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MOORE v. MERS | NH Dist. Court “defendants do not possess the note, and it is enforcement of the note which the Moores seek to avoid”

MOORE v. MERS | NH Dist. Court “defendants do not possess the note, and it is enforcement of the note which the Moores seek to avoid”


Angela Jo Moore and M. Porter Moore
v.
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., et al.

Civil No. 10-cv-241-JL, Opinion No. 2012 DNH 021.

United States District Court, D. New Hampshire.

January 27, 2012.



MEMORANDUM ORDER

JOSEPH N. LAPLANTE, District Judge.

<EXCERPT>

After hearing oral argument, the court grants the motions in part and denies them in part. As explained in more detail below:

Count 4, a claim against defendant Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, is not dismissed. Contrary to Ocwen’s argument, the Moores have sufficiently pleaded that they suffered actual damages—in the form of emotional distress—as a result of its statutory violation.

Count 5, which makes claims against Ocwen and its co-defendant Harmon Law Offices under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, is not dismissed. Though Harmon argues that it was not engaged in “debt collection” subject to that statute, Harmon’s own representations in its letters to the Moores suggest otherwise.

Count 6, a claim for violations of the New Hampshire Unfair, Deceptive or Unreasonable Collection Practices Act, is dismissed as to Harmon because the Moores have not pleaded facts stating a plausible claim for relief under that statute.

Count 8, a claim for fraud, is dismissed as to Harmon because the Moores have not pleaded their claim against it with sufficient specificity. Count 8 is also dismissed insofar as it claims fraud in the assignment of the Moores’ mortgage because they did not rely on the alleged fraud. The Moores’ claim for “modification fraud” against Ocwen and its co-defendant Saxon Mortgage Services, Inc., however, is pleaded with the particularity required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9 and may proceed.

Count 11, a claim for intentional and negligent misrepresentation against all defendants, is dismissed as to Harmon and its co-defendants Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Holding Corp., and Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2007-HE5. The claims against those defendants are not pleaded with the particularity required of fraud claims by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9. The Moores’ claim against Saxon and Ocwen for intentional and negligent misrepresentation are, however, sufficiently pleaded and may proceed.

Finally, Count 17, a claim for “avoidance of note” against “all defendants claiming to own the note and mortgage,” is not dismissed. Though defendants argue that under New Hampshire law, they need not possess the Moores’ promissory note in order to foreclose on the associated mortgage, possession of the note is a necessary prerequisite of a claim to enforce it, which is what the Moores seek to avoid through this count.

C. Foreclosure proceedings and removal

In late January 2010, Ocwen sent the Moores a Reinstatement Quote informing them that the total amount due by April 1, 2010 to reinstate their loan was $79,151.46. Not long thereafter, on February 20, 2010, Harmon sent Mr. and Mrs. Moore each a separate Notice of Mortgage Foreclosure Sale. The Notices informed the Moores that a foreclosure sale of their property would take place on March 18, 2010, on behalf of defendant Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for the registered holders of Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2007-HE5 Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-HE5. MERS had assigned the Moores’ mortgage to Deutsche Bank on February 18, 2010, in an assignment reciting an effective date of November 16, 2009.[3]

[…]

M. Count 17 — Avoidance of note

Finally, Count 17 of the complaint makes a claim for “avoidance of note” against “all defendants claiming to own the note [and] mortgage.” In support of this claim, the Moores allege that the defendants “have been unable or unwilling to provide the Plaintiffs with evidence that they hold the original of the Note or Mortgage,” that “[a]ctual possession of the original of the note is a necessary legal prerequisite to enforcement of the Note,” and that “[i]n the absence of an ability to show that [they possess] the original of the Note” none of the defendants “has a right to enforce the same.” Third Am. Compl. (document no. 47) at ¶¶ 184-86. While New Hampshire courts have not recognized a cause of action for “avoidance of note”[18] and a federal court sitting in diversity should not “create new doctrines expanding state law,” Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., Inc., 2010 DNH 164, at 16, the court interprets this cause of action as seeking a declaratory judgment that the defendants may not enforce the note against the Moores.[19] The only parties that have moved to dismiss this claim (and the only parties who appear to “claim to own the note and mortgage”) are Deutsche Bank and the Morgan Stanley defendants. They argue that under New Hampshire law, they need not possess the Note in order to foreclose on the mortgage.

Even if this argument is correct (and the court need not and does not reach that issue at this time), it is beside the point. On its face, Count 17 does not assert that defendants may not enforce the mortgage by foreclosing, but that they may not enforce the note—e.g., by attempting to collect the amount due under it. Under New Hampshire law, possession of a negotiable instrument such as the note is (with limited exceptions not invoked here) a prerequisite to its enforcement. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 382-A:3-301. As the Moores have sufficiently alleged that the defendants do not possess the note, and it is enforcement of the note which the Moores seek to avoid, the motions to dismiss Count 17 are denied.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, WMC’s motion to dismiss[20] is GRANTED. The remaining defendants’ motions to dismiss[21] are each GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.  ……..

Accordingly, counts 4 and 6 may proceed against Ocwen; count 5 against Ocwen and Harmon; counts 8 and 11 against Saxon and Ocwen; and count 17 against Deutsche Bank and the Morgan Stanley defendants.

SO ORDERED.

[1] The third amended complaint does not identify this person any more specifically.

[2] A “jumbo loan,” also known as a non-conforming loan, “is a loan that exceeds Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s loan limits.” U.S. Department of Housing & Urban Development, Glossary, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/housing/ sfh/buying/glossary (last visited Jan. 23, 2012).

[3] The assignment, which was filed with the Carroll County registry of deeds on February 18, 2010, was signed by Juan Pardo as Vice President of MERS. The Moores allege that Pardo is not an employee of MERS, but of Ocwen, though they do not allege that Pardo lacked authority from MERS to assign the mortgage.

[4] The complaint alleges that on the date of the scheduled sale, an auctioneer arrived at the Moores’ property and informed them that the foreclosure sale had been rescheduled for April 20, 2010. But no foreclosure sale has actually taken place, and the Moores confirmed at oral argument that they continue to occupy the property.

[5] These claims include agency/respondeat superior (Count 1), breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count 7), origination fraud (Count 8), negligence (Count 10), intentional and negligent misrepresentation (Count 11), breach of assumed duty (Count 12), breach of fiduciary duty (Count 13), civil conspiracy (Count 14), and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count 15).

[6] TILA also contains a three-year statute of limitations for a claim seeking rescission of the loan. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f). Here, the only relief the Moores seek for the alleged TILA violations in Counts 2 and 3 are damages and attorneys’ fees and costs, see Third Am. Compl. (document no. 47) at 20, ¶ 86, so the limitations period for rescission claims is not at issue.

[7] This view is extremely charitable to the Moores, given the court of appeals’ holding in Salois. There, the court held that because the loan documents contained all the information necessary for the plaintiffs to discover that they had been misled about the terms of their loan, and because “one who signs a writing that is designed to serve as a legal document is presumed to know its contents,” the “plaintiffs were on notice of their claims when they signed their loan documents.” 128 F.3d at 26 & n.10. In evaluating the Moores’ claims, this court has assumed, dubitante, that the loan documents themselves did not place the Moores on notice of their claims.

[8] Although this allegation appears in a separate count of the complaint, because the Moores are pro se the court reads their complaint “with an extra degree of solicitude.” Hecking v. Barger, 2010 DNH 032, at 4. The allegation specifically ties the Moores’ emotional distress to Ocwen’s alleged conduct—which includes its failure to respond to their letters—and to ignore it simply because it does not appear in the RESPA count itself would elevate form over substance. Indeed, in their objections to the motions to dismiss the Moores maintain that their emotional distress stemmed in part from Ocwen’s RESPA violations. See, e.g., Pls.’ Objection to Morgan Stanley Mot. to Dismiss (document no. 72) at 7-8, ¶ 24.

[9] The court may consider this letter, which is expressly referenced in the complaint and forms part of the basis for the Moores’ claims, without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Giragosian v. Ryan, 547 F.3d 59, 65 (1st Cir. 2008).

[10] Given the dearth of case law on the UDUCPA, these FDCPA cases are also useful in interpreting the UDUCPA “because [the FDCPA] contains provisions similar to the [UDUCPA].” Gilroy, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 136.

[11] There is some support for Harmon’s position, see, e.g., Beadle, 2005 DNH 016, at 7-12 (McAuliffe, J.) (concluding that attorneys who conducted foreclosure proceedings were not subject to FDCPA); see also Speleos v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, No. 10-cv-11503-NMG, 2011 WL 4899982, *5-6 (D. Mass. Oct. 14, 2011) (same), but the case law is not uniform on this point. One court of appeals has held that the FDCPA may apply to efforts to recoup a debt through foreclosure, expressing concern that to hold otherwise “would create an enormous loophole in the Act immunizing any debt from coverage if that debt happened to be secured by a real property interest and foreclosure proceedings were used to collect the debt.” Wilson v. Draper & Goldberg, P.L.L.C., 443 F.3d 373, 376 (4th Cir. 2006); cf. also Piper v. Portnoff Law Assocs., Ltd., 396 F.3d 227, 235 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he text of the FDCPA evidences a Congressional intent to extend the protection of the Act to consumer defendants in suits brought to enforce liens.”).

[12] Deutsche Bank and one of the Morgan Stanley defendants, Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Holding Corp., also argue that the Moores did not allege a contract with either of them. The complaint alleges, however, that at various relevant times both defendants owned or purported to own the Moores’ mortgage.

[13] Again, because the SPAs are expressly referenced in the complaint and form part of the basis for the Moores’ claims, the court may consider them in ruling on this motion to dismiss. See supra n.6. Both SPAs are also posted for public review at the Treasury Department’s website: Saxon’s SPA is available at http://tinyurl.com/SaxonSPA (last visited Jan. 23, 2012); Ocwen’s at http://tinyurl.com/OcwenSPA (last visited Jan. 23, 2012).

[14] In so holding, the court joins the overwhelming majority of courts to have considered whether borrowers are the intended third-party beneficiaries of SPAs. See Alpino, 2011 WL 1564114 at *3; Speleos, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 308.

[15] The apparent absurdity of the Moores’ attempt to sue MERS for an allegedly fraudulent transfer of its own interest in the mortgage has not escaped the court’s attention. The parties did not address this issue in their memoranda, though, so the court does not address it here.

[16] Claims for negligence—like claims for breach of an assumed duty or a fiduciary duty—”rest primarily upon a violation of some duty owed by the offender to the injured party.” Ahrendt v. Granite Bank, 144 N.H. 308, 314 (1999).

[17] It is worth noting here that New Hampshire does not permit an action for negligence to be premised upon the violation of a duty imposed by statute unless a similar duty existed at common law. Stillwater Condo. Ass’n v. Town of Salem, 140 N.H. 505, 507 (1995). The Moores have not argued that their negligence claims are premised on alleged RESPA, FDCPA, or UDUCPA violations, so the court need not address whether the duties imposed by those statutes existed at common law so as to permit a negligence claim against any of the defendants.

[18] In the only publicly available opinions that so much as mention this cause of action—in New Hampshire or elsewhere—the courts never reached the question of whether such a cause of action exists because the plaintiff conceded that his claim for avoidance of the note could not survive the defendants’ motion to dismiss. See Dillon v. Select Portfolio Servicing, 630 F.3d 75, 83 (1st Cir. 2011); Dillon v. Select Portfolio Servicing, 2008 DNH 019, at 20. The court observes that in typical legal usage, “avoidance” refers to the power of a bankruptcy trustee under the Bankruptcy Code to undo “some prebankruptcy transfers of the debtor’s property and most postbankruptcy transfers of estate property.” 1 David G. Epstein et al., Bankruptcy § 6-1, at 498 (1992).

[19] The court here reads the Moores’ complaint with an extra degree of solicitude. See supra n.8.

[20] Document no. 80.

[21] Documents nos. 52, 53, 54, 60, 70, and 71.

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New Hampshire AG Michael Delaney probing some big banks’ foreclosure practices

New Hampshire AG Michael Delaney probing some big banks’ foreclosure practices


Nashua Telegraph-

Attorney General Michael Delaney confirmed he’s actively investigating the claims of Milford Executive Councilor David Wheeler that major national banks fraudulently moved to foreclose upon several of his constituents.

Wheeler said he’s talked to four homeowners who tried without success to reach “catch-up agreements” with Bank of America and Wells Fargo to get up to date on their home mortgage payments.

“I want the state taking an active role to try and make sure these homeowners in danger of losing all they have, by no fault of their own, are made whole,” Wheeler said in an interview.

[NASHUA TELEGRAPH]

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[VIDEO] NH Supreme Court Oral Argument of DEUTSCHE BANK v. KEVLIK

[VIDEO] NH Supreme Court Oral Argument of DEUTSCHE BANK v. KEVLIK


Via: Mike Dillon

Excerpt:

Judge: I went through the material that you attached and I was very confused about IndyMac’s role and how we ended up with a foreclosure deed that didn’t reflect IndyMac’s role…can you explain?

Attorney Sheridan for the Kevlik’s  replies… There’s nothing in the record that explains MERS’ role! […] No power to assign… What happened to OneWest bank???

Go on to the link to video below…

  • 2010-0249

[View Video/Audio]

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co.
OM
(John T. Precobb)
(15 min.)
v. James Kevlik & a.
William C. Sheridan
(15 min.)

After you watch the video come back and read…

New Hampshire Supreme Court Reversal “Plaintiff has not carried its burden to show ownership of the property” DEUTSCHE BANK v. KEVLIK

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New Hampshire Supreme Court Reversal “Plaintiff has not carried its burden to show ownership of the property” DEUTSCHE BANK v. KEVLIK

New Hampshire Supreme Court Reversal “Plaintiff has not carried its burden to show ownership of the property” DEUTSCHE BANK v. KEVLIK


DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY

v.

JAMES KEVLIK & a.

No. 2010-249.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Argued: February 17, 2011.

Opinion Issued: April 28, 2011.

Orlans Moran, PLLC, of Boston, Massachusetts (John T. Precobb on the brief and orally), for the plaintiff.

William C. Sheridan, of Londonderry, on the brief and orally, for the defendants.

CONBOY, J.

The defendants, James Kevlik, Catherine Kevlik, and Patricia Durgin, appeal an order of the Derry District Court (Coughlin, J.) denying their motion to dismiss and granting judgment to the plaintiff, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, in its action for possession of real estate located in Chester. See RSA 540:12 (2007). We reverse.

The following facts are supported by the record or are undisputed. Through its attorney, the plaintiff filed a landlord and tenant writ, alleging that: (1) the plaintiff was entitled to possession of the property; (2) the defendants had been provided with an eviction notice; and (3) the defendants had refused to deliver the property. In the eviction notice, attached to its writ, the plaintiff alleged that it was the current owner of the property “as a result of the foreclosure of a [m]ortgage, which foreclosure sale was held at the [p]roperty on June 12, 2009.” On the day of the merits hearing, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss asserting that a foreclosure sale had never taken place.

At the merits hearing, the Kevliks appeared without counsel. Defendant Durgin did not appear. The plaintiff’s attorney appeared without his client and proffered copies of the landlord and tenant writ with an “affidavit of ownership,” a foreclosure deed with an attached statutory affidavit, and a mortgage assignment, all of which the trial court allowed into evidence over the defendants’ objection. The assignment, dated on January 25, 2009, indicates a transfer of a mortgage executed by defendant Patricia Durgin from Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (as nominee of SouthStar Funding, LLC) to IndyMac Bank F.S.B. The July 20, 2009 foreclosure deed purports to describe a sale of the property from One West Bank, F.S.B., to the plaintiff at a June 12, 2009 foreclosure auction.

At the hearing, the plaintiff’s attorney admitted that the foreclosure and assignment documents were not certified and that he could not attest to their authenticity. Plaintiff’s attorney acknowledged that his firm had not handled the foreclosure sale and that he did not know what the mortgage payments had been. Until the hearing, he was not aware that the Kevliks were related to Patricia Durgin, the mortgagor, and did not know what, if any, rental agreement they had. When asked by the trial court to name a reasonable rent for the property, plaintiff’s attorney suggested five hundred dollars per month. When questioned further on that point by the trial court, he admitted he was “not from this area.”

The Kevliks argued that they had videotape evidence that no foreclosure sale had occurred. The trial court, however, refused to consider this evidence, characterizing the defendants’ argument as contesting title to the property. The trial court told the Kevliks that they would have to pay “recognizance” to the plaintiff of $348.84 per week pending their entry of an action in superior court.

The Kevliks told the trial court they did not wish to pursue the matter in superior court, but requested a continuance in order to consult with counsel. Plaintiff’s attorney did not oppose this request, stating that, “in the interest of fairness, they should have an attorney here.” However, the trial court denied the motion to continue as well as the motion to dismiss, and took the matter under advisement. Subsequently, the trial court ordered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. In its order, the trial court also stated that, “One week after the [h]earing on the [m]erits . . .[,] the tenants paid $348.84 into the Court and the Court accepted the payment. However, the Court accepted said payment with regards to an appeal to the New Hampshire Supreme Court regarding the Landlord/Tenant action and not a plea of title transfer to the Superior Court.”

The defendants moved for reconsideration, again asserting that a foreclosure sale had not, in fact, taken place. They explained that the auctioneer arrived thirty minutes late for the scheduled sale, sat in his car for five minutes, and then drove away. No buyer or anyone else appeared. The defendants argued that the plaintiff could not have purchased the mortgage at the foreclosure sale and therefore did not have standing to evict the defendants. The court denied this motion.

On appeal, the defendants argue that the plaintiff failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that it was the owner of the property, and, thus, the plaintiff is not entitled to judgment. Specifically, the defendants maintain that the documents submitted by the plaintiff’s attorney were insufficient to establish ownership because the evidence was based on “incompetent and unauthenticated hearsay.” Further, the defendants assert, the trial court should have permitted them to challenge the plaintiff’s “offer[s] of proof.”

The issue before us presents a question of statutory interpretation. We are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole. Kenison v. Dubois, 152 N.H. 448, 451 (2005). We first examine the language of the statute, and, where possible, we ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings to the words used. Id. We review the trial court’s interpretation of a statute de novo. Id.

RSA 540:17 (2007) provides:

If the defendant shall plead a plea which may bring in question the title to the demanded premises he shall forthwith recognize to the plaintiff, with sufficient sureties, in such sum as the court shall order, to enter his action in the superior court for the county at the next return day, and to prosecute his action in said court, and to pay all rent then due or which shall become due pending the action, and the damages and costs which may be awarded against him.

Although the statute requires title issues to be resolved in superior court, it does not relieve a possessory plaintiff of the obligation to establish ownership of the subject property. Possessory actions are authorized by RSA 540:12, which provides that, “[t]he owner, lessor, or purchaser at a mortgage foreclosure sale of any [property] may recover possession thereof from a lessee, occupant, mortgagor, or other person in possession . . . after notice in writing to quit the same . . . .” In Liam Hooksett, LLC v. Boynton, 157 N.H. 625 (2008), we addressed the required ownership element of a possessory action brought pursuant to RSA 540:12. In that case, the defendants asserted that an individual other than the plaintiff actually owned the property. Liam Hooksett, 157 N.H. at 627. At the hearing, the plaintiff’s manager appeared on its behalf, but she did not testify that the plaintiff was the owner of the property. Id. at 628. Rather, she presented to the court an “Affidavit of Ownership/Tenancy” that purported to “certify” that the plaintiff was the owner, but the document was not notarized, signed under oath, or admitted into evidence. Id. On that record, we agreed that the plaintiff had not carried its burden to demonstrate that it was the actual owner of the property. Id. “The plaintiff filed a writ seeking possession of the property. Thus, to prevail in this action, the plaintiff was required to prove that it was the `owner, lessor, or purchaser at a mortgage foreclosure sale’ of the property.” Id. The same is true here.

Here, the plaintiff’s attorney presented, as proof of ownership, uncertified copies of a foreclosure deed and affidavit and a mortgage assignment. He did not, however, have first-hand knowledge as to the authenticity of the documents and presented no other proof of their authenticity. The rules of evidence provide that a copy of a public record is admissible only when it is either: (1) certified as correct by a custodian or other authorized person; or (2) accompanied by the testimony of a witness who has compared it to the original and found it to be correct. See N.H. R. Ev. 902(4), 1005. Because the plaintiff satisfied neither requirement, the trial court erred in admitting and relying upon these documents.

Plaintiff’s attorney also submitted a copy of the landlord and tenant writ and attachments, including an “affidavit of ownership.” This “affidavit” stated that plaintiff’s attorney was “certifying” that the plaintiff was the owner of the subject property, but the purported affidavit was not notarized or signed under oath. Further, the initials next to the name on the signature line indicate that it was actually signed by another individual, “C.M.S.” Thus, it was error for the trial court to admit and rely on that document. See Liam Hooksett, 157 N.H. at 628.

On this record, we conclude that the plaintiff has not carried its burden to show ownership of the property. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s decision to grant judgment to the plaintiff.

We note the limited nature of our holdings herein. Had the plaintiff proffered authenticated documents, with supporting testimony if necessary, regarding the foreclosure sale, or other proof of its ownership of the property, the trial court could have properly ruled on the issue of the plaintiff’s entitlement to possession because the defendants stated they did not wish to file a title action in superior court. The defendants would not have been able to pursue their challenge to the plaintiff’s title in the district court. See Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Cataldo, 161 N.H. 135 (2010).

Reversed.

DALIANIS, C.J., and DUGGAN, HICKS and LYNN, JJ., concurred.

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NH BK Court Concludes WELLS FARGO “Violated TILA, Rescind Transaction, Award Damages” IN RE SOUSA

NH BK Court Concludes WELLS FARGO “Violated TILA, Rescind Transaction, Award Damages” IN RE SOUSA


Excerpt:


IV. CONCLUSION
The Court concludes that Wells Fargo violated TILA and the Sousas were therefore entitled to rescind the Transaction in July 2007. As a result of the violation and the rescission, Wells Fargo’s proof of claim is disallowed and the Sousas are entitled to damages. The Sousas are required to tender to Wells Fargo the actual money lent to them less any finance charges and payments they made to Wells Fargo on the loan. Accordingly, the Court shall grant Claim 1, deny Claim 2, deny as moot Claim 3, grant Claim 4, and grant Claim 5. Furthermore, the Court will grant Count I and Count II of Wells Fargo’s cross-claim against the Ginn Firm. This opinion constitutes the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7052. The Court will issue a separate order and judgment consistent with this opinion.
[ipaper docId=50795322 access_key=key-2ipl4g9y76zej4m6cavk height=600 width=600 /]
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New Hampshire couple get Permanent Injunction on their mortgage

New Hampshire couple get Permanent Injunction on their mortgage


Many thanks to Foreclosure Fraud Fighter MIKE DILLON!

Couple Fighting Foreclosure Gets Day In Court

Manchester Homeowner Helps Couple Navigate Paperwork

POSTED: 5:41 pm EDT July 13, 2010

SANDWICH, N.H. —
A couple in Sandwich who nearly lost their home to foreclosure is gaining traction in their fight against what they said is fraudulent action by the companies trying to take their home.

In March, a last-minute court order forced a foreclosure auctioneer to drive away on auction day without selling the home of Porter and Angie Moore.

While many foreclosures are a legitimate result of a down economy, lost jobs and homeowners taking on more debt than they can manage, the Moores said that’s not the case for them. They said they may have enough proof that their home shouldn’t be foreclosed to get them their day in court.

The Moores said one problem with the foreclosure proceedings is that it’s unclear who owns their bank note. The confusion has made it difficult to appeal, and they had almost given up before they met Mike Dillon.

Dillon, of Manchester, said he’s no expert in foreclosures, but he’s an angry homeowner in the middle of a 10-year battle to keep a bank from foreclosing on his home. He heard the Moores’ story and gave them some advice on how to fight back.

“I was able to share some information with Porter as far as what was going on with his case, just based on his paperwork, on his assignment of mortgage filed at the Registry of Deeds,” Dillon said.



Continue Reading…WMUR

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Posted in conflict of interest, conspiracy, deutsche bank, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, injunction, lawsuit, MERS, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC., Mortgage Foreclosure Fraud, Ocwen, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD, TROComments (1)


GARY DUBIN LAW OFFICES FORECLOSURE DEFENSE HAWAII and CALIFORNIA
Kenneth Eric Trent, www.ForeclosureDestroyer.com

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