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Branch Banking & Trust Company Agrees to Pay $83 Million to Resolve Alleged False Claims Act Liability Arising from FHA-Insured Mortgage Lending

Branch Banking & Trust Company Agrees to Pay $83 Million to Resolve Alleged False Claims Act Liability Arising from FHA-Insured Mortgage Lending


FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Thursday, September 29, 2016

Branch Banking & Trust Company Agrees to Pay $83 Million to Resolve Alleged False Claims Act Liability Arising from FHA-Insured Mortgage Lending

Branch Banking & Trust Company (BB&T) has agreed to pay the United States $83 million to resolve allegations that it violated the False Claims Act by knowingly originating and underwriting mortgage loans insured by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) Federal Housing Administration (FHA) that did not meet applicable requirements, the Justice Department announced today.  BB&T is headquartered in Winston-Salem, North Carolina.

“The FHA program depends on Direct Endorsement Lenders endorsing only eligible loans for FHA mortgage insurance, and complying with HUD’s quality control requirements,” said Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Benjamin C. Mizer, head of the Justice Department’s Civil Division.  “Lenders like BB&T that participate in the FHA program must make adherence to the FHA program rules a priority.  The Department has and will continue to hold accountable those lenders that prioritize profits over program compliance.”

“While profiting from the FHA program, BB&T exposed the taxpayers to losses by failing to comply with HUD guidelines, and then took the additional step of falsely certifying that it had complied with such guidelines,” said U.S. Attorney John Horn of the Northern District of Georgia. “This settlement recovers substantial losses caused by BB&T’s decision to place its own profits above its commitment to adhere to HUD underwriting and quality control requirements.”

Since at least January 2006, BB&T has participated as a Direct Endorsement lender (DEL) in the FHA insurance program.  A DEL has the authority to originate, underwrite, and endorse mortgages for FHA insurance.  If a DEL approves a mortgage loan for FHA insurance and the loan later defaults, the holder of the loan may submit an insurance claim to HUD, FHA’s parent agency, for the losses resulting from the defaulted loan.  Under the DEL program, the FHA does not review a loan before it is endorsed for FHA insurance for compliance with FHA’s credit and eligibility standards, but instead relies on the efforts of the DEL to verify compliance.  DELs are therefore required to follow program rules designed to ensure that they are properly underwriting and certifying mortgages for FHA insurance.

The settlement announced today resolves allegations that BB&T failed to comply with certain FHA origination, underwriting and quality control requirements.  As part of the settlement, BB&T admitted to the following facts: Between Jan. 1, 2006 and Sept. 30, 2014, it certified for FHA insurance mortgage loans that did not meet HUD underwriting requirements and did not adhere to FHA’s quality control requirements.  BB&T significantly increased its loan volume between 2006 and 2009—more than doubling all loan originations, while increasing the number of FHA insured loans six fold.  This increase in volume was accompanied by an increase in the number of loans internally rated “Serious-Marketability” by BB&T’s quality control department —the most significant quality control defect rating and a defect that rendered a loan ineligible for FHA insurance.  Between 2007 and 2011, the percentage of loans underwritten by BB&T each year that were rated Serious-Marketability by its quality control department always exceeded 30 percent, and exceeded as much as 50 percent in 2010 and 2011.  BB&T nevertheless endorsed many of these loans for FHA insurance and, if they defaulted, sought payment from HUD for the insured loans.

The monthly reviews and reports that BB&T’s quality control department shared with management alerted BB&T to deficiencies in many of its FHA loans.  A 2010 internal memorandum at BB&T stated that “increased volume of FHA requests and changes to regulatory requirements have resulted in origination, processing and underwriting errors.  Some employees are not applying current and accurate FHA guidelines.”  A proposal to improve BB&T’s underwriting of FHA loans with additional training as well as a testing and certification process for underwriters was prepared in 2010, but neither recommendation was implemented until after 2014.

Additionally, between 2006 and 2014, BB&T’s quality control process did not satisfy certain FHA requirements.  Although loan volume more than doubled from 2006 to 2009, the number of quality control employees remained the same.  The quality control department requested additional employees in 2009, yet new employees were not added until 2013.  Because BB&T’s quality control department did not have adequate staff, it instituted a cap on the number of loans it reviewed.  As a result, between 2009 and 2014, the quality control department did not always review the number of loans necessary to comply with HUD’s loan review sampling requirements.  Additionally, BB&T did not perform reviews of its lender branch offices, as required by HUD, before beginning the reviews again in late 2014.

Finally, since at least 2006, HUD has required self-reporting.  However, despite internal ratings showing that 30 percent or more of the loans underwritten by BB&T between 2007 and 2011 had Serious-Marketability findings, and were thus ineligible for FHA insurance, BB&T did not self-report any loans containing material underwriting defects until 2013.

As a result of BB&T’s conduct and omissions, HUD insured loans endorsed by BB&T that were not eligible for FHA mortgage insurance under the DEL program, and that HUD would not otherwise have insured.  HUD subsequently incurred substantial losses when it paid insurance claims on those loans.

“Lenders are required to apply FHA’s standards to each mortgage loan we insure and to honestly certify to us that they’ve done so,” said Associate General Counsel Dane M. Narode for HUD’s Program Enforcement.  “Today’s settlement reminds all lenders that sound underwriting is the bedrock of a healthy housing market and the financial futures of homeowners we support.”

“Today’s settlement agreement resolves allegations that BB&T, entrusted by American taxpayers to comply with FHA regulations, failed to conform with certain FHA origination, underwriting and quality control requirements,” said Inspector General David A. Montoya for HUD.  “This settlement demonstrates a continued commitment to address the failures and halt the business practices that potentially harm the FHA program and its participants.”

The settlement was the result of a joint investigation conducted by HUD, the HUD Office of Inspector General, the Civil Division’s Commercial Litigation Branch and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Georgia.  The claims asserted against BB&T are allegations only, and there has been no determination of liability.

16-1128
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QUI TAM| Schneider v. JP Morgan Chase Bank National Association et al – case asserts that JP Morgan Chase improperly took credits for loans hidden in a secret system of records known as RCV1, which were not being properly serviced as federally related mortgages

QUI TAM| Schneider v. JP Morgan Chase Bank National Association et al – case asserts that JP Morgan Chase improperly took credits for loans hidden in a secret system of records known as RCV1, which were not being properly serviced as federally related mortgages


SUMMARY

Laurence Schneider, principal investor in three companies, Mortgage Resolution Servicing LLP, S&A Capital Partners, Inc., and 1st Fidelity Loan Servicing, filed a False Claims Act case against JPMorgan Chase for fraudulent claims of consumer relief and the nation’s largest bank’s failure to comply with mortgage loan servicing requirements, under the National Mortgage Settlement, HAMP and Making Home Affordable Program.  The case asserts that JP Morgan Chase improperly took credits for loans hidden in a secret system of records known as RCV1, which were not being properly serviced as federally related mortgages.  As a result, JP Morgan Chase received credit against its multi-billion settlements with the United States Department of Justice that it never should have received.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE
STATES OF CALIFORNIA,
DELAWARE, FLORIDA, GEORGIA,
HAWAII, ILLINOIS, INDIANA, IOWA,
MASSACHUSETTS, MINNESOTA,
MONTANA, NEVADA, NEW
HAMPSHIRE, NEW JERSEY, NEW
MEXICO, NEW YORK, NORTH
CAROLINA, RHODE ISLAND,
TENNESSEE, VIRGINIA, AND THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.,

Plaintiffs,

Ex rel. LAURENCE SCHNEIDER,
Plaintiff-Relator,

v.

J.P. MORGAN CHASE BANK,
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, J.P.
MORGAN CHASE & COMPANY; AND
CHASE HOME FINANCE LLC,
Defendants.

Case. No. 1:14-cv-01047-RMC

Judge Rosemary M. Collyer

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

<excerpt>

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Defendant’s Fraud

3. Defendant Chase’s fraud arises out of its response to efforts by the United States
Government (“Government” or “Federal Government”) and the States (the “States”)1 to remedy
the misconduct of Chase and other financial institutions whose actions significantly contributed
to the consumer housing crisis.

4. Defendant’s misconduct resulted in the issuance of improper mortgages,
premature and unauthorized foreclosures, violation of service members’ and other homeowners’
rights and protections, the use of false and deceptive affidavits and other documents, and the
waste and abuse of taxpayer funds. Each of the allegations regarding Defendant contained
herein applies to instances in which one or more, and in some cases all, of the defendants
engaged in the conduct alleged.

5. In March 2012, after a lengthy investigation (in part due to other qui tam
plaintiffs) under the Federal False Claims Act, the Government, along with the States, filed a
complaint against Chase and the other banks responsible for the fraudulent and unfair mortgage
practices that cost consumers, the Federal Government, and the States tens of billions of dollars.
Specifically, the Government alleged that Chase, as well as other financial institutions, engaged
in improper practices related to mortgage origination, mortgage servicing, and foreclosures,
including, but not limited to, irresponsible and inadequate oversight of the banks’ quality control
standards.

6. These improper practices had previously been the focus of several administrative
enforcement actions by various government agencies, including but not limited to, the Office of
the Controller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Bank and others. Those enforcement actions
resulted in various other Consent Orders that are still in full force and effect.

7. In April 2012, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
approved a settlement between the Federal Government, the States, the Defendant and four other
banks, which resulted in the NMSA. The operative document of this agreement was the Consent
Judgment (“Consent Judgment” or “Agreement”). The Consent Judgment contains, among other
things, Consumer Relief provisions. The Consumer Relief provisions required Chase to provide
over $4 billion in consumer relief to their borrowers. This relief was to be in the form of, among
other things, loan forgiveness and refinancing. Under the Consent Judgment, Chase received
“credits” towards its Consumer Relief obligations by forgiving or modifying loans it maintained
as a result of complying with the procedures and requirements contained in Exhibits D and D-1
of the Consent Judgment.

8. The Consent Judgment also contains Servicing Standards in Exhibit A that were
intended to be used as a basis for granting Consumer Relief. The Servicing Standards were
tested through various established “Metrics” and were designed to improve upon the lack of
quality control and communication with borrowers. Compliance was overseen by an
independent Monitor.

9. The operational framework for the Servicing Standards and Consumer Relief
requirements of the NMSA was based on a series of Treasury Directives that were themselves
designed as part of the Making Home Affordable (MHA) program. The MHA program was a
critical part of the Government’s broad strategy to help homeowners avoid foreclosure, stabilize
the country’s housing market, and improve the nation’s economy by setting uniform and industry
wide default servicing protocols, policies and procedures for the distribution of federal and
proprietary loan modification programs.

10. Before the Consent Judgment was entered into, Chase sold a significant amount
of its mortgage obligations to individual investors. Between 2006 and 2010, the Relator bought
the rights to thousands of mortgages owned and serviced by Chase. Unbeknownst to the Relator,
these mortgages were saturated with violations of past and present regulations, statutes and other
governmental requirements for first and second federally related home mortgage loans.

11. After both the Consent Judgment was signed and the MHA program was in effect,
numerous borrowers, whose 2nd lien mortgages had been sold by Chase to the Relator, received
debt-forgiveness letters from Chase that were purportedly sent pursuant to the Consent
Judgment.

12. Relator, through his contacts at Chase, was made aware that 33,456 letters were
sent by Chase on September 13, 2012 to second-lien borrowers. On December 13, 2012 another
approximately 10,000 letters were sent, and on January 31, 2013 another approximately 8,000
letters were sent, for a total of over 50,000 debt-forgiveness letters. These letters represented to
the recipient borrowers that, pursuant to the terms of the NMSA, the borrowers were discharged
from their obligations to make further payments on their mortgages, which Chase stated, it had
forgiven as a “result of a recent mortgage servicing settlement reached with the states and federal
government.” None of these borrowers made an application for a loan modification as required
by the Consent Judgment. These letters were not individually reviewed by Chase to ensure that
Chase actually owned the mortgages or to ensure the accuracy and integrity of the borrower’s
information but instead were “robo-signed”; each of the letters sent out was signed by “Patrick
Boyle” who identified himself as a Vice President at Chase.

13. Relator’s experience with Chase’s baseless debt-forgiveness letters was not
unique. Several other investors were also affected by Chase choosing to mass mail the “robo-
signed” debt-forgiveness letters to thousands of consumers from its system of records in order to
earn credits under the terms of the Consent Judgment and to avoid detection of its illegal and
discriminatory loan servicing policies and procedures.

14. In addition to the debt forgiveness letters sent, and after both the Consent
Judgment was signed and the MHA program was in effect, numerous borrowers, whose 1st
mortgages had been sold by Chase to the Relator, had their 1st mortgages liens quietly released.

15. Relator, through his third party servicer, which was handling normal and
customary default mortgage servicing activities, was made aware that several lien releases were
filed in the public records on mortgage loans that were owned by Relator in the fall of 2013.
Through Relator’s subsequent investigation of the property records for 1st mortgage loans that
Chase had previously sold to Relator, scores of additional lien releases were also discovered.

16. During the course of Relator’s investigation of Chase’s servicing practices, he
discovered that Chase maintains a large set of loans outside of its primary System of Records
(“SOR”), which is known as the Recovery One population (“RCV1” or “RCV1 SOR”). RCV1
was described to the Monitor by Chase as an “application” for loans that had been charged off
but still part of its main SOR. However, once loans had been charged off by Chase, the accuracy
and integrity of the information pertaining to the borrowers’ accounts whose loans became part
of the RCV1 population was and is fatally and irreparably flawed. Furthermore, the loans in the
RCV1 were not serviced according to the requirements of Federal law, the Consent Judgment,
the MHA programs or any of the other consent orders or settlements reached by Chase with any
government agency prior to the NMSA.2

17. Chase’s practice of sending unsolicited debt-forgiveness letters to intentionally
pre-selected borrowers of valueless loans did not meet the Servicing Standards set out in the
Consent Judgment to establish eligibility for credits toward its Consumer Relief obligations.
This practice enabled Chase to reduce its cost of complying with the Consent Judgment and
MHA program, while at the same time enhancing its own profits through unearned Consumer
Relief credits and MHA incentives. Chase sought to take credit for valueless charged-off and
third-party owned loans instead of applying the Consumer Relief under the NMSA and MHA
2 By letter dated September 16, 2015 to Schneider’s counsel, in reference to Relator’s claim that
“Chase concealed from the Monitor and MHA-C both the existence of the RCV1 charged-off
and the way those loans were treated for purposes of HAMP solicitations and NMS metrics
testing”, Chase’s counsel stated that “Those allegations are wholly incorrect. Chase repeatedly
disclosed the relevant facts to both the Monitor and MHA-C.”

Schneider’s counsel requested that Chase provide all documents demonstrating the “relevant
facts” to support Chase’s statement. Chase has refused to provide said documents, citing
Chase‘s concerns with providing documents that it had previously provided to the U.S.
Government. While Chase has offered to allow Chase’s counsel to read such documents
“verbatim” to Schneider’s counsel, Schneider knows of no supportable reason why documents
previously disclosed to the U.S. Government should not be shared with Schneider in his capacity
as a Relator under the FCA. No privilege exists for such a claim and therefore Schneider has
rejected this limitation. Such documents, if they in fact exist, should be produced before such a
defense can be raised, particularly because Chase’s counsel has raised the issue of Rule 11
responsibilities.

18. The Servicing Standards and the Consumer Relief Requirements of the Consent
Judgment are set forth in Exhibits A and D of that document. The Consent Judgment is
governed by the underlying Servicer Participation Agreements of the MHA program, which
required mandatory compliance with the Treasury Directives under the MHA Handbook
(“Handbook”). Chase is required to demonstrate compliance with the Handbook’s guidelines in
the form of periodic certifications to the government. Chase ignored the requirements of
Exhibits A and D of the Consent Judgment, especially with respect to the RCV1 population of
loans. Therefore, Chase has been unable to service with any accuracy the charged-off loans it
owns and to segregate those loans that it no longer owns. As such, any certifications of
compliance with the Consent Judgment or the Services Participation Agreement (“SPA”) are
false claims.

19. Relator conducted his own investigations and found that the Defendants sent loan
forgiveness letters to consumers for mortgages that Chase no longer owns or that were not
eligible for forgiveness credit. Further, Chase continues to fail to meet its obligations to service
loans and to prevent blight as required by both the Consent Judgment and SPA. Chase’s
intentional failure to monitor, report and/or service these loans, and its issuance of invalid loan
forgiveness letters and lien releases, evidence an attempt to thwart the goal of the Consent
Judgment and the MHA program. The purpose of this scheme was to quickly satisfy the
Defendant’s Consumer Relief obligations as cheaply as possible, without actually providing the
relief that Chase promised in exchange for the settlement that Chase reached with the Federal
Government and the States. In addition, Chase applied for and received MHA incentive
payments without complying with the MHA mandatory requirements. In short, Chase decreased
its liabilities, increased its revenues, avoided its obligations, and provided little to no relief to
consumers.

20. The mere existence of RCV1 makes all claims by Chase that it complied with the
Servicing Standards and the Consumer Relief Requirements of the Consent Judgment false.
Likewise, the existence of RCV1 makes all claims by Chase that it complied with the SPA of the
MHA program false.

B. Damages to the Government Related to the NMSA

21. Exhibit E of the Consent Judgment provides for penalties of up to $5 million for
failure to meet a prescribed Metric of the Servicing Standards. Exhibit E, ¶ J.3(b) at E15.

22. Exhibit D of the Consent Judgment provides:

If Servicer fails to meet the commitment set forth in these Consumer Relief
Requirements within three years of the Servicer’s Start Date, Servicer shall pay an
amount equal to 125% of the unmet commitment amount, except that if Servicer
fails to meet the two year commitment noted above, and then fails to meet the
three year commitment, the Servicer shall pay an amount equal to 140% of the
unmet three-year Commitment amount.

Exhibit D, ¶10.d. at D-11.

23. The required payment set out in Exhibit D, ¶10.d is made either to the United
States or the States that are parties to the Consent Judgment. Fifty percent of any payment is
distributed to the United States. Consent Judgment, Exhibit E, ¶ J.c.(3)c. at E-16.

24. As explained in more detail below, Chase was required to certify that it was in
compliance with the Servicing Standards and the Consumer Relief Requirements. Many, if not
all, of the loans that Chase identified for credits against the $4 billion Consumer Relief
provisions were not eligible for the credit, because Chase did not comply with the Servicing
Standards or the Consumer Relief Requirements. Specifically, all loan modification programs
must be made available to all borrowers, who may then apply to determine eligibility. Hundreds
of thousands of borrowers’ accounts, in the RCV1 system of records, were not considered for all
eligible loss mitigation options (even though they could likely have qualified). Due to this
omission none of the loan modification programs qualified for Consumer Relief Credit. Thus,
Chase did not and does not qualify for any of the Consumer Relief Credit for which it applied.

25. For these reasons, each of Chase’s certifications to the Federal Government of
compliance represents a “reverse” false claim to avoid paying money to the Government.

26. Under the FCA a person is liable for penalties and damages who:

[k]nowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or
statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the
Government, or knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly avoids or
decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government.

31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G).

27. Under the FCA, “the term ‘obligation’ means an established duty, whether or not
fixed, arising from an express or implied contractual, grantor-grantee, or licensor-licensee
relationship, from a fee-based or similar relationship, from statute or regulation, or from the
retention of any overpayment.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(3).

28. Thus, under the FCA, Chase is liable for its false claims whether or not the
government fixed the amount of the obligation owed by Chase.

29. Under the FCA, “the term ‘material’ means having a natural tendency to
influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property.” U.S.C. §
3729(b)(3).

30. Under the “natural tendency” test Chase is liable for its false statements so long as
they reasonably could have influenced the government’s payment or collection of money. A
statement is false if it is capable of influencing the government’s funding decision, not whether it
actually influenced the government.

31. Each of Chase’s false certifications is actionable under 31 U.S.C. §
3729(a)(1)(G), because they represent a false record or statement that concealed, avoided or
decreased an obligation to transmit money to the Government.

32. The Federal Government and the States agreed to the NMSA with Chase, with the
understanding that Chase would meet its obligations under the Consent Judgment.

33. As set out in the Consumer Relief Requirements, the measure of the Federal and
State Governments’ damages is up to 140 percent of the credits that Chase falsely claimed met
the requirements of the Consent Judgment and up to $5 million for each Metric the Chase failed
to meet.

34. These damages are recoverable under the Federal Civil False Claims Act, 31
U.S.C. § 3729 et seq. (the “FCA”), and similar provisions of the State False Claims Acts of the
States of California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota,
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, the Commonwealths of Massachusetts and Virginia, and the District of
Columbia.

35. The Federal Government and the States are now harmed because they are not
receiving the benefit of the bargain for which they negotiated with Chase due to the false claims
for credit that have been made by the Defendant.

C. Damages to the Government Related to the HAMP

36. The Amended and Restated Commitment to Purchase Financial Instrument and
Servicer Participation Agreement between the United States Government and Chase provided for
the implementation of loan modification and foreclosure prevention services (“HAMP
Services”).

37. The value of Chase’s SPA was limited to $4,532,750,000 (“Program Participation
Cap”).

38. The value of EMC Mortgage Corporation’s (“EMC”) SPA (Chase is successor in
interest) was limited to $1,237,510,000.

39. As explained in more detail below, Chase must certify that it is in compliance
with the SPA and the MHA program and must strictly adhere to the guidelines and procedures
issued by the Treasury with respect to the programs outlined in the Service Schedules (“Program
Guidelines”). The Program Guidelines pursuant to the Treasury Directives are cataloged in the
MHA Handbook (“Handbook”). None of the loans that Chase and EMC identified and
submitted for payment against their respective Participation Caps were eligible for the incentive
payment, because neither Chase nor EMC complied with the SPA and Handbook guidelines.
Specifically, all loan modification programs must be made available to all borrowers, who must
then apply to determine eligibility. Hundreds of thousands of borrowers’ mortgage loan
accounts in the RCV1 system of records were not offered and thereby unable to be considered
for all eligible loss mitigation options (even though they likely could have qualified). Due to the
omission of the RCV1 population for any loss mitigation options, none of the modifications that
Chase provided qualified for HAMP incentives. Thus, Chase does not qualify for any of the
HAMP incentives for which it applied and received funds.
40. Therefore, Chase’s certifications of compliance and its creation of records to
support those certifications represent both the knowing presentation of false or fraudulent claims
for a payment and the knowing use of false records material to false or fraudulent claims.

41. Under the FCA, a person is liable for penalties and damages who:

(A) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for
payment or approval;

31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)
and
(B) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or
statement material to a false or fraudulent claim.

31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G).

42. Each of Chase’s false certifications is actionable under either 31 U.S.C. §
3729(a)(1)(A) and (B), because they represent a false or fraudulent claim for payment or
approval of a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim.
43. Under HAMP, the Federal Government entered into the Commitment with Chase,
with the understanding that Chase would meet its obligations under the SPA and related Treasury
directives. The Federal Government is now harmed because it is not receiving the benefit of the
bargain for which it negotiated with Chase due to the false claims for payment that have been
made by the Defendant.

[…]

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Whistleblower Suit alleges banks and mortgage companies cheated veterans and U.S. taxpayers

Whistleblower Suit alleges banks and mortgage companies cheated veterans and U.S. taxpayers


Seriously, when is enough really enough with these banks?

WaPO-

Some of the nation’s biggest banks and mortgage companies have defrauded veterans and taxpayers out of hundreds of millions of dollars by disguising illegal fees in veterans’ home refinancing loans, according to a whistleblower suit unsealed in federal court in Atlanta.

The suit accuses the companies, including Wells Fargo, Bank of America, J.P. Morgan Chase and GMAC Mortgage, of engaging in “a brazen scheme to defraud both our nation’s veterans and the United States treasury” of millions of dollars in connection with home loans guaranteed by the Department of Veterans Affairs.

“This is a massive fraud on the American taxpayers and American veterans,” James E. Butler Jr., one of the lawyers bringing the suit, said Tuesday.

[WASHINGTON POST]

[ipaper docId=67526742 access_key=key-w80spahtz1zyelupsdi height=600 width=600 /]

 

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