Abstract: This article offers a critical analysis of anti-homeowner arguments that have arisen in the wake of the enactment of the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 (MFDRA), which excludes forgiven principal residence indebtedness from generating federal income tax liability. Some argue that forgiveness encourages housing speculation and overconsumption or benefits wealthy homeowners more than homeowners of moderate means, while others suggest that forgiveness is not fair to homeowners who paid such taxes prior to Congress’s exemption being enacted.
This article asserts that such criticisms, even if facially valid, are overstated and do not overcome the importance of eliminating existing homeowner incentives to file bankruptcies in order to avoid cancellation of indebtedness income tax. Furthermore, excluding cancellation of indebtedness income tax prevents disincentives to homeowners from seeking to modify their home loans. Aside from addressing scholarship regarding the temporary Congressional exclusion of principal residence indebtedness, this article also proposes an expansion of the permanent exclusions to cancellation of indebtedness taxation in the Internal Revenue Tax Code (the Code). In particular, the existing purchase-price exception to cancellation of indebtedness taxation should be expanded.
Because the purchase-price exception only applies to original lenders negotiating with original purchasers, the exemption has effectively been eliminated for a large portion of homeowners whose loans have been sold on the secondary market. This article argues that the theoretical justifications for the purchase-price exception should apply whether or not a home loan has been sold, as homeowners exercise no control over whether their loans are transferred from lender to lender. The Code already allows for subjective considerations of infirmity and impropriety at origination to equitably justify the purchase-price exception, and this article asserts that such considerations should be even more closely examined in light of the wildly inflated property values and subprime and exotic loans presented to homeowners at the height of the bubble. Therefore, even without a permanent extension of the MFDRA’s temporary exemption, expanding the purchase-price exemption would provide homeowners with incentives to renegotiate their home loans or to negotiate walkaways rather than filing for bankruptcy.
IRENE RIGALI; GREG RIGALI; IRENE RIGALI, as Guradian as litem for Meghan Rigali,
Plaintiffs,
v.
ONEWEST BANK, a Federal Savings Bank, INDYMAC MORTGAGE SERVICES, a Division of OneWest Bank; NDEx, West LLC, a Delaware Corp., U.S. Bank National Assoc., a Federally Chartered Bank, as Trustee for GSR LOAN MORTGAGE TRUST; and DOES 1 through 150, inclusive,
The gift that has no limit! Even with massive fraud, these degenerates are getting their fees paid!
CRIME PAYS!
My Palm Beach Post-
Banks are getting tens of millions of taxpayer dollars through Florida’s key foreclosure prevention program to pay down borrower debt, but are also using the money to pay off their own attorney’s fees and other costs associated with taking back people’s homes.
The more than $1 billion Hardest Hit program has been operating statewide for two years, awarding struggling borrowers 12 months of mortgage payments and between $18,000 and $24,000 to bring a mortgage current.
But some homeowners exiting the program are finding themselves still in debt and on the same path to foreclosure after their lender subtracted legal costs from the Hardest Hit stipend.
While the Hardest Hit program allows lenders to use the money to pay their attorney fees and out-of-pocket expenses, the federal law that authorized the plan forbids homeowners from doing the same.
Documentation failings: they aren’t just for bankers.
New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman is revising his allegations of foreclosure settlement violations by Wells Fargo (WFC) and Bank of America (BAC), resetting the clock on his plans to sue the banks over 339 alleged servicing violations.
Under the national mortgage settlement agreement, Schneiderman must give the other settlement parties 21 days before pursuing litigation. Schneiderman asserted during his May 6 press conference that his office was ready to bring a case, making the re-submission something of a do-over.
The cause of the revisions is unclear, as is the question of whether complaints will be resubmitted for each of the cases. A spokeswoman for the office was checking on this late Friday afternoon.
The attorney general “temporarily suspended” his complaints earlier this week, according to the office of Iowa’s Attorney General, who is on the monitoring committee for the national foreclosure settlement. Iowa declined to comment on why New York’s original grievance was retracted.
“We are sending the [mortgage settlement] monitoring committee more information which we believe will help them in their analysis of their enforcement action,” a spokeswoman for Schneiderman told American Banker. “We expect to have that to them by the middle of next week..”
This one monster should have died in the first place!
Reuters-
Here is how U.S. Senior District Judge Jed Rakoff led off his blockbuster ruling Friday in Dexia’s mortgage-backed securities case against Bear Stearns successor JPMorgan Chase: “Those who don’t believe in ghosts have never been in court, where legal claims are regularly seen rising from the grave. This is a case in point.” Is it ever! Rakoff’s resurrection and remand of Dexia’s $775 million suit merits its own chapter in the annals of zombie litigation.
You may recall that little more than a month ago, the judge issued one of his famous bottom-line orders, granting JPMorgan’s motion for summary judgment on all but five of the 65 certificates for which Dexia’s lawyers at Bernstein, Litowitz, Berger & Grossman had asserted securities fraud claims. At the time, JPMorgan’s lawyers at Cravath, Swaine & Moore publicly estimated that Dexia’s potential losses on its remaining claims were about $5.7 million, down $769 million from the Franco-Belgian bank’s original claims. In typical fashion, Rakoff said he would issue an opinion explaining his reasoning in due time. But before he did, the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the heretofore obscure Edge Act, which involves international transactions and federally chartered institutions, did not justify federal court jurisdiction in AIG’s case against Bank of America. JPMorgan had cited the Edge Act in removing Dexia’s case from New York State Supreme Court, and Rakoff had denied remand partly on Edge Act grounds. So on April 22, the judge docketed a sua sponte order directing the parties to brief whether the 2nd Circuit’s ruling in the AIG case meant that Dexia’s suit should be remanded to state court, and, if so, whether his summary judgment decision should be vacated.
Now you can understand why foreclosures saw a drop in recent weeks!
American Banker-
Wells Fargo (WFC) and Citigroup (NYSE:C) have halted the vast majority of their foreclosure sales in multiple states following the release of new guidance by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.
The abrupt slowdown came in response to the OCC’s April release of minimum standardsfor foreclosure sales, which are usually the final act in the foreclosure process. The Federal Reserve issued identical guidance to the banks it oversees, making the guidelines universal for the industry.
Within two weeks of the release of the guidance, Wells Fargo, Citi and JPMorgan Chase (JPM) all but stopped foreclosure sales, which are usually the point of no return in the foreclosure process. JPMorgan has since resumed its normal volume.
Wells Fargo & Co. (WFC), the largest U.S. home lender, halted some foreclosures until it can understand new guidelines from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, a spokeswoman said.
“We postponed certain foreclosure sales while we study the revised guidance from the OCC regarding imminent foreclosure sales,” Vickee Adams, a bank spokeswoman, said in a phone interview. “We expect it to be brief,” she said, referring to the length of the postponement. She declined to say which states were affected.
Yes! Finally, we catch up to what the consultants got paid and they made about $20K THOUSAND per file while homeowners got $300 for fraud and damages and stolen property!
WASHINGTON—More than 2.4 million checks related to the Independent Foreclosure Review have been cashed or deposited for nearly $2.2 billion through May 16, 2013.
To date, more than 3.9 million checks, totaling more than $3.4 billion, have been sent to eligible borrowers. The first wave of checks was sent April 12. A final wave of checks that required additional information from the borrower will be issued during the summer.
The payments result from agreements between the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, and 13 servicers to provide $3.6 billion in payments to borrowers whose homes were in any stage of the foreclosure process in 2009 or 2010 and whose mortgages were serviced by one of the following companies, their affiliates, or subsidiaries: Aurora, Bank of America, Citibank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JPMorgan Chase, MetLife Bank, Morgan Stanley, PNC, Sovereign, SunTrust, U.S. Bank, and Wells Fargo.
Notice to Financial Institutions Institutions processing checks are reminded that to help prevent fraud, checks require positive identification. Banks and other financial institutions should follow the instructions provided on the back of the check to validate authenticity.
Borrowers Assistance Borrowers with questions regarding payments should contact the Paying Agent—Rust Consulting, Inc. at 1-888-952-9105, Monday through Friday, 8 a.m. – 10 p.m. ET or Saturday, 8 a.m. – 5 p.m. ET.
Regulators encourage borrowers needing foreclosure prevention assistance to work directly with their servicer or contact the Homeowner’s HOPE Hotline at 888-995-HOPE (4673) (or at www.makinghomeaffordable.gov) to be put in touch with a U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development-approved nonprofit organization that can provide free assistance.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT
BARRINGTON HUMPHREY,
Appellant,
v.
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST CO.,
Appellee. ________________________________ Opinion filed May 17, 2013.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Polk County; J. Michael McCarthy, Judge.
Jeffrey Sullivan of Stidham & Stidham, P.A., Bartow, for Appellant.
Owen Sokolof and Elizabeth Tamborra of Morris Hardwick Schneider, LLC, Tampa, for Appellee.
NORTHCUTT, Judge.
Barrington Humphrey is the named defendant in a mortgage foreclosure suit filed by Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. On Humphrey’s motion, the circuit court quashed the service of process on him. In its order, the circuit court also directed Humphrey to provide his current address to the Bank. Humphrey challenges this provision on appeal. The Bank has neither appealed the quashal of service nor filed an answer brief in response to Humphrey’s appeal. We treat this case as an appeal from a nonfinal order determining jurisdiction of the person. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i). We reverse. Without proper service, the court never secured personal jurisdiction over Humphrey and, thus, had no power over him. That being so, the court had no authority to direct Humphrey to do anything. See Riddick v. Suncoast Beauty Coll., Inc., 570 So. 2d 1064, 1065-66 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (reversing injunction entered against individuals not named in suit or served); see also Springbrook Commons, Ltd. v. Brown, 761 So. 2d 1192, 1194 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (“If the court is to exercise its power over a person it must have jurisdiction over that individual. . . . In the absence of personal service or a statutorily permitted alternative, the court lacks jurisdiction to enter a personal judgment against the defendant.”). In Alger v. Peters, 88 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1956), the Florida Supreme Court explained the necessity of personal jurisdiction:
[N]o court can make a decree which will bind any one but a party; a court of equity is as much so limited as a court of law; it cannot lawfully enjoin the world at large, no matter how broadly it words its decree. If it assumes to do so, the decree is pro tanto brutum fulmen [to that extent an empty threat], and the persons enjoined are free to ignore it. It is not vested with sovereign powers to declare conduct unlawful; its jurisdiction is limited to those over whom it gets personal service . . . .
Id. at 907 (quoting Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832, 832-33 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand, J.)).
We reverse the order quashing service insofar as it directed Humphrey to furnish his address to the Bank.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT
ANDRE J. SAS,
Appellant,
v.
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION,
Appellee.
Opinion filed May 17, 2013.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Sarasota County; Charles E. Williams, Judge.
H. Daniel McKillop of McKillop Law Firm, Sarasota, for Appellant.
Kimberly N. Hopkins of Shapiro, Fishman, and Gaché, LLP, Tampa, for Appellee.
VILLANTI, Judge.
Andre Sas appeals the trial court’s final judgment of foreclosure in favor of Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae). Although Sas raises several challenges to the final judgment, we find merit in only one of his arguments. Sas argues that Fannie Mae representative Jon Greenlee’s oral testimony about the amount of the debt owed by Sas to Fannie Mae was hearsay and, therefore, legally insufficient to establish the amount of the debt because Fannie Mae never admitted into evidence any business records supporting Greenlee’s testimony. We agree with this argument. Therefore, while we affirm the final judgment of foreclosure, we reverse and remand for further proceedings to determine the amount of the debt owed.
In 2007, Sas financed the purchase of a residence by executing a promissory note and mortgage. In 2009, after Sas defaulted, Chase Home Finance, LLC, as servicing agent for Fannie Mae, filed a foreclosure action against Sas. Fannie Mae was eventually substituted as plaintiff in July 2011. At the bench trial, the only evidence of the total amount due and owed by Sas was testified to by Greenlee, a litigation specialist with Seterus, Inc. Seterus had been Fannie Mae’s mortgage loan servicer since August 1, 2010. As a litigation specialist for Seterus, Greenlee handled contested foreclosure matters and reviewed business records in preparation for trial. However, he had no personal knowledge of the amount of the debt in this case and testified about the amount based only on his review of Seterus’s business records related to the loan. Specifically, Fannie Mae asked Greenlee: “[G]oing back to review of the damages in this case, have you had an opportunity based on your business records to review the total amount due and owing in this case?” Greenlee looked at his notes and testified that the total amount due and owing was $240,756.88. Fannie Mae followed up asking, “And that $240,756.88, that particular figure, does that represent all fees and costs due and owing for this particular case based on your review of your business records?” Greenlee replied, “Yes, it does.” Fannie Mae did not produce the business records upon which Greenlee relied to testify about the debt amount, and the trial court overruled Sas’s objection to the testimony as being hearsay. Sas asked to see the personal notes that Greenlee used to refresh his recollection about the amount, but the trial court denied that request. At the end of trial, the court entered a final judgment of foreclosure in the amount of $240,756.88.
A trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Sottilaro v. Figueroa, 86 So. 3d 505, 507 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 103 So. 3d 139 (Fla. 2012). Here, the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Greenlee to testify over objection about the contents of Fannie Mae’s business records to prove the amount of the debt without having first admitted those business records. See Dreyer v. State, 46 So. 3d 613, 615 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (holding that trial court erred in allowing witness to offer hearsay testimony regarding the amount of money the defendant stole to prove the amount of restitution because the witness had no personal knowledge of the amount at issue and the testimony was based on information received from employees of the victim’s financial institution and from financial statements received from those institutions); A.S. v. State, 91 So. 3d 270, 271 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (“Because the actual estimate was not admitted into evidence, the testimony concerning its contents should have been stricken. Without this evidence, the record does not provide competent, substantial evidence demonstrating the essential element of value.”); Richardson v. State, 875 So. 2d 673, 677 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (holding that trial court erred in allowing witness with no personal knowledge to testify about the amount of money taken from a cash register based on the contents of a record that was never introduced into evidence); Thompson v. State, 705 So. 2d 1046, 1048 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (holding that business record exception to hearsay did not authorize hearsay testimony about the contents of business record reflecting the value of merchandise stolen when the business record was not admitted into evidence); Cullimore v. Barnett Bank of Jacksonville, 386 So. 2d 894, 895 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) (“The business records exception is . . . inapplicable because there were no records or reports offered into evidence; there was only testimony concerning communications made between the dispatcher and the deputy. Accordingly, we conclude that the hearsay testimony should have been excluded.”).1
Based on the foregoing, we reverse and remand for further proceedings to properly establish the amounts allegedly due and owing. See Mazine v. M&I Bank, 67 So. 3d 1129, 1131 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (remanding for further proceedings where bank failed to lay proper foundation for introduction into evidence of an affidavit of the amounts allegedly due and owing); see generally Dreyer, 46 So. 3d at 615 (remanding for new hearing to determine amount of restitution); Mitchell Bros., Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 24 So. 3d 1269, 1270 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (remanding for further proceedings to determine damages amount through nonhearsay evidence).
Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. WALLACE and BLACK, JJ., Concur.
footnote: 1Our holding makes it unnecessary to address the corollary issue of the trial court’s denial of Sas’s request to examine Greenlee’s notes. See § 90.613, Fla. Stat. (2011); Merlin v. Boca Raton Cmty. Hosp., 479 So. 2d 236, 238-39 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) (explaining that when a witness refers to documents to refresh his memory while testifying, the adverse party is entitled to inspect the documents and to cross-examine the witness about them). These notes are not included in the record on appeal and were not reviewed in camera. Since neither the notes themselves nor any findings of their contents have been presented to us, we make no comment as to whether, if Sas’s right to examine the purported evidence against him had not been denied, this could have sufficed to establish the amount legally owed.
The owners of an Aurora woman’s mortgage said they absolutely will file a foreclosure lawsuit to take her house because of claims that Colorado’s public trustee process is unconstitutional.
In a request to dismiss a federal lawsuit against them, lawyers for U.S. Bank on Thursday said they’ll pursue a foreclosure against Lisa Kay Brumfiel in Arapahoe County District Court “to remove any due process concerns” that come from a public trustee foreclosure.
U.S. District Judge William J. Martínez stopped the Arapahoe County public trustee from auctioning the house until he could hear evidence that Brumfiel’s constitutional rights were violated.
U.S. Bank is the trustee for an investment trust that owns the rights to mortgages bundled into securities that were sold in 2007 and included Brumfiel’s note.
Why not? The government ain’t doing diddly squat to prevent any abuses or fraud…so why not?
WFTV-
A man who made loan modification payments on time and early said Wells Fargo stopped taking payments and started foreclosing on his house.
Etienne Syldor said he’s worked his whole life for a home in Orlando for his wife and three children.
Syldor is an immigrant from Haiti and a bus driver at Walt Disney World. At times, he said he has worked multiple jobs to make sure he never missed a mortgage payment.
The timing couldn’t have been better for a family from north suburban Geneva when they hit the jackpot after finding some old Lotto tickets stuffed in a cookie jar.
Earlier this month, Ricardo Cerezo said his wife was cleaning the kitchen in the home they were about to lose to foreclosure. She told him to take the old Lottery tickets out of the jar and have them checked, or toss them out.
“It was either take them, get them checked, or she was going to trash them that night,” he said.
So he took the tickets to a local gas station to get them scanned. The first 8 or 9 tickets weren’t winners.
United States District Court EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS SHERMAN DIVISION
ENZO BIBOLOTTI
v.
AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE SERVICING, INC., et. al.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court are Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #53), Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Liability Only) (Dkt. #55), Defendants’ Objections to, and Motion to Strike Portions of, the Affidavit of Enzo Bibolotti (Dkt. #66), and Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Cindi Ellis (Dkt. #67).
BACKGROUND
In February 2006, Plaintiff and Jessica Bibolotti sought and obtained a mortgage loan (the “Loan”) in connection with the property located at 3668 Braeden Court, Middleburg, Florida 32068 (the “Property”) (Dkt. #53 at Ex. A-1). The borrowers executed an Adjustable Rate Note (the “Note”) in the amount of $200,000, and a Mortgage (the “Mortgage”) securing the indebtedness (Dkt. #53 at Exs. A-1 and A-2).
The original lender in connection with the Loan was Option One Mortgage Corporation (“Option One”). Id. Option One subsequently indorsed the Note in blank and transferred the Note to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as trustee for Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006-OPT 2, Asset Backed Certificates, Series 2006-OPT 2 (“Deutsche”). Deutsche became the owner of the Note on April 1, 2006, and is currently the owner of the Note indorsed in blank, and the current creditor in connection with the Loan.
In July of 2008, Option One transferred the servicing rights on the Loan to American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc. (“AHMSI”), and AHMSI began servicing the Loan. At the time the servicing was transferred to AHMSI, the Loan was current and was not in default.
On August 12, 2010, Plaintiff filed his Voluntary Chapter 7 Petition for Bankruptcy, styled In re Bibolotti, Case No. 10-42702, in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Sherman Division (the “Bankruptcy Proceeding”) (Dkt. #53 at Ex. E-2). Plaintiff contends he was current on his mortgage prior to his bankruptcy. In addition, Plaintiff vacated the Property prior to moving to Texas and prior to filing bankruptcy and did not return. Plaintiff scheduled the debt in connection with the Loan as due and owing to AHMSI, and indicated in his statement of intentions that he wished to surrender the Property (Dkt. #53 at Ex. E-2). On November 21, 2012, the Bankruptcy Court entered its Order granting Plaintiff’s discharge in the Bankruptcy Proceeding. Id. at Ex. E-5.
Following Plaintiff’s discharge, Defendants sent numerous communications to Plaintiff. On November 26, 2010, Defendant G. Moss & Associates, LLP (“Moss”) sent Plaintiff one letter containing a notice of default and acceleration, and notice of opportunity to cure in connection with the foreclosure. Id. at Ex. B-1. This is the only communication Plaintiff alleges Moss sent. On November 26, 2010, December 28, 2010, and February 14, 2011, AHMSI and Deutsche sent Plaintiff letters regarding a loan modification under the Home Affordable Modification Program (“HAMP”) or other various “loss mitigation” options. Id. at Exs. A-6, A-9, C-2. On January 19, 2011, February 14, 2011, August 17, 2011, February 15, 2012, and August 17, 2012, AHMSI and Deutsche sent Plaintiff letters regarding an interest rate adjustment with the Loan. Id. at Exs. A-9, C-1. On January 25, 2011, AHMSI and Deutsche sent Plaintiff a letter regarding insurance on the Property. Id. at Exs. A-9, C-3. In addition, on May 31, 2011, August 18, 2011, August 29, 2011, and August 30, 2011, representatives from AHMSI attempted to call or called Plaintiff.1 Id. at Ex. A-7. Finally, beginning in September 2010 and continuing through April of 2011, AHMSI reported Plaintiff’s default history in connection with the Loan.2 Defendants received notice of Plaintiff’s bankruptcy filing and participated in the bankruptcy by filing a motion for relief from stay. Plaintiff did not initiate or invite any of the post-discharge communications from Defendants. In addition, Defendants had notice that Plaintiff intended to surrender his property in bankruptcy.
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FOURTH DISTRICT January Term 2013
JEROME SAVER and BEA SAVER, Appellants,
v.
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION AS ACQUIRER OF CERTAIN ASSETS AND LIABLITIES OF WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK FROM THE FEDERAL RECEIVER, Appellee.
No. 4D12-2069 [May 15, 2013]
DAMOORGIAN, J.
Appellants, Jerome and Bea Saver, pro se, appeal the trial court’s order granting final judgment of foreclosure in favor of Appellee, JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association, as Acquirer of Certain Assets and Liabilities of Washington Mutual Bank From the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Acting as Receiver (“JP Morgan”). We reverse. The underlying cause is a foreclosure action. After being served with the foreclosure complaint, Appellants moved to dismiss the case for lack of standing. Appellants asserted in their motion that the complaint did not “allege or indicate that [JP Morgan] owns the note and mortgage which are the subjects of the [JP Morgan’s] Complaint.” JP Morgan moved for summary judgment, without establishing when it became the holder or owner of the note. On the day of the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, Appellants filed a response in which they again raised lack of standing. Nothing in the record suggests that the trial court had the benefit of the response. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of JP Morgan. Appellants moved for rehearing asserting that there were issues of material fact regarding JP Morgan’s standing to bring the cause of action. The trial court summarily denied the motion. This appeal follows.
A plaintiff seeking foreclosure in a mortgage proceeding must establish that it had standing to foreclose at the time it filed suit. McLean v. JP Morgan Chase Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 79 So. 3d 170, 173 (Fla. holder of the mortgage at the time it filed suit. Id. If the plaintiff’s name is not on the mortgage, it can establish standing by proving that the mortgage was either assigned or equitably transferred prior to the date it filed the complaint. Id. The following evidence is sufficient to establish standing in such a scenario: 1) a special endorsement on the note in favor of the plaintiff or a blank endorsement, 2) evidence of an assignment from the payee to the plaintiff, or 3) an affidavit of ownership. Id. at 174.
Here, J P Morgan’s affidavits were executed after it filed suit. Additionally, they did not state when JP Morgan became the owner of the note nor did they indicate that JP Morgan was the owner of the note before it filed suit. Thus, JP Morgan failed to submit evidence that it held the mortgage at the time it filed suit, and the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in its favor.
Reversed and Remanded.
STEVENSON and CONNER, JJ., concur. * * *
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Diana Lewis, Judge; L.T. Case No. 502010CA015885XXXXMB.
Jerome Saver, Boca Raton, pro se.
No appearance for appellee. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
So lets get this straight. LPS gets caught committing massive fraud by fabricating mortgage documents and now is allowed to continue to provide government sponsored entities services? What is wrong with this picture? Government hard at work.
Either links below will work but this is unfreakinbelievable!
HW-
Lender Processing Services unveiled its Workout Interaction Tool, an online application that transfers data from its managed services provider servicing system to and from Fannie Mae’s Servicing Management Default Underwriter platform.
The new tool allows mortgage servicers to access SMDU to provide consistent, real-time decisions on loan modifications and other solutions for homeowners with payment challenges.
Fannie Mae Tool Streamlines Foreclosure Prevention Efforts
Keosha Burns
202-752-7840
WASHINGTON, DC – Fannie Mae (FNMA/OTC) introduced Servicing Management Default Underwriter™ (SMDU™), a tool to help mortgage servicers work faster and more consistently with homeowners to prevent foreclosure. This technology, a counterpart to Fannie Mae’s widely used Desktop Underwriter® for mortgage originations, breaks new ground by evaluating a homeowner’s financial situation and determining what options are available to prevent foreclosure.
“SMDU addresses several challenges the servicing industry has faced in recent years by eliminating a manual and resource-intensive process for servicers while improving accuracy and consistency,” said Leslie Peeler, Senior Vice President of Fannie Mae’s National Servicing Organization. “So far, adoption has been voluntary and we are pleased a number of leading technology providers and servicing partners have implemented SMDU. There are several large servicers working towards adoption this year. Servicers should anticipate that adoption will be required at some point in the near future. SMDU serves the interests of homeowners, servicers and taxpayers. The bottom line is that we want servicers to prevent as many foreclosures as possible and provide excellent service.”
Apparently it never occurred to Attorney General Eric Holder that the Associated Press might be “too big to fail.” If it had, then his Justice Department probably never would have investigated it.
The AP isn’t just any news agency. It’s the largest one in the United States and one of the three largest in the world, along with Great Britain’s Reuters and Agence France-Presse. And it is, understandably enough, angry.
So are journalists who work for other outlets, along defenders of a free press and supporters of an informed citizenry. Journalists must be free of direct or implied intimidation if democracy is to work properly. Correspondents who cover this administration will often admit privately that they do feel intimidated.
“Twice as much as all previous administrations combined”
A free press sometimes makes powerful people uncomfortable, and even causes them considerable inconvenience. Actions against journalists must be very carefully weighed against democratic principle and fundamental freedoms. Instead, this White House has been as zealous as its Republican predecessors — in many ways, more so — both in its pursuit of low-level officials who leak information to reporters, and in its pursuit of reporters themselves.
A federal judge on Tuesday formally stopped the foreclosure auction of an Aurora woman’s house, leaving unanswered whether he can determine if a part of Colorado’s foreclosure laws is unconstitutional.
While U.S. District Judge William J. Martínez’s order enjoins U.S. Bank, the trustee on Lisa Kay Brumfiel’s mortgage, from seeking a public-trustee foreclosure, it doesn’t stop the bank from pursuing her house the old-fashioned way — via a lawsuit in state court.
The bank conceded to the injunction late Monday because, lawyers said in a court filing, it had already closed the foreclosure case it filed against Brumfiel with the Arapahoe County public trustee’s office more than 18 months ago. Additionally, the bank said it has requested a state judge to rescind his order to sell the house.
Lets see what they say because these criminals were their clients!
HuffPO-
Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) raised the stakes of her quest to find out why a single Wall Street bank has not been prosecuted in the aftermath of the financial crisis Tuesday, sending a letter to the heads of three federal agencies.
Warren, a member of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs asked Attorney General Eric Holder, current Securities and Exchange Commission Chairwoman Mary Jo White and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke whether they had done any cost-benefit research into prosecuting a bank versus settling with one, which is equivalent to a slap on the wrist for a profitable financial institution.
“Have you conducted any internal research or analysis on trade-offs to the public between settling an enforcement action without admission of guilt and going forward with litigation as necessary to obtain such admission and, if so, can you provide that analysis to my office?” Warren said in the letter.
A second federal lawsuit contesting the constitutionality of Colorado’s foreclosure laws has emerged.
Unlike the case of an Aurora woman who obtained an interim federal injunction against the foreclosure auction of her house, the other involves a federal judge who decided a Denver man’s 14th Amendment guarantee of due process was in question.
U.S. District Judge Philip Brimmer last week dismissed the entirety of John Mbaku’s complaint against Bank of America that challenged the bank’s right to foreclose on his condominium. Brimmer determined there was a constitutional issue, though Mbaku didn’t bring it up specifically.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Philip A. Brimmer Civil Action No. 12-cv-00190-PAB-KLM
JOHN M. MBAKU, LUVIBIDILA JOLIE LUMUENEMO, Plaintiffs,
v.
BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as successor by merger to BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP f/k/a Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP, Defendant.
__________________________
ORDER CERTIFYING MATTER TO THE COLORADO ATTORNEY GENERAL __________________________
In the Court’s February 1, 2013 Order [Docket No. 26], the Court declined to dismiss the claim advanced by plaintiffs John M. Mbaku and Luvibidila Jolie Lumuenemo that Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 120 violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 Docket No. 26 at 18-19; see also Docket No. 1 at 2-3, ¶¶ 4-6.
Section 2403(b) of Title 28 of the United States Code provides that:
In any action, suit, or proceeding in a court of the United States to which a State or any agency, officer, or employee thereof is not a party, wherein the constitutionality of any statute of that State affecting the public interest is drawn in question, the court shall certify such fact to the attorney general of the State, and shall permit the State to intervene for presentation of evidence, . . . and for argument on the question of constitutionality.
The local rules of the District of Colorado explicitly incorporate this provision, requiring that “[o]n receipt of a notice of unconstitutionality, the court shall comply with the certification provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2403.” D.C.Colo.LCivR 24.1C.
Rule 120 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth a procedure by which a party may initiate foreclosure proceedings. Colo. R. Civ. P. 120. Given that Rule 120 involves adjudication of property rights, it affects “the public interest” and plaintiffs’ challenge has “drawn in question” its constitutionality. See 28 U.S.C. § 2403(b). Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that plaintiffs’ challenge to the constitutionality of Rule 120 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure is certified to the Colorado Attorney General. It is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of this Court shall forward a copy of this Order, the complaint [Docket No. 1], and the February 1, 2013 Order [Docket No. 26], certified under seal, to the Colorado Attorney General.
DATED May 9, 2013. BY THE COURT: s/Philip A. Brimmer PHILIP A. BRIMMER United States District Judge
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