Title: To require a full audit of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal reserve banks by the Comptroller General of the United States before the end of 2012, and for other purposes.
Sponsor: Rep Paul, Ron [TX-14] (introduced 1/26/2011) Cosponsors: (271)) Latest Major Action: 2/8/2011 Referred to House subcommittee. Status: Referred to the Subcommittee on Government Organization, Efficiency, and Financial Management .
Tom Axon’s mortgage-collection firm gets about 25 calls a day from delinquent homeowners’ brokers seeking approval to sell their houses for a loss and avoid foreclosure. We’ll help, his staff tells them, as long as we get paid enough.
Axon, working with co-investors, buys distressed U.S. home- equity loans and other junior real estate liens, often for pennies on the dollar. Investors like Axon have to be dealt with whenever a home is sold in a short sale, a transaction in which the lenders agree to accept less than what’s owed on the property.
“The short-sale brokers know us — they know we’re not cupcakes,” Axon, 60, chairman of Jersey City, New Jersey-based mortgage-servicer Franklin Credit Management Corp., said in an interview. “At the end of the day, my friend, you signed a contract. You owe money and we’re willing to reach an accommodation that is commensurate with your ability to pay.”
Tough bargaining by second-lien holders is delaying deals and killing some short sales, even as …
National Security Agency whistle blowers Thomas Drake, former senior official; Kirk Wiebe, former senior analyst; and William Binney, former technical director, return to “Viewpoint” to talk about their allegations that the NSA has conducted illegal domestic surveillance. All three men are providing evidence in a lawsuit by the Electronic Frontier Foundation against the NSA.
On Wall Street, there’s a benefit to developing into something big and complex.
America’s seven biggest banks now have more than 14,500 subsidiaries around the world, according to a new report by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (h/t Bloomberg). They have hatched more than 10,000 of these subsidiaries since 1991, largely in an aim to skirt regulations and taxes, according to the report.
By stashing assets in foreign subsidiaries, banks can avoid U.S. taxes since the assets are subject to taxes in the country in which they are held. In addition, if the subsidiaries are in tax havens, the companies can pay taxes at a super low rate or, in some cases, not at all.
The boost in foreign subsidiaries is part of a larger trend of wealthy people and corporations finding creative ways to avoid paying taxes. Thirty of America’s most profitable companies didn’t pay anything in income taxes from 2008 to 2010, according to a November report from the Citizens for Tax Justice. In addition, wealthy people and their families hold between $21 and $32 trillion, or between 30 and 46 percent of global GDP, in offshore tax havens, according to a new report by former McKinsey chief economist James Henry on behalf of the Tax Justice Network.
As the Global Financial Crisis rumbles along in its fifth year, we read the latest revelations of bankster fraud, the LIBOR scandal. This follows the muni bond fixing scam detailed a couple of weeks ago, as well as the J.P. Morgan trading fiasco and the Corzine-MF Global collapse and any number of other scandals in recent months. In every case it was traders run amuck, fixing “markets” to make an easy buck at someone’s expense. In times like these, I always recall Robert Sherrill’s 1990 statement about the S&L crisis that “thievery is what unregulated capitalism is all about.”
After 1990 we removed what was left of financial regulations following the flurry of deregulation of the early 1980s that had freed the thrifts so that they could self-destruct. And we are shocked, SHOCKED!, that thieves took over the financial system.
Nay, they took over the whole economy and the political system lock, stock, and barrel. They didn’t just blow up finance, they oversaw the swiftest transfer of wealth to the very top the world has ever seen. They screwed workers out of their jobs, they screwed homeowners out of their houses, they screwed retirees out of their pensions, and they screwed municipalities out of their revenues and assets.
Could this have the potential to overturn thousands of Illinois foreclosures?
Note: They are not listed as Designated/Retained Law Firms for eitherFannie MaeorFreddie Mac.
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS COUNTY DEPARTMENT – CHANCERY DIVISION
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS Plaintiff,
v.
KLUEVER & PLATT LLC Defendant,
EXCERPT:
7. As described below, Defendant has engaged in acts or practices that violate Illinois Law. Defendant’s conducts on going and impacts many Illinois consumers Therefore any examples provided of specific consumer experiences are simply illustrations and should not be construed as the only instance in which Illinois consumers were harmed or could potentially be harmed by Defendant.
8. Since at least July 25,2001, and continuing to date, KLUEVER has provided debt collection services.
9. KLUEVER has filed at least 3 ,700 lawsuits in cook county and other counties since July 25, 2001 to collect on debt and/or property for others.
10. KLUEVER is not now and has never been licensed as a debt collection agency.
11. KLUEVER is not exempt because it is not a licensed attorney at law (see Exhibit “A”).
12. Filing a lawsuit to collect a debt is an “exercise [of] the right to collect”‘ (225 rLCS4 25/4). Illinois courts have repeatedly held both in cases arising under the ICAA and otherwise, that litigation is a form of debt collection. Business Serv. Bureau v . Webster2, 98 Il1. App.3 d 257( Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 19 98); Petrick v . Kaminski6, 8 Ill. App.3 d 649( ilI. App.C t. 1sr Dist.1 979)Similarly federal courts applying the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15U .S.C.$ 1692e t seq. (‘FDCPA’) hold that litigation is a form of debt collection Heintz v . Jenkins,5r4 U.S.2 91( U.S.1 995)( “litigating..seems simply one way of collecting a debt,); FTC v Check Investors In c.,5 02F .3di 59 (3rdC ir.2007); Farbevr v NP Funding Ii, LP,C V-96-4322(C PS),I 997U .S.D ist.L EXrS2 124s,*S (E.D,N .y., Dec.9 . 1997)( “litigation is one form of debt collection”). LVNV Funding, L LC v. Trice, 952N .E.2d1 232,1 237( Ill. App.C t. 1stDist.2 011)( if LVNV had not registered before it filed the complaint against Trice, it committed the crime of engaging in debt collection”).
13. KLUEVER, by filing lawsuits to collect debt, is acting as a “collection agency, ‘as defined in Section2 of the ICAA (225I LCS4 25/2\.
Before MARCUS and BLACK, Circuit Judges, and HODGES,[*] District Judge.
DO NOT PUBLISH
PER CURIAM.
Angela and Paul Birster ceased making home mortgage payments on or around June 1, 2008. The Birsters allege American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc. (AHMSI), who began servicing their loan on July 30, 2008, subsequently engaged in a relentless assault of harassing phone calls and home inspections in an attempt to collect the mortgage debt, in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. The district court granted summary judgment to AHMSI after concluding the Birsters’ allegations related solely to efforts by AHMSI to enforce a security interest, rather than to collect a debt. And, although 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6) of the FDCPA was available to the Birsters, the district court concluded the Birsters failed to assert a claim for a violation of that section. We conclude this case is controlled by Reese v. Ellis, Painter, Ratterree & Adams, LLP, 678 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2012), which was issued after the district court’s entry of summary judgment. In light of Reese, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
The Birsters own a home in Jupiter, Florida. They refinanced the home on April 19, 2006, through “Option One” to get money for hurricane repairs. The Birsters subsequently entered into a loan modification agreement with Option One on two separate occasions, but ceased making mortgage payments on or around June 1, 2008. The promissory note and mortgage provide that any missed payment by the Birsters places the loan into a default status.
On July 30, 2008, AHMSI began servicing the loan. Two months later, on September 30, 2008, AHMSI sent the Birsters a letter stating that the promissory note was “presently in default due to the non-payment of the [August 1, 2008, payment] and the subsequent payments.” The letter advised the Birsters that AHMSI would proceed with foreclosure unless the Birsters cured the default by paying $7,761.14 within 30 days. AHMSI’s letter also contained the following disclosure:
THIS IS AN ATTEMPT TO COLLECT A DEBT AND ANY INFORMATION OBTAINED WILL BE USED FOR THAT PURPOSE. THIS DOES NOT IMPLY THAT [AHMSI] IS ATTEMPTING TO COLLECT MONEY FROM ANYONE WHOSE DEBT HAS BEEN DISCHARGED UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES.
On February 2, 2009, U.S. Bank, N.A., as the trustee for the lienholder, initiated foreclosure proceedings against the Birsters. AHMSI was not a party to the foreclosure. After being served with the complaint and summons in the foreclosure proceeding, the Birsters retained an attorney to represent them.
The Birsters allege AHMSI began its relentless assault on them in 2008. According to the Birsters, AHMSI called them multiple times on a daily basis to collect the past due amounts. The Birsters allege that most of these calls occurred after AHMSI knew that Angela suffered from an inoperable glioma (brain tumor) that cannot be diagnosed as cancerous or non-cancerous. As early as April 16, 2009, the Birsters informed AHMSI that they were represented by an attorney, and provided AHMSI with the attorney’s name and phone number. The Birsters advised AHMSI to contact their attorney and to cease contacting them directly.
AHMSI nevertheless continued its direct communications with the Birsters. Angela repeatedly provided AHMSI with the name and contact information for her attorney; regardless, AHMSI refused to stop directly contacting the Birsters. During these calls, the Birsters claim AHMSI used offensive and abusive language towards Angela, and made false representations that the Birsters’ home was scheduled for a foreclosure sale. Angela alleges that after a particularly abusive call on May 5, 2009, she collapsed in her front yard and was rushed to a nearby hospital.
Once the calls ceased, the Birsters claim AHMSI then began intimidating and harassing them at their home. AHMSI sent agents to “inspect” the property, despite knowing the Birsters resided there. Although AHMSI was initially inspecting the property on a monthly basis, AHMSI soon began visiting the Birsters’ home every day or every other day. AHMSI’s home inspections even occurred on Thanksgiving and Christmas days.
The Birsters allege AHMSI’s actions caused Angela to suffer “a deep depression and anxiety, resulting in her attempted suicide on August 17, 2009.” On March 23, 2011, Angela was treated again for suicidal tendencies, resulting in a five-day hospital stay. The Birsters moved to Arizona shortly thereafter, although their adult children continued to live in and maintain the Florida home.
On May 4, 2010, the Birsters filed a complaint in Florida circuit court. AHMSI removed the case to federal court on June 21, 2010. The district court granted in part, and denied in part, AHMSI’s motion for summary judgment on July 7, 2011, and entered final judgment.
Section 1692a of the FDCPA defines “debt collector” as the following:
The term “debt collector” means any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another. . . . For the purpose of section 1692f(6) of this title, such term also includes any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the enforcement of security interests. . . .
15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). The substantive provisions of the FDCPA that follow § 1692a prohibit “debt collectors” from taking certain actions. Therefore, whether an individual or entity is a “debt collector” is determinative of liability under the FDCPA.
The district court, relying on our unpublished opinion in Warren v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 342 F. App’x 458 (11th Cir. 2009), rejected the Birsters’ contention that AHMSI’s actions were taken solely for the purpose of collecting a debt. Even accepting the Birsters’ allegations as true, the district court noted such allegations related to the foreclosure action. Thus, the district court concluded the conduct alleged by the Birsters related to enforcement of a security interest, rendering the FDCPA inapplicable with the exception of § 1692f(6). With regard to § 1692f(6), the district court concluded there was no information “that would indicate any basis for such a claim.” Because all that remained after granting summary judgment to AHMSI on the FDCPA claim were state law claims, the district court remanded the rest of the suit to Florida state court.
Following the district court’s grant of summary judgment, a panel of this Court issued a published opinion in Reese v. Ellis, Painter, Ratterree & Adams, LLP, 678 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2012). Based on the reasoning of Reese, it is apparent an entity that regularly attempts to collect debts can be a “debt collector” beyond § 1692f(6) of the FDCPA, even when that entity is also enforcing a security interest. In that case, the Reeses defaulted on a loan they had secured by giving the lender a mortgage on their property. Slip. Op. at 2. A law firm representing the lender sent the Reeses a letter and documents demanding payment and threatening to foreclose on the property if the debt was not paid. Id. at 3. The Reeses filed a lawsuit alleging the communication violated the FDCPA, specifically § 1692e, which prohibits a “debt collector” from using “false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” Id. at 5; 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim after finding the law firm was not a “debt collector” under § 1692a(6), and the letter and documents did not amount to a debt collection activity, but instead were an attempt to enforce a client’s security interest.
This Court reversed and remanded to the district court after concluding that “[t]he fact that the letter and documents relate to the enforcement of a security interest does not prevent them from also relating to the collection of a debt within the meaning of § 1692e.” Id. at 11. We began by noting that the FDCPA’s definition of “debt” in § 1692a(5) clearly encompassed the Reeses’ payment obligations under the promissory note at issue. Id. at 8-9. Relying on the language in the letter demanding payment and referencing debt collection, we then reasoned that the law firm’s attempt to collect the money owed on the promissory note was “the collection of [a] debt” within the meaning of § 1692e. Id. at 9-10. Pertinent to this appeal, we stated:
Even if the . . . law firm intended the letter and documents to give the Reeses notice of the foreclosure, they also could have—and did—demand payment on the underlying debt. . . . A communication related to debt collection does not become unrelated to debt collection simply because it also relates to the enforcement of a security interest. A debt is still a “debt” even if it is secured.
Id. at 11-12.
The Reese opinion notes the rule that the law firm asked us to adopt—the same rule AHMSI is asking us to adopt here—”would exempt from the provisions of § 1692e any communication that attempts to enforce a security interest regardless of whether it also attempts to collect the underlying debt.” Id. at 11. We noted that proposed rule would create a big loophole in the FDCPA: “The practical result would be that the [FDCPA] would apply only to efforts to collect unsecured debts.” Id. at 12.
Although Reese dealt with the applicability of § 1692e, the practical effect of the case is to overrule the reasoning relied on by the district court, since Reese allowed the enforcer of a security interest to be held liable under the FDCPA beyond § 1692f(6). Reese provides that an entity can both enforce a security interest and collect a debt, and constitutes binding precedent on this point. Id. at 11.
Here, the Birsters’ allegations support a conclusion that AHMSI engaged in debt collection activity, as AHMSI was both attempting to enforce a security interest and collect a debt. The September 30, 2008, letter advised the Birsters that AHMSI would foreclose on their home unless they cured the default by paying $7,761.14 within 30 days. The letter also included a disclosure stating “THIS IS AN ATTEMPT TO COLLECT A DEBT AND ANY INFORMATION OBTAINED WILL BE USED FOR THAT PURPOSE.” Under the reasoning of Reese, AHMSI may be liable under the FDCPA beyond § 1692f(6) even though it was also enforcing a security interest. Thus, we reverse the district court’s order concluding otherwise, and remand to the district court for further proceedings in light of Reese.
We note that although Reese resolves the question of whether FDCPA liability may exist for an enforcer of a security interest, and thus whether AHMSI was engaging in a debt collection activity, the Birsters must still show that AHMSI is a “debt collector” under § 1692a(6). The statutory text clearly states that, to qualify as a “debt collector,” the “principal purpose” of “any business” must be “the collection of any debts” or that the business must “regularly collect[] or attempt[] to collect . . . debts.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). The record before us is devoid of pertinent evidence supporting or disputing whether AHMSI is a “debt collector” under this definition. Neither party has offered any evidence on this issue, and AHMSI has not argued that it is an undisputed fact.[1] It is impossible for us to tell whether AHMSI falls within the general definition of “debt collector,” and the district court will have to make this assessment on remand.[2] Finally, we note that on remand, the district court should reassess whether the Birsters met their pleading burden with regard to a § 1692f(6) violation.
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[*] Honorable Wm. Terrell Hodges, United States District Judge for the Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.
[1] Contrary to the Birsters’ assertions, AHMSI did not waive its right to argue that it is not a “debt collector” in the September 30, 2008, letter.
[2] AHMSI also argues it is not a debt collector because it became the loan servicer on July 30, 2008, and the Birsters were not placed in default status until September 30, 2008, the date of the default letter. The Birsters counter that (1) the terms of “the promissory note and mortgage provide that any missed payment by the B[irsters] places their loan into a default status,” and “[t]he foreclosure complaint alleges that the B[irsters] defaulted on June 1, 2008 by failing to make a payment when due.” The district court has not addressed this issue in the first instance, and will have an opportunity to do so on remand.
In the year since I stepped down as the special inspector general of the Troubled Asset Relief Program, the sadly predictable consequences of the government’s disparate treatment of Wall Street and Main Street have only become worse. As the banks amass size and power, Main Street continues to get pummeled.
Part of the current economic malaise can be traced directly to Treasury’s betrayal of its promise to use TARP to “preserve homeownership.” The Home Affordable Modification Program has brought little meaningful improvement, with fewer than 800,000 ongoing permanent modifications as of March 31, 2012, a number that is growing at the glacial pace of just 12,000 per month.
In June 2011, Treasury appeared to take a tentative step toward holding the mortgage servicers accountable for the widespread misconduct in the program by pledging to withhold the incentive payments to three of the largest banks —…
So why not investigate these individuals, I’m sure names go with these trillion dollar figures!
Investigate!
Reuters-
Rich individuals and their families have as much as $32 trillion of hidden financial assets in offshore tax havens, representing up to $280 billion in lost income tax revenues, according to research published on Sunday. The study estimating the extent of global private financial wealth held in offshore accounts – excluding non-financial assets such as real estate, gold, yachts and racehorses – puts the sum at between $21 and $32 trillion.
Let me make this perfectly clear, The President is the “CEO” of the U.S. and he has the power to make anything happen (as he has proven with the constitution). He has failed and so will the next president. They have turned their backs in just about everything that would help Main Street and they have chosen Wall Street every single time.
HuffPO-
The ranks of America’s poor are on track to climb to levels unseen in nearly half a century, erasing gains from the war on poverty in the 1960s amid a weak economy and fraying government safety net.
Census figures for 2011 will be released this fall in the critical weeks ahead of the November elections.
The Associated Press surveyed more than a dozen economists, think tanks and academics, both nonpartisan and those with known liberal or conservative leanings, and found a broad consensus: The official poverty rate will rise from 15.1 percent in 2010, climbing as high as 15.7 percent. Several predicted a more modest gain, but even a 0.1 percentage point increase would put poverty at the highest since 1965.
Poverty is spreading at record levels across many groups, from underemployed workers and suburban families to the poorest poor. More discouraged workers are giving up on the job market, leaving them vulnerable as unemployment aid begins to run out. Suburbs are seeing increases in poverty, including in such political battlegrounds as Colorado, Florida and Nevada, where voters are coping with a new norm of living hand to mouth.
Here we are 3 years later and not a single thing has changed. Until you cut your ties off these who control you, only will you continue to be their puppets.
IT might seem remarkable that there’s more to say about our late Bailout Age. But there is more — a lot more.
Nearly four years after Washington began its huge rescues of banks with taxpayer dollars, an important player in this, one of the great financial dramas of all time, is offering a damning account of how the Bush and Obama administrations handled the whole episode.
He is Neil Barofsky. Remember him — the man whose job it was to police the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program? And his new account, a book titled “Bailout” (Free Press), to be published on Tuesday, is a must-read.
Is it my imagination, or does every week bring news of another financial scandal? No, it’s not my imagination.
First up: Peregrine Financial Group. This long-running fraud, which has apparently been going on almost as long as the Bernard Madoff Ponzi scheme, came to light when the firm’s founder and longtime chief executive, Russell Wasendorf Sr., tried to commit suicide a few weeks ago. (He failed.) Helpfully, he left a lengthy note that laid out what he had done. Peregrine, you see, is a commodities broker, and Wasendorf had been stealing the money that customers had on deposit with the firm. As you’ll no doubt recall from the very similar MF Global scandal, where $1.6 billion in supposedly segregated customer funds went missing as the firm careened toward bankruptcy, this is supposed to be the sin of sins for a commodities brokerage. Sinful it may be, but not all that difficult, it would appear.
Pixar Animation Studios averages making more money per film than any other film studio. Perhaps the reason is people recognize and are attracted to powerful truths slightly veiled in allegories; as in this six-minute video.
A Bug’s Life (1998) is about two societies: one numerous slave society of ants and a small psychopath-led parasitic society of grasshoppers.
As an early propagator of the allegation that JP Morgan Chase deliberately hastened the Lehman collapse, the Slog finds itself vindicated three years on by a successful regulator action against JPM, and contemporary documentation.
Around the time of the Lehman disaster, a senior insider at the firm relayed to me what seemed an astonishing allegation: that in the weeks prior to the eventual collapse, JP Morgan deliberately withheld huge monies owed to Lehman in order to make the bankruptcy a certainty from which they could benefit. I relayed this story to another contact the following year, and he not only corroborated the charge, he also said he was sure Barclays had done the same. The now disgraced Barclays CEO Bob Diamond took over Lehman in a fire sale only weeks later (using taxpayers’ money as a bridging loan to do it) and rapidly built up a commanding position for the division he then headed up, Barcap – the investment arm of the bank.
In case you haven’t read this from Gretchen Mortgenson please do and see if this adds up. But here is a glimpse of the story from 8/2010:
Outwardly, Fannie and Freddie wrapped themselves in the American flag and the dream of homeownership. But internally, they were relentless in their pursuit of profits from partners in the mortgage boom. One of their biggest and most steadfast collaborators was Countrywide, the subprime lending machine run by Angelo R. Mozilo.
Countrywide was the biggest supplier of loans to Fannie during the mania; in 2004, it sold 26 percent of the loans Fannie bought. Three years later, it was selling 28 percent. What Countrywide got out of the relationship was clear — a buyer for its dubious loans. Now the taxpayer is on the hook for those losses.
But what was in it for Fannie?
An internal Fannie document from 2004 obtained by The New York Times sheds light on this question. A “Customer Engagement Plan” for Countrywide, it shows how assiduously Fannie pursued Mr. Mozilo and 14 of his lieutenants to make sure the company continued to shovel loans its way.
* Banks under increasing pressure to buy back bad loans * Banks say Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae getting more aggressive * Bank of America faces biggest possible losses
Lenders like Bank of America Corp and Wells Fargo & Co say they are facing mounting pressure to buy back bad mortgages they sold to investors, signaling that banks’ home-loan headaches could continue for years.
Investors like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been pressing banks to buy back bad mortgages for years, but in recent months those requests have intensified, the banks have said in recent second-quarter earnings reports.
These comments from banks provide a fresh reminder of the loose ends that remain from the housing bust that started five years ago. The threat of new expenses and litigation is dampening bank share prices, and the problem could linger for some time, analysts and experts said.
There’s been so much corruption on Wall Street in recent years, and the federal government has appeared to be so deeply complicit in many of the problems, that many people have experienced something very like despair over the question of what to do about it all.
But there’s something brewing that looks like it might be a blueprint to effectively take on Wall Street: a plan to allow local governments to take on the problem of neighborhoods blighted by toxic home loans and foreclosures through the use of eminent domain.
Under the proposal, towns would essentially be seizing and condemning the man-made mess resulting from the housing bubble. Cooked up by a small group of businessmen and ex-venture capitalists, the audacious idea falls under the category of “That’s so crazy, it just might work!” One of the plan’s originators described it to me as a “four-bank pool shot.”
Call it a case of man bites dog. Since the start of the housing crash, millions of Americans have lost their homes to foreclosure. Many of them lived in homeowner or condo associations.
These are organizations that collect monthly dues to pay for amenities, like added security, maintenance and recreational areas; one in five Americans currently lives in an association-governed community.
These associations have been hit hard by the housing crisis, as many delinquent borrowers stopped paying their monthly HOA dues. In some cases, HOA’s, which do have the authority in many states, managed to foreclose on properties even before the banks, by using the back dues as liens.
Now the homeowner associations are taking it one step further. They are going after the banks, claiming that several of the largest lenders are not paying monthly HOA/condo fees on homes they’ve repossessed and now hold as bank-owned properties (Real Estate Owned, or commonly called REO’s).
I’m already waiting for the next Fraud that comes out of these [RICO] Organizations!
Mark my words…a regulator is going to get dragged into one of these fraudulent scandals.
Bloomberg-
Wall Street, grappling with mounting regulatory probes and investor claims over alleged interest-rate manipulation, may face yet another formidable foe: Itself.
Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS) and Morgan Stanley (MS) are among financial firms that may bring lawsuits against their biggest rivals as regulators on three continents examine whether other banks manipulated the London interbank offered rate, known as Libor, said Bradley Hintz, an analyst with Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. Even if Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley forgo claims on their own behalf, they oversee money-market funds that may be required to pursue restitution for injured clients, he said.
Because Libor is based on submissions from only some of the world’s largest banks, the probes threaten to pit firms uninvolved in setting the rate against any implicated in its manipulation, Hintz said. Libor serves as a benchmark for at least $360 trillion in securities.
“This will be a feeding frenzy of sharks,” said Hintz, who has served as treasurer of Morgan Stanley and chief financial officer of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. “We’re going to have Wall Street suing Wall Street.”
Executive Summary This is the first study to measure the progression of the mortgage crisis and its effecton people age 50 and older. Based on an analysis of nationwide loan-level data providedby CoreLogic for the years 2007 through 2011, this study examines loan performancebased on borrower age, loan type, and borrower demographics. The study shows that noage group, race, or ethnicity has been spared from the effects of declining home valuesand the financial difficulties caused by the Great Recession and continuing economicweakness.
Despite the perception that older Americans are more housing secure than younger people, millions of older Americans are carrying more mortgage debt than ever before, and more than three million are at risk of losing their homes. Although the serious delinquency rate of the under-50 population is higher than that of the over-50 population, the increase in the rate of serious delinquency of older Americans has outpaced that of younger homeowners from 2007 to 2011. 1 As the mortgage crisis continues, millions of older Americans are struggling to maintain their financial security.
As of December 2011, approximately 3.5 million loans of people age 50+ were underwater—meaning homeowners owe more than their home is worth, so they have no equity; 600,000 loans of people age 50+ were in foreclosure, and another 625,000 loans were 90 or more days delinquent. From 2007 to 2011, more than 1.5 million older Americans lost their homes as a result of the mortgage crisis.
To date, public policy programs designed to stem the progression of the foreclosure crisis have been inadequate, and programs that focus on the needs of older Americans are needed.
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