the subject property. Taking these assertions as true, Plaintiff has stated a claim for wrongful foreclosure against Defendants. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is denied as to Plaintiff’s quiet title claim.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (#15) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for intentional misrepresentation is DENIED.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for negligence per se under TILA is DENIED.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for negligence per se under RESPA is GRANTED.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for negligence against QLS is DENIED.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for rescission under TILA is GRANTED.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for wrongful foreclosure is DENIED.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for quiet title in DENIED.

[1] Defendant Quality Loan Service Corporation filed a Joinder (#22) to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss that is considered together with Defendant’s Motion herein. [2] If matters outside of the pleadings are submitted in conjunction with a motion to dismiss, Rule 12(b) grants courts discretion to either accept and consider, or to disregard such materials. See Isquith v. Middle S. Utils., Inc., 847 F.2d 186, 193 n.3 (5th Cir.1988). A court exercises this discretion by examining whether the submitted material, and the resulting conversion from the Rule 12(b)(6) to the Rule 56 procedure, may facilitate disposing of the action. Id. at 193 n.3. If the court elects to convert the motion, “[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Here, Defendants have attempted to provide evidence refuting Plaintiff’s no default claim, Plaintiff however, has not had an adequate opportunity to fully brief this issue. Accordingly, without opining whether Plaintiff’s claims may survive a summary judgment motion, the Court elects not to convert Defendants’ immediate Motion into one for summary judgment.

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in aurora loan servicing, breach of contract, concealment, conspiracy, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, lehman brothers, respa, tila, truth in lending act, Violations0 Comments

Townhouse for sale…but with a catch

Townhouse for sale…but with a catch

Listen up Real Estate agents as you are well too familiar with this tale.

Previously I wrote a post  ARE FORECLOSURE MILLS Coercing Buyers for BANK OWNED homes? ARE ALL THE MILLS? and just today I received another example of these foreclosure mills working hand in hand as title companies demanding you use their terms or else get NO CONTRACT.

Here is the example of this agent from Coldwell Banker who clearly states

“FannieMaeHomePath-Purchase this property for as little as 3% down. This property approved for HomePath Mortgage Financing. Approved for HomePath Renovation Mortgage Financing. Large 3 bedroom unit with two full baths. 2nd floor master suite has hardwood floors and a huge closet. Upgraded kitchen has granite countertops and cherry wood cabinets. Laundry Room.  Fenced yard for added privacy.”

“REO Addendum not furnished until acceptance-See IMPORTANT attachments & Follow**Use FAR9 Contract-No Calls Please- EMAIL only: UNIT HAS NO APPLIANCES.”

Well here’s the catch, I got a sneak peek…read the last few sentences to discover the major RESPA VIOLATION among other serious issues.

I am sure Coldwell Banker would be estatic to see agents working in this fashion as well as Fannie Mae having their addendum crossed out in certain areas.

[ipaper docId=33202164 access_key=key-kovwb3di6vj5wqfk52w height=600 width=600 /]



© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in coercion, concealment, conspiracy, CONTROL FRAUD, djsp enterprises, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, foreclosures, Law Offices Of David J. Stern P.A., law offices of Marshall C. Watson pa, respa, Violations0 Comments

TILA ‘VIOLATION’ TIMELY FILED REVERSAL & REMAND: Luce Frazile v. EMC Mortgage Corporation, 09-15560

TILA ‘VIOLATION’ TIMELY FILED REVERSAL & REMAND: Luce Frazile v. EMC Mortgage Corporation, 09-15560


LUCE FRAZILE, Plaintiff-Appellant,

EMC MORTGAGE CORPORATION, a Foreign corporation, FREMONT REORGANIZING CORPORATION, a foreign corporation, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 09-15560. Non-Argument Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

June 11, 2010.

Before BIRCH, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.



Luce Frazile brought this action against EMC Mortgage Corporation (“EMC”) and Fremont Reorganizing Corporation (“Fremont”). She alleges that in executing and servicing her mortgage loan the defendants misrepresented the true nature of her obligations and violated various federal loan processing requirements. The district court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss. This appeal followed. For reasons we will discuss, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the district court.


Accepting the factual allegations of the complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable to Frazile, the relevant facts are as follows. In 2006, a Fremont agent approached Frazile and encouraged her to refinance the home mortgage on her primary residence, which she alone owned. After she refinanced, it quickly became apparent that Frazile could not afford the payments on her newly refinanced mortgage and she turned to Fremont to rework the agreement’s terms. On November 16, 2006, Frazile again refinanced her mortgage loan. However, Frazile claims that at closing Fremont never provided her with certain documents, namely a consumer handbook on adjustable rate mortgages, two copies of a notice of right to cancel the mortgage, or a closing package. She further alleges that at some point after closing, EMC was assigned either the mortgage and note, loan servicing responsibility, or some combination of these.

Approximately two years after closing, in November 2008, Frazile attempted to rescind her mortgage loan transaction, a right to which she claimed entitlement under the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f. In December 2008, Frazile finally received a “less-than-complete copy of the closing package” from EMC. In these documents, her monthly income was misstated as $4,000, well above her actual $1,200 monthly earnings. Under the terms of the mortgage, the required monthly payments actually exceeded her monthly income. According to her complaint, “[t]he cumulative effect of increased monthly mortgage payments, property taxes and insurance premiums was to create an onerous financial burden on Frazile that would seriously jeopardize her ownership of the homestead of sixteen (16) years.”

On June 15, 2009, Frazile filed this lawsuit. In addition to three state law claims, she sought relief under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617, TILA, and relevant federal regulations. The defendants filed Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the defendants’ motions, dismissing with prejudice Frazile’s federal claims, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction as to her remaining state law claims, and closing the case. Frazile now appeals, challenging only the district court’s ruling as to her two federal claims.


“We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Redland Co. v. Bank of Am. Corp., 568 F.3d 1232, 1234 (11th Cir. 2009). While we accept all allegations of the complaint as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). In other words, the plaintiff must “allege[] enough facts to suggest, raise a reasonable expectation of, and render plausible” the claims. Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir. 2007). “[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Furthermore, although the pleading party is not required to “allege a specific fact to cover every element or allege with precision each element of a claim, it is still necessary that a complaint contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.” Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).


Count I of the complaint alleged violation of RESPA. In her complaint, Frazile specifically identified only one provision of that statute as the basis for her claims. She asserted that the defendants’ statutorily required “good faith estimate” failed to “timely provide [her] with full disclosure regarding the nature and the cost of the loan” including the “amount or range of settlement charges.” For this reason, she alleged that the defendants violated 12 U.S.C. § 2604(c).

We have held in the past that “there is no private civil action for a violation of 12 U.S.C. § 2604(c), or any regulations relating to it.” Collins v. FMHA-USDA, 105 F.3d 1366, 1368 (11th Cir. 1997). For this reason, we affirm the district court’s conclusion that all claims brought under this provision must fail.

However, the district court went on to liberally construe Frazile’s complaint. The court examined Frazile’s argument, made in response to the defendants’ motions to dismiss, that she had pleaded sufficient facts to give rise to a claim under 12 U.S.C. § 2605. Section 2605 does afford a private cause of action, and requires that “[e]ach transferee servicer to whom the servicing of any federally related mortgage loan is assigned, sold, or transferred shall notify the borrower of any such assignment, sale, or transfer.” 12 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(1). The district court dismissed any claim arguably brought under § 2605 on the grounds that Frazile failed to allege either (1) actual damage from the nondisclosure of the assignment of the servicing of the loan—as compared to nondisclosure of the terms of the mortgage—or (2) a pattern or practice of nondisclosure by the defendants that would warrant statutory damages. Such an allegation is a necessary element of any claim under § 2605. Id. § 2605(f). After careful review of the complaint, we agree with the conclusion of the district court that Frazile failed to allege facts relevant to the necessary element of damages caused by assignment. She did not, therefore, state a claim under § 2605.

On appeal, Frazile first acknowledges that her “complaint, as drafted, alleges that the [RESPA] violations were of § 2604(c), only.” Despite this fact, and without citation to any statutory provision, relevant regulation, or binding authority, Frazile sets out a series of other RESPA claims that she argues can be inferred from the facts alleged in her complaint. Her attempts to salvage a RESPA claim, however, are without merit. Frazile seems to suggest that she can assert a cause of action under 12 U.S.C. § 2607 (prohibiting kickbacks, markups, and fee splitting for services not performed) or 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e) (setting out the proper form and timing of responses to qualified written requests).

Frazile never raised arguments regarding § 2607 at the district court, even though she had the opportunity to do so. When, for instance, the defendants pointed out in their respective motions to dismiss that § 2604(c) could not support a private cause of action, Frazile did not argue that her complaint alleged facts sufficient to give rise to claims of unlawful markups, kickbacks, or fee splitting. Instead, as it related to RESPA, Frazile’s responsive filing focused entirely on § 2605. She argued that although she had cited only § 2604(c), “[t]he motion to dismiss should be denied because Ms. Frazile is afforded a private or individual cause of action under § 2605.” “[W]e have repeatedly held that `an issue not raised in the district court and raised for the first time in an appeal will not be considered by this court.’” Walker v. Jones, 10 F.3d 1569, 1572 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting Depree v. Thomas, 946 F.2d 784, 793 (11th Cir. 1991)). If we were to try and address these new arguments on appeal, “we [would] have nothing to go on other than scattered (and unsupported) factual references in the appellant[`s] brief before this Court.” Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1332 (11th Cir. 2004). Under this standard, Frazile failed to preserve a § 2607 claim.

In addition, after careful review of Frazile’s complaint, we cannot conclude that Frazile “alleged enough facts to suggest, raise a reasonable expectation of, and render plausible” claims brought under either § 2607 or § 2605(e). See Watts, 495 F.3d at 1296. Relying solely on the allegations of the complaint, we conclude that Frazile’s pleading did not afford the defendants fair notice either that she brought a claim for payment of unlawful kickbacks, markups, or fee splitting, or that she brought a claim based on the inadequacy of their response to her qualified written request. In other words, her complaint did not include factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1965.

For the foregoing reasons, the district court did not err when it held that Frazile’s complaint failed to state a RESPA claim.


Frazile also sought relief under TILA, alleging that the defendants violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1635, 1640, and 1641 as well as Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226. She asked that the district court remedy her losses by rescinding her mortgage transaction and awarding damages, costs, and attorney’s fees. The district court rejected Frazile’s TILA claims on the grounds that rescission was not available for residential mortgage transactions of the type at issue in Frazile’s suit and that any claim for damages was time-barred.

The district court turned to 15 U.S.C. § 1635(e)(1) to dispense with Frazile’s rescission claim. However, its reliance on this provision was misplaced. TILA exempts from the right of rescission residential mortgage transactions “to finance the acquisition or initial construction of such dwelling.” See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1635(e)(1), 1602(w); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.23(f)(1), 226.2(a)(24). However, the facts alleged in Frazile’s complaint clearly demonstrate that the mortgage at issue was obtained as part of a refinancing transaction. Thus, § 1635(e)(1)’s exemption is not applicable.[ 1 ]

Frazile also sought damages, attorney’s fees, and costs under § 1640(a) both for the defendants’ failure to comply with the statute’s disclosure requirements and for their failure to properly respond to her November 2008 rescission request. The district court addressed only the former issue, deeming any claim for damages time-barred under § 1640(e), which requires that plaintiffs bring suit “within one year from the date of the occurrence of the violation.” 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e).

This Court has observed that a TILA nondisclosure “violation `occurs’ when the transaction is consummated,” in other words, at the time of closing of a residential mortgage transaction. Smith v. Am. Fin. Sys., Inc. (In re Smith), 737 F.2d 1549, 1552 (11th Cir. 1984). Insofar as nondisclosure is concerned, we have held that the violation “is not a continuing violation for purposes of the statute of limitations.” Id. We have also recognized that the doctrine of equitable tolling might salvage a stale TILA claim where the debtor “ha[s] been prevented from [bringing suit] due to inequitable circumstances.” Ellis v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 160 F.3d 703, 706-08 (11th Cir. 1998).

The alleged nondisclosure occurred at closing on November 16, 2006, more than a year prior to the commencement of this suit. As the district court correctly observed, the complaint’s relevant assertions of misconduct all relate to conduct that took place on or before closing. Because Frazile filed this suit on June 15, 2009, more than one year later, her damages action for noncompliance with TILA’s disclosure requirements is time-barred.[ 2 ]

However, the district court did not evaluate whether the defendants’ failure to timely rescind the mortgage transaction amounted to a separate violation of § 1635(b), which is actionable under § 1640(a). See In re Smith, 737 F.2d at 1552. When a borrower exercises a valid right to rescission, the creditor must take action within twenty days after receipt of the notice of rescission, returning the borrower’s money and terminating its security interest. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b). Failure to do so constitutes a separate violation of TILA, actionable under § 1640. Therefore, the one-year limitations period for violation of § 1635(b) claims runs from twenty days after a plaintiff gives notice of rescission. See Belini v. Wash. Mut. Bank, FA, 412 F.3d 17, 26 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that though the plaintiffs had conceded that their disclosure-based TILA claims were time-barred, the statute of limitations had not yet run on claims arising out of noncompliance with § 1635(b)’s twenty-day requirement). Frazile alleged that in November 2008 she exercised her statutory right to rescind and that the defendants failed to timely respond. Frazile then filed this action on June 15, 2009. Thus, Frazile’s cause of action for inadequate response to her notice of rescission is not time-barred.[ 3 ]

We recognize that the defendants set out a series of alternative grounds on which we might affirm the district court’s dismissal of Frazile’s TILA claims. Despite our authority to affirm on other grounds, we think the better course is to leave these issues for appropriate factual and legal development by the district court. See Jones v. Dillard’s, Inc., 331 F.3d 1259, 1268 n.4 (11th Cir. 2003). On remand, the district court should therefore evaluate the defendants’ other grounds for dismissal and determine whether Frazile has, in fact, stated a TILA claim. If she has, the district court must then determine whether the alleged nondisclosures preserved Frazile’s right to rescind for three years, see 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f), and whether Frazile has alleged that the defendants violated TILA’s rescission procedures by failing to adequately respond to her rescission notice, see id. § 1635(b).


For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s dismissal of Frazile’s RESPA claims is AFFIRMED. However, we REVERSE as to Frazile’s TILA claims and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

1. We are aware that under 15 U.S.C. § 1635(e)(2) the right to rescind does not apply to certain refinancing and consolidation loans. However, neither the district court nor either defendant—in their motions to dismiss or on appeal—cites to or relies upon this provision when arguing that Frazile failed to state a TILA claim. Furthermore, even if § 1635(e)(2) were applicable, Frazile might still have a right to rescind “to the extent the new amount financed exceed[ed] the unpaid principal balance, any earned unpaid finance charge on the existing debt, and amounts attributed solely to the costs of the refinancing or consolidation.” 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(f)(2).
2. In her briefs on appeal, Frazile asserts that the district court should have deemed the statute of limitations equitably tolled because the defendants did not supply her with the relevant TILA-required disclosures until December 2008 or January 2009, and that the documents eventually provided were incomplete. She also claims that the statute of limitations defense is inapplicable because the exact date of the closing is in question.Frazile’s equitable tolling arguments fail. The alleged nondisclosure of TILA-related documents is the same conduct that makes up the TILA violation itself, a violation that we have deemed noncontinuing for statute of limitation purposes. See In re Smith, 737 F.2d at 1552. To hold otherwise would mean that any failure to disclose at the time of closing would not only give rise to a TILA claim, but would also toll the statute of limitations, thereby eviscerating the time limit expressly set out in § 1640(e). Frazile knew in 2006, at the time of closing, that she had not been supplied with the documents. Her ability to bring suit within one year of this alleged TILA violation was not affected by the defendants’ failure to provide the required documents at closing or by EMC’s purportedly incomplete disclosures two years later.Insofar as she questions the exact date of the closing, Frazile’s argument is directly contradicted by the allegations of her own complaint, in which she clearly and repeatedly asserts that the refinancing transaction closed on November 16, 2006.

Thus, Frazile has failed to state facts sufficient to demonstrate that she was prevented from filing this lawsuit by extraordinary circumstances that were both beyond her control and unavoidable and that she had diligently sought to preserve her statutory rights within a year of the alleged nondisclosure violation. See Arce v. Garcia, 434 F.3d 1254, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006).

3. Fremont argues that Frazile waived the right to object to both § 1635(e)(1)’s applicability and the timeliness of her damages action because her initial brief did not directly address the grounds on which the district court based its ruling. Instead, argues Fremont, Frazile conflates the two issues and dedicates the bulk of her initial brief to the timeliness of her rescission claim. We do not consider these issues abandoned. In her brief, Frazile argues that she continues to enjoy TILA’s protections, citing cases to support the position that she is allowed three years to request rescission of the mortgage transaction, pursuant to § 1635(f). Her argument therefore necessarily takes issue with the district court’s conclusion that her mortgage transaction is exempted under § 1635(e). Additionally, she challenges the district court’s finding that she is not entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations, claiming in her initial brief that in 2008 and in 2009 EMC obstructed her ability to acquire information relevant to her suit. Thus, the defendants were on notice that the district court’s TILA rulings were within the scope of Frazile’s appeal.
© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, respa, reversed court decision, tila0 Comments

Homeowners strike back at banks: The Daily Tribune

Homeowners strike back at banks: The Daily Tribune

“None of the named defendants have the right or authority to foreclose under (state law) or by contractual right,” he says in the lawsuit.

Published: Tuesday, May 11, 2010

By Jameson Cook, Daily Tribune Staff Writer

Lawsuits filed in maneuver to try to stop foreclosure, recover losses from alleged overpayments, improper approval.

About 90 homeowners in Oakland and Macomb counties have accused more than two dozen banks of deceptive lending and other wrongdoing by approving loans far exceeding the plaintiffs’ ability to pay and charging excessive fees, among other allegations.

The accusations are levied in two lawsuits filed in each county’s circuit court within the past two weeks through the Troy-based Michigan Loan Compliance Advisory Group Inc., created to help homeowners in trouble with their mortgages. A third lawsuit with about 10 plaintiffs is expected to be filed in Wayne County Circuit Court this week.

The lawsuits represent an emerging tactic nationwide for struggling homeowners in their attempt to fight off potential foreclosure and gain relief on stifling mortgages from some of the country’s largest banks.

Continue reading … The Daily Tribune

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in case, concealment, conspiracy, corruption, foreclosure fraud, forensic loan audit, forensic mortgage investigation audit, mortgage gfe, mortgage modification, note, respa, tila0 Comments

Lenders Unload Mortgages to Collection Agencies

Lenders Unload Mortgages to Collection Agencies

What we were discussing this morning…

dcbreidenbach, on April 26, 2010 at 9:51 am Said:in a prior posting it was stated that defense attys press people to be concerned about deficiency judgements unnecessarily. This advice may be practical for some homeowners but is extremely dangerous for borrowers generally. The current practice of most collectors is to press foreclosure on the mortgage–ignoring the note. This is an inverted approach that enables the collection agency to acquire the property and proceeds of its disposition without ever demonstrating who holds the note, or possession of the note. The collector obtains the home today, settling the mortgage, but is fully capable of selling the note deficiency balance collection rights to an even worse collection agency. The collectors are legally able to lay in the weeds for as much as 5-10 years depending on state laws and the facts of the case. When the homeowner is “back on his feet” with a good job, restored credit and other assets accumulated, the collector shows up with the old note and deficiency judgment and makes the claim plus interest accrued in the meantime. Just when the homeowner thought it was over-he/she is drawn back into the horror. another opportunity for them exists; they know you owe a deficiency amount-they record it and wait for you to die ——-then they come after your estate for proceeds of your life insurance and pension payouts that you thought were to help your family! Be wary of advice that says “dont worry-be happy” ; these people feed on deception, its a way of life to them. Beware disinformation—find attornies if you have deficiencies–force the collectors to warrant that the deficiency is waived. And get a warranty from an employee of one of the big name banks at the minimum that you will not be pursued. Trust them not.
Given any opportunity to screw you they will!

Lenders Unload Mortgages to Collection Agencies

19 April 2010 @ 05:11 pm EDT

Lenders are selling second mortgages and home-equity lines in default to collection agencies that have the right to collect this money potentially for decades.

“It’s a big business, and investors are coming out of the woodwork,” says Sylvia Alayon, a vice president for Consumer Mortgage Audit Center, which analyzes mortgage documents for lenders, advocacy groups, and attorneys.

Real estate professionals will be doing their short-sale clients a big favor if they urge them to get professional advice before they sign agreements, Alayon says.

A new government short-sale program, which takes effect Monday, aims to prevent banks from reselling this debt. Sellers covered under the program will receive notice that secondary lien holders have received part of the proceeds of the sale “in exchange for release and full satisfaction of their liens.”

 Reprinted from REALTOR® Magazine Online with permission of the NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS®. Copyright 2009. All rights reserved.

Related Story:

FORENSIC AUDIT (FMI) & Securitization


Why Your Lawyer May Threaten You With a Deficiency Judgment After Foreclosure

Posted in concealment, conspiracy, foreclosure fraud, forensic mortgage investigation audit, nina, note, respa, short sale, siva, tila1 Comment

Freedom of Information Act Requests Show OneWest Bank Misrepresentation

Freedom of Information Act Requests Show OneWest Bank Misrepresentation

When will ALL this Bull Shit come to an END? Everything is a stage and all these “Non-Bank’s” are characters!

 Freedom of Information Act Requests Show OneWest Bank Misrepresentation
Posted on March 17, 2010 by Neil Garfield

Submitted by BMcDonald

Most of us are trying to get the info from the banks, which they will not do unless forced. Well, now many of us can walk right in through the back door. FOIA requests! I fought for 7 months to get the bank to cough up the info and it only took 6 days by going through the FDIC. So now I’m in the drivers seat. This damned bank has been lying from day one claiming they are the sole beneficiary of my loan. Now they have committed the fraud and done the crime by illegally selling my home. They are now in deep, deep, trouble.

I’ve been fighting OneWest Bank since August of last year here in Colorado. In Colorado they have nonjudicial foreclosures and the laws as so totally banker-biased it’s insane. All the bank has to do is go to the public trustee with a note from an attorney who “certifies” that the bank is the owner of the loan. What they don’t tell you is the bank has to go before a judge and get an order for sale in a 120 hearing. Most only find out about it at the last minute and don’t even show up because the only issue discussed is whether a default has occurred or not.

I discovered however that if you raise the question of whether the foreclosing party is a true party in interest or not, the court has to hear that as well. I raised that issue and demanded the bank produce the original documents and endorsements or assignements. The judge only ordered them to produce originals, which they did.

Long story short, I managed to hold them off for seven months after hiring an attorney. I found a bankruptcy case from CA in 2008 in which IndyMac produced original documents and ended up having to admit they didn’t own them. I had a letter from OneWest that only stated they purchased servicing rights. I had admissions from the bank’s attorney that there were no endorsements. And at the last minute I discovered the FDIC issued a press release in response to a YouTube video that went viral over the sweetheart deal OneWest did with the FDIC. The FDIC stated in their press release that OneWest only owned 7% of the loans they service. I presented all this to the judge but he ended up ignoring it all and gave OneWest an order to sell my home, which they did on the 4th.

About a week before the sale I went directly to the FDIC and filed a FOIA request for any and all records indicating ownership rights and servicing rights related to my loans and gave them my loan numbers. I managed to get the info in about 6 days. I got PROOF from the FDIC that OneWest did not own my loan. Fredie Mac did. And the info came directly from OneWest systems. And just last Friday I got a letter from IndyMac Mortgage services, obviously in compliance with the FOIA request that Freddie Mac owned the loan. So I now have a confession from OneWest themselves that they have been lying all along! I have a motion in to have the sale set aside and once that’s done I’m going to sue the hell out of them and their attorneys in Federal court.

So I found a wonderful little back door to the proof most of us need. If the FDIC is involved, you can do a FOIA request for the info. I don’t know if it applies to all banks since they are all involved in the FDIC. You all should try it to see.

Most of us are trying to get the info from the banks, which they will not do unless forced. Well, now many of us can walk right in through the back door. FOIA requests! I fought for 7 months to get the bank to cough up the info and it only took 6 days by going through the FDIC. So now I’m in the drivers seat. This damned bank has been lying from day one claiming they are the sole beneficiary of my loan. Now they have committed the fraud and done the crime by illegally selling my home. They are now in deep, deep, trouble.


Posted in concealment, conspiracy, corruption, fdic, FOIA, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, freedom of information act, indymac, Law Offices Of David J. Stern P.A., Lender Processing Services Inc., livinglies, LPS, MERS, neil garfield, note, onewest, respa, scam2 Comments

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