promissory note - FORECLOSURE FRAUD - Page 2

Tag Archive | "promissory note"

FL APPEALS 2nd DCA “Unsupportable Claim, Lost Note Affidavit” COUNTRY PLACE COMM v. JPMORGAN

FL APPEALS 2nd DCA “Unsupportable Claim, Lost Note Affidavit” COUNTRY PLACE COMM v. JPMORGAN


COUNTRY PLACE COMMUNITY
ASSOCIATION, INC.,

v.

J.P. MORGAN MORTGAGE
ACQUISITION CORP.,

Opinion filed December 29, 2010.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for
Hillsborough County; William P. Levens,
Judge.

Leslie M. Conklin, Clearwater, for
Appellant.

No appearance for Appellee.

WALLACE, Judge.

EXCERPTS:

The lender named in the copy of the note and mortgage attached to the
complaint was First Franklin Financial Corporation. The mortgage designated Mortgage
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as the mortgagee. J.P. Morgan did not attach to
its complaint any evidence of an assignment of either the note or the mortgage in its
favor. When J.P. Morgan filed the action, no assignment of the mortgage in its favor
had been recorded in the public records of Hillsborough County.

<SNIP>

2The note had apparently been endorsed in blank. Oddly, J.P. Morgan
had filed an “Affidavit of Lost Original Instruments” after the entry of the adverse
summary judgment and about seven weeks before the hearing on Country Place’s
motion for attorney’s fees. In the affidavit, J.P. Morgan’s representative swore that the
original note and mortgage “have been lost or misplaced and cannot be located by
Plaintiff. Plaintiff has caused an extensive search of Plaintiff’s records and said Note
and Mortgage cannot be found.”

Continue below…

[ipaper docId=46137500 access_key=key-24kokwkxzzsfbuyfu9nz height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (3)

John O’Brien, the Essex County register of deeds, isn’t buying it, and neither should you

John O’Brien, the Essex County register of deeds, isn’t buying it, and neither should you


Our View: Avoiding another mortgage mess

The Salem News Thu Dec 16, 2010, 06:00 AM EST

They did such a good job depressing the housing market and sending the economy into a tailspin, why not trust the banking cabal with keeping track of all property titles?

John O’Brien, the Essex County register of deeds, isn’t buying it, and neither should you.

O’Brien, of Lynn, is in the forefront of a national effort to challenge the policies and practices of the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. (MERS). The agency was established in 1995 by a group of banking conglomerates including Bank of America, Countrywide Home Loans and Wells Fargo, to keep track of loans issued against property titles — a task previously performed by the public registries of deeds.

In a Nov. 18 letter to Attorney General Martha Coakley, O’Brien alleged that MERS “has failed to pay the proper recording fees required under Massachusetts statute when a lender assigns a mortgage to another entity.” And this week Coakley announced that she will join her colleagues in several other states in an investigation to see whether MERS is skirting laws regarding such transactions.

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (0)

[NYSC] Judge Finds Issues With “NOTE AMOUNTS”, Robo Signer “ROGER STOTTS” Affidavit: ONEWEST v. GARCIA

[NYSC] Judge Finds Issues With “NOTE AMOUNTS”, Robo Signer “ROGER STOTTS” Affidavit: ONEWEST v. GARCIA


Any issues with “Defendant MERS VP Roger Stotts” signing an affidavit for “Plaintiff ONEWEST”?? See image below 🙂

ONEWEST BANK, FSB AS SUCCESSOR IN
INTEREST TO INDYMAC‘ BANK, FSB
Plaintiff,

-against-

JESUS GARCIA,
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION
SYSTEMS, INC., AS NOMINEE FOR INDYMAC
BANK, FSB,

Excerpt:

Plaintiffs failure to provide a note or notes reflecting the amount it claims is due from
defendant-mortgagor precludes the Court from granting the relief requested. It is well settled that in
order to make a prima facie case in a foreclosure action, the plaintiff must show the existence of the
note and mortgage and that it is the owner of same. Ocwen Fed. Bank FSB v Miffer, 18 AD3d 527
(2d Dept 2005); MERS v Coakfey, 41 AD3d 674 (2d Dept 2007); Kluge v Fugazy, 145 AD2d 537 (2d
Dept 1988). The note provided here reflects only partial proof of the amount allegedly owed.

Additionally, with regard to the proof necessary on a motion for default in general, CPLR
321 5(f) requires that the applicant “shall file … proof of the facts constituting the claim, the default and
the amount due by affidavit …” Neither the affirmation of Jason E. Brooks nor the affidavit of Roger
Stotts satisfies that requirement. Such failure is particularly striking in view of the confusion present
here by virtue of allegations which are inconsistent with documents, and documents which are
submitted without explanation.

Continue below… Make sure you see the image down below as well…

[ipaper docId=44765302 access_key=key-7x1tgf95t71omaqahds height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (0)

OHIO COMMON PLEAS COURT DISMISSES DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION

OHIO COMMON PLEAS COURT DISMISSES DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION


Deutsche Bank National Trust Company

v.

Steve M. Feck

Excerpt:

Because Plaintiff failed to establish by preponderance of the evidence that it possessed the Note at the time it filed it’s complaint, the Court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the rights of the parties and orders the matter dismissed without prejudice as to it’s re-filing.

Continue below…

[ipaper docId=44549597 access_key=key-1ww169yebt2r1scyb5pf height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (0)

The Big Lie: MERS Mortgages in Massachusetts by Jamie Ranney, Esq.

The Big Lie: MERS Mortgages in Massachusetts by Jamie Ranney, Esq.


by Jamie Ranney, Esq.
Jamie Ranney, PC
4 Thirty Acres Lane
Nantucket, MA 02554
jamie@nantucketlaw.pro
508-228-9224

This memo will focus on MERS-designated mortgages in Massachusetts.

In this author’s opinion two (2) things are evident after a survey of Massachusetts law.

First, MERS cannot be a valid “mortgagee” under Massachusetts law and thus MERS designated mortgages are invalid in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

This is because MERS-designated mortgages by definition “split” the security instrument (the mortgage) from the debt (the promissory note) when they are signed. This “split” invalidates the mortgage under Massachusetts law. Where the security interest is invalid upon the signing of the mortgage, MERS cannot occupy the legal position of a “mortgagee” under Massachusetts law no matter what language MERS inserts into their mortgages that purports to give them the legal position of “mortgagee”. Since MERSdesignated mortgages are invalid at their inception, it follows logically therefore that MERS mortgages are not legally capable of being recorded in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts by its Registers of Deeds.

Second, even if a MERS-designated mortgage were found to be a valid security instrument in Massachusetts, each and every assignment of the mortgage and note “behind” a MERS-designated mortgage must be recorded on the public land records of the Commonwealth in order to comply with the Massachusetts recording statute at M.G.L. c. 183, s. 4 which requires that “conveyances of an estate” be recorded to be valid. A mortgage is a “conveyance of an estate” under Massachusetts law. Since MERS-designated mortgages exist for the primary purpose of holding “legal” title on the public land records while the “beneficial” interest is transferred and sold multiple times (and a mortgage cannot exist without a note under Massachusetts law), MERS-mortgages unlawfully avoid recording fees due the Commonwealth for the transfer(s) of interests under MERS-designated mortgages.

“If you tell a lie that’s big enough, and you tell it often enough, people will believe you are telling the truth, even when what you are saying is total crap.”1

Continue reading below…

[ipaper docId=44370743 access_key=key-1en9gd3bwhh0zs2atypk height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (4)

KENTUCKY, KENTON COUNTY ORDER REQUIRES COMPLETE CHAIN OF TITLE AND OWNERSHIP TO FORECLOSE

KENTUCKY, KENTON COUNTY ORDER REQUIRES COMPLETE CHAIN OF TITLE AND OWNERSHIP TO FORECLOSE


COMMONWEALTH OF  KENTUCKY

KENTON CIRCUIT COURT

GENERAL ORDER

Pursuant to CR 8.01(1) and CR 17.01, plaintiff in foreclosure complaints filed in Kenton County, Kentucky, must show that it is the holder of the note and mortgage at the time the complaint is filed. Effective with the foreclosure complaints filed November 15, 2010, and thereafter, the complaint at the time of the filing must be accompanied by all of the following:

(1)   a copy of the promissory note with all endorsements;

(2)   a copy of the recorded mortgage;

(3)   an affidavit by the plaintiff, it’s representative, it’s attorney or it’s servicer (a) documenting that the named plaintiff is the owner of the note and mortgage at the time the complaint is filed, and (b) identifying plaintiff as either the original note and mortgage holder, or as an assignee, trustee or successor-in-interest of the original note and mortgage holder;

(4)   a copy of all the assignments of the note and mortgage, if plaintiff is not the original mortgage holder, evidencing the complete chain of assignments. The assignment of the note and mortgage to the named plaintiff must be executed prior to the filing of the foreclosure complaint;

(5)   documentation establishing plaintiff as a successor-in-interest if plaintiff is a successor-in-interest.


Date Oct 14, 2010

[ipaper docId=40495636 access_key=key-wvoanylhlqmtiec6rgx height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (1)

VIDEOS YOU MUST WATCH! IT ALL BEGAN w/ MARCY KAPTUR

VIDEOS YOU MUST WATCH! IT ALL BEGAN w/ MARCY KAPTUR


Back in January 15, 2009 Marcy Kaptur told Foreclosure Victims “Don’t Leave your Home” because we will find out that they don’t have the mortgage.

“They can’t find the paper up there on Wall Street”

You can feel it through her passion she knows what she’s talking about. I have a feeling I may know who might be consulting her 🙂

Go to 3:05 where they clearly mention the problems with MERS

Barry Ritholtz goes at it with Diana Olick

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in assignment of mortgage, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosures, mbs, MERS, MERSCORP, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC., note, robo signers, scam, securitization, servicers, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD, Trusts, Wall StreetComments (1)

DOCX / LPS Price List…any documents you want!

DOCX / LPS Price List…any documents you want!


Looks like this is becoming more and more like a fabricating factory mill full of ?????????

DOCX’s GetNet™ Document Recovery solution is a national network of runners that is engaged to provide document recovery, expedited recordation services, title searches, and insurance submissions.

The service is unique in that our clients can request that DOCX obtain any missing recordable documents through this web site through our online GetNet™ Work Order Form. Status of existing projects can also be obtained through our Online Services.

We also accept work orders the “old fashioned” way via fax or mail. Upon receipt of the work order, DOCX will access the national network of runners, place the order and follow up to ensure prompt delivery.

GetNet™ was designed to assist mortgage servicers in meeting agency certifications and to avoid costly penalties for filing late satisfaction pieces.

GetNet™ Features

  • A National Network of title runners retains presence in every county jurisdiction nationwide.
  • Obtains missing mortgage documents, assignments, title policies and LGC/MICs.
  • Expedites recordation by physically walking documents in to county recorder offices.
  • Provides title searches to identify mortgage holders.
  • Provides online reporting capabilities.

GETNET™ RATE SHEET

[ipaper docId=38616465 access_key=key-1gta9io0omavgx417a90 height=600 width=600 /]

.

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in assignment of mortgage, bogus, concealment, conflict of interest, CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, DOCX, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, foreclosures, forgery, Lender Processing Services Inc., LPS, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (3)

MERS FAILS AS NOMINEE, AUTHORITY TO TRANSFER OWNERSHIP OF NOTE!

MERS FAILS AS NOMINEE, AUTHORITY TO TRANSFER OWNERSHIP OF NOTE!


NEW YORK SUPREME COURT NASSAU

In support of its standing to maintain the action when the action was commenced is an “Assignment of Mortgage” executed by MERS as nominee of Home Funds Direct which includes a provision indicating the assignment is TOGETHER with the bond or note. . . ” . Not only has plaintiff failed to establish MERS’ right as a nominee for purposes of recording to assign the mortgage, more importantly, no effort has been made to establish the authority of MERS, a non-party to the note, to transfer its ownership. Without establishing ownership of the note at the time the action was instituted, the plaintiff lacked a right to maintain the action.

[ipaper docId=37175715 access_key=key-2k2arwpk653s6uaz71jr height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in bank of new york, chain in title, concealment, conspiracy, CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, dismissed, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosures, MERS, MERSCORP, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC., note, rmbs, securitization, servicers, stopforeclosurefraud.com, Supreme Court, trusteeComments (0)

HSBC’s Irregularities: Mortgage Documentation and Corporate Relationships with Ocwen, MERS, and Delta

HSBC’s Irregularities: Mortgage Documentation and Corporate Relationships with Ocwen, MERS, and Delta


HSBC BANK USA v. THOMPSON

2010 Ohio 4158

HSBC Bank USA, N.A., as Indenture Trustee for the Registered Noteholders of Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2007-1, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Jamie W. Thompson, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

Appellate No. 23761.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Second District, Montgomery County.

Rendered on September 3, 2010.

Benjamin D. Carnahan, Atty. Reg. #0079737, Shapiro, Van Ess, Phillips & Barragate, LLP, 4805 Montgomery Road, Norwood, OH 45212 and Brian P. Brooks, (pro hac vice), O’Melveny & Myers LLP, 1625 Eye Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20006-4001, Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant, HSBC Bank.

Amy Kaufman, Atty. Reg. #0073837, 150 East Gay Street, 21st Floor, Columbus, Ohio 43215, Attorney for Appellee, Department of Taxation.

Andrew D. Neuhauser, Atty. Reg. #0082799, and Stanley A. Hirtle, Atty. Reg. #0025205, 525 Jefferson Avenue, Suite 300, Toledo, OH 43604, Attorneys for Amici Curiae, Advocates for Basic Legal Equality, et al.

Richard Cordray, Atty. Reg. #0038034, by Susan A. Choe, Atty. Reg. #0067032, Mark N. Wiseman, Atty. Reg. #0059637, and Jeffrey R. Loeser, Atty. Reg. #0082144, Attorney General’s Office, 30 E. Broad Street, 14th Floor, Columbus, OH 43215, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae, Ohio Attorney General Richard Cordray.

Andrew M. Engel, Atty. Reg. #0047371, 3077 Kettering Boulevard, Suite 108, Moraine, Ohio 45439, Attorney for Defendant-Appellee Jamie W. Thompson.

Colette Carr, Atty. Reg. #00705097, 301 W. Third Street, Fifth Floor, Dayton, OH 45422, Attorney for Appellee, Montgomery County Treasurer.

OPINION

FAIN, J.

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant HSBC Bank USA, N.A., as Indenture Trustee for the Registered Noteholders of Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2007-1 (HSBC), appeals from a judgment of the trial court, which rendered summary judgment and dismissed HSBC’s complaint for foreclosure, without prejudice. HSBC contends that the trial court improperly treated the date the assignment of mortgage was executed as dispositive of the claims before it. HSBC further contends that the trial court’s decision is erroneous, because it is premised on the court’s having improperly struck the affidavit of Chomie Neil, and having failed to consider Neil’s restated affidavit.

{¶ 2} Two briefs of amicus curiae have been filed in support of the position of defendants-appellees Jamie W. Thompson, Administratrix of the Estate of the Estate of Howard W. Turner, and Jamie W. Thompson (collectively Thompson). One brief was filed by the Ohio Attorney General Richard Cordray (Cordray). The other brief was filed by the following groups: Advocates for Basic Legal Equality; Equal Justice Foundation; Legal Aid Society of Southwest Ohio; Northeast Ohio Legal Aid Services; Ohio Poverty Law Center; and Pro Seniors, Inc. (collectively Legal Advocates). We have considered those briefs, all of which have been helpful, in deciding this appeal.

{¶ 3} We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking Neil’s affidavit, because of defects in the affidavit. We further conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to consider Neil’s restated affidavit, in the course of deciding objections to the magistrate’s decision, because HSBC failed to indicate why it could not have properly submitted the evidence, with reasonable diligence, before the magistrate had rendered a decision in the matter. Finally, we conclude that the trial court did not err in rendering summary judgment against HSBC, and dismissing the foreclosure action for lack of standing. HSBC failed to establish that it was the holder of a promissory note secured by a mortgage. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is Affirmed.

I

{¶ 4} On January 27, 2007, Howard Turner borrowed $85,000 from Fidelity Mortgage, a division of Delta Funding Corporation (respectively, Fidelity and Delta). Turner signed a note promising to repay Fidelity in monthly payments of $786.44 for a period of thirty years. The loan number on the note is 0103303640, and the property listed on the note is 417 Cushing Avenue, Dayton, Ohio, 45429.

{¶ 5} In order to secure the loan, Turner signed a mortgage agreement, which names Fidelity as the “Lender,” and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as a nominee for Fidelity and Fidelity’s successors and assigns. The mortgage states that Turner, as borrower, “does hereby mortgage, grant and convey to MERS (solely as nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns) and to the successors and assigns of MERS, the following described property in the County of Montgomery, * * * which currently has the address of 417 Cushing Avenue, Dayton, Ohio 45429.” The mortgage was recorded with the Montgomery County Recorder on February 20, 2007, as MORT-07-014366.

{¶ 6} The entire amount of the loan proceeds was not disbursed. Fidelity placed $5,000 in escrow after closing, until certain repairs (roofing and heating) were made to the house. The required deposit agreement indicated that Turner had three months to make the repairs, and that if the items were not satisfactorily cleared, Fidelity had the option of satisfying the items from the funds held, of extending the time to cure, or of taking any other steps Fidelity felt necessary to protect the mortgage property, including but not limited to, paying down the principal of the loan with the deposit.

{¶ 7} Turner made timely payments through June 2007. However, he died in late July 2007, and no further payments were made. HSBC filed a foreclosure action on November 8, 2007, alleging that it was the owner and holder of Turner’s promissory note and mortgage deed and that default had occurred. HBSC sued Thompson, as administratrix of her father’s estate, and individually, based on her interest in the estate.

{¶ 8} HSBC attached purported copies of the note and mortgage agreement to the complaint. The note attached to the complaint is also accompanied by two documents that are each entitled “Allonge.” The first allonge states “Pay to the Order of _________ without recourse,” and is signed on behalf of Delta Funding Corporation by Carol Hollman, Vice-President. The second allonge states “Pay to the Order of Delta Funding Corporation” and is signed by Darryl King, as “authorized signatory” for Fidelity Mortgage.

{¶ 9} In January 2008, Thompson filed an answer, raising, among other defenses, the fact that the action was not being prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. HSBC subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment in February 2007, supported by the affidavit of an officer of Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (Ocwen), which was a servicing agent for HSBC.

{¶ 10} Thompson filed a response to the summary judgment motion, pointing out various deficiencies in the affidavit and documents. Thompson further contended that HSBC was not the holder of the mortgage and note, and was not the real party in interest. In addition, Thompson filed an amended answer and counterclaim, contending that HSBC was not the real party in interest, and that HSBC had made false, deceptive, and misleading representations in connection with collecting a debt, in violation of Section 1692, Title 15, U.S. Code (the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, or FDCPA).

{¶ 11} HSBC withdrew its motion for summary judgment in March 2008. In November 2008, the trial court vacated the trial date and referred the matter to a magistrate. HSBC then filed another motion for summary judgment in January 2009. This motion was supported by the affidavit of Chomie Neil, who was employed by Ocwen as a manager of trial preparation and discovery. Neil averred in the affidavit that he had executed it in Palm Beach, Florida. However, the notation at the top of the first page of the affidavit and the jurat both state that the affidavit was sworn to and subscribed to in New Jersey, before a notary public.

{¶ 12} Thompson moved to strike the affidavit, contending that it was filled with inadmissible hearsay, contained legal conclusions, and purported to authenticate documents, when no proper documentation had been offered. Thompson also questioned when the affidavit was executed, and whether it had been properly acknowledged, due to the irregularities in execution and acknowledgment. In addition, Thompson responded to the summary judgment motion, contending that HSBC was not the real party in interest and was not the holder of the note, because HSBC’s name was not on the note, and HSBC had failed to provide evidence that it was in possession of the note. In responding to the motion to strike, HSBC contended that the defects in the affidavit were the result of a scrivener’s error. HSBC did not attempt to correct the affidavit.

{¶ 13} In late March 2009, Thompson filed a motion for partial summary judgment against HSBC. The motion was based on the fact that under the allonges, Delta Funding Corporation was the payee of the note. Thompson also noted that MERS failed to assign the mortgage note to HSBC before the action was commenced. Thompson contended that HSBC was not the real party in interest when it filed the lawsuit, and lacked standing to invoke the court’s jurisdiction.

{¶ 14} In May 2009, the magistrate granted Thompson’s motion to strike the affidavit, because the affidavit stated that it had been sworn to in New Jersey, and the affiant declared that the affidavit was executed in Florida. The magistrate also overruled HSBC’s motion for summary judgment, and granted Thompson’s partial motion for summary judgment. The magistrate concluded that HSBC lacked standing because it was not a mortgagee when the suit was filed and could not cure its lack of standing by subsequently obtaining an interest in the mortgage. The magistrate further concluded that there was no evidence properly before the court that would indicate that HSBC was the holder of the promissory note originally executed by Turner. Accordingly, the magistrate held that HSBC’s foreclosure claim should be dismissed without prejudice. Due to factual issues regarding Thompson’s FDCPA counterclaim, HSBC’s motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim was denied.

{¶ 15} HSBC filed objections to the magistrate’s decision, and attached the “restated” affidavit of Neil. The affidavit was identical to what was previously submitted, except that the first page indicated that the affidavit was being signed in Palm Beach County, Florida. The jurat is signed by a notary who appears to be from Florida, although the notary seals on the original and copy that were submitted are not very clear. HSBC did not offer any explanation for the mistake in the original affidavit.

{¶ 16} In November 2009, the trial court overruled HSBC’s objections to the magistrate’s report. The court concluded that the errors in the affidavit were more than format errors. The court further noted that the document became an unsworn statement and could not be used for summary judgment purposes, because the statements were sworn to a notary in a state outside the notary’s jurisdiction. The court also held that, absent Neil’s affidavit, HSBC had failed to provide support for its summary judgment motion. Finally, the court concluded that HSBC failed to provide evidence that it was in possession of the note prior to the filing of the lawsuit, because the Neil affidavit had been struck, and a prior affidavit only verified the mortgage and note as true copies; it did not verify the undated allonges. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed HSBC’s action with prejudice, and entered a Civ. R. 54(B) determination of no just cause for delay.

{¶ 17} HSBC appeals from the judgment dismissing its action without prejudice.

II

{¶ 18} We will address HSBC’s assignments of error in reverse order. HSBC’s Second Assignment of Error is as follows:

{¶ 19} “THE LOWER COURT’S DECISION IS PREMISED ON IMPROPERLY STRIKING MR. NEIL’S AFFIDAVIT AND FAILING TO CONSIDER THE RESTATED AFFIDAVIT.”

{¶ 20} Under this assignment of error, HSBC contends that the errors in Neil’s affidavit were scrivener’s errors that have no bearing on the content of the affidavit. HSBC contends, therefore, that the trial court erred in refusing to consider the affidavit.

{¶ 21} The error, as noted, is that Neil averred that he signed the affidavit in Florida, while the first page and the jurat indicate that the affidavit was executed before a notary public in New Jersey.

{¶ 22} Thompson, Cordray, and Legal Advocates argue that the defect is not merely one of form, because the errors transform the affidavit into an unsworn statement that cannot be used to support summary judgment. The trial court agreed with this argument.

{¶ 23} Legal Advocates also stresses that HSBC was notified of problems with Neil’s affidavit, but made no attempt to cure the defect until after the magistrate had issued an unfavorable ruling. In addition, Cordray notes that the integrity of evidence in foreclosure cases is critical, due to the imbalance between access to legal representation of banks and homeowners. Thompson, Cordray, and Legal Advocates further contend that even if Neil’s affidavit could be considered, it is replete with inadmissible hearsay and legal conclusions, and is devoid of evidentiary value.

{¶ 24} Concerning the form of affidavits, Civ. R. 56(E) provides that:

{¶ 25} “Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated in the affidavit. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts of papers referred to in an affidavit shall be attached to or served with the affidavit. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions or by further affidavits. * * *”

{¶ 26} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “An affidavit must appear, on its face, to have been taken before the proper officer and in compliance with all legal requisites. A paper purporting to be an affidavit, but not to have been sworn to before an officer, is not an affidavit.” In re Disqualification of Pokorny (1992), 74 Ohio St.3d 1238 (citation omitted). Accord, Pollock v. Brigano (1998), 130 Ohio App.3d 505, 509.

{¶ 27} The affidavit submitted to the magistrate contains irreconcilable conflicts, because the affiant, Neil, states that he executed the affidavit in Florida. In contrast, the jurat, as well as the first page of the affidavit, indicate that the affidavit was signed in New Jersey.

{¶ 28} In Stern v. Board of Elections of Cuyahoga Cty. (1968), 14 Ohio St.2d 175, the Supreme Court of Ohio noted that in common use, a jurat “is employed to designate the certificate of a competent administering officer that a writing was sworn to by the person who signed it. It is no part of the oath, but is merely evidence of the fact that the oath was properly taken before the duly authorized officer.” Id. at 181 (citations omitted).

{¶ 29} In light of the inconsistencies, Neil’s oath could not have been properly taken before a duly authorized officer. Under New Jersey law, a notary public commissioned in New Jersey may perform duties only throughout the state of New Jersey. See N.J. Stat. Ann. 52:7-15. Therefore, a New Jersey notary public could not properly have administered the oath in Florida. A New Jersey notary public also could not properly have certified that the writing was sworn to, when the person signed it in another jurisdiction.

{¶ 30} As support for admission of Neil’s affidavit, HSBC cites various cases that have overlooked technical defects in affidavits. See, e.g., State v. Johnson (Oct. 24, 1997), Darke App. No. 96CA1427 (holding that a “scrivener’s error” was inconsequential and did not invalidate an affidavit), and Chase Manhattan Mtg. Corp. v. Locker, Montgomery App. No. 19904, 2003-Ohio-6665, ¶ 26 (holding that omission of specific date of month on which affidavit was signed was “scrivener’s error” and did not invalidate affidavit, because notary public did include the month and year).

{¶ 31} In Johnson, the error involved a discrepancy between the preamble and the jurat.

{¶ 32} The preamble said the site of the oath was in a particular county, but the notary swore in the jurat that the affidavit had been signed in a different county. The trial court concluded that this was a typographical error, and we agreed. This is consistent with the fact that in Ohio, a notary public may administer oaths throughout the state. See R.C. 147.07. Therefore, even if a discrepancy exists between the location listed in the preamble and the notary’s location, the official status of the affidavit is not affected. In contrast, the affiant in the case before us stated that he signed the affidavit in a different state, where the notary did not have the power to administer oaths. The difference is not simply one of form.

{¶ 33} HSBC contends that the trial court should have accepted the “restated” affidavit that it attached to HSBC’s objections to the magistrate’s decision. The trial court did not specifically discuss the restated affidavit when it overruled HSBC’s objections. We assume, therefore, that the court rejected the affidavit. See, e.g., Maguire v. Natl. City Bank, Montgomery App. No. 23140, 2009-Ohio-4405, ¶ 16, and Takacs v. Baldwin (1995), 106 Ohio App.3d 196, 209 (holding that where a trial court fails to rule on a motion, an appellate court assumes that the matter was overruled or rejected).

{¶ 34} The trial court was not required to consider the restated affidavit, because HSBC failed to explain why the affidavit could not have been properly produced for the magistrate. In this regard, Civ. R. Rule 53(D)(4)(d) provides that:

{¶ 35} “If one or more objections to a magistrate’s decision are timely filed, the court shall rule on those objections. In ruling on objections, the court shall undertake an independent review as to the objected matters to ascertain that the magistrate has properly determined the factual issues and appropriately applied the law. Before so ruling, the court may hear additional evidence but may refuse to do so unless the objecting party demonstrates that the party could not, with reasonable diligence, have produced that evidence for consideration by the magistrate.”

{¶ 36} Well before the magistrate ruled, HSBC was aware that objections had been raised to the affidavit. HSBC made no attempt to submit a corrected document to the magistrate, nor did it provide the trial court with an explanation for the cause of the problem. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider the original or restated affidavit. See Hillstreet Fund III, L.P. v. Bloom, Montgomery App. No. 23394, 2010-Ohio-2267, ¶ 49 [noting that trial courts have discretion to accept or refuse additional evidence under Civ. R. 53(D)(4)(d).]

{¶ 37} Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the Neil affidavits, we need not consider whether the contents of the affidavits are inadmissible.

{¶ 38} HSBC’s Second Assignment of Error is overruled.

III

{¶ 39} HSBC’s First Assignment of Error is as follows:

{¶ 40}THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS IMPROPERLY TREATED THE DATE THE ASSIGNMENT OF MORTGAGE WAS EXECUTED AS DISPOSITIVE OF THE CLAIMS BEFORE IT.”

{¶ 41} Under this assignment of error, HSBC contends that the trial court committed reversible error by disregarding the ruling in State ex rel. Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 1998-Ohio-275, that defects in standing may be cured at any time before judgment is entered. According to HSBC, an assignment of mortgage recorded with the Montgomery County Recorder establishes that HSBC is the current holder of the mortgage interest, because the interest was transferred about one week after the action against Thomson was filed. HSBC further contends that the trial court improperly disregarded evidence that HSBC legally owned the note before its complaint was filed. Before addressing the standing issue, we note that the case before us was resolved by way of summary judgment. “A trial court may grant a moving party summary judgment pursuant to Civ. R. 56 if there are no genuine issues of material fact remaining to be litigated, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and reasonable minds can come to only one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party, who is entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in his favor.” Smith v. Five Rivers MetroParks (1999), 134 Ohio App.3d 754, 760. “We review summary judgment decisions de novo, which means that we apply the same standards as the trial court.” GNFH, Inc. v. W. Am. Ins. Co., 172 Ohio App.3d 127, 2007-Ohio-2722, ¶ 16.

{¶ 42} To decide the real-party-in-interest issue, we first turn to Civ. R. Rule 17(A), which states that:

{¶ 43} “Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. * * * * No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest. Such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest.”

{¶ 44} “Standing is a threshold question for the court to decide in order for it to proceed to adjudicate the action.” Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d at 77. The issue of lack of standing “challenges the capacity of a party to bring an action, not the subject matter jurisdiction of the court.” Id. To decide whether the requirement has been satisfied that an action be brought by the real party in interest, “courts must look to the substantive law creating the right being sued upon to see if the action has been instituted by the party possessing the substantive right to relief.” Shealy v. Campbell (1985), 20 Ohio St.3d 23, 25.

{¶ 45}In foreclosure actions, the real party in interest is the current holder of the note and mortgage.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Sessley, Franklin App. No. 09AP-178, 2010-Ohio-2902, ¶ 11 (citation omitted). Promissory notes are negotiable, and may be transferred to someone other than the issuer. That person then becomes the holder of the instrument. R.C. 1303.21(A). R.C. 1303.21(B) provides, however, that:

{¶ 46} “Except for negotiation by a remitter, if an instrument is payable to an identified person, negotiation requires transfer of possession of the instrument and its indorsement by the holder. If an instrument is payable to bearer, it may be negotiated by transfer of possession alone.”

{¶ 47} R.C, 1301.01(T)(1) also states that a holder with regard to a negotiable instrument means either of the following:

{¶ 48} “(a) If the instrument is payable to bearer, a person who is in possession of the instrument;

{¶ 49} “(b) If the instrument is payable to an identified person, the identified person when in possession of the instrument.”

{¶ 50} In the case before us, the promissory note identifies Fidelity as the holder. The note, therefore, could have been negotiated only by Fidelity, through transfer of possession, and by either endorsing the note to a specific person, or endorsing the note to “bearer.”

{¶ 51} HSBC contends that it is the legal holder of the promissory note, and is entitled to enforce it, because it obtained the note as a bearer. A “bearer” is “the person in possession of an instrument, document of title, or certificated security payable to bearer or endorsed in blank.” R.C. 1301.01(E). HSBC’s claim that it is the bearer of the note is based on the “allonges” that were included as part of the exhibits to the complaint.

{¶ 52} The rejected affidavits of Neil do not refer to the allonges, nor were any allonges included with the promissory note that was attached to Neil’s affidavit. During oral argument, HSBC referred frequently to the Jiminez-Reyes affidavit, which was attached to a February 2008 summary judgment motion filed by HSBC. Jiminez-Reyes identified the exhibits attached to the complaint, but did not refer to the allonges. HSBC withdrew the summary judgment motion in March 2008, after Thompson had identified various deficiencies in the affidavit, including the fact that Jiminez-Reyes had incorrectly identified Thompson as the account holder. Since the motion was withdrawn, it is questionable whether the attached affidavit of Jiminez-Reyes was properly before the trial court. Byers v. Robinson, Franklin App. No. 08AP-204, 2008-Ohio-4833, ¶ 16 (effect of withdrawing motion is to leave the record as it stood before the motion was filed).

{¶ 53} Nonetheless, shortly after the complaint was filed, and prior to its first summary judgment motion, HSBC filed an affidavit of Jessica Dybas, who is identified in the affidavit as an “agent” of HSBC. The exact status of Dybas’s agency or connection to HSBC is not explained in the affidavit.

{¶ 54} Dybas states in the affidavit that she has personal knowledge of the history of the loan, that she is the custodian of records pertaining to the loan and mortgage, and that the records have been maintained in the ordinary course of business. See “Exhibit A attached to Plaintiff’s Notice of Filing of Loan Status, Military, Minor and Incompetent Affidavit and Loan History,” which was filed with the trial court in February 2008. Dybas’s affidavit also identifies Exhibits A and B of the complaint as true and accurate copies of the originals. Exhibit A to the complaint includes a copy of the promissory note of the decedent, Howard Turner, made payable to Fidelity, and a copy of two documents entitled “Allonge,” that are placed at the end of the promissory note. Exhibit B is a copy of the mortgage agreement, which names Fidelity as the “Lender” and MERS as “nominee” for Fidelity and its assigns. Dybas’s affidavit does not specifically mention the allonges. Like the affidavit of Jiminez-Reyes, Dybas’s affidavit incorrectly identifies Thompson as the borrower on the note. Thompson was not the borrower; she is the administratrix of the estate of the borrower, Howard Turner.

{¶ 55} Assuming for the sake of argument that Dybas’s affidavit is sufficient, or that the affidavit of Jiminez-Reyes was properly before the court, we note that Ohio requires endorsements to be “on” an instrument, or in papers affixed to the instrument. See R.C. 1303.24(A)(1) and (2), which state that “For the purpose of determining whether a signature is made on an instrument, a paper affixed to the instrument is a part of the instrument.”

{¶ 56} “The use of an allonge to add indorsements to an instrument when there is no room for them on the instrument itself dates from early common law.” Southwestern Resolution Corp. v. Watson (Tex. 1997), 964 S.W.2d 262, 263. “An allonge is defined as `[a] slip of paper sometimes attached to a negotiable instrument for the purpose of receiving further indorsements when the original paper is filled with indorsements.'” Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Fequiere (2010), 119 Conn.App. 570, 577, 989 A.2d 606, quoting from Black’s Law Dictionary (9th Ed. 2009).

{¶ 57} In Watson, a note and allonge produced at trial were taped together and had several staple holes. The president of the noteholder testified that when his company received the note, “the allonge was stapled to it and may also have been clipped and taped, but that the note and allonge had been separated and reattached five or six times for photocopying.” 964 S.W.2d at 263. The lower courts agreed with a jury that the allonge was not so firmly affixed as to be part of the note. But the Supreme Court of Texas disagreed.

{¶ 58} The Supreme Court of Texas recounted the history of allonges throughout various versions of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The court noted that an early provision had provided that an endorsement must be written on the note or on a paper attached thereto. Id., citing Section 31 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law. Under this law, an allonge could be attached by a staple. Id (citation omitted). The Supreme Court of Texas also noted that:

{¶ 59} “When the UCC changed the requirement from `attached thereto’ to `so firmly affixed thereto as to become a part thereof’, * * * the drafters of the new provision specifically contemplated that an allonge could be attached to a note by staples. American Law Institute, Comments & Notes to Tentative Draft No. 1-Article III 114 (1946), reprinted in 2 Elizabeth Slusser Kelly, Uniform Commercial Code Drafts 311, 424 (1984) (`The indorsement must be written on the instrument itself or on an allonge, which, as defined in Section ___, is a strip of paper so firmly pasted, stapled or otherwise affixed to the instrument as to become part of it.’).” Id. at 263-64 (citation omitted).

{¶ 60} The Supreme Court of Texas further observed that:

{¶ 61} “The attachment requirement has been said to serve two purposes: preventing fraud and preserving the chain of title to an instrument. * * * * Still, the requirement has been relaxed in the current code from `firmly affixed’ to simply `affixed’. Tex. Bus. & Com.Code § 3.204(a). As the Commercial Code Committee of the Section of Business Law of the State Bar of Texas concluded in recommending adoption of the provision, `the efficiencies and benefits achieved by permitting indorsements by allonge outweigh[] the possible problems raised by easily detachable allonges.'” Id. at 264 (citations omitted).

{¶ 62} The Supreme Court of Texas, therefore, concluded that a stapled allonge is “firmly affixed” to an instrument, and that the allonge in the case before it was properly affixed. In this regard, the court relied on the following evidence:

{¶ 63} “In the present case, Southwestern’s president testified that the allonge was stapled, taped, and clipped to the note when Southwestern received it. There was no evidence to the contrary. The fact that the documents had been detached for photocopying does not raise a fact issue for the jury about whether the documents were firmly affixed. If it did, the validity of an allonge would always be a question of the finder of fact, since no allonge can be affixed so firmly that it cannot be detached. One simply cannot infer that two documents were never attached from the fact that they can be, and have been, detached. Nor could the jury infer from the staple holes in the two papers, as the court of appeals suggested, that the two documents had not been attached. This would be pure conjecture.” Id. at 264.

{¶ 64} Like Texas, Ohio has adopted the pertinent revisions to the UCC. In All American Finance Co. v. Pugh Shows, Inc. (1987), 30 Ohio St.3d 130, the Supreme Court of Ohio noted that under UCC 3-302, “a purported indorsement on a mortgage or other separate paper pinned or clipped to an instrument is not sufficient for negotiation.” Id. at 132, n. 3. At that time, R.C. 1303.23 was the analogous Ohio statute to UCC 3-202, which required endorsements to be firmly affixed.

{¶ 65} Ohio subsequently adopted the revisions to the UCC. R.C. 1303.24(A)(2) now requires that a paper be affixed to an instrument in order for a signature to be considered part of the instrument. R.C. 1303.24 is the analogous Ohio statute to UCC. 3-204. The 1990 official comments for UCC 3-204 state that this requirement is “based on subsection (2) of former Section 3-202. An indorsement on an allonge is valid even though there is sufficient space on the instrument for an indorsement.” This latter comment addresses the fact that prior to the 1990 changes to the UCC, the majority view was that allonges could be used only if the note itself contained insufficient space for further endorsements. See, e.g., Pribus v. Bush (1981), 118 Cal.App.3d 1003, 1008, 173 Cal.Rptr. 747. See, also, All American Finance, 30 Ohio St.3d at 132, n.3 (indicating that while the court did not need to reach the issue for purposes of deciding the case, several jurisdictions “hold that indorsement by allonge is permitted only where there is no longer room on the instrument itself due to previous indorsements.”)

{¶ 66} The current version of the UCC, codified as R.C. 1303.24(A)(2), allows allonges even where room exists on the note for further endorsements. However, the paper must be affixed to the instrument in order for the signature to be considered part of the instrument. As the Supreme Court of Texas noted in Watson, the requirement has changed from being “firmly affixed” to “affixed.” However, even the earlier version, which specified that the allonge be “attached thereto,” was interpreted as requiring that the allonge be stapled. Watson, 964 S.W.2d at 263.

{¶ 67} In contrast to Watson, no evidence was presented in the case before us to indicate that the allonges were ever attached or affixed to the promissory note. Instead, the allonges have been presented as separate, loose sheets of paper, with no explanation as to how they may have been attached. Compare In re Weisband, (Bkrtcy. D. Ariz., 2010), 427 B.R. 13, 19 (concluding that GMAC was not a “holder” and did not have ability to enforce a note, where GMAC failed to demonstrate that an allonge endorsement to GMAC was affixed to a note. The bankruptcy court noted that the endorsement in question “is on a separate sheet of paper; there was no evidence that it was stapled or otherwise attached to the rest of the Note.”)

{¶ 68} It is possible that the allonges in the case before us were stapled to the note at one time and were separated for photocopying. But unlike the alleged creditor in Watson, HSBC offered no evidence to that effect. Furthermore, assuming for the sake of argument that the allonges were properly “affixed,” the order of the allonges does not permit HSBC to claim that it is the possessor of a note made payable to bearer or endorsed in blank.

{¶ 69} The first allonge is endorsed from Delta to “blank,” and the second allonge is endorsed from Fidelity to Delta. If the endorsement in blank were intended to be effective, the endorsement from Fidelity to Delta should have preceded the endorsement from Delta to “blank,” because the original promissory note is made payable to Fidelity, not to Delta. Delta would have had no power to endorse the note before receiving the note and an endorsement from Fidelity.

{¶ 70} HSBC contends that the order of the allonges is immaterial, while Thompson claims that the order is critical. At the oral argument of this appeal, HSBC appeared to be arguing that the order of allonges would never be material. This is easily refuted by the example of two allonges, one containing an assignment from the original holder of the note to A, and the other containing an assignment from the original holder of the note to B. Whichever allonge was first would determine whether the note had been effectively assigned to A, or to B.

{¶ 71} Thompson contends that because the last-named endorsement is made to Delta, Delta was the proper holder of the note when this action was filed, since the prior, first-named endorsement was from an entity other than the current holder of the note. In Adams v. Madison Realty & Development, Inc. (C.A.3, 1988), 853 F.2d 163, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals stressed that from the maker’s standpoint:

{¶ 72} “it becomes essential to establish that the person who demands payment of a negotiable note, or to whom payment is made, is the duly qualified holder. Otherwise, the obligor is exposed to the risk of double payment, or at least to the expense of litigation incurred to prevent duplicative satisfaction of the instrument. These risks provide makers with a recognizable interest in demanding proof of the chain of title.” Id. At 168.

{¶ 73} The Third Circuit Court of Appeals further observed that:

{¶ 74} “Financial institutions, noted for insisting on their customers’ compliance with numerous ritualistic formalities, are not sympathetic petitioners in urging relaxation of an elementary business practice. It is a tenet of commercial law that `[h]oldership and the potential for becoming holders in due course should only be accorded to transferees that observe the historic protocol.'” 853 F.2d at 169 (citation omitted).

{¶ 75} Consistent with this observation, recent decisions in the State of New York have noted numerous irregularities in HSBC’s mortgage documentation and corporate relationships with Ocwen, MERS, and Delta. See, e.g., HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Cherry (2007), 18 Misc.3d 1102(A), 856 N.Y.S.2d 24 (Table), 2007 WL 4374284, and HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Yeasmin (2010), 27 Misc.3d 1227(A), 2010 N.Y. Slip Op. 50927(U)(Table), 2010 WL 2080273 (dismissing HSBC’s requests for orders of reference in mortgage foreclosure actions, due to HSBC’s failure to provide proper affidavits). See, also, e.g., HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Charlevagne (2008), 20 Misc.3d 1128(A), 872 N.Y.S.2d 691 (Table), 2008 WL 2954767, and HSBC Bank USA, Nat. Assn. v. Antrobus (2008), 20 Misc.3d 1127(A), 872 N.Y.S.2d 691,(Table), 2008 WL 2928553 (describing “possible incestuous relationship” between HSBC Bank, Ocwen Loan Servicing, Delta Funding Corporation, and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., due to the fact that the entities all share the same office space at 1661 Worthington Road, Suite 100, West Palm Beach, Florida. HSBC also supplied affidavits in support of foreclosure from individuals who claimed simultaneously to be officers of more than one of these corporations.).

{¶ 76} Because the last allonge endorses the note to Delta, and no further endorsement to HSBC was provided, the trial court did not err in concluding that HSBC was not the holder of the note when the litigation was commenced against Thompson.

{¶ 77} As an alternative position, HSBC contended at oral argument that it had standing to prosecute the action, because assignment of the mortgage alone is sufficient. In this regard, HSBC notes that the mortgage was transferred to HSBC by MERS on November 14, 2007. This was about one week after HSBC commenced the mortgage foreclosure action.

{¶ 78} HSBC did not argue this position in its briefs, and did not provide supporting authority for its position at oral argument. In fact, HSBC relied in its brief on the contrary position that HSBC “was the legal holder of the note and, accordingly, entitled to enforce the mortgage loan regardless of the date the Mortgage was assigned, and under Marcino, even if the Mortgage had never been separately assigned to HSBC.” Brief of Appellant HSBC Bank USA, N.A., pp. 15-16 (bolding in original).

{¶ 79} The Marcino case referred to by HSBC states as follows:

{¶ 80} “For nearly a century, Ohio courts have held that whenever a promissory note is secured by a mortgage, the note constitutes the evidence of the debt and the mortgage is a mere incident to the obligation. Edgar v. Haines (1923), 109 Ohio St. 159, 164, 141 N.E. 837. Therefore, the negotiation of a note operates as an equitable assignment of the mortgage, even though the mortgage is not assigned or delivered.” U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. v. Marcino, 181 Ohio App.3d 328, 2009-Ohio-1178, ¶ 52.

{¶ 81} Even if HSBC had provided support for the proposition that ownership of the note is not required, the evidence about the assignment is not properly before us. The alleged mortgage assignment is attached to the rejected affidavits of Neil. Furthermore, even if we were to consider this “evidence,” the mortgage assignment from MERS to HSBC indicates that the assignment was prepared by Ocwen for MERS, and that Ocwen is located at the same Palm Beach, Florida address mentioned in Charlevagne and Antrobus. See Exhibit 3 attached to the affidavit of Chomie Neil. In addition, Scott Anderson, who signed the assignment, as Vice-President of MERS, appears to be the same individual who claimed to be both Vice-President of MERS and Vice-President of Ocwen. See Antrobus, 2008 WL 2928553, * 4, and Charlevagne, 2008 WL 2954767, * 1.

{¶ 82} In support of its argument that a subsequent mortgage assignment can confer standing on a noteholder, HSBC cites some Ohio cases in which “courts have rejected claims that the execution of an assignment subsequent to the filing of a complaint necessarily precludes a party from prosecuting a foreclosure action as the real party in interest.” Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Cassens, Franklin App. No. 09-AP-865, 2010-Ohio-2851, ¶ 17. Accordingly, at least in the view of some districts in Ohio, if the note had been properly negotiated to HSBC, HSBC may have been able to claim standing, based on equitable assignment of the mortgage, supplemented by the actual transfer of the mortgage after the complaint was filed.

{¶ 83} In contrast to the Seventh District, other districts take a more rigid view. See Wells Fargo Bank v. Jordan, Cuyahoga App. No. 91675, 2009-Ohio-1092 (holding that Civ. R. 17(A) does not apply unless a plaintiff has standing in the first place to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. Accordingly, a bank that is not a mortgagee when suit is filed is not the real party in interest on the date the complaint is filed, and cannot cure its lack of standing by subsequently obtaining an interest in the mortgage). Accord Bank of New York v. Gindele, Hamilton App. No. C-090251, 2010-Ohio-542.

{¶ 84} In Gindele, the First District Court of Appeals commented as follows:

{¶ 85} “We likewise reject Bank of New York’s argument that the real party in interest when the lawsuit was filed was later joined by the Gindeles. We are convinced that the later joinder of the real party in interest could not have cured the Bank of New York’s lack of standing when it filed its foreclosure complaint. This narrow reading of Civ.R. 17 comports with the intent of the rule. As other state and federal courts have noted, Civ.R. 17 generally allows ratification, joinder, and substitution of parties `to avoid forfeiture and injustice when an understandable mistake has been made in selecting the parties in whose name the action should be brought.’ * * * * `While a literal interpretation of * * * Rule 17(a) would make it applicable to every case in which an inappropriate plaintiff was named, the Advisory Committee’s Notes make it clear that this provision is intended to prevent forfeiture when determination of the proper party to sue is difficult or when an understandable mistake has been made. When determination of the correct party to bring the action was not difficult and when no excusable mistake was made, the last sentence of Rule 17(a) is inapplicable and the action should be dismissed.'” Id. at ¶ 4 (footnotes omitted).

{¶ 86} We need not decide which approach is correct, because the alleged assignment of mortgage is attached to Neil’s rejected affidavits. Since the trial court’s disregard of the affidavits was not an abuse of discretion, there is currently no evidence of a mortgage “assignment” to consider. Moreover, we would reject HSBC’s position even if we considered the alleged assignment, because HSBC failed to establish that it was the holder of the note. Therefore, no “equitable assignment” of the mortgage would have arisen. All that HSBC might have established is that the mortgage was assigned to it after the action was filed. However, as we noted, the matters pertaining to that fact were submitted with an affidavit that the trial court rejected, within its discretion.

{¶ 87} Accordingly, the trial court did not err in dismissing the action without prejudice, based on HSBC’s failure to prove that it had standing to sue.

{¶ 88} HSBC’s First Assignment of Error is overruled.

IV

{¶ 89} The final matter to be addressed is Thompson’s motion to dismiss the part of HSBC’s appeal which assigns error in the trial court’s denial of HSBC’s motion for summary judgment. HSBC filed a motion for summary judgment on Thompson’s counterclaim, which alleged violations of the Fair Debt Practices Collection Act. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment, and filed a Civ. R. 54(B) certification regarding the summary judgment that had been rendered in Thompson’s favor.

{¶ 90} Thompson contends that denial of summary judgment is not a final appealable order, and that HSBC’s argument regarding the FDCPA should not be considered on appeal. In response, HSBC maintains that it is not appealing the denial of its motion for summary judgment. HSBC argues instead, that if we reverse the trial court order granting Thompson’s motion to strike the affidavit of Neil, or if we reverse the order dismissing HSBC’s foreclosure complaint, we would then be entitled under App. R. 12(B) to enter a judgment dismissing the FDCPA claims.

{¶ 91} App. R. 12(B) provides that:

{¶ 92} “When the court of appeals determines that the trial court committed no error prejudicial to the appellant in any of the particulars assigned and argued in appellant’s brief and that the appellee is entitled to have the judgment or final order of the trial court affirmed as a matter of law, the court of appeals shall enter judgment accordingly. When the court of appeals determines that the trial court committed error prejudicial to the appellant and that the appellant is entitled to have judgment or final order rendered in his favor as a matter of law, the court of appeals shall reverse the judgment or final order of the trial court and render the judgment or final order that the trial court should have rendered, or remand the cause to the court with instructions to render such judgment or final order. In all other cases where the court of appeals determines that the judgment or final order of the trial court should be modified as a matter of law it shall enter its judgment accordingly.”

{¶ 93} App. R. 12(B) does not apply, because the trial court did not commit error prejudicial to HSBC. Furthermore, HSBC admits that it is not appealing the denial of its summary judgment motion. Accordingly, Thompson’s motion to dismiss is without merit and is overruled.

V

{¶ 94} All of HSBC’s assignments of error having been overruled, the judgment of the trial court is Affirmed. Thompson’s motion to dismiss part of HSBC’s appeal is overruled.

Brogan and Froelich, JJ., concur.

This copy provided by Leagle, Inc.

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in bogus, chain in title, conflict of interest, conspiracy, CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, fdcpa, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosures, HSBC, MERS, mortgage, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC., Notary, notary fraud, note, robo signers, stopforeclosurefraud.com, trade secrets, trustee, TrustsComments (0)

Open Letter to all attorneys who aren’t PSA literate by April Charney

Open Letter to all attorneys who aren’t PSA literate by April Charney


Via: Max Gardner

Are You PSA Literate?

Written on August 16, 2010 by admin

We are pleased to present this guest post by April Charney.

If you are an attorney trying to help people save their homes, you had better be PSA literate or you won’t even begin to scratch the surface of all you can do to save their homes. This is an open letter to all attorneys who aren’t PSA literate but show up in court to protect their client’s homes.

First off, what is a PSA? After the original loans are pooled and sold, a trust hires a servicer to service the loans and make distributions to investors. The agreement between depositor and the trust and the truste and the servicer is called the Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA).

According to UCC § 3-301 a “person entitled to enforce” the promissory note, if negotiable, is limited to:

(1) The holder of the instrument;

(2) A nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the rights of a holder; or

(3) A person not in possession of the instrument who is entitled to enforce the instrument pursuant to section 3-309 or section 3-418(d).

A person may be a person entitled to enforce the instrument even though the person is not the owner of the instrument or is in wrongful possession of the instrument.

Although “holder” is not defined in UCC § 3-301, it is defined in § 1-201 for our purposes to mean a person in possession of a negotiable note payable to bearer or to the person in possession of the note.

So we now know who can enforce the obligation to pay a debt evidenced by a negotiable note. We can debate whether a note is negotiable or not, but I won’t make that debate here.

Under § 1-302 persons can agree “otherwise” that where an instrument is transferred for value and the transferee does not become a holder because of lack of indorsement by the transferor, that the transferee is granted a special right to enforce an “unqualified” indorsement by the transferor, but the code does not “create” negotiation until the indorsement is actually made.

So, that section allows a transferee to enforce a note without a qualifying endorsement only when the note is transferred for value.? Then, under § 1-302 (a) the effect of provisions of the UCC may be varied by agreement. This provision includes the right and ability of persons to vary everything described above by agreement.

This is where you MUST get into the PSA. You cannot avoid it. You can get the judges to this point. I did it in an email. Show your judge this post.

If you can’t find the PSA for your case, use the PSA next door that you can find on at www.secinfo.com. The provisions of the PSA that concern transfer of loans (and servicing, good faith and almost everything else) are fairly boilerplate and so PSAs are fairly interchangeable for many purposes. You have to get the PSA and the mortgage loan purchase agreement and the hearsay bogus electronic list of loans before the court. You have to educate your judge about the lack of credibility or effect of the lifeless list of loans as the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act specifically exempts Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities from its application. Also, you have to get your judge to understand that the plaintiff has given up the power to accept the transfer of a note in default and under the conditions presented to the court (out of time, no delivery receipts, etc). Without the PSA you cannot do this.

Additionally the PSA becomes rich when you look at § 1-302 (b) which says that the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by the code may not be disclaimed by agreement, but may be enhanced or modified by an agreement which determine the standards by which the performance of the obligations of good faith, diligence reasonableness and care are to be measured. These agreed to standards of good faith, etc. are enforceable under the UCC if the standards are “not manifestly unreasonable.”

The PSA also has impact on when or what acts have to occur under the UCC because § 1-302 (c) allows parties to vary the “effect of other provisions” of the UCC by agreement.

Through the PSA, it is clear that the plaintiff cannot take an interest of any kind in the loan by way of an A to D” assignment of a mortgage and certainly cannot take an interest in the note in this fashion.

Without the PSA and the limitations set up in it “by agreement of the parties”, there is no avoiding the mortgage following the note and where the UCC gives over the power to enforce the note, so goes the power to foreclose on the mortgage.

So, arguing that the Trustee could only sue on the note and not foreclose is not correct analysis without the PSA.? Likewise, you will not defeat the equitable interest “effective as of” assignment arguments without the PSA and the layering of the laws that control these securities (true sales required) and REMIC (no defaulted or nonconforming loans and must be timely bankruptcy remote transfers) and NY trust law and UCC law (as to no ultra vires acts allowed by trustee and no unaffixed allonges, etc.).

The PSA is part of the admissible evidence that the court MUST have under the exacting provisions of the summary judgment rule if the court is to accept any plaintiff affidavit or assignment.

If you have been successful in your cases thus far without the PSA, then you have far to go with your litigation model. It is not just you that has “the more considerable task of proving that New York law applies to this trust and that the PSA does not allow the plaintiff to be a “nonholder in possession with the rights of a holder.”

And I am not impressed by the argument “This is clearly something that most foreclosure defense lawyers are not prepared to do.”?Get over that quick or get out of this work! Ask yourself, are you PSA adverse? If your answer is yes, please get out of this line of work. Please.

I am not worried about the minds of the Circuit Court Judges unless and until we provide them with the education they deserve and which is necessary to result in good decisions in these cases.

It is correct that the PSA does not allow the Trustee to foreclose on the Note. But you only get there after looking at the PSA in the context of who has the power to foreclose under applicable law.

It is not correct that the Trustee has the power or right to sue on the note and PSA literacy makes this abundantly clear.

Are you PSA literate? If not, don’t expect your judge to be. But if you want to become literate, a good place to start is by attending Max Gardner’s Mortgage Servicing and Securitization Seminar.

April Carrie Charney

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in bankruptcy, chain in title, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosures, Max Gardner, mbs, mortgage, note, psa, rmbs, securitization, trustee, Trusts, Wall StreetComments (1)

Proving “Originality” and Ownership of Electronic Mortgage Notes

Proving “Originality” and Ownership of Electronic Mortgage Notes


“Testing”- Document Authenticity

READ CAREFULLY…

  • The mortgage market’s continued ability to lend money relies on the liquidity of promissory notes secured by real property.
  • Paper promissory notes are endorsed “in blank”so that whoever has “possession”of the note is considered a holder, holder in due course, or purchaser.

[ipaper docId=35170867 access_key=key-qw5eoqxma51sn7wcqic height=600 width=600 /]

If you on SPERS.org’s site there is also some information to be looked at…like power point presentation and some pdf files. Click below

SPERS.ORG

Posted in foreclosure, foreclosures, MERS, mortgage, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC., noteComments (1)

MUST READ |Yellow Dots of Mystery, on your “original promissory note”

MUST READ |Yellow Dots of Mystery, on your “original promissory note”


Via: Brian K. Korte, Esq.

http://www.signaturemachine.com/products/demo_page.htm

http://www.signaturemachine.com/forms/PDF/GW_MAX_T2.pdf

The information here shows the manner in which a promissory note and mortgage is photocopied and presented to the court as an original. Most of the notes “may” actually be photocopies, the UCC does not provide for photocopies. Lawyers are now bringing in experts to look at all the notes we found using our microscopes.

Attention Homeowners buy a microscope for under $20.00 and find the dots on the fake promissory note, read on and understand how we were have been duped, its a fake note, counterfeit.

5th grade enotes (3)

Power and Control (3)

The Condensed Potomac Two Step (3)

Article 9 by JMcguire (3)

Precision and Detail (1)

5th grade enotes fan fred (1)

UCC 9308 d Collateral does not follow security Instrument for Real estate (1)

What We Know Imaginary Electronic Promissory Notes (2)

FLORIDA BANKER’S ASSOCIATION – LOST NOTES 09-1460_093009_Comments (FBA)1 062710 (2)

suspense account (1)

Esign Trillion Dollar FUBAR (1)

The Mortgage Fraud Envelope (2)

Chain of endorsements visual five star 041910 James McGuire (2)

IAAC (1)

Paper-Electronic Process (3)

IGWTIGWT (1)

Illusion (1)

Chains (1)

MERS-Bifurcation-Negotiable-Instrument-Security-Instrument (1)

Simplicity (1)

Avatar image source: w2.eff.org

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosures, forgery, noteComments (1)

WHERE’S THE NOTE, WHO’S THE HOLDER | ENFORCEMENT OF PROMISSORY NOTE SECURED BY REAL ESTATE

WHERE’S THE NOTE, WHO’S THE HOLDER | ENFORCEMENT OF PROMISSORY NOTE SECURED BY REAL ESTATE


WHERE’S THE NOTE, WHO’S THE HOLDER

INTRODUCTION

In an era where a very large portion of mortgage obligations have been securitized, by assignment to a trust indenture trustee, with the resulting pool of assets being then sold as mortgage backed securities, foreclosure becomes an interesting exercise, particularly where judicial process is involved.  We are all familiar with the securitization process.  The steps, if not the process, is simple.  A borrower goes to a mortgage lender.  The lender finances the purchase of real estate.  The borrower signs a note and mortgage or deed of trust.  The original lender sells the note and assigns the mortgage to an entity that securitizes the note by combining the note with hundreds or thousands of similar obligation to create a package of mortgage backed securities, which are then sold to investors.

Unfortunately, unless you represent borrowers, the vast flow of notes into the maw of the securitization industry meant that a lot of mistakes were made.  When the borrower defaults, the party seeking to enforce the obligation and foreclose on the underlying collateral sometimes cannot find the note.  A lawyer sophisticated in this area has speculated to one of the authors that perhaps a third of the notes “securitized” have been lost or destroyed.  The cases we are going to look at reflect the stark fact that the unnamed source’s speculation may be well-founded.

UCC SECTION 3-309

If the issue were as simple as a missing note, UCC §3-309 would provide a simple solution.  A person entitled to enforce an instrument which has been lost, destroyed or stolen may enforce the instrument.  If the court is concerned that some third party may show up and attempt to enforce the instrument against the payee, it may order adequate protection.  But, and however, a person seeking to enforce a missing instrument must be a person entitled to enforce the instrument, and that person must prove the instrument’s terms and that person’s right to enforce the instrument.  §3-309 (a)(1) & (b).

continue below…

[ipaper docId=34639366 access_key=key-16iibafykexw94r9ex7k height=600 width=600 /]

More on….MERS

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in conspiracy, CONTROL FRAUD, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosures, investigation, MERS, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC., Mortgage Foreclosure Fraud, note, stopforeclosurefraud.comComments (1)

Screw the Note, SHOW ME THE LOAN!

Screw the Note, SHOW ME THE LOAN!


SHOW ME THE LOAN

A legal doctrine developed by: John Chester; of the family Stuart

The government did not want to end prohibition. It was great for the politicians. Over a period of time, over 70,000 lawsuits were filed against prohibition. The government could not fight them anymore and got rid of prohibition.

The new concepts are based on these concepts of law which fall under contract law. Specific performance in real estate: You go to buy a house, they screw up and you don’t get the house. Under specific performance you can refuse to take another house or your money returned – you want that house. You have to go into a replevin concept where they give you some reasonable value. Those are fights that you have in contract law, which is what we want to use.

The nice aspect of it is that we have come along this far to the documentation and everything we are going to be claiming here, they have already confessed to by fighting us. Now they cannot change their minds. A lot of what kind of blackballed me from the guru aspect of this was the fact that I was right. But, they don’t need to be right. They just need to make money. A lot of it was based on the concept, in law, that most people do not really understand. It is the difference between a covenant and a contract.

There is a difference between a contract and a covenant. If you read the law and the legal definitions, they are substantially different. If you remember when you were in school, you said the Pledge of Allegiance. “I pledge allegiance to the flag of the united States of America.” Exactly what was that flag giving in return? Nothing. That is a pledge. “I pledge allegiance.” A pledge is a covenant. It’s unilateral.

When you do a covenant:
Go through your Deed of Trust, your Mortgage, etc., they use the word “covenant.” They do not use the word “contract.” There is a reason for it. They are never going to give you anything. You already have everything. It is legalese for, “I’m going to shaft you really bad and you’re going to thank me later.” You have to understand the difference between a contract and a covenant. The laws are so applicable that you enter into it believing it was a contract.

Here is the issue: We go through this whole thing, and the whole time the banks are yelling and screaming that, “We never separated the Note and the Deed of Trust.” Are they telling the truth or are they lying? They are telling the truth because those two documents were never together. That is where they have you. They were never intended to be together. They can never be together in law. The Deed of Trust got recorded and the Note went to the lender.

We have all kinds of evidence of that. The first thing they do with the Note is they give it over to someone to cash it. The first thing they do with the Deed of Trust is they run it over to the County Recorder’s Office. Did they separate them which would invalidate everything, or were they never together? They were never together to begin with. They never lied about that. They tricked us.

The Deed of Trust (Mortgage) – that contractual agreement which is truly a covenant says, “This Deed of Trust is evidenced by the Note.” There is no note. That is all a separate deal. What is the Deed of Trust evidenced by? Nothing. It does not exist in law. It is a mortgage. It is dead. You eventually bring it back to life because you send them a check or cash or money order every month. In law, if you make someone an offer, and behind that offer is written ‘in valuable consideration’ (in this instance, it would be cash) and they accept that cash, then we have brought that deal back to life.

The mortgage was dead. There were two deals. You sold them a Promissory Note, i.e., you are buying a house for $500,000. You give them a Promissory Note, they give you the $500,000 or they give it to the home builder and now you have the house. That is a fair and even exchange, lawful and legal. You are done.

Now, for some reason, you wanted to borrow $500,000 from them. That is a separate deal. This deal (Promissory Note) is done, now you want to do this other deal. If you pay them, when did you get the $500,000? There is a bit of an issue there. Here is what happened in law and in reality, and here is what the law has to say about this… Example/concept: Now that we are here and now that the banks say, “It is our note.” Okay, it is your note. You bought it fair and square.

If I sell you my car, can I come back yelling at you saying, “You can’t take the doors off it, you can’t paint it pink, you can’t do anything.” Do I have a legal right to say that? No. They can do whatever they want. They don’t even need to bring it to court.

When you sold them the Note, what did they do with it? They stamped the note: “Paid to the Order of __________ (put a third party name on it) without recourse.” According to the Federal Reserve, what is that Note now? It’s a check. Did they cash the check? It is a bearer instrument payable to the holder. Do we have a name for that? Check. It’s a bearer’s instrument. It’s a check. What is a check? A check is a bearer’s instrument. If I have a check given from you by you to me, am I the bearer of that? Yes. They cashed the check.

Do you understand what happened here? If I sell you this book for $1.00 and you go away with this book, is that all right? Yes. What does this other book have to do with that deal? Nothing. It is a separate book. We now want to make a deal over this book. How do we know this for certain?

We have to start talking about the Mortgage. You sold them the check (Note), that deal is done. Now we have to talk about the other deal. What is happening is, everyone is saying, “Show me the note.” We should be saying, “Show me the Loan.” Because you sold them your check for $500,000. You got the $500,000. That Note is completed and perfected. It’s done.

Now we are over here talking about a Mortgage – a Deed of Trust – a loan – a contract that is really a covenant where you are borrowing $500,000. You are paying them every month. When did they loan you the $500,000? They never did. Who, by law, is in default? They are. Who is responsible to inform the Court when the other party is in default? You are. If you don’t inform the Court the other party is in default, what must the Court therefore presume? They are not in default. The Court and law are very clear on these aspects. It is not the Court’s job to come and do your job for you. The Court does not know who is in default. The bank says you are in default through the non-judicial process. You don’t argue it – that’s it. In Connolly v. General Accounting and numerous other cases: acquiescence is agreement. If you don’t say anything, you are in agreement.

Credit card companies operate on this concept. They send you a note or a letter stating you owe us this much money, and you don’t respond. By the time you respond, you are already being garnished. Do you understand why? Because you never argued. Affidavits stand in law if un-rebutted. If somebody says something and you don’t rebut it, you are in agreement with it. That is not in all cases.

For instance, in this case of the last couple of weeks. I don’t deal with the plaintiff who was not at all prepared to get on trial. She gets up on the stand and says that the bank says, “Well, didn’t we loan you the money?” And, she said, “Well, yes.”

Part of learning how to do this is going to be very direct and honest. There are all kinds of maxims of law and court rulings where, if you don’t have clean hands, then they have an argument. If one side of the hands are dirty, then there is your claim. You just win by default.

They asked her a simple question: “Did you get a loan from the bank?” It was over with for her. She said “yes.”

She never got a loan from the bank. Not only is she a liar, but she destroyed her own case. If she had said, “I never got a loan from the bank. I sold them the Promissory Note, they gave me the money, I bought the house with the money and I paid them for the loan, but they never gave me loan.” That would have been it. There is one sum certain, one lump of money (in this case, $500,000). Where did it go? It’s only one lump sum. You sold them the Promissory Note.

This is about winning. It is about doing the right thing. It is very simple. You sold them the Promissory Note, they gave you the cash, you went over and bought the house. Do you all understand that? I don’t care about the Note.

There is a thing in law called res judicata. Those that are attorneys or paralegals understand res judicata. Once it’s done, once it has been decided, it is over with. Res judicata means, “Shut the hell up. Don’t bring it in my Court.”

I can give you a million arguments on this. Do you know which one of them matters? The one that proves whether or not this happened. Nothing else happened. Everything in the documents, the banks have confessed this happened. They cannot argue about this any more. They have already tried to bitch-slap us in thirty different ways to say, “This is over with.” Ok. You bought the Note. This is done.

Now we must discuss this. Did you make your payments for an extended period of time? Shannon and I have a deal. Shannon, I need to borrow $1,000. Shannon agrees and says, “I’ll tell you what. I have plenty of money. You send me $10 a week for the next two years; that’s $1,040. I will lend you the $1,000 now and I will make $40 in the two years after. I am way under the usury laws, etc.” We are both happy. How many $10 payments do I have to make before I say, give me my $1,000? None. If I made a few payments, what number of payments that I have made can I come back and take him into court if he does not give me that $1,000? One-third. That’s it. He is in total default. If I made three payments and he does not give me the money, who is in default? He is.

How many people understand there are two difference cases here? They confessed they bought the Note. This is all done. So we only have the Deed of Trust argument. On their side of the Deed of Trust it says says: “This Deed of Trust is evidenced by the Note.” What Note? It’s sold. It’s gone. So what is the Deed of Trust evidenced by? Nothing. They have no evidence. So what did you do? You paid them. Even though the Mortgage/Deed of Trust has negotiations, that deal is dead. When you pay them, under the law of acceptance (equity chancery law), when this is on the table and no one has actually picked it up. If you go ahead and you start sending them the payment, did you pick it up and hand it to them by giving them payment? In law, if they accepted by payment, what did they also accept? The check. So what must they also do? They have to give you that $500,000 loan. There is only one $500,000 lump sum.

When you look at this deal, you see what is called a “specific performance.” You had a job to do. Did the bank have a job to do? What was your job to do? Make the monthly payments. What was the bank’s job to do? Loan you. Did you specifically perform your duties in pursuance of this convenant/contract?

You performed your job. You sent them a check. They cashed it.

This whole thing is a scam. How can you tell if a bank or a lawyer or a politician is lying? There are two rabbit holes. Everyone is going down the wrong rabbit hole. You are not going to find any rabbits down there. You are going to find snakes and worms, etc. Here is the rabbit. That is what you need to argue. That is what it is all about. Inside of there is the right to take your house. In the covenant, they have all kinds of rights. You don’t have any rights. Fraud in the factum; fraud in the inducement. When you believe it is a contract because you do not understand legalese, but it was a covenant, so they really are not tied in to be punished if they fail. Isn’t that the reason they probably made it a covenant and not contract? It’s all there. They did not lie to you, verbally. They did not make a misstatement and they had a liable mission so you can use that against them.

Militia/patriot groups sprung up. The most famous being the Posse Comitatus. Posse Comitatus was an Act by Congress after the Civil War. It states the United States will never use the military against its own people. That was the United States, not the corporate entity of the United States of America. We all remember Waco. That whole Act has some issues. When the Posse Comitatus sprung up, they used the legal doctrine of filing documents which we call liens. What these different groups did was they put liens on sheriffs and judges and government employees creating a nightmare. The way the government attacked these groups through the law was under certain aspects of the law that says when you record something and it is not correct, that is a crime. They had a lot of recordings to deprive people of their property so that it fell into terrorism. They did it in mass quantities to deprive whole areas of their land.

This is important. If you look up Arizona Revised Statutes §13-2301 and read it through (D)(4)(b)45, it defines filing false documents to deprive people of their lands as terrorism. It is terrorism for a group of people to get together and file false, fraudulent or forged documents in a public office. It is defined in Arizona law as one type of criminal act: terrorism.

Under terrorist laws, they do not have to prove you are a terrorist. The onus probandi is extrapolated from the Patriot Act to all acts of terrorism. The terrorists must disprove they were a terrorist. When you get charged as a terrorist and there is any evidence therein, you have to dispute it. There are all kinds of people in Guantanamo Bay who don’t have anything to do with anything, but they had some kind of association somewhere where they got charged as terrorists. They are there waiting to dispute that they are terrorists.

The law states that if you record documents that are fraudulent, forged or false, to deprive people of property, you are a terrorist. How many people have looked at the documents that the banks have filed and recorded? How many people have found one that is not false, fraudulent or forged? It goes a prima facie evidence.

The nuclear option
There is no way, under Arizona or U.S. law, that a CEO of any bank in this country can disprove that he is not a terrorist. They cannot. The law defines every CEO of every bank in this country as a terrorist. There are judicial notices of case law in support of this. That will get posted. Read it. It shows this. The banks did this about a thousand times every day.

It is ground in legal fact. We’ve got the recorded documents and I have the laws. They cannot state they accidentally recorded it. Accident a thousand times a day throughout the country?

For all of these people, it is imprisonment for life. If you read the Posse Comitatus, the banks are following their playbook. The only difference in the laws between the bankers and the so-called terrorists that are doing life imprisonment in recording this stuff is they wore camping t-shirts and the bankers are in Armani suits. You talk about whether or not you can prove this or whether or not it is factual: they have already admitted to it. They gave us all the evidence we need. It really is this simple. They have done everything we need to do to jump over to the nuclear option and go against them. They have already said they own the note, they have already recorded the documents – all those documents are fraudulent.

The documents that they record that lead to the criminal acts that Arizona law defines as terrorism are: a substitution of trustee. In other words, this person gets to steal that property because we have a financial interest, etc. That is what the bank does. The other one is an assignment of rights where that leads to who has the rights to do what. They are going to record those documents. Some of them now they are stamping that they are recorded and not recording them. The crime happens when you record. Either way, they are still claiming it and using it to steal your property.

In criminal law, after the prosecution rests, you claim Rule 20, that they have not proved their prima facie case. They may have proved a lot of things, but they did not prove you did the act. That case gets dismissed, with prejudice.

In civil law you do not get it dismissed, but you get summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff or the defendant. That, basically, is reliant on the same concepts of the prima facie case. Then someone proves, prima facially, a certain concept. When we say, “Here is the law that says you are a terrorist and it states that if you do this, you are a terrorist.” And we put all the other with it; that is a prima facie evidence. They are a terrorist. How many times do you think we have done a prima facie case? Under the law, you only have to do it once. We have about a dozen cases.

That is the nuclear option.

There is a little confusion that I am going to clear up.

When the banks bought your Promissory Note, they did not actually give you money. When the banks bought your Promissory Note from you, they stamped it, “paid to the order of (the third party name) without recourse” and turned it into a check. They took that check and cashed it. They bought the house and you got the house. It is just the same as if you got the money. Here is the fraud: they bought everything in their name. You sold them the Promissory Note, yes, they paid you. They paid the builders, the builder gave you the house. The thing is, they bought everything in their name. That is illegal. That is a criminal act in and of itself.

If they upheld the law and did things not as a criminal enterprise – you sold them the Promissory Note, they took the money, they paid for the builder in your name, you were given the house in your name – this would not have generated the fraud. They were not supposed to purchase anything with that money using their name. They got the Promissory Note. They should have just given you the money, but they did all these little tricks to confuse everyone. They did everything in their name to make it look like they were doing the purchase, but they were using your money. They were really just an agent for you.

The money that they were supposed to give you, instead of giving it to you, they took that money and bought your old lien or bought your house with the money. It is spelled out in the handout.

Under the adjustable rate note, “In return for the loan that I have received, I promise to pay… ” Now we are playing a game of legalese: “In return for a loan that I received” is past tense, not current tense. We are talking about something that is extraneous. Whether it did or did not happen is not intrinsic to our argument.

They are playing these games and you are falling for it. You are making assumptions that you have got to get away from. What if you never had a loan before? Then that is just a fraudulent statement. What if you had a loan before? That would be what they are talking about. No where do they really claim that they were. You just read it, took it for granted, because you were doing this all at the same time. The whole thing is: where is the loan? Everyone is screaming, “Where is the Note?”, show me the loan. The loan I had received was in past tense, why are we bringing that up? That is intrinsic to the argument, but it is not substantial when we get into the case. It will be brought up. It is just evidence in the process.

Image Credit: Jerry Maguire

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in conspiracy, CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, deed of trust, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosures, mortgage, note, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (3)

Even More Embarrassment for Banks: Foreclosure Fraud

Even More Embarrassment for Banks: Foreclosure Fraud


Even More Embarrassment for Banks: Foreclosure Fraud

Oppenheim Law

cartoon_bank_bailoutWhat could be more embarrassing for the already floundering banks than the fact that their foreclosure, loan modification and short sale systems are a complete mess?

Well, a recent court decision in a mortgage foreclosure lawsuit in Pasco County, FL, revealed the banks, besides being disorganized, are apparently not above stooping to commit fraud in order to file foreclosure actions against homeowners.   You can view the Court’s order by clicking here.

Many homeowners probably don’t know the bank has to prove it has standing to bring a foreclosure action.  Standing is the constitutional right for a party to appear to bring a case in court.  Without standing, a party has no right to be in court. But in reality, the bank must prove that they in fact own and hold both the mortgage and promissory note, and thus have the right to foreclose.

This becomes a problem for banks because they are so disorganized that the documents are often lost or misplaced. An even bigger problem occurs when the original mortgage lenders sell the mortgages and notes and convert them into a securitized trust. When these mortgages are assigned to another bank or a securitized trust, the assignment of mortgage must be executed and notarized. Within these assignments, foreclosure defense attorneys are finding all kinds of problems that are leading to foreclosure cases being thrown out of court.

Fraud in the Court

A problem found in an assignment of mortgage that was recently thrown out by the court was especially astounding. The Plaintiff, U.S. Bank, filed a foreclosure action on December 6, 2007, based on an alleged assignment of mortgage dated as of December 5, 2007.

However, during the course of the litigation, the homeowner’s attorney noticed that the Notary’s commission was dated to expire on May 19, 2012. Pursuant to Florida law, notary stamps are only valid for 4 years. So, the notary that signed the assignment back on December 5, 2007 could not have had a notary stamp that expired in May of 2012.

This fact was confirmed by a sworn affidavit by the Notary Bonding Company’s representative, confirming that this Notary’s stamp was not issued until April 2008, five months after the purported date of assignment on the mortgage.

Based on this evidence, the judge found that the assignment was “fraudulently backdated in a purposeful, intentional effort to mislead the defendant and this court.”

On these grounds, the Judge found the defendant homeowner was the prevailing party because the Plaintiff lacked standing to file the lawsuit on December 6, 2007, and granted the Defendant’ attorney’s fees as well.

Defending is Better than Default

This news brings hope to many homeowners and shows defending the foreclosure action is better than doing nothing at all.  Additionally this teaches us we should never accept anything on its face and scrutinize every document produced by the banks to support their foreclosure complaint.

An argument can be made that Judges should be examining the authenticity of the documents produced by the Plaintiff before entering default and granting summary judgment against homeowners. However, in all likelihood, mistakes such as these are slipping through the cracks with the unprecedented number of foreclosure actions each judge has on their docket.

Thus, these kinds of problems truly exemplify why it is in every homeowner’s best interest to defend their foreclosure and not assume the court system will automatically protect their interests.

Posted in foreclosure fraudComments (0)

Advert

Archives