MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION
SYSTEMS, INC., as nominee for U.S.
BANK, N.A. f/k/a FIRSTAR BANK, N.A.
successor in interest to ALLIANCE
MORTGAGE BANKING CORP.,

against

CARMEN POBLETE

excerpt:

An examination of the plaintiff’s papers submitted herein reveals that they do not contain proof of plaintiff‘s standing to commence this action. The papers assert the plaintiff, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), is the “nominee” for the original mortgagee, Alliance Mortgage Banking Corp. The papers also assert that U.S. Bank, formerly known as First Star Bank, is the successor in interest to the original mortgagee. Furthermore plaintiff has submitted a certificate of merger between U.S. Bank of Oregon and U.S. Bank of Minnesota. Thus the court is unable to ascertain from the papers which party is the record owner of the mortgage, whether or not the mortgage was assigned, and the nature of the relationship between the mortgagee and the plaintiff.

Additionally, plaintiff has submitted, inter alia, an affidavit in support from ”Gregg V. Speer, Vice President,” who claims to be familiar with the books and records maintained by the plaintiff. However the Mr. Speer has failed to identify what entity he represents. Additionally, the affidavit does not specifically recite the facts of this particular default, the facts concerning the subject property, and when the default notice was sent. Indeed the affidavit only contains boilerplate recitations that could relate to any property or defendant.

Furthermore, the copy of the mortgage included in the plaintiff’s papers is barely legible.

Accordingly, as plaintiff has not established its standing to institute this action or prima facie entitlement to relief the proceeding is dismissed

Dated: MARCH 10, 2004
~

continue below…

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By Donal Griffin and Dakin Campbell – Feb 8, 2011 12:00 AM ET

Citigroup Inc., the third-largest U.S. bank, settled or lost at least five claims in 2010 brought by borrowers who accused the bank of filing fraudulent mortgage documents provided by a Texas firm.

In the most recent settlement in December, a bankrupt homeowner in Wappingers Falls, New York, challenged Citigroup’s use of a mortgage “assignment,” which shows the transfer of ownership of a mortgage. It was signed by an employee at Orion Financial Group Inc., a Southlake, Texas, firm that provides document services to lenders.

The document was “of fraudulent nature and questionable origin,” the borrower’s attorney, Linda Tirelli, wrote in an August objection to the bank’s claim at U.S. Bankruptcy Court in New York. Citigroup created and filed the assignment after proceedings began because it otherwise couldn’t prove its right to collect the debt, she wrote in an e-mail. The bank denied the allegations and didn’t admit liability in the settlement.

MUST WATCH ORION’S VIDEO

http://www.orionfgi.com/video.html

Excerpts:

A We don’t work in foreclosures.
Q You don’t work in foreclosures?
A No.
Q You don’t sign notices of default starting
foreclosures?
A I sign notices of default, yes.
Q And what do you understand the effect of a
notice of default is?
A It starts the clock ticking on the
formal foreclosure period.
Q But that is not working in foreclosures is your
testimony under oath here today on this video?
A Correct.
Q Does a notice of default put the property in
foreclosure?
A It starts the formal process of the foreclosure
time frames.

<SNIP>

Q What documents do you review prior to signing a
notice of default?
A We don’t review any documents.
Q What documents are provided to you in
connection with a loan where a notice of default t is
presented to you for your signature?
A Nothing.

<SNIP>

Q Let’s look at the second sentence there. It
says the amount is $9,751.03 as of 10/17/2007 and will
increase until your account becomes current.
At the time you signed this document you had
absolutely no knowledge whether that was true; correct?
A Correct.
Q On the second page, the last full paragraph
above your signature line, do you see that, that by
reason thereof, the present beneficiary under such deed
of trust has executed and delivered to the duly
appointed trustee a wri t ten declaration of default and
demand for sale.
You don’t know whether that was ever true, do
you?
A No.

<SNIP>

Q So to be clear, you receive an e-mail from LPS
that has as an attachment to it a notice of default?
A Yes.
Q That has names on that notice of default that
Ticor Title does not have an agency relationship with directly?
A Correct.
Q Correct?
A Right.
Q And then you sign the notice of default without
verifying the accuracy of any information in that notice
of default and cause it to be recorded?
A Correct.

Continue reading below…

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By Paul McMorrow
January 14, 2011

LAST WEEK’S Supreme Judicial Court decision, in which the court upended a pair of Springfield foreclosures and upbraided Wells Fargo and US Bank for maintaining sloppy records is great news for homeowners facing foreclosure. Mortgage-servicing banks, which were in the habit of trading mortgages around like cheap baseball cards, will be forced to slow the pace of foreclosures even more, and carefully verify that they actually own the mortgages on the properties they want to foreclose on. But the decision brings uncertainty to buyers of foreclosed properties — buyers who might not have clear title to their homes anymore.

The SJC decision in Ibanez vs. US Bancorp justifiably beat up on a pair of banks that couldn’t prove they owned mortgages they foreclosed on. The reverberations should be especially strong for mortgage investors and big banks.

Investors who bought up bonds backed by huge pools of mortgages have already been pressuring banks to buy back pools of bad mortgages that they sold before the housing bubble collapsed. These cases only cover a relatively small universe of poorly underwritten loans, but billions of dollars are at stake. Investors burned by mortgage bets have been trying to line up a much more expansive set of lawsuits challenging not the mortgages themselves, but the way big banks handled them after they were sold. The Ibanez decision gives serious weight to those investors, who are eying massive potential payouts.

The Ibanez foreclosure decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has gotten a lot of attention since it came down on Friday. The case is, not surprisingly being taken to heart by both bulls and bears. While I don’t think Ibanez is a death blow to the securitization industry, at the very least it should make investors question the party line that’s been coming out of the American Securitization Forum. At the very least it shows that the ASF’s claims in its White Paper and Congressional testimony are wrong on some points, as I’ve argued elsewhere, including on this blog. I would argue that at the very least, Ibanez shows that there is previously undisclosed material risk in all private-label MBS.

The Ibanez case itself is actually very simple. The issue before the court was whether the two securitization trusts could prove a chain of title for the mortgages they were attempting to foreclose on.  

There’s broad agreement that absent such a chain of title, they don’t have the right to foreclose–they’d have as much standing as I do relative to the homeowners. The trusts claimed three alternative bases for chain of title:

(1) that the mortgages were transferred via the pooling and servicing agreement (PSA)–basically a contract of sale of the mortgages

(2) that the mortgages were transferred via assignments in blank.

(3) that the mortgages follow the note and transferred via the transfers of the notes.

The Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) held that arguments #2 and #3 simply don’t work in Massachusetts. The reasoning here was heavily derived from Massachusetts being a title theory state, but I think a court in a lien theory state could easily reach the same result. It’s hard to predict if other states will adopt the SJC’s reasoning, but it is a unanimous verdict (with an even sharper concurrence) by one of the most highly regarded state courts in the country.  The opinion is quite lucid and persuasive, particularly the point that if the wrong plaintiff is named is the foreclosure notice, the homeowner hasn’t received proper notice of the foreclosure.

Regarding #1, the SJC held that a PSA might suffice as a valid assignment of the mortgages, if the PSA is executed and contains a schedule that sufficiently identifies the mortgage in question, and  if there is proof that the assignor in the PSA itself held the mortgage. (This last point is nothing more than the old rule of nemo dat–you can’t give what you don’t have. It shows that there has to be a complete chain of title going back to origination.)  

On the facts, both mortgages in Ibanez failed these requirements. In one case, the PSA couldn’t even be located(!) and in the other, there was a non-executed copy and the purported loan schedule (not the actual schedule–see Marie McDonnell’s amicus brief to the SJC) didn’t sufficiently identify the loan. Moreover, there was no proof that the mortgage chain of title even got to the depositor (the assignor), without which the PSA is meaningless: 

Today my friend’s history was made. The Massachusetts decision represents a major victory for consumers as well as for the handful of attorneys and advocates who dedicated their lives to protecting the defenseless. Perhaps the critical game-changing event in the Massachusetts litigation was the Amicus Brief submitted by Marie McDonnell setting forth and outlining the securitization paradigm and the defects in the chain of title.

Her analysis exposed both the material deficits contained and the subsequent fraudulent actions taken by the banks in foreclosing the properties. If you recall correctly it was Marie who first made the discovery in Antonio Ibanez’s loan in which it may have been securitized twice? Lets not forget who the robo-signer was that assigned the mortgage to U.S. Bank but non other than Linda Green.

And after two and half very long years post-foreclosure who would have thought that Mark and Tammy LaRace would move back home!

I would like to personally thank all the attorney’s involved and a special thanks to my good friend Marie McDonnell for her brilliant work and who deserves a mighty high five from all of us…

Marie McDonnell is the President of McDonnell Property Analytics, Inc. (www.mcdonnellanalytics.com), a company dedicated to helping consumers, and training and supporting attorneys in defending foreclosures.

Posted at 12:26 PM ET, 01/ 7/2011

The Massachusetts Supreme Court on Friday upheld a lower court ruling voiding two foreclosures because the banks failed to show the proper paperwork to prove they owned the loans-a decision that challenges the way mortgages were bundled and sold around the world.

Shares of Wells Fargo and U.S. Bancorp–the banks involved in the case–as well as those of other banks fell following the announcement of the decision. Wells Fargo was down 3.4 percent and US Bancorp 1.1 percent at midday.

The Massachusetts court is the highest to ruled on this issue and the decision has the potential to invalidate thousands of foreclosures across the state. It also provides more ammunition to borrowers in other states who could push the case to the U.S. Supreme Court. If the nation’s highest court rules that these transfers are not legal, the multi-trillion-dollar mortgage-backed securitization industry could face massive liability.

By Thom Weidlich – Jan 7, 2011 2:56 PM ET

U.S. Bancorp and Wells Fargo & Co. lost a foreclosure case in Massachusetts’s highest court that will guide lower courts in that state and may influence others in the clash between bank practices and state real-estate law. The ruling drove down bank stocks.

The state Supreme Judicial Court today upheld a judge’s decision saying two foreclosures were invalid because the banks didn’t prove they owned the mortgages, which he said were transferred into two mortgage-backed trusts without the recipients’ being named.

Joshua Rosner, an analyst at the New York-based research firm Graham Fisher & Co., called the decision “a landmark ruling” showing that at least in Massachusetts a mortgage “must name the assignee to be valid.”

“This is likely to open the floodgates to more suits in Massachusetts and strengthens cases in other states,” Rosner said.

“We agree with the judge that the plaintiffs, who were not the original mortgagees, failed to make the required showing that they were the holders of the mortgages at the time of foreclosure,” Justice Ralph D. Gants wrote for a unanimous court.

Via Marie McDonnell

read the decision below...

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NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030       (617) 557-1030

SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us

SJC-10694

U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, trustee¹ vs. ANTONIO IBANEZ (and a consolidated case^2,3).

Suffolk. October 7, 2010. – January 7, 2011.

Present: Marshall, C.J., Ireland, Spina, Cordy, Botsford, & Gants, JJ.⁴

Real Property, Mortgage, Ownership, Record title. Mortgage, Real estate, Foreclosure, Assignment. Notice, Foreclosure of mortgage.

Civil actions commenced in the Land Court Department on September 16 and October 30, 2008.

Motions for entry of default judgment and to vacate judgment were heard by Keith C. Long, J.

The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review.

R. Bruce Allensworth (Phoebe S. Winder & Robert W. Sparkes, III, with him) for U.S. Bank National Association & another.

Paul R. Collier, III (Max W. Weinstein with him) for Antonio Ibanez.

Glenn F. Russell, Jr., for Mark A. LaRace & another.

The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:

Martha Coakley, Attorney General, & John M. Stephan, Assistant Attorney General, for the Commonwealth.

Kevin Costello, Gary Klein, Shennan Kavanagh & Stuart Rossman for National Consumer Law Center & others.

Ward P. Graham & Robert J. Moriarty, Jr., for Real Estate Bar Association for Massachusetts, Inc.

Marie McDonnell, pro se.

GANTS, J. After foreclosing on two properties and purchasing the properties back at the foreclosure sales, U.S. Bank National Association (U.S. Bank), as trustee for the Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-Z; and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo), as trustee for ABFC 2005-OPT 1 Trust, ABFC Asset Backed Certificates, Series 2005-OPT 1 (plaintiffs) filed separate complaints in the Land Court asking a judge to declare that they held clear title to the properties in fee simple. We agree with the judge that the plaintiffs, who were not the original mortgagees, failed to make the required showing that they were the holders of the mortgages at the time of foreclosure. As a result, they did not demonstrate that the foreclosure sales were valid to convey title to the subject properties, and their requests for a declaration of clear title were properly denied.⁵

Procedural history. On July 5, 2007, U.S. Bank, as trustee, foreclosed on the mortgage of Antonio Ibanez, and purchased the Ibanez property at the foreclosure sale. On the same day, Wells Fargo, as trustee, foreclosed on the mortgage of Mark and Tammy LaRace, and purchased the LaRace property at that foreclosure sale.

In September and October of 2008, U.S. Bank and Wells Fargo brought separate actions in the Land Court under G. L. c. 240, § 6, which authorizes actions “to quiet or establish the title to land situated in the commonwealth or to remove a cloud from the title thereto.” The two complaints sought identical relief: (1) a judgment that the right, title, and interest of the mortgagor (Ibanez or the LaRaces) in the property was extinguished by the foreclosure; (2) a declaration that there was no cloud on title arising from publication of the notice of sale in the Boston Globe; and (3) a declaration that title was vested in the plaintiff trustee in fee simple. U.S. Bank and Wells Fargo each asserted in its complaint that it had become the holder of the respective mortgage through an assignment made after the foreclosure sale.

In both cases, the mortgagors — Ibanez and the LaRaces — did not initially answer the complaints, and the plaintiffs moved for entry of default judgment. In their motions for entry of default judgment, the plaintiffs addressed two issues: (1) whether the Boston Globe, in which the required notices of the foreclosure sales were published, is a newspaper of “general circulation” in Springfield, the town where the foreclosed properties lay. See G. L. c. 244, § 14 (requiring publication every week for three weeks in newspaper published in town where foreclosed property lies, or of general circulation in that town); and (2) whether the plaintiffs were legally entitled to foreclose on the properties where the assignments of the mortgages to the plaintiffs were neither executed nor recorded in the registry of deeds until after the foreclosure sales.⁶ The two cases were heard together by the Land Court, along with a third case that raised the same issues.

On March 26, 2009, judgment was entered against the plaintiffs. The judge ruled that the foreclosure sales were invalid because, in violation of G. L. c. 244, § 14, the notices of the foreclosure sales named U.S. Bank (in the Ibanez foreclosure) and Wells Fargo (in the LaRace foreclosure) as the mortgage holders where they had not yet been assigned the mortgages.⁷ The judge found, based on each plaintiff’s assertions in its complaint, that the plaintiffs acquired the mortgages by assignment only after the foreclosure sales and thus had no interest in the mortgages being foreclosed at the time of the publication of the notices of sale or at the time of the foreclosure sales.⁸

The plaintiffs then moved to vacate the judgments. At a hearing on the motions on April 17, 2009, the plaintiffs conceded that each complaint alleged a postnotice, postforeclosure sale assignment of the mortgage at issue, but they now represented to the judge that documents might exist that could show a prenotice, preforeclosure sale assignment of the mortgages. The judge granted the plaintiffs leave to produce such documents, provided they were produced in the form they existed in at the time the foreclosure sale was noticed and conducted. In response, the plaintiffs submitted hundreds of pages of documents to the judge, which they claimed established that the mortgages had been assigned to them before the foreclosures. Many of these documents related to the creation of the securitized mortgage pools in which the Ibanez and LaRace mortgages were purportedly included.⁹

The judge denied the plaintiffs’ motions to vacate judgment on October 14, 2009, concluding that the newly submitted documents did not alter the conclusion that the plaintiffs were not the holders of the respective mortgages at the time of foreclosure. We granted the parties’ applications for direct appellate review.

Factual background. We discuss each mortgage separately, describing when appropriate what the plaintiffs allege to have happened and what the documents in the record demonstrate.¹⁰

The Ibanez mortgage. On December 1, 2005, Antonio Ibanez took out a $103,500 loan for the purchase of property at 20 Crosby Street in Springfield, secured by a mortgage to the lender, Rose Mortgage, Inc. (Rose Mortgage). The mortgage was recorded the following day. Several days later, Rose Mortgage executed an assignment of this mortgage in blank, that is, an assignment that did not specify the name of the assignee.¹¹ The blank space in the assignment was at some point stamped with the name of Option One Mortgage Corporation (Option One) as the assignee, and that assignment was recorded on June 7, 2006. Before the recording, on January 23, 2006, Option One executed an assignment of the Ibanez mortgage in blank.

According to U.S. Bank, Option One assigned the Ibanez mortgage to Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB, which assigned it to Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., which then assigned it to the Structured Asset Securities Corporation,¹² which then assigned the mortgage, pooled with approximately 1,220 other mortgage loans, to U.S. Bank, as trustee for the Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-Z. With this last assignment, the Ibanez and other loans were pooled into a trust and converted into mortgage-backed securities that can be bought and sold by investors — a process known as securitization.

For ease of reference, the chain of entities through which the Ibanez mortgage allegedly passed before the foreclosure sale is:

Rose Mortgage, Inc. (originator)

Option One Mortgage Corporation (record holder)

Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB

Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (seller)

Structured Asset Securities Corporation (depositor)

U.S. Bank National Association, as trustee for the Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-Z

According to U.S. Bank, the assignment of the Ibanez mortgage to U.S. Bank occurred pursuant to a December 1, 2006, trust agreement, which is not in the record. What is in the record is the private placement memorandum (PPM), dated December 26, 2006, a 273-page, unsigned offer of mortgage-backed securities to potential investors. The PPM describes the mortgage pools and the entities involved, and summarizes the provisions of the trust agreement, including the representation that mortgages “will be” assigned into the trust. According to the PPM, “[e]ach transfer of a Mortgage Loan from the Seller [Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.] to the Depositor [Structured Asset Securities Corporation] and from the Depositor to the Trustee [U.S. Bank] will be intended to be a sale of that Mortgage Loan and will be reflected as such in the Sale and Assignment Agreement and the Trust Agreement, respectively.” The PPM also specifies that “[e]ach Mortgage Loan will be identified in a schedule appearing as an exhibit to the Trust Agreement.” However, U.S. Bank did not provide the judge with any mortgage schedule identifying the Ibanez loan as among the mortgages that were assigned in the trust agreement.

On April 17, 2007, U.S. Bank filed a complaint to foreclose on the Ibanez mortgage in the Land Court under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (Servicemembers Act), which restricts foreclosures against active duty members of the uniformed services. See 50 U.S.C. Appendix §§ 501, 511, 533 (2006 & Supp. II 2008).¹³ In the complaint, U.S. Bank represented that it was the “owner (or assignee) and holder” of the mortgage given by Ibanez for the property. A judgment issued on behalf of U.S. Bank on June 26, 2007, declaring that the mortgagor was not entitled to protection from foreclosure under the Servicemembers Act. In June, 2007, U.S. Bank also caused to be published in the Boston Globe the notice of the foreclosure sale required by G. L. c. 244, § 14. The notice identified U.S. Bank as the “present holder” of the mortgage.

At the foreclosure sale on July 5, 2007, the Ibanez property was purchased by U.S. Bank, as trustee for the securitization trust, for $94,350, a value significantly less than the outstanding debt and the estimated market value of the property. The foreclosure deed (from U.S. Bank, trustee, as the purported holder of the mortgage, to U.S. Bank, trustee, as the purchaser) and the statutory foreclosure affidavit were recorded on May 23, 2008. On September 2, 2008, more than one year after the sale, and more than five months after recording of the sale, American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc., “as successor-in-interest” to Option One, which was until then the record holder of the Ibanez mortgage, executed a written assignment of that mortgage to U.S. Bank, as trustee for the securitization trust.¹⁴ This assignment was recorded on September 11, 2008.

The LaRace mortgage. On May 19, 2005, Mark and Tammy LaRace gave a mortgage for the property at 6 Brookburn Street in Springfield to Option One as security for a $103,200 loan; the mortgage was recorded that same day. On May 26, 2005, Option One executed an assignment of this mortgage in blank.

According to Wells Fargo, Option One later assigned the LaRace mortgage to Bank of America in a July 28, 2005, flow sale and servicing agreement. Bank of America then assigned it to Asset Backed Funding Corporation (ABFC) in an October 1, 2005, mortgage loan purchase agreement. Finally, ABFC pooled the mortgage with others and assigned it to Wells Fargo, as trustee for the ABFC 2005-OPT 1 Trust, ABFC Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-OPT 1, pursuant to a pooling and servicing agreement (PSA).

For ease of reference, the chain of entities through which the LaRace mortgage allegedly passed before the foreclosure sale is:

Option One Mortgage Corporation (originator and record holder)

Bank of America

Asset Backed Funding Corporation (depositor)

Wells Fargo, as trustee for the ABFC 2005-OPT 1, ABFC Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-OPT 1

Wells Fargo did not provide the judge with a copy of the flow sale and servicing agreement, so there is no document in the record reflecting an assignment of the LaRace mortgage by Option One to Bank of America. The plaintiff did produce an unexecuted copy of the mortgage loan purchase agreement, which was an exhibit to the PSA. The mortgage loan purchase agreement provides that Bank of America, as seller, “does hereby agree to and does hereby sell, assign, set over, and otherwise convey to the Purchaser [ABFC], without recourse, on the Closing Date . . . all of its right, title and interest in and to each Mortgage Loan.” The agreement makes reference to a schedule listing the assigned mortgage loans, but this schedule is not in the record, so there was no document before the judge showing that the LaRace mortgage was among the mortgage loans assigned to the ABFC.

Wells Fargo did provide the judge with a copy of the PSA, which is an agreement between the ABFC (as depositor), Option One (as servicer), and Wells Fargo (as trustee), but this copy was downloaded from the Securities and Exchange Commission website and was not signed. The PSA provides that the depositor “does hereby transfer, assign, set over and otherwise convey to the Trustee, on behalf of the Trust . . . all the right, title and interest of the Depositor . . . in and to . . . each Mortgage Loan identified on the Mortgage Loan Schedules,” and “does hereby deliver” to the trustee the original mortgage note, an original mortgage assignment “in form and substance acceptable for recording,” and other documents pertaining to each mortgage.

The copy of the PSA provided to the judge did not contain the loan schedules referenced in the agreement. Instead, Wells Fargo submitted a schedule that it represented identified the loans assigned in the PSA, which did not include property addresses, names of mortgagors, or any number that corresponds to the loan number or servicing number on the LaRace mortgage. Wells Fargo contends that a loan with the LaRace property’s zip code and city is the LaRace mortgage loan because the payment history and loan amount matches the LaRace loan.

On April 27, 2007, Wells Fargo filed a complaint under the Servicemembers Act in the Land Court to foreclose on the LaRace mortgage. The complaint represented Wells Fargo as the “owner (or assignee) and holder” of the mortgage given by the LaRaces for the property. A judgment issued on behalf of Wells Fargo on July 3, 2007, indicating that the LaRaces were not beneficiaries of the Servicemembers Act and that foreclosure could proceed in accordance with the terms of the power of sale. In June, 2007, Wells Fargo caused to be published in the Boston Globe the statutory notice of sale, identifying itself as the “present holder” of the mortgage.

At the foreclosure sale on July 5, 2007, Wells Fargo, as trustee, purchased the LaRace property for $120,397.03, a value significantly below its estimated market value. Wells Fargo did not execute a statutory foreclosure affidavit or foreclosure deed until May 7, 2008. That same day, Option One, which was still the record holder of the LaRace mortgage, executed an assignment of the mortgage to Wells Fargo as trustee; the assignment was recorded on May 12, 2008. Although executed ten months after the foreclosure sale, the assignment declared an effective date of April 18, 2007, a date that preceded the publication of the notice of sale and the foreclosure sale.

Discussion. The plaintiffs brought actions under G. L. c. 240, § 6, seeking declarations that the defendant mortgagors’ titles had been extinguished and that the plaintiffs were the fee simple owners of the foreclosed properties. As such, the plaintiffs bore the burden of establishing their entitlement to the relief sought. Sheriff’s Meadow Found., Inc. v. Bay-Courte Edgartown, Inc., 401 Mass. 267, 269 (1987). To meet this burden, they were required “not merely to demonstrate better title . . . than the defendants possess, but . . . to prove sufficient title to succeed in [the] action.” Id. See NationsBanc Mtge. Corp. v. Eisenhauer, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 727, 730 (2000). There is no question that the relief the plaintiffs sought required them to establish the validity of the foreclosure sales on which their claim to clear title rested.

Massachusetts does not require a mortgage holder to obtain judicial authorization to foreclose on a mortgaged property. See G. L. c. 183, § 21; G. L. c. 244, § 14. With the exception of the limited judicial procedure aimed at certifying that the mortgagor is not a beneficiary of the Servicemembers Act, a mortgage holder can foreclose on a property, as the plaintiffs did here, by exercise of the statutory power of sale, if such a power is granted by the mortgage itself. See Beaton v. Land Court, 367 Mass. 385, 390-391, 393, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 806 (1975).

Where a mortgage grants a mortgage holder the power of sale, as did both the Ibanez and LaRace mortgages, it includes by reference the power of sale set out in G. L. c. 183, § 21, and further regulated by G. L. c. 244, §§ 11-17C. Under G. L. c. 183, § 21, after a mortgagor defaults in the performance of the underlying note, the mortgage holder may sell the property at a public auction and convey the property to the purchaser in fee simple, “and such sale shall forever bar the mortgagor and all persons claiming under him from all right and interest in the mortgaged premises, whether at law or in equity.” Even where there is a dispute as to whether the mortgagor was in default or whether the party claiming to be the mortgage holder is the true mortgage holder, the foreclosure goes forward unless the mortgagor files an action and obtains a court order enjoining the foreclosure.¹⁵ See Beaton v. Land Court, supra at 393.

Recognizing the substantial power that the statutory scheme affords to a mortgage holder to foreclose without immediate judicial oversight, we adhere to the familiar rule that “one who sells under a power [of sale] must follow strictly its terms. If he fails to do so there is no valid execution of the power, and the sale is wholly void.” Moore v. Dick, 187 Mass. 207, 211 (1905). See Roche v. Farnsworth, 106 Mass. 509, 513 (1871) (power of sale contained in mortgage “must be executed in strict compliance with its terms”). See also McGreevey v. Charlestown Five Cents Sav. Bank, 294 Mass. 480, 484 (1936).¹⁶

One of the terms of the power of sale that must be strictly adhered to is the restriction on who is entitled to foreclose. The “statutory power of sale” can be exercised by “the mortgagee or his executors, administrators, successors or assigns.” G. L. c. 183, § 21. Under G. L. c. 244, § 14, “[t]he mortgagee or person having his estate in the land mortgaged, or a person authorized by the power of sale, or the attorney duly authorized by a writing under seal, or the legal guardian or conservator of such mortgagee or person acting in the name of such mortgagee or person” is empowered to exercise the statutory power of sale. Any effort to foreclose by a party lacking “jurisdiction and authority” to carry out a foreclosure under these statutes is void. Chace v. Morse, 189 Mass. 559, 561 (1905), citing Moore v. Dick, supra. See Davenport v. HSBC Bank USA, 275 Mich. App. 344, 347-348 (2007) (attempt to foreclose by party that had not yet been assigned mortgage results in “structural defect that goes to the very heart of defendant’s ability to foreclose by advertisement,” and renders foreclosure sale void).

A related statutory requirement that must be strictly adhered to in a foreclosure by power of sale is the notice requirement articulated in G. L. c. 244, § 14. That statute provides that “no sale under such power shall be effectual to foreclose a mortgage, unless, previous to such sale,” advance notice of the foreclosure sale has been provided to the mortgagee, to other interested parties, and by publication in a newspaper published in the town where the mortgaged land lies or of general circulation in that town. Id. “The manner in which the notice of the proposed sale shall be given is one of the important terms of the power, and a strict compliance with it is essential to the valid exercise of the power.” Moore v. Dick, supra at 212. See Chace v. Morse, supra (“where a certain notice is prescribed, a sale without any notice, or upon a notice lacking the essential requirements of the written power, would be void as a proceeding for foreclosure”). See also McGreevey v. Charlestown Five Cents Sav. Bank, supra. Because only a present holder of the mortgage is authorized to foreclose on the mortgaged property, and because the mortgagor is entitled to know who is foreclosing and selling the property, the failure to identify the holder of the mortgage in the notice of sale may render the notice defective and the foreclosure sale void.¹⁷ See Roche v. Farnsworth, supra (mortgage sale void where notice of sale identified original mortgagee but not mortgage holder at time of notice and sale). See also Bottomly v. Kabachnick, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 480, 483-484 (1982) (foreclosure void where holder of mortgage not identified in notice of sale).

For the plaintiffs to obtain the judicial declaration of clear title that they seek, they had to prove their authority to foreclose under the power of sale and show their compliance with the requirements on which this authority rests. Here, the plaintiffs were not the original mortgagees to whom the power of sale was granted; rather, they claimed the authority to foreclose as the eventual assignees of the original mortgagees. Under the plain language of G. L. c. 183, § 21, and G. L. c. 244, § 14, the plaintiffs had the authority to exercise the power of sale contained in the Ibanez and LaRace mortgages only if they were the assignees of the mortgages at the time of the notice of sale and the subsequent foreclosure sale. See In re Schwartz, 366 B.R. 265, 269 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) (“Acquiring the mortgage after the entry and foreclosure sale does not satisfy the Massachusetts statute”).¹⁸ See also Jeff-Ray Corp. v. Jacobson, 566 So. 2d 885, 886 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (per curiam) (foreclosure action could not be based on assignment of mortgage dated four months after commencement of foreclosure proceeding).

The plaintiffs claim that the securitization documents they submitted establish valid assignments that made them the holders of the Ibanez and LaRace mortgages before the notice of sale and the foreclosure sale. We turn, then, to the documentation submitted by the plaintiffs to determine whether it met the requirements of a valid assignment.

Like a sale of land itself, the assignment of a mortgage is a conveyance of an interest in land that requires a writing signed by the grantor. See G. L. c. 183, § 3; Saint Patrick’s Religious, Educ. & Charitable Ass’n v. Hale, 227 Mass. 175, 177 (1917). In a “title theory state” like Massachusetts, a mortgage is a transfer of legal title in a property to secure a debt. See Faneuil Investors Group, Ltd. Partnership v. Selectmen of Dennis, 458 Mass. 1, 6 (2010). Therefore, when a person borrows money to purchase a home and gives the lender a mortgage, the homeowner-mortgagor retains only equitable title in the home; the legal title is held by the mortgagee. See Vee Jay Realty Trust Co. v. DiCroce, 360 Mass. 751, 753 (1972), quoting Dolliver v. St. Joseph Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 128 Mass. 315, 316 (1880) (although “as to all the world except the mortgagee, a mortgagor is the owner of the mortgaged lands,” mortgagee has legal title to property); Maglione v. BancBoston Mtge. Corp., 29 Mass. App. Ct. 88, 90 (1990). Where, as here, mortgage loans are pooled together in a trust and converted into mortgage-backed securities, the underlying promissory notes serve as financial instruments generating a potential income stream for investors, but the mortgages securing these notes are still legal title to someone’s home or farm and must be treated as such.

Focusing first on the Ibanez mortgage, U.S. Bank argues that it was assigned the mortgage under the trust agreement described in the PPM, but it did not submit a copy of this trust agreement to the judge. The PPM, however, described the trust agreement as an agreement to be executed in the future, so it only furnished evidence of an intent to assign mortgages to U.S. Bank, not proof of their actual assignment. Even if there were an executed trust agreement with language of present assignment, U.S. Bank did not produce the schedule of loans and mortgages that was an exhibit to that agreement, so it failed to show that the Ibanez mortgage was among the mortgages to be assigned by that agreement. Finally, even if there were an executed trust agreement with the required schedule, U.S. Bank failed to furnish any evidence that the entity assigning the mortgage — Structured Asset Securities Corporation — ever held the mortgage to be assigned. The last assignment of the mortgage on record was from Rose Mortgage to Option One; nothing was submitted to the judge indicating that Option One ever assigned the mortgage to anyone before the foreclosure sale.¹⁹ Thus, based on the documents submitted to the judge, Option One, not U.S. Bank, was the mortgage holder at the time of the foreclosure, and U.S. Bank did not have the authority to foreclose the mortgage.

Turning to the LaRace mortgage, Wells Fargo claims that, before it issued the foreclosure notice, it was assigned the LaRace mortgage under the PSA. The PSA, in contrast with U.S. Bank’s PPM, uses the language of a present assignment (“does hereby . . . assign” and “does hereby deliver”) rather than an intent to assign in the future. But the mortgage loan schedule Wells Fargo submitted failed to identify with adequate specificity the LaRace mortgage as one of the mortgages assigned in the PSA. Moreover, Wells Fargo provided the judge with no document that reflected that the ABFC (depositor) held the LaRace mortgage that it was purportedly assigning in the PSA. As with the Ibanez loan, the record holder of the LaRace loan was Option One, and nothing was submitted to the judge which demonstrated that the LaRace loan was ever assigned by Option One to another entity before the publication of the notice and the sale.

Where a plaintiff files a complaint asking for a declaration of clear title after a mortgage foreclosure, a judge is entitled to ask for proof that the foreclosing entity was the mortgage holder at the time of the notice of sale and foreclosure, or was one of the parties authorized to foreclose under G. L. c. 183, § 21, and G. L. c. 244, § 14. A plaintiff that cannot make this modest showing cannot justly proclaim that it was unfairly denied a declaration of clear title. See In re Schwartz, supra at 266 (“When HomEq [Servicing Corporation] was required to prove its authority to conduct the sale, and despite having been given ample opportunity to do so, what it produced instead was a jumble of documents and conclusory statements, some of which are not supported by the documents and indeed even contradicted by them”). See also Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Nelson, 382 Ill. App. 3d 1184, 1188 (2008) (reversing grant of summary judgment in favor of financial entity in foreclosure action, where there was “no evidence that [the entity] ever obtained any legal interest in the subject property”).

We do not suggest that an assignment must be in recordable form at the time of the notice of sale or the subsequent foreclosure sale, although recording is likely the better practice. Where a pool of mortgages is assigned to a securitized trust, the executed agreement that assigns the pool of mortgages, with a schedule of the pooled mortgage loans that clearly and specifically identifies the mortgage at issue as among those assigned, may suffice to establish the trustee as the mortgage holder. However, there must be proof that the assignment was made by a party that itself held the mortgage. See In re Samuels, 415 B.R. 8, 20 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009). A foreclosing entity may provide a complete chain of assignments linking it to the record holder of the mortgage, or a single assignment from the record holder of the mortgage. See In re Parrish, 326 B.R. 708, 720 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005) (“If the claimant acquired the note and mortgage from the original lender or from another party who acquired it from the original lender, the claimant can meet its burden through evidence that traces the loan from the original lender to the claimant”). The key in either case is that the foreclosing entity must hold the mortgage at the time of the notice and sale in order accurately to identify itself as the present holder in the notice and in order to have the authority to foreclose under the power of sale (or the foreclosing entity must be one of the parties authorized to foreclose under G. L. c. 183, § 21, and G. L. c. 244, § 14).

The judge did not err in concluding that the securitization documents submitted by the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they were the holders of the Ibanez and LaRace mortgages, respectively, at the time of the publication of the notices and the sales. The judge, therefore, did not err in rendering judgments against the plaintiffs and in denying the plaintiffs’ motions to vacate the judgments.²⁰

We now turn briefly to three other arguments raised by the plaintiffs on appeal. First, the plaintiffs initially contended that the assignments in blank executed by Option One, identifying the assignor but not the assignee, not only “evidence[] and confirm[] the assignments that occurred by virtue of the securitization agreements,” but “are effective assignments in their own right.” But in their reply briefs they conceded that the assignments in blank did not constitute a lawful assignment of the mortgages. Their concession is appropriate. We have long held that a conveyance of real property, such as a mortgage, that does not name the assignee conveys nothing and is void; we do not regard an assignment of land in blank as giving legal title in land to the bearer of the assignment. See Flavin v. Morrissey, 327 Mass. 217, 219 (1951); Macurda v. Fuller, 225 Mass. 341, 344 (1916). See also G. L. c. 183, § 3.

Second, the plaintiffs contend that, because they held the mortgage note, they had a sufficient financial interest in the mortgage to allow them to foreclose. In Massachusetts, where a note has been assigned but there is no written assignment of the mortgage underlying the note, the assignment of the note does not carry with it the assignment of the mortgage. Barnes v. Boardman, 149 Mass. 106, 114 (1889). Rather, the holder of the mortgage holds the mortgage in trust for the purchaser of the note, who has an equitable right to obtain an assignment of the mortgage, which may be accomplished by filing an action in court and obtaining an equitable order of assignment. Id. (“In some jurisdictions it is held that the mere transfer of the debt, without any assignment or even mention of the mortgage, carries the mortgage with it, so as to enable the assignee to assert his title in an action at law. . . . This doctrine has not prevailed in Massachusetts, and the tendency of the decisions here has been, that in such cases the mortgagee would hold the legal title in trust for the purchaser of the debt, and that the latter might obtain a conveyance by a bill in equity”). See Young v. Miller, 6 Gray 152, 154 (1856). In the absence of a valid written assignment of a mortgage or a court order of assignment, the mortgage holder remains unchanged. This common-law principle was later incorporated in the statute enacted in 1912 establishing the statutory power of sale, which grants such a power to “the mortgagee or his executors, administrators, successors or assigns,” but not to a party that is the equitable beneficiary of a mortgage held by another. G. L. c. 183, § 21, inserted by St. 1912, c. 502, § 6.

Third, the plaintiffs initially argued that postsale assignments were sufficient to establish their authority to foreclose, and now argue that these assignments are sufficient when taken in conjunction with the evidence of a presale assignment. They argue that the use of postsale assignments was customary in the industry, and point to Title Standard No. 58 (3) issued by the Real Estate Bar Association for Massachusetts, which declares: “A title is not defective by reason of . . . [t]he recording of an Assignment of Mortgage executed either prior, or subsequent, to foreclosure where said Mortgage has been foreclosed, of record, by the Assignee.”²¹ To the extent that the plaintiffs rely on this title standard for the proposition that an entity that does not hold a mortgage may foreclose on a property, and then cure the cloud on title by a later assignment of a mortgage, their reliance is misplaced because this proposition is contrary to G. L. c. 183, § 21, and G. L. c. 244, § 14. If the plaintiffs did not have their assignments to the Ibanez and LaRace mortgages at the time of the publication of the notices and the sales, they lacked authority to foreclose under G. L. c. 183, § 21, and G. L. c. 244, § 14, and their published claims to be the present holders of the mortgages were false. Nor may a postforeclosure assignment be treated as a pre-foreclosure assignment simply by declaring an “effective date” that precedes the notice of sale and foreclosure, as did Option One’s assignment of the LaRace mortgage to Wells Fargo. Because an assignment of a mortgage is a transfer of legal title, it becomes effective with respect to the power of sale only on the transfer; it cannot become effective before the transfer. See In re Schwartz, supra at 269.

However, we do not disagree with Title Standard No. 58 (3) that, where an assignment is confirmatory of an earlier, valid assignment made prior to the publication of notice and execution of the sale, that confirmatory assignment may be executed and recorded after the foreclosure, and doing so will not make the title defective. A valid assignment of a mortgage gives the holder of that mortgage the statutory power to sell after a default regardless whether the assignment has been recorded. See G. L. c. 183, § 21; MacFarlane v. Thompson, 241 Mass. 486, 489 (1922). Where the earlier assignment is not in recordable form or bears some defect, a written assignment executed after foreclosure that confirms the earlier assignment may be properly recorded. See Bon v. Graves, 216 Mass. 440, 444-445 (1914). A confirmatory assignment, however, cannot confirm an assignment that was not validly made earlier or backdate an assignment being made for the first time. See Scaplen v. Blanchard, 187 Mass. 73, 76 (1904) (confirmatory deed “creates no title” but “takes the place of the original deed, and is evidence of the making of the former conveyance as of the time when it was made”). Where there is no prior valid assignment, a subsequent assignment by the mortgage holder to the note holder is not a confirmatory assignment because there is no earlier written assignment to confirm. In this case, based on the record before the judge, the plaintiffs failed to prove that they obtained valid written assignments of the Ibanez and LaRace mortgages before their foreclosures, so the postforeclosure assignments were not confirmatory of earlier valid assignments.

Finally, we reject the plaintiffs’ request that our ruling be prospective in its application. A prospective ruling is only appropriate, in limited circumstances, when we make a significant change in the common law. See Papadopoulos v. Target Corp., 457 Mass. 368, 384 (2010) (noting “normal rule of retroactivity”); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 565 (1982). We have not done so here. The legal principles and requirements we set forth are well established in our case law and our statutes. All that has changed is the plaintiffs’ apparent failure to abide by those principles and requirements in the rush to sell mortgage-backed securities.

Conclusion. For the reasons stated, we agree with the judge that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate that they were the holders of the Ibanez and LaRace mortgages at the time that they foreclosed these properties, and therefore failed to demonstrate that they acquired fee simple title to these properties by purchasing them at the foreclosure sale.

Judgments affirmed.

CORDY, J. (concurring, with whom Botsford, J., joins). I concur fully in the opinion of the court, and write separately only to underscore that what is surprising about these cases is not the statement of principles articulated by the court regarding title law and the law of foreclosure in Massachusetts, but rather the utter carelessness with which the plaintiff banks documented the titles to their assets. There is no dispute that the mortgagors of the properties in question had defaulted on their obligations, and that the mortgaged properties were subject to foreclosure. Before commencing such an action, however, the holder of an assigned mortgage needs to take care to ensure that his legal paperwork is in order. Although there was no apparent actual unfairness here to the mortgagors, that is not the point. Foreclosure is a powerful act with significant consequences, and Massachusetts law has always required that it proceed strictly in accord with the statutes that govern it. As the opinion of the court notes, such strict compliance is necessary because Massachusetts is both a title theory State and allows for extrajudicial foreclosure.

The type of sophisticated transactions leading up to the accumulation of the notes and mortgages in question in these cases and their securitization, and, ultimately the sale of mortgaged-backed securities, are not barred nor even burdened by the requirements of Massachusetts law. The plaintiff banks, who brought these cases to clear the titles that they acquired at their own foreclosure sales, have simply failed to prove that the underlying assignments of the mortgages that they allege (and would have) entitled them to foreclose ever existed in any legally cognizable form before they exercised the power of sale that accompanies those assignments. The court’s opinion clearly states that such assignments do not need to be in recordable form or recorded before the foreclosure, but they do have to have been effectuated.

What is more complicated, and not addressed in this opinion, because the issue was not before us, is the effect of the conduct of banks such as the plaintiffs here, on a bona fide third-party purchaser who may have relied on the foreclosure title of the bank and the confirmative assignment and affidavit of foreclosure recorded by the bank subsequent to that foreclosure but prior to the purchase by the third party, especially where the party whose property was foreclosed was in fact in violation of the mortgage covenants, had notice of the foreclosure, and took no action to contest it.

Dead Soul Is a Debt Collector

Deceased Woman’s Name Was Robo-Signed on Thousands of Affidavits

• DECEMBER 31, 2010

By JESSICA SILVER-GREENBERG

Martha Kunkle has come back to life.

She died in 1995. Yet her signature later appeared on thousands of affidavits submitted by one of the nation’s largest debt collectors, Portfolio Recovery Associates Inc., in lawsuits filed against borrowers.

Some regulators complain that the use of Ms. Kunkle’s name reflects an epidemic of mass-produced, sloppy and inaccurate documentation in the debt-collection industry. Lawsuits have surged as more borrowers fall behind on payments and collection firms turn to courts to get what they are owed.

After being sued for fraud, Portfolio Recovery Associates decided in early 2008 that any documents bearing Ms. Kunkle’s name had “defects” and shouldn’t be used when trying to collect debts, a company spokeswoman said.

Found another interesting affidavit/ foreclosure deed in Massachusetts Land Records. Some might recall back on June/2010 SFF made a post on this address here.

What all information is in these walls? Maybe ya’ll can fill in the missing pieces. 🙂

MERS 1270

[ipaper docId=44855213 access_key=key-2dsyy5ygaew0kwfjovyt height=600 width=600 /]

SUPERIOR COURT

JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF HARTFORD

———————————

THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON
v.
ROBERT STENHOUSE

REPLY TO OBJECTION TO STATE’S MOTION FOR
ORDERS TO ADDRESS IMPROPER DOCUMENTS

EXCERPT:

A court cannot award a foreclosing plaintiff relief unless that plaintiff comes to the court with “clean hands.” Here, there are no facts from which the court can conclude that the plaintiff acted with clean hands because the only facts before the court are that the plaintiff was aware in February of 2010 that its employees were routinely executing foreclosure affidavits without personal knowledge and outside the presence of a notary and that it was not until eight months later in October 2010 –

Continue below…

[ipaper docId=44668795 access_key=key-ks28l55dvm15scg5tk height=600 width=600 /]

SUPREME COURT – STATE OF NEW YORK
I.A.S. PART XXXVI SUFFOLK COUNTY

Plaintiff, PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY:
STEVEN J. BAUM, P.C.
220 Northpointe Parkway, Suite G
Amherst, New York 14228

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,

-against-

SUNNY ENG, SHIRLEY ENG, HTFC
CORPORATION, JANE ENG,

DEFENDANTS’ ATTORNEY:
LAW OFFICES OF CRAIG D. ROBINS
Woodbury, New York 11797
Defendants. 180 Froehlich Farm Blvd.
……………………………………………………….. X

Excerpts:

The Court notes that the same law firm, Steven J. Baum, P.C., represented both HTFC and Wells Fargo as plaintiffs.

Moreover, Mr. Wider avers that “Jeffrey Stephan,” who purportedly executed the assignment as “Limited Signing Officer” of HTFC Corporation, has never been an employee of HTFC and that such person was never authorized to act as a “Limited Signing Officer” on behalf of HTFC for any purpose.

Wells Fargo does not have standing to maintain and prosecute this action to foreclose defendants’ mortgage. Plaintiffs have failed to come forward with any evidence to substantiate its claims herein or to raise a triable issue of fact. Indeed, the affirmation of plaintiffs attorney, sworn to September 8, 2010, reflects that plaintiff has been unable to locate any documents substantiating plaintiffs “belief’ that “its servicer had the authority to execute any and all documents attendant to the transfer of the loan.”

Continue below to see both the Decision, Assignment in question…

ENG COM

[ipaper docId=44232303 access_key=key-faynnigo46v0go85gbf height=600 width=600 /]

In re: SIMEON MORENO, Chapter 13, Debtor

Case No. 08-17715-FJB.

United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts, Eastern Division.

May 24, 2010.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION OF PROPERTY ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC. FOR RELIEF FROM THE AUTOMATIC STAY

FRANK J. BAILEY, Bankruptcy Judge

In the Chapter 13 case of debtor Simeon Moreno, Property Asset Management, Inc. (“PAM”), claiming to be the assignee of a mortgage originally given by the debtor to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) as nominee for lender GE Money Bank, moved for relief from the automatic stay to foreclose the mortgage. Moreno initially opposed the motion but then withdrew his objection, whereupon the Court granted the relief requested. Months later, at Moreno’s request, the Court vacated the order granting relief from stay and scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the Motion for Relief from Stay for the limited purpose of reconsidering whether PAM had an interest in the mortgage it sought to foreclose and, to that extent, standing to seek relief from stay.^[1] Having held the evidentiary hearing and received proposed findings and conclusions, the Court now enters the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Findings of Fact and Procedural History

On January 23, 2007, Moreno executed a promissory note in the principal amount of $492,000, payable to lender GE Money Bank. GE subsequently endorsed the note in blank, whereupon possession of the note was transferred through a series of holders and ultimately to Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. (“LBHI”), who held the note when PAM filed its Motion for Relief from Stay and continues to hold it now.^[2] LBHI, through one of its employees and through LBHI’s attorney, who not coincidentally also is PAM’s attorney in the present matter, produced the original note at the evidentiary hearing. PAM is not now a holder of the note or an entity for whose benefit another has held the note.

To secure the promissory note, Moreno gave a mortgage on the real property at 5 Maple Street, West Roxbury, Massachusetts (the “Property”) to MERS as nominee for GE (the “Mortgage”). The Mortgage specifies that MERS “is a separate corporation that is acting solely as a nominee for [GE] and [GE’s] successors and assigns. MERS is the mortgagee under this security instrument.” The Mortgage further provides that Moreno does hereby mortgage, grant and convey to MERS (solely as nominee for [GE] and [GE’s] successors and assigns) and to the successors and assigns of MERS, with power of sale, the [Property]. . . . Borrower understands and agrees that MERS holds only legal title to the interests granted by Borrower in this Security Instrument, but, if necessary to comply with law or custom, MERS (as nominee for [GE] and [GE’s] successors and assigns) has the right: to exercise any or all of those interests, including, but not limited to, the right to foreclose and sell the Property; and to take any action required of [GE] including, but not limited to, releasing and canceling this Security Instrument.

The Mortgage was duly recorded.

MERS administers an electronic registry to track the transfer of ownership interest and servicing rights in mortgage loans. With respect to certain loans of which its members are the beneficial owners, MERS also serves as mortgagee of record and holds legal title to the mortgages in a nominee capacity. MERS remains the mortgagee of record when beneficial ownership interests or servicing rights are sold from one member of the MERS system to another. When the beneficial interest in a mortgage loan is transferred from one member of the MERS system to another, MERS tracks the transfer through its internal records. When rights are transferred from a member of the MERS system to a non-member, MERS executes and records an assignment from MERS to the non-member.

To facilitate the execution of the assignments from MERS, MERS designates “certifying officers,” who are typically employees of MERS member firms. MERS authorizes these employees, through formal corporate resolutions, to execute assignments on behalf of MERS. On or about January 6, 2005, MERS, through a document entitled Corporate Resolution and issued by its board of directors, authorized Denise Bailey, an employee of Litton Loan Servicing L.P. (“Litton”), a member of MERS, to execute such assignments on behalf of MERS. In the language of the authorizing document (the “MERS Authorization”),^[3] Ms. Bailey was authorized to, among other things, “assign the lien of any mortgage loan naming MERS as the mortgagee when the Member [Litton] is also the current promissory note-holder, or if the mortgage loan is registered on the MERS System, is shown [sic] to be registered to the Member”^[4]; and Ms. Bailey was further authorized to “take any such actions and execute such documents as may be necessary to fulfill the Member’s servicing obligations to the beneficial owner of such mortgage loan (including mortgage loans that are removed from the MERS System as a result of the transfer thereof to a non-member of MERS).” In each instance, Bailey’s authority to act is dependent on the existence of a specified relationship of Litton, the MERS member for whom she is employed, to the loan in question.

The Moreno loan was entered into the MERS tracking database in the ordinary course of business. Thereafter, MERS tracked the beneficial interest in the loan. The beneficial interest was transferred from G.E. Money Bank to WMC Mortgage Corporation; then, on September 19, 2007, from WMC Mortgage Corporation to Aurora Bank FSB (formerly known as Lehman Brothers Bank FSB), and then, on July 30, 2008, from Aurora Bank FSB to LBHI. Aurora Bank was at all relevant times a wholly-owned subsidiary of LBHI.

With respect to the Moreno Mortgage, MERS remained the mortgagee of record until, on or about April 30, 2008, MERS, acting through Denise Bailey, assigned the Mortgage to PAM. At the time, Aurora Bank FSB was the beneficial owner of the loan. In executing the MERS assignment to PAM, Ms. Bailey purported to be acting under her MERS Authorization.

The MERS Authorization limited Ms. Bailey’s authority to act for MERS to matters with respect to which Litton was involved in at least one of the ways specified in the above-quoted language from the MERS Authorization. There is evidence, and I find, that Aurora Bank FSB had requested that Litton transfer the loan from MERS to PAM in anticipation of foreclosure. However, PAM has adduced no evidence that Litton had any specified connection to this loan at the time it executed this assignment. There is no evidence that Litton was then (or at any time) the servicer of the loan for Aurora Bank or that Litton was registered as servicer of the loan in the MERS system.^[5] (PAM does not contend that Litton was the holder of the promissory note or the owner of the beneficial interest in the loan.)

Scott Drosdick, a vice-president of LBHI and witness for PAM at the evidentiary hearing, testified that Aurora Bank’s instruction to Litton to transfer the mortgage to PAM was later “ratified by LBHI.” Drosdick did not explain what he meant by this, precisely how and when this ratification occurred. Absent such evidence and clarification, this testimony is too vague to have any definite meaning; accordingly I give it no weight.

By a master servicing agreement dated February 1, 1999, LBHI engaged Aurora Loan Services, Inc., now known as Aurora Loan Services LLC (“ALS”), as master servicer of certain loans, including eventually the present Moreno loan. In turn, ALS engaged Litton to service certain loans, including eventually this same loan.

After Bailey executed the MERS assignment to PAM, Bailey executed another assignment of the same mortgage from MERS to LBHI. This second assignment was never recorded; nor is there evidence that it was ever delivered by MERS to LBHI.

Moreno filed a petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on October 13, 2008, commencing the present bankruptcy case. On November 13, 2008, LBHI, acting through its servicer Litton Loan Servicing, LP, filed a proof of claim in this case; the proof of claim asserts a claim, secured by real estate, in the total amount of $530,168.04, the same secured claim as PAM now seeks relief from stay to enforce by foreclosure. On the proof of claim form itself, Litton actually identifies the creditor claimant as simply “Litton,” but on an explanatory document attached to the proof of claim form, Litton states that the claim is filed by “Litton Loan Servicing, LP, as Servicing Agent for Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.” The proof of claim does not mention PAM or indicate in any way that the mortgage securing the claim is held by anyone other than LBHI.

On March 31, 2009, and at LBHI’s direction, PAM filed the present motion for relief from the automatic stay, seeking relief from the automatic stay to foreclose and to preserve its rights as to a potential deficiency. PAM intends and is obligated to remit the proceeds of the intended foreclosure sale to Aurora Loan Services LLC, as servicer for LBHI. Regarding ownership of the note and Mortgage, PAM stated in the motion only that it was the holder of a mortgage originally given by Moreno to MERS, that the mortgage secured a note given by Moreno to GE, and that MERS had assigned the mortgage to PAM. PAM did not indicate that LBHI was the current holder of the note or that it held the mortgage as nominee for the benefit of LBHI or of any other entity. The motion did not mention LBHI.

Moreno filed a response to the motion, in essence an objection, in which he expressly admitted PAM’s allegation that his prepetition arrearage was $39,442.49 and, by lack of denial, tacitly admitted that Moreno was some four months in arrears on his postpetition payments under the mortgage. By these allegations and admissions, PAM has established that Moreno is in default on his mortgage loan obligations; the Court rejects Moreno’s request for a finding that PAM has not established a default. The response made no issue of PAM’s standing to foreclose or to seek relief from stay and did not dispute PAM’s allegations regarding ownership of the note and Mortgage. In any event, before a hearing was held on the motion, Moreno, through counsel, withdrew his objection. Consequently, on April 28, 2009, and without a hearing or any review of apparent inconsistencies in the bankruptcy record concerning ownership of the mortgage and note, the court granted PAM relief from the automatic stay to foreclose and to preserve its rights as to a potential deficiency.

PAM had not yet foreclosed when, on December 2, 2009 and by new counsel, Moreno filed an adversary complaint against PAM and, with it, a motion for preliminary injunction. The complaint sought among other things (i) an order invalidating the mortgage on account of irregularities in its origination and (ii) a declaration that PAM was not the holder of the mortgage and note. In the motion for preliminary injunction, Moreno asked that the foreclosure be stayed, or that the automatic stay be reimposed, pending disposition of the adversary proceeding. On December 7, 2009, after a hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction, the Court found that the motion was, in part, essentially one to vacate the order granting relief from the automatic stay, vacated that order, and scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the motion for relief. The order specified that the sole issue at the evidentiary hearing would be PAM’s standing to seek relief from the automatic stay, all other issues under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) being deemed established. After discovery, the evidentiary hearing was held on April 8, 2010, and, with the submission of proposed findings and conclusions, the matter was then taken under advisement.

Discussion

As the party seeking relief from stay to foreclose a mortgage on the debtor’s property, PAM bears the burden of proving that it has authority under applicable state law to foreclose the mortgage in question and, by virtue of that authority, standing to move for relief from the automatic stay to foreclose. PAM contends that it has such authority and standing because, although it does not hold the promissory note that the mortgage secures, it does have title to the mortgage itself; and it holds that title as nominee of and for the benefit of the note holder, LBHI, and is foreclosing for LBHI. In these circumstances, PAM contends, a mortgagee has a right under Massachusetts law to foreclose for the benefit of the note holder and therefore standing to move for relief from stay to foreclose. The Debtor objects, arguing (among other things) that Massachusetts law prohibits foreclosure by one who holds only the mortgage and not the note it secures. I need not address the merits of this and other objections because, even if the theory is a valid one, it requires proof that PAM is the present title holder of the mortgage, and PAM has not carried its burden in this regard.

To show that it presently holds the mortgage, PAM must show a valid assignment of the mortgage from MERS to itself. PAM contends that it holds the mortgage by assignment from MERS. Accordingly, PAM must show that the assignment, which was executed for MERS by Denise Bailey, was within the scope of Bailey’s limited authority to act for MERS.

Ms. Bailey’s authority to act for MERS is defined in the MERS Authorization in seven enumerated paragraphs. In each, Ms. Bailey’s authority to act is dependent on the existence of a specified relationship of Litton, the MERS member by whom she is employed, to the loan in question. PAM has submitted no evidence of the existence of any such relationship. The beneficial owner of the loan at the time of the assignment was Aurora Bank FSB, but there is no evidence that Litton was at the time the servicer of the loan for Aurora Bank FSB or was registered with MERS as such. The Court does not find that Aurora Bank FSB had not retained Litton as its servicer; there is simply no evidence on the issue. But the burden is on PAM to prove that it had, and PAM has not adduced evidence to that effect.

Accordingly, by a separate order, the Court will deny PAM’s motion for relief from the automatic stay without prejudice to renewal upon proper proof.

[1] All other issues were resolved upon entry of the original order granting relief from stay. No cause has been adduced to revisit any but the narrow issue of standing.

[2] Moreno contends that LBHI, which is in bankruptcy proceedings of its own, may have sold its interest in the note through a court-approved sale in its bankruptcy case. However, Moreno does not contend that possession of the note has passed from LBHI to the alleged purchaser (or any nominee of the purchaser), and therefore the alleged possible sale is irrelevant, as possession undisputedly remains in LBHI. In any event, Moreno attempted to establish the fact of the alleged sale by designating certain documents on the docket of the LBHI case and asking the Court to take judicial notice of these and then to find them on its own and to determine from them whether the promissory note in question was among the assets transferred. Having found the alleged sale to be irrelevant, the Court declined to take judicial notice of the bankruptcy documents. However, the proffer also failed for two additional reasons: first, that Moreno did not take a position as to whether a sale did occur, only that the Moreno note may have been among those transferred in the sale; and second, even if the court had taken judicial notice as requested, it remained Moreno’s obligation, which he has not fulfilled, to produce the documents in question and to explain in the first instance how one would conclude from them that the asset in question was among those transferred.

[3] MERS Corporate Resolution, attached to Bailey Affidavit as Exhibit 1.

[4] The grammatical difficulty in this second clause is native to the authorizing document.

[5] The original affidavit of Scott Drosdick includes the following two sentences:

By Master Servicing Agreement dated February 1, 1999, LBHI engaged Aurora Bank FSB (f/k/a Lehman Brothers Bank FSB), to master service, among other things, the Loan [the Moreno loan]. In turn, Aurora Bank FSB engaged Litton pursuant to a Flow Subservicing Agreement dated October 1, 2007, to service the loan.”

By an amendment to the affidavit and in testimony, Drosdick later amended his affidavit to correct this passage by striking Aurora Bank FSB from the first sentence and in its place inserting Aurora Loan Services LLC. Drosdick did not expressly change the second sentence, but that sentence, which begins with the critical words “in turn,” would be nonsensical unless the same substitution—Aurora Loan Services LLC for Aurora Bank FSB—were also made in the second sentence. Therefore, though the second sentence might perhaps be read in isolation as evidence that Litton was servicing the loan for Aurora Bank FSB at the time when Bailey executed the assignment, that sentence cannot credibly be so construed.

Highlights:

• Uses a real pen
• Yes, It crosses all T’s and Dots all I’s
  
• Resulting product looks like it was processed by an actual human
  
• Unlike a human…it makes NO mistakes!

Check it out below:

NOTE: Not saying this is an actual machine used, for demonstration only of amazing technology today!

Here is the work of Robo-Scanners “signing” Satisfaction of Mortgages/ Discharges below…no different!

Only that the above uses a “real pen” that a real human can use.

I also included MERS exec. sigs at the end…

[ipaper docId=42947649 access_key=key-1khopfb5zy15wihne1na height=600 width=600 /]

EXCELLENT JOB! Now this is what I am talking about…no affidavits…it’s the “assignments”, the destroyed notes, the Break in Chain, the E-Signatures, no supervision!

By Prashant Gopal – Nov 15, 2010 12:00 AM ET

Bryan Bly is a pen-wielding “robo- signer” at Nationwide Title Clearing Inc., inking his name on an average 5,000 mortgage documents a day for companies such as Citigroup Inc. and JPMorgan Chase & Co.

Those are just the ones that cross his desk.

Nationwide Title employs a computer system that automatically inserts a copy of Bly’s signature on thousands of digital files that he never sees. The system even affixes an electronic notary seal.

“The problem with the way these documents are created isn’t because a computer is used,” said Gloria Einstein, a legal aid attorney in Green Cove Springs, Florida, who deposed Bly in a case in a which her client faces foreclosure by a unit of Deutsche Bank AG. “It’s because an enterprise has decided to use a computer to create a system where nobody is responsible for the information and the decisions.”

The rush to securitize more than $4 trillion of mortgages as U.S. home sales peaked in 2005 and 2006 inundated loan servicers and contractors like Palm Harbor, Florida-based Nationwide Title that help them handle paperwork. Lawsuits fighting some of the more than 4 million foreclosures since then have exposed sloppy recordkeeping and raised questions about the validity of documents used to seize properties.

Signatures Draw Scrutiny

Bly is just one of more than a dozen robo-signers deposed in the past two years by lawyers for borrowers seeking to block foreclosures. Spurred by descriptions in depositions of employees signing thousands of affidavits a week without checking their accuracy as legally required, the attorneys general in all 50 states last month opened an investigation into whether banks and loan servicers used faulty documents or improper practices to foreclose.

Nationwide Title, which has about 175 employees, provides document imaging, tracking, retrieval, recording and processing on bulk loan transfers for lenders, servicers and investors. It’s the largest third-party processor of mortgage assignments, handling more than 350,000 last year, Senior Vice President Jeremy Pomerantz said in a telephone interview. The company also prepares lien releases, which show that a mortgage has been paid off by the borrower.

Assignments, which are usually recorded with county land record departments, list the buyer and seller of a loan as it’s sold or packaged with other loans into a mortgage-backed security. Lawyers for homeowners are challenging the legitimacy of the documents, which are relied on by lenders to show they have the right to foreclose.

Batches of 30,000

(While closely held Nationwide Title in the past offered a package of foreclosure-specific services, it had just one client, Pomerantz said. The company doesn’t handle foreclosure affidavits — submitted by banks to assert ownership of a loan when they’ve lost the promissory note or to show that borrowers are in default — and often it doesn’t know when clients are requesting documents for defaulted loans, he said.)

Nationwide Title’s proprietary system isn’t entirely automated, said Erika Lance, senior vice president of administration. Employees receive requests from clients for lien releases and mortgage assignments, which are often sent in batches of as many as 30,000. They review the information and images of loan documents sent along with the request, and the information is keyed into the computer system.

The computer system fills in the electronic assignments in the format and wording each county requires, and places a signature and notary seal from a list of employees approved by each bank. Bly and other signers are given a title at the bank requesting the documents, such as “vice president” or “assistant secretary,” depending on what the individual counties require, Lance said.

Laws Catching Up

Excerpts:

#1 TP1_US BANK v. Ronnie Fishbein

The purported affidavit of Tamara Price, “Vice President of CITI RESIDENTIAL LENDING MORTGAGE, a
servicing agent who has power of attorney for the plaintiff,” does not contain a jurat, and there is
no language of oath or affirmation. The absence of a jurat renders the “affidavit” inadmissible as
there is no evidence that an oath or affirmation was taken (Pagano v Kingsbury, 182 AD2d 268
[ 2d Dept 19921; see also, People v Lieberman, 57 Misc 2d 1070 [Sup. Ct 19681). Moreover, the
purported power of attorney pursuant to which 1 he affidavit was assertedly prepared is not
annexed to the motion papers, and the submissions do not otherwise establish the authority of an
officer of plaintiffs servicer to execute the affidavit on behalf of plaintiff.

#2 TP2_ARGENT v. Olivera

The Affidavit of Merit and Amount Due was executed and notarized in San Bernadino, California
by Tamara Price and it is unaccompanied by a certificate of conformity and, therefore, cannot
provide evidence on this application. (see Daimler Chrysler Services North America LLC v,
Tammaro 14 Misc 34128 [A]; 2006 NY Slip OP 52506[U]* [App Term, 2Deptl; Bath Meaka1
Suppw, Inc. v. Allstate Indemnity Co., 13 Misc 3d142[A] 2006 NY Slip OP52273[U] *1-*2 [App
Term 2d Dept]).

#3 TP 3 DBNT v. Halverson

Moreover, the submissions do not reflect the authority of Tamara Price, a
self-described “authorized agent” of AMC Mortgage Services, hc., a
non-party to this mortgage foreclosure action, to represent plaintiff in this action, nor do the
submissions contain evidence that AMC Mortgage Services, Inc. is the attorney in fact for the
plaintiff in this action, as alleged in the affidavit of Ms. Price. Similarly, the assignment whereby
the mortgage was purportedly assigned to plaintiff was executed by Tamara Smith on behalf of
AMC Mortgage Services, Inc. as “authorized agent” for the assignor, without any evidence of
such agency. Accordingly, the motion is denied, with leave to renew upon proper submissions
that address the deficiencies identified herein.

#4 FROM JUDGE SCHACK

TP 4 JUDGE SCHACK_ DEUTSCHE v. Ezagui

According to plaintiffs application, defendant Ezaguis’ default began with the
nonpayment of principal and interest due on September 1,2006. Yet, more than five
months later, plaintiff DEUTSCHE BANK was idling to take an assignment of a
nonperforming loan from AMERIQUEST. Further, both assignor AMC, as Attorney in
Fact for AMERIQUEST, and assignee, DEUTSCHE BANK, have the same address, 505
City Parkway West, Orange, CA 92868. Plaintiffs “affidavit of amount due,” submitted
in support of the instant application for a default order of reference was executed by
Tamara Price, on February 16, 2007. Ms. Price states that “I am the Vice President for
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE OF
AMERIQUEST MORTGAGE SECURITIES, INC., ASSET-BACKED PASS
THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2004-R1( 1, UNDER THE POLING AND
SERVICING AGREEMENT DATED AS OF OCTOBER 1,2004, WITHOUT
RECOURSE (DEUTSCHE BANK.” However, i he February 7,2007 assignment from
AMERIQUEST, by AMC, its Attorney in Fact, is executed by Tamara Price, Vice
President of AMC. The Tamara Price signatures on both the February 7,2007 affidavit
and the February 16,2007 assignment are identical. Did Ms. Price change employers
from February 7,2007 to February 16,2007? The Court is concerned that there may be
fraud on the part of AMERIQUEST, or at least malfeasance. Before granting an
application for an order of reference, the Court requires an affidavit from Ms. Price,
describing her employment history for the past three years. Further, irrespective of her
employment history, Ms. Price must explain why DEUTSCHE BANK would purchase a
nonperforming loan from AMERIQUEST, and why DEUTSCHE BANK shares office

THE BIGGIE

#5 JUDGE SCHACK_DBNT v. CLOUDEN

In the instant action, Argent’s defective assignment to Deutsche Bank affects the
standing of Deutsche Bank to bring this action. The recorded assignment from Argent to
Deutsche Bank, made by “Tamara Price, as Authorized Agent” on behalf of “AMC
Mortgage Services Inc. as authorized agent,” lacks any power of attorney granted by
Argent to AMC Mortgage Services, Inc. and/or Tamara Price to act on its behalf. The
first mortgage assignment, from Grand Pacific Mortgage to Argent, was proper. It was
executed by the President of Grand Pacific Mortgage.

Continue Below…

[ipaper docId=41560174 access_key=key-1o4ekwtxjmbkpjujphp5 height=600 width=600 /]

Excerpts:

Q Do you know if Deutsche Bank is owed any
money?

A Yes.

Q How do you know that?

A By what the document says.

Q I know that, but you signed the document
saying that you had done some things. Are you saying
you know it to be true simply because it was presented
to you?

A No.

Q Well, how do you know that Deutsche Bank
National Bank, as trustee is owed a thing?

A Because of the process in the place with the
department that generate the foreclosure figures for
us, and I rely on their integrity and their accuracy.

Q Do you know if Deutsche Bank owned the notes as
of the day this was notarized February, 27, 2007?

A Yes.

Q How do you know that?

A By the transaction of the sale of the loan to
them.

Q By who?

A By investor operations.

Q Who is investor operations?

A They are the department that processed the
reporting to the investors.

[ipaper docId=41550504 access_key=key-2crvm8l5p6is55j5cyo8 height=600 width=600 /]

COUNT I

VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS UNDER COLOR OF STATE OF LAW42U.S.C.1983

COUNT II
ABUSE OF PROCESS

COUNT III
UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES, FLA. STAT. 501.201 et. seq.

COUNT IV
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT- UNCLEAN HANDS 28 U.S.C. 2201-2202

COUNT V
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT- VOID AFFIDAVITS 28 U.S.C. 2201-2202

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

[ipaper docId=41467074 access_key=key-26mabjuyq21vtvvdzrw0 height=600 width=600 /]

Excerpts:

4 Q. So all of the client files, all of your
5 clients have a file in that system, and you maintain
6 records relating to that client in these files?
7 A. No. Specific clients are in specific
8 systems. So you update only those clients that are in
9 that particular system.
10 Q. Okay. What system would MERS be in?
11 A. MERS isn’t in the system.
12 Q. They’re not? What about GMAC Mortgage, LLC?
13 A. They’re NewTrack.
14 Q. What other systems do you use for the — for
15 the clients, for your clients?
16 A. It depends upon the client.
17 Q. Can you give me some examples of the systems?
18 A. Um, we have Lendstar, we have Vendorscape,
19 those are the two that I have used.
20 Q. And you’ve also used NewTrack?
21 A. Yes, ma’am.
22 Q. What type of information do you keep in the
23 systems?
24 A. We have to update when hearings are
25 scheduled, when service is complete for the clients.

1 Q. Do you also keep in those systems,
2 information as to when the lawsuit is filed, when
3 assignments are executed, when affidavits are
4 executed?
5 A. When complaints are filed, yes.
6 Q. But not when assignments are executed or
7 affidavits are executed?
8 A. No.
9 Q. Is that information kept in another software
10 program?
11 A. Not to my knowledge.

<SNIP>

1 A. It’s a form. It’s the same form for every
2 assignment.
3 Q. So you do not read them?
4 A. They’re checked by an attorney before I sign.
5 Q. So you rely on the attorney?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Okay. Also, in this document it indicates
8 that “Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.,
9 residing or located at care of GMAC Mortgage, LLC,”
10 what does that mean?
11 A. The address of the servicer.
12 Q. So Mortgage Electronic Registration System is
13 the servicer?
14 A. Mortgage Electronic Registrations is who
15 the — the mortgage apparently was sitting in the name
16 of for this file at the time.
17 Q. And GMAC is the servicer?
18 A. Correct.
19 Q. What does that phrase residing or located at
20 care of mean?
21 A. That’s an address.
22 Q. So MERS is physically located at GMAC
23 Mortgage, LLC?
24 A. I don’t know.
25 Q. Don’t know. Do you have access to any of the

1 title work, or any other information before you
2 execute the assignments of mortgage?
3 A. It’s in the file that’s been reviewed by the
4 attorney.
5 Q. So you don’t review them yourself?
6 A. No. It’s been reviewed by the attorney.
7 Q. Are you — what provides you the
8 authorization to sign?
9 You notice on the assignment, that you’re
10 executing it as Assistant Secretary of Mortgage
11 Electronic Registration System; is that correct?
12 A. Correct.
13 Q. So before I asked you if you were employed by
14 any other corporations, you indicated that you were
15 not. What does it mean when you hold the position of
16 Assistant Secretary of Mortgage Electronic
17 Registration Systems, Inc.?
18 A. We have power of attorney.
19 Q. And what does that mean?
20 A. That we had authorization to sign on behalf
21 of.
22 Q. And did you obtain that power of attorney?
23 A. No, I did not.
24 Q. Did you — do you know anything about the
25 negotiations leading up to the execution of that power

1 of attorney?
2 A. No.

<SNIP>

23 Q. If you’ll take a look at the first document
24 that I handed to you, the Lis Pendens and complaint.
25 If you look, there’s a document attached to that as

1 Exhibit A. And who is listed as the lender on that
2 document?
3 A. It says MERS.
4 Q. And does it, a little bit further down, also
5 say Taylor, Bean, and Whitaker Mortgage Corporation,
6 “lender —
7 A. Uh-huh.
8 Q. — is organized and existing under the laws
9 of?”
10 A. Uh-huh.
11 Q. Do you have any documents — did you have any
12 documents in your file relating to Taylor, Bean and
13 Whitaker Mortgage Corporation at the time you executed
14 the assignment?
15 A. I don’t know.
16 Q. Would you have looked at the original
17 mortgage prior to executing the assignment?
18 (Brief telephonic interruption.)
19 THE WITNESS: No. Again, they were reviewed
20 by an attorney.

Continue to the depo below…

[ipaper docId=41044236 access_key=key-1s17qv7pitz1rmk5i19t height=600 width=600 /]

Excerpts:

Q. Okay. And did it actually grant you
14 authority to sign as vice president anywhere in there?
15 A. The listing capacity on that assignment was
16 — is a clerical error. It needed to state “attorney in
17 fact.” This document grants the power as attorney in
18 fact.
19 Q. Okay. So —
20 A. But it does grant the authority to execute
21 the assignment of mortgage.
22 Q. Okay. So you are not vice president of
23 Wells Fargo Bank N.A.?
24 A. No.
25 Q. Okay. During your employment at Florida

1 Default Law Group, were there other companies that you
2 would execute assignments of mortgages on behalf of?
3 A. Yes. I believe there were others.
4 Q. And would you execute those assignments of
5 mortgages as attorney in fact or vice president?
6 A. I believe it varied. I do believe there were
7 other corporate resolutions that it did vary, the
8 capacity in which I signed.
9 Q. Okay. Do you recall specifically any of the
10 other entities that you would execute assignments of
11 mortgages on behalf of?
12 A. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems,
13 known as MERS.
14 Q. MERS?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And what was your capacity as — what was
17 your signing authority on behalf of MERS?
18 A. I believe it was as vice president and
19 assistant secretary. I’m not positive, but I believe it
20 was as vice president.
21 Q. All right. Are you currently — this grants
22 you authority to act as attorney in fact for Wells Fargo
23 Bank until December 31st, 2010.
24 Do you still then execute documents as
25 attorney in fact for Wells Fargo Bank?

1 A. No, I don’t.
2 Q. Okay. And when did you stop doing that?
3 A. It would have been when I left Florida
4 Default in October of 2008.
5 Q. Okay. So was the sole basis of your actions
6 to sign documents as attorney in fact for Wells Fargo
7 Bank out of your employment for Florida Default Law
8 Group?
9 MS. HILL: Object to form.
10 MR. GANO: Objection to the form.
11 A. I’m sorry. Can you rephrase it?
12 Q. Outside of working as an attorney for Florida
13 Default Law Group, did you execute assignments of
14 mortgages for Wells Fargo Bank pursuant to this for any
15 other types of actions not related to Florida Default
16 Law Group?
17 A. No.
18 MS. HILL: When you say “this,” you pointed.
19 For record, you are referring to?
20 MR. IMMEL: This Limited Power of Attorney.
21 MR. GANO: Exhibit A.
22 MR. IMMEL: Exhibit A.
23 Q. And have you ever been to Wells Fargo Bank’s
24 headquarters or any of their offices?
25 A. No. I don’t believe I have.

1 Q. Okay. Are you aware — did you have to apply
2 for the limited power of attorney status with Wells
3 Fargo?
4 A. No.
5 Q. Are you aware of how you were chosen as a
6 limited — to be appointed the limited power of
7 attorney?
8 A. No, I don’t.
9 Q. Okay. Did Wells Fargo Bank provide you any
10 formal training or, I guess, any sort of detailed job
11 responsibilities, or was just this limited power of
12 attorney provided to you?
13 MR. GANO: I’m going to object as far as that
14 going into any specific instructions regarding
15 particular files that she was working while at
16 Florida Default on behalf of the Plaintiff.
17 Q. Without divulging privileged information, if
18 you would limit the answer to that.
19 A. Instruction from Wells Fargo, no.
20 Q. Okay. Did you receive any compensation from
21 Wells Fargo Bank for your duties as an attorney in fact,
22 limited power of attorney?
23 MR. SMITH: You’re asking about her
24 personally?
25 MR. IMMEL: Yes, her personally.

1 A. No.
2 Q. No. Okay. Did you ever attend any board
3 meetings or executive meetings for Wells Fargo Bank?
4 A. No.
5 Q. For that matter, with regard to your signing
6 authority on behalf of MERS, was there any difference
7 between how you carried out your authority with being
8 able to sign documents on behalf of MERS versus Wells
9 Fargo Bank?
10 MS. HILL: I’m going to object to the form.
11 A. I’m sorry. Rephrase, please.
12 Q. Okay. In executing an assignment of mortgage
13 on behalf of Wells Fargo Bank pursuant to the Limited
14 Power of Attorney, when you would do that, did that
15 differ in any way from when you would execute them and
16 an assignment of mortgage on behalf of MERS?
17 A. No.
18 MS. HILL: Object to the form.
19 Q. Okay. Are you still — do you still have
20 signing authority on behalf of MERS?
21 A. I don’t know.
22 Q. You don’t know?
23 A. No, sir.
24 Q. Okay. Did MERS pay you for executing
25 assignments of mortgages?

1 A. No.
2 Q. Okay. Approximately, how many assignments of
3 mortgages would you execute on behalf of Wells Fargo
4 Bank?
5 A. I have no —
6 MS. HILL: Object to the form.
7 A. I don’t know.
8 Q. Okay. Going back to Exhibit A, it says that
9 Mark Wooton, Vice President of Loan Documentation,
10 granted this Limited Power of Attorney.
11 Did you ever meet Mark Wooton?
12 MS. HILL: I’m going to object to the form
13 only to the extent that Mark Wooton signed the
14 Limited Power of Attorney, I don’t know if signing
15 it is the same thing as granting it or if there is
16 a distinction. But to that extent, I’m objecting
17 to the question.
18 Q. Mark Wooton signed the Limited Power of
19 Attorney. Did you ever meet Mark Wooton?
20 A. Not that I recall.
21 Q. Okay. Are you aware of whether he was
22 authorized to sign this Limited Power of Attorney?
23 A. No. I don’t know.
24 Q. Okay. Did you report to anyone directly at
25 Wells Fargo Bank?

1 A. No.
2 Q. Did you receive directions to execute an
3 assignment of mortgage directly from Wells Fargo Bank?
4 MR. GANO: I’m going to object base upon
5 attorney-client privilege, any specific
6 instruction she obtained regarding this case or
7 any other cases.
8 Q. Without divulging privileged information.
9 A. We did have a procedure that under certain
10 circumstances, yes, we were directed to prepare the
11 assignments.
12 Q. Okay. Could you, I guess, describe the
13 procedure for when you would be directed, without
14 divulging attorney-client privileges?
15 A. Yes. When our client referred in the
16 mortgage referral.
17 Q. Okay.
18 A. It could be the owner or it could be the
19 servicer. In this particular case with Wells Fargo,
20 they sent in the referral. They indicated that they
21 were the servicer for the new owner, which I believe was
22 HSBC, and indicated that HSBC was the proper owner and
23 holder of the note.
24 In that event of record, Wells was the last
25 of-record owner and holder of the note; therefore, we

1 were to effectuate the assignment of mortgage prepared
2 and executed on behalf of Wells Fargo.
3 Q. Okay. What type of documents would you rely
4 upon to determine that aside from just the referral
5 stating that HSBC Bank was, I guess, the owner of the
6 note; what other documents would you rely upon to
7 ascertain that?
8 A. That HSBC was the owner?
9 Q. Yes.
10 A. We relied on our client’s referral indicating
11 that they had sold it to HSBC.
12 Q. Okay. Was there any other information that
13 you can recall?
14 A. Not that I recall.
15 Q. Okay. So going back to the referral, the
16 determination to execute an assignment of mortgage then
17 would be sent to you by Wells Fargo in a case like this
18 — in this case?
19 MR. GANO: Object to the form.
20 A. I’m sorry. I don’t quite understand that
21 question.
22 Q. Okay. Wells Fargo directed you to execute
23 the assignment of mortgage in this case?
24 MR. GANO: Again, I’m going to object based
25 upon any specific information given as

1 attorney-client privilege.
2 Q. Without divulging attorney-client privilege.
3 A. Under the procedure we had, yes.
4 Q. Okay.
5 A. Correct.
6 Q. Okay. And how would the referral — how was
7 the referral sent?
8 A. I’m not positive. It varied. I believe it
9 was electronic.
10 Q. Okay. And in situations where the — would
11 you ever rely upon the note to determine who to execute
12 an assignment of mortgage to?
13 A. Rely upon the note?
14 Q. The note, the promissory note.
15 A. A copy or the original?
16 Q. Copy, original, any fashion, the promissory
17 note?
18 A. No.
19 Q. Okay. So whether or not the note was lost at
20 the time of the referral would not impact your execution
21 of the assignment of mortgage?
22 A. No.
23 Q. Okay. How would you receive a promissory
24 note then from the plaintiff or whoever referred the
25 case to you?

1 A. Typically, they would mail the original
2 documents to our office.
3 Q. Do you recall if it would be mailed by any
4 sort of certified mail or return receipt; would you sign
5 for anything?
6 A. I don’t know. It didn’t come to me directly.
7 Q. And in cases such as this where Wells Fargo
8 would send the referral to you and state that they were
9 the servicer, what type of information would you review
10 to ascertain that they were, in fact, the servicer?
11 MR. GANO: Object to the form, and object to
12 any specific information, again, on this
13 particular referral.
14 Q. Without divulging privileged information.
15 A. We just relied on them indicating that they
16 were the servicer —
17 Q. Okay.
18 A. — who the plaintiff was to be.

See Deposition/Transcript below

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CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND COMES NOW,

Plaintiff, Reginald Jones (hereinafter “Plaintiff”), by and through his attorneys Jon D. Pels, Esq., Lawrence J. Anderson, Esq., Justin M. Reiner, Esq. and Jennifer Schiffer, Esq., and Pels Anderson, LLC, and all others similarly situated, and makes the following Complaint against Defendants HSBC Bank USA, N.A., as Trustee, (hereinafter “HSBC”), Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (hereinafter “WELLS FARGO”) and Buonassissi, Henning & Lash, P.C. (hereinafter “BH&L”)1

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
–    Solely Against Buonassissi, Henning & Lash, P.C    –
Violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) (15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq.)

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
–    All Defendants –
Wrongful Foreclosure: Failure to Comply with Maryland Real Property Article, §§ 7-105.1 or 7-105.2

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
–    All Defendants    –
VIOLATION OF THE MARYLAND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
–    All Defendants    –
BREACH OF CONTRACT – IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
–    All Defendants    –
UNJUST ENRICHMENT/CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
–    All Defendants    –
INJUNCTIVE / DECLARATORY RELIEF

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
–    All Defendants    –
COMMON LAW FRAUD

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