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DEUTSCHE BANK v. QUINONES | NYSC “Restored to Possession, No Affidavit of Service, Not in Default”

DEUTSCHE BANK v. QUINONES | NYSC “Restored to Possession, No Affidavit of Service, Not in Default”


NEW YORK SUPREME COURT –
QUEENS COUNTY


DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST CO. As TrusteeUnder Pooling and Servicing Agreement Dated as of November 1, 2006 Securitized Asset Backed Receivables Certificates Series 2006-WM3,

-against-

JOSE QUINONES, JOHNNY FERREIRA, MORTGAGE
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., As
Nominee for WMC Mortgage Corp., NYCTAB,
NYCPVB, NYCECB, JOHNNY FERREIRA JR.,
MEKIDA AZCONA, CLARENCE FORD,

EXCERPT:

The referee’s deed dated, March 27, 2009, and filed in the Office of the City Register on April 13, 2009, CFRN 2009000107255 is vacated and set aside and the defendant, Johnny Ferreira is restored to possession.

[…]

Finally, it is pointed out that even if, as plaintiff claims, the defendant was served pursuant to CPLR 308(2), no affidavit of service was filed in this action, thus, the defendant is not in default. Service pursuant to CPLR 308(2) is complete, and the defendant’s time to answer begins to run ten days after filing proof of service (see CPLR 320[a]; 3012[c]; Zareef v. Wong, 61 AD3d 749 [2009]; Marazita v. Nelbach, 91 AD2d 604 [1982], appeal withdrawn 58 NY2d 826 [1983]). No affidavit of service has been filed in this action and the plaintiff has never moved for leave to file the affidavit of service. The plaintiff’s actions, or rather inaction, has contributed if not caused the delay it claims is prejudicial.

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Facebook Becomes Tool to Serve Legal Papers

Facebook Becomes Tool to Serve Legal Papers


BLOOMBERG

Two years after an Australian lawyer caused a stir by sending a foreclosure notice via Facebook, the practice of online legal service is spreading as a means for courts to keep their dockets moving.

Courts in New Zealand, Canada and the U.K. have adopted the Australian example to avoid having cases stall when people can’t be located and served in person. Lawyers said the U.S. may not be far behind in using the world’s most popular social- networking service.


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FL 5DCA Reversed | “Vacant Home, Purported Service” SILVA v. BAC HOME LOANS

FL 5DCA Reversed | “Vacant Home, Purported Service” SILVA v. BAC HOME LOANS


ABNER SILVA,
Appellant,

v. …………………………Case No. 5D10-3511

BAC HOME LOANS SERVICING, L.P., ETC.,
Appellee.
________________________________/

Opinion filed May 6, 2011

Non Final Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Orange County,

Emerson Thompson, Jr., Senior Judge.

Matthew D. Valdes, Kaufman, Englett &
Lynd, PLLC, Orlando, for Appellant.

No Appearance for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Abner Silva, the defendant below, seeks review of an order denying his motion to set aside a default final judgment entered against him. We reverse.

In this foreclosure case, substituted service of process was secured on Silva under section 48.031, Florida Statutes (2010), by serving a “Luz Rodriguez”, who purportedly lived at the mortgaged property. However, the affidavits and other information submitted in support of Silva’s motion below established that the mortgaged property had been vacant for some time prior to the purported service, that he did not ?know anyone by the name of Luz Rodriguez, and that his usual place of abode was, and had been for eighteen months prior to the purported service, in Miami.

The party seeking to invoke the court’s jurisdiction has the burden to prove the validity of service of process. See Torres v. Arnco Constr., Inc., 867 So. 2d 583, 587 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). This record does not reflect competent evidence that BAC Home Loans Servicing L.P., the plaintiff below, met that burden. The default judgment was,
therefore, void and must be set aside. See Alvarez v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 635 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).

REVERSED.

MONACO, C.J., SAWAYA and ORFINGER, JJ., concur.

[ipaper docId=55010635 access_key=key-yfuardbwb8evgw2jmls height=600 width=600 /]

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FL Process Server Alleges Her Signatures Were Forged

FL Process Server Alleges Her Signatures Were Forged


Palm Beach Post- Kimberly Miller

West Palm Beach resident Liz Mills learned she was a robo-signer when a friend suggested she search her own name online.

On foreclosure blogs and in at least one newspaper article, the 51-year-old process server was singled out for the numerous and varying styles of her signatures on summons paperwork used to prove her efforts in locating home­owners in foreclosure.

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NY Appeals Court “Nail and Mail, Referee’s Deed, Insufficent” HOME LOAN SERVS., INC. v. Moskowitz

NY Appeals Court “Nail and Mail, Referee’s Deed, Insufficent” HOME LOAN SERVS., INC. v. Moskowitz


2011 NY Slip Op 21051

HOME LOAN SERVICES, INC. SUCCESSOR BY MERGER TO NATIONAL CITY HOME LOAN SERVICES, Respondent,
v.
FRANCES MOSKOWITZ, “JOHN DOE” AND “JANE DOE,” Occupants, AND
JACOB MARKOWITZ AND SARAH MARKOWITZ, Appellants.

2009-1851 KC.Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department.

Decided February 14, 2011.PRESENT: PESCE, P.J., WESTON and RIOS, JJ.

Prior to commencing this summary proceeding, petitioner served a 10-day notice to quit upon occupants, together with a certified copy of the referee’s deed, by “nail and mail” service, after four attempts at personal service had been made at different times on different days. Occupants Jacob Markowitz and Sarah Markowitz (appellants) moved to dismiss the petition as against them on the ground that attaching a copy of the referee’s deed to a 10-day notice to quit served by “nail and mail” is not sufficient to satisfy the requirement of RPAPL 713 (5) that a deed be “exhibited” to the respondent. The Civil Court denied appellants’ motion. We reverse.

RPAPL 713 provides in pertinent part:

“A special proceeding may be maintained under this article after a ten-day notice to quit has been served upon the respondent in the manner prescribed in section 735, upon the following grounds:

. . .

5. The property has been sold in foreclosure and either the deed delivered pursuant to such sale, or a copy of such deed, certified as provided in the civil practice law and rules, has been exhibited to him.”

While this statute provides that a notice to quit may be served in the same manner as a notice of petition and petition, it does not make the same provision for the referee’s deed. Instead, the statute specifically requires that the deed be “exhibited” to the respondent. In our view, and in light of the strong policy prohibiting unlawful evictions (see generally Bill Jacket, L. 1981, ch. 467), attaching a copy of the referee’s deed to a 10-day notice to quit served by “nail and mail” was insufficient to satisfy the requirement of exhibition of the deed pursuant to RPAPL 713 (5) (see Colony Mtge. Bankers, 192 Misc 2d 704 [Sup Ct, Westchester County 2002]; but see Novastar Mtge., Inc. v LaForge, 12 Misc 3d 1179[A], 2006 NY Slip Op 51306[U] [Sup Ct, Greene County 2006] [discussing a writ of assistance]; Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Resnik, 24 Misc 3d 1238[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51793[U] [Nassau Dist Ct 2009]; GRP/AG REO 2004-1, LLC v Friedman, 8 Misc 3d 317, 318-319 [Just Ct, Town of Ramapo, Rockland County 2005]). Accordingly, the order is reversed and appellants’ motion to dismiss the petition as against them is granted.

Pesce, P.J., Weston and Rios, JJ., concur.

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Interesting Appeals Court Reversal From 1950’s “Fourteenth Amendment, Due Process” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.

Interesting Appeals Court Reversal From 1950’s “Fourteenth Amendment, Due Process” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.


339 U.S. 306 (1950)

MULLANE, SPECIAL GUARDIAN,
v.
CENTRAL HANOVER BANK & TRUST CO., TRUSTEE, ET AL.

No. 378.Supreme Court of United States.

Argued February 8, 1950. Decided April 24, 1950.

APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK.
.

307*307 Kenneth J. Mullane argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant.

Albert B. Maginnes argued the cause for the Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., appellee. With him on the brief was J. Quincy Hunsicker, 3rd.

James N. Vaughan submitted on brief for Vaughan, appellee.

Peter Keber and C. Alexander Capron filed a brief for the New York State Bankers Association, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

This controversy questions the constitutional sufficiency of notice to notice to beneficiaries on judicial settlement of accounts by the trustee of a common trust fund established under the New York Banking Law. The New York Court of Appeals considered and overruled objections that the statutory notice contravenes requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment and that by allowance of the account beneficiaries were deprived of property without due process of law. 299 N. Y. 697, 87 N. E. 2d 73. The case is here on appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1257.

Common trust fund legislation is addressed to a problem appropriate for state action. Mounting overheads have made administration of small trusts undesirable to corporate trustees. In order that donors and testators of moderately sized trusts may not be denied the service of corporate fiduciaries, the District of Columbia and some 308*308 thirty states other than New York have permitted pooling small trust estates into one fund for investment administration.[*] The income, capital gains, losses and expenses of the collective trust are shared by the constituent trusts in proportion to their contribution. By this plan, diversification of risk and economy of management can be extended to those whose capital standing alone would not obtain such advantage.

Statutory authorization for the establishment of such common trust funds is provided in the New York Banking Law, § 100-c (c. 687, L. 1937, as amended by c. 602, L. 1943 and c. 158, L. 1944). Under this Act a trust company may, with approval of the State Banking Board, establish a common fund and, within prescribed limits, 309*309 invest therein the assets of an unlimited number of estates, trusts or other funds of which it is trustee. Each participating trust shares ratably in the common fund, but exclusive management and control is in the trust company as trustee, and neither a fiduciary nor any beneficiary of a participating trust is deemed to have ownership in any particular asset or investment of this common fund. The trust company must keep fund assets separate from its own, and in its fiduciary capacity may not deal with itself or any affiliate. Provisions are made for accounting twelve to fifteen months after the establishment of a fund and triennially thereafter. The decree in each such judicial settlement of accounts is made binding and conclusive as to any matter set forth in the account upon everyone having any interest in the common fund or in any participating estate, trust or fund.

In January, 1946, Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company established a common trust fund in accordance with these provisions, and in March, 1947, it petitioned the Surrogate’s Court for settlement of its first account as common trustee. During the accounting period a total of 113 trusts, approximately half inter vivos and half testamentary, participated in the common trust fund, the gross capital of which was nearly three million dollars. The record does not show the number or residence of the beneficiaries, but they were many and it is clear that some of them were not residents of the State of New York.

The only notice given beneficiaries of this specific application was by publication in a local newspaper in strict compliance with the minimum requirements of N. Y. Banking Law § 100-c (12): “After filing such petition [for judicial settlement of its account] the petitioner shall cause to be issued by the court in which the petition is filed and shall publish not less than once in each week 310*310 for four successive weeks in a newspaper to be designated by the court a notice or citation addressed generally without naming them to all parties interested in such common trust fund and in such estates, trusts or funds mentioned in the petition, all of which may be described in the notice or citation only in the manner set forth in said petition and without setting forth the residence of any such decedent or donor of any such estate, trust or fund.” Thus the only notice required, and the only one given, was by newspaper publication setting forth merely the name and address of the trust company, the name and the date of establishment of the common trust fund, and a list of all participating estates, trusts or funds.

At the time the first investment in the common fund was made on behalf of each participating estate, however, the trust company, pursuant to the requirements of § 100-c (9), had notified by mail each person of full age and sound mind whose name and address were then known to it and who was “entitled to share in the income therefrom. . . [or] . . . who would be entitled to share in the principal if the event upon which such estate, trust or fund will become distributable should have occurred at the time of sending such notice.” Included in the notice was a copy of those provisions of the Act relating to the sending of the notice itself and to the judicial settlement of common trust fund accounts.

Upon the filing of the petition for the settlement of accounts, appellant was, by order of the court pursuant to § 100-c (12), appointed special guardian and attorney for all persons known or unknown not otherwise appearing who had or might thereafter have any interest in the income of the common trust fund; and appellee Vaughan was appointed to represent those similarly interested in the principal. There were no other appearances on behalf of any one interested in either interest or principal.

311*311 Appellant appeared specially, objecting that notice and the statutory provisions for notice to beneficiaries were inadequate to afford due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore that the court was without jurisdiction to render a final and binding decree. Appellant’s objections were entertained and overruled, the Surrogate holding that the notice required and given was sufficient. 75 N. Y. S. 2d 397. A final decree accepting the accounts has been entered, affirmed by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, 275 App. Div. 769, 88 N. Y. S. 2d 907, and by the Court of Appeals of the State of New York. 299 N. Y. 697, 87 N. E. 2d 73.

The effect of this decree, as held below, is to settle “all questions respecting the management of the common fund.” We understand that every right which beneficiaries would otherwise have against the trust company, either as trustee of the common fund or as trustee of any individual trust, for improper management of the common trust fund during the period covered by the accounting is sealed and wholly terminated by the decree. See Matter of Hoaglund, 194 Misc. 803, 811-812, 74 N. Y. S. 2d 156, 164, aff’d 272 App. Div. 1040, 74 N. Y. S. 2d 911, aff’d 297 N. Y. 920, 79 N. E. 2d 746; Matter of Bank of New York, 189 Misc. 459, 470, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 444, 453; Matter of Security Trust Co. of Rochester, id.Matter of Continental Bank & Trust Co., id. 795, 797, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 806, 807-808. 748, 760, 70 N. Y. S. 2d 260, 271;

We are met at the outset with a challenge to the power of the State—the right of its courts to adjudicate at all as against those beneficiaries who reside without the State of New York. It is contended that the proceeding is one in personam in that the decree affects neither title to nor possession of any res, but adjudges only personal rights of the beneficiaries to surcharge their trustee for negligence or breach of trust. Accordingly, it is said, under the strict doctrine of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, the Surrogate 312*312 is without jurisdiction as to nonresidents upon whom personal service of process was not made.

Distinctions between actions in rem and those in personam are ancient and originally expressed in procedural terms what seems really to have been a distinction in the substantive law of property under a system quite unlike our own. Buckland and McNair, Roman Law and Common Law, 66; Burdick, Principles of Roman Law and Their Relation to Modern Law, 298. The legal recognition and rise in economic importance of incorporeal or intangible forms of property have upset the ancient simplicity of property law and the clarity of its distinctions, while new forms of proceedings have confused the old procedural classification. American courts have sometimes classed certain actions as in rem because personal service of process was not required, and at other times have held personal service of process not required because the action was in rem. See cases collected in Freeman on Judgments, §§ 1517 et seq. (5th ed.).

Judicial proceedings to settle fiduciary accounts have been sometimes termed in rem, or more indefinitely quasi in rem, or more vaguely still, “in the nature of a proceeding in rem.” It is not readily apparent how the courts of New York did or would classify the present proceeding, which has some characteristics and is wanting in some features of proceedings both in rem and in personam. But in any event we think that the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution do not depend upon a classification for which the standards are so elusive and confused generally and which, being primarily for state courts to define, may and do vary from state to state. Without disparaging the usefulness of distinctions between actions in rem and those in personam in many branches of law, or on other issues, or the reasoning which underlies them, we do not rest the power of the State to resort to constructive service in this proceeding 313*313 upon how its courts or this Court may regard this historic antithesis. It is sufficient to observe that, whatever the technical definition of its chosen procedure, the interest of each state in providing means to close trusts that exist by the grace of its laws and are administered under the supervision of its courts is so insistent and rooted in custom as to establish beyond doubt the right of its courts to determine the interests of all claimants, resident or nonresident, provided its procedure accords full opportunity to appear and be heard.

Quite different from the question of a state’s power to discharge trustees is that of the opportunity it must give beneficiaries to contest. Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.

In two ways this proceeding does or may deprive beneficiaries of property. It may cut off their rights to have the trustee answer for negligent or illegal impairments of their interests. Also, their interests are presumably subject to diminution in the proceeding by allowance of fees and expenses to one who, in their names but without their knowledge, may conduct a fruitless or uncompensatory contest. Certainly the proceeding is one in which they may be deprived of property rights and hence notice and hearing must measure up to the standards of due process.

Personal service of written notice within the jurisdiction is the classic form of notice always adequate in any type of proceeding. But the vital interest of the State in bringing any issues as to its fiduciaries to a final settlement can be served only if interests or claims of individuals who are outside of the State can somehow be determined. A construction of the Due Process Clause which 314*314 would place impossible or impractical obstacles in the way could not be justified.

Against this interest of the State we must balance the individual interest sought to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. This is defined by our holding that “The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.” Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385, 394. This right to be heard has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest.

The Court has not committed itself to any formula achieving a balance between these interests in a particular proceeding or determining when constructive notice may be utilized or what test it must meet. Personal service has not in all circumstances been regarded as indispensable to the process due to residents, and it has more often been held unnecessary as to nonresidents. We disturb none of the established rules on these subjects. No decision constitutes a controlling or even a very illuminating precedent for the case before us. But a few general principles stand out in the books.

An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457; Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385; Priest v. Las Vegas, 232 U. S. 604; Roller v. Holly, 176 U. S. 398. The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information, Grannis v. Ordean, supra, and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance, Roller v. Holly, supra, and cf. Goodrich v. Ferris, 214 U. S. 71. But if with due regard for the practicalities and peculiarities of the case these conditions 315*315 are reasonably met, the constitutional requirements are satisfied. “The criterion is not the possibility of conceivable injury but the just and reasonable character of the requirements, having reference to the subject with which the statute deals.” American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U. S. 47, 67; and see Blinn v. Nelson, 222 U. S. 1, 7.

But when notice is a person’s due, process which is a mere gesture is not due process. The means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it. The reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of any chosen method may be defended on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform those affected, compare Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, with Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13, or, where conditions do not reasonably permit such notice, that the form chosen is not substantially less likely to bring home notice than other of the feasible and customary substitutes.

It would be idle to pretend that publication alone, as prescribed here, is a reliable means of acquainting interested parties of the fact that their rights are before the courts. It is not an accident that the greater number of cases reaching this Court on the question of adequacy of notice have been concerned with actions founded on process constructively served through local newspapers. Chance alone brings to the attention of even a local resident an advertisement in small type inserted in the back pages of a newspaper, and if he makes his home outside the area of the newspaper’s normal circulation the odds that the information will never reach him are large indeed. The chance of actual notice is further reduced when, as here, the notice required does not even name those whose attention it is supposed to attract, and does not inform acquaintances who might call it to attention. In weighing its sufficiency on the basis of equivalence with actual notice, we are unable to regard this as more than a feint.

316*316 Nor is publication here reinforced by steps likely to attract the parties’ attention to the proceeding. It is true that publication traditionally has been acceptable as notification supplemental to other action which in itself may reasonably be expected to convey a warning. The ways of an owner with tangible property are such that he usually arranges means to learn of any direct attack upon his possessory or proprietary rights. Hence, libel of a ship, attachment of a chattel or entry upon real estate in the name of law may reasonably be expected to come promptly to the owner’s attention. When the state within which the owner has located such property seizes it for some reason, publication or posting affords an additional measure of notification. A state may indulge the assumption that one who has left tangible property in the state either has abandoned it, in which case proceedings against it deprive him of nothing, cf. Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, 321 U. S. 233; Security Savings Bank v. California, 263 U. S. 282, or that he has left some caretaker under a duty to let him know that it is being jeopardized. Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U. S. 241; Huling v. Kaw Valley R. Co., 130 U. S. 559. As phrased long ago by Chief Justice Marshall in The Mary, 9 Cranch 126, 144, “It is the part of common prudence for all those who have any interest in [a thing], to guard that interest by persons who are in a situation to protect it.”

In the case before us there is, of course, no abandonment. On the other hand these beneficiaries do have a resident fiduciary as caretaker of their interest in this property. But it is their caretaker who in the accounting becomes their adversary. Their trustee is released from giving notice of jeopardy, and no one else is expected to do so. Not even the special guardian is required or apparently expected to communicate with his ward and client, and, of course, if such a duty were merely transferred 317*317 from the trustee to the guardian, economy would not be served and more likely the cost would be increased.

This Court has not hesitated to approve of resort to publication as a customary substitute in another class of cases where it is not reasonably possible or practicable to give more adequate warning. Thus it has been recognized that, in the case of persons missing or unknown, employment of an indirect and even a probably futile means of notification is all that the situation permits and creates no constitutional bar to a final decree foreclosing their rights. Cunnius v. Reading School District, 198 U. S. 458; Blinn v. Nelson, 222 U. S. 1; and see Jacob v. Roberts, 223 U. S. 261.

Those beneficiaries represented by appellant whose interests or whereabouts could not with due diligence be ascertained come clearly within this category. As to them the statutory notice is sufficient. However great the odds that publication will never reach the eyes of such unknown parties, it is not in the typical case much more likely to fail than any of the choices open to legislators endeavoring to prescribe the best notice practicable.

Nor do we consider it unreasonable for the State to dispense with more certain notice to those beneficiaries whose interests are either conjectural or future or, although they could be discovered upon investigation, do not in due course of business come to knowledge of the common trustee. Whatever searches might be required in another situation under ordinary standards of diligence, in view of the character of the proceedings and the nature of the interests here involved we think them unnecessary. We recognize the practical difficulties and costs that would be attendant on frequent investigations into the status of great numbers of beneficiaries, many of whose interests in the common fund are so remote as to be ephemeral; and we have no doubt that such impracticable and extended searches are not required in the 318*318 name of due process. The expense of keeping informed from day to day of substitutions among even current income beneficiaries and presumptive remaindermen, to say nothing of the far greater number of contingent beneficiaries, would impose a severe burden on the plan, and would likely dissipate its advantages. These are practical matters in which we should be reluctant to disturb the judgment of the state authorities.

Accordingly we overrule appellant’s constitutional objections to published notice insofar as they are urged on behalf of any beneficiaries whose interests or addresses are unknown to the trustee.

As to known present beneficiaries of known place of residence, however, notice by publication stands on a different footing. Exceptions in the name of necessity do not sweep away the rule that within the limits of practicability notice must be such as is reasonably calculated to reach interested parties. Where the names and postoffice addresses of those affected by a proceeding are at hand, the reasons disappear for resort to means less likely than the mails to apprise them of its pendency.

The trustee has on its books the names and addresses of the income beneficiaries represented by appellant, and we find no tenable ground for dispensing with a serious effort to inform them personally of the accounting, at least by ordinary mail to the record addresses. Cf. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, supra. Certainly sending them a copy of the statute months and perhaps years in advance does not answer this purpose. The trustee periodically remits their income to them, and we think that they might reasonably expect that with or apart from their remittances word might come to them personally that steps were being taken affecting their interests.

We need not weigh contentions that a requirement of personal service of citation on even the large number of known resident or nonresident beneficiaries would, by 319*319 reasons of delay if not of expense, seriously interfere with the proper administration of the fund. Of course personal service even without the jurisdiction of the issuing authority serves the end of actual and personal notice, whatever power of compulsion it might lack. However, no such service is required under the circumstances. This type of trust presupposes a large number of small interests. The individual interest does not stand alone but is identical with that of a class. The rights of each in the integrity of the fund and the fidelity of the trustee are shared by many other beneficiaries. Therefore notice reasonably certain to reach most of those interested in objecting is likely to safeguard the interests of all, since any objection sustained would inure to the benefit of all. We think that under such circumstances reasonable risks that notice might not actually reach every beneficiary are justifiable. “Now and then an extraordinary case may turn up, but constitutional law like other mortal contrivances has to take some chances, and in the great majority of instances no doubt justice will be done.” Blinn v. Nelson, supra, 7.

The statutory notice to known beneficiaries is inadequate, not because in fact it fails to reach everyone, but because under the circumstances it is not reasonably calculated to reach those who could easily be informed by other means at hand. However it may have been in former times, the mails today are recognized as an efficient and inexpensive means of communication. Moreover, the fact that the trust company has been able to give mailed notice to known beneficiaries at the time the common trust fund was established is persuasive that postal notification at the time of accounting would not seriously burden the plan.

In some situations the law requires greater precautions in its proceedings than the business world accepts for its own purposes. In few, if any, will it be satisfied with 320*320 less. Certainly it is instructive, in determining the reasonableness of the impersonal broadcast notification here used, to ask whether it would satisfy a prudent man of business, counting his pennies but finding it in his interest to convey information to many persons whose names and addresses are in his files. We are not satisfied that it would. Publication may theoretically be available for all the world to see, but it is too much in our day to suppose that each or any individual beneficiary does or could examine all that is published to see if something may be tucked away in it that affects his property interests. We have before indicated in reference to notice by publication that, “Great caution should be used not to let fiction deny the fair play that can be secured only by a pretty close adhesion to fact.” McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90, 91.

We hold that the notice of judicial settlement of accounts required by the New York Banking Law § 100-c (12) is incompatible with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for adjudication depriving known persons whose whereabouts are also known of substantial property rights. Accordingly the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed.

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

MR. JUSTICE BURTON, dissenting.

These common trusts are available only when the instruments creating the participating trusts permit participation in the common fund. Whether or not further notice to beneficiaries should supplement the notice and representation here provided is properly within the discretion of the State. The Federal Constitution does not require it here.

[*] Ala. Code Ann., 1940, Cum. Supp. 1947, tit. 58, §§ 88 to 103, as amended, Laws 1949, Act 262; Ariz. Code Ann., 1939, Cum. Supp. 1949, §§ 51-1101 to 51-1104; Ark. Stat. Ann. 1947, §§ 58-110 to 58-112; Cal. Bank. Code Ann., Deering, 1949, § 1564; Colo. Stat. Ann., 1935, Cum. Supp. 1947, c. 18, §§ 173 to 178; Conn. Gen. Stat. 1949 Rev., § 5805; Del. Rev. Code, 1935, § 4401, as amended, Laws, 1943, c. 171, Laws 1947, c. 268; (D. C.) 63 Stat. 938; Fla. Stat., 1941, §§ 655.29 to 655.34; Ga. Code Ann., 1937, Cum. Supp. 1947, §§ 109-601 to 109-622; Idaho Code Ann., 1949, Cum. Supp. 1949, §§ 68-701 to 68-703; Ill. Rev. Stat., 1949, c. 16 1/2, §§ 57 to 63; Ind. Stat. Ann., Burns, 1950, §§ 18-2009 to 18-2014; Ky. Rev. Stat., 1948, § 287.230; La. Gen. Stat. Ann., 1939, § 9850.64; Md. Ann. Code Gen. Laws, 1939, Cum. Supp. 1947, art. 11, § 62A; Mass. Ann. Laws, 1933, Cum. Supp. 1949, c. 203A; Mich. Stat. Ann., 1943, §§ 23.1141 to 23.1153; Minn. Stat., 1945, § 48.84, as amended, Laws 1947, c. 234; N. J. Stat. Ann., 1939, Cum. Supp. 1949, §§ 17:9A-36 to 17:9A-46; N. C. Gen. Stat., 1943, §§ 36-47 to 36-52; Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1946) §§ 715 to 720, 722; Okla. Stat., 1941, Cum. Supp. 1949, tit. 60, § 162; Pa. Stat. Ann., 1939, Cum. Supp. 1949, tit. 7, §§ 819-1109 to 819-1109d; So. Dak. Laws 1941, c. 20; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., 1939, Cum. Supp. 1949, art. 7425b-48; Vt. Stat., 1947 Rev., § 8873; Va. Code Ann., 1950, §§ 6-569 to 6-576; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann., Supp. 1943, §§ 3388 to 3388-6; W. Va. Code Ann., 1949, § 4219(1) et seq.; Wis. Stat., 1947, § 223.055.

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Full Deposition Transcript of Mary Cordova: Law Offices of David J. Stern/ GZ Gissen & Zawyer Process Service Inc.

Full Deposition Transcript of Mary Cordova: Law Offices of David J. Stern/ GZ Gissen & Zawyer Process Service Inc.


EXCERPTS:
5 I do know we have to bill the clients in advance. It
6 wouldn’t be after the fact. From what I recall it would
7 be at least four people that were being served. That’s
8 the person being served, their unknown spouse, Mary Jane
9 and John Doe. So it’s forty-five dollars times four.
10 That’s the amount that we would do before they got
11 served or not, regardless if John Doe was served or the
12 unknown spouse was served.
13 Q It would still be a hundred and eighty
14 dollars?
15 A Right. That’s what I remember.
16 Q What did you think about that?
17 A I thought that was a little unfair. I felt
18 like I wanted to question why. I kind of got the
19 impression from my trainers that we don’t ask questions,
20 we just do what we are told. There was really no
21 handbook during my training as to which clients are
22 billed. I would sit with each training and — I’m
23 trying to remember. It’s been a year.
24 Q That’s okay.
25 A We didn’t have a manual so I was trying to

1 understand why they bill clients differently. I never
2 really got an explanation. I just typed really fast and
3 that’s why I was hired.
4 Q Were you ever aware that Stern had an
5 ownership interest in G&Z?

6 A No.
7 Q Besides process serving did G&Z offer any
8 other services? Were there skip tracers in there?
9 A There were skip tracers, yes.
10 Q Were there investigators?
11 A Private investigators.
12 Q Did David Stern utilize them as well to the
13 best of your knowledge?
14 A Yes. They had an office right next to the
15 input department of about three or four individuals that
16 were skip tracers. I think they had one private
17 investigator. He was an older man. I don’t recall his
18 name.

19 Q How did you become aware that Stern was using
20 them as well?
21 A Because when I was introduced during my
22 interview and after I got hired they said this is our
23 skip trace department and these are private
24 investigator/skip tracers. That’s how I was introduced,
25 by title.

<SNIP>

9 Q So how come you were there only for two
10 months?
11 A I was there only two months because I had to
12 sign a paper that said — I wish I had that paper. They
13 gave out a paper to all employees saying if you don’t
14 sign this paper you’re pretty much considered fired.
15 Don’t even bother coming back to work if you don’t sign
16 it.
17 Q Was it a confidentiality agreement?
18 A Something like that, yeah.
19 Q What was in it that made you not want to sign
20 it?
21 A I wish I had a copy of it.
22 Q I wish you did too.
23 A It’s in my email somewhere. I didn’t have
24 internet at work the past couple of days.
25 Q You have a copy of it?

1 A I have a copy somewhere in my email, yeah.
2 Q Would you send it to me?
3 A Yes, I can send it.

13 Q Okay. That makes sense. So you basically
14 only worked with the night people and didn’t have that
15 much contact with the day people?
16 A I didn’t have that much contact other than
17 when I was training and in that thirty minute gap when
18 everyone is pretty much wrapping it up.
19 Q Did you ever hear anything or did you ever
20 notice anything that was to you made you feel
21 uncomfortable about doing work over there, specifically
22 with Stern’s office besides the four names on every
23 complaint?
24 A Well, not with Stern but the way G&Z was
25 handling. For instance, before I got hired I looked at

1 G&Z’s website and the part where they said they use
2 private investigators and skip tracers, it said that we
3 have fully licensed private investigators. There was
4 one guy Michael Gold and I mentioned him in that letter,
5 that was a skip tracer but he wasn’t licensed. He was
6 still going to school. The only licensed private
7 investigator that I recall was Ira and Michelle.
8 He was talking to a lady that I think only
9 spoke Spanish. There was a language barrier. He was
10 kind of bullying her. His tone of voice was well we
11 need to serve these papers. He was acting as if he was
12 a private investigator. He’s even announced himself as
13 a private investigator. He’s right next to me in the
14 other office and I just felt a little uncomfortable that
15 he’s claiming to be that and he’s not. He was asking
16 for her address and saying we have to do this and saying
17 we’ll serve it at your place of work if we need to. He
18 was really —
19 Q Bullying her?
20 A Bullying her into getting information. I just
21 kind of felt bad for the lady that he was talking to.
22 Q Nothing else about Stern?
23 A No. It was more about G&Z.
24 MS. CLARKSON: This is a two-page memo. It
25 looks like it was sent to Duane. Enter that as

1 Exhibit B. There was a letter dated September 9,
2 2009 that we’ll enter as exhibit C.
3 BY MR. BRIESMEISTER:
4 Q Mary, are those copies that we can keep?
5 A You can keep those. Actually, I have copies
6 on my little hard drive.
7 Q Mary, you indicated you were there
8 approximately two months at G&Z. Can you tell us why
9 you left, under what circumstances did you leave?
10 A Because I did not agree to sign that paper
11 that everyone had to sign.
12 Q That’s the only reason?
13 A That was it.
14 Q Did somebody come to you and say you must sign
15 it or else you have to leave?
16 A It was a group meeting. It was said that
17 everyone has to sign it. Don’t even bother working here
18 if you don’t. They told everyone that they had to sign.
19 Q Did others leave?
20 A No.
21 Q At that point in time?
22 A No.
23 Q You were the only one?
24 A I was the only one to my knowledge. I think
25 the environment from the impression I got at G&Z was

[ipaper docId=39605403 access_key=key-28tnns3a1fjg1hyp76jg height=600 width=600 /]

RELATED LINK:

Lender Processing Services LPS and ProVest: Resemblance is uncanny

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Florida Foreclosure Firm Fudged Forms, Ex-Paralegal Claims

Florida Foreclosure Firm Fudged Forms, Ex-Paralegal Claims


By Phil Milford and Denise Pellegrini – Oct 9, 2010 12:01 AM ET

A former paralegal told Florida investigators that workers at a law firm that processed foreclosures signed paperwork without reading it, misdated records and skirted rules protecting homeowners in the military.

Tammie Lou Kapusta, who said she spent more than a year at the Law Offices of David J. Stern PA, made the accusations in a Sept. 22 interview with lawyers for Florida Attorney General Bill McCollum. In August, McCollum announced a probe of three law firms to see whether improper documents were created and filed with state courts to hasten the foreclosure process.

Jeffery Tew, a lawyer for the Stern firm, denied Kapusta’s claims.

Kapusta, who spoke under oath, said the Stern firm ballooned from 225 employees when she started in March 2008, to more than 1,100 when she was fired in July 2009. She described a disorganized workplace where documents got lost and mortgages were misfiled. The training process was “stupid and ridiculous,” she said.

“There were a lot of young kids working up there who really didn’t pay attention to what they were doing,” she said, according to a transcript. “We had a lot of people that were hired in the firm that were just hired as warm bodies.”

Kapusta’s statements were reported Oct. 7 in the Tampa Tribune. Tew, of Tew Cardenas LLP in Miami, said he wasn’t aware of the interview until it was released to the public.

“We didn’t get a chance to cross-examine her,” he said. “It was a one-sided statement by a disgruntled employee. There was a lot of animus and personal references, and she seeks to besmirch people’s reputation. The law firm denies there’s any accuracy in the charges.”

Jurisdiction Challenged

There’s a court hearing set for Oct. 12 to determine whether McCollum’s office has jurisdiction over the firm’s conduct, Tew said.

“This is a civil investigation, and the attorney general hasn’t made any conclusions,” Tew said.

Continue reading…BLOOMBERG

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Related:

EXPLOSIVE DEPOSTION!!!! BUSTED!! DAVID J. STERN “MILL” KNEW THIS ALL ALONG…THIS FORECLOSURE FRAUD!!!

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Posted in assignment of mortgage, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, foreclosures, Law Offices Of David J. Stern P.A., ProVest, robo signers, sewer serviceComments (1)

EXPLOSIVE DEPOSTION!!!! BUSTED!! DAVID J. STERN “MILL” KNEW THIS ALL ALONG…THIS FORECLOSURE FRAUD!!!

EXPLOSIVE DEPOSTION!!!! BUSTED!! DAVID J. STERN “MILL” KNEW THIS ALL ALONG…THIS FORECLOSURE FRAUD!!!


FORMER EMPLOYEE WHISTLE BLOWER!!!

.

Via: 4ClosureFraud

.

HEY JUDGE COX, THIS IS WHAT YOUR MOTION TO QUASH IS PROTECTING!

~

MY GOD!

~

WHERE ARE THE F***ING FEDERAL AGENTS!!!

~

“I personally did not do it because I refused to do it.”

“I wasn’t going to falsify a military document.”

“I was told that that’s fine, somebody else on your team will do it.”

~

This just in and it is unbelievable!

We are neck deep in issues today so I do not have time to go through and highlight everything, and there is a lot, but here are some snips…

TAKE THE TIME TO READ THIS IN ITS ENTIRETY

THIS SHOULD BE THE BOMBSHELL THAT STOPS IT ALL IN FLORIDA

MORE TO FOLLOW ON THIS

1                             STATE OF FLORIDA
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
2                             DEPARTMENT OF LEGAL AFFAIRS

3                             AG # L10-3-1145

4

5   IN RE:

6   INVESTIGATION OF LAW OFFICES
OF DAVID J. STERN, P.A.
7

8   ____________________________/

9

10

11

12               DEPOSITION OF TAMMIE LOU KAPUSTA

13

14

15

16                    12:11 p.m. – 1:58 p.m.
September 22, 2010
17                Office of the Attorney General
110 Southeast 6th Street, 10th Floor
18                Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301

1 P R O C E E D I N G S
2 – – –
3 Deposition taken before Kalandra Smith, Court
4 Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of
5 Florida at Large, in the above cause.
6 – – –
7 THERE UPON:
8 TAMMIE LOU KAPUSTA
9 having been first duly sworn or affirmed, was examined
10 and testified as follows:

1 Q Let’s go to the assignments of mortgage. They
2 were prepared in-house?
3 A Yeah.
4 Q You’re smiling. You want to tell me about
5 them?
6 A Assignments were done sometimes after the
7 final judgement was entered.
8 Q Do you know why that is?
9 A Because that’s what we were directed to do

19 Q Can you tell me the execution of the
20 assignments, how it worked?
21 A Assignments were prepared again from the
22 casesum. All of our stuff comes from the casesum. They
23 would be stamped and signed by a notary or not. Per
24 floor we had a designated spot to place them and Cheryl
25 would come once a day and sign them.
22
1 Q Sign them as what?
2 A As –
3 Q For the bank?
4 A Correct.
5 Q Or for MERS or whoever it was for?
6 A Correct.
7 Q Would these notaries be there watching her as
8 she signed?
9 A No.
10 Q She would just sit there and sign stacks of
11 them?
12 A Correct. As far as notaries go in the firm I
13 don’t think any notary actually used their own notary
14 stamp. The team used them.
15 Q There were just stamps around?
16 A Yes.
17 Q And you actually saw that?
18 A I was part of that.
19 Q You did it? Are you a notary?
20 A No, I’m not.
21 Q Did you sign as a witness?
22 A I did not. I signed as a witness on one
23 document and after that I decided that I didn’t want to
24 put my name as a witness anymore.
25 Q Tell me about the stamps. You stamped them?
23
1 A Yeah, I had stamps. Each team had a notary on
2 them or notaries that I was aware of. Whether they were
3 or weren’t wasn’t –
4 Q You had stamps?
5 A Correct. We would stamp them and they would
6 get signed.
7 Q Stamp them in blanks?
8 A Yes.
9 Q Who would sign them?
10 A Other people on the team that could sign the
11 signature of the person or just a check on there or
12 whatever.
13 Q Was that common practice?
14 A Yes.
15 Q Was that standard practice?
16 A Pretty much.
17 Q What about the witnesses?
18 A Those would be signed by juniors who were –
19 Q Standing there?
20 A Here, sign this. It has to go to Cheryl, sign
21 it. Then it would go and sit at the desk where Cheryl
22 would sign everything.
23 Q Out of view of the notary and out of view of
24 the witnesses?
25 A Correct.
24
1 Q Do you know who implemented this procedure?
2 A Cheryl.
3 Q Cheryl did?
4 A Um-hum.
5 Q Did anybody else sign with the firm for the
6 banks?
7 A Yes.
8 Q Who was that?
9 A There were people that were responsible for
10 signing Cheryl’s name. Cheryl, Tammie Sweat, and Beth
11 Cerni. Those were the only three people that could sign
12 Cheryl’s name. If you ever look at assignments you’ll
13 see that they are not all the same.
14 MS. EDWARDS: What are the names again?
15 Cheryl, Tammie?
16 THE WITNESS: Tammie Sweat and Beth Cerni.
17 MS. EDWARDS: Could you spell that.
18 MS. CLARKSON: C-E-R-N-I.
19 BY MS. CLARKSON:
20 Q Did they practice Cheryl’s signature?
21 A I would assume so.
22 Q Did you ever see them?
23 A Not practicing but I’ve seen them sign it.
24 Q Did you see somebody sign Cheryl’s name?
25 A Yes.
25
1 Q That wasn’t Cheryl?
2 A Yes. All the time.
3 Q Did Cheryl know about this?
4 A Yes.
5 Q Was it at her direction?
6 A Yes.

16 Q Did anyone quit as far as you know due to the
17 practices?
18 A I’m sure but they wouldn’t come right out and
19 say I quit because of the practices. I know that people
20 had left because they were uncomfortable with the things
21 that they were being asked to do, as most of us were.
22 When it got really sticky there were a lot of us that
23 weren’t here.
24 Q What does really sticky mean?
25 A They wanted us to start changing the documents
33
1 and stuff and doing stuff that we weren’t supposed to be
2 doing as far as service.
3 Q What documents did they want you to change?
4 A Manpower documents. A lot of judges started
5 requiring, because of the Jane and John Doe issues,
6 required that you have a military search for all the
7 defendants. If you named a Jane and John Doe as an NKA
8 you had to pull a military search on them. Unless you
9 have somebody’s social security number technically you
10 can’t pull a military search supposedly.
11 The program that we used for the program that
12 we used, you could put in the main defendant’s social
13 security and John or Jane Doe’s name and it would give
14 us a military search saying that they were in the
15 military.
16 Q You would get their social security number
17 because the bank documents contained it?
18 A Correct. The lenders, the referrals had the
19 socials.
20 Q Did you put the social in on everybody to find
21 out their address for service?
22 A Not everybody. I personally did not do it
23 because I refused to do it. I wasn’t going to falsify a
24 military document. I was told that that’s fine,
25 somebody else on your team will do it.
1 Q What do you mean falsify a military document?
2 A Well, I’m using the main defendant’s social
3 security number on somebody else’s name, not his name.
4 John Doe and the main defendant was James, I was taking
5 James’ social security number and putting John Doe’s
6 name in there. I wasn’t but that’s what the practice
7 was. The judges started saying we’re not going to
8 consider service completed until –
9 Q There’s a miliary search?
10 A Correct.
11 Q So why wouldn’t they use the right social
12 security number for the right person?
13 A Because you don’t have a social for an NKA or
14 unknown tenant. They wouldn’t enter a final judgement
15 unless the military doc was there.
16 Q So you just used anybody’s?
17 A Correct.

9 A So what we had to do from that point, again
10 the affidavits were still split in two pages, at that
11 point we were supposed to be sending them back to the
12 banks to be signed now. The problem being that a lot of
13 times we wouldn’t get them back or executed in time for
14 the hearings. So we had what they called signature
15 pages that Tammie Sweat or someone else would have in
16 their possession. If we couldn’t get it back from the
17 bank executed in time we would just take a signature
18 page and put it on the affidavit.
19 Q What was on the signature page?
20 A The signature and notary from the bank.
21 Q Were these documents photocopied or were they
22 original documents?
23 A Some were photocopied.
24 Q How would you get that many from a bank
25 original? The bank supplied them to you.
42
1 A Well, what would happen would be like if I had
2 file A and that one didn’t go to hearing because there
3 was something wrong with it and file B was going to
4 hearing but it was the same bank, I would take the
5 signature page from A and give it to B.
6 Q Oh give it to another file?
7 A And just re-execute this file.
8 Q Okay. That was common practice?
9 A Yes, after Cheryl couldn’t sign.
10 Q Did Cheryl know?
11 A Yes.
12 Q Cheryl knew about all the practices because
13 she is the one who ran the office?
14 A She was the one who implemented them.
15 Q Were there any other activities or practices
16 over at David Stern’s firm that made you feel
17 uncomfortable or that you were unwilling to do?
18 A I don’t know how to answer that question.
19 It’s a loaded one.
20 Q Take your time.
21 A Yeah. Some of the things that were done there
22 just were not on the up and up.
23 Q Explain to me in as much detail as you can
24 what those things were.
25 A I don’t even know where to start with it.

Now that’s some BULLSHIT!

~

MUCH MORE IN THE DEPO BELOW…

~

Full-Deposition-of-Tammie-Lou-Kapusta-Law-Office-of-David-J-Stern

[ipaper docId=38901226 access_key=key-1qyc5k5u2jgdkg86i66p height=600 width=600 /]

Image credit: PI Bill Warner


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Posted in assignment of mortgage, aurora loan servicing, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, foreclosures, Law Offices Of David J. Stern P.A., MERS, MERSCORP, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC., STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD, Tammie Lou KapustaComments (6)

Foreclosed without notice: How a court order could be violating homeowners’ due process

Foreclosed without notice: How a court order could be violating homeowners’ due process


(UPDATED)

user-pic

Angela Caputo on 07.23.10 at 10:41 AM |

(Originally published 7/22/10 at 5:20 p.m.) Chicagoan Rich Gregory figured it was only a matter of time before he’d hear from his bank after falling behind on his second mortgage. But when he was summonsed to foreclosure court in 2008, he realized his bank wasn’t interested in negotiating.

Gregory noticed something “goofy” about the summons. Attached to it was a copy of the server’s credentials, issued on the letterhead of former Cook County Circuit Court Clerk Morgan Finley, a man convicted of extortion and ousted from office more than two decades earlier. “I thought, ‘This guy’s not licensed. He’s not authorized to do it,” Gregory said.

Turns out that Cook County Judge Dorothy Kinnaird, who oversees the Chancery Division, issued a court order in June 2007, allowing lenders and servicers to sidestep the Cook County Sheriff’s office and hire private agencies to deliver foreclosure summons. The idea was to free up a flood of new foreclosure cases. Lawmakers had toyed with the idea decades earlier. Ultimately, they decided that having a neutral party – primarily the Sheriff’s office – delivering court documents would avert the sort of conflict that’s brewing in the Cook County court system. Homeowners are now challenging the legitimacy of their summonses, and some are saying that they were never called to court to plead their case.

We hear that a lawsuit is coming down to challenge the court’s use of special process servers.

As far as Marty Stack, legal council to the Sheriff’s office is concerned, these questionable summonses could threaten the legitimacy of potentially thousands of local foreclosure cases. “Basically, all of these people could come back to vacate their case,” Stack said. “The judge has no right to take away their due process.”

Continue reading…Chicagonow.com

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Posted in conspiracy, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosures, scam, sewer serviceComments (1)

Law Office Of Ben-Ezra & Katz, Fort Lauderdale, FL Omits Postage Meter Date

Law Office Of Ben-Ezra & Katz, Fort Lauderdale, FL Omits Postage Meter Date


Keep sending these in…

940 18 U.S.C. Section 1341—Elements of Mail Fraud

© 2010-17 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in ben-ezra, conspiracy, envelope, foreclosure fraud, mail fraud, scamComments (0)


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