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Ohio Supreme Court Oral Arguments: Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Duane Schwartzwald et al.

Ohio Supreme Court Oral Arguments: Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Duane Schwartzwald et al.


How can you commence an action if you don’t have the proof you’re entitled to to enforce the action in the first place?

Must Lender Have Current Ownership Interest in Promissory Note or Mortgage at the Time Foreclosure Action Is Filed?

Or May Lack of Standing Be ‘Cured’ Through Mortgage Assignment Before Judgment?

Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Duane Schwartzwald et al., Case nos. 2011-1201 and 2011-1362
Second District Court of Appeals (Greene County)

ISSUE: If a party files a lawsuit to foreclose on a mortgage and it is later shown that party did not have a current ownership interest in the mortgage or the underlying promissory note on the date the foreclosure action was filed, is the court required to dismiss the suit based on the plaintiff’s lack of standing to bring it? Or may the plaintiff “cure” a defect in standing or in naming the actual party in interest under Civil Rule 17(A) by obtaining an assignment of the mortgage prior to the court’s entry of a judgment in the case?

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The Bankers’ Subversion of the Rule of Law, Notary and Land Records edition

The Bankers’ Subversion of the Rule of Law, Notary and Land Records edition


Abigail C. Filed-

Hi

For the next couple of weeks, I’m one of the David Dayen subs at FireDogLake–no one person could fill his shoes–and this post ran there earlier today. This version is slightly updated but essentially the same.

One way to see the double standard at the heart of the foreclosure fraud—one set of laws for the bailed out banks, one for the rest of us—is to focus on the role of notaries public, and then consider that role in light of what our Supreme Court said about notaries in 1984, in a case called Bernal v. Fainter, Secretary of State of Texas.

First, let’s recap the role of notaries in the foreclosure fraud crisis: Notaries are the people who verify that someone actually is who they say they are when that person signs a document. Because banks and their agents industrialized “Document Execution” as part of their foreclosure business model, notaries did not do their jobs. Notaries’ failure to verify identities has been so complete that many people will sign as one person, say, “Linda Green.” Notaries have also been told to sign documents using one name, and then notarize their own “surrogate” signature. “Well, what’s the big deal?” bank defenders say. Beyond the fact that there’s no “business convenience” exception to following the rule of law, consider Bernal.

Bernal involved Texas’s requirement that all notaries be citizens; lawful permanent resident aliens need not apply. Bernal challenged the Constitutionality for the citizenship requirement. To rule on the question, the Court had to consider what notaries did, and whether or not what notaries did was so political, so central to representative democracy, that limiting being a notary to citizens was rational. In finding that notaries were important but not political officers of the state, the Court made some observations of note.

[REALITY CHECK]

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BofA, U.S. Bancorp sued for role as WaMu bond trustee

BofA, U.S. Bancorp sued for role as WaMu bond trustee


Another day, another new suit against securities.

REUTERS-

Bank of America Corp (BAC.N) and U.S. Bancorp (USB.N) have been sued by a Chicago pension fund that said they failed to protect investors in their roles as trustees for mortgage-backed securities for Washington Mutual Inc.

Wednesday’s complaint was filed eight days after U.S. District Judge William Pauley in Manhattan let four pension funds pursue similar claims against Bank of New York Mellon Corp (BK.N) over its role as trustee for Countrywide Financial Corp mortgage debt.

[REUTERS]

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U.S. BANK v. MOORE | Oklahoma SC “a fundamental precept of the law to expect a foreclosing party to actually be in possession of its claimed interest in the Note”

U.S. BANK v. MOORE | Oklahoma SC “a fundamental precept of the law to expect a foreclosing party to actually be in possession of its claimed interest in the Note”


U.S. BANK v. MOORE
2012 OK 32

Case Number: 109763
Decided: 04/10/2012

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA


Cite as: 2012 OK 32, __ P.3d __


NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL.

 


U.S. BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, NOT IN ITS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY BUT SOLELY AS TRUSTEE ON BEHALF OF GSAA HOME EQUITY TRUST 2006-6, Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
DAVID F. MOORE, a/k/a DAVID F. MOORE and BARBARA MOORE a/k/a BARBARA K. MOORE, Defendants/Appellants.

ON APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY
HONORABLE BRYAN C. DIXON
DISTRICT JUDGE

¶0 Appeal of a summary judgment granted on May 13, 2011, in favor of Chase Home Finance, LLC, and against David F. and Barbara Moore. In a Journal Entry of Judgment, filed on August 26, 2011, the trial court found the Appellant was the undisputed owner and holder of the Note and Mortgage. The Moores appealed on September 23, 2011, arguing standing, and this Court retained the matter on November 18, 2011.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS

Gary L. Blevins, GARY L. BLEVINS & ASSOCIATES, PC, Oklahoma City Oklahoma, for Defendants/Appellants.
Bryan Miles Harrington and A. Grant Schwabe, KIVELL, RAYMENT AND FRANCIS, PC, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellee.

COMBS, J.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶1 On October 21, 2005, David F. Moore and Barbara Moore, husband and wife (hereinafter “Appellants”), executed a Note and Mortgage in favor of Colonial Bank, N.A. (hereinafter “Lender”), for property located in Oklahoma County, Oklahoma. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (hereinafter “MERS”), was designated as the nominee for the lender pursuant to subsection (C) of the Mortgage.1 Within the Mortgage was a security interest provision with the following granting clause:

Borrower understands and agrees that MERS holds only legal title to the interests granted by Borrower in this Security Instrument, but, if necessary to comply with law or custom, MERS (as nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns) has the right: to exercise any or all of those interests, including. . .the right to foreclose and sell the Property.

¶2 Also contained in the Mortgage was a provision entitled “Sale of Note; Change of Loan Servicer.” Per the terms of this provision:

The Note or a partial interest in the Note (together with this Security Instrument) can be sold one or more times without prior notice to Borrower.

Thus, the borrower may have difficulty in determining who holds the note and mortgage, and to whom the payment is due.

¶3 Appellants defaulted on the Note during August of 2008. U.S. Bank, National Association, commenced foreclosure proceedings on December 24, 2008, not in its individual capacity, but solely as trustee on behalf of GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-6 (hereinafter “Appellee”). According to the verified petition, the Appellee was “the present holder of said Note and Mortgage having received due assignment through mesne assignments of record or conveyance via mortgaging servicing transfer.” The original petition did not attach a copy of the note in question sued upon. Appellants answered, pro se, on May 20, 2009. Appellants disputed all allegations and requested that the Appellee’s “submit additional documentation to prove their claims including the representation that they were the “present holder of said Note.” Appellee subsequently filed an amended petition and a second amended petition to add additional defendants. Neither of these amendments included a copy of the note sued upon.

¶4 Appellee submitted its Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter the “Motion”) to the court on November 20, 2009. Again, the Appellee represented that it was the holder of the Note. Documentation attached to the Motion attempted tosupport this representation: it included the Mortgage, the Note, an Assignment of Mortgage, and an Affidavit in Support of Appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment. For the first time, Appellee submitted the Note and Mortgage to the trial court. The note was indorsed in blank and contained no date for the indorsement.

¶5 Executed on October 21, 2005, the Note designated the Appellants as the Borrowers and Colonial Bank, N.A., as the Lender. The following agreement, inter alia, was made:

I [Appellants] understand that the Lender may transfer this Note. The Lender or anyone who takes this Note by transfer and who is entitled to receive payments under this Note is called the ‘Note Holder.’

An Assignment of Mortgage (hereinafter the “Assignment”) was attached to the motion. MERS, again as nominee for the Lender, assigned the Mortgage, which secured “the payment of a certain promissory note” described therein, to the Appellee.2 The Assignment was executed and notarized on February 11, 2009; it was recorded one week later, but made effective “11/27/2008.” In other words, the Assignment was executed after the foreclosure suit commenced, but made effective before the filing of the petition as well as any subsequent amendments to the petition.

¶6 Appellants did not respond to Appellee’s Motion, and the trial court entered a default judgment against them. The trial court entered a final judgment, on December 17, 2009, (hereinafter “Judgment”) in favor of the Appellee. The judgment concluded that Appellee was the owner and holder of the Note and Mortgage; the court then approved an Order of Sale. Approximately six (6) weeks later, on January 31, 2010, the Appellants filed for protection under Chapter 7 of Title XI of the United States Bankruptcy Code, which stayed the proceedings. On March 2, 2011, the bankruptcy court granted Appellee’s Motion to Lift the Automatic Stay. Shortly thereafter, on March 18, 2011, with the assistance of counsel, the Appellants filed a Petition to Vacate the Judgment. The trial court subsequently dismissed the Appellants Petition to Vacate the Judgment.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7 The standard of review3for a trial court’s ruling either vacating or refusing to vacate a judgment is abuse of discretion. Ferguson Enterprises, Inc. v. Webb Enterprises, Inc., 2000 OK 78, ¶ 5, 13 P.3d 480, 482; Hassell v. Texaco, Inc., 1962 OK 136, 372 P.2d 233. A clear abuse-of-discretion standard includes appellate review of both fact and law issues. Christian v. Gray, 2003 OK 10, ¶ 43, 65 P.3d 591, 608. An abuse of discretion occurs when a court bases its decision on an erroneous conclusion of law, or where there is no rational basis in evidence for the ruling. Fent v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 2001 OK 35, ¶12; 27 P.3d 477, 481.

ANALYSIS

¶8 The Appellants have questioned the standing of the Appellee to commence foreclosure proceedings against them. “Standing refers to a person’s legal right to seek relief in a judicial forum.” Fent v. Contingency Review Board, 2007 OK 27, ¶ 7, 163 P.3d 512, 519-520. Foremost, the party seeking relief must prove that they suffered an actual and concrete injury. Absent an injury of this nature, the party lacks standing. Whether or not such an injury exists is determined at the commencement of the lawsuit. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 570, n. 5, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2142, 119 L.Ed. 351 (1992).

¶9 Countering, Appellee argues that Appellants have forfeited the opportunity to question enforcement of the Note. However, a review of the record reveals the Appellants, in their pro se Answer, clearly questioned the ability of the Appellee to enforce the Note.4 It is settled law in Oklahoma that standing “may be raised at any stage of the judicial process by any party or by the court sua sponte.” Hendrick v Walters, 1993 OK 162, ¶ 4, 865 P.2d 1232, 1234 (emphasis original). Therefore, this issue is properly before the Court.

¶10 Article III of the Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter “U.C.C.”) governs negotiable instruments and is codified in the Oklahoma Statutes. Promissory notes are negotiable instruments. See, 12A OS 2001, § 3-104. The Appellee has the burden of showing that it is entitled to enforce the instrument. See Reserve Loan Life Ins. Co. v. Simmons, 1929 OK 669, ¶ 9, 282 P. 279, 281. Unless the Appellee was able to enforce the Note at the time the suit was commenced, it cannot maintain its foreclosure action against the Appellants.

¶11 Ownership of the note determines ownership of the mortgage. Engle v. Federal Nat’l. Mortg. Ass’n, 1956 OK 176, ¶ 7, 300 P.2d 997, 999. Oklahoma law does not permit the bifurcation of the security interest from the note. Deutsche Bank National Trust v. Brumbaugh, 2012 OK 3, ___P.3d ___; BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. v. White, 2011 OK CIV APP 35, ¶ 10, 256 P.3d 1014, 1017. A party which is assigned a mortgage without the accompanying promissory note holds no rights of enforcement. Id. Plainly, a party must properly acquire rights to both instruments before such party is able to enforce their terms.

¶12 In the present case, the only instrument attached to Appellee’s petition was the Mortgage. Appellee did not produce the Note until the summary disposition stage. Under the U.C.C., both holders and non-holders in possession of a negotiable instrument are permitted to enforce the instrument. 12A OS 2001, § 3-301. A “holder” is “(A) the person in possession of a negotiable instrument that is payable either to bearer5 or to an identified person that is the person in possession. 12A OS 2001, § 1-201(21).6 The evidence in the present matter is not clear as to whether the Appellee held the Note as a “holder” or as a “non-holder in possession with the ability to enforce the Note.

¶13 To enforce a negotiable instrument as a non-holder in possession, the moving party must show (i) that the party possessed the negotiable instrument when suit was filed; (ii) how possession was achieved; and (iii), if necessary, that the purpose of the transfer was to transfer rights of enforcement. 12A O.S. 2001, § 3-301. The Appellee has not demonstrated its possession of the Note at the time it commenced foreclosure proceedings against Appellants.

¶14 Appellants contend Appellee lacks standing to commence this foreclosure action. Appellants further allege the validity of the affidavit offered in support of Appellees Motion for Summary Judgment. The dispositive issue is whether or not Appellee has standing. Appellants’ argument is based on the failure of Appellee to establish Appellee was a person entitled to enforce the Note at the commencement of the action and the inability to establish the effectiveness of the indorsements attached to the Note when the Note was ultimately produced as an exhibit to the Appellees Motion for Summary Judgment.

¶15 This Court has previously held:

Standing, as a jurisdictional question, may be correctly raised at any level of the judicial process or by the Court on its own motion. This Court has consistently held that standing to raise issues in a proceeding must be predicated on interest that is “direct, immediate and substantial.” Standing determines whether the person is the proper party to request adjudication of a certain issue and does not decide the issue itself. The key element is whether the party whose standing is challenged has sufficient interest or stake in the outcome.

Matter of the Estate of Doan, 1986 OK 15, ¶7, 727 P.2d 574, 576. In Hendrick v. Walters, 1993 OK 162, ¶ 4, 865 P.2d 1232, 1234, this Court also held:

Respondent challenges Petitioner’s standing to bring the tendered issue. Standing refers to a person’s legal right to seek relief in a judicial forum. It may be raised as an issue at any stage of the judicial process by any party or by the court sua sponte. (Emphasis original)

¶16 Furthermore, in Fent v. Contingency Review Board, 2007 OK 27, footnote 19, 163 P.3d 512, 519, this Court stated “[s]tanding may be raised at any stage of the judicial process or by the court on its own motion.” Additionally in Fent, this Court stated:

Standing refers to a person’s legal right to seek relief in a judicial forum. The three threshold criteria of standing are (1) a legally protected interest which must have been injured in fact- i.e., suffered an injury which is actual, concrete and not conjectural in nature, (2) a causal nexus between the injury and the complained-of conduct, and (3) a likelihood, as opposed to mere speculation, that the injury is capable of being redressed by a favorable court decision. The doctrine of standing ensures a party has a personal stake in the outcome of a case and the parties are truly adverse.

Fent v. Contingency Review Board, 2007 OK 27, ¶7, 163 P.3d 512, 519-520. In essence, a plaintiff who has not suffered an injury attributable to the defendant lacks standing to bring a suit. And, thus, “standing [must] be determined as of the commencement of suit; . . .” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 570, n.5, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2142, 119 L.Ed. 351 (1992).

¶17 To commence a foreclosure action in Oklahoma, a plaintiff must demonstrate it has a right to enforce the note and, absent a showing of ownership, the plaintiff lacks standing. Gill v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Oklahoma City, 1945 OK 181, 159 P.2d 717.7An assignment of the mortgage, however, is of no consequence because under Oklahoma law, “[p]roof of ownership of the note carried with it ownership of the mortgage security.” Engle v. Federal Nat. Mortg. Ass’n, 1956 OK 176, ¶7, 300 P.2d 997, 999. Therefore, in Oklahoma it is not possible to bifurcate the security interest from the note.” Deutsche Bank National Trust v. Brumbaugh, 2012 OK 3, ___P.3d ___; BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. v. White, 2011 OK CIV APP 35, ¶ 10, 256 P.3d 1014, 1017. Because the note is a negotiable instrument, it is subject to the requirements of the UCC. Thus, a foreclosing entity has the burden of proving it is a “person entitled to enforce an instrument” by showing it was “(i) the holder of the instrument, (ii) a nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the rights of a holder, or (iii) a person not in possession of the instrument who is entitled to enforce the instrument pursuant to Section 12A-3-309 or subsection (d) of Section 12A-3-418 of this title.” 12A O.S. 2001 §3-301.

¶18 To show you are the “holder” of the Note you must prove you are in possession of the note and the note is either “payable to bearer” (blank indorsement) or to an identified person that is the person in possession (special indorsement).8 Therefore, both possession of the note and an indorsement on the note or attached allonge9 are required in order for one to be a “holder” of the Note.

¶19 Negotiation is the voluntary or involuntary transfer of an instrument by a person other than the issuer to a person who thereby becomes its holder. 12A O.S. 2001, § 3-201. Transfer occurs when the instrument is delivered by a person other than its issuer for the purpose of giving to the person receiving delivery the right to enforce the instrument. 12A O.S. 2001, § 3-203. Delivery of the note would still have to occur even though there is no negotiation. Delivery is defined as the voluntary transfer of possession. 12A O.S. 2001, § 1-201(b) (15). The transferee would then be vested with any right of the transferor to enforce the note. 12A O.S. 2001, 3-203(b). Some jurisdictions have held, without holder status and therefore the presumption of a right to enforce, the possessor of the note must demonstrate both the fact of the delivery and the purpose of the delivery of the Note to the transferee in order to qualify as the person entitled to enforce. In re Veal, 50 B.R. 897, 912 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011). See also, 12A O.S. 2001, § 3-203.

¶20 Appellee must also demonstrate it became a “person entitled to enforce” prior to the filing of the foreclosure proceeding. We find there is no evidence in the record establishing Appellee had standing to commence this foreclosure action. The trial court’s granting of a default judgment in favor of Appellee could not have been rationally based upon the evidence or Oklahoma law. Therefore, we find that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the Appellants Petition to Vacate the default judgment. Because this issue is dispositive, we will not address the remaining issues on appeal. The order denying Appellant’s petition and motion to vacate should be reversed and remanded back for further proceedings to determine whether Appellee is a person entitled to enforce the Note consistent with this opinion.

CONCLUSION

¶21 It is a fundamental precept of the law to expect a foreclosing party to actually be in possession of its claimed interest in the Note, and to have the proper supporting documentation in hand when filing suit, showing the history of the Note, so that the defendant is duly apprised of the rights of the plaintiff. This is accomplished by showing the party is a holder of the instrument or a nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the rights of a holder, or a person not in possession of the instrument who is entitled to enforce the instrument pursuant to 12A O.S. 2001, § 3-309 or 12A O.S. 2001, § 3-418. Likewise, for the homeowners, absent adjudication on the underlying indebtedness, today’s decision to reverse the dismissal of the petition and motion to vacate cannot cancel their obligation arising from an authenticated Note, or insulate them from foreclosure proceedings based on proven delinquency. This Court’s decision in no way releases or exonerates the debt owed by the defendants on this home. See, U.S. Bank National Association v. Kimball, 27 A.3d 1087, 75 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 100, 2011 VT 81 (VT 2011); and Indymac Bank, F.S.B. v. Yano-Horoski, 78 A.D.3d 895, 912 N.Y.S.2d 239 (2010).

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS

¶22 CONCUR: TAYLOR, C.J., KAUGER, WATT, EDMONDSON, REIF, COMBS, JJ.

¶23 DISSENT: WINCHESTER (JOINS GURICH, J.), GURICH (BY SEPARATE WRITING), JJ.

¶24 RECUSED: COLBERT, V.C.J.

FOOTNOTES

1 Subsection (C) of the Mortgage reads as follows: “‘MERS’ is Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. MERS is a separate corporation that is acting solely as a nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns. MERS is the mortgagee under this security instrument.”

2 Specifically, the assignment was made to “U.S. Bank National Association, not in its individual capacity, but solely as trustee on behalf of GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-6.”

3 Summary judgment decisions are reviewed de novo, Carmichael v. Beller, 1996 OK 48, ¶ 2, 914 P.2d 1051, 1053, whereas orders denying or granting a petition to vacate are reviewed for an abuse of discretion, Patel v. OMH Medical Center, Inc. , 1999 OK 33 at ¶ 20.

4 In relevant part, the Answer states: “The defendants hereby dispute the cause and information within the petition and hereby request that the plaintiff provide proper documentation of any and all allegations” including the allegation that the Appellee was present holder of the Note and Mortgage and thereby entitled to enforce its terms.

5 Bearer” means…a person in possession of an instrument, negotiable tangible document of title, or certificated security payable to bearer or endorsed in blank. 12A, O.S. 2001§ 1-201(5).

6 Documents of title are not at issue. Therefore, this is the only relevant U.C.C. definition of “holder.”

7 This opinion occurred prior to the enactment of the UCC. It is, however, possible for the owner of the note not to be the person entitled to enforce the note if the owner is not in possession of the note. (See the REPORT OF THE PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, APPLICATION OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE TO SELECTED ISSUES RELATING TO MORTGAGE NOTES (NOVEMBER 14, 2011)).

812A O.S. 2001, §§ 1-201(b)(21), 3-204 and 3-205

9 According to Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009) an allonge is “[a] slip of paper sometimes attached to a negotiable instrument for the purpose of receiving further indorsements when the original paper is filled with indorsements.” It should be noted that under 12A O.S. 2001, § 3-204(a) and its comments in paragraph 2, it is no longer necessary that an instrument be so covered with previous indorsements that additional space is required before an allonge may be used. An allonge, however, must still be affixed to the instrument.


GURICH, J., with whom WINCHESTER, J. joins dissenting:

¶1 I respectfully dissent. In this case, the record indicates that attached to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment was an indorsed-in-blank note, the mortgage, an assignment of mortgage, and an affidavit in support of the motion for summary judgment. Because the Plaintiff was the proper party to pursue the foreclosure and because the Plaintiff presented the proper documentation at summary judgment to prove such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendants’ Petition to Vacate. I would affirm the trial court for the reasons stated in my dissenting opinions in Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Matthews, 2012 OK 14, ___P.3d___ (Gurich, J. dissenting) and Bank of America, NA v. Kabba, 2012 OK 23, ___P.3d___ (Gurich, J. dissenting).1

FOOTNOTES

1 Although I originally concurred in the majority opinion in Deutsche Bank National Trust v. Brumbaugh, 2012 OK 3, ___P.3d___, which the majority now cites as authority in this case, after further consideration, I disagree with the majority’s analysis in that case, and my views on the issues in these cases are accurately reflected in J.P. Morgan Chase Bank N.A. v. Eldridge, 2012 OK 24, ___P.3d___ (Gurich, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part); Kabba, 2012 OK 23, ___P.3d___ (Gurich, J. dissenting); CPT Asset Backed Certificates, Series 2004-EC1 v. Kham, 2012 OK 22, ___P.3d___ (Gurich, J. dissenting); Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Richardson, 2012 OK 15, ___P.3d___ (Gurich, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part); and Matthews, 2012 OK 14, ___P.3d___ (Gurich, J. dissenting).

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NJ gets green light to enter final judgment of uncontested foreclosure actions

NJ gets green light to enter final judgment of uncontested foreclosure actions


“It is FURTHER ORDERED that the Office of Foreclosure is authorized to recommend the entry of final judgment pursuant to Rule 1:34-6 in uncontested actions which the procedures set forth in this Order have been followed.”


 

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ELSTON / LEETSDALE vs CWCAPITAL | FL 4DCA “did not file any evidence, affidavits or other documents, supporting…it was authorized …on behalf of the trust”

ELSTON / LEETSDALE vs CWCAPITAL | FL 4DCA “did not file any evidence, affidavits or other documents, supporting…it was authorized …on behalf of the trust”


DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT

January Term 2012

ELSTON/LEETSDALE, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company,
Appellant,

v.

CWCAPITAL ASSET MANAGEMENT LLC, solely in its capacity as
Special Servicer on behalf of U.S. BANK, N.A., Successor to STATE
STREET BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, as Trustee for the registered
holders of J.P. MORGAN CHASE COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE
SECURITIES CORP., MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES,
SERIES 2001-C1BC1,
Appellee.

No. 4D11-3151

[April 4, 2012]

POLEN, J.

Elston/Leetsdale, LLC (Elston) appeals the trial court’s non-final
order, requiring it to make payments to CWCapital Asset Management
LLC, solely in its capacity as special servicer on behalf of U.S. Bank,
N.A., successor to State Street Bank and Trust Company, as trustee for
the Registered Holders of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Securities Corp., Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2001-
C1BC1 (CW) during the pendency of the action. Because CW did not
properly plead standing, we reverse.

The facts are as follows. Elston executed a promissory note as
evidence of a loan made by First Union National Bank; to secure
payment, Elston executed a mortgage and security agreement, along with
an assignment of leases and rents. First Union assigned its rights in the
loan documents to Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York, which
then assigned its right, title and interest in the loan to State Street Bank
and Trust Company, as Trustee for J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Corp., Series 2001-C1BC1 (the trust). Presently, the
trust is the current owner and holder of all the loan documents subject
to this appeal.

CW, the special servicer for the trust, filed a verified complaint, in its
own name, for foreclosure. The complaint alleged that Elston defaulted
on the loan, and the trust elected to accelerate and declare immediately
due and owing the entire unpaid principal balance together with accrued
interest. In response to CW’s motions, the trial court ordered Elston to
show cause as to why payments should not b e ma d e during the
pendency of the foreclosure action. Elston then moved to dismiss the
complaint, arguing that CW failed to properly allege standing to pursue
enforcement of the security instruments. CW argued that it had
standing to bring the foreclosure action because it is duly authorized by
the trust to do so and, as special servicer for the loan, it is entitled to
take all required action to protect the interests of the trust. After a
hearing,1 the trial court entered a payment order, requiring Elston to pay
CW $42,404.91 per month during the pendency of the action. This
appeal followed.

Elston argues that the trial court erred b y ordering it to make
payments to CW because CW failed to properly allege standing. CW
argues that Elston has not furnished a sufficient record for this court to
review the trial court’s ruling.2 On the merits, CW argues that, as agent
and special servicer to the trust, which owns the loan documents at
issue, it has standing to foreclose.

“Whether a party is the proper party with standing to bring an action
is a question of law to be reviewed de novo.” FCD Dev., LLC v. S. Fla.
Sports Comm., Inc., 37 So. 3d 905, 909 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (quoting
Westport Recovery Corp. v. Midas, 954 So. 2d 750, 752 (Fla. 4th DCA
2007)).

Every action may be prosecuted in the name of the real party
in interest, but a personal representative, administrator,
guardian, trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or
in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of
another, or a party expressly authorized by statute may sue
in that person’s own name without joining the party for
whose benefit the action is brought.

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.210(a). “In its broadest sense, standing is no more than
having, or representing one who has, ‘a sufficient stake in an otherwise
justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy.’”
Kumar Corp. v. Nopal Lines, Ltd., 462 So. 2d 1178, 1182 (Fla. 3d DCA
1985) (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972)).

In the mortgage foreclosure context, “standing is broader than just
actual ownership of the beneficial interest in the note.” Mortgage Elec.
Registration Sys., Inc. v. Azize, 965 So. 2d 151, 153 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).
“The Florida real party in interest rule, Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.210(a), permits
an action to be prosecuted in the name of someone other than, but
acting for, the real party in interest.” Id. (quoting Kumar, 462 So. 2d at
1183). “Thus, where a plaintiff is either the real party in interest or is
maintaining the action on behalf of the real party in interest, its action
cannot be terminated on the ground that it lacks standing.” Kumar, 462
So. 2d at 1183. See also BAC Funding Consortium Inc. ISAOA/ATIMA v.
Jean-Jacques, 28 So. 3d 936, 938 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (“The proper party
with standing to foreclose a note and/or mortgage is the holder of the
note and mortgage or the holder’s representative.”).

In securitization cases, a servicer may b e considered a party in
interest to commence legal action as long as the trustee joins or
ratifies its action. In re Rosenberg, 414 B.R. 826, 842 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
2009) (emphasis added). In CWCapital Asset Management, LLC v.
Chicago Properties, LLC, 610 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 2010), the Seventh
Circuit found that CW, as a special servicer to a loan, had standing to
bring an action in its own name against a mortgagor and landlord for
money paid by a tenant in settlement of a suit for unpaid rent. Id. at
499-500. Significantly, however, in opposition to the defendant’s motion
for judgment on the pleadings (based on CW’s lack of standing), CW filed
an affidavit of the trustee, which was not contradicted, ratifying the
servicer’s (CW’S) commencement of the lawsuit. Id. at 502 (emphasis
added). Additionally, the pooling and servicing agreement was placed in
evidence as additional evidence that CW’s principal granted CW authority
to enforce the debt instruments that CW neither owned nor held. Id. at
501.

In Juega v. Davidson, 8 So. 3d 488 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009), relied on by
the trial court, the Third District reversed an order of dismissal for lack
of standing, finding that because the plaintiff was an agent who had been
granted full authority to act for the real party in interest, there was no
violation of rule 1.210(a). Id. at 489. However, in Juega, there was
evidence in the trial court that the agent/plaintiff had been granted full
authority to act on the real party in interest’s behalf: The real party in
interest filed an affidavit in opposition to the motion to dismiss for lack of
standing, averring that Juega was pursuing the litigation for the real
party in interest’s benefit and ratifying all actions taken by Juega since
the inception of the lawsuit. Id. at 489. Finding the affidavit filed by the
real party in interest to be indistinguishable from the affidavit filed by the
principal in Kumar, the Third District held that “the facts stated in [the
affidavit] establish that the agent, Juega, has standing.” Id. at 490
(emphasis added).

Here, the caption of the verified complaint states that the underlying
action is brought by CW “solely in its capacity as special servicer on
behalf of U.S. Bank, N.A.” In the complaint, CW alleges, and verifies as
true, that it “has been and is duly authorized by the Trust to prosecute
this action as agent and special servicer for the Trust.” However, CW did
not file any evidence, affidavits or other documents, supporting its
allegation that it was authorized to prosecute the action on behalf of the
trust, as was done in Kumar, Juega and Chicago Properties. Although
CW’s complaint is verified, it is verified by the “SVP” for CW – not by the
real party in interest, the trust. CW relies on nothing more than its own
allegations and affidavit to support its argument that it has standing to
sue on behalf of the trust. This is insufficient evidence to prove that it is
authorized to sue on the trust’s behalf.

We affirm on the other issue raised by Elston, as we find that the trial
court properly determined that CW was not required to register as a
commercial collection agency or as a licensed mortgage broker under
Chapters 559 and 494, Florida Statutes.

Reversed and Remanded.

TAYLOR and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.
* *

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U.S. Bank v Dellarmo | NY Appellate Division, 2nd Dept. “Corrective Assignment of Mortgage”, “Transfer or ASMT of only the mortgage without the debt is a nullity”

U.S. Bank v Dellarmo | NY Appellate Division, 2nd Dept. “Corrective Assignment of Mortgage”, “Transfer or ASMT of only the mortgage without the debt is a nullity”


Decided on April 3, 2012

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE DIVISION : SECOND JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

PETER B. SKELOS, J.P.
L. PRISCILLA HALL
LEONARD B. AUSTIN
ROBERT J. MILLER, JJ.
2010-11958
(Index No. 2986/06)

[*1]U.S. Bank National Association, etc., respondent,

v

Joseph Dellarmo, also known as Joseph Dell’Armo, appellant, et al., defendants.

Schloss & Schloss, Airmont, N.Y. (Jonathan B. Schloss of
counsel), for appellant.
Locke Lord, LLP, New York, N.Y. (R. James DeRose III of
counsel), for respondent.

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the defendant Joseph Dellarmo, also known as, Joseph Dell’Armo, appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Weiner, J.), entered October 5, 2010, which denied his motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him for lack of standing.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the motion of the defendant Joseph Dellarmo, also known as Joseph Dell’Armo, to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him is granted.

In commencing this action on April 25, 2006, to foreclose a mortgage entered into by the defendant Joseph Dellarmo, also known as Joseph Dell’Armo (hereinafter Dellarmo), the plaintiff asserted in its complaint that it had been assigned the subject mortgage by assignment dated April 11, 2006, which was duly recorded with the Clerk of Rockland County. Dellarmo failed to answer or appear, but thereafter moved, inter alia, to enjoin the plaintiff from foreclosing on the property on the ground that it lacked standing, and to vacate a default judgment entered against him. On October 30, 2009, while Dellarmo’s motion was pending, a “Corrective Assignment of Mortgage” (hereinafter the corrective assignment) dated July 28, 2009, to the plaintiff was recorded with the Clerk of Rockland County, purporting to “correct and replace the April 11, 2006 assignment . . . which was sent for recording but was lost prior to being recorded” by the Clerk of Rockland County. The corrective assignment was notarized outside New York State but unaccompanied by a CPLR 2309(c) certification. By order dated January 4, 2010, the Supreme Court determined, based on the April 11, 2006, assignment, which the complaint described as having been recorded, and without referencing the corrective assignment, that the plaintiff had standing to commence this action, and directed a hearing to determine the validity of the service of process. Following the hearing, the Supreme Court vacated the default judgment entered against Dellarmo.

Dellarmo moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him, contending, among other things, that the corrective assignment was a nullity, as it had been notarized out-of-state without the required CPLR 2309(c) certification, and, even if the corrective assignment was valid, the plaintiff nevertheless lacked standing to bring this action, as it was not the holder in due course of both the mortgage and note when it commenced the action. The Supreme Court denied the motion, finding that the failure to accompany the corrective assignment with a CPLR 2309(c) certification was not a fatal defect and that Dellarmo raised merely speculative doubts about the validity of the corrective assignment. Dellarmo appeals, and we [*2]reverse.

The plaintiff’s failure to comply with CPLR 2309(c) in submitting various documents, including, among others, the corrective assignment, which were notarized outside the state but not accompanied with a certificate in conformity with CPLR 2309(c), was not a fatal defect, as such certification may be provided nunc pro tunc (see CPLR 2001; Betz v Daniel Conti, Inc., 69 AD3d 545; Matapos Tech. Ltd. v Compania Andina de Comercio Ltda, 68 AD3d 672, 673; Smith v Allstate Ins. Co., 38 AD3d 522).

“In a mortgage foreclosure action, a plaintiff has standing where it is both the holder or assignee of the subject mortgage and the holder or assignee of the underlying note at the time the action is commenced” (Bank of N.Y. v Silverberg, 86 AD3d 274, 279; see Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v Gress, 68 AD3d 709). Where a defendant raises the issue of standing, the plaintiff must prove its standing to be entitled to relief (see CitiMortgage, Inc. v Rosenthal, 88 AD3d 759; U.S. Bank, N.A. v Collymore, 68 AD3d 752, 753). Moreover, while assignment of a promissory note also effectuates assignment of the mortgage (see Bank of N.Y. Silverberg, 86 AD3d at 280; U.S. Bank, N.A. v Collymore, 68 AD3d at 753-754; Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v Coakley, 41 AD3d 674), the converse is not true: since a mortgage is merely security for a debt, it cannot exist independently of the debt, and thus, a transfer or assignment of only the mortgage without the debt is a nullity and no interest is acquired by it (see Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Barnett, 88 AD3d 636; Bank of N.Y. v Silverberg, 86 AD3d at 280). The failure to record an assignment prior to the commencement of the action is not necessarily fatal since “an assignment of a note and mortgage need not be in writing and can be effectuated by physical delivery” (Bank of N.Y. v Silverberg, 86 AD3d at 280; see Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Barnett, 88 AD3d 636; U.S. Bank, N.A. v Collymore, 68 AD3d at 754; LaSalle Bank Natl. Assn. v Ahearn, 59 AD3d 911, 912).

Here, as the plaintiff concedes, the complaint incorrectly asserts that the April 11, 2006, assignment of the mortgage to the plaintiff had been duly recorded. Further, there is no allegation that the note or mortgage was physically delivered to the plaintiff prior to commencement of the action (compare Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v Coakley, 41 AD3d 674). The record also suggests that in the order dated January 4, 2010, in which the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had standing pursuant to the April 11, 2006, assignment, the court relied upon the incorrect assertion in the complaint that the April 11, 2006, assignment had been recorded. The Supreme Court referred only to the April 11, 2006, assignment and made no reference to the corrective assignment’s purported replacement of the April 11, 2006, assignment.

The plaintiff now relies on the corrective assignment, which was recorded with the Clerk of Rockland County on October 30, 2009, to demonstrate that it was a holder of the mortgage as of the April 25, 2006, commencement of this action. The corrective assignment recites, in pertinent part, that it “is meant to correct and replace the April 11, 2006 assignment by and between the parties herein which was sent for recording but was lost prior to being recorded” in Rockland County. However, inasmuch as the complaint does not allege that the note was physically delivered to the plaintiff, and nothing in the plaintiff’s submission in opposition to Dellarmo’s motion could support a finding that such physical delivery occurred, the corrective assignment cannot be given retroactive effect (see Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v Gress, 68 AD3d at 710; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Marchione, 69 AD3d 204, 210; LaSalle Bank Natl. Assn. v Ahearn, 59 AD3d at 912-913). Moreover, both the unrecorded April 11, 2006, assignment and the recorded corrective assignment indicate only that the mortgage was assigned to the plaintiff. Since an assignment of a mortgage without the underlying debt is a nullity (see Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Barnett, 88 AD3d 636; Bank of N.Y. v Silverberg, 86 AD3d at 280), the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that it had standing to commence this action (see Bank of N.Y. v Silverberg, 86 AD3d at 280; U.S. Bank, N.A. v Collymore, 68 AD3d at 754).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted Dellarmo’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him for lack of standing.

In light of the foregoing, we need not reach Dellarmo’s remaining contentions.
SKELOS, J.P., HALL, AUSTIN and MILLER, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Aprilanne Agostino

Clerk of the Court

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Review Finds Possible Flaws in More Than 138,000 Bank Foreclosures

Review Finds Possible Flaws in More Than 138,000 Bank Foreclosures


Not this word again “Flaw”…it’s FULL   B L O W N   FRAUD!

Why wasn’t this review done prior to any settlement? Because they never began any investigation.

DealBook-

The nation’s biggest banks may have put the huge $25 billion settlement over bad foreclosure practices behind them, but that doesn’t mean their mortgage troubles are over.

A separate review — this time by independent consultants on behalf of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency — flagged more than 138,000 cases for possible flaws in the foreclosure process at the nation’s largest mortgage servicers. Those include foreclosures involved with the so-called robo-signing scandal, in which bank representatives churned through hundreds of documents a day in foreclosure proceedings without reviewing them for accuracy.

[DEALBOOK]

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NEW YORK CONTINUES ASSAULT ON MERS

NEW YORK CONTINUES ASSAULT ON MERS


By Jonathan C. Cross and Stacey Trimmer

New York government officials are continuing their assault against foreclosure actions where Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) was the assignee of the mortgage, and challenges to foreclosures involving MERS are increasingly gaining traction in New York courts. Recently, the New York State Attorney General filed a complaint against MERS and several banks alleging fraud and deception in foreclosure proceedings. People v. JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A., No. 2012/2768 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 3, 2012). In addition, three New York trial courts have decided motions involving standing and other issues in such actions. CIT Group/Consumer Fin., Inc. v. Platt, 33 Misc. 3d 1231(A) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011); U.S. Bank N.A. v. Bressler, 33 Misc. 3d 1231(A) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011); Bank of New York Mellon v. Martinez, 33 Misc. 3d 1215(A) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011). Two courts ruled against the foreclosing banks, finding they did not have standing to foreclose where MERS assigned a mortgage without express authority to do so or sufficient documentation evidencing that the note was also transferred. Although the third court dismissed a lack of standing defense, it did so solely for procedural reasons.

Read More Beginning At Page 16

[CHADBOURNE]

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RePOST: U.S. BANK v. BRESSLER | NYSC “ASMT from MERS is defective, as it had no right, authority to assign the mortgage or the note”

RePOST: U.S. BANK v. BRESSLER | NYSC “ASMT from MERS is defective, as it had no right, authority to assign the mortgage or the note”



Decided on December 7, 2011

Supreme Court, Kings County

 

U.S. Bank National Association, AS TRUSTEE FOR SG MORTGAGE SECURITIES ASSET BACKED CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-FRE2, Plaintiff,

against

Alan Bressler, CCU LLC, MERS, INC. ET AL, Defendants.

33920/08

Debra Silber, J.

Recitation, as required by CPLR 2219(a), of the papers considered in the review of plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and for the appointment of a Referee to compute in this foreclosure action, and defendant’s cross-motion to dismiss.

PapersNumbered

Notice of Motion and Exhibits Annexed ……………………………….1-12

Cross-motion and Exhibits Annexed ……………………………………13- 20

Answering Affidavits …………………………………………………………21-30

Reply Affidavits ………………………………………………………………..

Other:

Upon the foregoing cited papers, the Decision/Order on this application is as follows:

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and the appointment of a referee to compute in this foreclosure action concerning 1477 East 32nd Street, Brooklyn, NY, 11234, Block 7694, Lot 85, is denied and defendant mortgagor’s motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing is granted, for the reasons set forth herein.

Defendant Alan Bressler alleges in his Answer to the Complaint that the plaintiff lacks standing to bring this action. In response to the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, defendant cross moves to dismiss the foreclosure action on the grounds that plaintiff lacks standing to bring this action. The court finds that defendant is correct, and as such, the action must be dismissed.

The mortgage in question was issued by Fremont Investment and Loan on May 4, 2006. The loan states “for purposes of recording, MERS is the mortgagee of record.” The tortured history of MERS is described in Bank of NY v. Silverberg, 2011 NY Slip Op 5002, 86 AD3d 274 (2nd Dept), and need not be repeated. On December 18, 2008, an Assignment of Mortgage was executed, and subsequently recorded, which assigns the mortgage and not the note, and assigns it from MERS to plaintiff. First, the assignment of a mortgage without the note is defective as the transfer of the mortgage without the debt is a nullity. In a decision citing Silverberg, the court said “an assignment of the mortgage without assignment of the underlying note or bond is a nullity” Citimortgage, Inc. v Stosel, 2011 NY Slip Op 8319 (2nd Dept) citing U.S. Bank, N.A. v [*2]Collymore, 68 AD3d at 754; see Bank of NY v Silverberg, 86 AD3d 274, 280, 926 N.Y.S.2d 532.

Secondly, an assignment from MERS to plaintiff is defective, as MERS had no right or authority to assign the mortgage or the note. Bank of NY v Silverberg, supra. “The plaintiff, which merely stepped into the shoes of MERS, its assignor, and gained only that to which its assignor was entitled . . . did not acquire the power to foreclose by way of the

. . . assignment.” Id.

It must also be noted that not only did MERS lack the power and authority to execute the assignment on behalf of Fremont Investment and Loan on December 18, 2008, but Fremont did not exist any longer on that date, as it was first subjected to a cease and desist order from the FDIC and then went into Bankruptcy. Then, its assets were apparently sold sometime in 2010 in a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy proceeding, which started in the summer of 2008, to Signature Group Holdings Inc.[FN1]

Further, it must be noted that the execution of an Assignment of Mortgage by MERS is barred by the Settlement Agreement between the US Attorney’s Office on behalf of the United States of America and the Office of Steven J. Baum P.C. and Pillar Processing, LLC, dated October 6, 2011, which states at paragraph 14 that “Baum shall no longer permit anyone employed by or contracted by Baum to execute any assignment of a mortgage as an officer, director, employee, agent or other representative of MERSCORP, Inc., and/or Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.” The office of Mr. Baum was the attorney for the plaintiff when this matter was commenced, the assignment at issue is stamped “Pillar Processing LLC” and is signed on behalf of MERS by Elpiniki M. Bechakas, an attorney in the office of Steven J. Baum, according to the public internet attorney registration website maintained by the State of New York.

To the extent that plaintiff’s counsel opposes the defendant’s motion to dismiss with various affirmations of counsel, including one that states that the Note was indeed also assigned, and annexes (Exhibit B) a photocopy of a document alleged to be an assignment of the note, which is merely a blank piece of paper that states “Pay to the order of US Bank National Association as Trustee, without recourse,” and is undated and signed by “Michael Koch, Vice President, Fremont Investment and Loan,” this is insufficient. Ms. Jones, Vice President for Loan Documentation for Wells Fargo Bank N.A., states in her affidavit (Paragraph 5) “the Note was endorsed and was physically delivered to Wells Fargo/ASC as servicing agent and custodian for US Bank prior to the commencement of this action . . . Thus, Wells Fargo’s records specifically reflect that, it was in physical possession of the endorsed note prior to the commencement of this action.” The language in the affidavit indicates that the loan was assigned and transferred to plaintiff while Fremont Investment & Loan was still in existence, in July of 2006, but this is the only indication of this fact, and does not indicate delivery to plaintiff, but merely alleging delivery to plaintiff’s agent for servicing without any supporting documentation. Ms Jones provides no date of the alleged delivery, and as discussed above, at the time of the alleged delivery, Fremont may not have existed, or may have been subject to the restrictions on transfer in the proceedings in Bankruptcy Court, or may have been subject to the FDIC’s cease [*3]and desist order. This cannot be ascertained without a date.

The affirmation of counsel that indicates that the current loan servicer has confirmed that the information in the complaint is accurate is also insufficient, as there is no indication that the alleged servicer is actually the servicer for this loan. The pooling and servicing agreement is between plaintiff and the servicer. There is nothing in the papers from Signature Group Holdings, Inc., the entity that now appears to own the Note and Mortgage, which confirms that they too have retained Wells Fargo as servicer for this loan.

In conclusion, plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case for summary judgment due to the defects in the documentation in their motion, described above. The defendant has made out a prima facie case for dismissal on the grounds that plaintiff lacked standing at the time the action was commenced, and may in fact still lack standing, which plaintiff has not overcome with any documentation, in admissible form or not, to prevent dismissal of the complaint.

This shall constitute the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: December 7, 2011

E N T E R :

Hon. Debra Silber A.J.S.C.

Footnotes

Footnote 1:http://nationalmortgageprofessional.com/news18108/former-sub-prime-lender-fremont-exits-bankruptcy-and-re-emerges-signature-group-holdings

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US Bank National Association, v. Guillaume, et al. | New Jersey Supreme Court Says Lenders Must Be Named in Foreclosures

US Bank National Association, v. Guillaume, et al. | New Jersey Supreme Court Says Lenders Must Be Named in Foreclosures


Business Week-

New Jersey’s Supreme Court ruled documents indicating a bank’s intention to foreclose on a mortgage must name the lender before a residential property can be seized.

The case involves the foreclosure on an East Orange home owned by Maryse and Emilio Guillaume, who received a notice of intention to foreclose in May 2008. That notice included the name of the mortgage servicer, America’s Servicing Company while omitting the name of the lender. Credit Suisse AG made the loan and assigned it to US Bank National Association.

The state court in Trenton ruled today that the notice sent to the Guillaumes failed to comply with the state’s Fair Foreclosure Act, which requires the name and address of the actual lender, as well as contact information for a loan servicer. Failure to do so creates “potential for significant prejudice” to homeowners, the court said.

[BUSINESS WEEK]

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

A-11 September Term 2011
068176

US BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
AS TRUSTEE FOR CSAB MORTGAGEBACKED
PASS-THROUGH
CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-3,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

MARYSE GUILLAUME and EMILIO
GUILLAUME,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
CITY OF EAST ORANGE,
Defendant.

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Notice of Oral Argument on 4/4/12: Freddie Mac v. SCHWARTZWALD – Ohio Supreme Court

Notice of Oral Argument on 4/4/12: Freddie Mac v. SCHWARTZWALD – Ohio Supreme Court


H/T B. Behrens

The Supreme Court of Ohio

Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp

v.

Duane Schwartzwald et al.

The Supreme Court of Ohio will hold an oral argument on the merits in this case on Wednesday, April 04, 2012. Time allowed for oral argument will be 15 minutes per
side.

[ipaper docId=82147561 access_key=key-oaw4nbp66kdwp9azyrt height=600 width=600 /]

 

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REO PROP CO. vs. JEFFERS | Ohio CT Common Pleas “Servicer mgr testified REO Properties Corp. – a wholly owned sub of a wholly owned sub of Deutsche Bank did not own the note

REO PROP CO. vs. JEFFERS | Ohio CT Common Pleas “Servicer mgr testified REO Properties Corp. – a wholly owned sub of a wholly owned sub of Deutsche Bank did not own the note


IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO

REO PROPERTIES CORP.,
Plaintiff,

vs.

THOMAS E. JEFFERS, et al,

EXCERPT:

11. Regarding the above letter, Degneau testified on cross-examination:

Q. . . . [H]ave you ever seen these three entities [DB Structured Products,
Inc., Green Tree SerVertis Acquisition LLC and U.S. Bank National
Association, not in its individual capacity, but solely as trustee for
SerVertis REO Pass-Through Trust I] listed as owners [of the note and
mortgage] or having been owners in a succession?

A. Not listed as owners . . . Green Tree services the loan for a group that’s
identified as SerVertis so its kind of an internal. . . classification.

Q. SerVertis is a trust is it not?

A. It’s not necessarily a trust. It’s sort of an investment group. . ..

Q. So that investment group owns the notes and mortgages in [a] pool [of
loans]?

A. In the pool yes. . . . But as far as in this case actually being the owner of
record [given] the status of the account at the time of conversion it was a
business decision not to change the owner of record at the time because
the action has already been started.

Q. [By the magistrate] Is this loan now owned by SerVertis?

A. The owner of record is REO Properties Corp.

Q. I understand the owner of record . . . I want to know who owns it now.. .?

A. Green Tree services the loan for SerVertis who in a pool of loans
purchased [the subject loan]. .. and Green Tree services for them now.
REO Properties is still the record owner.

Q. I understand that. I want to know who is the actual owner and according
to this [letter of November 18, 2009], it’s SerVertis Trust, is that accurate?

A. Well based on this I don’t think I can say yes to that because based on this
it says ‘the transfer of the ownership of your loan will be formally
recorded in the real property records of the county in which your mortgage
was originally recorded’. It was not recorded as SerVertis Pass-Through
Trust.

On redirect examination Degneau testified further:

Q. Can you tell the Court why ownership was not changed from REO
Properties to any other entity? . . .

A. There’s a legal action in place and the decision was made to . . . not
change the owner of record until.. the situation was resolved. It’s my
assumption that after the action . . . there will be a new recording.

Q. At the present time there has been no internal assignment or anything that
has been done to transfer ownership?

A. No, there has been no other internal transfers at all.

12. No other entities other than Ocwen, Green Tree and REO have attempted to
collect this debt from the Jeffers.

[…]

In this case, the note in question is endorsed in blank. Thus, REO would have
been the holder of the note and entitled to enforce the note at the time the case was filed
only if it possessed the note when the case was filed. See R.C. Sec. 1303.21(B); Vitols v.
Citizens Banking Co., 10 F.3d at 1235.

The original note was produced at trial. Off the record, REO’s counsel indicated
that the note came from “the vault”. The location or the owner of the vault was not
disclosed. There is no direct testimony regarding who was in actual possession of the
note either at the time of filing of the case or at the time of trial. Degneau, an employee
of Green Tree, testified that he was familiar with the note and was able to identify it.
Based on this testimony, it is likely that Green Tree possessed the note as servicing agent
on behalf of the party for whom it was servicing. As detailed above, it is more likely than
not that Green Tree was servicing this loan for DB Structured Products, Inc., not REO,
when this case was filed. Therefore, at that time, Green Tree possessed the note as agent
of DB Structured Products, Inc. REO was not in possession of the note when the case
was filed. Consequently, REO has filed to prove it was the “holder” of the note when the
case was filed and was not a party who is entitled to enforce the note as a holder. See Id.;
R.C. Sec.1303.31.

[…]
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Institutional Bondholders Issue Instructions to Two Trustees to Open Investigations of Ineligible Mortgages in Over $19 Billion of Wells Fargo-Issued RMBS

Institutional Bondholders Issue Instructions to Two Trustees to Open Investigations of Ineligible Mortgages in Over $19 Billion of Wells Fargo-Issued RMBS


HOUSTON, Jan. 5, 2012 /PRNewswire/ — Gibbs & Bruns LLP announced today that its clients have issued instructions to US Bank and HSBC, as Trustees, to open investigations of ineligible mortgages in pools securing over $19 billion of Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBS) issued by various affiliates of Wells Fargo.  Collectively, Gibbs & Bruns’ clients hold over 25% of the Voting Rights in 48 Trusts that issued these RMBS. 

“Our clients continue to seek a comprehensive solution to the problems of ineligible mortgages in RMBS pools and deficient servicing of those loans.  Today’s action is another step toward achieving that goal,” said Kathy D. Patrick of Gibbs & Bruns LLP, lead counsel for the Holders.     

The Holders anticipate that they may provide additional instructions to Trustees, as needed, to further the investigations.  The securities that are the subject of these instruction letters include: 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

WFALT 2005-1

 

WFMBS 2005-9

 

WFMBS 2006-19

 

WFMBS 2007-13

WFALT 2007-PA2

 

WFMBS 2005-AR11

 

WFMBS 2006-20

 

WFMBS 2007-8

WFALT 2007-PA3

 

WFMBS 2005-AR12

 

WFMBS 2006-6

 

WFMBS 2007-9

WFALT 2007-PA4

 

WFMBS 2005-AR14

 

WFMBS 2006-7

 

WFMBS 2007-AR3

WFALT 2007-PA6

 

WFMBS 2005-AR16

 

WFMBS 2006-8

 

WFMBS 2007-AR8

WFHET 2005-3

 

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WFMBS 2006-AR10

 

WMLT 2005-A

WFHET 2006-3

 

WFMBS 2005-AR5

 

WFMBS 2006-AR13

 

WMLT 2005-B

WFHET 2007-1

 

WFMBS 2005-AR8

 

WFMBS 2006-AR14

 

WMLT 2006-A

WFMBS 2005-12

 

WFMBS 2005-AR9

 

WFMBS 2006-AR18

 

WMLT 2006-ALT1

WFMBS 2005-17

 

WFMBS 2006-11

 

WFMBS 2006-AR2

 

 

WFMBS 2005-18

 

WFMBS 2006-13

 

WFMBS 2006-AR4

 

 

WFMBS 2005-3

 

WFMBS 2006-14

 

WFMBS 2006-AR8

 

 

WFMBS 2005-4

 

WFMBS 2006-17

 

WFMBS 2007-10

 

 

ABOUT GIBBS & BRUNS LLP
Gibbs & Bruns is a leading boutique law firm engaging in high-stakes business and commercial litigation.  The firm is renowned for its representation of both plaintiffs and defendants in complex matters, including significant securities and institutional investor litigation, director and officer liability, contract disputes, fraud and fiduciary claims, energy, oil and gas litigation, construction litigation, insurance litigation, trust & estate litigation, antitrust litigation, legal and professional malpractice, and partnership disputes. Gibbs & Bruns is routinely recognized as a top commercial litigation firm in the US.  For more information, visit www.gibbsbruns.com.

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Davis v. U.S. Bank – Nevada Supreme Court to determine the legality of MERS foreclosures. Oral Argument: 01/04/2012 at 10:00 AM

Davis v. U.S. Bank – Nevada Supreme Court to determine the legality of MERS foreclosures. Oral Argument: 01/04/2012 at 10:00 AM


Docket: Read from top to Bottom

ANDREW DAVIS AND LAURETTA DAVIS,
Appellants,

VS.

US BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION AS
TRUSTEE,
Respondent.

06/29/2010 Notice of Appeal Documents – Certified Copy of Notice of Appeal/Settlement Filed Certified Copy of Notice of Appeal/Settlement. Notice Re Settlement Conference Program and Suspension of Rules mailed to all counsel. (The requesting of transcripts and briefing are stayed pursuant to NRAP 16(a)(1). Docketing Statement Form mailed to counsel for appellant(s).) 10-16890
06/29/2010 Filing Fee – Filing Fee due Filing Fee due. Filing fee will be fowarded by the District Court.
06/30/2010 Filing Fee – Filing Fee Paid with Efiling Received Filing Fee Paid on Filing. $250.00 from Mark Mausert, Esq. Check No. 1311.
07/02/2010 Notice/Outgoing – Notice to File Documents Issued Notice to File Documents. It has been determined that this appeal willl not be scheduled for settlement conference. Transcript request form due: 15 days. Opening Brief due: 120 days. 10-17323
07/19/2010 Docketing Statement – Docketing Statement Filed Docketing Statement. 10-18354
07/30/2010 Transcript – Notice from Court Reporter Filed Notice from Court Reporter. Stephanie Koetting stating that the requested transcripts were delivered. Dates of transcripts: 06/08/10. 10-19737
08/03/2010 Notice/Outgoing – Notice to Request Transcripts Issued Notice to Request Transcripts. 10-19978
08/04/2010 Transcript Request – Request for Transcript of Proceedings Filed Request for Transcript of Proceedings. Transcripts requested: 06/08/10. To Court Reporter: Stephanie Koetting. 10-20088
10/26/2010 Brief – Opening Brief Filed Opening Brief. 10-28063
10/26/2010 Appendix – Appendix to Opening Brief Filed Appendix to Opening Brief. 10-28065
12/06/2010 Order/Procedural – Order Denying Motion Filed Order Denying Motion to Consolidate Appeals and Granting Motion to Enlarge time to File Opening Brief and Appendix in Docket No. 56138. Opening brief and appendix in docket no. 56138 due 14 days. Nos. 56306/56138. 10-31650
12/14/2010 Notice/Outgoing – Notice to File Answering Brief Issued Notice to File Answering Brief. Due Date: 15 days. 10-32638
12/23/2010 Brief – Answering Brief Filed Answering Brief. 10-33603
01/21/2011 Brief – Reply Brief Filed Reply Brief. 11-02154
01/21/2011 Appendix – Appendix to Reply Brief Filed Appendix to Reply Brief. 11-02158
02/28/2011 Notice/Incoming – Substitution of Attorneys Filed Substitution of Attorneys. Kravitz, Schnitzer, Sloane & Johnson, Chtd. substituted in place and stead of McCarthy & Holthus as counsel for respondent Litton Loan Servicing, LP. 11-06065
03/18/2011 Motion – Motion Filed Motion to Dismiss or in the alternative, Motion to File Supplemental Brief. 11-08471
05/11/2011 Order/Procedural – Order Filed Order Dismissing Respondent Litton Loan Servicing, LP. We direct the clerk of this court to remove Litton Loan Servicing, LP from the caption in this appeal. 11-13932
06/28/2011 Order/Procedural – Order Filed Order Directing Filing of Appendix and Clarification of Counsel. Law Firm McCarthy & Holthus: 15 days to file and serve appendix. Law Firm McCarthy & Holthus and Law Firm Kravitz, Schnitzer, Sloane & Johnson: 15 days to file a response to this order, stating whether they represent US Bank, and if not, identifying US Bank’s new counsel. 11-19225
07/12/2011 Appendix – Appendix Filed Respondents Appendix. (Submitted by McCarthy & Holthus). 11-20723
07/19/2011 Motion – Response to Order Filed Response to Order for Clarification for Counsel. 11-21668
12/09/2011 Notice/Outgoing – Notice Scheduling Oral Argument Issued Notice Scheduling Oral Argument. Oral argument is scheduled or January 4, 2012, at 10:00 a.m. in Carson City for 30 minutes before the En Banc Panel. 11-37593
12/22/2011 Notice/Outgoing – Oral Argument Reminder Notice Issued Oral Argument Reminder Notice. 11-39424

[ipaper docId=77091745 access_key=key-1j06omxv6bw46x7y6zbj height=600 width=600 /]

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I-Team: Nevada Supreme Court MERS Case Could Impact Homeowners

I-Team: Nevada Supreme Court MERS Case Could Impact Homeowners


This isn’t rocket science… The Banks created this unreliable system, destroyed land records, screwed the courts, screwed the counties of fees and fabricated documents that were all pre-dated in order to make them appear legit. All the Supreme Court needs to do is read Max Gardner’s Top Tips for Fake Mortgage Documents or read to spot the crime.

These are a few other interesting Nevada cases:

REDMON v. HOMEQ SERVICING INC. | Nevada Supreme Court Vacating Judgment & Remanding “Mediation, Sanctions, In RE PASILLAS”

Nevada Supreme Court Reversed & Remand – “Mediation, Sanctions, MERS Failed To Produce the Deed of Trust & Any Assignments” | HEREDIA-BONNET v. LOANSTAR

LEYVA v. National Default Servicing Corp. | Nevada Supreme Court Remand and Reverse “Defective ASMT, U.C.C Article 3, No Endorsement, In Re Pasillas, Wells Fargo, MortgageIt”

PASILLAS v. HSBC Bank USA | Nevada Supreme Court Reverse “Sanctionable offenses under the Foreclosure Mediation Program, IBANEZ, AHMSI, Alleged Assignment”

8NEWS NOW-

A case before the Nevada State Supreme Court next week could have far-reaching impact on Nevadans struggling to stay in their homes. Among the issues before the justices is what proof lenders must provide to show they own the property they seek to foreclose.

[8NEWS NOW]

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KCSG Television – Utah Federal Judges Decisions Conflict in ReconTrust Utah Home Foreclosure Actions

KCSG Television – Utah Federal Judges Decisions Conflict in ReconTrust Utah Home Foreclosure Actions


There are some judges that get it and some that maybe still do but side the other way!

KCSG-

Utah senior federal Judges Dee Benson and Bruce Jenkins have ruled Bank of America’s foreclosure arm, ReconTrust Company, N.A. (NYSE: “BAC”) may not be qualified to perform non-judicial foreclosures in Utah. However, this week senior federal Judge David Sam ruled that ReconTrust is operating under the National Bank Act regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), is a trustee under the Texas law where ReconTrust is located rendering Utah Code 57-1-21(3) inapplicable. Ruling

The ruling comes in a case filed by attorney John Christian Barlow, in which ReconTrust is being sued by Utah homeowner Garry Franklin Garrett and accused of conducting an unlawful foreclosure sale because ReconTrust is not a qualified trustee under Utah Law.

[KCSG]

[ipaper docId=76349579 access_key=key-1gc7dwjst0siby2ccnk5 height=600 width=600 /]

 

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U.S. Bank N.A. v Mollah | NYSC Denies Wells Fargo s/h/a Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. As Nominee and Mortgagee of Records Summary Judgment

U.S. Bank N.A. v Mollah | NYSC Denies Wells Fargo s/h/a Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. As Nominee and Mortgagee of Records Summary Judgment


NEW YORK SUPREME COURT – QUEENS COUNTY

U.S. BANK N.A.,
Plaintiff,

-against-

MOHAMMED MOLLAH, et al.,
Defendants.

Excerpt:
Defendant, Wells Fargo Home Mortgage s/h/a Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. As Nominee and Mortgagee of Record’s motion for an order pursuant to RPAPL 1521 granting summary judgment on its twenty-second affirmative defense that said defendant’s lien is superior to plaintiffs by virtue of the fact that said defendant’s lien is recorded prior to plaintiffs is hereby denied.

[ipaper docId=76193823 access_key=key-9vtffm9a40zflgd2ztx height=600 width=600 /]

 

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NYSC Judge Hammers Fremont, MERS, Pillar, Steven J. Baum PC, U.S. Bank “ASMT from MERS is defective, as it had no right, authority to assign the mortgage or the note”

NYSC Judge Hammers Fremont, MERS, Pillar, Steven J. Baum PC, U.S. Bank “ASMT from MERS is defective, as it had no right, authority to assign the mortgage or the note”



Decided on December 7, 2011

Supreme Court, Kings County

 

U.S. Bank National Association, AS TRUSTEE FOR SG MORTGAGE SECURITIES ASSET BACKED CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-FRE2, Plaintiff,

against

Alan Bressler, CCU LLC, MERS, INC. ET AL, Defendants.

33920/08

Debra Silber, J.

Recitation, as required by CPLR 2219(a), of the papers considered in the review of plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and for the appointment of a Referee to compute in this foreclosure action, and defendant’s cross-motion to dismiss.

PapersNumbered

Notice of Motion and Exhibits Annexed ……………………………….1-12

Cross-motion and Exhibits Annexed ……………………………………13- 20

Answering Affidavits …………………………………………………………21-30

Reply Affidavits ………………………………………………………………..

Other:

Upon the foregoing cited papers, the Decision/Order on this application is as follows:

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and the appointment of a referee to compute in this foreclosure action concerning 1477 East 32nd Street, Brooklyn, NY, 11234, Block 7694, Lot 85, is denied and defendant mortgagor’s motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing is granted, for the reasons set forth herein.

Defendant Alan Bressler alleges in his Answer to the Complaint that the plaintiff lacks standing to bring this action. In response to the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, defendant cross moves to dismiss the foreclosure action on the grounds that plaintiff lacks standing to bring this action. The court finds that defendant is correct, and as such, the action must be dismissed.

The mortgage in question was issued by Fremont Investment and Loan on May 4, 2006. The loan states “for purposes of recording, MERS is the mortgagee of record.” The tortured history of MERS is described in Bank of NY v. Silverberg, 2011 NY Slip Op 5002, 86 AD3d 274 (2nd Dept), and need not be repeated. On December 18, 2008, an Assignment of Mortgage was executed, and subsequently recorded, which assigns the mortgage and not the note, and assigns it from MERS to plaintiff. First, the assignment of a mortgage without the note is defective as the transfer of the mortgage without the debt is a nullity. In a decision citing Silverberg, the court said “an assignment of the mortgage without assignment of the underlying note or bond is a nullity” Citimortgage, Inc. v Stosel, 2011 NY Slip Op 8319 (2nd Dept) citing U.S. Bank, N.A. v [*2]Collymore, 68 AD3d at 754; see Bank of NY v Silverberg, 86 AD3d 274, 280, 926 N.Y.S.2d 532.

Secondly, an assignment from MERS to plaintiff is defective, as MERS had no right or authority to assign the mortgage or the note. Bank of NY v Silverberg, supra. “The plaintiff, which merely stepped into the shoes of MERS, its assignor, and gained only that to which its assignor was entitled . . . did not acquire the power to foreclose by way of the

. . . assignment.” Id.

It must also be noted that not only did MERS lack the power and authority to execute the assignment on behalf of Fremont Investment and Loan on December 18, 2008, but Fremont did not exist any longer on that date, as it was first subjected to a cease and desist order from the FDIC and then went into Bankruptcy. Then, its assets were apparently sold sometime in 2010 in a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy proceeding, which started in the summer of 2008, to Signature Group Holdings Inc.[FN1]

Further, it must be noted that the execution of an Assignment of Mortgage by MERS is barred by the Settlement Agreement between the US Attorney’s Office on behalf of the United States of America and the Office of Steven J. Baum P.C. and Pillar Processing, LLC, dated October 6, 2011, which states at paragraph 14 that “Baum shall no longer permit anyone employed by or contracted by Baum to execute any assignment of a mortgage as an officer, director, employee, agent or other representative of MERSCORP, Inc., and/or Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.” The office of Mr. Baum was the attorney for the plaintiff when this matter was commenced, the assignment at issue is stamped “Pillar Processing LLC” and is signed on behalf of MERS by Elpiniki M. Bechakas, an attorney in the office of Steven J. Baum, according to the public internet attorney registration website maintained by the State of New York.

To the extent that plaintiff’s counsel opposes the defendant’s motion to dismiss with various affirmations of counsel, including one that states that the Note was indeed also assigned, and annexes (Exhibit B) a photocopy of a document alleged to be an assignment of the note, which is merely a blank piece of paper that states “Pay to the order of US Bank National Association as Trustee, without recourse,” and is undated and signed by “Michael Koch, Vice President, Fremont Investment and Loan,” this is insufficient. Ms. Jones, Vice President for Loan Documentation for Wells Fargo Bank N.A., states in her affidavit (Paragraph 5) “the Note was endorsed and was physically delivered to Wells Fargo/ASC as servicing agent and custodian for US Bank prior to the commencement of this action . . . Thus, Wells Fargo’s records specifically reflect that, it was in physical possession of the endorsed note prior to the commencement of this action.” The language in the affidavit indicates that the loan was assigned and transferred to plaintiff while Fremont Investment & Loan was still in existence, in July of 2006, but this is the only indication of this fact, and does not indicate delivery to plaintiff, but merely alleging delivery to plaintiff’s agent for servicing without any supporting documentation. Ms Jones provides no date of the alleged delivery, and as discussed above, at the time of the alleged delivery, Fremont may not have existed, or may have been subject to the restrictions on transfer in the proceedings in Bankruptcy Court, or may have been subject to the FDIC’s cease [*3]and desist order. This cannot be ascertained without a date.

The affirmation of counsel that indicates that the current loan servicer has confirmed that the information in the complaint is accurate is also insufficient, as there is no indication that the alleged servicer is actually the servicer for this loan. The pooling and servicing agreement is between plaintiff and the servicer. There is nothing in the papers from Signature Group Holdings, Inc., the entity that now appears to own the Note and Mortgage, which confirms that they too have retained Wells Fargo as servicer for this loan.

In conclusion, plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case for summary judgment due to the defects in the documentation in their motion, described above. The defendant has made out a prima facie case for dismissal on the grounds that plaintiff lacked standing at the time the action was commenced, and may in fact still lack standing, which plaintiff has not overcome with any documentation, in admissible form or not, to prevent dismissal of the complaint.

This shall constitute the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: December 7, 2011

E N T E R :

Hon. Debra Silber A.J.S.C.

Footnotes

Footnote 1:http://nationalmortgageprofessional.com/news18108/former-sub-prime-lender-fremont-exits-bankruptcy-and-re-emerges-signature-group-holdings

[ipaper docId=75268698 access_key=key-11yt6778nbw437v3l28w height=600 width=600 /]

 

© 2010-17 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



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Future of foreclosures in N.J. hinges on state Supreme Court decision | US Bank N.A. v. Guillaume

Future of foreclosures in N.J. hinges on state Supreme Court decision | US Bank N.A. v. Guillaume


I disagree with the judge’s motion words below and see video below as to why even attorney’s have a difficult time.

“I have a lot of problems with saying that all that’s going, with all this evidence of [c]ourt process for over a year, to just rely on trying to negotiate something with the bank was like sticking your head in the sand.

This wasn’t going to go away and they
didn’t get any assurance from the bank that
they were succeeding in their negotiation
efforts or that an answer to the complaint
was not required. I mean they just focused
on one path. And they ignored the
negotiation path and they ignored the
litigation side of things. You can’t do
that.

And I have to say that . . . Mrs.
Guillaume was being so aggressive and so
persistent in trying to negotiate and going
to all these different places to get help,
but the one place she wasn’t going was a
member of the bar, a lawyer which is usually
what you do when you get [c]ourt papers.

Or if you absolutely can’t afford a
lawyer and that’s the case of many
foreclosures, a very heavy self-represented
area of the law to at least contact the
[c]ourt yourself and you send in some
rudimentary answer. And it doesn’t have to
be fancy. I mean you write a letter to the
foreclosure unit, they’ll stamp contested on
it.

Because I’ve seen so many of them long
hand. But nothing was done. And I don’t
regard that as excusable neglect. So that
prong is lacking.”  

(emphasis added).

Simply wrong, one does NOT understand how frustrating it is to even try to get anyone from the “bank” on the phone, attempting a modification as we have read time and time again were nothing but DISASTROUS and GOING ABSOLUTELY NO PLACE!

[Please watch Michigan Atty Vanessa Fluker and you’ll understand why].

Lets not forget, this reversal that goes to the heart of this from out of New Jersey: BANK OF NEW YORK vs. LAKS | NJ Appeals Court Reversal “A notice of intention is deficient…if it does not provide the name and address of the lender”

NJ.COM-

In the nearly five months since the state Supreme Court effectively allowed six of the country’s biggest banks to begin filing foreclosures again, attorneys and court officials have been expecting a flood of new filings to hit the courts.

Except it hasn’t happened. Foreclosure filings are down 83 percent as of October this year, compared with the same time period last year, according to court figures, and there are at least 100,000 cases either pending in the system or waiting to be submitted.

Attorneys involved in the work in New Jersey point to at least one reason for the significant delay: a court case that has reached the state Supreme Court, with oral arguments on Wednesday.

The case, US Bank National Association v. Guillaume, is important because the court …

[NJ.COM]

[ipaper docId=74692087 access_key=key-1xrvd0kemha1r7mycu2h height=600 width=600 /]

 

© 2010-17 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



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Phillips vs. U.S. Bank | JUDGE DENNIS BLACKMON NAILS US BANK IN GEORGIA ON HAMP, WRONGFUL FORECLOSURE AND EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGES

Phillips vs. U.S. Bank | JUDGE DENNIS BLACKMON NAILS US BANK IN GEORGIA ON HAMP, WRONGFUL FORECLOSURE AND EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGES


H/T Living Lies For This Superb Find

“Sometimes, only courts of law stand to protect the taxpayer. Somewhere, someone has to stand up. Well, sometimes is now, and the place is the Great State of Georgia. The Defendant’s Motion is hereby Denied”

“The United States Government paid taxpayer dollars to the largest of our financial institutions, and to European Union Banks, in order to prop up those poorly run organizations. Twenty Billion of those dollars were handed over to the defendant, U.S. Bank.”

“The HAMP guidelines require U.S. Bank to perform modification services for all mortgage loans its services. Otis Philips applied to modify his mortgage with U.S. Bank. U..S. Bank denied the request, without numbers, figures, or explanation, reasoning, comparison to the guidelines, or anything.”

“A cynical Judge might believe that this entire motion to dismiss is a desperate attempt to avoid the discovery period, where U.S. Bank would have to tell Mr. Phillips how his financial situation did not qualify him for a modification. Or, perhaps he was [Judge’s emphasis, not mine] qualified, yet didn’t receive the modification, in violation of U.S. Bank’s Service Participation Agreement (SPA).”

“U.S. Bank’s silence on this issue might heighten the suspicions of such a cynical jurist.”

“Clearly, U.S. Bank cannot take the money, contract with our government to provide a a service to the taxpayer, violate that agreement, and then say no one on earth can sue them for it. That is not the law in Georgia. In fact, since no administrative review is provided in HAMP [which is something you should put in your OCC letter demanding review], the courts are the only recourse.”

  [ipaper docId=72757477 access_key=key-2mhv6qb83jgun7xscoll height=600 width=600 /]

 

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U.S. Bank calls for court to hear MERS class-action suit

U.S. Bank calls for court to hear MERS class-action suit


Highly recommend that if anyone wants to go after MERS, you first read STATE OF DELAWARE v. MERSCORP, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., (MERS) to get familiar with some specifics. 

 

Observer- Reporter

U.S. Bank National Association has asked U.S. District Court to hear a class-action suit, filed by Washington County on behalf of all counties in the state, over the association’s failure to use the recorder of deeds offices to record mortgages, denying counties the related fees.

Washington County first took the case to Washington County Court, but the bank is now seeking a change in jurisdiction. The county alleges that more than $100 million has been lost in recording fees by all 67 counties in the state.

The county alleges U.S. Bank National Association, as trustee for various residential mortgage-backed security trusts, violated state law by failing to record “each and every mortgage transfer.”

The bank instead used a private entity, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc., for recording, “thereby depriving Washington County of the accompanying recording fees” for 15 or more years.

[OBSERVER-REPORTER]

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