Crooks and Liars–

Matt Taibbi has a new article on Rolling Stone on the recent hearings in the U.S. Senate and whether or not Goldman Sachs executives should be facing criminal trials or not in the wake of ongoing investigations into their part in the financial meltdown we went through a few years ago. CNN decided to bring in the Atlantic Monthly’s Wall Street apologist Megan McArdle to debate Taibbi on Your Money.

NYTimes’s Gretchen Morgenson–

Mistakes happen, of course. And loan servicers like to contend that if errors occur, they are rare and honestly made. But after sifting through the data produced by this investigation, Mr. White disagreed that problems are rare. “In Senate testimony, an executive from Countrywide said its error rate was 1 percent,” Mr. White recalled. “The mortgage servicer industry error rate might be 10 times higher, based on the number of cases we are looking at.”

“There are continued flaws in the process, and they are not merely technical,” Mr. White continued. “Those flaws undermine the integrity of the bankruptcy system. Many homeowners have been harmed, including where the lender has come in and said ‘we want to lift the stay and go back into foreclosure proceedings,’ even though they lacked a sufficient basis to do it.”

The investigation conducted by the OCC and the Fed included a review of just 100 foreclosure files.

Housing Wire-

When mortgage servicers signed consent orders with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve, these companies were required to hire outside firms to conduct “look back” evaluations of questionable foreclosure practices.

But these reviews will not be made public, according to an OCC spokesman.

William Black | ‘If you don’t look; you don’t find, Wherever you look; you will find’

~

FDIC Chair Shelia Bair concurs with O’Brien and Thigpen that damages to consumer’s “has yet to be quantified”

A Senate committee has laid out the evidence. Now the Justice Department should bring criminal charges

Rolling Stones-

They weren’t murderers or anything; they had merely stolen more money than most people can rationally conceive of, from their own customers, in a few blinks of an eye. But then they went one step further. They came to Washington, took an oath before Congress, and lied about it.

[image: abcnews]

CreditSlips-

Warning: This is a long blog post. But if you follow mortgage servicing, I think you’ll find it worth reading. Despite lots and lots of media coverage of the servicing fraud settlement, nobody seems to understand the real story that’s going on. I think that this post will explain a lot.

Let’s start by recapping what we know.  Back in March we started hearing media reports of a proposed penalty for servicers in the $20-$30B range.  Then the American Banker published a 27-page term sheet from the AGs for servicing standards. Next, Huffington Post published a 7-page CFPB powerpoint presentation. Then came the draft C&D orders and then in April, the final C&D orders (which eliminated the ridiculous “single point of contact which need not be a single person” and replaced it with “single point of contact as hereinafter defined” and then failed—quite deliberately—to define it anywhere in the document).

Now there’s another round of activity and conflicting reporting. The American Banker reported that there was a new AG term sheet proposed and that principal reductions were off the table. That turns out to be incorrect, as Shahien Nasiripour reported in the Huffington Post. The new AG term sheet that the American Banker referenced deals only with servicing standards. The American Banker assumed that this mean that principal reductions were off the table because they weren’t referenced in the term sheet. In fact they are still very much in play. They’re just in a second, separate term sheet. So now there are two separate term sheets–one covering servicing standard and another covering monetary issues/principal reductions. (Recall that the original AG term sheet did not cover the monetary issues—that was clearly for a separate document.) We are also hearing news reports that the banks are offering to settle for $5B and won’t go above $10B.

So how do we make sense out of all of this?

For those of you that disagree, please read this post to understand why this makes perfect sense…

HuffPo-

The nation’s five largest mortgage firms may be forced to reduce loan balances for distressed homeowners as part of an agreement with state attorneys general and the Obama administration to settle claims of faulty mortgage practices, a top state official involved in the negotiations said Tuesday.

Certainly everyone knows to read the fine print by now…

ProPUBLICA-

A few months ago, Bank of America offered Sergio Cortez of Staten Island, N.Y., the help he desperately needed to stay in his home: a break on his mortgage. Like millions of others, he was facing foreclosure. But there was a catch buried in the fine print. Cortez had to waive any possibility of ever suing the bank for anything relating to the loan.

Cortez isn’t alone. While regulators have banned the practice, some banks and others who handle mortgages have still been forcing homeowners into a corner: You want a chance at saving your home? Then you’ll have to waive your rights.

This Special Foreclosure Edition describes lessons learned from an interagency review of foreclosure practices at the 14 largest residential mortgage servicers and includes examples of effective mortgage servicing practices derived from these lessons.

.

Click Image Below

National Mortgage News- By John Walsh

First of all, the problems we found were extensive. Our reviews found significant weaknesses in foreclosure governance and document preparation: improper affidavits were submitted and documents were notarized improperly. Servicers devoted insufficient financial, staffing and managerial resources to foreclosure processing. Third party providers of foreclosure-related services, including outside law firms, were not adequately supervised, and, in a limited number of cases, servicers failed to ensure proper endorsement of promissory notes or mortgage documents.

BLOOMBERG-

The Justice Department is reviewing a report by a U.S. Senate panel that said Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS) misled clients about the firm’s bets on securities tied to the housing market, according to Attorney General Eric Holder.

Holder told the House Judiciary Committee at a hearing today that the department is reviewing the April report by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, led by Senator Carl Levin, a Michigan Democrat. Holder didn’t say which aspects of the report, which probed the causes of 2008 financial crisis, are under review

Tic Toc, Tick Toc,

Tic Toc…

Wall Street Journal-

“We’re not happy” with the time it takes to give borrowers an answer, said Christine Larsen, head of operations for retail financial services at J.P. Morgan, who is responsible for implementing the consent orders. The bank is trying to speed response times by setting new customer-communication deadlines.

HuffPO-

Regulatory agencies exist to protect the public, not the corporations they regulate. The head of the Office of Comptroller of the Currency doesn’t seem to understand that. But that’s not why John Walsh needs to resign.

The OCC was created to stabilize the economy, make it easier to conduct trade, and protect people’s savings. It didn’t do that. In fact, it ignored the warnings raised by others. But that’s not why John Walsh needs to resign.

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

MICHAEL G. BRAUTIGAM,

v.

ROBERT E. RUBIN, C. MICHAEL
ARMSTRONG, JOHN M. DEUTCH,
ANNE M. MULCAHY, VIKRAM PANDIT,
ALAIN J.P BELDA, TIMOTHY C. COLLINS,
JERRY A GRUNDHOFR, ROBERT L. JOSS,
ANDREW N. LIVERIS, MICHAEL E. O’NEILL,
RICHARD D. PARSONS, LAWRENCE R.
RICCIARDI, JUDITH RODIN, ROBERT
L. RYAN, ANTHONY M. SANTOMERO,
DIANA L. TAYLOR, WILLIAM S. THOMPSON,
JR., AND ERNESTO ZEDILLO
~
Excerpts:

I. This is a shareholder derivative action brought on behalf and for the benefit of Citigroup against certain of its current and former directors. Citigroup is a global . financial services company, and provides consumers, corporations, governments and institutions with a range of financial products and services. The recipient of some $45 billion of federal government bail-out monies, Citigroup has suffered, and will continue to suffer, serious financial and reputational impacts from the inadequate servicing of its troubled residential mortgage loans.

2. On April 13, 2011, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) publicized findings from its fourth quarter 2010 investigation into Citigroup’s mortgage servicing and foreclosure processing practices. As a result of that investigation, the OCC concluded that Citigroup (through its wholly-owned subsidiary, Citibank, N.A.): engaged in improper servicing and foreclosure practices; lacked sufficient resources to ensure proper administration of its foreclosure processes; lacked adequate oversight, internal controls, policies, and procedures, compliance risk management, internal audit, third party management; failed to supervise outside counsel and other third parties handling foreclosure-related services; and engaged in unsafe or unsound banking practices. The above findings were made public in the OCC’s formal enforcement agreement with Citibank as set forth in the Consent Order captioned In the Matter of Citibank, NA. Las Vegas, Nevada AA -EC-II-I3 (the “Consent Order”).

<SNIP>

13. Apar from a dismal track record in complying with its obligations under TARP and HAMP, Citigroup also suffered from the effects of a lack of adequate controls over its foreclosure processes. By third and fourth quarters of 20 10, reports had surfàced alleging that companies (including Citigroup) servicing $6.4 trillion in American mortgages may have bypassed legally required steps to foreclose on a home. For example, a New Jersey state cour administrative order specifically implicated Citi Residential Lending, Inc. (“Citi Residential,” a business of Citigroup) in the so-called “robosigning” scandal. Robo-signers, as the court put it, “are mortgage lender/servicer employees who sign hundreds-in some cases thousands-of affidavits submitted in support of foreclosure claims without any personal  knowledge of the information contained in the affidavits. ‘Robo-signing’ may also refer to improper notarizing practices or document backdating.” The administrative order cited devastating evidence of the inadequacies of Citigroup’s internal controls over its loan documentation and foreclosure processes:

An individual employed by Nationwide Title Clearing, Inc., with signing authority for Citi Residential Lending, Inc., testified in a deposition that when he signed documents for Citi, he did not review them for substantive correctness. He could not even explain what precisely an assignment of a mortgage accomplishes. He had no prior background in the mortgage industry.

Further, a second person with signing authority for Citi Residential Lending, Inc. testified that she never reviewed any books, records, or documents before signing affidavits and that she instead trusted the company’s internal policies and procedures to ensure the accuracy of the information she signed. She signed several documents each day (in many instances without knowledge of what she was signing) and indicated that they were often notarized outside of her presence.

14. The deficiencies in Citigroup’s controls over its loan documentation and foreclosure processes have led to tens of thousands of adverse outcomes for the Company throughout the United States. On November 23, 20 i 0, a Managing Director of Citi- Mortgage, in a written statement to the House Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity, admitted that: (a) the Company was reviewing approximately 10,000 affidavits executed in pending foreclosures initiated before February 2010; (b) affidavits executed before fàll 2009 would need to be refilled;
(c) that the Company was reviewing another approximately 4,000 pending foreclosure affidavits that may not have been properly executed; and (d) it was transferring approximately 8,500 foreclosure files from its former Florida law firm that engaged in robo-signing.

Continue below…

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http://www.scribd.com/full/53708513?access_key=key-1pzxbltfa7cdhtky3rr8

iWatch

In 2007, the report says, Deutsche Bank rushed to sell off mortgage-backed investments amid worries that the market for subprime loans was deteriorating.

“Keep your fingers crossed but I think we will price this just before the market falls off a cliff,” a Deutsche Bank manager wrote in February 2007 about a deal stocked with securities created from raw material produced by Ameriquest and other subprime lenders.

Spitzer to Holder: Prosecute Goldman Sachs or Resign

NY Times – Joe Nocera

Judging by last week’s performance, it sure looks as though the country’s top bank regulator is back to its old tricks.

Though, to be honest, calling the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency a “regulator” is almost laughable. The Environmental Protection Agency is a regulator. The O.C.C. is a coddler, a protector, an outright enabler of the institutions it oversees.

BLOOMBERG–

It may take at least two months to reach a final agreement, said the person, who declined to be identified because the talks are private. An accord remains out of reach because states want principal reductions for borrowers, which is more than banks agreed to in deals reached with U.S. regulators last week, said Allison Schoenthal, a lawyer at Hogan Lovells in New York.

“Principal reductions I don’t think are going to be agreed to by banks, and I don’t think the banks see a need for a penalty when, in their view, they haven’t done anything wrong,” said Schoenthal, who represents lenders and servicers and isn’t involved in the talks.

Why they should be FORCED.

Take this home for example. It was originally sold for $289,000.

Prior to Final Judgment, property had two (2) assignments of mortgage for two entities same robo-signer for both via MERS.

At auction it was sold for a MAJOR discount at approx. 75% off. to Indymac via LPS Minnesota address in 2010. We know Indymac has been shut down way before this time.

Why couldn’t they work a deal like this when this person whom I personally know tried over and over to get a modification AT THE TIME?

They had a good job then and still have a good job today.

So why do they not want to work with the borrowers and reduce the principal to reflect today’s REAL and TRUE appraisal of the property?

Make sure you follow the transactions to understand what happened and why it makes no sense where this goes.

Now Here comes more funny business:

Still following?

• Property was Quit Claimed/Transferred To Freddie Mac for $100.00 (prepared by David Stern) but consideration shows only $10.00.
  
• Property then sold for $3900.00 more 13 days later $78,000
  
• SAME day flipped for $150,000
• Previous records are all gone [compare both images]
  

Don’t forget…

IS LPS’s Aptitude Solutions Software In Your County Courts & Land Records???

I asked Eliot Spitzer what he would do with the regulatory system if he were king.  He said he did not consider it probable that he would soon be king, but then he offered this simple fix:

He would get the SEC to start doing its job.

Continue reading…Yahoo-Finance

VIA: HuffPolitics

Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) and former Goldman Sachs Mortgages Department head Daniel Sparks, Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Investigations hearing, April 27, 2010

Dylan Ratigan with special guest New York Times’ Louise Story, discussing the 600+ page report uncovering Goldman Sachs scheme to defraud investors. According to Bloomberg, The U.S. Justice Department and regulators will have to determine whether employees and executives of Goldman Sachs Group Inc. violated any laws when they traded securities tied to the housing market and testified to Congress about the transactions, Senator Carl Levin said.

Prashant Gopal- Bloomberg

While the attorneys general proposed many similar terms last month, banking regulators didn’t include any requirements for lowering mortgage debt. That may hinder Iowa Attorney General Thomas J. Miller as he leads a group of state officials working with the administration to require lenders to evaluate loan cuts for some borrowers whose homes are worth less than their mortgages.

“I have always been pretty skeptical about the ability of principal reductions to get you much,” said Mark A. Calabria, director of financial-regulation studies at the Cato Institute, a public-policy research group in Washington. “I think we will look back and say this was the death knell.”