Mistaken foreclosure costly to family

Bank modified Peoria couple’s mortgage, then mistakenly sold their house in.

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Minute Entry

Hearing Information:

Debtor: ANDREW C BAILEY
Case Number: 2:09-bk-06979-RTBP Chapter: 11
Date / Time / Room: TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 09, 2010 10:00 AM 7TH FLOOR #701
Bankruptcy Judge: SARAH SHARER CURLEY
Courtroom Clerk: WANDA GARBERICK
Reporter / ECR: ANDAMO PURVIS

Matter:

ADV: 2-09-01728
ANDREW C. BAILEY vs THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, FKA THE BAN
HEARING RE Motion to Dismiss Complaint Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss, With Prejudice, Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint To Determine The Validity, Priority or Extent Of a Lien or Other Interest in Real Property and Petition For Injunctive Relief filed by KYLE S. HIRSCH of BRYAN CAVE LLP on behalf of BAC HOME LOANS SERVICING
R / M #: 50 / 0

Appearances:

ANDREW C BAILEY

KYLE S. HIRSCH, ATTORNEY FOR THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, FKA THE BANK

Proceedings:

Mr. Hirsch goes over the background of the complaints that have been filed, and notes that this is the fourth amended complaint with no basis. Mr. Bailey gives his statements to the court on the note.

COURT: THE COURT FINDS THAT AT THIS TIME MR. BAILEY HAS NO SUPPORT FOR HIS CLAIMS. MR. HIRSCH IS DIRECTED TO GET THE ORIGINAL CUSTODIAL FILE FROM NEW YORK FOR THE COURT TO REVIEW. HE SHOULD ALSO GET AN AFFIDAVIT FROM THE INDIVIDUAL GETTING THE FILE, THAT THERE HAS NOT BEEN ANY CHANGES SINCE 2006. IT IS ORDERED CONTINUING THIS HEARING TO JANUARY 13, 2011 AT 10:00 A.M.

Case 2:09-ap-01728-SSC Doc 61 Filed 11/09/10 Entered 11/09/10 15:07:05

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Hat tip to a reader:

ADRIENNE FRAZER, Plaintiff,
v.
MILLENNIUM BANK, N.A., et al., Defendants.

No. 2:10-cv-01509 JWS.

United States District Court, D. Arizona.

October 27, 2010.

ORDER AND OPINION

JOHN W. SEDWICK, District Judge.

I. MOTION PRESENTED

At docket 18, defendant Millennium Bank, N.A. (“Millennium) moves to dismiss plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the grounds that they are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. At docket 21, plaintiff Adrienne Frazer opposes the motion. Millennium replies at docket 22. Oral argument was requested, but it would not assist the court.

II. BACKGROUND^[1]

Adrienne Frazer is the owner of a house located at XXXXXXXXXXXX, Scottsdale, Arizona XXXXX. On August 18, 2006, Ms. Frazer re-financed the house by borrowing $497,250 from Millennium. Ms. Frazer used the broker services of Family Home Lending Corporation (“FHL”).

As part of the loan application process, Ms. Frazer was required to state her yearly income. Ms. Frazer stated her accurate yearly income. Millennium and FHL then filled out the loan application for Ms. Frazer. Millennium and FHL used an inflated income amount on the application in order to fraudulently qualify Ms. Frazer for the loan. Ms. Frazer was unable to qualify for the loan based on her actual income. Millennium and FHL did not disclose that they had used an inflated income figure, and Ms. Frazer was not shown the exact yearly income that was used in the loan application.

Based on the loan she received, Ms. Frazer’s debt to income ratio “ended up being 121.71%, excessively above the recommended industry standard of 35%.”^[2] During the loan closing, Ms. Frazer was “presented with loan documents reflecting that she only qualified for the above described loan.”^[3] “At all times, [Ms. Frazer] believed she qualified for her loan based on her actual income.”^[4]

Ms. Frazer learned that FHL received a kickback of $4,972.50 from Millennium after a forensic review of her loan documents on January 7, 2010. Millennium gave FHL the kickback in exchange for steering Ms. Frazer into the loan. In addition, the loan documents indicated the finance charge was $1,452,712.24, whereas the actual finance charge was $1,464,950.27. The disclosed finance charge understated the finance charge by $12,238.03.

Not surprisingly, Ms. Frazer had difficulty paying her mortgage. In April 2009, Ms. Frazer received a letter stating that foreclosure proceedings would begin on July 8, 2009, if payment was not received for the stated default amount before that date. Millennium and FHL did not attempt a loan modification “work out” plan with Ms. Frazer, although she had pursued and was willing to participate in such a plan. Ms. Frazer discovered the false representations made by Millennium and FHL when she consulted with an attorney and had her loan documents reviewed on January 7, 2010.

On July 16, 2010, Ms. Frazer filed a complaint against Millennium, FHL, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., BAC Home Loan Servicing, LP, Bank of America NA, and Specialty Underwriting and Residential Finance Trust Mortgage Loan Asset Backed Certificates Series 2006-BC 5. Ms. Frazer’s complaint alleges claims of intentional misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, consumer fraud, accounting, breach of fiduciary duty, constructive fraud, and quiet title. The complaint names Millennium in only two claims — intentional misrepresentation and consumer fraud. Millennium now moves to dismiss Ms. Frazer’s intentional misrepresentation and consumer fraud claims as barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims in the complaint.^[5] In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “[a]ll allegations of material fact in the complaint are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”^[6][7] To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), plaintiffs must aver in their complaint “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'”^[8] “Conclusory allegations of law, however, are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.”

A statute of limitations defense may be raised by a motion to dismiss “[i]f the running of the statute is apparent on the face of the complaint.”^[9] “When a motion to dismiss is based on the running of the statute of limitations, it can be granted only if the assertions of the complaint, read with the required liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.”^[10]

IV. DISCUSSION

Pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-543, “[a] claim for intentional misrepresentation must be brought within three years after the cause of action accrues.”^[11] The statute of limitations for intentional misrepresentation begins to run when a plaintiff “knew or by reasonable diligence should have known of the misrepresentation.”^[12]

Ms. Frazer’s intentional misrepresentation claim alleges that Millennium and FHL completed the loan application for her using an inflated income figure made up by Millennium and FHL in order the qualify her for the loan. The complaint further alleges that Millennium did not disclose to Ms. Frazer either that it had used an inflated income figure or the amount of income she would need to actually qualify for and afford the loan. The complaint also alleges that during the loan closing Ms. Frazer was given loan documents indicating that she only qualified for the presented loan. Ms. Frazer maintains that she is entitled to equitable tolling because she was in no position to discover and did not discover the alleged intentional misrepresentations until a forensic review of her loan documents was conducted on January 7, 2010, three and a half years after she received the loan.

Millennium contends that the complaint’s allegations that Ms. Frazer was approved for a loan that she could not afford and had difficulty paying her mortgage preclude her contention that she could not have learned of the alleged fraud until January 7, 2010. Millennium further argues that the fact the loan was not a good fit for her income was enough to put her on inquiry notice.

Under A.R.S. § 12-543(3), a cause of action “shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud.” Thus, the relevant issue is when Ms. Frazer knew or should have known that the statements in the loan application and other loan documents were false. Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Ms. Frazer, as the court must on a Rule 12(b)(6), it appears that Ms. Frazer did not learn of the inflated income level used on her loan application and the fact that she would not have qualified for the loan with her actual income until January 2010. Moreover, nothing on the face of the complaint indicates when Ms. Frazer, with reasonable diligence, should have known of the alleged misrepresentations.

Millennium next contends that Ms. Frazer admits in her complaint that the alleged fraud was discoverable on the face of the loan document because her claim for intentional misrepresentation states in pertinent part, “Because the fraud is discoverable on the face of the instrument, Defendants Certificate and [Bank of America], as assignee[s] of Millennium, are also liable to [Ms. Frazer].”^[13] Millennium’s argument is not persuasive, because the complaint alleges that Millennium and FHL filled out Ms. Frazer’s loan application and concealed the fact that they used an inflated income figure to qualify her for the loan. The complaint further alleges that Ms. Frazer, who is not a mortgage professional, would have been unable to determine whether material information was concealed or misstated. Because the running of the statute limitations on Ms. Frazer’s intentional misrepresentation claim is not apparent on the face of the complaint, the court will deny Millennium’s motion to dismiss based on their statute of limitations defense.

Ms. Frazer’s complaint also alleges a claim of consumer fraud against Millennium pursuant to Consumer Fraud Act, A.R.S. § 44-1521. Because a consumer fraud claim is created by statute, a consumer fraud action must be initiated within one year after the cause of action accrues pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-541(3).^[14] The discovery rule also applies to an action for consumer fraud.^[15] As such, the statute of limitations begins running “when the defrauded party discovers or with reasonable diligence could have discovered the fraud.”^[16]

Ms. Frazer’s consumer fraud claim essentially mirrors the allegations in her intentional misrepresentation claim. Ms. Frazer argues that she is entitled to equitable tolling of the one-year statute of limitations because she “was in no position to discover the aforementioned concealed and/or false information until a forensic review of her loan documents was conducted on January 7, 2010.”^[17]

Again construing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, her consumer fraud claim is timely because she alleges she first knew of the misrepresentations in January 2010 and filed her complaint in July 2010, and nothing on the face of the complaint indicates when Ms. Frazer, with reasonable diligence, should have known of the alleged misrepresentations. Because the running of the statute limitations is not apparent on the face of the complaint, the court will deny Millennium’s motion to dismiss Ms. Frazer’s consumer fraud claim.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set out above, defendant’s motion to dismiss at docket 18 is DENIED.

[1] For purposes of this Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the background facts are taken from the factual allegations in plaintiff’s compliant, which are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff.

[2] Id.

[3] Doc. 1-1 at p. 8.

[4] Id.

[5] De La Cruz v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 48 (9th Cir. 1978).

[6] Vignolo v. Miller, 120 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1997).

[7] Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001).

[8] al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 956 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal citation omitted)).

[9] Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980).

[10] Id.

[11] Bank of the West v. Estate of Leo, 231 F.R.D. 386, 390 (D.Ariz. 2005);.

[12] Bank of the West, 231 F.R.D. at 390; Coronado Development Corp. v. Superior Court of Ariz., 678 P.2d 535, 537 (Ariz.App. 1984)(“The statute of limitations in a fraud case begins to run when the plaintiff by reasonable diligence could have learned of the fraud, whether or not he actually learned of it.”)

[13] Doc. 1-1 at p. 9 ¶ 46.

[14] Alaface v. National Inv. Co., 892 P.2d 1375, 1380 (Ariz.App. 1994).

[15] Id. at 1379.

[16] Id. (quoting Mister Donut of Am., Inc. v. Harris, 723 P.2d 670, 672 (1986).

[17] Doc. 1-1 at p. 11.

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Hat Tip to a subscriber on this!

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
Minute Entry
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Hearing Information:

Date / Time / Room:
Case Number: 4:08-BK-15510-EWH Chapter: 13
Debtor: JULIA V. VASQUEZ
Hearing Information:
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 07, 2010 11:30 AM COURTROOM 430

Bankruptcy Judge: EILEEN W. HOLLOWELL
Reporter / ECR: ALICIA JOHNS
Courtroom Clerk: TERESA MATTINGLY

Matter:

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY SANCTIONS SHOULD NOT BE IMPOSED PURSUANT TO FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011, 3001, LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULES 4001 (e) AND 9011-1 AND 11 U.S.C. SEC. 105 FOR CONDUCT RELATED TO A PROOF OF CLAIM FILED 11/28/08 AND MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM STAY FILED ON 1/6/09. (reset from 9/2/10) R / M #: 90 / 0

Appearances:

BEVERLY B. PARKER, ATTORNEY FOR JULIA V. VASQUEZ, Appearing in Phoenix
ERIC J MCNEILUS, ATTORNEY FOR JULIA V. VASQUEZ
LEONARD MCDONALD, ATTORNEY FOR TIFFANY & BOSCO, Appearing in Phoenix
DAVID GOSS FROM SAXON MORTGAGE, ASSISTANT VICE-PRESIDENT OF BANKRUPTCY DEPARTMENT, Present in courtroom in Phoenix

Proceedings:

Mr. McDonald filed a pre-hearing statement yesterday and provides a copy to Ms. Parker.

The court expresses its concerns and explains why the order was issued.

Mr. McDonald walks the court through what he has learned about the matter. Admittedly the proof of claim nor stay relief motion were plead to say that they were done in the name of Saxon Mortgage Servicer as servicer for the beneficial interest of Deutsche.

Court asks Mr. McDonald if his office knew who held the deed of trust.

Mr. McDonald responds that the electronic referral was asked to be done in the name of Saxon. They were not prosecuting a non-judicial trustee sale. They noticed up the trustee sale in the name of Deutsche. If you look at the note and deed of trust they are in the name of Saxon Mortgage.

Court points out that the proof of claim was never withdrawn. No one had the courtesy to inform the debtor that Deutsche Bank should have been served.

Mr. McDonald responds that he did not represent Saxon in the adversary. When they received push back they did not go forward with a trustee sale or prosecute the motion for relief from stay.

Mr. David Goss is sworn and examined by the court. Ms. Parker cross-examines the witness and Mr. McDonald objects.

The witness is excused.

COURT PLACES ITS FINDINGS ON THE RECORD. SAXON TO PAY MS. VASQUEZ’S LAWYERS $5000.00 WITHIN TEN DAYS FROM TODAY OR A NOTICE OF APPEAL IS FILED.

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DinSFLA here: Notice the address Saxon Mortgage Services, Inc. 1270 Northland Drive., Suite 200 Mendota Heights, MN 55120….THIS IS Lender Processing Services address in which I wrote about in this post below..

LENDER PROCESSING SERVICES (LPS) BUYING UP HOMES AT AUCTIONS? Take a look to see if this address is on your documents!

TO: Saxon Mortgage Services, Inc. (“Saxon”) Natalia Shasko, Corey M. Robertus, Tiffany & Bosco, Mark Bosco, Leonard J. McDonald, Jr.

YOU ARE HEREBY ORDERED to appear before this court on Thursday, September 2, 2010 at 1:30 p.m., U.S. Bankruptcy Court, 38 South Scott Avenue, Courtroom 446, Tucson, AZ 85701 and show cause, if any, why sanctions should not be imposed on you pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011, 3001, Local Bankruptcy Rules 4001(e) and 9011-1 and 11 U.S.C. § 105 for the following conduct relating to a proof of claim (“POC”) filed on November 28, 2008, and a Motion for Relief from Stay (“MRS”) filed on January 6, 2009:?

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U.S. Bankruptcy Judge EILEEN W. HOLLOWELL knew exactly where this was going and put an immediate stop to it.

Deutsche not only created the Allonge after it filed its MRS and falsely represented that it was affixed to the Original, but it also relied on the LPA authorizing the transfer of the Note when substantially identical powers of attorney have been held to be ineffective in reported decisions involving Deutsche.

Deutsche, AHMSI and counsel should, however, treat this decision as a warning. If, in the future, the court is confronted with filings as deficient and incorrect as filed in this case, the court will issue an order to show cause and consider imposing sanctions including, but not limited to, an award of fees to debtors’ counsel for having to oppose motions filed without proper evidence or worse with improper evidence.

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These people DO NOT care about you or your family! STAND UP!

Via: Livinglies

GMAC has failed to demonstrate that it is the holder of the Note because, while it was in possession of the Note at the evidentiary hearing, it failed to demonstrate that the Note is properly payable to GMAC

Once the securities have been sold, the SPV is not actively involved.

IN RE WEISBAND

In re: BARRY WEISBAND, Chapter 13, Debtor.

Case No. 4:09-bk-05175-EWH.

United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Arizona.

March 29, 2010.

Barry Weisband, Tucson, AZ, Ronald Ryan, Ronald Ryan, P.C., Tucson, AZ, Attorney for Debtor.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

EILEEN W. HOLLOWELL, Bankruptcy Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

The debtor, Barry Weisband (“Debtor”), has challenged the standing of creditor, GMAC Mortgage, LLC (“GMAC”), to seek stay relief on his residence. After reviewing the documents provided by GMAC and conducting an evidentiary hearing, the court concludes that GMAC, the alleged servicer of the Debtor’s home loan, lacks standing to seek stay relief. The reasons for this conclusion are explained in the balance of this decision.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Creation of Debtor’s Note And Asserted Subsequent Transfers

On or about October 6, 2006, the Debtor executed and delivered to GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. (“GreenPoint”) an adjustable rate promissory note in the principal sum of $540,000 (“Note”) secured by a Deed of Trust (“DOT”) on real property located at 5424 East Placita Apan, Tucson, Arizona 85718 (“Property”).

On a separate piece of paper, GreenPoint endorsed the Note to GMAC (“Endorsement”). The Endorsement is undated. The DOT was signed by the Debtor on October 9, 2006, and recorded on October 13, 2006. The DOT lists GreenPoint as the lender, and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) as the beneficiary of the DOT “solely as nominee for [GreenPoint], its successors and assigns.”

Approximately five months before the creation of the Note and DOT, on April 10, 2006, GreenPoint entered into a Flow Interim Servicing Agreement (“FISA”) (Exhibit D)^{[ 1 ]} with Lehman Capital, a division of Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. (collectively “Lehman”), pursuant to which Lehman agreed to purchase conventional, residential, fixed and adjustable rate first and second lien mortgage loans from GreenPoint. Under the FISA, GreenPoint agreed to service the mortgage loans it sold to Lehman. According to GMAC, GreenPoint transferred the Note and DOT to Lehman under the FISA.

On November 1, 2006, Lehman entered into a Mortgage Loan Sale and Assignment Agreement (“MLSAA”) with Structured Asset Securities Corporation (“SASC”) (Exhibit E). Under that agreement, Lehman transferred a number of the mortgage loans it acquired under the FISA to SASC. GMAC claims that the Note was one of the mortgage loans transferred to SASC. SASC created a trust to hold the transferred mortgages — GreenPoint Mortgage Funding Trust (“Trust”). The MLSAA also transferred the right to receive principal and interest payments under the transferred mortgage loans from Lehman to the Trust.

Also, on November 1, 2006, SASC entered into a Trust Agreement (Exhibit F) with Aurora Loan Services (“Aurora”) as the master servicer, and U.S. Bank National Association (“U.S. Bank”) as the trustee. A Reconstituted Servicing Agreement (Exhibit G) was executed the same day, which provided that GreenPoint would continue to service the mortgages transferred to the Trust under the MLSAA, but that the Trust could change servicers at any time. Also, according to GMAC, on November 1, 2006, GMAC, Lehman, and Aurora entered into a Securitization Servicing Agreement (“SSA”) (Exhibit H), pursuant to which GMAC would service the loans transferred to the Trust. GMAC claims that under the SSA it is the current servicer of the Note and DOT.

Thus, according to GMAC, as of November 1, 2006, the Note and DOT had been transferred to the Trust, with SASC as the Trustor, U.S. Bank as the Trustee, Aurora as the master servicer, and GMAC as the sub-servicer. GreenPoint went out of business in 2007. According to GMAC, it remains the sub-servicer of the Note, and that is its only financial interest in the Note and DOT. (Transcript Nov. 10, 2009, pp. 44, 47, 75.)

B. Bankruptcy Events

As of March 1, 2009, the Debtor was in default of his obligations under the Note. Debtor filed his petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on March 19, 2009. On May 16, 2009, GMAC filed a proof of claim (“POC”), which attached the Note and DOT. The Endorsement from GreenPoint to GMAC was not attached to GMAC’s proof of claim. On May 12, 2009, MERS, as nominee for GreenPoint, assigned its interest in the DOT to GMAC (“MERS Assignment”). The MERS Assignment was recorded on July 16, 2009.

GMAC filed a Motion for Relief from Stay (“Motion”) on May 29, 2009, on the grounds that the Debtor had no equity in the Property and the Property was not necessary for an effective reorganization. The Motion also requested adequate protection payments to protect GMAC’s alleged interest in the Property. GMAC attached the Note with the Endorsement and DOT as exhibits to the Motion.

The Debtor filed a response challenging GMAC’s standing to seek relief from stay. After various discovery disputes, GMAC sent a letter dated September 17, 2009, to the Debtor which purported to explain the various transfers of the Note and the DOT. (Docket #90). The letter explained that GreenPoint transferred the “subject loan” to Lehman under the FISA, that Lehman sold the “subject loan” to SASC under the MLSAA, that SASC, Aurora Loan Services, and U.S. National Bank entered into a trust agreement, which created the Trust and made Aurora the master servicer for the “subject loan,” and, that GMAC was the servicer of the “subject loan” under the SSA. According to GMAC, its status as servicer, along with the Endorsement of the Note to GMAC and the assignment of the DOT from MERS to GMAC, demonstrated that it had standing to bring the Motion.

On November 10, 2009, the Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the Motion. GMAC offered the original Note at the hearing and admitted into evidence a copy of the Note, DOT, copies of the FISA, MLSAA, Trust Agreement, the Reconstituted Servicing Agreement and the SSA. However, GMAC did not offer any documents demonstrating how the Note and DOT were conveyed by GreenPoint to the FISA. No document was offered demonstrating how the Note and DOT were conveyed from the FISA to the MLSAA or from the MLSAA into the Trust. Schedule A-1 of the MLSAA, where the transferred mortgages presumably would have been listed, only has the words “Intentionally Omitted” on it, and Schedule A-2 has the word “None.” (Exhibit F, pp. 19-20). Similarly, there is no evidence that the Note and DOT are subject to the SSA. Exhibit A to the SSA, titled “Mortgage Loan Schedule,” is blank. At the conclusion of the hearing, this Court ordered the Debtor to begin making adequate protection payments commencing on December 1, 2009 to the Chapter 13 Trustee. The Court further ordered GMAC and the Debtor to negotiate the amount of the adequate protection payments. When the parties were unable to reach agreement, the Court set the amount of the monthly payments at $1,000.

III. ISSUE

Does GMAC have standing to bring the Motion?

IV. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(a) and 157(b)(2)(G).

V. DISCUSSION

A. Introduction

Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as a stay of collection and enforcement actions. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). The purpose of the automatic stay is to provide debtors with “protection against hungry creditors” and to assure creditors that the debtor’s other creditors are not “racing to various courthouses to pursue independent remedies to drain the debtor’s assets.” In re Tippett,Dean v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 72 F.3d 754, 755-56 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also In re Johnston, 321 B.R. 262, 2737-4 (D. Ariz. 2005). Despite the broad protection the stay affords, it is not without limits. 542 F.3d 684, 689-90 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Section 362(d) allows the court, upon request of a “party in interest,” to grant relief from the stay, “such as terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). The court may grant relief “for cause, including the lack of adequate protection.” Id. The court may also grant relief from the stay with respect to specific property of the estate if the debtor lacks equity in the property and the property is not necessary to an effective reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2).

Any party affected by the stay should be entitled to seek relief. 3 COLLIER’S ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 362.07[2] (Henry Somers & Alan Resnick, eds. 15th ed., rev. 2009); Matter of Brown Transp. Truckload, Inc., 118 B.R. 889, 893 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1990); In re Vieland, 41 B.R. 134, 138 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984)). Relief from stay hearings are limited in scope — the validity of underlying claims is not litigated. In re Johnson, 756 F.2d 738, 740 (9th Cir. 1985). As one court has noted, “[s]tay relief hearings do not involve a full adjudication on the merits of claims, defenses or counterclaims, but simply a determination as to whether a creditor has a colorable claim.” In re Emrich, 2009 WL 3816174, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009).

Nevertheless, in order to establish a colorable claim, a movant for relief from stay bears the burden of proof that it has standing to bring the motion. In re Wilhelm, 407 B.R. 392, 400 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009). The issue of standing involves both “constitutional limitations on federal court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). Constitutional standing concerns whether the plaintiff’s personal stake in the lawsuit is sufficient to have a “case or controversy” to which the federal judicial power may extend under Article III. Id.; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992); Pershing Park Villas Homeowners Ass’n v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 219 F.3d 895, 899 (9th Cir. 2000).

Additionally, the “prudential doctrine of standing has come to encompass several judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.'” Pershing Park Villas, 219 F.3d at 899. Such limits are the prohibition on third-party standing and the requirement that suits be maintained by the real party in interest. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 498-99; Gilmartin v. City of Tucson, 2006 WL 5917165, at *4 (D. Ariz. 2006). Thus, prudential standing requires the plaintiff to assert its own claims rather than the claims of another. The requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 17, made applicable in stay relief motions by Rule 9014, “generally falls within the prudential standing doctrine.” In re Wilhelm, 407 B.R. at 398.

B. GMAC’s Standing

GMAC advances three different arguments in support of its claim to be a “party in interest” with standing to seek relief from stay. First, GMAC asserts it has standing because the Note was endorsed to GMAC and GMAC has physical possession of the Note. Second, GMAC asserts that by virtue of the MERS Assignment, it is a beneficiary of the DOT and entitled to enforce and foreclose the DOT under Arizona law. Third, GMAC asserts it has standing because it is the servicer of the Note. The court addresses each of GMAC’s claims in turn.

1. GMAC Has Not Demonstrated That It Is A Holder Of The Note

If GMAC is the holder of the Note, GMAC would be a party injured by the Debtor’s failure to pay it, thereby satisfying the constitutional standing requirement. GMAC would also be the real party in interest under Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 because under ARIZ. REV. STAT. (“A.R.S.’) § 47-3301, the holder of a note has the right to enforce it.^{[ 2 ]} However, as discussed below, GMAC did not prove it is the holder of the Note.

Under Arizona law, a holder is defined as “the person in possession of a negotiable instrument that is payable either to bearer or to an identified person that is the person in possession.” A.R.S. § 47-1201(B)(21)(a).^{[ 3 ]} GMAC has failed to demonstrate that it is the holder of the Note because, while it was in possession of the Note at the evidentiary hearing, it failed to demonstrate that the Note is properly payable to GMAC. A special endorsement to GMAC was admitted into evidence with the Note. However, for the Endorsement to constitute part of the Note, it must be on “a paper affixed to the instrument.” A.R.S. § 47-3204; see also In re Nash, 49 B.R. 254, 261 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1985). Here, the evidence did not demonstrate that the Endorsement was affixed to the Note. The Endorsement is on a separate sheet of paper; there was no evidence that it was stapled or otherwise attached to the rest of the Note. Furthermore, when GMAC filed its proof of claim, the Endorsement was not included, which is a further indication that the allonge containing the Endorsement was not affixed to the Note.^{[ 4 ]}

In Adams v. Madison Realty & Dev., Inc., 853 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1988), the plaintiffs executed promissory notes which, after a series of transfers, came into the defendant’s possession. At issue was whether the defendant was the rightful owner of the notes. The court held that the defendant was not entitled to holder in due course status because the endorsements failed to meet the UCC’s fixation requirement. Id. at 168-69. The court relied on UCC section 3-202(2) [A.R.S. § 47-3204]: “An indorsement must be written by or on behalf of the holder and on the instrument or on a paper so firmly affixed thereto as to become a part thereof.” Id. at 165. Since the endorsement page, indicating that the defendant was the holder of the note, was not attached to the note, the court found that the note had not been properly negotiated. Id. at 166-67. Thus, ownership of the note never transferred to the defendant. Applying that principle to the facts here, GMAC did not become a holder of the Note due to the improperly affixed special endorsement.

While the bankruptcy court in In re Nash, 49 B.R. 254 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1985) found that holder in due course status existed even though an allonge was not properly affixed to an instrument, the court based its determination on the clear intention that the note assignment be physically attached because: (1) the assignment was signed and notarized the same day as the trust deed; (2) the assignment specifically referenced the escrow number; (3) the assignment identified the original note holder; and (4) the assignment recited that the note was to be attached to the assignment. Id. at 261.

In this case, however, there is no proof that the allonge containing the special endorsement from GreenPoint to GMAC was executed at or near the time the Note was executed. Furthermore, the Endorsement does not have any identifying numbers on it, such as an account number or an escrow number, nor does it reference the Note in any way. There is simply no indication that the allonge was appropriately affixed to the Note, in contradiction with the mandates of A.R.S. § 47-3204. Thus, there is no basis in this case to depart from the general rule that an endorsement on an allonge must be affixed to the instrument to be valid.

GMAC cannot overcome the problems with the unaffixed Endorsement by its physical possession of the Note because the Note was not endorsed in blank and, even if it was, the problem of the unaffixed endorsement would remain.^{[ 5 ]} As a result, because GMAC failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the Endorsement was proper, it has failed to demonstrate that it is the holder of the Note.

2. The MERS Assignment Of The DOT Did Not Provide GMAC With Standing

GMAC argues that it has standing to bring the Motion as the assignee of MERS.^{[ 6 ]} In this case, MERS is named in the DOT as a beneficiary, solely as the “nominee” of GreenPoint, holding only “legal title” to the interests granted to GreenPoint under the DOT. A number of cases have held that such language confers no economic benefit on MERS. See, e.g., In re Sheridan, 2009 WL 631355, *4 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009); In re Mitchell, 2009 WL 1044368, *3-4 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2009); In re Jacobson, 402 B.R. 359, 367 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2009). As noted by the Sheridan court, MERS “collect[s] no money from [d]ebtors under the [n]ote, nor will it realize the value of the [p]roperty through foreclosure of the [d]eed of [t]rust in the event the [n]ote is not paid.” 2009 WL 631355 at *4.

Because MERS has no financial interest in the Note, it will suffer no injury if the Note is not paid and will realize no benefit if the DOT is foreclosed. Accordingly, MERS cannot satisfy the requirements of constitutional standing. GMAC, as MERS’ assignee of the DOT, “stands in the shoes” of the assignor, taking only those rights and remedies the assignor would have had. Hunnicutt Constr., Inc. v. Stewart Title & Trust of Tucson, Trust No. 3496, 187 Ariz. 301, 304 (Ct. App. 1996) citing Van Waters & Rogers v. Interchange Res., Inc., 14 Ariz. App. 414, 417 (1971); In re Boyajian, 367 B.R. 138, 145 (9th Cir. BAP 2007). Because GMAC is MERS’ assignee, it cannot satisfy the requirements of constitutional standing either.^{[ 7 ]}

3. GMAC Does Not Have Standing As The Servicer Of The Note

(a) Servicer’s Right To Collect Fees For Securitized Mortgages

Securitization of residential mortgages is “the process of aggregating a large number of notes secured by deeds of trust in what is called a mortgage pool, and then selling security interests in that pool of mortgages.” Kurt Eggert, Held Up In Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 536 (2002). The process begins with a borrower negotiating with a mortgage broker for the terms of the loan. Then, the mortgage broker either originates the loan in its own name or in the name of another entity, which presumably provides the money for the loan. Almost immediately, the broker transfers the loan to the funding entity. “This lender quickly sells the loan to a different financial entity, which pools the loan together with a host of other loans in a mortgage pool.” Id. at 538.

The assignee then transfers the mortgages in the pool to another entity, which in turn transfers the loans to a special purpose vehicle (“SPV”,) whose sole role is to hold the pool of mortgages. Id. at 539. “The transfer to the special purpose trust must constitute a true sale, so that the party transferring the assets reduces its potential liability on the loans and exchanges the fairly illiquid loans for much more liquid cash.” Id. at 542. Next, the SPV issues securities which the assignee sells to investors. Id. at 539.

Once the securities have been sold, the SPV is not actively involved. It “does not directly collect payments from the homeowners whose notes and deeds of trust are held by the SPV.” Id. at 544. Rather, servicers collect the principal and interest payments on behalf of the SPV. Id. Fees are associated with the servicing of loans in the pool. Therefore, GMAC would have constitutional standing if it is the servicer for the Note and DOT because it would suffer concrete injury by not being able to collect its servicing fees.^{[ 8 ]}In re O’Kelley, 420 B.R. 18, 23 (D. Haw. 2009) . In this case, however, the evidence does not demonstrate that the Note and DOT were transferred to the Trust, and, without that evidence, there is no demonstration that GMAC is the servicer of the Note.

(b) There Is Insufficient Evidence That The Note Was Sold To Lehman And Became Part Of The Trust

When the Debtor executed the Note and DOT, GreenPoint was the original holder of the Note and the economic beneficiary of the DOT. GreenPoint, allegedly, transferred the Note to Lehman pursuant to the FISA. However, the term “mortgage loans” is not defined in the FISA and GMAC’s documents regarding the securitization of the Note and DOT provide no evidence of actual transfers of the Note and DOT to either the FISA or the Trust. Because such transfers must be “true sales,” they must be properly documented to be effective. Thus, to use an overused term, GMAC has failed “to connect the dots” to demonstrate that the Note and DOT were securitized. Accordingly, it is immaterial that GMAC is the servicer for the Trust.

C. Debtor’s Other Arguments

1. Securities Investors Are Not The Only Individuals Who Can Satisfy Standing Requirements When Dealing With A 362 Motion on a “Securitized” Mortgage

The Debtor argues that, in an asset securitization scheme, only the securities investors have standing to seek stay relief because they are the only parties with a financial interest in the securitized notes. However, because the Debtor executed the Note and received consideration (which he used to purchase the house), the contract is enforceable regardless of who provided the funding. In other words, the fact that the funds for a borrower’s loan are supplied by someone other than the loan originator, does not invalidate the loan or restrict enforcement of the loan contract to the parties who funded the loan. A number of cases and treatises recognize that consideration for a contract, including a promissory note, can be provided by a third party. See, e.g., DCM Ltd. P’ship v. Wang, 555 F. Supp. 2d 808, 817 (E.D. Mich. 2008); Buffalo County v. Richards, 212 Neb. 826, 828-29 (Neb. 1982); 3 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 7:20 (Richard A. Lord, 4th ed. 2009); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(4) (2009).

Notes are regularly assigned and the assignment does not change the nature of the contract. The assignee merely steps into the shoes of the assignor. In re Boyajian, 367 B.R. 138, 145 (9th Cir. BAP 2007); In re Trejos, 374 B.R. 210, 215 (9th Cir. BAP 2007). No additional consideration is required, as opposed to a novation which creates a new obligation. Id. at 216-17 citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 280, cmt. e. Therefore, the Debtor’s argument that the Note is unenforceable because the funder of the Note was not the payee fails. The Note is still valid and can be enforced by the party who has the right to enforce it under applicable Arizona law.

2. Proof Of A Note’s Entire Chain Of Ownership Is Not Necessary For Stay Relief

A movant for stay relief need only present evidence sufficient to present a colorable claim — not every piece of evidence that would be required to prove the right to foreclose under a state law judicial foreclosure proceeding is necessary. In re Emrich, 2009 WL 3816174, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009). Accordingly, not every movant for relief from stay has to provide a complete chain of a note’s assignment to obtain relief.

Arizona’s deed of trust statute does not require a beneficiary of a deed of trust to produce the underlying note (or its chain of assignment) in order to conduct a Trustee’s Sale. Blau v. Am.’s Serv. Co., 2009 WL 3174823, at *6 (D. Ariz. 2009); Mansour v. Cal-W. Reconveyance Corp., 618 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1181 (D. Ariz. 2009); Diessner v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 618 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1187 (D. Ariz. 2009). It would make no sense to require a creditor to demonstrate more to obtain stay relief than it needs to demonstrate under state law to conduct a judicial or non-judicial foreclosure. Moreover, if a note is endorsed in blank, it is enforceable as a bearer instrument. See In re Hill, 2009 WL 1956174, at *2 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2009). Therefore, this Court declines to impose a blanket requirement that all movants must offer proof of a note’s entire chain of assignments to have standing to seek relief although there may be circumstances where, in order to establish standing, the movant will have to do so.

3. The Movant Has Not Violated Rule 9011

The Debtor argues that GMAC “violated Rule 7011” by presenting insufficient and misleading evidence. Given that there is no Rule 7011, the Court assumes that the Debtor was actually referring to Bankruptcy Rule 9011. Rule 9011 allows a court to impose sanctions for filing a frivolous suit. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011(c); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c). As noted at the evidentiary hearing, the Court did not find that GMAC filed its motion for relief stay in bad faith, nor does this Court believe GMAC filed its motion thinking it did not have proper evidentiary support. There are numerous, often conflicting, decisions on the issues of “real party in interest” and constitutional standing, and what evidence must be presented by a servicer seeking stay relief. The record in this case does not support imposition of 9011 sanctions.

VI. CONCLUSION

GMAC has not demonstrated that it has constitutional or prudential standing or is the real party in interest entitled to prosecute a motion for relief from stay.

Accordingly, its motion is DENIED without prejudice.

Sheriff Joe Arpaio’s chief deputy’s home foreclosed

by JJ Hensley – Apr. 2, 2010 10:36 AM
The Arizona Republic