How many hoops do homeowners have to jump through to shake off a bad mortgage?
This question is at the heart of a growing area of law as judges across the country try to determine whether borrowers who took out loans at the height of the subprime bubble, under shady terms that they weren’t told about, can cancel their mortgage and walk away debt-free.
Under the federal Truth in Lending Act, homebuyers who aren’t properly informed of the terms of their mortgage have up to three years to cancel or “rescind” the loan. What’s unclear now is whether borrowers, to ensure the debt is canceled, also have to file a lawsuit within that three-year window against whoever owns the loan.
On Tuesday, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau weighed in, filing a friend of the court brief in a …
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X)
AGENCY: Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection.
ACTION: Interim final rule with request for public comment.
SUMMARY: Title X of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and ConsumerProtection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) transferred rulemaking authority for a number of consumer financial protection laws from seven Federal agencies to the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (Bureau) as of July 21, 2011. The Bureau is in the process of republishing the regulations implementing those laws with technical and conforming changes to reflect the transfer of authority and certain other changes made by the Dodd-Frank Act. In light of the transfer of the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD’s) rulemaking authority for the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) to the Bureau, the Bureau is publishing for public comment an interim final rule establishing a new Regulation X (Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act). This interim final rule does not impose any new substantive obligations on persons subject to the existing Regulation X, previously published by HUD.
DATES: This interim final rule is effective December 30, 2011. Comments must be received on or before February 21, 2012.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by Docket No. CFPB-2011- 0030 or RIN 3170-AA06, by any of the following methods: Electronic: http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
Mail: Monica Jackson, Office of the Executive Secretary, Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, 1500 Pennsylvania Ave. NW., (Attn: 1801 L Street), Washington, DC 20220.
Hand Delivery/Courier in Lieu of Mail: Monica Jackson, Office of the Executive Secretary, Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, 1700 G Street NW., Washington, DC 20006.
All submissions must include the agency name and docket number or Regulatory Information Number (RIN) for this rulemaking. In general, all comments received will be posted without change to http://www.regulations.gov. In addition, comments will be available for publicinspection and copying at 1700 G Street NW., Washington, DC 20006, on official business days between the hours of 10 a.m. and 5 p.m. Eastern Time. You can make an appointment to inspect the documents by telephoning (202) 435-7275.
All comments, including attachments and other supporting materials, will become part of the public record and subject to public disclosure. Sensitive personal information, such as account numbers or social security numbers, should not be included. Comments will not be edited to remove any identifying or contact information.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Joseph Devlin or Jane Gao, Office of Regulations, at (202) 435-7700.
Mortgage/ Securitization forensic auditors especially, may want to pay close attention to this case.
WSJ-
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed Tuesday to clarify the circumstances in which home buyers can sue mortgage lenders for allegedly charging them unearned fees during the closing process.
The case centers on a group of lawsuits from Louisiana in which borrowers alleged Detroit-based Quicken Loans Inc. charged them loan-discount fees but did not provide reduced interest rates in return.
Quicken Loans said the fees were legal and denied allegations that the fees were unearned.
Fed wants to strip a key protection for homeowners
Posted on Wednesday, December 1, 2010
By Tony Pugh | McClatchy Newspapers
WASHINGTON — As Americans continue to lose their homes in record numbers, the Federal Reserve is considering making it much harder for homeowners to stop foreclosures and escape predatory home loans with onerous terms.
The Fed’s proposal to amend a 42-year-old provision of the federal Truth in Lending Act has angered labor, civil rights and consumer advocacy groups along with a slew of foreclosure defense attorneys.
They’re not only asking the Fed to withdraw the proposal, they also want any future changes to the law to be handled by the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which begins its work next year.
In a letter to the Fed’s Board of Governors, dozens of groups that oppose the measure, including the National Consumer Law Center, the NAACP and the Service Employees International Union, say the proposal is bad medicine at the wrong time.
“At the depths of the worst foreclosure crisis since the Great Depression, we are surprised that the Fed has proposed rules that would eviscerate the primary protection homeowners currently have to escape abusive loans and avoid foreclosure: the extended right of rescission.”
Because the public comment period on the Fed’s proposal is still open until Dec. 23, a spokesman declined comment on the matter.
But in a September passage in the Federal Register, the Fed said the proposal was designed to “ensure a clearer and more equitable process for resolving rescission claims raised in court proceedings” and reflects what most courts already require.
Further,it appears that there is a conflict of interest in that MERS is both a plaintiff and defendant, at least as far as the original caption shows.
EXCERPTS:
On November 7, 2007, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., (MERS), as nominee for Lend America, assigned the mortgage to Central Mortgage Company (CMC). The assignment states that November 10, 2006 mortgage was made by Defendant Caughman to MERS as nominee for Lend America.
The caption of the action lists MERS, ,as nominee for Lend America, as the plaintiff. Defendants are Sherri Caughman, MERS, as nominee for Lend America, John Doe and Jane Doe.
In this motion, plaintiff seeks an order striking Defendant Caughman’s answer; the appointment of a Referee to compute the amount due and owing and the amendment of the caption. The amended caption would substitute CMC as plaintiff, in place and instead of MERS, as nominee for Lend America. In the amended caption, Sherri Caughmann would remain as a defendant, MERS, as nominee for Lend America, would be added as a defendant and Mr. Caughman and Vicki Douglas were added as defendants.
In support of its motion, plaintiff argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because it has made out a prima facie case and that defendant’s answer does not show that there are any issues of fact which would warrant denial of its motion.
Defendants, in opposing the motion, contends that MERS has no standing, as a nominee, to bring action because its status as nominee is limited and does not give it the power to transfer or assign ownership rights in property on behalf of the party for which it is acting as nominee. They add that MERS has said that it is not in possession of the original promissory note and, as such it allegations are inconsistent with its exhibits. Thus, defendants conclude, this raises issues of fact.
Continuing, defendants conted that the mortgage and note involved here were issued in Violation of the Federal Truth in Lending Act in that plaintiff did not provide them with the disclosures required under 15USC1639(a)(1) and (a)(2)(A) and 12 CFR 226.32. These violations, say defendants, leaves them with a “continuing right” to rescind the deal, which they claim to do in their opposition.
Upon review, defendants’ motion is granted. Neither MERS nor CMC has shown that it had the mortgage and note at the time the action was commenced. Further,it appears that there is a conflict of interest in that MERS is both a plaintiff and defendant, at least as far as the original caption shows.
The parties are directed to appear before this court on May 4, 2010 at 9:30 am for a conference.
Buried in The Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, which the President signed into law yesterday, is an amendment to the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) that calls for a notice to the consumer when a ‘mortgage loan’ is transferred or assigned. The provision appears to be effective immediately, and violations are subject to TILA liability.
The text of the provision follows:
SEC. 404. NOTIFICATION OF SALE OR TRANSFER OF MORTGAGE LOANS. (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 131 of the Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. 1641) is amended by adding at the end the following: ‘‘(g) NOTICE OF NEW CREDITOR.— ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—In addition to other disclosures required by this title, not later than 30 days after the date on which a mortgage loan is sold or otherwise transferred or assigned to a third party, the creditor that is the new owner or assignee of the debt shall notify the borrower in writing of such transfer, including— ‘‘(A) the identity, address, telephone number of the new creditor; ‘‘(B) the date of transfer; ‘‘(C) how to reach an agent or party having authority to act on behalf of the new creditor; ‘‘(D) the location of the place where transfer of ownership of the debt is recorded; and ‘‘(E) any other relevant information regarding the new creditor. ‘‘(2) DEFINITION.—As used in this subsection, the term ‘mortgage loan’ means any consumer credit transaction that is secured by the principal dwelling of a consumer.’’. (b) PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION.—Section 130(a) of the Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. 1640(a)) is amended by inserting ‘‘subsection (f) or (g) of section 131,’’ after ‘‘section 125,’’.
THIS OPENS UP A HUGE NEW AVENUE OF ATTACK AGAINST FORECLOSURE AND
On December 31, 2009, the Third Circuit held that a borrower must prove detrimental reliance to obtain actual damages for a violation of the federal Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”). SeeVallies v. Sky Bank, —F.3d—, 2009 WL 5154473 (3rd Cir. 2009).
Under TILA, the federal government requires that lenders make certain disclosures to borrowers about the terms of their loans before lending them money. TILA claims are at the epicenter of the mortgage litigation crises. Over the past two years, TILA claims, including class action claims, have flooded the state and federal courts. Most of these claims involve allegations that some technical TILA disclosure violation has occurred.
Though not a mortgage case, the allegations of the borrower in Vallies v. Sky Bank are typical. The plaintiff alleged that the finance charge statement made by the bank for an auto loan was misleading in that it did not include $395 representing the amount of the debt cancellation insurance, which the plaintiff alleged should have been included in the finance charge statement under TILA. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the bank because the borrower had failed to show that (1) he had read the TILA disclosure statement pertaining to finance charges, (2) he had understood the finance charges being disclosed, (3) had the disclosure been accurate by including an additional $395, he would have sought better terms or foregone the loan, and (4) if he had sought better terms, he would have obtained them.
The Third Circuit declined to state the specific facts or circumstances that constitute detrimental reliance under TILA, but affirmed the decision of the district court that detrimental reliance must be shown and had not been shown here. In so holding, the Third Circuit relied on the language of TILA itself, which provides for both actual damages and statutory damages. According to the Third Circuit, to obtain actual damages, a plaintiff must show causation by showing that he or she relied on a misleading or improper loan disclosure statement to his or her detriment. In contrast, to obtain statutory damages, a plaintiff must only show that a violation of TILA has occurred. (For class action suits, statutory damages under TILA are capped at the lesser of $500,000 or 1% of the defendant’s net worth.).
In reaching its decision, the Third Circuit considered but rejected as irrelevant the concerns of some legal commentators, who have noted that under a detrimental reliance standard actual damages for TILA loan disclosure violations may be difficult to prove. The court also disregarded the fact that “detrimental reliance may create obstacles for class certification because of the individualized fact-specific nature of the reliance inquiry.” The court distinguished other case law, holding that detrimental reliance under TILA is not necessary, on the grounds that those cases involved claims for statutory damages, not actual damages, under TILA.
Finally, the Third Circuit noted that it joined the holding of every other circuit court that has addressed the issue, including the First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. CitingUnited States v. Petroff-5 Kline, 557 F.3d 285, 297 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[A]ctual damages require a showing of detrimental reliance.”); McDonald v. Checks-N-Advance, Inc.(In re Ferrell), 539 F.3d 1186, 1192 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding no valid basis to overturn the rule of In re Smith requiring a showing of detrimental reliance to establish actual damages); Gold Country Lenders v. Smith (In re Smith), 289 F.3d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Wejoin with other circuits and hold that in order to receive actual damages for a TILA violation . . . a borrower must establish detrimental reliance.”); Turner v. Beneficial Corp., 242 F.3d 1023, 1028 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (“We hold that detrimental reliance is an element of a TILA claim for actual damages . . . .”); Perrone v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 232 F.3d 433, 434–40 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that detrimental reliance is an element of a claim for actual damages); Peters v. Jim Lupient Oldsmobile Co., 220 F.3d 915, 917 (8th Cir. 2000)(requiring a showing of proximate causation and adopting a four-prong reliance test for establishing actual damages); Bizier v. Globe Fin. Servs., Inc., 654 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1981) (noting in dicta the need to show causation for an award of actual damages “in addition to a threshold showing of a violation of a TILA requirement”).
Under this law, it is not enough, as plaintiffs in TILA cases often do, to allege that a TILA loan disclosure violation has occurred. Instead, a plaintiff must also allege and prove that he or she relied on the misleading or improper statement and as a result of this reliance suffered actual damage. This recent decision of the Third Circuit also emphasizes the difficulty of certifying a class action for actual damages under TILA. Even where the named plaintiff has detrimentally relied on an improper loan disclosure statement, such reliance can rarely be universally inferred for other, unnamed class members. Instead, to determining detrimental reliance usually requires an individual inquiry about whether the class member read the disclosure statement, understood it, and relied on it to his or her detriment. For this reason, such cases are very difficult to certify for class treatment. See, e.g., Stout v. J.D. Byrider, 228 F.3d 709, 718 (6th Cir. 2000) (affirming the denial of class certification based on the need for individualized assessment of whether “each putative class member relied upon false representations or failures to disclose” under TILA).
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