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Citibank, N.A. v Van Brunt Props., LLC | NYSC “plaintiff’s papers are defective, the fact that the limited power of attorney is undated is a further defect”

Citibank, N.A. v Van Brunt Props., LLC | NYSC “plaintiff’s papers are defective, the fact that the limited power of attorney is undated is a further defect”


Decided on March 16, 2012

Supreme Court, Kings County

 

Citibank, N.A., Plaintiff,

against

Van Brunt Properties, LLC; and “John Does” and “Jane Does” No.1-100, the last names being fictitious and unknown to the plaintiff, the persons and parties intended being the tenants, occupants, persons or corporations, if any, having or claiming an interest in or lien upon the premises described in the verified amended complaint, Defendant. Plaintiff, Sutter Avenue Management, LLC Miller Lumber & Mill Work Inc.; And “John Does” and “Jane Does” #1-100, the last names being fictitious and unknown to the plaintiff, the persons and parties intended being the tenants, occupants, persons or corporations, if any, having or claiming an interest in or lien upon the premises described in the verified amended complaint, Defendants.

Plaintiff, – against –

against

Sutter Avenue Management, LLC Miller Lumber & Mill Work Inc.; And “John Does” and “Jane Does” #1-100, the last names being fictitious and unknown to the plaintiff, the persons and parties intended being the tenants, occupants, persons or corporations, if any, having or claiming an interest in or lien upon the premises described in the verified amended complaint, Defendants.

3523/10

Plaintiff Attorney: Dacia C Cocariu, Esq.

Sills Cummis & Gross

Defense Attorney: Kirk P. Tzandies, Esq

Yvonne Lewis, J.

Defendant Van Brunt Properties, LLC (Van Brunt) and defendant Sutter Avenue Management, LLC (Sutter) collectively move for an order, pursuant to [*2]Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) §602(a), to consolidate the foreclosure action of Citibank, N.A. v Sutter Avenue Management, LLC., Midwood Lumber & Mill Work, Inc., et al. (Index No. 354/10), into the foreclosure action of Citibank, N.A. v Van Brunt Properties, LLC, et al. (Index No. 3523/10). Upon consolidation, the defendants seek an order, pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel, declaring that this court’s March 4, 2011 order in the Van Brunt action is equally binding on the Sutter action. The defendants further move for equitable relief in the Sutter action based on their assertion that Citibank acted unconscionably and in bad faith during the protracted period of settlement negotiation. Finally the defendants seek an order terminating the temporary receivership imposed on the Sutter property.

Citibank cross-moves for an order striking all references to conduct and statements made during settlement negotiations, including a pre-negotiation agreement (signed by all three parties), which together form much of the basis of the defendants’ claims for equitable relief, in the Van Brunt action under CPLR § 4547. Citibank also cross-moves, pursuant to CPLR §1018, to substitute Wells Fargo as the plaintiff in the Van Brunt action, and, pursuant to CPLR §3025, to correspondingly amend the case caption. Finally, Citibank cross-moves for an order clarifying the portion of this court’s March 4th order which requires Van Brunt to commence making monthly payments to Citibank.

Background and Procedural History

Sutter is the legal and equitable owner of premises located at 529 Sutter Avenue in Brooklyn. On October 29, 2007, Citibank entered into a mortgage loan in the principal amount of $2,610,000.00 with Sutter. Van Brunt is the legal and equitable owner of premises located at 252-254 Van Brunt Street, also in Brooklyn, which is encumbered by a mortgage in the amount of $950,000.00 financed by Citibank, dated March 21, 2007. Roland Dib is a managing member of both Sutter and Van Brunt. Both the defendants began to have difficulty meeting their mortgage obligations and assert that attempts were made in late 2008 and early 2009 to negotiate with Citibank for a modification of the interest rate so that the requisite payments could be made. The defendants assert that they expended substantial sums to attract new tenants to the properties.

Commencing on July 1, 2009, Van Brunt failed to make its required monthly payments.. Citibank contends that on December 16,2009, it notified Van Brunt that it was in default and advised that if the default was not cured, Citibank reserved its right to exercise all of its rights and remedies. Citibank initiated a foreclosure proceeding against Van Brunt on February 5, 2010.On August 9, 2010, Citibank moved for summary judgment on its foreclosure action against Van Brunt and sought dismissal of Van Brunt’s answer and affirmative defenses and the appointment of a temporary receiver. Van Brunt cross-moved for an order determining that Citibank was not entitled to: any interest on the principal balance of the mortgage loan, late charges, advances, attorneys’ fees, prepayment penalties, commissions and all other costs and expenses. On October 15, 2010, Citibank transferred all interest in the note and mortgage, as well as the other loan documents, to LSREF2 Nova Investments, LLC (“Nova”). On December 10, 2010, all interest in the note and mortgage , together with the other loan documents, were transferred to Wells Fargo. On June 24, 2011, Citibank moved to substitute Wells Fargo into the action as the plaintiff.

In an order dated March 4, 2011, this Court denied that branch of [*3]Citibank’s motion seeking the appointment of a receiver, and denied without prejudice that branch of the motion seeking substitution and for summary judgment. The order granted Van Brunt’s cross motion to the extent of ordering that Citibank is not entitled to any interest from the date of the alleged default to and through March 31, 2011 and found that Citibank is not entitled to any default interest or expenses, including attorneys fees and prepayment penalties. Van Brunt was directed to pay the principal and interest due under the loan commencing on April 1, 2011. In addition, it was directed to pay to Citibank by April 1, 2011, the principal only from the date of default to March 31, 2011, which would be applied to the reduction of the principal.

As regards Sutter, beginning October 2009 it failed to make its required monthly payments under the mortgage. By letter dated December 16, 2009, Citibank maintains that it advised Sutter that it was in default and that failure to cure could result in Citibank exercising its right to accelerate the indebtedness. On February 5, 2010, Citibank filed a separate foreclosure action against the Sutter property. On February 24, 2010, a receiver was appointed to manage the Sutter property.On May 26, 2011, Citibank moved for summary judgment on its foreclosure action and to dismiss Sutter’s answer and affirmative defense. On October 15, 2010, Citibank transferred all interest in the note and mortgage, as well as the other loan documents, to LSREF2 Nova Investments, LLC (“Nova”). On December 10, 2010, all interest in the note and mortgage , together with the other loan documents, were transferred to Wells Fargo. On April 11,2011, Citibank moved to substitute Wells Fargo into the action as the plaintiff.

Defendants’ Motion

Consolidation

The defendants move to consolidate the Van Brunt and Sutter actions arguing that both actions involve common questions of law and fact and arise from the same facts and circumstances and assert the identical legal theories and defenses, in accord with the direction of §602(a) of the CPLR. If successful on the issue of consolidation, the defendants then seek an order, pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel, declaring that this court’s March 4, 2011 order in the Van Brunt action is equally binding on the Sutter action. The defendants further move for equitable relief in the Sutter action based on their assertion that Citibank acted unconscionably and in bad faith during the protracted period of settlement negotiation. Finally the defendants seek an order terminating the temporary receivership imposed on the Sutter property.They further contend that the resolution of both cases will involve the same documents and witnesses and thus, such overlap, necessitates consolidation to avoid unnecessary costs, delays and inconsistent judgments. Finally, they contend that there would be no prejudice to Citibank if the actions were consolidated arguing that both actions are in the same pre-discovery stage.

The defendants assert that Citibank treated the two mortgages as a package from the moment of default, noting for example, that Citibank alleges that it notified both properties of default on the same day and that all renegotiation’ efforts were done with both properties and as a package. The defendants note that every transfer of the property – October 15, 2010 to Nova and December 10, 2010 to Wells Fargo – was packaged as well. They argue that both of the defendants’ theory of the case is that foreclosure should be denied due to the bad faith and unconscionable behavior of Citibank throughout the course of said joint negotiations. They allege that they were jointly induced [*4]to make substantial personal investments in the respective properties at issue, based on an implied promise by Citibank that this show of good faith on the defendants’ part would result in a renegotiation of both mortgages, thereby avoiding default. The defendants conclude that the substance and legal theories of both cases are identical, will require the same testimony and evidence to be presented to the court, and should therefore be consolidated to avoid unnecessary costs, delay and inconsistent judgments.In opposition, Citibank argues that Van Brunt and Sutter are foreclosure actions filed separately by Citibank on February 5th, 2010 against two different commercial borrowers, namely Van Brunt Properties LLC, et al. and Sutter Avenue Management, LLC, et. al., each of whom holds a mortgage on a distinct property. They further point out that the circumstances under which each loan was made, the loan documents, and the defaults differ from one another. Moreover, Citibank avers that the receivership status and procedural posture of each case differs. Citibank maintains that consolidation should be denied inasmuch as the two actions do not have the requisite common issues of law and fact. Citibank also argues that it would be prejudiced by consolidation since consolidation would delay the resolution while both actions were aligned with one another. Finally, Citibank claims that the defendants are only seeking consolidation in an attempt to obtain a more favorable outcome, noting that there was no motion for consolidation until, this court’s ruling favorable to Van Brunt in the Van Brunt action.

Discussion

Section 602(a) of the CPLR gives a court discretion to consolidate actions where common questions of law or fact are present. Consolidation is preferred where these commonalities exist, absent proof that consolidation will prejudice a substantial right of the party opposing the motion (Best Price Jewelers.Com, Inc. v Internet Data Stor. & Sys., Inc., 51 AD3d 839 [2008]; Beerman v Morhaim, 17 AD3d 302 [2005]; Progressive Insurance Co. v Vasquez, 10 AD3d 518, 519 [2004]; Zupich v Flushing Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 156 AD2d 677, 677 [1989]). Further, consolidation is appropriate where it will avoid unnecessary duplication of trials, save unnecessary costs and expense, and prevent an injustice which would result from divergent decisions based on the same facts (see Zupich, 156 AD2d at 677). The defendants assert that their respective actions raise identical factual and legal issues, that the two properties have been dealt with as a package since they defaulted, that there will be little delay as the result of consolidation, that there would be no substantial prejudice to the plaintiff and therefore consolidation is required. The plaintiff does not dispute that the two properties were dealt with as a package during the period of renegotiation of their mortgages, but opposes the consolidation of these actions primarily on the ground that substantial prejudice would result from the delay that such a consolidation would cause. It avers that each action has an independent mortgage related to a separate and distinct parcel of land, that consolidation will unduly and additionally delay resolution and that the defendants’ motion is an attempt to forum shop in order to get a more favorable outcome in both actions

Absent a showing of prejudice to a substantial right the existence of common questions of law or fact justifies the grant of a motion for consolidation. (Lamboy v. Inter Fence Co., 196 AD2d 705, 601 N.Y.S.2d 619 (1st Dept.1993).However, a delay which would prevent a trial from taking place for “some time to come” has justified the denial of such a motion, Mulligan v. Farmingdale Union Free School District No. 22, 133 AD2d 617, 519 N.Y.S.2d [*5]725 (2d Dept.1987). In the instant actions, there are, as the plaintiff suggests, different procedural postures but these differences are not likely to cause such a delay as would substantially prejudice the plaintiff. The plaintiff does argue that it will be so prejudiced, but the arguments consist of conclusory self-serving statements that prejudice would occur if consolidation were ordered. The plaintiff suggests that there will be a delay “while the actions [are] brought in line with each other.” The major delay , appears to be caused by the appeals this Court’s March 4, 2011 Order, and the appeal of the instant motion, regardless of the out come. The plaintiff’s counsel says, “[t]rying to bring these actions in line with each other, so that they can proceed together, would only create undue delay and confusion, allowing defendant to prolong the proceedings and avoid judgement to Plaintiff’s severe prejudice.” Counsel does say not how the plaintiff is prejudiced nor what the prejudice is. There is no showing of prejudice to a substantial right of the plaintiff. “[A] and mere delay of the trial is not a sufficient basis upon which to deny a motion for consolidation or a joint trial (see Alsol Enters., Ltd. v. Premier Lincoln—Mercury, Inc., 11 AD3d 494, 783 N.Y.S.2d 620; Zupich, 156 AD2d at 677).” (Whiteman v Parsons Transportation Group of New York, Inc, et al. 72 AD3d 677, 900 N.Y.S.2d 87 ( 2d Dept 2010)

” Although a motion pursuant to CPLR 602 (a) to consolidate two pending actions is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, consolidation is favored by the courts in serving the interests of justice and judicial economy (see, Zupich v Flushing Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 156 AD2d 677). As both actions clearly involve similar issues of fact and law, it [would be] an improvident exercise of discretion to deny consolidation….” (Flaherty v RCP Assoc., 208 AD2d 496, 616 N.Y.S.2d 801,[ 1994]). In the case at bar, there are issues, with regard to whether the plaintiff and or its assigns have acted in good faith, which necessarily must be decided prior to a determination of whether the foreclosure of the defendants’ properties should go forward.These actions arise from the same factual events, involve virtually identical legal theories and defenses; they feature nearly the same principal parties. ” Where common questions of law or fact exist, a motion pursuant to CPLR 602(a) to consolidate … should be granted absent a showing of prejudice to a substantial right of the party opposing the motion (see Mas—Edwards v. Ultimate Servs., Inc., 45 AD3d 540, 845 N.Y.S.2d 414; Perini Corp. v. WDF, Inc., 33 AD3d 605, 606, 822 N.Y.S.2d 295; Nationwide Assoc. v. Targee St. Internal Med. Group, P.C. Profit Sharing Trust, 286 AD2d 717, 730 N.Y.S.2d 349).

Collateral Estoppel

The defendants seek an order, pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel, declaring that this Court’s March 4, 2011 order in the Van Brunt action is equally binding on the Sutter action. They urge the utilization of the doctrine of issue preclusion which is part of Collateral Estoppel. In order for a court’s ruling to be dictated by the decision made in a prior action under the doctrine of issue preclusion, “the identical issue necessarily must have been decided in the prior action and be decisive of the present action, and second, the party to be precluded from relitigating the issue must have had a full and fair opportunity to contest the prior determination” (Kaufman v Eli Lily and Co., 65 NY2d 449, 455 [1985]; Allied Chemical v Niagra Mohawk Power, 72 NY2d 271, 276 [1988]. When a court decides whether issue preclusion applies in a given case “the party seeking the benefit of collateral estoppel bears the initial burden of demonstrating that an issue in the present litigation is identical to an issue decided in the prior determination” (Lewis v City of New York, 17 Misc 3d [*6]537, 544 [2007]. The defendants further move for equitable relief in the Sutter action based on their assertion that Citibank acted unconscionably and in bad faith during the protracted period of settlement negotiation and that Citibank treated Van Brunt and Sutter identically during the course of said negotiation. For which reason, the defendants believe that Sutter is entitled to the relief granted to Van Brunt in this Court’s March 4, 2011 order.

Citing Halyalkar v. Board of Regents of the State of NY, 72 NY2d 261,268, the plaintiff, argues in opposition, that collateral estoppel is inapplicable unless the matter has been “actually litigated” The plaintiff’s counsel buttresses Citibank’s argument with a reminder that the actions “involve, among other things, different loan transactions and different parties. Most notably, the Sutter Loan Documents and the circumstances of Sutter’s default have never even been before this Court.” In sum, the argument is that collateral estoppel cannot be applied herein because there has been no actual litigation of the foreclosure in the Sutter action. Halyalkar,defines actually litigated’ as follows: “To satisfy the identicality requirement, the question must have been actually litigated and, therefore, it must have been properly raised by the pleadings or otherwise placed in issue and actually determined in the prior proceeding.” Halyalkar, supra at 261.

This Court’s March 4, 2011order in the Van Brunt action was issued after consideration of the papers and after oral argument on several motions which were before the Court. The motions and cross motion were before the court on March 4th and they were heard together. The plaintiff’s motions sought a temporary receiver, substitution and summary judgement on the foreclosure. The relief requested was denied with express permission to re-file both as to substitution and summary judgement. The motion for a temporary receiver can be made anew at anytime during the course of the proceeding where new facts arise. The defendants cross motion sought equitable relief; the plaintiff responded with opposition and oral argument was heard on the motion. The March 4th Order resulted from a full presentation by the parties on the issues before the court. As relevant to the collateral estoppel, the order addresses the behavior of the parties in that action and the consequences of that behavior with regard to the period following the “default” and renegotiation efforts made by the parties. It is not a permanent determination with regard to the foreclosures of the subject properties, rather it is the imposition of an equity equalizer put in place in recognition of the fact that Citibank and its assigns, as determined on papers and after oral argument, did actively prolong these proceeding with such lack of good faith as to require that they should forfeit any interest that would have otherwise been owning to them under the terms of the agreement they had with the borrowers. All of the renegotiation efforts were made with both Van Brunt and Sutter and at all the same times and places. Citibank had a full and fair opportunity to contest the prior determination; the issues were actually litigated in the Van Brunt action. In as much as the behavior of the lenders in the Van Buren action were identical, both in substance and in time, to the behavior of the lenders in Sutter, this Court cannot see how any different outcome for the Sutter action can fail to be an inconsistent result and a waste of judicial resources.

Finally the defendants seek an order terminating the temporary receivership imposed on the Sutter property. This Court is without sufficient information to make a determination as to wether or not the temporary receiver should be removed. Upon consolidation, and in as much as the papers are already before the Court, defendant Sutter may request a [*7]conference/argument with the plaintiff on the appropriateness/lack of need for the receiver.

Citibank’s Cross Motion.

Citibank cross-moves for an order finding that all conduct and statements over the course of settlement negotiations entered into between Citibank and the defendants, including the pre-negotiation agreement signed by all three parties, be ruled inadmissable in the Van Brunt action, pursuant to CPLR § 4547. Citibank also cross moves for an order seeking to substitute Wells Fargo as the plaintiff in the Van Brunt action and that the case caption be amended accordingly. Finally, Citibank cross-moves for clarification of two rulings contained in this court’s March 4, 2011 order.

In opposition to Citibank’s cross motion, the defendants argue that the cross motion and opposition papers should not be considered as such submissions were untimely and defective. On the issue of timeliness, the court notes that CPLR §2215 pertinently provides that “[a]t least three days prior to the time at which the motion is noticed to be heard, or seven days prior to such time if demand is properly made pursuant to subdivision (b) of rule 2214, a party may serve upon the moving party a notice of cross-motion demanding relief, with or without supporting papers . . .” Here, the defendants motion was served upon the plaintiff on April 6, 2011. The cross motion was not served until June 20, 2011, a full seventy-five days later.

The defendants further argue that the plaintiff’s papers are defective and should not be considered by the court. Specifically, it is argued that the papers are defective because they are submitted in reliance upon an affidavit of Marisa K. McGuaghey, who describes herself as an “authorized representative of Hudson Americas LLC” and bases her authority to submit her affidavit on behalf of Wells Fargo pursuant to an undated, uncertified copy of a Limited Power of Attorney. A power of attorney presented to the Court must be an original or a copy certified by an attorney, pursuant to CPLR §2105. Section 2105 of the CPLR states, inter alia, that “an attorney admitted to practice in the court of the state may certify that it has been compared by him with the original and found to be a true and complete copy” (see Security Pacific Nat. Trust Co. v Cuevas, 176 Misc 2d 846 [1998]). Here, there is nothing in the record indicating that the plaintiff’s attorney has performed this comparison (see Lasalle Bank N.A. v Smith, 26 Misc 3d 1239A [2010]; United States Bank Natl. Assn. v White, 22 Misc 3d 1112A [2009]; U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. v Bernard,18 Misc 3d 1130A [2008]). Additionally, the court notes that the fact that the limited power of attorney is undated is a further defect (see Ameriquest Mortgage Co., v Basevich, 16 Misc 3d 1104A [2007]. Based upon the foregoing, the court finds that the plaintiff’s papers are defective and therefore will not address the merits, or lack thereof, of the plaintiff’s cross motion.

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

E N T E R,

____________________________

yvonne lewis, JSC

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Judge Schack Gives One Last Shot For Trust Which Purchased Tax Liens To Produce a Vaild POA of an Officer From Trust

Judge Schack Gives One Last Shot For Trust Which Purchased Tax Liens To Produce a Vaild POA of an Officer From Trust


2011 NY Slip Op 50375(U)

NYCTL 2009-A TRUST AND THE BANK OF NEW YORK AS COLLATERAL AGENT AND CUSTODIAN FOR THE NYCTL 2009-A TRUST, Plaintiffs,
v.
273 BRIGHTON BEACH AVE. REALTY CO., ET AL., Defendants.

8124/10.

Supreme Court, Kings County.

Decided March 15, 2011.

Leonid Krechmer, Esq., Windels Marx Lane & Mittendorf LLP, NY NY, Plaintiff.

The defendant did not answer, Defendant.

ARTHUR M. SCHACK, J.

In this action to foreclose on a tax lien for the premises located at 273 Brighton Beach Avenue, Brooklyn, New York (Block 8672, Lot 31, County of Kings), plaintiffs,

NYCTL 2009-A TRUST AND THE BANK OF NEW YORK AS COLLATERAL AGENT AND CUSTODIAN FOR THE NYCTL 2009-A TRUST (THE TRUST), previously moved for an order to appoint a referee to compute and amend the caption. In my December 7, 2010 decision and order, I denied the motion without prejudice, because the affidavit submitted in support of the motion, upon the default of defendants, was not executed by an officer of THE TRUST or someone with a power of attorney from THE TRUST. I granted leave to plaintiffs to renew their motion, within sixty (60) days of the December 7, 2010 decision and order, upon plaintiffs’ presentation to the Court of its compliance with the statutory requirements of CPLR § 3215 (f), with “an affidavit of facts” executed by someone who is an officer of THE TRUST or someone who has a valid power of attorney from THE TRUST.

Plaintiffs moved in a timely manner, on December 29, 2010, and renewed their motion for the appointment of a referee and to amend the caption. However, plaintiffs failed to comply with my December 7, 2010 decision and order. Therefore, the Court grants plaintiffs one final opportunity to comply, within sixty (60) days of this decision and order, by presenting the Court with “an affidavit of facts” executed by someone who is an officer of THE TRUST or someone who has a valid power of attorney from THE TRUST. A repeated failure to comply with this court order will mandate the dismissal of the instant action with prejudice.

Background

THE TRUST purchased certain tax liens from the City of New York on August 18, 2009. These liens, including the tax lien for the premises known as 273 Brighton Beach Avenue, Brooklyn, New York (Block 8672, Lot 31, County of Kings), were recorded in the Kings County Office of the City Register, New York City Department of Finance, on August 25, 2009, at City Register File Number (CRFN) XXXXXXXXXXXXX.

Plaintiffs’ original moving papers for an order to appoint a referee to compute and amend the caption failed to present an “affidavit made by the party,”pursuant to CPLR § 3215 (f). Instead the previous motion contained an affidavit of merit by Marc Marino, who stated “I am the Authorized Signatory of Mooring Tax Asset Group, LLC, servicing agent for plaintiffs in the within action.” For reasons unknown to the Court, plaintiffs failed to provide any power of attorney authorizing Mooring Tax Asset Group, LLC to go forward with the instant foreclosure action. Therefore, in my December 7, 2010 decision and order, I denied without prejudice the original motion, for the appointment of a referee to compute and to amend the caption. I granted plaintiffs leave to comply with CPLR § 3215 (f) by providing an “affidavit made by the party,” whether by an officer of THE TRUST or someone with a valid power of attorney from THE TRUST, within sixty (60) days from my December 7, 2010 decision and order.

In the instant renewed motion, “[i]n an effort to comply with said [December 7, 2010] Decision and Order, Plaintiffs submit with the instant application the Affidavit of Marc Marino sworn to on December 21, 2010, and a relevant except from the Servicing Agreement, certified pursuant to CPLR § 2105 (Exhibit “E”) [¶ 11 of affirmation in support of motion].” Further, plaintiffs’ counsel alleges that this “establishes . . . Plaintiffs’ compliance with CPLR § 3215 (f), including Marc Marino’s personal knowledge of the facts and his authority to seek the relief requested herein.” Despite the arguments presented by plaintiffs’ counsel, it is clear that plaintiffs’ counsel failed to comply with my December 7, 2010 decision and order. Plaintiff’s submission is not in compliance with the requirements of CPLR § 3215 (f).

Discussion

CPLR § 3215 (f) states:

On any application for judgment by default, the applicant shall file proof of service of the summons and the complaint, or a summons and notice served pursuant to subdivision (b) of rule 305 or subdivision (a) of rule 316 of this chapter, and proof of the facts constituting the claim, the default and the amount due by affidavit made by the party. . . Where a verified complaint has been served, it may be used as the affidavit of the facts constituting the claim and the amount due; in such case, an affidavit as to the default shall be made by the party or the party’s attorney. [Emphasis added].

Plaintiffs continue to fail to submit “proof of the facts” in “an affidavit made by the party.” The renewed “affidavit of facts” was submitted by Marc Marino, “the Authorized Signatory of Mooring Tax Asset Group, LLC, servicing agent for plaintiffs in the within action.” Further, plaintiffs’ counsel provided the Court with snippets of the July 1, 2009 Amended and Restated Servicing Agreement between NYCTL 2009-A TRUST, Issuer, MOORING TAX ASSET GROUP, LLC, Servicer and THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, Paying Agent and Collateral Agent and Custodian, consisting of the cover paper, pages 16, 17, 18 and three signature pages. In my December 7, 2010 decision and order I stated that:

Mr. Marino must have, as plaintiffs’ agent, a valid power of attorney for that express purpose. Additionally, if a power of attorney is presented to this Court and it refers to servicing agreements, the Court needs a properly offered copy of the servicing agreements, to determine if the servicing agent may proceed on behalf of plaintiffs.

(EMC Mortg. Corp. v Batista, 15 Misc 3d 1143 (A), [Sup Ct, Kings County 2007]; Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. v Lewis, 14 Misc 3d 1201 (A) [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 2006]).

While it appears in the snippets, on page 17, that the Servicer might have authority to prepare affidavits in support of a foreclosure action, the Court, in following the requirements of CPLR § 3215 (f), needs an affidavit by an officer of THE TRUST or someone with a valid power of attorney from THE TRUST.

General Obligations Law § 5 — 1501 (10) defines “power of attorney” as “a written document by which a principal with capacity designates an agent to act on his or her behalf.” The selected portions presented of the July 1, 2009 Amended and Restated Servicing Agreement are not a power of attorney. Further, the Court wonders why plaintiffs’ counsel did not present the entire servicing agreement for review. Is there classified information in the document? Moreover, unlike a power of attorney, the parties executing the July 1, 2009 Amended and Restated Servicing Agreement did not sign under penalty of perjury before a notary public. One signatory, Jacqueline Kuhn, Assistant Treasurer, signed the document for THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, as Paying Agent and Collateral Agent and Custodian, and then acknowledged and agreed to the agreement for THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, as Indenture Trustee. It is comforting to know that Ms. Kuhn agreed with herself.

Therefore, the instant renewed motion for an order to appoint a referee to compute and amend the caption is denied without prejudice. The Court will grant THE TRUST a final opportunity for the appointment of a referee to compute and to amend the caption by its timely submission of an affidavit by either an officer of THE TRUST, or someone with a valid power of attorney from THE TRUST, possessing personal knowledge of the facts.

Plaintiffs’ counsel is reminded of the recent December 16, 2010 Court of Appeals decision, in Gibbs v St. Barnabas Hosp. (16 NY3d 74), which instructed, at *5:

As this Court has repeatedly emphasized, our court system is dependent on all parties engaged in litigation abiding by the rules of proper practice (see e.g. Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 748 [2004]; Kihl v Pfeffer, 94 NY2d 118 [1999]). The failure to comply with deadlines not only impairs the efficient functioning of the courts and the adjudication of claims, but it places jurists unnecessarily in the position of having to order enforcement remedies to respond to the delinquent conduct of members of the bar, often to the detriment of the litigants they represent. Chronic noncompliance with deadlines breeds disrespect for the dictates of the Civil Practice Law and Rules and a culture in which cases can linger for years without resolution.

Furthermore, those lawyers who engage their best efforts to comply with practice rules are also effectively penalized because they must somehow explain to their clients why they cannot secure timely responses from recalcitrant adversaries, which leads to the erosion of their attorney-client relationships as well. For these reasons, it is important to adhere to the position we declared a decade ago that “[i]f the credibility of court orders and the integrity of our judicial system are to be maintained, a litigant cannot ignore court orders with impunity [Emphasis added].” (Kihl, 94 NY2d at 123).

“Litigation cannot be conducted efficiently if deadlines are not taken seriously, and we make clear again, as we have several times before, thatdisregard of deadlines should not and will not be tolerated (see Miceli v State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 3 NY3d 725 [2004]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 748 [2004]; Kihl v Pfeffer, 94 NY2d 118 [1999]) [Emphasis added].” (Andrea v Arnone, Hedin, Casker, Kennedy and Drake, Architects and Landscape Architects, P.C., 5 NY3d 514, 521 [2005]).” As we made clear in Brill, and underscore here, statutory time frames —like court-order time frames (see Kihl v Pfeffer, 94 NY2d 118 [1999]) — are not options, they are requirements, to be taken seriously by the parties. Too many pages of the Reports, and hours of the courts, are taken up with deadlines that are simply ignored [Emphasis added].” (Miceli, 3 NY3d at 726-726).

Conclusion

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED, that the renewed motion of plaintiffs NYCTL 2009-A TRUST AND THE BANK OF NEW YORK AS COLLATERAL AGENT AND CUSTODIAN FOR THE NYCTL 2009-A TRUST, for an order appointing a referee to compute and amend the caption in a tax lien foreclosure action for the premises located at 273 Brighton Beach Avenue, Brooklyn, New York (Block 8672, Lot 31, County of Kings) is denied without prejudice; and it is further

ORDERED, that leave is granted to plaintiffs NYCTL 2009-A TRUST AND THE BANK OF NEW YORK AS COLLATERAL AGENT AND CUSTODIAN FOR THE NYCTL 2009-A TRUST, to renew its application, within sixty (60) days of this decision and order, for an order appointing a referee to compute and amend the caption in a tax lien foreclosure action for the premises located at 273 Brighton Beach Avenue, Brooklyn, New York (Block 8672, Lot 31, County of Kings), upon presentation to the Court of its compliance with the statutory requirements of CPLR § 3215 (f), with an affidavit of facts by someone with authority to execute such an affidavit; and it is further

ORDERED, the failure of plaintiffs NYCTL 2009-A TRUST AND THE BANK OF NEW YORK AS COLLATERAL AGENT AND CUSTODIAN FOR THE NYCTL 2009-A TRUST, to comply with the requirements of the preceding paragraph will result in the dismissal with prejudice of the instant tax lien foreclosure action for the premises located at 273 Brighton Beach Avenue, Brooklyn, New York (Block 8672, Lot 31, County of Kings).

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

[ipaper docId=51273406 access_key=key-neoqia8pou1bk1p1mj height=600 width=600 /]

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Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (1)

[MUST READ] NOTICE OF RECORDED MERS et al REMOVAL

[MUST READ] NOTICE OF RECORDED MERS et al REMOVAL


Will leave the comments for you all if you wish on these recorded documents from public records.

NOTE: It appears these were done by pro se individuals.

YOU MUST CONSULT WITH AN ATTORNEY.

REPEAT:

DO NOT try this without consulting an attorney.

Excerpt:

WHEREAS TRUSTOR/GRANTOR STATES AND DECLARES that, in recognition of certain pertinent facts not limited to the fact that the Mortgage contained NO SIGNATURES showing an acceptance of the document by any other party, the above-described Mortgage is, at best, an unconscionable contract and, for that reason alone, said, Mortgage is not an enforceable instrument; and since no other party signed th document, no party would have standing to assert that said party has been damaged in any way, or that a “default” occurred, or that a “breach” occurred; AND…

AND ANOTHER


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Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (6)

FIVE (5) NYSC CASES INVOLVING ROBO-SIGNER TAMARA PRICE

FIVE (5) NYSC CASES INVOLVING ROBO-SIGNER TAMARA PRICE


Excerpts:

#1 TP1_US BANK v. Ronnie Fishbein

The purported affidavit of Tamara Price, “Vice President of CITI RESIDENTIAL LENDING MORTGAGE, a
servicing agent who has power of attorney for the plaintiff,” does not contain a jurat, and there is
no language of oath or affirmation. The absence of a jurat renders the “affidavit” inadmissible as
there is no evidence that an oath or affirmation was taken (Pagano v Kingsbury, 182 AD2d 268
[ 2d Dept 19921; see also, People v Lieberman, 57 Misc 2d 1070 [Sup. Ct 19681). Moreover, the
purported power of attorney pursuant to which 1 he affidavit was assertedly prepared is not
annexed to the motion papers, and the submissions do not otherwise establish the authority of an
officer of plaintiffs servicer to execute the affidavit on behalf of plaintiff.

#2 TP2_ARGENT v. Olivera

The Affidavit of Merit and Amount Due was executed and notarized in San Bernadino, California
by Tamara Price and it is unaccompanied by a certificate of conformity and, therefore, cannot
provide evidence on this application. (see Daimler Chrysler Services North America LLC v,
Tammaro 14 Misc 34128 [A]; 2006 NY Slip OP 52506[U]* [App Term, 2Deptl; Bath Meaka1
Suppw, Inc. v. Allstate Indemnity Co., 13 Misc 3d142[A] 2006 NY Slip OP52273[U] *1-*2 [App
Term 2d Dept]).

#3 TP 3 DBNT v. Halverson

Moreover, the submissions do not reflect the authority of Tamara Price, a
self-described “authorized agent” of AMC Mortgage Services, hc., a
non-party to this mortgage foreclosure action, to represent plaintiff in this action, nor do the
submissions contain evidence that AMC Mortgage Services, Inc. is the attorney in fact for the
plaintiff in this action, as alleged in the affidavit of Ms. Price. Similarly, the assignment whereby
the mortgage was purportedly assigned to plaintiff was executed by Tamara Smith on behalf of
AMC Mortgage Services, Inc. as “authorized agent” for the assignor, without any evidence of
such agency. Accordingly, the motion is denied, with leave to renew upon proper submissions
that address the deficiencies identified herein.

#4 FROM JUDGE SCHACK

TP 4 JUDGE SCHACK_ DEUTSCHE v. Ezagui

According to plaintiffs application, defendant Ezaguis’ default began with the
nonpayment of principal and interest due on September 1,2006. Yet, more than five
months later, plaintiff DEUTSCHE BANK was idling to take an assignment of a
nonperforming loan from AMERIQUEST. Further, both assignor AMC, as Attorney in
Fact for AMERIQUEST, and assignee, DEUTSCHE BANK, have the same address, 505
City Parkway West, Orange, CA 92868. Plaintiffs “affidavit of amount due,” submitted
in support of the instant application for a default order of reference was executed by
Tamara Price, on February 16, 2007. Ms. Price states that “I am the Vice President for
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE OF
AMERIQUEST MORTGAGE SECURITIES, INC., ASSET-BACKED PASS
THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2004-R1( 1, UNDER THE POLING AND
SERVICING AGREEMENT DATED AS OF OCTOBER 1,2004, WITHOUT
RECOURSE (DEUTSCHE BANK.” However, i he February 7,2007 assignment from
AMERIQUEST, by AMC, its Attorney in Fact, is executed by Tamara Price, Vice
President of AMC. The Tamara Price signatures on both the February 7,2007 affidavit
and the February 16,2007 assignment are identical. Did Ms. Price change employers
from February 7,2007 to February 16,2007? The Court is concerned that there may be
fraud on the part of AMERIQUEST, or at least malfeasance. Before granting an
application for an order of reference, the Court requires an affidavit from Ms. Price,
describing her employment history for the past three years. Further, irrespective of her
employment history, Ms. Price must explain why DEUTSCHE BANK would purchase a
nonperforming loan from AMERIQUEST, and why DEUTSCHE BANK shares office

THE BIGGIE

#5 JUDGE SCHACK_DBNT v. CLOUDEN

In the instant action, Argent’s defective assignment to Deutsche Bank affects the
standing of Deutsche Bank to bring this action. The recorded assignment from Argent to
Deutsche Bank, made by “Tamara Price, as Authorized Agent” on behalf of “AMC
Mortgage Services Inc. as authorized agent,” lacks any power of attorney granted by
Argent to AMC Mortgage Services, Inc. and/or Tamara Price to act on its behalf. The
first mortgage assignment, from Grand Pacific Mortgage to Argent, was proper. It was
executed by the President of Grand Pacific Mortgage.

Continue Below…

[ipaper docId=41560174 access_key=key-1o4ekwtxjmbkpjujphp5 height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (3)

NY SUPREME COURT finds RECORDING DEFECTS |Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc., v. Lisser

NY SUPREME COURT finds RECORDING DEFECTS |Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc., v. Lisser


This is an action pursuant to RP APL Article 15 in which determination of its interest in real property, and to direct the Nassau County Clerk’s Office to accept a copy of a deed and mortgage for recording, insofar as the originals were misplaced and never recorded.

  • the Court seeks an explanation as to why the Affidavit of Merit is provided by a principal of the United General Title Insurance Company. What is the relationship of that company to Plaintiff? What authority does the affiant have to speak on behalf of Plaintiff? What is the basis of the affiant’s personal knowledge?
  • the Court questions whether or not MERS, as nominee for Am Trust Bank has standing to bring this action. A party who “claims an estate or interest in real property” may bring an action under Article 15 of the RPAPL. RPAPL ~1501(1). “The interest had by any mortgagee” is an interest in real property for purposes of bringing such an action. ~RPAPL1501(5). Is MERS a mortgagee for purposes of Article 15, or is MERS the mortgagee only for recording purposes? Can MERS bring this action without a Power of Attorney from the beneficial owner of the Mortgage?

Finally, the Court is reluctant to grant declaratory or other relief without evidence of the recorded interests in the Property from July 20 2007 and the current state of title.

[ipaper docId=36625524 access_key=key-27n9yhwldi5upd4adt9n height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in chain in title, conflict of interest, conspiracy, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosures, MERS, MERSCORP, mortgage, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC., note, Real Estate, sewer service, trustee, TrustsComments (0)


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