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DEUTSCHE BANK TRUST CO. AMERICAS v. PICON | NYSC Vacates JDGMT “ASMT Mortgage from MERS to Plaintiff, under New York law, definitively did not transfer ownership of the Note to Plaintiff”

DEUTSCHE BANK TRUST CO. AMERICAS v. PICON | NYSC Vacates JDGMT “ASMT Mortgage from MERS to Plaintiff, under New York law, definitively did not transfer ownership of the Note to Plaintiff”


RePOST due to a possible hack.

Don’t be a fool. I can assure you, the AG’s that are investigating have this info.

~

2011 NY Slip Op 31747(U)

DEUTSCHE BANK TRUST COMPANY AMERICAS AS TRUSTEE, 9350 Waxie Way San Diego, CA 92123 Plaintiff,

v.

DANILO PICON, MAGALYS T. PICON, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., AS NOMINEE FOR FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF ARIZONA, NEW YORK CITY ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL BOARD, NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT ADJUDICATION BUREAU, NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION AND FINANCE,
JOHN DANIELS, YVETTE “DOE” Defendants.

No. 1070/08, Motion Seq. No. 4.

Supreme Court, Queens County.

June 22, 2011.

BERNICE D. SIEGAL, Judge.

EXCERPT:

Once the issue of standing is raised by the Defendant, the burden is placed on the Plaintiff to prove, as in the instant matter, that it owns the Note underlying the action and the validity of any associated assignment (TPZ Corp. v Dabbs, 25 AD3d 787, 789 [2d Dep’t 2006]). A demonstration by the Plaintiff that it owns the Mortgage, without a showing that it also owns the Note is a nullity and any action for foreclosure based on the ownership of the mortgage alone must fail (Kluge v Fugazy, 145 AD2d 537, 538 [2d Dept 1988]). This result is mandated because the mortgage is “but an incident to the debt which it is intended to secure,” and without more, it provides the holder with no actionable interest on which to commence a foreclosure action (Merritt v Bartholick, 36 NY 44, 45 [1867].

While a written assignment or physical transfer of the Note is sufficient to result in an implicit transfer of an associated Mortgage, an assignment of the Mortgage, without an explicit assignment of the Note, will not result in an assignment of that Note (U.S. Bank, N.A. v Collymore, 68 AD3d 752, 754 [2d Dept 2009]).

In the case before us, Plaintiff only proffers evidence that the mortgage was transferred to the Plaintiff (through MERS, as nominee for Firs National Bank of Arizona [“Arizona”]) via an Assignment of Mortgage dated January 7, 2008. It does not, critically, provide evidence that the Note itself was transferred to the Plaintiff.

The only documents the Plaintiff submits in connection with the issue of the ownership and assignment of the Note are a copy of the original Adjustable Rate Note Agreement between Arizona and the Defendant dated March 8, 2006, and a copy of an undated allonge between Arizona and the First National Bank of Nevada [“Nevada”], seemingly transferring Arizona’s interest in the Note to Nevada. Although not dated, it is only logical for the court to assume that the allonge was executed prior to any purported assignment of the Note to the Plaintiff. If we were to assume otherwise, it would imply that Arizona was assigning to Nevada a Note that it did not own (since such Note had already been purportedly assigned to the Plaintiff).

Critically, Plaintiff does not provide documents demonstrating that the Note itself was assigned to Plaintiff, such as from MERS (as nominee for Arizona), from Arizona itself, or from a third-party such as Nevada.

The only interpretation the court can adduce from such evidence is that although it is possible that Nevada may own both the Mortgage and the Note since a valid transfer of a Note (in this case through the undated allonge), effectively transfers an associated Mortgage, the assignment of the Mortgage from MERS (as nominee for Arizona) to Plaintiff, under New York law, definitively did not transfer ownership of the Note to Plaintiff.

Since the allonge indicates that the Note is the property of Nevada and not Arizona, Arizona was never in a position to assign the Note to Plaintiff. Therefore, even if Plaintiff holds the Mortgage, without evidence that it also owns the Note, it lacks standing to pursue the foreclosure action at bar. Consequently, Plaintiff’s acquisition of the Mortgage without the underlying Note is insufficient to sustain a foreclosure action and Defendant’s motion to dismiss based on the Plaintiff’s lack of standing is granted.

[…]

The other issues raised in Defendant’s Order to Show Cause including the 1) motion to dismiss due to a failure to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211, and 2) a motion to vacate the default judgment and allow an answer under CPLR 317 are deemed moot as they are subsumed or deemed irrelevant in light of this court’s decision above. Based on the forgoing, it is

ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to vacate the default judgment and dismiss the action is granted; it is further

ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to have the case dismissed with prejudice due to fraud is denied.

The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of the court.

[…]

[ipaper docId=59328003 access_key=key-118ad3g85p29i38ysxi2 height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (1)

DEUTSCHE BANK TRUST CO. AMERICAS v. PICON | NYSC Vacates JDGMT “ASMT Mortgage from MERS to Plaintiff, under New York law, definitively did not transfer ownership of the Note to Plaintiff”

DEUTSCHE BANK TRUST CO. AMERICAS v. PICON | NYSC Vacates JDGMT “ASMT Mortgage from MERS to Plaintiff, under New York law, definitively did not transfer ownership of the Note to Plaintiff”


[PDF].DEUTSCHE v PICON w RePOST since the content was possibly hacked

2011 NY Slip Op 31747(U)

DEUTSCHE BANK TRUST COMPANY AMERICAS AS TRUSTEE, 9350 Waxie Way San Diego, CA 92123 Plaintiff,

v.

DANILO PICON, MAGALYS T. PICON, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., AS NOMINEE FOR FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF ARIZONA, NEW YORK CITY ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL BOARD, NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT ADJUDICATION BUREAU, NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION AND FINANCE,
JOHN DANIELS, YVETTE “DOE” Defendants.

No. 1070/08, Motion Seq. No. 4.

Supreme Court, Queens County.

June 22, 2011.

BERNICE D. SIEGAL, Judge.

EXCERPT:

Once the issue of standing is raised by the Defendant, the burden is placed on the Plaintiff to prove, as in the instant matter, that it owns the Note underlying the action and the validity of any associated assignment (TPZ Corp. v Dabbs, 25 AD3d 787, 789 [2d Dep’t 2006]). A demonstration by the Plaintiff that it owns the Mortgage, without a showing that it also owns the Note is a nullity and any action for foreclosure based on the ownership of the mortgage alone must fail (Kluge v Fugazy, 145 AD2d 537, 538 [2d Dept 1988]). This result is mandated because the mortgage is “but an incident to the debt which it is intended to secure,” and without more, it provides the holder with no actionable interest on which to commence a foreclosure action (Merritt v Bartholick, 36 NY 44, 45 [1867].

While a written assignment or physical transfer of the Note is sufficient to result in an implicit transfer of an associated Mortgage, an assignment of the Mortgage, without an explicit assignment of the Note, will not result in an assignment of that Note (U.S. Bank, N.A. v Collymore, 68 AD3d 752, 754 [2d Dept 2009]).

In the case before us, Plaintiff only proffers evidence that the mortgage was transferred to the Plaintiff (through MERS, as nominee for Firs National Bank of Arizona [“Arizona”]) via an Assignment of Mortgage dated January 7, 2008. It does not, critically, provide evidence that the Note itself was transferred to the Plaintiff.

The only documents the Plaintiff submits in connection with the issue of the ownership and assignment of the Note are a copy of the original Adjustable Rate Note Agreement between Arizona and the Defendant dated March 8, 2006, and a copy of an undated allonge between Arizona and the First National Bank of Nevada [“Nevada”], seemingly transferring Arizona’s interest in the Note to Nevada. Although not dated, it is only logical for the court to assume that the allonge was executed prior to any purported assignment of the Note to the Plaintiff. If we were to assume otherwise, it would imply that Arizona was assigning to Nevada a Note that it did not own (since such Note had already been purportedly assigned to the Plaintiff).

Critically, Plaintiff does not provide documents demonstrating that the Note itself was assigned to Plaintiff, such as from MERS (as nominee for Arizona), from Arizona itself, or from a third-party such as Nevada.

The only interpretation the court can adduce from such evidence is that although it is possible that Nevada may own both the Mortgage and the Note since a valid transfer of a Note (in this case through the undated allonge), effectively transfers an associated Mortgage, the assignment of the Mortgage from MERS (as nominee for Arizona) to Plaintiff, under New York law, definitively did not transfer ownership of the Note to Plaintiff.

Since the allonge indicates that the Note is the property of Nevada and not Arizona, Arizona was never in a position to assign the Note to Plaintiff. Therefore, even if Plaintiff holds the Mortgage, without evidence that it also owns the Note, it lacks standing to pursue the foreclosure action at bar. Consequently, Plaintiff’s acquisition of the Mortgage without the underlying Note is insufficient to sustain a foreclosure action and Defendant’s motion to dismiss based on the Plaintiff’s lack of standing is granted.

[…]

The other issues raised in Defendant’s Order to Show Cause including the 1) motion to dismiss due to a failure to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211, and 2) a motion to vacate the default judgment and allow an answer under CPLR 317 are deemed moot as they are subsumed or deemed irrelevant in light of this court’s decision above. Based on the forgoing, it is

ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to vacate the default judgment and dismiss the action is granted; it is further

ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to have the case dismissed with prejudice due to fraud is denied.

The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of the court.

[…]

[ipaper docId=59328003 access_key=key-118ad3g85p29i38ysxi2 height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (4)

NY Appeals Court “Nail and Mail, Referee’s Deed, Insufficent” HOME LOAN SERVS., INC. v. Moskowitz

NY Appeals Court “Nail and Mail, Referee’s Deed, Insufficent” HOME LOAN SERVS., INC. v. Moskowitz


2011 NY Slip Op 21051

HOME LOAN SERVICES, INC. SUCCESSOR BY MERGER TO NATIONAL CITY HOME LOAN SERVICES, Respondent,
v.
FRANCES MOSKOWITZ, “JOHN DOE” AND “JANE DOE,” Occupants, AND
JACOB MARKOWITZ AND SARAH MARKOWITZ, Appellants.

2009-1851 KC.Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department.

Decided February 14, 2011.PRESENT: PESCE, P.J., WESTON and RIOS, JJ.

Prior to commencing this summary proceeding, petitioner served a 10-day notice to quit upon occupants, together with a certified copy of the referee’s deed, by “nail and mail” service, after four attempts at personal service had been made at different times on different days. Occupants Jacob Markowitz and Sarah Markowitz (appellants) moved to dismiss the petition as against them on the ground that attaching a copy of the referee’s deed to a 10-day notice to quit served by “nail and mail” is not sufficient to satisfy the requirement of RPAPL 713 (5) that a deed be “exhibited” to the respondent. The Civil Court denied appellants’ motion. We reverse.

RPAPL 713 provides in pertinent part:

“A special proceeding may be maintained under this article after a ten-day notice to quit has been served upon the respondent in the manner prescribed in section 735, upon the following grounds:

. . .

5. The property has been sold in foreclosure and either the deed delivered pursuant to such sale, or a copy of such deed, certified as provided in the civil practice law and rules, has been exhibited to him.”

While this statute provides that a notice to quit may be served in the same manner as a notice of petition and petition, it does not make the same provision for the referee’s deed. Instead, the statute specifically requires that the deed be “exhibited” to the respondent. In our view, and in light of the strong policy prohibiting unlawful evictions (see generally Bill Jacket, L. 1981, ch. 467), attaching a copy of the referee’s deed to a 10-day notice to quit served by “nail and mail” was insufficient to satisfy the requirement of exhibition of the deed pursuant to RPAPL 713 (5) (see Colony Mtge. Bankers, 192 Misc 2d 704 [Sup Ct, Westchester County 2002]; but see Novastar Mtge., Inc. v LaForge, 12 Misc 3d 1179[A], 2006 NY Slip Op 51306[U] [Sup Ct, Greene County 2006] [discussing a writ of assistance]; Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Resnik, 24 Misc 3d 1238[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51793[U] [Nassau Dist Ct 2009]; GRP/AG REO 2004-1, LLC v Friedman, 8 Misc 3d 317, 318-319 [Just Ct, Town of Ramapo, Rockland County 2005]). Accordingly, the order is reversed and appellants’ motion to dismiss the petition as against them is granted.

Pesce, P.J., Weston and Rios, JJ., concur.

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



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