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Federal Natl. Mtge. Assn. (FANNIE MAE) v Williams | NYSC “Sewer Service, highly questionable whether Countrywide had a valid assignment of the note, MERS”

Federal Natl. Mtge. Assn. (FANNIE MAE) v Williams | NYSC “Sewer Service, highly questionable whether Countrywide had a valid assignment of the note, MERS”


Decided on January 10, 2012

District Court of Nassau County, First District

 Federal National Mortgage Association A/K/A FANNIE MAE, Petitioner(s)

against

Mary Williams, LISA WILLIAMS, “JOHN DOE” and “JANE DOE,” Respondent(s)

LT-003567-11

Rosicki, Rosicki & Associates, P.C., Attorneys for Petitioner, 51 East Bethpage Road, Plainview, NY 11803, 516-741-2585; Jeffrey A. Siegel, Esq., Volunteer Lawyers Project, Attorneys for Respondent, One Helen Keller Way, Hempstead, NY 11550, 516-292-8100.

Scott Fairgrieve, J.

Petitioner Federal National Mortgage Association a/k/a Fannie Mae (hereinafter referred to as petitioner) commenced this holdover action to recover possession of 74 a/k/a 72 Laurel Avenue, Hempstead, New York from the respondents Mary Williams and Lisa Williams.

Petitioner contends in paragraph 6 of the petition, dated June 16, 2011, that it became the owner of said premises pursuant to a public sale on March 2, 2010 when a referee’s deed was duly executed to petitioner.

Respondent Mary Williams has moved pursuant to CPLR Sec. 3211(A)(1), (3) and (7), and RPAPL Sections 713(5), 721 and 741 to dismiss the petition. Respondent Mary Williams contends that petitioner lacks standing to commence this summary proceeding due to defective assignment of the note and mortgage in the underlying foreclosure.

Respondent states that Michael Eastman and Veronica Eastman executed a note and mortgage, both dated May 12, 2006, in favor of Cambridge Home Capital LLC.

Cambridge Home Capital LLC appointed Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as its nominee with respect to recording of said mortgage executed by Michael Eastman and Veronica Eastman; this language is reflected in said mortgage as follows:

FOR PURPOSES OF RECORDING THIS MORTGAGE, MERS IS THE MORTGAGEE OF RECORD.

On August 13, 2007, plaintiff Countrywide Home Loans filed the summons and verified complaint in the Office of the Nassau County Clerk. The verified complaint dated August 10, 2007 alleges in paragraph 3 that:

On or about May 12, 2006, MICHAEL EASTMAN; VERONICA EASTMAN executed and delivered to MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. ACTING SOLELY AS NOMINEE FOR CAMBRIDGE HOME CAPITAL, LLC., a note bearing date that day, whereby MICHAEL EASTMAN; VERONICA EASTMAN covenanted and agreed to pay the sum of $342900.00, with interest on the unpaid balance thereof, at the rate of 7.25 percent per annum, to be computed from the date of said note, by payments of $2,071.69 on July 1, 2006 For the first 120 months and thereafter in payments of $2,710.20 on the like date of each subsequent month, until said note is fully paid, except that the final payment of principal and interest remaining due, if not sooner paid, shall become due and payable on June 1, 2036.

A review of the note executed by Mr. & Mrs. Eastman reveals no reference of the note being executed and delivered to MERS or to Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. Paragraph 4 of the verified complaint alleges:

As collateral security for the payment of said indebtedness, the aforesaid defendant(s) MICHAEL EASTMAN; VERONICA EASTMAN, also executed, acknowledged and delivered to MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. ACTING SOLELY AS NOMINEE FOR CAMBRIDGE HOME CAPITAL, LLC., a mortgage dated May 12, 2006 and recorded in the County of Nassau on June 7, 2006 in Liber/Reel D30580 of Mortgages, at page 979-995. The mortgage tax was duly paid. The aforesaid instruments were thereafter assigned to Plaintiff.

Said mortgaged premises being known as and by street address: 72 Laurel Avenue, Hempstead, NY 11550 bearing tax map designation: Dist:Section: 34Block: 377Lot(s): 146-147

which premises are more fully described in Schedule “A,” annexed hereto and made a part hereof.

Plaintiff claims in paragraph 4 of the verified complaint that the note and mortgage were assigned to plaintiff prior to commencing the foreclosure action. This statement may be unfounded. The said note executed by the Eastmans was endorsed in blank by Craig J. Hyman, Vice President/Member of Cambridge:

Pay to the Order of Without Recourse

CAMBRIDGE HOME CAPITAL LLC [*2]

/s/ Craig J. Hyman

BY: CRAIG J. HYMAN

VICE PRESIDENT/MEMBER

However, there is no evidence to demonstrate that this note was in fact assigned to Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. prior to or at the time it commenced the foreclosure action.

The said mortgage was assigned from MERS as nominee for Cambridge Home Capital, LLC to Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. on January 8, 2008, which is 5 months after Countrywide began the foreclosure action.

The said property was purchased on March 2, 2010 at the foreclosure sale by Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. for the sum of $470,090.47.

On March 2, 2010, Rosicki, Rosicki and Associates, on behalf of Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., assigned the bid for said property to Federal National Mortgage Association a/k/a Fannie Mae. Rosicki, Rosicki and Associates accepted the bid on behalf of Federal National.

Petitioner became the owner pursuant to a referee’s deed in foreclosure dated March 8, 2010 and recorded on May 18, 2010.

Petitioner points out that respondent Mary Williams was served personally on September 11, 2007 with the summons and complaint in the foreclosure action, but was sued as a “Jane Doe No.1.” Respondent Mary Williams defaulted in answering the summons and complaint.

The evidence demonstrates that Mary Williams was originally sued as a Jane Doe with no effort being made to ascertain if she resided at the said premises as a tenant. Petitioner did a search of the Nassau County Clerk records but no recorded lease was found.

Petitioner moved to amend the pleadings in February of 2008 to substitute the name Mary Williams for Jane Doe by the submission of the affirmation of Josephine Sangiorgio, Esq., dated February 1, 2008. Thereafter, the judgment of foreclosure and sale was served upon the Eastmans and Mary Williams. No explanation is provided by Countrywide as to how it discovered that Mary Williams was a tenant at the premises and why this information was not ascertained when the action for foreclosure was commenced in the Supreme Court.

Respondent Mary Williams is a Section 8 tenant who has lived at the premises since July 2006. Ms. Williams recertified in June of 2011 and is effective until July 1, 2012.

The issue for this court to decide is whether it has jurisdiction to decide any of the issues raised by respondent in connection with the foreclosure. [*3]

The court agrees that service upon Mary Williams in the foreclosure action was probably invalid. It does not appear that Plaintiff Countrywide made “timely efforts” to ascertain the identity of Mary Williams prior to commencing the foreclosure action. See Porter v. Kingsbrook OB/Gyn Assoc., 209 AD 497, 618 NYS2d 837 (2nd Dept 1994); Tucker v. Lorieo, 291 AD2d 261, 738 NYS2d 33 (1st Dept 2002); and Countrywide Home Loans v. Williams, 20 Misc 3d 1111(A), 867 NYS2d 16 (NY Dist Ct 2008).

Furthermore, it is highly questionable whether Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. had a valid assignment of the note at the time of commencement of the suit. See Bank of New York v. Silverberg, 86 AD3d 274, 926 NYS2d 532 (2nd Dept 2011) holding that a plaintiff which never was an actual assignee or holder of note at the time of commencement of the suit lacked standing to commence the foreclosure action.

If Countrywide lacked standing to bring the foreclosure action due to not being an assignee of the note or holder of same, then any subsequent transfer of title to Federal National Mortgage Association a/k/a Fannie Mae would be a nullity.

However, the foregoing issues raised by respondent cannot be addressed in this court. See Nassau Homes Corp. v. Shuster, 33 Misc 3d 130(A), 2011 WL 4952990 (App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2011) holding that:

The District Court properly found that petitioner had established its ownership of the subject premises, as evidenced by a certified copy of the referee’s deed, and that petitioner had properly served occupant with a notice to quit. Occupant’s only challenge to this proceeding appeared to be based upon objections to the foreclosure proceeding itself. However, the judgment of foreclosure and sale was final as to all issues and defenses that might have been litigated in the foreclosure action (see Cherico v. Bank of NY, 211 AD2d 961 [1995]), and the Supreme Court’s determination is not subject to collateral attack in the District Court (see Banker’s Trust v. Corbin, 14 Misc 3d 136[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 50239[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). Thus, as occupant has shown no basis to disturb the final judgment, the final judgment is affirmed.

Based upon the foregoing, since respondent has raised serious issues concerning the foreclosure, this court will stay these proceedings until March 15, 2012, to afford respondent an opportunity to address all issues in the Supreme Court Nassau County. Unless the Supreme Court has granted a stay to respondent Mary Williams or has vacated the foreclosure judgment, then this case will proceed to trial on March 19, 2012.

So Ordered:

/s/ Hon. Scott Fairgrieve

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE [*4]

Dated:January 10, 2012

CC:Volunteer Lawyers Project

Rosicki, Rosicki & Associates, P.C.

SF/mp

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NYSC Judge Schack Slams Foreclosure Firm Rosicki, Rosicki & Associates, P.C. “Conflicted Robosigner Kim Stewart”

NYSC Judge Schack Slams Foreclosure Firm Rosicki, Rosicki & Associates, P.C. “Conflicted Robosigner Kim Stewart”


Decided on December 12, 2011

Supreme Court, Kings County

U.S. Bank, N.A., Plaintiff,

against

Wayne Ramjit et al., Defendants.

17027/08 Plaintiff Rosicki Rosicki and Associates

Batavia NY

Arthur M. Schack, J.

In this foreclosure action, plaintiff, U.S. BANK N.A. (U.S. BANK), moved for an order of reference and related relief for the premises located at 1485 Sutter Avenue, Brooklyn, New York (Block 4259, Lot 22, County of Kings). For the Court to consider the motion for an order of reference, I ordered plaintiff’s counsel, Rosicki, Rosicki & Associates, P.C., on July 29, 2011, to comply with the October 20, 2010 Administrative Order of then Chief Administrative Judge Ann T. Pfau, as revised on March 2, 2011, and concluded that:

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED, that plaintiff U.S. BANK N. A.’s motion for an

order of reference and related relief for the premises located at 1485

Sutter Avenue, Brooklyn, New York (Block 4259, Lot 22, County of

Kings) and the instant foreclosure action will be dismissed with

prejudice, unless, within sixty (60) days from this decision and order,

counsel for plaintiff, U.S. BANK N.A., complies with the new Rule,

promulgated by the Chief Administrative Judge Ann T. Pfau on

October 20, 2010, as revised on March 2, 2011, by submitting an

affirmation, to my Chambers (not the Foreclosure Department), [*2]

360 Adams Street, Room 478, Brooklyn, NY 11201, using the new

standard Court form, pursuant to CPLR Rule 2106 and under the

penalties of perjury, that counsel for plaintiff, U.S. BANK N.A., has

“based upon my communications [with named representative or

representatives of plaintiff], as well as upon my own inspection and

reasonable inquiry under the circumstances . . . that to the best of

my knowledge, information and belief, the Summons, Complaint and

other papers filed or submitted to the Court in this matter contain no

false statements of fact or law”, and is “aware of my obligations under

New York Rules of Professional Conduct (22 NYCRR Part 1200) and

22 NYCRR Part 130.”

On September 23, 2011, plaintiff’s counsel, Rosicki, Rosicki & Associates, P.C., filed with the Court the instant motion, requesting an extension of thirty (30) days, up to and including October 26, 2011, to submit the required attorney’s affirmation.

According to ¶ 15 of the affirmation in support of the motion, by Timothy Menasco, Esq., of Rosicki, Rosicki & Associates, P.C., “plaintiff and plaintiff’s counsel has been actively reviewing the file in order to properly abide by said Administrative Order creating the delay in submission of the affirmation.” Mr. Menasco then states, in ¶ 16 of his affirmation, “[i]t is unduly harsh and inappropriate to dismiss this action, on the basis of a delay in submitting an affirmation to the court.”

Plaintiff’s counsel, Rosicki, Rosicki & Associates, P.C., continued, for reasons unknown and not satisfactorily explained to the Court, to not comply with the Administrative Order of the Chief Administrative Judge and my July 28, 2011 order. I have not received the affirmation from plaintiff’s counsel, as ordered by the Chief Administrative Judge’s Administrative Order and my previous order.

Today, plaintiff U.S. BANK’S instant motion to extend the time to file the required attorney’s affirmation, appeared on my motion calendar. It is one hundred thirty-seven (137) days since I issued my July 28, 2011 order and four hundred eighteen (418) days since the Chief Administrative Judge issued her Administrative Order. Therefore, for violation of these orders, the instant foreclosure action is dismissed with prejudice and the notice of pendency is cancelled and discharged.

Discussion

The Office of Court Administration issued a press release on October 20, 2010 explaining the reasons for the Administrative Ordered issued that day by Chief Administrative Judge Pfau. It stated:

The New York State court system has instituted a new filing

requirement in residential foreclosure cases to protect the integrity

of the foreclosure process and prevent wrongful foreclosures. Chief

Judge Jonathan Lippman today announced that plaintiff’s counsel in

foreclosure actions will be required to file an affirmation certifying

that counsel has taken reasonable steps — including inquiry to banks

and lenders and careful review of the papers filed in the case — to

verify the accuracy of documents filed in support of residential [*3]

foreclosures. The new filing requirement was introduced by the

Chief Judge in response to recent disclosures by major mortgage

lenders of significant insufficiencies — including widespread deficiencies

in notarization and “robosigning” of supporting documents — in

residential foreclosure filings in courts nationwide. The new requirement

is effective immediately and was created with the approval of the

Presiding Justices of all four Judicial Departments.

Chief Judge Lippman said, “We cannot allow the courts in

New York State to stand by idly and be party to what we now know

is a deeply flawed process, especially when that process involves

basic human needs — such as a family home — during this period of

economic crisis. This new filing requirement will play a vital role in

ensuring that the documents judges rely on will be thoroughly examined,

accurate, and error-free before any judge is asked to take the drastic step

of foreclosure.” [Emphasis added]

(See Gretchen Morgenson and Andrew Martin, Big Legal Clash on Foreclosure is Taking Shape, New York Times, Oct. 21, 2010; Andrew Keshner, New Court Rules Says Attorneys Must Verify Foreclosure Papers, NYLJ, Oct. 21, 2010).

The failure of plaintiff’s counsel, Rosicki, Rosicki & Associates, P.C., to comply with two court orders, my July 28, 2011 and Chief Administrative Judge Pfau’s October 20, 2010 order, as revised on March 2, 2011, demonstrates delinquent conduct by Rosicki, Rosicki & Associates, P.C. This mandates the dismissal with prejudice of the instant action. Failure to comply with court-ordered time frames must be taken seriously. It cannot be ignored. There are consequences for ignoring court orders. Recently, on December 16, 2010, the Court of Appeals, in Gibbs v St. Barnabas Hosp., 16 NY3d 74, 81 [2010], instructed:

As this Court has repeatedly emphasized, our court system is

dependent on all parties engaged in litigation abiding by the rules of

proper practice (see e.g. Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 748 [2004];

Kihl v Pfeffer, 94 NY2d 118 [1999]). The failure to comply with

deadlines not only impairs the efficient functioning of the courts and

the adjudication of claims, but it places jurists unnecessarily in the

position of having to order enforcement remedies to respond to the

delinquent conduct of members of the bar, often to the detriment of

the litigants they represent. Chronic noncompliance with deadlines

breeds disrespect for the dictates of the Civil Practice Law and Rules

and a culture in which cases can linger for years without resolution.

Furthermore, those lawyers who engage their best efforts to comply

with practice rules are also effectively penalized because they must

somehow explain to their clients why they cannot secure timely [*4]

responses from recalcitrant adversaries, which leads to the erosion

of their attorney-client relationships as well. For these reasons, it

is important to adhere to the position we declared a decade ago that

[i]f the credibility of court orders and the integrity of our judicial

system are to be maintained, a litigant cannot ignore court orders

with impunity [Emphasis added].” (Kihl, 94 NY2d at 123).

Despite Mr. Menasco’s assertion, it is not unduly harsh and inappropriate to

dismiss the instant action because of the delay by plaintiff’s counsel, Rosicki, Rosicki & Associates, P.C. to submit the required affirmation. “Litigation cannot be conducted efficiently if deadlines are not taken seriously, and we make clear again, as we have several times before, that disregard of deadlines should not and will not be tolerated (see Miceli v State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 3 NY3d 725 [2004]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 748 [2004]; Kihl v Pfeffer, 94 NY2d 118 [1999]) [Emphasis added].” (Andrea v Arnone, Hedin, Casker, Kennedy and Drake, Architects and Landscape Architects, P.C., 5 NY3d 514, 521 [2005]).As we made clear in Brill, and underscore here, statutory time frames —like court-order time frames (see Kihl v Pfeffer, 94 NY2d 118 [1999]) — are not options, they are requirements, to be taken seriously by the parties. Too many pages of the Reports, and hours of the courts, are taken up with deadlines that are simply ignored [Emphasis added].” (Miceli, 3 NY3d at 726-726). The Court cannot wait for plaintiff’s counsel, Rosicki, Rosicki & Associates, P.C., to take its time in complying with court mandates.

Moreover, even if plaintiff U.S. BANK’s counsel complied in a timely manner

with my July 28, 2011 order and the order of the Chief Administrative Judge, plaintiff U.S. BANK would have to address its use, in the instant action, of conflicted robosigner Kim Stewart. The instant mortgage and note, were executed on October 11, 2007 and recorded on December 10, 2007, by MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATIONS SYSTEM, INC. (MERS), “acting solely as a nominee for Lender [U.S. BANK]” and “FOR PURPOSES OF RECORDING THIS MORTGAGE, MERS IS THE MORTGAGEE OF RECORD,” in the Office of the City Register of the City of New York, at City Register File Number (CRFN) 2007000605594. Then on May 23, 2008, MERS assigned the instant mortgage and note back to U.S. BANK. This was recorded on July 24, 2008. in the Office of the City Register of the City of New York, at CRFN 2008000294495.

The assignment was executed for MERS, in Owensboro, Kentucky, by Kim Stewart, Assistant Secretary of MERS, as assignor. The very same Kim Stewart, as Assistant Vice President of assignee U.S. BANK, on April 13, 2009, also in Owensboro, Kentucky, executed the affidavit of merit for an order of reference in the instant action.She signed the affidavit of merit as Assistant Vice President of plaintiff U.S. BANK. However, in ¶ 1 of her affidavit of merit, Ms. Stewart alleges to “a Vice President of U.S. BANK, N.A., the plaintiff.”

Perhaps, plaintiff U.S. BANK and its counsel, Rosicki, Rosicki & Associates, P.C., do not want the Court to confront the conflicted Ms. Stewart? This would certainly contradict the disingenuous opening statement by Richard K. Davis, Chairman, President and Chief Executive [*5]Officer of U.S. BANCORP, (U.S. BANK’s parent corporation), in his cover letter to the 2010 Annual Report of U.S. BANCORP, sent to U.S BANCORP’s shareholders. Mr. Davis stated that “[t]hroughout its history, U.S. Bancorp has operated with a tradition of uncompromising honesty and integrity.”

Further, the dismissal of the instant foreclosure action requires the cancellation of the notice of pendency. CPLR § 6501 provides that the filing of a notice of pendency against a property is to give constructive notice to any purchaser of real property or encumbrancer against real property of an action that “would affect the title to, or the possession, use or enjoyment of real property, except in a summary proceeding brought to recover the possession of real property.” The Court of Appeals, in 5308 Realty Corp. v O & Y Equity Corp. (64 NY2d 313, 319 [1984]), commented that “[t]he purpose of the doctrine was to assure that a court retained its ability to effect justice by preserving its power over the property, regardless of whether a purchaser had any notice of the pending suit,” and, at 320, that “the statutory scheme permits a party to effectively retard the alienability of real property without any prior judicial review.”

CPLR § 6514 (a) provides for the mandatory cancellation of a notice of pendency by:

The Court,upon motion of any person aggrieved and upon such

notice as it may require, shall direct any county clerk to cancel

a notice of pendency, if service of a summons has not been completed

within the time limited by section 6512; or if the action has been

settled, discontinued or abated; or if the time to appeal from a final

judgment against the plaintiff has expired; or if enforcement of a

final judgment against the plaintiff has not been stayed pursuant

to section 551. [emphasis added]

The plain meaning of the word “abated,” as used in CPLR § 6514 (a) is the ending of an action. “Abatement” is defined as “the act of eliminating or nullifying.” (Black’s Law Dictionary 3 [7th ed 1999]). “An action which has been abated is dead, and any further enforcement of the cause of action requires the bringing of a new action, provided that a cause of action remains (2A Carmody-Wait 2d § 11.1).” (Nastasi v Nastasi, 26 AD3d 32, 40 [2d Dept 2005]). Further, Nastasi at 36, held that the “[c]ancellation of a notice of pendency can be granted in the exercise of the inherent power of the court where its filing fails to comply with CPLR § 6501 (see 5303 Realty Corp. v O & Y Equity Corp., supra at 320-321; Rose v Montt Assets, 250 AD2d 451, 451-452 [1d Dept 1998]; Siegel, NY Prac § 336 [4th ed]).” Thus, the dismissal of the instant complaint must result in the mandatory cancellation of plaintiff U.S. BANK’s notice of pendency against the subject property “in the exercise of the inherent power of the court.”

Conclusion

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED, that the instant action, Index Number 17027/08, is dismissed with

prejudice; and it is further

ORDERED that the Notice of Pendency in this action, filed with the Kings

County Clerk on June 16, 2008, by plaintiff, U.S. BANK, N.A., to foreclose on a mortgage for real property located at 1485 Sutter Avenue, Brooklyn, New York (Block 4259, Lot 22, County [*6]of Kings), is cancelled and discharged.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

ENTER

________________________________HON. ARTHUR M. SCHACK

J. S. C.

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Internal Doc Reveals GMAC Filed False Document in Bid to Foreclose

Internal Doc Reveals GMAC Filed False Document in Bid to Foreclose


by Paul Kiel
ProPublica, July 27, 2011, 1:07 p.m.

GMAC, one of the nation’s largest mortgage servicers, faced a quandary last summer. It wanted to foreclose on a New York City homeowner but lacked the crucial paperwork needed to seize the property.

GMAC has a standard solution to such problems, which arise frequently in the post-bubble economy. Its employees secure permission to create and sign documents in the name of companies that made the original loans. But this case was trickier because the lender, a notorious subprime company named Ameriquest, had gone out of business in 2007.

And so GMAC, which was bailed out by taxpayers [1] in 2008, began looking for a way to craft a document that would pass legal muster, internal records obtained by ProPublica [2]show.

“The problem is we do not have signing authority—are there any other options?” Jeffrey Stephan, the head of GMAC’s “Document Execution” team, wrote to another employee and the law firm pursuing the foreclosure action [2]. No solutions were offered.

Three months later, GMAC had an answer. It filed a document with New York City authorities [3] that said the delinquent Ameriquest loan had been assigned to it “effective of” August 2005. The document [3] was dated July 7, 2010, three years after Ameriquest had ceased to exist and was signed by Stephan, who was identified as a “Limited Signing Officer” for Ameriquest Mortgage Company. Soon after, GMAC filed for foreclosure.

An examination by ProPublica suggests this transaction was not unique. A review of court records in New York identified hundreds of similar assignment documents filed in the name of Ameriquest after 2008 by GMAC and other mortgage servicers.

Get ProPublica’s stories delivered to your inbox [4]

The issue has attracted growing scrutiny in recent months as bloggers [5], consumer attorneys and media outlets [6] have identified what appears to be part of a pattern of questionable assignments filed across the country.

GMAC, which is still majority owned by the government, was at the center of what became known as the robo-signing scandal [7]. The uproar began last fall after revelations that mortgage servicing employees had produced flawed documents to speed foreclosures [8]. GMAC and other banks have acknowledged filing false affidavits in which bank officials claimed “personal knowledge” of the facts underlying thousands of mortgages. But GMAC and other servicers say they’ve since tightened their procedures. They insist that their records were largely accurate and the affidavits amounted to errors of form, not substance.

The issues surrounding the Ameriquest loan and others like it appear to be more serious.

“This assignment of mortgage has all of the markings of GMAC finding that it lacked a needed mortgage assignment in order to foreclose and just making it up,” said Thomas Cox, a Maine foreclosure defense attorney.

In New York, it’s a felony to file a public record with “intent to deceive.”

“It’s fraud,” said Linda Tirelli, a consumer bankruptcy attorney. “I want to know who’s going to do a perp walk for recording this.”

No criminal charges have been filed in the robo-signing cases.

Asked by ProPublica about the document, GMAC acknowledged Stephan did not have authority to sign on behalf of Ameriquest. The bank said it is still planning to push ahead with foreclosure on the homeowner, who remains in the property.

Company spokeswoman Gina Proia said an internal review last fall into “suspected documentation execution issues” had flagged the loan as problematic and that GMAC is “determining what needs to be done in order to receive the necessary authorization.”

“We will determine and complete the necessary steps to remediate and proceed with foreclosure,” Proia said.

GMAC also declined a request from ProPublica to interview Stephan.

Another GMAC document obtained by ProPublica shows that in at least one recent incident, GMAC employees were still discussing the possibility of fabricating evidence needed to facilitate a foreclosure.

The company once again lacked a document that would show it had been assigned the mortgage. Since the lender was defunct and no assignment had ever been made, GMAC again seemed to be stuck. But the employee proposed in June of this year that GMAC file a sworn statement that the assignment had once existed but had been lost. It’s unclear if such an affidavit was ultimately provided to a court.

Records also show that GMAC has continued to rely on documents signed by the very employee at the center of the robo-signing scandal—Jeffrey Stephan, the same employee who also signed the Ameriquest document in 2010. Stephan acknowledged in sworn testimony last year that he had been signing 400 documents each day [9], a revelation that helped kick off the scandal. According to a former employee and a consumer attorney, Stephan still works at GMAC, though he has been transferred to a different unit.

GMAC said it is still pursuing foreclosures based on assignments signed by Stephan. As part of a bid to rebrand itself, GMAC renamed its holding company Ally Financial last year.

“There is no reason or requirement to ‘withdraw’ valid assignments of mortgage that happened to have been signed by Mr. Stephan,” said GMAC spokeswoman Proia, because there’s “no requirement that [the assignment] be signed by a person with knowledge of any particular facts.” All that mattered, she said, was that the signer had received the proper authority.

Banks have little reason to worry about their documents being challenged, since homeowners rarely contest foreclosure actions. In a filing with the New Jersey Supreme Court, GMAC said that of the more than 4,000 foreclosures it has handled in the state only about 4 percent of homeowners had contested the action.

When homeowners do challenge banks’ documentation for foreclosures, they can have success. Late last week, the Vermont Supreme Court threw out a foreclosure case handled by GMAC due, in part, to a flawed assignment document signed by Stephan.

“It is neither irrational nor wasteful to expect the foreclosing party be actually in possession of its claimed interest,” the court said [10], “and have the proper supporting documentation in hand when filing suit.”

Since last fall, GMAC has added staff, increased training and added new procedures, said Proia. But some of those new hires have come from firms themselves accused of filing false foreclosure documents.

One manager at GMAC, Kevin Crecco, moved there from a position at the Law Offices of David Stern in Florida after the firm drew scrutiny from the state’s attorney general for allegedly filing forged documents. Stern’s office, once among Florida’s biggest foreclosure law firms and labeled a “foreclosure mill” by critics, ceased operations earlier this year.

An internal organization chart [11] from this spring for GMAC’s foreclosure department lists Crecco as a manager overseeing roughly two dozen employees. GMAC declined to make Crecco available for an interview. He hasn’t been accused of any wrongdoing.

Mortgage servicers like GMAC continue to be set up like assembly lines, with members of its “Document Execution” team responsible for signing documents. The organizational chart shows two “Document Execution” teams of 13 employees each.

The employees are tasked with, among other things, signing affidavits attesting to the accuracy of the basic facts of the loan, such as the mortgage amount, outstanding fees, etc. Affidavits are a necessary step to foreclosure in many states where banks have to go to court to seize a home.

During the robo-signing scandal, GMAC admitted that employees signing affidavits didn’t verify the underlying facts. The bank says it has fixed the problems.

But consumer attorneys said that while GMAC’s processes have improved, they haven’t corrected basic flaws with their process.

Cox, the attorney who questioned Stephan last year as part of a foreclosure case, said employees on the “Document Execution” team still aren’t truly checking the accuracy of the underlying information. Rather than digging for the original documents, employees on the team look at the numbers given by a GMAC database and double-check the math.

If the employee “just looks at a computer screen, that’s not sufficient in my view,” said Cox. He said he would soon be challenging affidavits GMAC recently filed in court.

Consumer attorneys also said the systems that servicers rely on are consistently plagued with inaccuracies, making a more thorough verification of the information necessary. “These days, homeowners are being forced to save every receipt, every letter, every statement, so that one day they can prove that their payment history is accurate and the bank is wrong,” said Jim Kowalski, a consumer attorney in Florida.

GMAC’s Proia said the company’s procedures—which amount to a review of information in the company’s computerized databases—were sufficient to file affidavits.

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NY Judge Spinner Denies 86 Applications for JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE AND SALE Due to No Affirmation by Plaintiff Counsel

NY Judge Spinner Denies 86 Applications for JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE AND SALE Due to No Affirmation by Plaintiff Counsel


Excerpt:

Plaintiff has applied to this Court for the granting of a Judgment of Foreclosure & Sale pursuant to RPAPL § 1351. The express provisions of the Administrative Order of the Chief Administrative Judge of the Courts, no. A0548/10 require the filing of an Affirmation by Plaintiff’s counsel. No such Affirmation has been filed in this proceeding, in derogation of the aforesaid mandate. Accordingly, this application must be denied.

It is, therefore,

ORDERED that the within application by the Plaintiff shall be and the same is hereby denied without prejudice.

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NYSC Orders All Witnesses To Be Present, All Documents Demonstrating Exactly When Bank Acquired Possession of the Note and Mortgage

NYSC Orders All Witnesses To Be Present, All Documents Demonstrating Exactly When Bank Acquired Possession of the Note and Mortgage


Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC

v

Bozymowski

00296-2010

Rosicki, Rosicki & Associates
Attorneys for Plaintiff
26 Harvester Avenue
Batavia, New York 14020

Lydia Bozymowski
Defendant Pro Se
8 Hofstra Drive
Greenlawn, New York 11740-1908

Peter H. Mayer, J.

Upon the reading and filing of the following papers in this matter: (1) Notice of Motion by the plaintiff, dated May 21, 2010, and supporting papers; and (2) prior Order of this Court, dated November 1, 2010; and now

UPON DUE DELIBERATION AND CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT of the foregoing papers, the motion is decided as follows: it is

ORDERED that the plaintiff’s application (seq. #001) in this foreclosure action is hereby denied for the reasons set forth herein; and it is further

ORDERED that plaintiff shall appear for a hearing on May 13, 2011, 10:00 a.m., at which time the Court will conduct an inquiry of the plaintiff’s witnesses concerning the information and documents submitted by the plaintiff in connection with this foreclosure action, and will determine what, if any, sanction to impose upon the plaintiff and/or the plaintiff’s attorney; and it is further

ORDERED that at the time of the hearing, the plaintiff shall produce the following witnesses to provide testimony under oath in response to all inquiries by the Court: (1) Margaret Burke Tarab, Esq., the attorney from plaintiff’s counsel’s firm who executed the December 13, 2010 attorney affirmation, which is purportedly compliant with the October 20, 2010 Order of the Chief Administrative Judge of the State of New York; (2) Karen Griffith, Vice President of plaintiff Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, the individual who executed the February 2, 2010 affidavit in support of plaintiff’s application for an order of reference; and (3) Robert D. Repass, plaintiff’s Senior Vice President, identified in Ms. Tarab’s December 13, 2010 affirmation as the plaintiff’s representative with whom she communicated for purposes of executing her said affirmation; and it is further

ORDERED that at the time of the hearing, the plaintiff shall produce for Court inspection all of the documents and records reviewed by plaintiff’s counsel and plaintiff’s other representatives for purposes of submitting its application for an order of reference, including but not limited to the original note and mortgage, and all documents demonstrating exactly when the plaintiff acquired possession of the note and ownership of the mortgage in this case; and it is further

ORDERED that the plaintiff shall promptly serve, via first class mail, a copy of this Order upon the homeowner-defendant(s) at all known addresses, as well as upon all appearing parties (or upon their attorney[s] if represented by counsel), and shall promptly thereafter file the affidavit(s) of such service with the County Clerk; and it is further

ORDERED that failure to comply with any of the directives set forth herein shall result in [*2]the Court issuing any sanction the Court deems appropriate under the CPLR and/or Court Rules, including but not limited to waiver of any interest, attorneys fees and costs to which the plaintiff claims entitlement, as well as dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice.

In this foreclosure action, the plaintiff filed a summons and complaint on January 12, 2010. The complaint essentially alleges that the defendant-homeowner, Lydia Bozymowski, defaulted in payments with regard to the subject mortgage, dated April 22, 2004, in the principal amount of $225,000.00, for the premises located at 8 Hofstra Drive, Greenlawn, New York 11740. The original lender, Florida Bank, N.A. d/b/a Florida Bank Mortgage (“Florida Bank”), is alleged to have had the mortgage assigned to the plaintiff, Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC (“Bayview Loan”), by assignment dated November 25, 2009. The assignment was purportedly executed by Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as nominee for Florida Bank. In its application (001), the plaintiff requested a default order of reference and amendment of the caption to remove the “Doe” defendants as parties.

By Order dated November 1, 2010, this Court referred the plaintiff’s application to a conference with the Court on December 15, 2010. As part of that Order, the plaintiff’s counsel was instructed to review the pending application prior to the conference “to determine whether or not such application is fully compliant with all foreclosure-related statutes, case law and Court Rules.” If so, counsel was to then “execute and submit to the Court at the conference the requisite attorney affirmation mandated by the October 20, 2010 Administrative Order of the Chief Administrative Judge for the State of New York.” With regard to such attorney affirmation, this Court’s November 1, 2010 Order stated that, “[i]f plaintiff’s counsel is unable for personal or professional reasons to execute the necessary affirmation, the pending application may be withdrawn without prejudice and with leave to resubmit upon proper papers, including the mandatory attorney affirmation.” The November 1, 2010 Order also warned counsel that “with regard to any scheduled court conferences or future applications, if the Court determines that such conferences have been attended, or such applications have been submitted, without proper regard for the applicable statutes, case law and Court Rules, or without regard for the required proofs delineated herein, the Court may, in its discretion, strike the non-compliant party’s pleadings or deny such applications with prejudice and/or impose sanctions pursuant to 22 NYCRR §130-1, and may deny those costs and attorneys fees attendant with the filing of such future applications.”

On December 15, 2010, a conference was held and plaintiff’s counsel submitted an attorney affirmation. Initially, the Court notes the plaintiff’s failure to submit proof of compliance with RPAPL §1304. For those actions commenced on or after September 1, 2008 and prior to January 14, 2010, RPAPL §1304 requires that, with regard to a “high-cost home loan” (as defined in Banking Law §6-l), or a “subprime home loan” or a “non-traditional home loan” (as defined in RPAPL §1304), at least 90 days before a lender or mortgage loan servicer commences a foreclosure action against the borrower, the lender or mortgage loan servicer must give the borrower a specific, statutorily prescribed notice. In essence, the notice warns the borrower that he or she may lose his or her home because of the loan default, and provides [*3]information regarding available assistance for homeowners who are facing financial difficulty. The specific language and type-size requirements of the notice are set forth in RPAPL §1304(1).

Pursuant to RPAPL §1304(2), the requisite 90-day notice must be “sent by the lender or mortgage loan servicer to the borrower, by registered or certified mail and also by first-class mail to the last known address of the borrower, and if different, to the residence which is the subject of the mortgage. Notice is considered given as of the date it is mailed.” The notice must also contain a list of at least five housing counseling agencies approved by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, or those designated by the Division of Housing and Community Renewal, that serve the region where the borrower resides, as well as the counseling agencies’ last known addresses and telephone numbers.

This action was commenced on January 12, 2010. Therefore, barring any statutorily stated exceptions, if the subject loan being foreclosed upon qualifies as a “high-cost home loan,” a “subprime home loan,” or “non-traditional home loan,” the pre-commencement notice requirements of RPAPL §1304 will apply. Plaintiff, however, has failed to submit evidentiary proof, including an affidavit from one with personal knowledge, as to whether or not this action involves such a loan and, if so, proof of compliance with the applicable pre-commencement requirements of RPAPL §1304 or, in the alternative, an affidavit sufficient to show why such requirements do not apply. Such failure requires denial of plaintiff’s application for an order of reference. The boilerplate language in paragraph 4(c) of the complaint regarding compliance with RPAPL §1304 “if the underlying mortgage qualifies,” is ambiguous and is, therefore, insufficient to affirmatively show such compliance, particularly where, as here, the complaint is not verified by the plaintiff.

Plaintiff has also failed to submit a properly sworn affidavit in support of the requested relief. In this regard, CPLR §2309(b) requires that an “oath or affirmation shall be administered in a form calculated to awaken the conscience and impress the mind of the person taking it in accordance with his religious or ethical beliefs.” Accordingly, for affidavits to have sufficient validity, a notary public witnessing signatures must take the oaths of the signatories or obtain statements from them as to the truth of the statements to which they subscribe their names (see, Matter of Helfand v Meisser, 22 NY2d 762, 292 NYS2d 467 [1968]; Matter of Imre v Johnson, 54 AD3d 427, 863 NYS2d 473 [2d Dept 2008]; Matter of Leahy v O’Rourke, 307 AD2d 1008, 763 NYS2d 508 [2d Dept 2003]).

In support of its application for an order of reference, the plaintiff submits an affidavit from Karen Griffith, Vice President of plaintiff Bayview Loan; however, there is no showing that the notary who witnessed Ms. Griffith’s signature took an oath from Ms. Griffith, and no statement by Ms. Griffith attesting to the truth of the statements contained in her affidavit. Instead, there is a statement disguised to appear as a proper oath. Rather than swearing to the truth of the statements contained in her affidavit, Ms. Griffith merely attests in paragraph 12 to the truth of the contents of “the [plaintiff’s] complaint” (emphasis added). Such statement is insufficient to satisfy the form of oath required by CPLR §2309(b) with regard to Ms. Griffith’s [*4]affidavit. This is particularly pertinent here because additional submissions by the plaintiff raise questions as to the reliability of Ms. Griffith’s affidavit, as well as the plaintiff’s standing to bring this action.

A plaintiff has standing to maintain the action only where the plaintiff is the proper assignee of the mortgage and the underlying note at the time the foreclosure action was commenced (U.S. Bank, N.A. v Collymore, 68 AD3d 752, 890 NYS2d 578 [2d Dept 2009]; Federal Natl. Mtge. Assn. v Youkelsone, 303 AD2d 546, 755 NYS2d 730 [2d Dept 2003]; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Marchione, 69 AD3d 204, 887 NYS2d 615 [2d Dept 2009]; First Trust Natl. Assn. v Meisels, 234 AD2d 414, 651 N.Y.S.2d 121 [2d Dept 1996]). It remains settled that foreclosure of a mortgage may not be brought by one who has no title to it and absent transfer of the debt, the assignment of the mortgage is a nullity (U.S. Bank, N.A. v Collymore, supra; Kluge v Fugazy, 145 AD2d 537, 536 NYS2d 92 [2d Dept 1988]). Furthermore, a plaintiff has no foundation in law or fact to foreclose upon a mortgage in which the plaintiff has no legal or equitable interest (Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Marchione, supra; Katz v East-Ville Realty Co., 249 AD2d 243, 672 NYS2d 308 [1st Dept 1998]). Either a written assignment of the underlying note or the physical delivery of the note prior to the commencement of the foreclosure action is sufficient to transfer the obligation, and the mortgage passes with the debt as an inseparable incident (U.S. Bank, N.A. v Collymore, supra).

To support its contention that Bayview had proper standing to commence this action, Ms. Griffith’s alleges in paragraph 6 of her affidavit that “[t]he loan was acquired by and in the possession of the Plaintiff on April 22, 2004″ (emphasis added). Notably, this is the same date the mortgage documents were executed by the defendant-borrower to the original lender, Florida Bank. Even if this nebulous statement by Ms. Griffith were construed to mean that Bayview was in possession of the “note and mortgage” on April 22, 2004, such statement fails to show that the plaintiff was the holder of the note and mortgage when the action was commenced, nearly six years later (see U.S. Bank, N.A. v Collymore, supra; Federal Natl. Mtge. Assn. v Youkelsone, supra; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Marchione, supra; First Trust Natl. Assn. v Meisels, supra). On the one hand, Ms. Griffith alleges in paragraph 6 of her affidavit that the loan was in the possession of the plaintiff on April 22, 2004. On the other hand, in the same paragraph of her affidavit she states that the mortgage “instruments were assigned to [the Plaintiff] by [assignment] dated November 25, 2009.” Compounding this confusion is the handwritten statement on the assignment, asserting that it was “effective as of: 7/1/09.”

Despite these inconsistent statements of fact in support of ownership, there is an additional submission that suggests the true owner is or may be CitiMortgage, Inc. (“CitiMortgage”), a non-party to this action. In this regard, affixed to the last page of the note is an undated indorsement from Florida Bank to CitiMortgage. This indorsement, which was executed by Jacqueline Ring as Florida Bank’s Vice President, specifically states, “WITHOUT RECOURSE PAY TO THE ORDER OF CITIMORTGAGE, INC.” Thus, the plaintiff’s assertion that it possessed “the loan” on the same date it was executed by the borrower, and the inconsistent assertion that plaintiff obtained the mortgage instruments by assignment dated [*5]November 25, 2009, is rebutted by the fact that when the note was indorsed to CitiMortgage, the mortgage passed to CitiMortgage as an inseparable incident (U.S. Bank, N.A. v Collymore, 68 AD3d 752, 890 NYS2d 578 [2d Dept 2009]. Therefore, without the valid transfer of the note to the plaintiff, the assignment of the mortgage to the plaintiff was a nullity (id.; Kluge v Fugazy, 145 AD2d 537, 536 NYS2d 92 [2d Dept 1988]). Curiously, evidence of the indorsement to CitiMortgage by Florida Bank was not in the plaintiff’s affidavit or attorney affirmation.

The plaintiff has also failed to comply with this Court’s November 1, 2010 Order regarding submission of an attorney affirmation in the form and with the language required by the October 20, 2010 Administrative Order of Hon. Ann Pfau, New York’s Chief Administrative Judge. As explained in this Court’s November 1, 2010 Order, “[p]ursuant to the Administrative Order of the Chief Administrative Judge for the State of New York, dated and effective October 20, 2010, plaintiff’s counsel in foreclosure actions must file with the court in all such actions an affirmation in a form prescribed by the Order.” It remains clear from the language of Judge Pfau’s October 20, 2010 Order, as well from the language of the official mandatory affirmation and its preamble, that the intent of the new Rule is to assure accountability for and accuracy of all court filings in foreclosure actions.

With the intent of the new Rule in mind, this Court requires that after October 20, 2010, the mandatory affirmation must accompany all applications made at any and all stages of foreclosure proceedings. Obviously, a mere single filing at only one phase of the case would not comport with the intent of Judge Pfau’s Order. Indeed, if compliance were sufficient by filing the requisite affirmation at only one phase, improper or untruthful papers could be filed at other phases with virtual impunity. Therefore, plaintiff’s failure to submit the official mandatory affirmation in the form and with the language prescribed by Judge Pfau’s October 20, 2010 Order must result in denial of the requested relief.

In relevant part, the Court’s November 1, 2010 Order also included, with italicized emphasis, the warning set forth in the last sentence of the preamble paragraph of the official mandatory affirmation, which states: “The wrongful filing and prosecution of foreclosure proceedings which are discovered to suffer from these defects may be cause for disciplinary and other sanctions upon participating counsel” (emphasis added). Despite this language required by the official mandatory affirmation, and despite this Court’s emphasis of that language in its November 1, 2010 Order, the December 13, 2010 affirmation signed by plaintiff’s attorney, Margaret Burke Tarab, Esq., does not include such language. Also, as required by paragraph 3 of the official mandatory affirmation, the plaintiff’s attorney must affirm that “[b]ased upon my communication with [plaintiff’s representative], as well as upon my own inspection of the papers filed with the Court and other diligent inquiry, I certify that, to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief, the Summons and Complaint and all other documents filed in support of this action for foreclosure are complete and accurate in all relevant respects . . .” (emphasis added). In counsel’s December 13, 2010 affirmation, the word “diligent” was omitted and replaced with the word “reasonable.” In addition, as required by paragraph 4 of the official mandatory affirmation, the plaintiff’s attorney must acknowledge that he or she understands “that [*6]the Court will rely on this Affirmation in considering the [plaintiff’s] application.” In paragraph 4 of counsel’s affirmation, however, she omitted the specific mandatory language and replaced it with a generic acknowledgment, that “I am aware of my obligations under New York Rules of Professional Conduct (22 NYCRR Part 1200) and 22 NYCRR Part 130.”

Although the Court has heard several attorneys for plaintiff banks informally question Judge Pfau’s authority to have issued the October 20, 2010 Order in the first instance, this Court gives full deference to her Honor’s Order (see NY Const, art VI, § 28). Counsel for plaintiff banks have also claimed that the attorney affirmation required by Judge Pfau’s Order was unofficially amended on November 18, 2010 and posted on the internet in amended form. Counsel, however, has failed to submit an order by Judge Pfau executed after her October 20, 2010 Order, or any other legitimate legal authority, in which the language of the official mandatory affirmation was modified. Therefore, this Court requires counsel to submit an attorney affirmation in the specific form and with the specific language originally mandated by her Honor’s Order of October 20, 2010.

In this Court’s November 1, 2010 Order, the Court warned of potential sanctions, pursuant to 22 NYCRR §130-1, if a party submits an application “without proper regard for the applicable statutes, case law and Court Rules.” Indeed, although the plaintiff’s December 13, 2010 attorney affirmation does not include certain language mandated by Judge Pfau’s October 2010 Order, the affirmation does, nevertheless, state at paragraph 4 that counsel is “aware of [her] obligations under New York Rules of Professional Conduct (22 NYCRR Part 1200) and 22 NYCRR Part 130.” With regard to sanctions, 22 NYCRR §130-1.1 states, in pertinent part that:

(a) . . . [T]he court, in its discretion may impose financial sanctions upon any party or attorney in a civil action or proceeding who engages in frivolous conduct as defined in this Part, which shall be payable as provided in section 130-1.3 of this Part. . . .

(b) The court, as appropriate, may . . . impose such financial sanctions against either an attorney or a party to the litigation or against both. Where the . . . sanction is against an attorney, it may be against the attorney personally or upon a partnership, [or] firm . . . that has appeared as attorney of record. The . . . sanctions may be imposed upon any attorney appearing in the action or upon a partnership, firm or corporation with which the attorney is associated.

(c) For purposes of this Part, conduct is frivolous if:

(1) it is completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law;

(2) it is undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation, or to harass or maliciously injure another; or

(3) it asserts material factual statements that are false. [*7]

. . . In determining whether the conduct undertaken was frivolous, the court shall consider, among other issues the circumstances under which the conduct took place, including the time available for investigating the legal or factual basis of the conduct, and whether or not the conduct was continued when its lack of legal or factual basis was apparent, or should have been apparent, or was brought to the attention of counsel or the party.

(d) An . . . imposition of sanctions may be made . . . upon the court’s own initiative, after a reasonable opportunity to be heard. The form of the hearing shall depend upon the nature of the conduct and the circumstances of the case.

At the December 15, 2010 conference, plaintiff’s counsel represented to the Court that the plaintiff’s submitted application was, in fact, fully compliant with all applicable statutes, case law and Court Rules. Counsel then tendered to the Court Ms. Burke Tarab’s December 13, 2010 affirmation, which is purported to be compliant with the requirements of Judge Pfau’s Order of October 20, 2010. In counsel’s affirmation, she identifies Robert D. Repass, plaintiff’s Senior Vice President, as the representative with whom she communicated on December 10, 2010 for purposes of executing her affirmation.

According to paragraph 2 of the affirmation, Mr. Repass reportedly informed Ms. Tarab that he “personally reviewed plaintiff’s documents and records relating to this case for factual accuracy.” He also allegedly “confirmed the factual allegations set forth in the Complaint and any supporting affirmations filed with the court, as well as the accuracy of the notarizations contained in the supporting documents (Plaintiff’s Affidavit[s]) filed therewith.” Neither the proofs submitted in support of the order of reference, nor the mandatory attorney affirmation are sufficient to grant an order of reference.

Based on the foregoing, the plaintiff’s application for an order of reference is denied. The nature of the proofs provided by the plaintiff, from all sources, compels the Court to order hearing in accordance with 22 NYCRR §130-1 to determine if the conduct undertaken by the plaintiff and/or plaintiff’s counsel was “frivolous” as defined in 22 NYCRR §130-1.1(c) and what, if any, sanction should be imposed.

This constitutes the Order of the Court.

Dated:February 17, 2011

PETER H. MAYER, J.S.C.

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MIND-BLOWING!! NY JUDGE DENIES 127 FORECLOSURES PURSUANT TO ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS FROM CHIEF JUDGE, ROBO SIGNING

MIND-BLOWING!! NY JUDGE DENIES 127 FORECLOSURES PURSUANT TO ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS FROM CHIEF JUDGE, ROBO SIGNING


JUDGE COHALAN IS JUDGE OF THE WEEK!!!

“Issues”…Nah no “issues”? If this isn’t sending us a message or 127 messages that there aren’t any “issues”… Let them continue to submit exactly what they were filing before the *New Rule*… don’t stop now! Believe me there is more than these!

EXCERPT:

Pursuant to an Administrative Order of the Chief Judge, dated October 20, 2010, all residential mortgage foreclosure actions require an affirmation from the attorney representing the plaintiff/lender/bank, as stated in the affirmation attached to this order, that he/she has inspected all documents.

The plaintiff is also directed on any future application to provide a copy of this Court’s order, the prior application/motion papers and an updated affidavit of regularity/merit from the plaintiff/lender/bank’s representative that he/she has reviewed the file in this case and that he/she documents that all paperwork is correct. The plaintiff/lender/bank’s representative shall also provide in said affidavit of regularity her/his position, length of service, training, educational background and a listing of the documents and financial records reviewed substantiating the review of the amounts owed. The affidavit should also include that she/he has personally reviewed both the mortgage and the note and any assignments for accuracy.

The plaintiff bears the burden of proof in a summary judgment proceeding and judgment will only be awarded when all doubt is removed as to the existence of any triable issue of fact. Under the present circumstances, where there have been numerous instances alleged as to “robo” signing of documents and a failure to attest to the accuracy of documents in mortgage foreclosure proceedings, the plaintiff must prove its entitlement to foreclose on a mortgage as a matter of law by establishing the regularity and accuracy of the financial documentary evidence submitted and the Court will be scrutinizing all documents for accuracy.

The foregoing constitutes the decision of the Court.

SEE ALL 127  Below…


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GARY DUBIN LAW OFFICES FORECLOSURE DEFENSE HAWAII and CALIFORNIA
Kenneth Eric Trent, www.ForeclosureDestroyer.com

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