Fidelity National Financial, Inc. announced the reorganization of the former Lender Processing Services, Inc. (“LPS”) businesses, the formation of a wholly-owned subsidiary called Black Knight Financial Services, Inc. (“Black Knight”) and the issuance of a 35% interest in each of Black Knight’s two operating subsidiaries, ServiceLink Holdings, LLC (“ServiceLink”) and Black Knight Financial Services, LLC (“BKFS”), to funds affiliated with Thomas H. Lee Partners, L.P. and certain related entities.  Black Knight, through ServiceLink and BKFS, now owns and operates the former LPS businesses and FNF’s ServiceLink business.  FNF’s core operating subsidiaries now consist of Fidelity National Title Group, Inc. and Black Knight. 

BKFS consists of LPS’ former technology, data and analytics businesses and the technology offerings previously owned by FNF’s ServiceLink division. BKFS’ primary products and services include:

• Empower^®, PCLender^® and LendingSpace^® – enterprise-wide loan origination systems that support the correspondent, wholesale and retail markets
• RealEC^® – electronically connects mortgage lenders and their business partners, and supports the company’s loan quality offerings
• MSP^® – the leading residential mortgage servicing technology platform in the U.S.
• LPS Desktop® and Fusion – comprehensive workflow platforms that support mortgage servicing
• The world’s largest U.S. property database, that covers 99.9% of U.S. property records from over 3,000 counties
• Most comprehensive mortgage performance data – represents nearly 70 percent of loans in the mortgage industry and provides the broadest breadth and depth of any single loan-level data source
• Industry-leading analytics – Provide valuable insight that helps effectively manage risk, support regulatory compliance and improve decision-making

The name Black Knight Services, a nod to Fidelity National Chairman William “Bill” Foley’s alma mater at Army.

Perry Mehrling
>Columbia University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics

Zoltan Pozsar
International Monetary Fund (IMF)

James Sweeney
Credit Suisse

Daniel H. Neilson
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET); Bard College at Simon’s Rock

November 5, 2013

Abstract:

BANK OF AMERICA NATIONAL ASSOCIATION AS SUCCESSOR BY MERGER TO LASALLE BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE FOR MORGAN STANLEY LOAN TRUST 2006-2 3476 Stateview Boulevard Ft. Mill, SC 29715, Plaintiff,
v.
CHAU T. LAM, YAH RONG TING, ALAN CHILUNG WONG A/K/A ALAN CHI LUNG WONG, ADAMAR OF NEW JERSEY INC., BOARD OF MANAGERS OF EIGHT EAST TWELFTH CONDOMINIUM, HSBC BANK USA, NEW YORK CITY ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL BOARD, NEW YORK CITY PARKING VIOLATIONS BUREAU, NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT ADJUDICATION BUREAU, JOHN DOE (said name being fictitious, it being the intention of Plaintiff to designate any and all occupants of premises being foreclosed herein, and any parties, corporations or entities, if any, having or claiming an interest or lien upon the mortgaged premises, Defendants.

ALICE SCHLESINGER, Judge.

It is ordered that this motion and cross-motion are determined in accordance with the accompanying memorandum decision.

This is an action to foreclose a mortgage on a condominium apartment located at 8 East 12th Street, Unit # 2, New York, New York 10003. Plaintiff Bank of America National Association, as successor by merger to LaSalle Bank National Association, as Trustee for Morgan Stanley Loan Trust 2006-2 moves, pursuant to CPLR 3212, for summary judgment of foreclosure and sale, and for dismissal of the defenses asserted in the answers of defendants Chau T. Lam (“Lam”), Yah Rong Ting (“Ting”) and the Board of Managers of Eight East Twelfth Condominium (“Board of Managers”), pursuant to CPLR 3211(b). Plaintiff also requests the following additional relief: (I) that all answering defendants’ cross claims be severed or that the cross claims be ordered separately tried pursuant to CPLR 603; (ii) that “John Doe” be dropped as a party defendant in this action; (iii) that plaintiffs name be amended to reflect the succession of Bank America National Association (“Bank of America”) by U.S. Bank National Association (“U.S. Bank”) as trustee, and that the caption be amended accordingly; (iv) that the address of the plaintiff be deleted from the caption, and the caption be amended accordingly; (v) that all non-appearing defendants “be deemed in default, and the defaults fixed and determined; and (vi) “for such other and further relief as to the Court may deem just and proper.” Notice of Motion, at 2.

Defendants Lam and Alan Chi-Lung Wong a/k/a Alan Chi Lung Wong (“Wong”) cross-move, pursuant to CPLR 3212, for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice on the ground that plaintiff lacks standing. Defendant Ting, by way of her attorney’s affirmation, supports the plaintiff’s motion and the Board of Managers, too, offers no opposition to the motion.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

On September 1, 2005, defendant Lam borrowed $900,000 from nonparty Lynx Mortgage Bank LLC (“Lynx”). The loan was evidenced by a promissory note (the “Note”) signed by Lam, and secured by a mortgage on the condominium, also dated September 1, 2005 (the “Mortgage”). The Mortgage was executed by Lam, and her husband, defendant Wong. Defendant Ting, who is alleged to be a 50% owner of the condominium apartment,^[1] is also a signatory.

In support of plaintiffs motion, plaintiff submits an Assignment of Mortgage that is dated October 6, 2009 (the “Assignment”). This document purports to assign the Mortgage to plaintiff. Weinert Affirm., Ex. E. The Assignment identifies the assignor as the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”), as nominee for Lynx. In this regard, the Mortgage provides in a section entitled “Borrower’s Transfer to Lender of Rights in the Property”:

“I mortgage, grant and convey the Property to MERS (solely as nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors in interest) and its successors in interest subject to the terms of this Security Instrument. This means that, by signing this Security Instrument, I am giving Lender those rights that are stated in this Security Instrument and also those rights that Applicable Law gives to lenders who hold mortgage on real property. I am giving Lender these rights to protect Lender from possible losses that might result if I fail to [comply with certain obligations under the Security Instrument and accompanying Note.]

I understand and agree that MERS holds only legal title to the rights granted by me in this Security Instrument, but, if necessary to comply with law or custom, MERS (as nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns) has the right:

(A) To exercise any or all of those rights, including, but not limited to, the right to foreclose and sell the Property; and

(B) To take any action required of Lender including, but not limited to, releasing and canceling this Security Instrument.”

Weinert Affirm., Ex. D: Mortgage, at 3. The Assignment is executed by Elpiniki M. Bechaka, identified as an assistant secretary and vice president of MERS.

Plaintiff also submits an affidavit of merit from Laresea T. Jett sworn to on May 24, 2013. Ms. Jett avers that she is:

“Vice President Loan Documentation of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. DBA America’s Servicing Company, (hereinafter “Wells Fargo”) the servicer for U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee, successor in interest to Bank of America, National Association, as Trustee, successor by merger to LaSalle Bank National Association, as Trustee for Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-2, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006.”

Jett Aff., ¶ 1. Ms. Jett avers that “Plaintiff is the mortgagee of record and was in possession of the note prior to the commencement of this action.” Id., ¶ 3. She then contends that

“U.S. Bank National Association, As Trustee, successor in interest to Bank of America, National Association, as Trustee successor by merger to LaSalle Bank National Association, as Trustee for Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-2, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-2 is in possession of the Promissory Note. The Promissory Note was executed in blank.”

Id., ¶ 3. Thus, according to Ms. Jett, the trustee of the entity that owns the Mortgage and Note changed from LaSalle Bank National Association, to Bank of America as a result of a merger, and then to U.S. Bank at some time after this action was commenced. Plaintiff’s counsel submits a copy of an affidavit sworn to in April 2012, both by a vice-president of Bank of America and a vice-president of U.S. Bank, who aver that substantially all of Bank of America’s corporate trust business was sold to US Bank pursuant to a purchase agreement dated November 11, 2010. See Weinert Affirm., Ex. R. According to the Schedule A attached thereto, one of the assets sold to U.S. Bank was the “Morgan Stanley Mtg Loan Trust 2006-2,” with a succession date of June 10, 2011. Id. Plaintiff requests that the caption be amended to reflect that U.S. Bank is now the trustee of this mortgage-backed security.

Ms. Jett avers that, from her review of the records kept by Wells Fargo, defendants defaulted on the loan by failing to make the payment due on June 1, 2009. As of the date of the complaint, there was due and owing an unpaid principal balance of $856,079.00, plus interest at the rate of 5.75% from May 1, 2009. As of May 23, 2013, Ms. Jett avers that the loan remains in default and that the total amount due plaintiff on the Note is $1,107,596.48. Jett Aff., ¶¶ 8-9.

This action was commenced by plaintiff on October 26, 2009. The unverified complaint alleges that “Plaintiff is . . . the owner and holder of a note and mortgage being foreclosed.” Complaint, ¶ First. Defendant Lam, appearing pro se, answered the complaint on or about November 27, 2009, contending, inter alia, that plaintiff lacked standing to bring the action. Defendant Wong, also appearing pro se, served an answer to the complaint on November 16, 2009 and filed his answer with the County Clerk on December 7, 2009. Wong’s answer is identical to the answer filed by Lam, and thus he, too, has raised plaintiffs lack of standing as an affirmative defense. The settlement conference required by CPLR 3408 was held by the court on May 5, 2010. On or about December 15, 2011, a new law firm was substituted as counsel for plaintiff in place and stead of Stephen J. Baum, P.C. (the Baum firm), the law firm that commenced the action.

DISCUSSION

Wong’s Alleged Default

As an initial matter, I deny plaintiffs motion to the extent that it seeks a default judgment against defendant Wong. This defendant served and filed his answer to the complaint back in 2009, and a copy of that pleading is easily found on SCROLL (“The Supreme Court Records On-Line Library”). On reply, plaintiffs counsel explains that Wong’s answer was not in the file transmitted from prior counsel, the Baum firm, but argues that since his answer is identical to the answer filed by defendant Lam and he is now represented by an attorney who has briefed the merits of plaintiffs summary judgment motion, plaintiff’s motion should be treated as one for summary judgment against both Lam and Wong.

It is well settled that a movant cannot introduce new arguments in support of, or new grounds for relief, in reply papers (Schultz v 400 Coop. Corp., 292 AD2d 16, 21-22 [1st Dep’t 2002]), and it is equally well settled that a notice of motion must specify the relief demanded (CPLR 2214[a]). However, where a notice of motion contains a general relief clause, i.e., “for such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper,” as is the case herein, the court has discretion “to grant relief that is not too dramatically unlike that which is actually sought, as long as the relief is supported by proof in the papers and the court is satisfied that no party is prejudiced.” Tirado v Miller, 75 AD3d 153, 158 (2nd Dep’t 2010).

The relief sought herein is foreclosure, and I find that there is no prejudice to Wong if I treat the plaintiffs motion as seeking summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212. Wong and Lam are now both represented by legal counsel who has thoroughly briefed their defenses and defense counsel has cross-moved, on behalf of both defendants, for dismissal of the complaint for lack of standing.

Plaintiffs Standing

In opposition to this motion, defendant Lam submits an affidavit in which she contends that plaintiff has not submitted any evidence demonstrating that it held the Note and Mortgage at the time this action was commenced on October 26, 2009. Defendant Lam further contends that Elpiniki M. Bechaka, the person who executed the Assignment from Lynx to plaintiff on October 6, 2009, is or was an attorney with the Baum firm and is a “robosigner,”^[2] and that less than one month after the Mortgage was assigned, her law firm commenced this foreclosure action. Wong, too, asserts plaintiff’s lack of standing as a defense to this action. Counsel for defendants Lam and Wong argue that, although the Assignment purports to assign the Mortgage, it does not assign the Note. He further points out that: (1) no copy of the Note was attached to the complaint at the time the action was commenced; (2) the signature of the Lynx representative who endorsed the Note in blank is illegible and undated; (3) the Jett affidavit claims that plaintiff was in possession of the Note prior to the commencement of this action, but Ms. Jett does not explain when or how Bank of America came into possession of the Note; (4) Ms. Jett is an employee of Wells Fargo, and plaintiff has not established that Wells Fargo has authority to act on behalf of the plaintiff in this case; and (5) none of the documents allegedly relied upon by Ms. Jett are attached as exhibits to plaintiff’s motion.

Where standing is put into issue by a defendant, the plaintiff must prove its standing in order to be entitled to relief. See US Bank N.A. v Madero, 80 AD3d 751, 752 (2nd Dep’t 2011); U.S. Bank, N.A. v Collymore, 68 AD3d 752, 753 (2nd Dep’t 2009); Wells Fargo Bank Minn., N.A. v Mastropaolo, 42 AD3d 239, 242 (2nd Dep’t 2007). “`In a mortgage foreclosure action, a plaintiff has standing where it is both the holder or assignee of the subject mortgage and the holder or assignee of the underlying note at the time the action is commenced.'” Homecomings Fin., LLC v Guldi, 108 AD3d 506, 507-508 (2nd Dep’t 2013), quoting Bank of N.Y. v Silverberg, 86 AD3d 274, 279 (2nd Dep’t 2011); see also Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co. NA v Sachar, 95 AD3d 695, 695 (1st Dep’t 2012). “`Either a written assignment of the underlying note or the physical delivery of the note prior to the commencement of the foreclosure action is sufficient to transfer the obligation.'” HSBC Bank USA v Hernandez, 92 AD3d 843, 844 (2nd Dep’t 2012), quoting U.S. Bank, N.A. v Collymore, 68 AD3d at 754.^[3]

Assignment of the Mortgage

Defendants Lam and Wong attack the validity of the Assignment of the Mortgage on two grounds. First, defendants argue that where the plaintiff in a foreclosure action receives its interest in the mortgage from MERS acting as the “nominee” of the original lender, plaintiff must submit documents showing that the original lender consented to the assignment of the mortgage. Defendants rely on Bank of N.Y. v Cepeda, 39 Misc 3d 1221(A), 2013 NY Slip Op 50686(U) (Sup Ct, Kings County 2013) (Schack, J.); Bank of N.Y. v Mulligan, 28 Misc 3d 1226(A), 2010 NY Slip Op 51509(U) (Sup Ct, Kings County 2010) (Schack, J.); Bank of N.Y. v Alderazi, 28 Misc 3d 376 (Sup Ct, Kings County 2010) (Saitta, J.); HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Yeasmin, 27 Misc 3d 1227(A), 2010 NY Slip Op 50927(U) (Sup Ct, Kings County 2010) (Schack, J.). The gist of these decisions is that, as a mere nominee, MERS possesses few or no legally enforceable rights beyond what its principal, the lender, gives it and that the language of the mortgages at issue therein were not sufficient to bestow any authority on MERS to assign the mortgage.

Notably, defense counsel does not cite to US Bank N.A. v Flynn, 27 Misc 3d 802 (Sup Ct, Suffolk County 2010) (Whelan, J.), which reached a contrary result. In the Flynn case, the bank had successfully argued that the language of the mortgage indenture itself, which names MERS as mortgagee of record and nominee of the lender, its successors and assigns, and confers upon it broad authority to act with respect to the mortgage in all ways that the original lender, its successors and assigns could act, including the right to foreclose, and to take any action required of the lender, including, but not limited, to releasing or discharging the mortgage, was sufficient to confer authority upon MERS to effect a valid assignment of the mortgage. Both the First and Second Departments have adopted this reasoning, and rejected the argument that MERS lacks authority to assign a mortgage.

In Bank of New York v Silverberg, 86 AD3d 274, the Second Department specifically recognized that a mortgage consolidation agreement, identical in all respects to the Mortgage at issue herein, “gave MERS the right to assign the mortgages themselves.” Id. at 281. The borrowers had argued in that case that MERS could not assign the consolidated mortgage, because the clauses in the mortgages delegating to MERS the powers to act as the original lender’s nominee had no force and effect without a power of attorney from the original lender to MERS. Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent in Bank of N. Y. v Silverberg, available at 2010 WL 9583720, at *12. The bank, however, argued that the underlying mortgages specifically provided in the section titled “Borrower’s Transfer To Lender Of Rights in The Property” that MERS, as the original lender’s nominee, had the right “to exercise any and all of those rights, including, but not limited to, the right to foreclose and sell the Property.” The bank further argued that the borrowers had granted the lender “those rights that are stated in this Security Instrument,” and that one of these rights, set forth in paragraph 20 of the mortgage, was that the “Note, or an Interest in the Note, together with this Security Instrument, may be sold one or more times.” Thus, the bank argued that MERS was expressly authorized to sell or transfer the mortgages, as it did pursuant to the written assignment it executed. Id., at *12-13. The First Department has also ruled that where the mortgage contract confers broad powers upon MERS as nominee to act on the original lender’s behalf, MERS has the authority to assign the mortgage. See Bank of N. Y. Mellon Trust Co. NA v Sachar, 95 AD3d at 696.

The Mortgage at issue herein is the same “Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Security Instrument” at issue in the Silverberg and Sachar cases and contains the same paragraph 20, which provides that the “Note, or an Interest in the Note, together with this Security Instrument, may be sold one or more times.” See Weinert Affirm., Ex. D: Mortgage, ¶ 20, at 12. Accordingly, I reject the argument that plaintiff must submit documents showing that Lynx specifically consented to the Assignment.

Defendants Lam and Wong also argue that plaintiff should be barred from relying on the Assignment, because the Baum firm, through its employee Ms. Bechakas, served as both assignor of the Mortgage and plaintiffs counsel at the commencement of this action, and that this presents an impermissible conflict of interest. Defendants rely on U.S. Bank, N.A. v Guichardo, 22 Misc 3d 1116(A), 2009 NY Slip Op 50151(U) (Sup Ct, Kings County 2009) (Schack, J.) and Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Martinez, 33 Misc 3d 1215 (A), 2011 NY Slip Op 51937(U) (Sup Ct, Queens County 2011) (Flug, J.).

In the Guichardo case, Justice Schack merely required the Baum firm to submit proof that the bank and MERS consented to the simultaneous representation, and his later sua sponte dismissal of the foreclosure action was reversed by the Appellate Division. See U.S. Bank, N.A. v Guichardo, 90 AD3d 1032 (2nd Dep’t 2001). In the Martinez case, Justice Flug held only that:

“These actions undoubtedly raise the appearance of impropriety. Indeed, these practices were the subject of the October 6, 2011 settlement agreement between Steven J. Baum and the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York. Nevertheless, defendant has failed to establish that these actions breached a specific duty to plaintiff and require a dismissal of the action as a matter of law.”

33 Misc 3d 1215(a) at 2. In response to this challenge to the Assignment, plaintiff submits a copy of Opinion 847, dated December 21, 2010, issued by the New York State Bar Association’s Committee on Professional Ethics, which reached the conclusion that a lawyer may concurrently serve as an officer of MERS, for the purpose of executing a mortgage assignment to the beneficial owner and prosecuting a mortgage foreclosure action in the assignee’s name. See Bundt Affirm., Ex. J. Plaintiff has presented documentary proof that Ms. Bechakas held the position of assistant secretary and vice president of MERS as of July 19, 2007, and was authorized to execute mortgage assignments on behalf of MERS. Bundt Affirm., Ex. I. In any event, since the Baum firm no longer represents the plaintiff, any conflict of interest no longer exists, and I find that this is not an independent basis to hold the Assignment invalid.

Ownership of the Note

Although I am not persuaded by the defendants’ challenges to the Assignment, plaintiff has not proved that it owned the Note at the time this action was commenced. Although the Mortgage was properly assigned by MERS as the nominee of the original mortgagee, Lynx, to Bank of America, the transfer of a mortgage without a note is a nullity and insufficient to confer standing to foreclose. U.S. Bank N.A. v Dellarmo, 94 AD3d 746, 748 (2nd Dep’t 2012); Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Barnett, 88 AD3d 636, 637 (2nd Dep’t 2011); Bank of N.Y. v Silverberg, 86 AD3d at 280. Here, MERS purportedly assigned the Mortgage to Bank of America without the Note. See Weinert Affirm., Ex. E.

Plaintiff argues that it acquired standing based upon a physical transfer of the indorsed Note prior to the commencement of the action. This claim is based entirely on the Jett affidavit, which states that plaintiff “was in possession of the note prior to the commencement of this action.” Jett Aff., ¶ 3. The Appellate Division has held that the affidavit of the plaintiff’s servicing agent must give “factual details as to the physical delivery of the note.” Homecomings Fin., LLC v Guldi, 108 AD3d at 509, citing Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Haller, 100 AD3d 680, 682 (2nd Dep’t 2012); HSBC Bank USA v Hernandez, 92 AD3d at 844; Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Weisblum, 85 AD3d 95, 109 (2nd Dep’t 2011) (conclusory statement by loan servicing officer that his company was the holder of the mortgage by delivery without a written assignment was insufficient to establish standing to commence action).

In addition to the lack of any detail, the affiant, Laresea Jett, does not purport to have any personal knowledge of the delivery of the Note to Bank of America. Nor does she attach or describe any of Wells Fargo’s books and records upon which she relies. “Where an officer’s knowledge has been obtained either from unnamed, and unsworn employees or unidentified and unproduced work records, the affidavit lacks any probative value . . .” Dempsey v Intercontinental Hotel Corp., 126 AD2d 477, 479 (1st Dep’t 1987). What makes matters worse is that Ms. Jett admits that her affidavit is based, in part, on the unverified complaint drafted by the Baum firm.

In addition, Ms. Jett is an employee of nonparty Wells Fargo, and no proof of its authority to act on behalf of the plaintiff was submitted with plaintiff’s moving papers. Even plaintiff’s counsel admits, on reply, that an affidavit of merit must be executed either by an officer of the plaintiff or a person with a valid power of attorney. Plaintiff attempts to rectify this omission by submitting a document entitled “Limited Power of Attorney,” executed by Bank of America on August 27, 2009, and purporting to name Wells Fargo as its loan servicer. However, the power itself states that it is “given pursuant to a certain Servicing Agreement and solely with respect to the assets serviced pursuant to such an agreement . . . dated July 1, 2006. . . .” Bundt Affirm., Ex. L. Plaintiff has not submitted a copy of this Servicing Agreement nor established that the Note and Mortgage at issue in this lawsuit are serviced pursuant to this agreement.

Accordingly, I find that plaintiff failed to demonstrate its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, because it did not establish that the Note was physically delivered to Bank of America prior to the commencement of the action. An issue of fact exists as to who was in possession of the Note on October 26, 2009, which cannot be resolved on these papers. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment must be denied, and the cross motion of defendants Lam and Wong also denied since the latter have not proven, as a matter of law, that plaintiff lacks standing. Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Spanos, 102 AD3d 909, 912 (2nd Dep’t 2013); Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Haller, 100 AD3d at 683-684; HSBC Bank USA v Hernandez, 92 AD3d at 844; US Bank N.A. v Madero, 80 AD3d at 753; but see Homecomings Fin., LLC v Guldi,

CONCLUSION and ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment of foreclosure and sale against defendants Lam, Wong and Ting is denied, as is the plaintiff’s initial request for a declaration that defendant Wong is in default. That portion of plaintiff’s motion requesting that “John Doe” be dropped as a party defendant in this action, that plaintiff’s name be amended to reflect the succession of U.S. Bank, as trustee, for Bank of America, that the address of the plaintiff be deleted from the caption, and the caption be amended accordingly, is granted without opposition. The remaining portion of the plaintiff’s motion seeking to declare all non-appearing defendants in default is also granted, without opposition. The cross motion of defendants Lam and Wong for dismissal of the complaint based on plaintiff’s lack of standing is denied. Thus, it is hereby

ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment of foreclosure and sale is denied; and it is further

ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to amend the caption is granted, and that the caption shall now read as follows:

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF NEW YORK U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE, SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE, SUCCESSOR BY MERGER TO LASALLE BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE FOR MORGAN STANLEY LOAN TRUST 2006-2, Plaintiff, – against – Index No. 115035/09 CHAU T. LAM, YAH RONG TING, ALAN CHLUNG WONG A/K/A ALAN CHI LUNG WONG, ADAMAR OF NEW JERSEY INC., BOARD OF MANAGERS OF EIGHT EAST TWELFTH CONDOMINIUM, HSBC BANK USA, NEW YORK CITY ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL BOARD, NEW YORK CITY PARKING VIOLATIONS BUREAU, and NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT ADJUDICATION BUREAU, Defendants.

;and it is further

ORDERED that plaintiffs counsel shall serve a copy of this order with notice of entry on the Trial Support Office and the County Clerk, who are directed to mark the court’s records to reflect the change in the caption herein; and it is further

ORDERED that plaintiffs motion to declare all non-appearing defendants in default is granted, and that defendants New York City Transit Adjudication Bureau, New York City Parking Violations Bureau, New York City Environmental Control Board, Adamar of New Jersey Inc., and HSBC Bank USA have not appeared or answered the complaint and are deemed in default; and it is further

ORDERED that the cross motion by defendants Chau T. Lam and Alan Chi-Lung Wong a/k/a Alan Chi Lung Wong for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s complaint is denied.

[1] According to the Board of Manager’s answer, defendants Lam and Wong acquired title to the condominium by deed dated September 1, 2005 and recorded on September 23, 2005. Amended Answer and Cross-Claims of Defendant Board of Managers of Eight East Twelfth Condominium, dated March 23, 2010, ¶ 25.

[2] “Robosigning” refers to the fraudulent practice wherein an affiant signs, in a short time frame, numerous affidavits and legal documents asserting the lender’s right to foreclose, despite having no personal knowledge of the facts contained in them. See generally Ohio v GMAC Mtge., LLC, 760 F Supp 2d 741, 743 (ND Ohio 2011).

[3] Delivery of the note during the pendency of the action is insufficient. Homecomings Fin., LLC v Guldi, 108 AD3d at 508-509; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Marchione, 69 AD3d 204, 210 (2nd Dep’t 2009).

H/T Mike

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT

DENNIS RICKY HOLMES,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

HSBC BANK USA et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.

RUBIN, J. – Dissenting

I respectfully dissent.

When appellant Dennis Ricky Holmes borrowed $1 million from Countrywide
Home Loans, Inc., he gave Countrywide a promissory note. To secure repayment of his
debt to Countrywide, he also signed a deed of trust on his Los Angeles home. As of the
filing of his complaint, Holmes alleged that now-defunct Countrywide had not assigned
or transferred his promissory note or deed of trust to anyone, including respondent HSBC
Bank USA, N.A. or J.P. Morgan Alternative Loan Trust 2007-A1 for which HSBC is
trustee. Thus, as the record stands in reviewing a demurrer, lender Countrywide appears
to continue to own appellant’s note and the security interest under which he owes
payments.

Under the loan and deed of trust, only Countrywide (or its successors or assignees)
can declare Holmes’s loan in default. Paragraph 22 of the deed of trust states:
“Acceleration; Remedies. Lender shall give notice to Borrower prior to acceleration . . . .
If the default is not cured on or before the date specified in the notice, Lender at its option
may require immediate payment in full of all sums secured . . . and may invoke the power
of sale and any other remedies . . . . [¶] If Lender invokes the power of sale, Lender shall
execute or cause Trustee to execute a written notice of the occurrence of an event of
default and of Lender’s election to cause the Property to be sold. Trustee shall cause this
notice to be recorded . . . .” (Italics added.)

According to the first amended complaint, in 2010, the trustee on the deed of trust,
respondent Recontrust Company NA, conducted a nonjudicial foreclosure sale of
Holmes’s house. Although Countrywide had neither declared Holmes in default nor
invoked the trust deed’s power of sale, Recontrust issued a Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale
following the foreclosure sale to respondent HSBC as trustee for J.P. Morgan Alternative
Loan Trust 2007-A1. The record does not explain – and on demurrer we cannot resolve –
how or why J.P. Morgan Alternative Loan Trust 2007-A1 claims an interest in Holmes’s
mortgage, but I am willing to hazard a guess that it might have something to do with the
slicing, dicing, and securitizing of mortgages that was commonplace before Wall Street’s
meltdown five years ago, a meltdown that led to Countrywide’s demise and its absorption
by Bank of America. If this case were permitted to go to trial, presumably the true facts
would come out as to the HSBC/JP Morgan connection with this loan and whether
HSBC/JP Morgan was anything more than a purchaser after foreclosure.1

In August 2011, Holmes filed his first amended complaint. He alleged that
Countrywide’s failure to declare a default or invoke the power of sale meant respondent
Recontrust acted without authority when it foreclosed on his home and sold it to HSBC.
Therefore, he alleged, the Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale was void, giving HSBC no right,
title, or interest in his property. Distilled to its essence, Holmes’s complaint asserts that
respondents “with no right to do so, sold Dr. Holmes’s house to HSBC, claiming that
HSBC was the entity owed the money by Dr. Holmes (claiming that HSBC is the
beneficiary of the deed of trust).”2

Respondents HSBC and Recontrust demurred to Holmes’s first amended
complaint. They asserted he did not state a cause of action for wrongful foreclosure
because Recontrust had the authority to foreclose on Holmes’s house. Holmes’s
opposition disagreed, stating his theory of his case as follows: “The basis for this entire
action is that no money is owed from Dr. Holmes to any defendant herein, that the only
entity owed money by Dr. Holmes is Countrywide, and that Countrywide has not
declared the loan in default, nor invoked the power of sale in the deed of trust, nor caused
the trustee to execute and record a notice of default . . . .”

At the hearing on the demurrer, the court took judicial notice that Recontrust was
the trustee for Holmes’s deed of trust. The court also took judicial notice of Recontrust’s
notice of default and election to sell that preceded the foreclosure sale, and that
Recontrust recorded the notice at the behest of MERS. The court expressly declined,
however, to take judicial notice that Recontrust acted on Countrywide’s behalf. For the
purpose of Holmes’s opposition to the demurrer, the court accepted as true that
Recontrust acted without instructions from Countrywide. The court noted that “the
gravamen of the complaint is that Recontrust, as the Trustee, initiated foreclosure
proceedings without any instruction or authorization from the lender.”3
I believe the trial court accurately described the state of the pleadings but erred in
sustaining the demurrer.

California’s nonjudicial foreclosure statutory scheme promotes speed and
efficiency in foreclosing on property to enforce a debt. Nonjudicial foreclosure is
supposed to be streamlined. Thus, a homeowner traditionally cannot challenge a pending
foreclosure with a preemptive lawsuit. “California courts have refused to allow
[homeowners] to delay the nonjudicial foreclosure process by pursuing preemptive
judicial actions challenging the authority of a foreclosing ‘beneficiary’ or beneficiary’s
‘agent.’ ” (Siliga v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (2013)
219 Cal.App.4th 75, 82; Jenkins v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th
497, 511-512 [same].)

But the nonjudicial foreclosure statutory scheme, which courts have sustained by
largely rejecting homeowners’ attempts to encumber the system with additional
procedural safeguards beyond those contained in the foreclosure statutes, was written in a
bygone era, and that was then and this is now. The lending/foreclosure process which is
now playing out in the courts and elsewhere bears little resemblance to what happened
with the mortgages of our grandparents. The common law evolves to meet new
challenges from new circumstances. In a quip often attributed, perhaps incorrectly, to the
renowned economist John Maynard Keynes, “When the facts change, I change my mind.
What do you do sir?” I believe we have reached the time to make clear a homeowner’s
right to challenge a foreclosure based on the foreclosing party’s absence of authority
from the beneficiary of the homeowner’s deed of trust.

There was a time not long ago when a foreclosing trustee customarily enforced
collection of a homeowner’s debt at the direction of the lender or the lender’s successor
whose place in the promissory note’s chain of title was easily ascertained and apparent to
all. Widespread securitization of mortgages in the years before the financial meltdown of
2008, an economic catastrophe triggered in part by the often unlawful repeated
packaging, selling, repackaging, and reselling of mortgages in which the Mortgage
Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) played a pivotal role, mostly unseen and poorly
understood by homeowners, investors, regulators, and the public, has changed much of
that. “MERS is a private corporation that administers the MERS System, a national
electronic registry that tracks the transfer of ownership interests and servicing rights in
mortgage loans. Through the MERS System, MERS becomes the mortgagee of record
for participating members through assignment of the members’ interests to MERS.
MERS is listed as the grantee in the official records maintained at county register of
deeds offices. The lenders retain the promissory notes, as well as the servicing rights to
the mortgages. The lenders can then sell these interests to investors without having to
record the transaction in the public record.” (Gomes, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 1151.)

In this new era, ownership of a homeowner’s promissory note and of the beneficial
interest in a deed of trust may have changed hands many times to the point where reliable
proof of who owns what is hard to come by. “A side effect of the MERS system is that a
transfer of an interest in a mortgage loan between two MERS members is unknown to
those outside the MERS system.” (Gomes, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 1151.) As one
experienced federal district court judge noted in seeming dismay, the mortgage industry’s
lending practices fueled by Wall Street’s creation of ever-newer and arcane financial
products has upended traditionally simple, clear-cut foreclosure proceedings. The federal
judge said, “This Court has dealt with numerous mortgage-related cases, and in the
process of wading through them it has learned that seemingly straightforward
transactions—nonjudicial foreclosures—are not at all routine. Indeed, all too often they
are mystifying, because of the utterly confusing assignments, substitutions, and other
transactions (some recorded, some not) conducted by a host of entities.” (Sacchi v.
Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys. (C.D.Cal. June 24, 2011 No. CV 11-1658 AHM
(CWx)) 2011 U.S.Dist. Lexis 68007, *3.)

Perhaps in recognition that the mortgage business is not what it once was, courts
have started to permit homeowners to challenge the loss of their homes on the ground
that the foreclosing party did not own the homeowner’s promissory note or security
interest and did not represent the party who did. “[O]nly the ‘true owner’ or ‘beneficial
holder’ of a Deed of Trust can bring to completion a nonjudicial foreclosure under
California law.” (Barrionuevo v. Chase Bank, N.A. (N.D.Cal. 2012) 885 F.Supp.2d 964,
972.) “Several courts have recognized the existence of a valid cause of action for
wrongful foreclosure where a party alleged not to be the true beneficiary instructs a
trustee to file a Notice of Default and initiate nonjudicial foreclosure.” (Id. at pp. 972-
973.) Among the cases in this post-2008 financial meltdown era are:

Glaski v. Bank of America (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1088, 1097: A
homeowner successfully “raised questions regarding the chain of ownership, by
contending that the defendants were not the lenders or beneficiaries under his deed of
trust and, therefore, did not have the authority to foreclose.”

Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1378-
1379: Deutsche Bank was not entitled to summary judgment on a wrongful foreclosure
claim because it failed to show a chain of ownership that would establish it was the true
beneficiary under the deed of trust.

Barrionuevo v. Chase Bank, N.A., supra, 885 F.Supp.2d at pages 973-974: The
court permitted a cause of action for wrongful foreclosure where a homeowner alleged
that Chase lacked authority to foreclose because Washington Mutual securitized the
subject loan, divesting itself of any interest, prior to transferring its beneficial interest to
Chase.

Sacchi v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., supra, 2011 U.S.Dist. Lexis 68007,
*16-21: A homeowner stated a cause of action for wrongful foreclosure where MERS
transferred a lender’s beneficial interest in a deed to the lender’s successor after the
successor executed without authority a substitution of trustee, making the new trustee’s
notice of sale invalid.

Ohlendorf v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing (E.D. Cal. 2010) 279 F.R.D. 575, 583:
Permitted a homeowner to pursue a claim for wrongful foreclosure where the foreclosing
party may have relied on a series of backdated transfers of a deed of trust’s beneficial
interest to pursue foreclosure. Documents showed that MERS was beneficiary under the
deed of trust at the time foreclosure proceedings began, but the notice of default listed
Deutsche Bank as beneficiary and a mortgage servicer as trustee. To rectify the “taint” of
the inconsistent recorded documents, MERS filed a backdated assignment of the
beneficial interest to the mortgage servicer, and 11 seconds later the mortgage servicer
recorded a backdated assignment of the deed of trust to Deutsche.

Javaheri v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (C.D.Cal. June 2, 2011, No. CV10-
08185 ODW (FFMx)) 2011 U.S.Dist. Lexis 62152, *12-14: A homeowner stated a claim
for wrongful foreclosure against J.P. Morgan Chase by alleging that lender Washington
Mutual sold the homeowner’s promissory note to an investment pool, which thereafter
transferred the promissory note to another investment pool, preventing J.P. Morgan
Chase from obtaining the note when it acquired Washington Mutual’s assets because the
note was no longer owned by Washington Mutual at the time of the assignment.
I agree with the majority that these cases describe situations not completely found
in the present case. That is not my point in citing them. These authorities are useful
because they spell out the framework by which courts should analyze carefully lawsuits
challenging foreclosures.

To challenge the foreclosure of his home, Holmes must articulate specific facts
that demonstrate respondents lacked the authority to foreclose. (Siliga v. Mortgage
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 75, 82 [homeowner
permitted to challenge foreclosure if homeowner alleges “ ‘specific factual x’ for the
claim that the foreclosure was not initiated by the correct person”]; Fontenot v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 263, 272 [plaintiff who sought to
demonstrate that the nonjudicial foreclosure sale was invalid was “required to allege that
[HSBC as trustee for securities trust that purportedly owned homeowner’s promissory
note] did not receive a valid assignment of the debt in any manner”].)

Here, Holmes alleges that MERS can act only when the lender (or the lender’s
successor) who owns the note invokes the power of sale. Thus, if respondent HSBC was
a successor to Countrywide and owned Holmes’s promissory note, either for itself or as
trustee for J.P. Morgan Loan Trust, Holmes concedes MERS may act for HSBC. The
central allegation of Holmes’s complaint is that HSBC does not own Holmes’s
promissory note because Countrywide did not assign, sell, or transfer it to anyone. Thus,
Holmes alleges, HSBC was an interloper that had no legal interest or claim to his note,
his deed of trust, or his home. It is not a far-fetched possibility that HSBC indeed does
not own Holmes’s promissory note – at this juncture, HSBC has not demonstrated to the
contrary – and that Holmes does not owe his debt or repayment to HSBC. (Accord
Miller v. Carrington Mortgage Services (N.D.Cal. Sept. 19, 2013, No. C-12-2282 EMC)
2013 U.S.Dist. Lexis 165957, *16-17 [permitted challenge to foreclosure based on break
in the chain of title of the loan and deed of trust].) This appeal is from a demurrer.

Whether HSBC or anyone else (other than Countrywide) had the authority to direct
Recontrust (either directly or through MERS) to foreclose cannot be resolved on the face
of Holmes’s complaint or by taking judicial notice of a promissory note and deed of trust
in which HSBC’s name does not appear. Accordingly, the trial court erred in sustaining
the demurrer to Holmes’s cause of action for wrongful foreclosure.

A final point. The majority observes that Holmes has not tendered full repayment
of his debt, which respondents asserted was a precondition to challenging the foreclosure
(and which I believe underlies the majority’s characterization of Holmes as having
committed “predatory borrowing”). Holmes’s failure to tender full repayment of his debt
does not deny him the right to seek relief. “Tender is not required where the foreclosure
sale is void, rather than voidable, such as when a plaintiff proves that the entity lacked the
authority to foreclose on the property.” (Glaski v. Bank of America, supra,
218 Cal.App.4th at p. 1100.) Holmes’s dilemma is payment to “whom”? “Several courts
have refused to apply the tender requirement where plaintiff alleges that the defendant
lacks authority to foreclose on the property and, thus, that any foreclosure sale would be
void rather than merely voidable. . . . [W]here a sale is void at the outset, rather than
voidable, the transaction is a ‘nullity with no force or effect as opposed to one which may
be set aside’ in equity.” (Rockridge Trust v. Wells Fargo, N.A. (N.D.Cal. Sept. 25, 2013,
No. C-13-01457 JCS) __ F.Supp.2d __ (2013 U.S.Dist. Lexis 139606, *84), citations
omitted.)

Holmes alleges Recontrust Company N.A. lacked authority to foreclose on his
home. Because Holmes has stated facts, subject to development through discovery and
proof at trial, sufficient to support a cause of action for wrongful foreclosure, I would
reverse the trial court’s order sustaining the demurrer.

RUBIN, J.

Via NCLC–

This landmark lawsuit was filed in the federal court in the Southern District of New York on behalf of Michigan Legal Services and African American homeowners in the Detroit, Michigan area. The suit claims that the Defendent violated federal and state housing and anti-discrimination laws by adopting mortgage securitization policies that caused predatory lending and adversely impacted African Americans. It is the first case where a prospective class of affected homeowners victimized by subprime lending abuses has directly sued an investment bank by linking civil rights and consumer laws. It is also the first lawsuit to connect racial discrimination to the securitization of mortgage-backed securities.

Well, if they can afford $91 Billion in bonuses a year, then this is pennies for them!

Even though most will be a tax write-off.

CNBC-

Wall Street could pay nearly $50 billion to buy peace from federal authorities who are taking aim at the banks over their role in the mortgage crisis, according to interviews and a confidential analysis of the industry’s potential legal exposure.

Bracing for a potential reckoning, the banks and their outside lawyers are quietly using JPMorgan Chase’s record $13 billion mortgage settlement in November to do the math and determine just how much each bank might have to pay to move beyond the torrent of government mortgage litigation that has dogged them since the financial crisis. Such calculations, people briefed on the matter said, have gained particular urgency among the banks’ board members.

If the settlements materialize, they could yield, according to the analysis, $15 billion in relief for consumers — a mixture of cash payments and other assistance, like reductions in the size of homeowners’ loan payments. A payment of $50 billion, made up of a string of separate deals, would amount to roughly half the total annual profit of large American banks in 2012.

[CNBC]

74 members of Congress own GE stock

58 own Wells Fargo

51 own Bank of America and

49 own JP Morgan

Open Secrets-

For the first time in history, most members of Congress are millionaires, according to a new analysis of personal financial disclosure data by the Center for Responsive Politics.

Of 534 current members of Congress, at least 268 had an average net worth of $1 million or more in 2012, according to disclosures filed last year by all members of Congress and candidates. The median net worth for the 530 current lawmakers who were in Congress as of the May filing deadline was $1,008,767 — an increase from last year when it was $966,000. In addition, at least one of the members elected since then, Rep. Katherine Clark (D-Mass.), is a millionaire, according to forms she filed as a candidate. (There is currently one vacancy in Congress.)

Last year only 257 members, or about 48 percent of lawmakers, had a median net worth of at least $1 million.

[OPEN SECRETS]

Palm Beach Post

The Florida Supreme Court issued an order Tuesday officially disbarring David J. Stern, whose once-massive Plantation-based law firm collapsed amid allegations of fraudulent foreclosure documents.

Stern did not appeal a referee’s recommendation for the disbarment following an October hearing.

The Florida Bar pursued 17 complaints against Stern, who spoke publicly for the first time at the hearing and said he wasn’t to blame for mistakes made on foreclosures handled by his firm.

[PALM BEACH POST]

Why does this sound familiar? Oh yeah, remember this one in Orlando for $338.91!? Vistas Homeowners Association pursues extreme option — foreclosure — against Korean War veteran

MSN-

Foreclosure by homeowner associations over missed fees becoming more common since recession has emptied neighborhoods.

For six years, Ingrid Boak, who travels a lot for work as a racehorse trainer, ignored mail from her homeowner association.

Boak, of Lexington, Kentucky, says the letters were requests for $48 in annual fees for upkeep of the tidy neighborhood of one-story brick homes. Because she didn’t use the clubhouse or pool, or participate in social activities sponsored by the association, she didn’t think she needed to pay. Last September, while she was away, a neighbor called to tell her about a handwritten sign tacked to her front door. It said her house had been sold.

[MSN]

Now you know for DAMN SURE all other states will find this shit going on and not just with JPMorgan!

Bloomberg-

JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) lost a bid to throw out a lawsuit by the California attorney general alleging that the largest U.S. bank by assets illegally tried to collect debt from about 100,000 credit-card borrowers.

California Superior Court Judge Jane L. Johnson in Los Angeles yesterday rejected the bank’s argument that the attorney general’s unfair competition claims were precluded by California legal authority.

“I can’t find any case that is just slam-dunk there for you,” Johnson told JPMorgan’s lawyer, David Schrader.

 [BLOOMBERG]

H/T PRIVACY SOS

The bank official, Kimberly Triplett-Kolerich, says she is a former Washington State Patrol officer with 25 years of experience in law enforcement. On September 23, 2013, Triplett-Kolerich wrote:

I am [now] the Operational Criminal Intel Analyst for Bank of America for the 14 western states and also am the NW Executive Protection Market Manager. From time to time I will see items that I believe will be of use to my friends at WSP–especially during session. May Day I will pick your brain for intel and I will give you a lot also–the Public-Private Partnership worked great last year and hopefully being ahead of the Anarchists will protect all of you from protests/arrests/injury.

If you find any intel on Anarchists or Occupy Protesters please let me know–I will most likely find it first as Social Media trolling is not what the WSP does best–Bank of America has a team of 20 people and that’s all they do all day and then pass it to us around the country!!

FRONTLINE correspondent Martin Smith goes inside the government’s ongoing, seven-year crackdown on insider trading, drawing on exclusively obtained video of hedge fund titan Steven A. Cohen, incriminating FBI wiretaps of other traders, and interviews with both Wall Street and Justice Department insiders.

.

You can read the ruling posted here: PILGERAM v GREENPOINT | Montana SC – MERS is not a beneficiary under Montana’s Small Tract Financing Act (STFA)

Missoulian-

In home foreclosure cases the banks have contended that Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems is the beneficiary. Now, in a 21-page opinion issued Nov. 25, 2013, the Montana Supreme Court held that MERS is not the “beneficiary” under Montana’s Small Tract Financing Act. The decision is now the law in Montana.

Just to recap, the illegal fraudulent actions committed by banks are the use of “robo signers” (individuals forging executive signatures on documents); the use of fraudulent documents; and the separation of your deed from your note via MERS.

In researching illegal home foreclosure cases, results show that in state after state, court decisions favor of the homeowner, not the bank.

[MISSOULIAN]

How many bites at the apple are these cartels allowed to take when the core always ends up in rot?!

And just a little reminder to you folks, this will lead to the same window dressing investigations as the rest with absolutely no one going to jail but settlements.

WSJ-

Federal investigators are probing whether a number of Wall Street banks cheated clients in the years following the financial crisis by deliberately mispricing a type of mortgage bond that was central to the economic turmoil, according to people close to the inquiry.

The investigation is a potential blow to the banks, who are just starting to move on from years of intense scrutiny tied to their roles in the crisis.

Wall Street’s conduct leading up to and during the market convulsions of 2008 already has been closely examined by authorities. The new probe by regulators is the first known wide-ranging examination of mortgage-bond sales by banks in the years that followed.

[WALL STREET JOURNAL]

Decided on January 7, 2014

38302-07

ROSICKI, ROSICKI & ASSOC.

Attys. For Plaintiff

2 Summit Ct.

Fishkill, NY 12524

JOSEPH & TERESA GUARINO

Defendants Pro Se

358 Old Country Rd.

Deer Park, NY 11729

Thomas F. Whelan, J.

ORDERED that this motion (#003) by the plaintiff for an order vacating the judgment of foreclosure and sale dated December 14, 2009 is considered under CPLR 5015 and is denied.

This uncontested mortgage foreclosure action was commenced in December of 2007 and was concluded by the issuance and entry of a judgment in December of 2009. No answer was served by any of the named defendants and no non-answering appearances were interposed. The sale of the mortgaged property contemplated by the judgment was, however, not conducted.

By the instant motion (#003), the plaintiff seeks an order vacating the judgment it obtained by its successful prosecution of its claims for foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged premises. The motion is opposed by defendant, Joseph M. Guarino. However, the merits of the claims advanced in his opposing papers shall not be considered by the court since Mr. Guarino is a party in default in this action in which a judgment against him and his property has been entered and remains in full force and effect. Absent a vacatur of his default, which is not requested, Mr. Guarino is without authority to oppose otherwise participate on this motion (see CPLR 3215[f]; U.S. Bank Natl. Ass’n v Gonzalez, 99 AD3d 694, 952 NYS2d 59 [2d Dept 2012]; Deutsche Bank Trust Co., Am. v Stathakis, 90 AD3d 983, 935 NYS2d 651 [2d Dept 2011]; Holubar v Holubar, 89 AD3d 802, 934 NYS2d 710 [2d Dept 2011]; McGee v Dunn, 75 AD3d 624, 624, 906 NYS2d 74 [2d Dept 2010]; see also Unsettled Times Make Well-Settled Law: Recent Developments in New York State’s Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Statutes and Case Law“, 76 Albany Law Review 1085, 1114 [2012-2013]).

The reason advanced by the plaintiff as the basis for the relief requested is its purported inability to comply with affirmation requirements imposed upon its counsel under the terms of Administrative Orders 548-10 and 431-11. These highly unusual Administrative Orders were adopted and implemented following the dissemination of widely publicized national media accounts of misdeeds in the preparation of foreclosure papers by mortgagees in states other than New York. Concern on the part of court administrators over the veracity of alleged facts and the propriety of the procedures employed in the preparation of affidavits of merit submitted in residential New York foreclosure actions was the apparent basis for the issuance of the Administrative Orders numbered 548/10 and 436/11. These orders or rules, as they are sometimes referred to, impose vouching [*2]requirements upon counsel for foreclosing plaintiffs in all foreclosure cases in which a sale has not yet occurred. The plaintiff’s counsel must independently verify the accuracy of the notarizations contained in the supporting documents filed with the foreclosure action upon application for the final judgment or, if all ready issued, prior to the sale. While counsel’s compliance therewith has been held to be mandatory (see U.S. Bank Natl. Assoc. v Eaddy, 109 AD3d 908, 971 NYS2d 336 [2d Dept 2013]), the affirmation itself has also been held to be non-substantive in nature (see LaSalle Bank, NA v Pace, 100 AD3d 970, 955 NYS2d 161 [2d Dept 2012]).

In its moving papers, the plaintiff asserts that it is unable to satisfy the affirmation “vouching” requirements although all previously alleged facts regarding the obligor defendants’ payment defaults “are unchanged”. The plaintiff thus intends to have a new affidavit of merit executed by its agent to facilitate the preparation of the attorney’s affirmation. For reasons not apparent from the moving papers, the plaintiff believes that a vacatur of the judgment previously awarded to it some four years ago is necessary.

The court, however, finds this application to be in conflict with well established legal maxims of finality and with fundamental principles governing the independent adjudication of cases and wasteful of the extremely limited judicial resources available to state trial courts.

“It is elementary that a final judgment or order represents a valid and conclusive adjudication of the parties’ substantive rights…” (Da Silva v Masso, 76 NY2d 436, 440, 560 NYS2d 109 [1990]; see Matter of Huie, 20 NY2d 568, 285 NYS2d 610 [1967]). Legal maxims such as law of the case and collateral estoppel serve to protect the sanctity and finality of litigated judicial orders and judgments, while the doctrine of res judicata does the same for such orders and those issued upon default (see TD Bank, N.A. v Talia Prop., Inc., 110 AD3d 1057, 973 NYS2d 789 [2d Dept 2013]; Richter v Sportsman Prop., Inc., 82 AD3d 733, 918 NYS2d 511 [2d Dept 2011]; 83-17 Broadway Corp. v Debcon Fin. Serv., Inc., 39 AD3d 583, 835 NYS2d 602 [2d Dept 2007]; Rosendale v Citibank, 262 AD2d 628, 691 NYS2d 901 [2d Dept 1999]). These maxims are the root of the finality doctrine which has been characterized as: “[a] policy against relitigation of adjudicated disputes [that] is strong enough generally to bar a second action even where further investigation of the law or facts indicates that the controversy has been erroneously decided, whether due to oversight by the parties or error by the courts” (Reilly v Reid, 45 NY2d 24, 407 NYS2d 645 [1979] [emphasis added], citing Deposit Bank v Frankfort, 191 US 499, 510-511, 24 S.Ct.154 [1903]). “Considerations of judicial economy as well as fairness to the parties mandate, at some point, an end to litigation. Afterthoughts or after discoveries however understandable and morally forgivable are generally not enough to create a right to litigate anew” (Reilly v Reid, 45 NY2d 24, 28, supra). Vacatur of final adjudicatory documents, such as an order or judgment and a re-litiagtion of the causes determined therein, is generally precluded by the the finality doctrine.

In addition to determinations affected by errors, adjudications influenced by instances of perjury do not warrant a re-adjudication of the case upon the invocation of the court’s inherent power to vacate a judgment on the grounds of fraud. In Jacobowitz v Herson (269 NY 130, 197 N.E. 169 [1935]), the Court of Appeals described the nature of this rule and the reasons underlying as follows: [*3]

The authorities are uniform in holding that an action in equity will not lie to set aside a judgment in an action for intrinsic fraud, that is, for perjury or false swearing on the trial. Pomeroy states in his Equity Jurisprudence (Vol. V, § 2077, p. 4683) the rule as follows: The courts hold that perjury is intrinsic fraud and that therefore it is not ground for equitable relief against a judgment resulting from it. We have seen that the fraud which warrants equity in interfering with such a solemn thing as a judgment must be fraud in obtaining the judgment, and must be such as prevents the losing party from having an adversary trial of the issue. Perjury is a fraud in obtaining the judgment, but it does not prevent an adversary trial. * * * However, public policy seems to demand that there be an end to litigation. If perjury were accepted as a ground for relief, litigation might be endless; the same issues would have to be tried repeatedly.

This State is committed to the rule that the perjured testimony of the successful party or his witnesses at the trial, even where the false testimony was procured by a conspiracy, is not sufficient ground for vacating a domestic judgment or enjoining its enforcement. (Ross v. Wood, 70 NY 8; Gitler v. Russian Co., 124 App. Div. 273; Standard Fashion Co. v. Thompson, 137 App. Div. 588; Crouse v. McVickar, 207 NY 213.) As before stated, the weight of authority in this country is to the same effect. (Freeman on the Law of Judgments [Vols. 1 and 3, 5th ed.], §§ 235, 1241, 1242.) (See, also, Metcalf v. Gilmore, 59 N. H. 417; Mahoney v. State Ins. Co., 133 Iowa, 570; Riley v. Murray, 8 Ind. 354; El Capitan Land & Cattle Co. v. Lees, 13 N. M. 407).

Inherent powers of a court to vacate its own orders and judgments on grounds of fraud have thus been viewed as extending only to extrinsic fraud and not to intrinsic fraud, such as perjury at trial (see Lockett v Juviler, 65 NY2d 182, 490 NYS2d 764 [1985]; Jacobowitz v Herson, 268 NY 130, supra; Matter of Holden, 271 NY 212, 218, 2 NE2d 631 [1935]). To justify a court in setting aside and vacating a judgment on the ground of fraud, the fraud complained of must have been “extrinsic”, that is, practiced in the very act of obtaining the judgment in such a way that a party was prevented from fully and fairly litigating the matter (see Matter of Holden, 271 NY 212, supra; Citimortgage, Inc. v Brown, 111 AD3d 593, 974 NYS2d 272 [2d Dept 2013]; Augustin v Augustin, 79 AD3d 651, 913 NYS2d 207 [1st Dept 2010]; Shaw v Shaw, 97 AD2d 403, 467 NYS2d 231 [2d Dept 1983]).

The inherent power of the court to vacate its own judgments does, however, extend to cases in which the court finds that the interests of substantial justice so require (see Woodson v Mendon Leasing Corp., 100 NY2d 62, 68, 760 NYS2d 727 [2002]; HSBC Mtge. Serv. v Talip, 111 AD3d 889, 975 NYS2d 887 [2d Dept 2013]; Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v Dort-Relus, 107 AD3d 861, 968 NYS2d 117 [2d Dept 2013]; U.S. Bank Natl. Ass’n v Slavinski, 78 AD3d 1167, 912 NYS2d 285 [2d Dept 2010]; Katz v Marra, 74 AD3d 888, 905 NYS2d 204 [2d Dept 2010]). It is the movant’s burden “to show that the prior order should be set aside by submission of sufficient evidence supporting the grant of such relief” (Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v Dort-Relus, 107 AD3d 861, supra). Allegations of improper practices by a plaintiff’s or its agents in unrelated matters do not suffice (see Citimortgage, Inc. v Bustamante, 107 AD3d 752, 968 NYS2d 513 [2d Dept 2013]; Wells Fargo, N.A. v Levin, 101 AD3d 1519, 958 NYS2d 227 [3d Dept 2012]; cf., GMAC Mtge., LLC v Bisceglie, 109 AD3d 874, 973 NYS2d 225 [2d Dept 2013]). [*4]

In contrast to its inherent powers, courts are statutorily authorized to vacate a judgment under CPLR 5015(a)(3) for fraud, misrepresentation or misconduct of an adverse party (see Beltway Capital, LLC v Soleil, 104 AD3d 628, 961 NYS2d 225 [2d Dept 2013]; Chase Home Fin., LLC v Quinn, 101 AD3d 793, 954 NYS2d 897 [2d Dept 2012]; Katz v Marra, 74 AD3d 888, supra). The fraud contemplated by CPLR 50515(a)(3) has been held to include intrinsic fraud, which rests upon false claims or perjury, as well as extrinsic fraud, which rests upon an impairment of a party’s right to litigate (see Wilson v Galicia Contr. & Restoration Corp., 10 NY3d 827, 830, 860 NYS2d 417 [2008]; Oppenheimer v Westcott, 47 NY2d 595, 603, 419 NYS2d 908 [1979]; Bank of New York v Stradford, 55 AD3d 765, 869 NYS2d 554 [2d Dept 2008]). Underlying this more modern view is the notion that the “courts must protect the integrity of the judicial process and ensure that plaintiffs do not secure money judgments based on fraudulent claims” (Wilson v Galicia Contr. & Restoration Corp., 10 NY3d 827, 830, supra; see also Nash v Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, ___ NY3d ___, 2013 WL 6164436 [2013]). However, the objective of assuring the honesty and integrity of judicial processes has been held not to be “furthered when the Court goes outside applicable law to itself raise arguments” or does the “lawyering” for the parties to the action (Wilson v Galicia Contr. & Restoration Corp., 10 NY3d 827 at 830, supra).

Here, the judgment of foreclosure and sale that was entered in this action some four years ago, remains unchallenged by any party against whom it was rendered or by others with jural interests therein including the plaintiff. It thus constitutes a conclusive adjudication of all questions at issue between the parties and all matters of defense which were raised or could have been raised by any of the defendants (see Richter v Sportsman Prop., Inc., 82 AD3d 733, supra; 83-17 Broadway Corp. v Debcon Fin. Serv., Inc., 39 AD3d 583, supra; Rosendale v Citibank, 262 AD2d 628, supra). The judgment is thus immune from attack except in the most limited circumstances, such as an appeal or upon a timely application for its vacatur by a party against whom it was rendered or other person interested (see CPLR 5015[a][1]; Oppenheimer v Westcott, 47 NY2d 595, supra; Matter of Huie, 20 NY2d 568, 285 NYS2d 610 [1967]; Rizzo v Ippolito, 137 AD2d 511, 524 NYS2d 255 [2d Dept 1988]; Greenwich Sav. Bank v JAJ Carpet Mart, Inc., 126 AD2d 451, 510 NYS2d 594 [1st Dept 1987]). Since no facts constituting any one of the grounds necessary to support the vacatur of the judgment under the inherent or statutory powers of the court were advanced here, the vacatur of the judgment of foreclosure and sale requested is not available to the plaintiff.

Nor do the post-action commencement, administratively imposed affirmation requirements, with which the plaintiff cannot comply, constitute a valid basis on which the court may premise a vacatur of the previously issued judgment of foreclosure and sale (cf., CPLR 3012-b; effective 9/1/13).

As indicated above, the affirmation itself has been held not to constitute “substantive evidence” nor a “new argument” or defense in favor of the defendant mortgagor (see LaSalle Bank, NA v Pace, 100 AD3d 970, 971, supra). The affirmation requirement was the product of Administrative Order 548/10, which issued in response to the dissemination of media accounts of misdeeds and misconduct in foreclosure cases elsewhere. Promulgation of such order and its [*5]amendment (Administrative Order 430/11) can be traced solely to the concerns of court administrators who apparently believed that the misconduct of foreclosing parties elsewhere had or was about to infiltrate foreclosure actions in this state (see Affirmation Form-Preamble attached to AO 548/10 and 430/11). However, neither the anecdotal reports of misdeeds of foreclosing parties elsewhere nor the categorical concerns of court administrators that similar misdeeds and misconduct might be present in foreclosure actions pending in this state are relevant to an adjudication of the issues before this court in such actions. The Administrative Orders and the affirmation requirements therein imposed thus appear to be a mis-guided attempt on the part of court administrators to go outside the law and to raise issues not raised by the parties under the guise of protecting “the honesty and integrity of the judicial process” (see Wilson v Galicia Contr. & Restoration Corp., 10 NY3d 827, 830, supra), including those in non-judicial states, court administrators imposed the vouching requirements upon counsel for foreclosing plaintiffs as a means of sanitizing New York foreclosure proceedings.

In addition, it appears that the administratively imposed affirmation requirements are contrary to judicial conduct cannons and several of the fundamental principles upon which the judiciary is premised. These cannons and principles mandate a full, fair and independent judiciary by prohibiting the interjection of outside influences into adjudicatory processes thereby leaving the court with consideration of only the claims, pleadings and proofs put before it by the parties and the court’s judicious application of all relevant controlling principles of law thereto (see 22 NYCRR 100.2 [A];[B];[C]; 100.3[B][1];[2];[3] and [4]). Although the affirmation requirements are aimed at precluding such outside events from permeating judicial foreclosure proceedings in this state, their effect is just the opposite, as the taint arising from the misdeeds and other nefarious acts engaged in elsewhere must be affirmatively disproved by submission of the mandated vouching affirmation of the plaintiff’s counsel. The affirmation requirements thus constitute a prohibited intrusion of outside factors into the independent adjudicatory processes this court is bound to observe.

It is the view of this court that the Administrative Orders and their affirmation requirements are not in keeping with the well established principles of finality and those governing adjudicatory processes, particularly, where as here, it is the successful plaintiff who seeks to tear down its own judgment rather than any party interested who is adversely affected thereby. The court thus finds that no judgment of foreclosure and sale nor any precursor order of reference that remain unchallenged under common law and statutory provisions governing vacatur are not subject to vacatur due to an inability to comply with administrative “orders” of a non-substantive nature.

These unfortunate circumstances do not, however, leave the plaintiff or its counsel without a remedy. In a recent case authority emanating from the Appellate Division, Second Department, the court granted a foreclosing plaintiff who obtained a judgment of foreclosure and sale, leave to file a new affidavit of merit, “nunc pro tunc” so as to facilitate the preparation of the attorney’s affirmation that is the subject of the above cited Administrative Orders (see U.S. Bank v Eaddy, 109 AD3d 908, 971 NYS2d 336 [2d Dept 2013], supra). Similar applications may be employed in cases in which only an order of reference has issued. In such cases, the application should be made in conjunction with the motion for a judgment and include a proposed new affidavit of merit for which [*6]leave to file same is sought as well as the attorney’s affirmation. Whenever made, these applications should not include demands for “vacaturs”, “ratifications” or “confirmations” of prior orders or judgments, as the aim thereof should be to move the action forward to its ultimate conclusion, i.e., a judgment of foreclosure and/or the sale of the mortgaged premises under an existing judgment by facilitating the filing of the attorney’s affirmation.

Here, no new affidavit of merit is attached to the moving papers and no attorney’s affirmation of the type contemplated by the above cited Administrative Orders was included as a submission. Instead, the plaintiff merely asks that the court vacate its unchallenged judgment of foreclosure and sale due to counsel’s inability to formulate the attorney’s affirmation. These omissions, coupled with the court’s finding that judgments of foreclosure and sale which remain unchallenged under common law and statutory provisions should not be subject to vacatur due to an inability to comply with “orders” promulgated by court administrators, warrant a denial of this motion. The court thus denies this application without prejudice to a further application of the type contemplated by the appellate court in U.S. Bank v Eaddy, supra.

Counsel are reminded that motions such as the instant one are extremely taxing upon the resources of the judiciary which has, for too long and unnecessarily so, been spread too thin in so far as the funding and staffing of judicial parts charged with the responsibility of adjudicating cases. This court and others are literally swamped with applications such as the instant one, which is, essentially, a “do-over” of a prior application that was duly considered and adjudicated by this court in a manner consistent with the cannons of judicial ethics and the fundamental principles upon which the judiciary is premised. Colloquially known as “remediation” motions, no basis in law or fact has been presented nor found by the court to be supportive of demands for recall and/or vacatur of jurisdictionally valid orders and judgments that subsist without challenge for years in residential mortgage foreclosure actions. Counsel are thus urged to carefully tailor all future applications to the one granted in U.S. Bank v Eaddy, and to avoid the interposition of unnecessary and unduly burdensome applications like the one now before the court.

Dated: _____________________________________________

THOMAS F. WHELAN, J.S.C.

JPMorgan Chase & Co will pay $1.7 billion to settle U.S. charges it violated laws requiring banks to monitor customer activity for money laundering in its handling of accounts of convicted Ponzi-schemer Bernard Madoff.

JPMorgan Chase Bank will be criminally charged with 2 violations of the Bank Secrecy Act in connection with the Bernard Madoff’s Multi-Billion Dollar ponzi-scheme.

Deferred prosecution agreement requires JPMC to admit its conduct, pay $1.7B to victims of Madoff’s fraud & reform its anti-money laundering policies.

…

WASHINGTON’S BLOG

Interest Rates Are Manipulated

Bloomberg reports today:

Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc was ordered to pay $50 million by a federal judge in Connecticut over claims that it rigged the London interbank offered rate.

RBS Securities Japan Ltd. in April pleaded guilty to wire fraudas part of a settlement of more than $600 million with U.S and U.K. regulators over Libor manipulation, according to court filings. U.S. District Judge Michael P. Shea in New Haventoday sentenced the Tokyo-based unit of RBS, Britain’s biggest publicly owned lender, to pay the agreed-upon fine, according to a Justice Department Justice Department.

Global investigations into banks’ attempts to manipulate the benchmarks for profit have led to fines and settlements for lenders including RBS, Barclays Plc, UBS AG and Rabobank Groep.

RBS was among six companies fined a record 1.7 billion euros ($2.3 billion) by the European Union last month for rigging interest rates linked to Libor. The combined fines for manipulating yen Libor and Euribor, the benchmark money-market rate for the euro, are the largest-ever EU cartel penalties.

Global fines for rate-rigging have reached $6 billion since June 2012 as authorities around the world probe whether traders worked together to fix Libor, meant to reflect the interest rate at which banks lend to each other, to benefit their own trading positions.

To put the Libor interest rate scandal in perspective:

• The big banks have conspired for years to rig interest rates … upon which $800 trillion in assets are pegged

• This was the largest insider trading scandal ever … and the largest financial scam in world history

• Local governments got ripped off bigtime by the Libor manipulation

• Even though RBS and a handful of other banks have been fined for interest rate manipulation, Libor is still being manipulated.  No wonder … the fines are pocket change – the cost of doing business – for the big banks

Indeed, the experts say that big banks will keep manipulating markets unless and until their executives are thrown in jail for fraud.

Why? Because the system is rigged to allow the big banks to commit continuous and massive fraud, and then to pay small fines as the “cost of doing business”.  As Nobel prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz noted years ago:

“The system is set so that even if you’re caught, the penalty is just a small number relative to what you walk home with.

The fine is just a cost of doing business. It’s like a parking fine. Sometimes you make a decision to park knowing that you might get a fine because going around the corner to the parking lot takes you too much time.”

Experts also say that we have to prosecute fraud or else the economy won’t ever really stabilize.

But the government is doing the exact opposite.  Indeed, the Justice Department has announced it will go easy on big banks, and always settles prosecutions for pennies on the dollar (a form of stealth bailout. It is also arguably one of the main causes of the double dip in housing.)

Indeed, the government doesn’t even force the banks to admit any guilt as part of their settlements.

Because of this failure to prosecute, it’s not just interest rates. As shown below, big banks have manipulated virtually every market – both in the financial sector and the real economy – and broken virtually every law on the books.

And they will keep on doing so until the Department of Justice grows a pair.

Currency Markets Are Rigged

Currency markets are massively rigged. And see this and this.

Derivatives Are Manipulated

The big banks have long manipulated derivatives … a $1,200 Trillion Dollar market.

Indeed, many trillions of dollars of derivatives are being manipulated in the exact same same way that interest rates are fixed: through gamed self-reporting.

Oil Prices Are Manipulated

Oil prices are manipulated as well.

Gold and Silver Are Manipulated

Gold and silver prices are “fixed” in the same way as interest rates and derivatives – in daily conference calls by the powers-that-be.

Bloomberg reports:

It is the participating banks themselves that administer the gold and silver benchmarks.

So are prices being manipulated? Let’s take a look at the evidence. In his book “The Gold Cartel,” commodity analyst Dimitri Speck combines minute-by-minute data from most of 1993 through 2012 to show how gold prices move on an average day (see attached charts). He finds that the spot price of gold tends to drop sharply around the London evening fixing (10 a.m. New York time). A similar, if less pronounced, drop in price occurs around the London morning fixing. The same daily declines can be seen in silver prices from 1998 through 2012.

For both commodities there were, on average, no comparable price changes at any other time of the day. These patterns are consistent with manipulation in both markets.

Energy Markets Are Manipulated

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission says that JP Morgan has massively manipulated energy markets in California and the Midwest, obtaining tens of millions of dollars in overpayments from grid operators between September 2010 and June 2011.

Commodities Are Manipulated

The big banks and government agencies have been conspiring to manipulate commodities prices for decades.

The big banks are taking over important aspects of the physical economy, including uranium mining, petroleum products, aluminum, ownership and operation of airports, toll roads, ports, and electricity.

And they are using these physical assets to massively manipulate commodities prices … scalping consumers of many billions of dollars each year.

Everything Can Be Manipulated through High-Frequency Trading

Traders with high-tech computers can manipulate stocks, bonds, options, currencies and commodities. And see this.

Manipulating Numerous Markets In Myriad Ways

The big banks and other giants manipulate numerous markets in myriad ways, for example:

• Engaging in mafia-style big-rigging fraud against local governments. See this, this and this

• Shaving money off of virtually every pension transaction they handled over the course of decades, stealing collectively billions of dollars from pensions worldwide. Details here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here and here

• Charging “storage fees” to store gold bullion … without even buying or storing any gold . And raiding allocated gold accounts

• Committing massive and pervasive fraud both when they initiated mortgage loans and when they foreclosed on them (and see this)

• Pledging the same mortgage multiple times to different buyers. See this, this, this, this and this. This would be like selling your car, and collecting money from 10 different buyers for the same car

• Cheating homeowners by gaming laws meant to protect people from unfair foreclosure

• Pushing investments which they knew were terrible, and then betting against the same investments to make money for themselves. See this, this, this, this and this

• Engaging in unlawful “frontrunning” to manipulate markets. See this, this, this, this, this and this

• Engaging in unlawful “Wash Trades” to manipulate asset prices. See this, this and this

• Otherwise manipulating markets. And see this

• Participating in various Ponzi schemes

• Charging veterans unlawful mortgage fees

• Cooking their books (and see this)

• Bribing and bullying ratings agencies to inflate ratings on their risky investments

The criminality and blatant manipulation will grow and spread and metastasize – taking over and killing off more and more of the economy – until Wall Street executives are finally thrown in jail.

It’s that simple …

AND there are many, many more years to come!

Roll your mouse over a color block below to see what fine they paid.

YOU KNOW the inJustice Department didn’t want the Draft Complaint to be exposed!

TribLive-

A Pittsburgh-based home lender reached a settlement deal with J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., which it accused of selling it bad mortgage-backed securities that cost it hundreds of millions of dollars in the housing-bubble collapse.

Details of the settlement agreement between Federal Home Loan Bank of Pittsburgh and J.P. Morgan, announced on Friday before Allegheny County Common Pleas Judge Stanton Wettick, were not disclosed.

“The case is still before the court, and we are not commenting at this time,” said FHLBank spokeswoman Terri McKay.

[TRIBLIVE]

I hope they wear bullet proof vests as me thunks this is going to be very dangerous!

MI Lawyers Weekly-

Michigan process servers are no longer considered “trespassers” when trying to serve documents.

Public Act 230, passed by the state Legislature and given immediate effect at the end of 2013, amended the Michigan Penal Code so it is no longer a 30-day misdemeanor to enter or remain on the premises of another without lawful authority after having been forbidden to do so or asked to leave by the owner, occupant, or their agents.

PA 230 specifies that the trespassing prohibition and penalties do not apply to a process server who is on the land or premises of another while attempting to serve process.

[MILAWYERSWEEKLY]