This famous postgame rant from former Arizona Cardinals coach Denny Green after his team’s epic meltdown on Monday Night Football against the Bears could just as easily apply to my reaction to reading the official terms of the Attorney General Foreclosure Settlement (the “AGFS”), filed today. The nation’s largest banks get off with a relatively small penalty (much of it paid by investors or in “credits” for things the banks should already be doing) in return for releases across a broad spectrum of misconduct that pervades just about every dark corner of mortgage servicing. The categories of servicer misconduct are laid out in detail in the complaint filed today in D.C. Federal Court, and include the following:
Providing false or misleading information to borrowers,
Overcharging borrowers and investors for services of dubious value,
Denying relief to eligible borrowers,
Foreclosing on borrowers who were pursuing loan mods in good faith,
Submitting forged or fraudulent documents and making false statements in foreclosure and bankruptcy proceedings
Losing or destroying promissory notes and deeds of trust,
Lying to borrowers about the reasons for denying their loan mods,
Signing affidavits without personal knowledge and under false identities,
Improperly charging excessive fees related to foreclosures,
Foreclosing on servicemembers on active duty,
Making false claims to the government for insurance coverage, and
Being unorganized, understaffed, and generally slower than molasses to respond to borrowers desperately in need of relief, while servicing fees continue to accrue.
Fannie announced an initiative to make loan-level data for single-family MBS accessible as a move towards transparency.The agency will start releasing loan-level data beginning the first quarter of 2012 and will provide data updates regularly. Obviously investors in agency MBS, and all MBS, want to know what they’re buying, and this is another step in the direction of restoring investor confidence. The first release of loan-level data files for single-family MBS will be downloadable and published under the “New Issues Statistics” tab in PoolTalk, which is a tool that retrieves pool-level information and data on Fannie Mae securities. Concurring with the release of the loan-level data will be new features on PoolTalk, including the ability to view data on a specific pool and monitor data for specific securities at a glance. Daily issuance files, month statistics, and MBS-related documents will be accessible through PoolTalk.
57. In the course of their conduct, management and oversight of loan modifications in the plaintiff States, the Banks have engaged in a pattern of unfair and deceptive practices.
58. The Banks’ failure to discharge their required loan modification obligations, and related unfair and deceptive practices, include, but are not limited to, the following:
a. failing to perform proper loan modification underwriting;
b. failing to gather or losing loan modification application documentation and other paper work;
c. failing to provide adequate staffing to implement programs;
d. failing to adequately train staff responsible for loan modifications;
e. failing to establish adequate processes for loan modifications;
f. allowing borrowers to stay in trial modifications for excessive time periods;
g. wrongfully denying modification applications;
h. failing to respond to borrower inquiries;
i. providing false or misleading information to consumers while referring loans to foreclosure during the loan modification application process;
j. providing false or misleading information to consumers while initiating foreclosures where the borrower was in good faith actively pursuing a loss mitigation alternative offered by the Bank;
k. providing false or misleading information to consumers while scheduling and conducting foreclosure sales during the loan application process and during trial loan modification periods;
l. misrepresenting to borrowers that loss mitigation programs would provide relief from the initiation of foreclosure or further foreclosure efforts;
m. failing to provide accurate and timely information to borrowers who are in need of, and eligible for, loss mitigation services, including loan modifications;
n. falsely advising borrowers that they must be at least 60 days delinquent in loan payments to qualify for a loan modification;
o. miscalculating borrowers’ eligibility for loan modification programs and improperly denying loan modification relief to eligible borrowers;
p. misleading borrowers by representing that loan modification applications will be handled promptly when Banks regularly fail to act on loan modifications in a timely manner;
q. failing to properly process borrowers’ applications for loan modifications, including failing to account for documents submitted by borrowers and failing to respond to borrowers’ reasonable requests for information and assistance;
r. failing to assign adequate staff resources with sufficient training to handle the demand from distressed borrowers; and
s. misleading borrowers by providing false or deceptive reasons for denial of loan modifications.
Due to public interest in this case, the Department of Justice is releasing documents that may not be in an accessible format. If you have a disability and the format of any material on the site interferes with your ability to access some information, please email the Department of Justice webmaster at webmaster@usdoj.gov or contact Alisa Finelli at 202.514.2007. To enable us to respond in a manner that will be of most help to you, please indicate the nature of the accessibility problem, your preferred format (electronic format (ASCII, etc.), standard print, large print, etc.), the web address of the requested material, and your full contact information so we can reach you if questions arise while fulfilling your request.
Does anyone care how many lives were destroyed by these banks and continue to get hammered everyday??
NICK TIMIRAOS-
Banks won a handful of concessions in the landmark $25 billion settlement of alleged foreclosure abuses, as federal officials struck a balance between their desire to be tough on lenders and the need to provide immediate relief to the housing market.
A key sticking point in the year-long negotiations was how to structure mortgage write-downs, and who should bear the losses.
The banks that are party to the settlement—Ally Financial Inc., Bank of America Corp., Citigroup Inc., J.P. Morgan Chase & Co ., and Wells Fargo & Co .—heavily and publicly resisted initial government proposals that they absorb the hit for write-downs of loans held by investors for which the banks collect payments. They argued that doing so amounted to transfers of wealth to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and investors in mortgage-backed securities such as hedge funds and pensions.
A previously announced $25 billion settlement between five major banks accused of abusive mortgage practices and government officials will be filed in federal court on Monday, people familiar with the matter said late Friday.
The pact unveiled Feb. 9 is expected to result in payments and other mortgage relief for about one million borrowers, but must first be approved by a judge.
Bank of America Corp, Wells Fargo & Co, JPMorgan Chase & Co, Citigroup Inc and Ally Financial Inc agreed to the settlement after 16 months of negotiations with state attorneys general and federal agencies, including the U.S. Justice Department and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.
But the fine print took another month to finalize.
Negotiators had hoped to file a settlement on Friday, but the deal was held up at the last minute over a disagreement between Nevada and Bank of America, people familiar with the matter said.
Just when you’ve thought you’ve seen, read it all.
David Dayen-
I think my disgust over federal housing policy is just about complete. As you know, we’re still waiting for the actual terms of the foreclosure fraud settlement, more than one month after the announcement. But more information has dribbled out, not much of it to the good. Michael Hiltzik rounded up some of the more troubling issues. He mentions that OCC penalties will get folded into the settlement, basically charging $0 for their violations. The Federal Reserve did the same thing. He mentions the Ted Gayer study showing that only 500,000 borrowers will even be eligible for the principal reduction in the settlement, half of what HUD and other regulators promised. And he adds that the Treasury Department restored all HAMP incentive payments for servicers who failed to meet their obligations under the programs. As Hiltzik writes, “If the banks had shown as much forbearance toward their struggling borrowers as these three agencies have shown toward the banks, the foreclosure settlement wouldn’t have been necessary in the first place.”
Home buyers take out homeowners’ insurance policies to protect the value of their home and personal property in the event of a burglary or a natural disaster. The insurance is typically required to get a home loan, and if borrowers fall into default, banks have the right to make sure the property still has such coverage.
However, officials at the state and federal level have been concerned that insurers have been charging too much for something known as “force-placed insurance,” which takes the place of a lapsed policy.
This week, a new U.S. consumer watchdog and mortgage giant Fannie Mae have been promising a crackdown on those homeowners insurance policies.
In a speech Tuesday, the director of the new federal Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Richard Cordray, said his agency will issue rules “to prevent (mortgage) servicers from charging for this product unless there is a reasonable basis to believe that borrowers have failed to maintain their own insurance.”
After years of incompetence, intransigence, malevolence and whatever else may explain how mortgage companies have managed to screw over millions of troubled American homeowners, a fix is finally at hand.
Officials have presented the deal as justice for the so-called robo-signing scandal, whereby major mortgage companies improperly foreclosed on millions of properties. They have touted its centerpiece: a $20 billion fund stocked with fines paid by the mortgage companies, which will deliver relief to as many as 1 million troubled borrowers via lowered monthly payments, principal reduction and refinanced loan terms.
Someday the mortgage settlement will be filed in court and thus we will get to see its terms. Which day? Who knows—the latest deadline, the end of February, passed in silence, and annual reports filed at the end of the month with the SEC by Wells Fargo, JPMorgan Chase and Ally Bank, three putative deal signers, unequivocally stated there’s no final deal yet. As Wells put it, 19 days after the deal was announced:
“Furthermore, there can be no assurance as to when or whether a definitive agreement regarding the settlement will be reached and finalized or that it will be on terms consistent with the settlement in principle.”
Still, enough details of the agreement ‘in principle’ have been released, including by Wells in that annual report, for me to write this guide.
The settlement has four basic moving parts: money, lawsuit peace/liability release, mortgage servicing standards, and enforcement. I’m going to look at all four in three different posts. This one focuses on the money in the settlement.
Understanding the Money In the Mortgage Settlement
Nevada Attorney General Catherine Cortez Masto recently spoke with the Sun discussing Nevada’s participation in the national mortgage settlement as well as a separate agreement the state made with Bank of America. See here for a news story about the settlement. Here’s an edited transcript of the conversation.
Bankers, money changers, predatory lenders and financial criminals are jumping for joy after the United States government unveiled a plan that would allow each and every one of the crooks who conspired to steal trillions of dollars from innocent citizens to escape jail time.
Think about it. If your checking account is a penny overdrawn, you get punished but if you lie, cheat, falsify documents and take homes from everybody but the rich, you get bailed out by politicians.
Government talks about the great proposed settlement deal with Ally Financial, Bank of America, Citibank, JP Morgan Chase and Wells Fargo whereby the banks agreed to pay $5 billion in cash to try to remedy complaints about dubious mortgage practices and foreclosure abuses. But even if you settle with Ali Baba and four other crooks, there are still 35 thieves left to continue to rob you blind.
Since the DOJ failed miserably with mountains of evidence of fraud throughout the loans, lets see what the SEC will do.
CBS-
The SEC appears to be on the verge of doing what the Justice Department has yet to attempt — prosecuting the biggest players responsible for the mortgage securities fiasco that trashed the U.S. economy.
The securities watchdog has sent so-called Wells notices to Goldman Sachs (GS), JPMorgan Chase (JPM), and Wells Fargo (WFC), indicating that the agency may recommend enforcement proceedings against the banking firms. The investigation seems to focus on whether the companies misrepresented the quality of securities based on subprime mortgages that they bundled and sold to investors in the years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis.
It’s embarrassing that the most information we’ve yet received about the foreclosure fraud settlement comes from an annual report to stockholders by Wells Fargo. In other words, we had to wait for the banks to tell us what was in the settlement, I guess because the regulatory officials who negotiated it weren’t entirely proud of their work.
The Wells notice (it begins on page 74) isn’t legal language, and it states clearly that “the terms… do not become final until approval of the settlement agreement by the U.S. District Court and execution of a consent order.” But it provides some more detailed information than the broad sketch that has been released. For example, we have the first breakdown that I’ve seen of the credit system for principal reductions.
first lien principal forgiveness for LTV less than or equal to 175%: 100% credit (must constitute at least 30% of the Consumer Relief Program credits);
first lien principal forgiveness for LTV greater than 175%: 50% credit for portion forgiven over 175% LTV;
forgiveness of forbearance amounts on existing loan modifications – 40% credit;
earned forgiveness over no more than a 3 year period: 85% credit for LTV less than or equal to 175%; 45% credit for forgiveness over 175% LTV;
second lien principal forgiveness: 90% credit for loans 90 days or less delinquent; 50% credit for loans greater than 90 but less than 180 days delinquent; 10% credit for loans 180 days more delinquent. Subject to a number of requirements, servicers participating in the settlement will be obligated to implement second lien principal forgiveness on second mortgages it owns when another participating servicer reduces principal on a first mortgage via its proprietary non-HAMP modification programs (must constitute at least 60% of the Consumer Relief Program credits when combined with the first lien principal forgiveness credits);
deficiency balance waivers on first and second lien loans: 10% credit;
short sale deficiency balance waivers on first and second lien loans: 20% to 100% credit depending on whether the servicer, servicer/lien holder or investor incurs the loss;
payment arrearages forgiveness for unemployed borrowers: 100% credit;
transitional funds paid to homeowners in connection with a short sale or deed-in-lieu of foreclosure for payments in excess of $1,500: 45% credit if a non-GSE investor bears the cost or 100% if the servicer bears the cost;
anti-blight – forgiveness of principal associated with properties where foreclosure is not pursued: 50% credit;
anti-blight – cash costs paid by servicer for property demolition – 100% credit; and
anti-blight – donation of real estate owned properties to qualifying recipients such as non-profit organizations: 100% credit.
Update: My original headline said “Sold Out” where it now says failed. I think it’s more accurate.
Dear State Attorneys General:
Rumor has it that this week we will learn precisely how you failed us all regarding the criminal enterprise that is mortgage servicing and foreclosure in America. That is, rumor has it that more than two weeks after you announced a deal with five bailed-out banks, we’ll all get to see the deal. Well, precisely speaking, we’ll all see the court filing containing the settlement.
Why the Secrecy?
Why aren’t you releasing the deal before filing it? I realize that you’re not officially rulemaking regulators who must seek public comment before finalizing rules. But much of your agreement functions like a regulator’s rule making. So why wouldn’t you, as a matter of good public policy practice, make the deal public for comment before seeking to finalize it with the judge? …
The $26 billion settlement between government officials and the five largest mortgage servicers will exacerbate servicer conflict of interest by allowing the banks to use investor dollars to foot the bill, according to Amherst Securities Group.
The analysis comes as representatives from mortgage banks, trade groups and organizations expressed relief as the settlement with state attorneys general and federal prosecutors finally arrived.
By receiving credit for principal write-downs on the loans owned by investors, servicers can settle their liability claims with private investor money, Laurie Goodman and her team of analysts at Amherst noted.
If anyone can set the record straight, Abigail is just the person to do it!
Naked Cap-
U.S. Housing Secretary Shaun Donovan has embarrassed himself yet again. This time, though, he’s gone in for total humiliation. See, he praised the bank-run Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s (OCC) foreclosure reviews as an important part of the social justice delivered by the mortgage “settlement“. But thanks to an insider working on an OCC review, we know that process is a sham. Worse, the insider’s story shows that enforcement of the settlement is likely to be similar, which is to say, meaningless. Doesn’t matter how pretty the new servicing standards are if the bankers don’t have to follow them.
Let’s start with Donovan’s sales pitch for the OCC reviews:
“For families who suffered much deeper harm — who may have been improperly foreclosed on and lost their homes and could therefore be owed hundreds of thousands of dollars in damages — the settlement preserves their ability to get justice in two key ways.
First, it recognizes that the federal banking regulators have established a process through which these families can receive help by requesting a review of their file. [ACF: That’s the OCC process] If a borrower can document that they were improperly foreclosed on, they can receive every cent of the compensation they are entitled to through that process.
Second, the agreement preserves the right of homeowners to take their servicer to court. Indeed, if banks or other financial institutions broke the law or treated the families they served unfairly, they should pay the price — and with this settlement they will. [bold throughout mine]
Now, the justice of the settlement has been debunked many times over. And David Dayen debunks Donovan’s OCC pitch here. What’s important is that Bank Housing Secretary Donovan wants you to believe the Wells Fargo OCC process is a meaningful contribution to holding bankers accountable and compensating victims.
_Who are you going to put in jail? They all work for the government. Do you think “O” is going to lock any of his administration up? Goldman, Citi, JP, are all run DC…LPS is just getting started.
Barry Ritholtz-
After many months of wrangling, a foreclosure settlement has been reached between 49 state attorneys general and a consortium of banks.
It is an epic failure of law and a triumph for bank attorneys.
It will accomplish little of value, as I’ll explain. First, let’s recall what the “robosigning” foreclosure scandal was all about.
Foreclosure is an extremely serious issue in American jurisprudence. As a nation of laws with strong respect for property rights, we have always treated this process appropriately. After all, having a sheriff forcibly evict a family that typically made a down payment, moved into a home, lived there for some years, made payments, etc., is disruptive — for the family, the lender and the neighborhood.
Foreclosure laws vary from state to state. However, all are specific and precise as to the legal steps that must be followed, from the homeowner’s initial delinquency onward. There are benefits to giving the homeowner a chance to “cure their default.” It is in everyone’s interest for the homeowner to catch up if possible.
I got an email the other night from one of my readers. It said…
“I was hired as one of those “Independent File Review Specialist” at a company called Promontory working on Wells Fargo Bank. I have 15 years industry experience in all facets of the mortgage & title industry, and just needed a job at the moment. I must say the whole project is a mess, and a terrible joke on the victims of foreclosure and the American people. It’s a total sham.”
No kidding, I said to myself. Or, as Yves Smith would say… “Quelle surprise.” The email continued…
“I have found errors that should be moved up through the ranks, but am told “quit digging so deep”…”put your shovel away”…Focus on the questions “in scope”… The review forms are set up so no harm could ever be found. It’s equivalent of an attorney presenting his case to a judge with just 20% of the evidence.”
Well, that can’t be good, right? He went on…
“I would also like to mention that I was brought in through a temp agency…..some of the people brought in with me do not know the difference between a truth in lending statement, and a note. It’s a shame, these are your reviewers!!! The supervisors don’t want any trouble…they are mostly temps too, just trying to get a promotion to full time. Does this sound like a fair and impartial review to you? Since we’re temps I suppose that’s impartial, not to mention they made us “affiant notaries” so we can so-called “notarize each others reviews.”
Doesn’t sound “fair and impartial” in the least, now does it? But I do like the ability to notarize each other’s reviews. That sounds handier than a pocket on a man’s shirt. He closed by saying…
“The foreclosed victims don’t realize if they do not provide specific dates on the intake forms… their complaints are considered “general comments” out of scope. They should specifically ask for a “full file review” and hopefully their info has not been scrubbed or purged… I could go on and on, but I just felt I needed to share this.”
And in my opinion, you’ve done a very good thing.
Our insider says he was hired by Promontory Compliance Solutions, LLC to do work on the Independent Foreclosure Review for Wells Fargo Bank. The company’s Website describes itself as follows:
Promontory excels at helping financial companies grapple with and resolve critical issues, particularly those with a regulatory dimension. Taken as a whole, Promontory professionals have unparalleled regulatory credibility and insight, and we provide our clients with frank, proactive advice informed by evolving best practices and regulatory expectations.
Promontory is a leading strategy, risk management and regulatory compliance consulting firm focusing primarily on the financial services industry. Led by our Founder and CEO, Eugene A. Ludwig, former U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, our professionals have deep and varied expertise gained through decades of experience as senior leaders of regulatory bodies, financial institutions and Fortune 100 corporations.
Homeowners best interest was never a priority in the settlement discussions… If it was, do you think any of this would be happening? Would this even be legal?
Too bad you can’t question authority because there is none.
HuffPO-
The ink wasn’t even dry on a settlement with the nation’s top mortgage lenders when Missouri Gov. Jay Nixon laid claim to a chunk of the money to avert a huge budget cut for public colleges and universities.
He’s not the only politician eyeing the cash for purposes that have nothing to do with foreclosure. Like a pot of gold in a barren field, the $25 billion deal offers a tempting and timely source of funding for state governments with multimillion-dollar budget gaps.
Although most of the money goes directly to homeowners affected by the mortgage crisis, the settlement announced this month by attorneys general in 49 states includes nearly $2.7 billion for state governments to spend as they wish.
Washington, DC – Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) Acting Director Edward J. DeMarco today sent to Congress a strategic plan for the next phase of the conservatorships of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the Enterprises). The plan builds on the Acting Director’s February 2010 letter to Congress on the conservatorships and sets forth objectives and steps FHFA is taking or will take to meet FHFA’s obligations as conservator. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed into conservatorships Sept. 6, 2008 and have since received more than $180 billion in taxpayer support.
FHFA identifies three strategic goals for the next phase of the conservatorships:
Build. Build a new infrastructure for the secondary mortgage market;
Contract. Gradually contract the Enterprises’ dominant presence in the marketplacewhile simplifying and shrinking their operations; and
Maintain. Maintain foreclosure prevention activities and credit availability for newand refinanced mortgages.
“With the conservatorships operating for more than three years and no near-term resolution insight, it is time to update and extend the goals and directions of the conservatorships,” DeMarco wrote. “FHFA is contemplating next steps to build an infrastructure for thesecondary mortgage market that is consistent with existing policy proposals and will supportany outcome of the leading legislative proposals. FHFA looks forward to working withCongress and the Administration on a resolution of the conservatorships and a comprehensivereview of the nation’s housing finance system,” said DeMarco.
Someone obviously didn’t do their homework! Perhaps reading MERS 101 might help.
WSJ-
New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman seems to think his job is to sift through the wreckage of the housing market and shoot the wounded. His latest target is electronic mortgage record-keeping, which he calls a scandal, perhaps because he doesn’t understand it.
Mr. Schneiderman is following Delaware’s Beau Biden, who sued the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems in October, and Massachusetts’s Martha Coakley, who added banks to her suit in December. The New York complaint names many of the same institutions and alleges that MERS, as the database is known, has harmed homeowners by undermining judicial foreclosure and creating “confusion and uncertainty” about property ownership interests.
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