Posted on 11 May 2011.
Posted on 18 March 2011.
Q Have you reviewed the Pooling and
Servicing Agreement in this case?
A No, I haven’t.
Q It’s my understanding I believe it was
objected to being produced. So up till today, have
you reviewed any document that allows you to speak
on behalf of Bank of New York?
A I haven’t.
Q Have you spoken to anyone at Bank of New
York to confirm that you are allowed to speak on
behalf of a separate corporate entity here today?
Q So as you sit here, do you know whether
you have the authority from the Bank of New York to
testify to these matters and to bind the Bank of New
York as a corporation?
Q Okay. And let me go back before I get
into the question one. You are not an officer of
the Bank of New York, correct?
A That’s correct.
Q You’re not a director of the Bank of New
Q You’re not a managing agent of the Bank of
Q What I’m getting at is the ownership of
the actual note and mortgage, not the servicing, but
the ownership. Do you have any other document that
would either confirm or contest whether
NationsCredit Mortgage Corporation of Florida owned
this note and mortgage in order to assign it as set
forth in Exhibit 2?
A Not that I know of
Q So again, do you have anything at all that
suggests that NationsCredit Home Equity Services
Corporation ever owned this note?
A I don’t.
Q Do you agree that the Bank of New York
lacked standing to file the 2004 case?
A Can you be more specific on your question?
Q Do you agree that the Bank of New York did
not own the note and mortgage at the time it filed
the 2004 case?
A Well, I can say that there’s no recorded
document showing that date.
Q Do you agree that the lack of standing was clear?
Q Why not?
A Because of the overlapping of dates and
the obvious issues with the assignment chain, it’s not clear that it was straightforward.
[ipaper docId=51043744 access_key=key-17hvwa3aj1m8rwatd7fb height=600 width=600 /]
Posted on 03 December 2010.
Written Testimony of
James A. Kowalski, Jr., Esquire
Law Offices of James A. Kowalski, Jr., PL
Committee On The Judiciary
United States House of Representatives
“Foreclosed Justice: Causes and Effects of the Foreclosure Crisis“
The focus on speed is part of the business model for the servicers. As those of us
who have litigated these cases for years now, and as all of us now know as a result of the
robo-signing scandals, most of the servicers use “Signing Officers” – rows of individuals
who sit before reams of documents prepared by others, with not even a modest wink at
the business records exception to the hearsay rule, and who sign the documents only to
have the document transported across the business campus to rows of notaries, who attest
to the signatures without ever complying with the basics of their state’s notary laws.
Some of the mill firms now employ their own “Signing OffIcers” – individuals
who will sign Assignments of Mortgage on behalf of the owners of the pool, supposedly
authorized by the servicer pursuant to the Pooling and Servicing Agreement which
applies to the particular securitized trust. The documents are prepared entirely by the
On occasion, the law fIrm employees also sign the AffIdavits in support of
motions for summary judgment fIled by the law fIrms – here, the lawyer’s offIce staff
becomes the material witness for the lawyer’s client.
Continue reading below…
[ipaper docId=44593724 access_key=key-r8depdmlv6a3blz9a5u height=600 width=600 /]© 2010-17 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.
Posted on 10 November 2010.
The following is an article from the November 11, 2010 issue of Rolling Stone. This issue is available Friday on newsstands, as well online in Rolling Stone’s digital archive. Click here to subscribe.
The foreclosure lawyers down in Jacksonville had warned me, but I was skeptical. They told me the state of Florida had created a special super-high-speed housing court with a specific mandate to rubber-stamp the legally dicey foreclosures by corporate mortgage pushers like Deutsche Bank and JP Morgan Chase. This “rocket docket,” as it is called in town, is presided over by retired judges who seem to have no clue about the insanely complex financial instruments they are ruling on — securitized mortgages and labyrinthine derivative deals of a type that didn’t even exist when most of them were active members of the bench. Their stated mission isn’t to decide right and wrong, but to clear cases and blast human beings out of their homes with ultimate velocity. They certainly have no incentive to penetrate the profound criminal mysteries of the great American mortgage bubble of the 2000s, perhaps the most complex Ponzi scheme in human history — an epic mountain range of corporate fraud in which Wall Street megabanks conspired first to collect huge numbers of subprime mortgages, then to unload them on unsuspecting third parties like pensions, trade unions and insurance companies (and, ultimately, you and me, as taxpayers) in the guise of AAA-rated investments. Selling lead as gold, shit as Chanel No. 5, was the essence of the booming international fraud scheme that created most all of these now-failing home mortgages.