Countrywide Home Loans Inc. will pay $100 million to settle a class action alleging that the Bank of America Corp.-owned lender deceptively lured consumers into buying loans with higher interest rates than originally promised, according to a Thursday filing in California federal court.
Plaintiff Jay J. Ralston alleged that Countrywide and its correspondent lenders, including Mortgage Investors Group Inc., engaged in a “campaign of deceptive conduct and concealment” in which some consumers lost their homes through foreclosure, according to court documents.
ORDER PRELIMINARILY APPROVING SETTLEMENT, AND WITH RESPECT TO CLASS NOTICE, COURT APPROVAL HEARING AND ADMINISTRATION (granting 386 ). Signed by Judge Jeremy Fogel on 6/19/2013. (jflc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/19/2013)
ORDER GRANTING 413 MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT; OVERRULING OBJECTIONS; GRANTING 394 MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS; AND GRANTING SERVICE PAYMENT. Signed by Judge Jeremy Fogel on 9/19/2013. (jflc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/19/2013)
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA
IN RE: DARRELL LAYNE CARTER and PAMELA STRICKLAND CARTER, Debtors,
ORDER GRANTING DEBTOR’S MOTION FOR CONEMPT AND SANCTIONS AGAINST HOMEWARD RESIDENTIAL, INC.
EXCERPT:
2. Homeward Residential Inc., is in willful contempt of multiple court orders, more specifically, the Court’s mediation order entered on August 22, 2012 and the Court’s Compel Order entered on March 6, 2013.,
3. Debtors are entitled to damages of attorney’s fees and compensatory damages. Homeward Residential Inc.’s conduct also warrants and award of punitive damages.
IT IS ORDERED
1. The Motion for Contempt and Sanctions is GRANTED.
2. Debtor is awarded $2,140.00 for attorney’s fees; $1,000.00 in sanctions; and $15,000.00 in punitive damages; for a total award of $18,140.00.
As I have previously reported, the highest probability of forcing your mortgage servicer to modify your mortgage is in the Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Mortgage Modification Mediation Program.
Historically, mortgage modifications since 2008 (when mortgage servicers borrowed hundreds of billions of taxpayer money in a program known as TARP) have had dismal results. However, reports show that the probability of a meaningful mortgage modification in bankruptcy court is 75%, and our firm enjoys a success rate above 90%!
Obama Administration isn’t doing anything about the millions kicked to the curb and the regulators are busy twirling around the revolving door.
So homeowners, if you can hire a good attorney.
Washington Post-
For Jose Santos Benavides, the ordeal of losing his home was over.
The Salvadoran immigrant had worked for years as a self-employed landscaper to make a $15,000 down payment on a four-bedroom house in Rockville. He had achieved a portion of the American dream, earning nearly six figures.
Then the economy soured, and lean paychecks turned into late mortgage payments. On Aug. 20, 2008, one year after he bought his dream home for $469,000, the bank’s threat to take his house became real via a letter in the mail. Just four days before the bank seized the property, he moved out, along with his wife and their two young children.
* Judge lets fraud, unjust enrichment claims go forward
* Racketeering claims thrown out
By Jonathan Stempel
June 14 (Reuters) – JPMorgan Chase & Co must face a lawsuit accusing the largest U.S. bank of illegally imposing marked-up or unnecessary fees on delinquent mortgage borrowers, a federal judge ruled.
U.S. District Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers in Oakland, California on Thursday rejected the bank’s attempt to dismiss fraud and unjust enrichment claims by the plaintiff borrowers, who hope to represent classes of borrowers nationwide.
U.S. Federal Reserve staff approved a multibillion dollar foreclosure settlement with banks earlier this year without a formal vote of the board governors, a top Fed official wrote in a letter to Congress.
Federal regulators reached settlements worth about $9.3 billion with 13 banks earlier this year to end case-by-case reviews of whether they had wrongly seized homes.
Senator Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts, a Democrat who sits on the banking committee, and Representative Elijah Cummings of Maryland, who is the top Democrat on the House Oversight Committee, asked regulators for more information in January about the reviews after the settlements were announced.
Bank of America Corp. (BAC), the second-biggest U.S. lender, rewarded staff with cash bonuses and gift cards for meeting quotas tied to sending distressed homeowners into foreclosure, former employees said in court documents.
Mortgage workers falsified records and were told to delay U.S. loan-assistance applications by requesting paperwork that the Charlotte, North Carolina-based bank had already received, according to statements from ex-employees filed last week in federal court in Boston. The lender improperly disqualified applicants to the Home Affordable Modification Program, or HAMP, according to a May 23 statement from Simone Gordon, a loss-mitigation specialist who left the company in 2012.
“We were regularly drilled that it was our job to maximize fees for the bank by fostering and extending delay of the HAMP modification process by any means we could,” Gordon said. Managers instructed staff to “delay modifications by telling homeowners who called in that their documents were ‘under review,’ when in fact, there had been no review,” she said. The bank has denied the plantiffs’ allegations.
Beaufort County has filed a lawsuit against Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, a nationwide mortgage database that is owned by nearly two-dozen large banks and mortgage services.
County officials say the company’s records do not always accurately reflect a loan’s owner.
The company also does not consistently alert the county Register of Deeds Office when loans on properties are bought, sold or bundled into a tradable security. Instead, the record indicates only that MERS owns the note, county attorney Josh Gruber said.
“These activities have caused massive confusion and has made many of the Beaufort County Register of Deeds recording systems inaccurate and unreliable,” Gruber said in a statement.
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FOURTH DISTRICT January Term 2013
LAVERN DIXON, Appellant,
v.
EXPRESS EQUITY LENDING GROUP, LLLP, Appellee.
No. 4D12-1381 [June 5, 2013]
MAY, C.J.
A homeowner appeals a Final Judgment of Foreclosure. She argues the trial court erred in entering the final judgment because the special indorsement o n th e note refers to a non-party to the foreclosure proceedings. We agree and reverse.
The homeowner moved to dismiss the Complaint, and then before a ruling on the motion, answered asserting affirmative defenses. The case proceeded to a bench trial. At trial, the lender produced the original note. The note promised “to pay to the order of EXPRESS EQUITY LENDING GROUP, LLLP, ITS SUCCESSORS AND OR ASSIGNS AS THEIR INTERESTS MAY APPEAR.” The following language appeared on the back of the original note:
PAY TO THE ORDER OF:
U.S. Century Bank 7575 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33144
With Recourse, EXPRESS EQUITY LENDING GROUP, LLLP.
During the bench trial, the lender’s counsel elicited the following testimony from the lender’s president:
Q: Okay. Could you explain what the [i]ndorsement is; what it means on the back of the note? A: Basically, we have a mortgage warehouse agreement where we—where each note is provided as a collateral to a separate mortgage warehouse agreement that we have. Q: Okay. A: And the loan itself is Express Equity’s, but we have a separate agreement with our mortgage warehouse, that in the event that we would default in that separate warehouse agreement, then they would be able to foreclose on us, and then eventually foreclose on the real estate. The ownership is Express Equity’s. What we do is convey a security interest in that mortgage o n a separate mortgage warehouse agreement. Q: Okay. So has Express Equity maintained ownership on the subject note since its inception? A: Yes.
On redirect examination, the president offered the following testimony as to the lender’s standing to foreclose on the mortgage:
Q: Who is the owner and holder of the loan? A: Express Equity Lending Group. Q: Okay. You’re testifying to that notwithstanding the stamp pay to the order of U.S. Century Bank with recourse Express Equity Lending Group on the back of this note? A: I’m sorry, I don’t understand the question. Q: Has ownership of the note ever transferred, notwithstanding this document? A: No. As I mentioned before, we’re a mortgage lender. Under a separate mortgage warehouse lending agreement, we endorsed that mortgage, okay, or that note I should say, to pledge a security interest only, not ownership. The intent is that if we were to default on our mortgage warehouse lending agreement, then they could in turn enforce and eventually foreclose on that. However, we would have to be, in other words, we would have to be in default, like the current loan is in default, and yet they’re not here raising or defending or fighting the Plaintiff. Are they? It’s Express Equity. I brought the note. We’re the owners.
The trial court entered a Final Judgment of Foreclosure in favor of the lender. The homeowner now appeals.
The homeowner argues that the trial court erred in entering a final judgment of foreclosure because the lender did not own or hold the note.
The lender did not file an answer brief.
We have de novo review of whether a party has standing to bring an action. Westport Recovery Corp. v. Midas, 954 So. 2d 750, 752 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).
Section 673.2051(1), Florida Statutes (2009), provides, in pertinent part:
If an indorsement is made by the holder of an instrument, whether payable to an identified person or payable to bearer, and the indorsement identifies a person to whom it makes the instrument payable, it is a “special indorsement.” When specially indorsed, an instrument becomes payable to the identified person a n d ma y be negotiated only b y the indorsement of that person.
“A crucial element of any mortgage foreclosure proceeding is that the party seeking foreclosure must demonstrate that it has standing to foreclose.” McLean v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 79 So. 3d 170, 173 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). “To establish standing, the plaintiff must submit the note bearing a special [i]ndorsement in favor of the plaintiff, an assignment from payee to the plaintiff or an affidavit of ownership proving its status as holder of the note.” Rigby v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 84 So. 3d 1195, 1196 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).
Here, the lender did not have standing to foreclose. Although the lender’s president testified that the lender was the owner and holder of the note, the special indorsement appearing on the back of the original note suggests otherwise. Under section 673.2501(1) and Rigby, the special indorsement stating “pay to the order of U.S. Century Bank” established that only U.S. Century Bank had standing to bring the foreclosure action.
We therefore reverse the Final Judgment of Foreclosure and remand for further proceedings. Reversed and Remanded.
GERBER and LEVINE, JJ., concur. * * * Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Marina Garcia-Wood, Judge; L.T. Case No. 09-63645 CACE. Peter Ticktin, Josh Bleil and Kendrick Almaguer of The Ticktin Law Group, P.A., Deerfield Beach, for appellant. No appearance filed for appellee. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing
Look around, there’s probably a foreclosure in your neighborhood, and those homes can sit empty for years due to a huge backlog in Florida courts. Since 2008, when the average foreclosure took five months, the process has been known to last as long as 814 days.
This week, Gov. Rick Scott signed a bill to speed up the process, and let attorneys handle the paperwork, but Chip Parker, Managing Partner of Parker and Dufresne Law Firm calls the move unconstitutional.
“This turns the whole idea of due process on its head.”
Instead of requiring banks to prove why they should take a home, Parker says the law requires homeowners, who have little legal background, to keep their house out of the bank’s hands, and they only have a few days to do it.
CHERYL SOBH and SAM SOBH, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BANK OF AMERICA, NA, JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, TROTT & TROTT, and AMERICAN PREMIERE TITLE, Defendants-Appellees.
Before: WILDER, P.J., and STEPHENS and RONAYNE KRAUSE, JJ.
UNPUBLISHED
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal by right the trial court’s order granting summary disposition to defendants and dismissing their claims in this mortgage foreclosure action. For the reasons set forth below, we hold that defendant Bank of America lacked standing to foreclose under MCL 600.3204(3); accordingly, the foreclosure was voidable. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. BASIC FACTS
The property at issue in this case is located at 19035 Parke Lane, in Gross Isle, Michigan. In April, 2006, plaintiffs borrowed approximately $510,000 from Washington Mutual Bank (Washington Mutual), and in exchange, granted Washington Mutual a mortgage interest in the property. In 2008, Washington Mutual went into receivership, with the FDIC appointed as receiver. Chase acquired all of Washington Mutual’s assets, including plaintiffs’ mortgage, on September 25, 2008, via a voluntary Purchase and Assumption Agreement. There is no indication in the lower court record that Chase recorded its interest in plaintiffs’ mortgage after it was conveyed by Washington Mutual. In March, 2010, Chase assigned its interest in the mortgage to Bank of America.
Plaintiffs stopped making payments on their mortgage in late 2009, and in early 2011, Bank of America initiated foreclosure by advertisement proceedings. Plaintiffs filed a complaint to stop the foreclosure, alleging a variety of statutory and common law causes of action. Defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and MCR 2.116(C)(10), and the trial court granted the motion and dismissed plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs appealed.
II. ISSUE PRESERVATION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
For an issue to be preserved for appeal it must be raised, addressed, and decided by the trial court. Hines v Volkswagen of America, Inc., 265 Mich App 432, 444; 695 NW2d 84 (2005) (citations omitted). Plaintiffs’ argument on appeal is difficult to decipher, but it appears that it is based on whether plaintiffs had standing to foreclose under MCL 600.3204. Plaintiffs did not make this argument below, and therefore the trial court did not address or decide it. However, this issue is one of law for which all relevant facts are available; accordingly, we will review plaintiffs’ argument. Vushaj v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co of Michigan, 284 Mich App 513, 521; 773 NW2d 758 (2009).
A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. All well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true and construed in a light most favorable to the nonmovant. A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) may be granted only where the claims alleged are so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could possibly justify recovery. When deciding a motion brought under this section, a court considers only the pleadings.
A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint. In evaluating a motion for summary disposition brought under this subsection, a trial court considers affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties, in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Where the proffered evidence fails to establish a genuine issue regarding any material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [Id. at 119-120 (citations and quotations omitted).]
III. ANALYSIS
In Michigan, the prerequisites that a foreclosing party must satisfy in order for a foreclosure by advertisement to be valid are set forth in MCL 600.3204. Central to this case is whether defendants satisfied the requirements of MCL 600.3204(3). That statute provides:
If the party foreclosing a mortgage by advertisement is not the original mortgagee, a record chain of title shall exist prior to the date of sale . . . evidencing the assignment of the mortgage to the party foreclosing the mortgage.
A chain of title is “[t]he ownership history of a piece of land. . . .” Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed).
The Michigan Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kim v JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 493 Mich 98; 825 NW2d 329 (2012), addressed the proper application of MCL 600.3204(3). Kim, which was decided after the trial court granted summary disposition, is controlling in this case. In Kim, as here, the plaintiffs had a Washington Mutual mortgage. Id. at 103. The Kim plaintiffs’ mortgage was acquired by Chase on September 25, 2008, by a Purchase and Assumption Agreement—the exact same agreement by which Chase acquired plaintiffs’ mortgage in this case. Id. Chase never recorded its interest in the Kim plaintiffs’ mortgage, but foreclosed by advertisement nonetheless. Id. at 104. Similarly, in this case, there is no indication that once Chase acquired plaintiffs’ mortgage it recorded an assignment of its interest. None of defendants’ filings below assert that Chase recorded its interest in defendants’ mortgage once it acquired it from Washington Mutual, and defendants’ appellate brief suggests that Chase did not record its interest. Indeed, in both Kim and the instant case it appears that Chase did not record the mortgage interests it received from Washington Mutual. In fact, Kim and this case are factually identical up until the point at which, in the instant case, Chase assigned its interest in the mortgage to Bank of America, which eventually became the foreclosing entity.
In Kim, the Supreme Court held that because the Washington Mutual mortgage was acquired by Chase as part of a voluntary Purchase and Assumption Agreement, Chase did not acquire those mortgages by operation of law. Id. at 111. Further, the Court held, because Chase acquired Washington Mutual’s mortgages voluntarily, and not by operation of law, those mortgages were subject to the requirements of MCL 600.3204(3), and because Chase never recorded its interest the plaintiffs’ mortgage prior to foreclosing, the foreclosure was voidable. Id. at 113-115.
The same result is warranted here. There is no indication in the lower court record that Chase, after acquiring plaintiffs’ mortgage via the same Purchase and Assumption Agreement at issue in Kim, ever recorded its assignment before assigning the mortgage to Bank of America. Chase’s failure to comply with MCL 600.3204(3) prior to assigning its interest to Bank of America accordingly resulted in a break in the chain of title because Chase never recorded its assignment from Washington Mutual before assigning it to Bank of America. Therefore, the plain requirement of MCL 600.3204(3) was not met here because “a record chain of title” did not “exist prior to the date of sale.”
Defendants argue that MCL 3204(3)
does not require that all interim assignments be recorded . . . rather . . . all that is required is that the party foreclosing the mortgage record the assignment to it prior to the date of sale. Nowhere does the current statute require the recording of any interim assignments that may have been made between the date the initial mortgage was given and the date the last assignment was recorded prior to sale.
Defendants’ argument is meritless. First, defendants fail to cite a single source in their appellate brief to support their contention that under MCL 600.3204(3), interim assignments such as the one from Washington Mutual to Chase need not be recorded so long as the foreclosing entity recorded the assignment by which it acquired the mortgage. Second, the Kim Court squarely addressed this issue when it held that, under MCL 600.3204(3), “a mortgagee cannot validly foreclose a mortgage by advertisement before the mortgage and all assignments of that mortgage are duly recorded.” Kim493 Mich at 106 (emphasis added). Accordingly, defendants are incorrect that MCL 600.3204(3) does not require that interim assignments be recorded—it does. The trial court erred when it concluded that Bank of America received a valid assignment from Chase: Chase’s failure to comply with the statute resulted in a break in the chain of title, and consequently Bank of America did not have standing to foreclose on plaintiffs’ property under MCL 600.3204(3).
As in Kim, because defendants lacked standing to foreclose, defendants’ foreclosure is voidable, but not void ab initio. Kim, 493 Mich at 115. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand. As in Kim, on remand:
[T]o set aside the foreclosure sale, plaintiffs must show that they were prejudiced by . . . [the] failure to comply with MCL 600.3204. To demonstrate such prejudice, they must show that they would have been in a better position to preserve their interest in the property absent [the] noncompliance with the statute. [Kim, 493 Mich at 115-116.]
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. Plaintiffs, as the prevailing party, may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219(A).
5. Beginning in 2009, I regularly spoke to people who had received HAMP Trial Period Plans, made their trial payments, and who were calling to inquire about the status of their expected permanent loan modification. I also saw records showing that Bank of America employees had told people that documents had not been received when, in fact, the computer system showed that Bank of America had received the documents. This was consistent with the instructions my colleagues and I were given. We were told to lie to the customers and claim that Bank of America had not received documents it had requested, and that it had not received trial payments (when in fact it had). We were told that admitting that the Bank received documents would “open a can of worms” since the Bank was required to underwrite the loan modification within 30 days of receiving those documents, and it did not have sufficient underwriting staff to complete the underwriting in that time.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Opinion filed June 7, 2013.
Dane T. Stanish of Law Offices of Dane Stanish, P.A., Hollywood, for Appellant.
Jason F. Joseph of Gladstone Law Group, P.A., Boca Raton, for Appellee.
SILBERMAN, Chief Judge.
Narciso Vivot appeals an order denying his motion for attorney’s fees in this foreclosure action that was filed by Bank of America’s predecessor in interest and was dismissed for failure to prosecute. Because Vivot was the prevailing party in the action, we reverse the order and remand for further proceedings.
On November 28, 2005, Vivot executed a promissory note and mortgage in favor of Mackinac Savings Bank. The note and mortgage were subsequently transferred to Countrywide Bank, and Bank of America is the successor by merger to Countrywide Bank. On April 15, 2009, Countrywide filed a complaint to foreclose the mortgage and to enforce the note based on Vivot’s alleged default. Later, the trial court entered an order amending the plaintiff’s name to Bank of America.
Vivot filed an answer and affirmative defenses in which he requested an award of attorney’s fees. On October 22, 2009, Bank of America filed a motion for summary judgment of foreclosure. On June 2, 2011, Vivot filed a notice of lack of record activity and on August 10, 2011, filed a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution. On December 12, 2011, the trial court rendered a final order dismissing the case for lack of prosecution. Vivot filed a timely motion for attorney’s fees. He alleged that he was entitled to fees as the prevailing party based on the provisions of the note and mortgage and section 57.105(7), Florida Statutes (2005). After a hearing the trial court denied the motion, stating that there was no prevailing party in the case.
In this appeal, Vivot again claims attorney’s fees under the terms of the note and mortgage and section 57.105(7). When entitlement to attorney’s fees rests on the interpretation of a statute or contract, appellate review is de novo. Raza v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 100 So. 3d 121, 123 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). The mortgage provides in paragraph 22 that “Lender shall be entitled to collect all expenses incurred in pursuing the remedies provided in this Section 22, including, but not limited to, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of title evidence.” The note provides in paragraph 7(E) that the note holder has the right to be reimbursed for reasonable attorney’s fees in enforcing the note. Under section 57.105(7), if a contract provides for “attorney’s fees to a party when he or she is required to take any action to enforce the contract, the court may also allow reasonable attorney’s fees to the other party when that party prevails in any action, whether as plaintiff or defendant, with respect to the contract.” Based on the above provisions in the note and mortgage, section 57.105(7) allows Vivot an award of attorney’s fees if he is the prevailing party in this action. See Raza, 100 So. 3d at 124-25.
In Raza, the trial court involuntarily dismissed a mortgage foreclosure suit based on the bank’s failure to comply with the court’s directives. Id. at 123. This court determined that Raza “was entitled to claim fees as long as Deutsche Bank had proper notice and a statute or contract provided for such relief.” Id. at 124. This court recognized Raza as the prevailing party as the result of the involuntary dismissal. Id. In its analysis, this court discussed Stout Jewelers, Inc. v. Corson, 639 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). See Raza, 100 So. 3d at 123.
In Stout Jewelers, the trial court dismissed the landlord’s action against a tenant for failure to prosecute but denied the tenant’s motion for prevailing party attorney’s fees. 639 So. 2d at 83. This court noted that the dismissal was of the entire action, including the tenant’s counterclaim. We concluded that, under those circumstances, the tenant was the prevailing party for the purposes of an attorney’s fee award because the defendant successfully obtained an involuntarily dismissal of the case. Id. at 84; see also J.P. Morgan Mortg. Acquisition Corp. v. Golden, 98 So. 3d 220, 223 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (determining that the defendant was the prevailing party when the foreclosure action was dismissed for failure to give proper notice of intent to foreclose and that the defendant was entitled to a fee award based on the provisions of the note and mortgage even though the suit could be refiled); Norland v. Vills. at Country Creek Master Ass’n, 851 So. 2d 770, 771 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (“The appellees became the prevailing party when Norland’s claim was dismissed for failure to prosecute.”).
Here, Vivot became the prevailing party when the foreclosure suit was dismissed for failure to prosecute. He gave notice of his claim for fees in his answer and timely filed his motion for attorney’s fees. Pursuant to section 57.105(7), the provisions of the note and mortgage permit Vivot to claim attorney’s fees as the prevailing party. See Raza, 100 So. 3d at 125.
Therefore, we reverse the order denying Vivot’s motion for attorney’s fees and remand for further proceedings.
NORTHCUTT and LaROSE, JJ., Concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Complaint in the action brought by Beaufort County against MERS and a number of its member banks.
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA COUNTY OF BEAUFORT
GARY KUBIC, in his official capacity as County Administrator for Beaufort County, South Carolina, and DALE L. BUTTS, in his official capacity as Register of Deeds for Beaufort County, South Carolina,
Plaintiffs
V.
MERSCORP HOLDINGS, INC., MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., MORTGAGE NETWORK, INC., CITIMORTGAGE, INC., HSBC BANK, USA,. N.A., HSBC MORTGAGE CORPORATION (USA), HSBC MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC., SOUTH CAROLINA BANK AND TRUST, N.A., COASTAL STATES BANK, COASTAL BANKING COMPANY, INC., and TIDELANDS BANK,
Edward Snowden, the whistleblower behind the NSA internet and phone surveillance program has come to Hong Kong because, he says, we “have a spirited commitment to free speech and the right of political dissent”. Snowden sacrificed his personal safety and freedom to defend our right to free speech and Internet freedom.
We call on Hong Kong to respect international legal standards and procedures relating to the protection of Snowden; we condemn the U.S. government for violating our rights and privacy; and we call on the U.S. not to prosecute Snowden.”
Do you want to stand for freedom and the rule of law? Or should we totally disregard Hong Kong’s legal system? This episode marks a crossroads in Hong Kong’s future. Stand up for the future of Hong Kong..
Time: 3-5:30pm, Saturday June 15, 2013. Rally route: Starting 3pm at Chater Garden, Central MTR exit J2. Rally to the U.S Consulate and then Tamar SAR government building.
Rally preparation: Please bring your friends, prepare for rain and try to bring water resistant posters. Slogan suggestions: “Defend Free Speech, Protect Snowden”, “No Extradition”, “Respect Hong Kong Law”, “Shame on NSA”, “Stop Internet Surveillance”, “Betray Snowden = Betray Freedom”.
Confirmed speakers include: Albert Ho, Member of the Legislative Council, Ip lam Chong, In-Media HK; Claudia Mo, Member of the Legislative Council; Charles Mok, Member of the Legislative Council; and Law Yuk Kai, Director, Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor.
William K. Akina, Brooklyn Law School David J. Reiss, Brooklyn Law School Bradley T. Borden, Brooklyn Law School
Abstract
News outlets and foreclosure defense blogs have focused attention on the defense commonly referred to as “show me the note.” This defense seeks to forestall or prevent foreclosure by requiring the foreclosing party to produce the mortgage and the associated promissory note as proof of its right to initiate foreclosure.
The defense arose in two recent state supreme-court cases and is also being raised in lower courts throughout the country. It is not only important to individuals facing foreclosure but also for the mortgage industry and investors in mortgage-backed securities. In the aggregate, the body of law that develops as a result of the foreclosure epidemic will probably shape mortgage law for a long time to come. Courts across the country seemingly interpret the validity of the “show me the note” defense incongruously. Indeed, states appear to be divided on its application. However, an analysis of the situations in which this defense is raised provides a framework that can help consumers and the mortgage industry to better predict how individual states will rule on this issue and can help courts as they continue to grapple with this matter.
Suggested Citation
William K. Akina, David J. Reiss, and Bradley T. Borden. “Show Me The Note!” Westlaw Journal Bank & Lender Liability 19.1 (2013): 3-8. Available at: http://works.bepress.com/david_reiss/63
The American Civil Liberties Union and the New York Civil Liberties Union filed a lawsuit Tuesday against the Obama administration, challenging the constitutionality of the phone surveillance program revealed by The Guardian.
The suit alleges that the program violates the First and Fourth amendments.
The suit takes issue with the so-called metadata that a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court compelled Verizon Wireless to hand over to the National Security Agency under Section 215 of the Patriot Act.
“The practice is akin to snatching every American’s address book—with annotations detailing whom we spoke to, when we talked, for how long, and from where,” said the ACLU in the complaint. “It gives the government a comprehensive record of our associations and public movements, revealing a wealth of detail about our familial, political, professional, religious, and intimate associations.”
IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
LARRY KLAYMAN, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, 2020 Pennsylvania Ave. NW Suite 800 Washington, DC 20006
and
CHARLES AND MARY ANN STRANGE, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Plaintiffs,
v.
BARACK HUSSEIN OBAMA II, 1600 Pennsylvania Ave. NW Washington, DC 20500
and
ERIC HIMPTON HOLDER, JR., 555 Fourth St. NW Washington, DC 20530
and
KEITH B. ALEXANDER Director of the National Security Agency, 9800 Savage Rd. Fort Meade, MD 20755
and
LOWELL C. McADAM, Chief Executive Officer of Verizon Communications 140 West Street New York, NY 10007
and
Civil Action No.: 1:13-cv-00851 Judge Richard J. Leon Case 1:13-cv-00851-RJL Document 4 Filed 06/09/13 Page 1 of 24
ROGER VINSON, Judge, U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 950 Pennsylvania Ave. NW Washington, DC 20530
and
VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS, 140 West Street New York, NY 10007
and
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, Director of the National Security Agency, 9800 Savage Rd. Fort Meade, MD 20755
and
THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 950 Pennsylvania Ave. NW Washington, DC 20530 Defendants.
CLASS ACTION AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff, Larry Klayman, a former U.S. Department of Justice prosecutor, and Plaintiffs Charles and Mary Ann Strange (collectively “Plaintiffs”) bring this action on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of persons defined below. Plaintiffs hereby sue Barack Hussein Obama, Eric Holder, Keith B. Alexander, Lowell McAdam, Roger Vinson, Verizon Communications, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”), and the National Security Agency (“NSA”), (collectively “Defendants”), in their personal and official capacities, for violating Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, Plaintiffs’ reasonable expectation of privacy, free speech and association, right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures, and due process rights, as well as certain common law claims, for directly and proximately causing Plaintiffs mental and physical pain and suffering and harm as a result of the below pled illegal and criminal acts. Plaintiffs and members of the class pled below allege as follows:
INTRODUCTION
1. This is an action for violations of the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. This is also an action for violations of privacy, including intrusion upon seclusion, freedom of expression and association, due process, and other illegal acts. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated consumers, users, and U.S. citizens who are customers and users of Defendant Verizon Communications (“Verizon”).
2. This case challenges the legality of Defendants’ participation and conduct in a secret and illegal government scheme to intercept and analyze vast quantities of domestic telephonic communications. Specifically, on June 5, 2013, The Guardian posted a classified order from the secretive Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court directing Verizon to turn over, “on an ongoing daily basis,” the following tangible things: “All call detail records or “telephony metadata” created by Verizon for communications (i) between the United States and abroad; or (ii) wholly within the United States, including local telephone calls.”
3. This would give the NSA over one hundred millions phone records on a daily basis. The information would also include a list of all the people that Verizon customers call and who called them; how long they spoke; and perhaps, where they were on a given day. Further, there is nothing in the order requiring the government to destroy the records after a certain amount of time nor is there any provisions limiting who can see and hear the data.
4. The order, issued and signed by Judge Roger Vinson, violates the U.S. Constitution and also federal laws, including, but not limited to, the outrageous breach of privacy, freedom of speech, freedom of association, and the due process rights of American citizens.
5. This surveillance program was authorized and ordered by the President and primarily undertaken by the NSA and the other Defendants, intercepting and analyzing the communication of hundreds of millions of Americans. Prior to this disclosure and revelation, Plaintiffs and class members had no reasonable opportunity to discover the existence of the surveillance program or the violation of the laws alleged herein.
6. Defendant Verizon maintains domestic telecommunications facilities over which hundreds of millions of Americans’ telephone communications pass every day. They also manage some of the largest databases in the world containing records of most or all communications made through their myriad telecommunications services and operations.
7. Defendant Verizon has opened its key telecommunication databases to direct access by the NSA and/or other government agencies, intercepting and disclosing to the government the contents of its customers as well as detailed communication records over one hundred million of its customers, including Plaintiffs and class members. On information and belief, Defendant Verizon continues to assist the government in its secret surveillance of over one hundred million of ordinary Americans citizens just on a daily basis.
8. Plaintiffs and members of the class are suing for declaratory relief, damages, and injunctive relief to stop this illegal conduct and hold Defendants, individually and collectively, responsible for their illegal collaboration in the surveillance program, which has violated the law and damaged the fundamental freedoms of American citizens.
THE PARTIES
9. Plaintiff Larry Klayman is an individual and an attorney who is a subscriber and user of Verizon Wireless at all material times. In fact, on information and belief, Plaintiff Larry Klayman has been a subscriber and user of Verizon Wireless for many years. Plaintiff Larry Klayman resided in the District of Columbia (“D.C”) for over twenty years and continues to conduct business in Washington, D.C. as the Chairman and General Counsel of Freedom Watch and otherwise. Plaintiff Larry Klayman is a public advocate and has filed lawsuits against President Obama and has been highly critical of the Obama administration as a whole. On information and belief, Defendants have accessed the records pertaining to Plaintiff Larry Klayman pursuant to the Order issued by Defendant Vinson in addition to accessing his telephone conversations.
10. Plaintiffs Charles and Mary Ann Strange are the parents of Michael Strange, a member of Navy SEAL Team VI who was killed when the helicopter he was in was attacked and shot down by terrorist Taliban jihadists in Afghanistan on August 6, 2011. On information and belief, Defendants have accessed Plaintiffs Charles and Mary Ann Strange’s phone records particularly since these Plaintiffs have been vocal about their criticism of President Obama as commander-in-chief, his administration, and the U.S. military regarding the circumstances surrounding the shoot down of their son’s helicopter in Afghanistan, which resulted in the death of their son and other Navy Seal Team VI members and special operation forces. Plaintiffs Charles and Mary Ann Strange have substantial connections with Washington, D.C., as they hold press conferences in Washington, D.C. and lobby in Washington, D.C. as an advocate for their son and to obtain justice for him, as well as to change the policies and orders of President Obama and the U.S. military’s acts and practices, which contributed to their son’s death.
11. Defendant Barack Hussein Obama (“Obama”) is the President of the United States and currently resides in Washington, D.C.
12. Defendant Eric Holder (“Holder”) is the Attorney General of the United States and conducts his duties as the Attorney General in Washington, D.C.
13. The National Security Agency (“NSA”) is an intelligence agency of the U.S. Department of Defense and conduct its duties in Washington, D.C.
14. Defendant Keith B. Alexander (“Alexander”) is the Director of the National Security Agency. He is also the commander of the U.S. Cyber Command, where he is responsible for planning, coordinating, and conducting operations of computer networks. He is also at the command for U.S. National Security Information system protection responsibilities. He conducts his duties for the National Security Agency in Washington, D.C.
15. The U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) is a U.S. federal executive department responsible for the enforcement of the law and administration of justice, and its headquarters is located in Washington, D.C., where it conducts most of its activities and business.
16. Defendant Lowell C. McAdam (“McAdam”) is the Chief Executive Officer of Verizon Communications.
17. Defendant Roger Vinson (“Vinson”) is a judge to the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
18. Defendant Verizon Communications (“Verizon”) is an American broadband and telecommunications company. Defendant Verizon is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in New York. Defendant Verizon, at all material times, conducted business in Washington, D.C., including maintaining business offices in D.C., advertising in D.C., and conducting lobbying activities in D.C. Defendant is a telecommunication carrier, and offers electronic communications service(s) to the public and remote commuting service(s). Defendant Verizon is responsible, along with the other Defendants, for the illegal acts alleged herein and Defendant Verizon and the other Defendants proximately caused the injuries to Plaintiffs and class members herein alleged.
19. All of these Defendants, each and every one of them, jointly and severally, acted in concert to violate the constitutional privacy rights, free speech, freedom of association, due process and other legal rights of Plaintiffs and all other American citizens similarly situated who are members of the classes pled herein.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
20. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331 (Federal Question Jurisdiction).
21. Jurisdiction and venue are proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331, which states in pertinent part, “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” At issue here is the unconstitutional violation of Plaintiffs’ rights under the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
22. Supplemental jurisdiction is also proper under 28 U.S.C. §1367, which states in pertinent part, ” . . .in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the U.S. Constitution.
23. Plaintiffs are informed, believes and thereon alleges that, based on the places of business of the Defendants and/or on the national reach of Defendants, a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims herein alleged occurred in this district and that Defendants and/or agents of Defendants may be found in this district.
STANDING
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If the complaint does not load up I also attached it as a PDF file below. VERY UNUSUAL!
Wells Fargo has joined Bank of America on Florida Attorney General Pam Bondi’s list of possible violators of the $25 billion National Mortgage Settlement.
Last week, Bondi wrote a stern letter to Bank of America with examples of homeowner concerns and problems her own attorneys have had in trying to help borrowers who are covered by the settlement. The letter preceded a June 5 meeting with the lender.
But last month, the attorney general’s office also met with Wells Fargo representatives in Chicago to discuss “concerns about potential compliance issues surfacing in borrower complaints received by my office as well as other states.”
In a letter sent Friday to Wells Fargo, Bondi asks that the company let her office know by Wednesday when it will have a plan on how to answer those concerns.
Toni Furman was in her Lithonia home on May 7 when she heard someone breaking down her door.
“They kicked the back door in,” she said. “I was in an upstairs bedroom trying to call for help and they told me to drop everything and show my hands.”
“They” were the six DeKalb Sheriff’s deputies who evicted her from the home on Stoneleigh Hill Road where she had lived for more than 20 years.
“They ordered me to get my clothes on and to leave,” said the substitute high school science teacher. “And they started to take my things out into the street.”
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF LORAIN
WELLS FARGO BANK NA Appellee
v.
BRIAN HORN, et al. Appellants
C.A. No. 12CA010230
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO
CASE No. 10CV167220
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: June 10, 2013
CARR, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, Brian Horn, appeals the judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas. This Court reverses and remands this matter to the trial court for the complaint to be dismissed.
I.
{¶2} On November 21, 1993, Brian and Carol Horn executed a note for $49,323 in favor of Norwest Mortgage, Inc., for the property located at 9800 Root Road in Columbia Township, Ohio. The note was secured by an open-end mortgage.
{¶3} Wells Fargo filed the instant foreclosure action on April 19, 2010. The named defendants in the complaint were Brian Horn, Carol Horn, Jane Doe, the unknown spouse of Brian Horn, the Lorain County Treasurer, Huntington National Bank, and First Merit Bank. On June 2, 2010, Brian Horn, acting pro se, filed a handwritten “Response to Complaint.” On July 21, 2010, Wells Fargo filed a motion for summary judgment. On September 2, 2010, Mr. Horn filed a motion for leave to file an answer instanter in because he had retained counsel. On September 16, 2010, a magistrate granted the motion for leave, and Mr. Horn filed his formal answer to the complaint. In his answer, Mr. Horn claimed that Wells Fargo “may not be the real party in interest and lacks standing to bring said claim against Defendant.” Subsequently, on May 12, 2011, Wells Fargo filed an amended motion for summary judgment. On June 2, 2011, Mr. Horn filed a brief in opposition to the amended motion for summary judgment.
{¶4} On June 24, 2011, the magistrate issued findings of fact and conclusions of law, and determined that Wells Fargo was entitled to summary judgment on the note and mortgage. On the same day, the trial court issued a journal entry adopting the magistrate’s findings and granting summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo.
{¶5} Mr. Horn filed a notice of appeal from the June 24, 2011 journal entry. On August 11, 2011, the Court issued a journal entry dismissing the appeal on the basis that the trial court had yet to issue a judgment of foreclosure.
{¶6} On August 26, 2011, Mr. Horn filed a motion in the trial court requesting that the summary judgment order be vacated pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B). Wells Fargo filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion on April 6, 2012. On April 27, 2012, the trial court issued a journal entry denying Horn’s motion on the basis that he had not presented a meritorious defense. The trial court also granted the decree of foreclosure, setting forth the priority of the liens on the property.
{¶7} Mr. Horn filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, Mr. Horn raises four assignments of error.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOW[ING] MANIPULATED DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED AS EVIDENCE.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING WELLS FARGO BANK MADE REASONABLE EFFORTS TO ARRANGE A FACE-TO-FACE INTERVIEW (CFR 203.604).
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN WHICH JUDGMENT WAS NOT FINAL AND APPEALABLE.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV WAS BRIAN HORN’S ATTORNEY, MR. MARK DANN, ACTING IN CLIENT’S BEST INTEREST?
{¶8} Mr. Horn raises four assignments of error in which he argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo. We agree.
{¶9} “We note that [a] foreclosure requires a two[-]step process.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) Natl. City Bank. v. Skipper, 9th Dist. No. 24772, 2009-Ohio-5940, ¶ 25. “The prerequisites for a party seeking to foreclose a mortgage are execution and delivery of the note and mortgage; valid recording of the mortgage; default; and establishing an amount due.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Firestone, 9th Dist. No. 25959, 2012–Ohio–2044, ¶ 11. “Once a court has determined that a default on an obligation secured by a mortgage has occurred, it must then consider the equities of the situation in order to decide if foreclosure is appropriate.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) Skipper at ¶ 25. As the Ohio Supreme Court recently decided, before a court can consider this, the plaintiff must establish that it has standing to proceed. See Fed. Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 134 Ohio St.3d 13, 2012-Ohio-5017, ¶ 40. “It is well established that before an Ohio court can consider the merits of a legal claim, the [party] seeking relief must establish standing to sue.” State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 469 (1999), citing Ohio Contractors Assn. v. Bicking, 71 Ohio St.3d 318, 320 (1994).
{¶10} Civ. R. 17(A) states, in a pertinent part: Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute may sue in his name as such representative without joining with him the party for whose benefit the action is brought. “‘In foreclosure actions, the real party in interest is the current holder of the note and mortgage.’” U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Richards, 189 Ohio App.3d 276, 2010-Ohio-3981, ¶ 13 (9th Dist.), quoting Everhome Mtge. Co. v. Rowland, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-615, 2008-Ohio-1282, ¶ 12. Civ.R. 17(A) is not applicable “unless the plaintiff ha[s] standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court in the first place * * *.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Jordan, 8th Dist. No. 91675, 2009-Ohio-1092, ¶ 21, quoting Northland Ins. Co. v. Illuminating Co., 11th Dist. Nos. 2002-A-0058, 2002-A-0066, 2004-Ohio-1529, ¶ 17.
{¶11} The trial court decided that Wells Fargo had standing when it granted summary judgment. In Schwartzwald, however, the Supreme Court held that because standing is required to invoke the jurisdiction of the common pleas court, “standing is to be determined as of the commencement of suit.” Schwartzwald at ¶ 24, quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 570-571 (1992). A party may not later rely on the Rules of Civil Procedure to cure a lack of standing when it has failed to demonstrate that it had standing at the time the complaint was filed. Schwartzwald at ¶ 37-38. The high court concluded that “[t]he lack of standing at the commencement of a foreclosure action requires dismissal of the complaint[.]” Id. at ¶ 40.
{¶12} In this case, Wells Fargo filed its complaint on April 19, 2010. A review of the complaint does not demonstrate that it had standing at the time it filed its foreclosure complaint. In the caption, Wells Fargo identified itself as the “successor by merger to Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. fka Norwest Mortgage, Inc.” However, while Wells Fargo attached several documents to the complaint, including the note and mortgage, no documents evidencing a merger or a name change were attached. The note and mortgage each identify the Horns as the borrowers and Norwest Mortgage, Inc. as the lender.
{¶13} It follows that Wells Fargo lacked standing to bring the foreclosure action against the Horns. While Wells Fargo later tried to demonstrate that a merger and name change had occurred in the exhibits attached to its motion for summary judgment, it was required to demonstrate that it had standing to invoke the jurisdiction at the time the complaint was filed, and it failed to do so in the complaint and the documents attached thereto. Wells Fargo v. Burrows, 9th Dist. No. 26326, 2012-Ohio-5995, ¶ 15. Therefore, the trial court erred in concluding that Wells Fargo was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Pursuant to the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Schwartzwald, we are required to sustain Mr. Horn’s assignments of error, reverse summary judgment, and order the trial court to dismiss the complaint without prejudice.
III.
{¶14} Mr. Horn’s assignments of error are sustained. The judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellee.
DONNA J. CARR FOR THE COURT MOORE, P. J. WHITMORE, J. CONCUR.
APPEARANCES: BRIAN HORN, pro se, Appellant. SCOTT A. KING and NICHOLAS W. MYLES, Attorneys at Law, for Appellee
The Guardian has just published an article about and video interview with the man behind the NSA leaks. 29 year-old Edward Snowden works for the massive defense contractor Booz Allen Hamilton and is a former technical assistant to the CIA. Snowden explained to the Guardian that he realized he was risking extreme harm to himself by revealing the government’s spying programs, but that he wanted the public to know the truth about the massive surveillance state. “What they’re doing” poses “an existential threat to democracy”, he warned, and also said that the NSA “routinely lied to Congress,” which would be a crime.
Edward Snowden is a national hero and should be immediately issued a a full, free, and absolute pardon for any crimes he has committed or may have committed related to blowing the whistle on secret NSA surveillance programs.
ORDER PRELIMINARILY APPROVING SETTLEMENT, AND WITH RESPECT TO CLASS NOTICE, COURT APPROVAL HEARING AND ADMINISTRATION (granting 386 ). Signed by Judge Jeremy Fogel on 6/19/2013. (jflc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/19/2013)
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