Indymac | FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA

Tag Archive | "indymac"

Onewest Bank v Cumberbatch | NYSC “failed to offer any evidence to demonstrate the establishment of a FDIC receivership in connection with IndyMac Bank, F.S.B.”

Onewest Bank v Cumberbatch | NYSC “failed to offer any evidence to demonstrate the establishment of a FDIC receivership in connection with IndyMac Bank, F.S.B.”


NEW YORK SUPREME COURT – QUEENS COUNTY

ONEWEST BANK, FSB as successor in
Interest to INDYMAC BANK, FSB
Plaintiff,

-against-

KATHLEEN CUMBERBATCH,
Defendant.

EXCERPT:

A plaintiff establishes that it has standing where it demonstrates that it is both the
holder or assignee of the subject mortgage and the holder or assignee of the underlying note
(see Bank of N.Y. v Silverberg, 86 AD3d 274 [2011]; U.S. Bank, N.A. v Collymore,
68 AD3d 752 [2011]).

The subject mortgage names IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. as the lender,3 and the note is
made payable to IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. and does not bear any endorsement. Plaintiff
OneWest alleged in its complaint, and when seeking the judgment, that it is the “holder” of
the subject mortgage and underlying note. It makes no claim that it is a holder of the subject
mortgage and note based upon the assignment4 offered by defendant Cumberbatch in support
of her motion. Rather, plaintiff OneWest asserts that IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. went into
receivership and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), as receiver, transferred
the assets of IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. to IndyMac Federal Bank, FSB on July 11, 2008.

Plaintiff OneWest also asserts that all assets of IndyMac Federal Bank, FSB, including the
subject note, thereafter were sold on March 19, 2009 to OneWest.

Plaintiff OneWest, however, has failed to offer any evidence to demonstrate the
establishment of a FDIC receivership in connection with IndyMac Bank, F.S.B., the note was
part of the assets of such FDIC receivership, or the FDIC, as receiver, transferred such assets
to IndyMac Federal Bank, FSB. Furthermore, the copy of the bill of sale presented by
plaintiff OneWest indicates that the FDIC, as receiver of IndyMac Federal Bank, FSB, sold
only those “Assets,” as defined in a “Servicing Business Asset Purchase Agreement” dated
March 19, 2009, to OneWest. Plaintiff OneWest has not presented evidence of the
establishment of an FDIC receivership in connection with IndyMac Federal Bank, FSB, or
a copy of the March 19, 2009 agreement (or relevant parts thereof), to show the subject note
was one of the assets sold to OneWest. Nor has plaintiff OneWest presented any evidence
that it was in physical possession of the note at the time of the commencement of the action
and the note was endorsed in its favor or in blank (see UCC § 1-201[20] [“ ‘[h]older’ means
a person who is in possession of a document of title or an instrument or an investment
certificated security drawn, issued or indorsed to him or to his order or to bearer or in
blank”]). Under these circumstances, defendant Cumberbatch has presented a possible
meritorious defense based upon lack of standing (see generally Bank of N.Y. v Silverberg,
86 AD3d 274 [2011]; U.S. Bank, N.A. v Adrian Collymore, 68 AD3d 752 [2009]).

[…]

[ipaper docId=87906988 access_key=key-ktxoawq9wfn7mmgct6h height=600 width=600 /]

 

© 2010-15 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (2)

Onewest Bank, FSB v Galli | NYSC “ASMT between WMC & WAMU a nullity and therefore the plaintiff must establish how it procured the notes and mortgages”

Onewest Bank, FSB v Galli | NYSC “ASMT between WMC & WAMU a nullity and therefore the plaintiff must establish how it procured the notes and mortgages”


SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF RICHMOND

ONEWEST BANK, FSB, as successor in interest to
INDYMAC BANK, FSB,

Plaintiff

against

JOHN A. GALLI,
GEORGANN GALLI, and
“JOHN DOE #1″ through “JOHN DOE #10″,
inclusive the last ten names being fictitious and unknown
to the plaintiff, the persons or parties intended being the persons,
tenants, occupants, or corporations, if any, having or claiming
an interest in or lien upon the mortgaged premises described
in the complaint

Defendants

The plaintiff moves for partial summary judgment dismissing the defendants’ third,
fourth, sixth, seventh, eighth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth
affirmative defenses. In opposition, the defendants cross-move for summary judgment arguing
that the plaintiff lacks standing; lacks capacity to commence and maintain this action; failed to
elect remedies pursuant to RPAPL § 1301; and failed to provide each defendant with the
requisite acceleration notices. The plaintiff’s motion is denied, and the defendants’ motion is
granted.

Facts

This is an action to foreclose real property known as 231 Douglas Road, Staten Island,
New York. On August 26, 2003 John A. Galli and Georgann Galli executed a promissory note
and mortgage in favor of WMC Mortgage Corp. (“WMC”) in the amount of $550,000. The
mortgage contained the following language concerning the business entity known as Mortgage
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”):

I understand and agree that MERS holds legal title to the rights
granted by me in this Security Instrument, but, if necessary to
comply with law or custom, MERS (as nominee for Lender and
Lender’s successor and assigns) has the right:
(A) to exercise any or all of those rights, including, but not
limited to, the right to foreclose and sell the Property; and
(B) to take any action required of Lender including, but not
limited to, releasing and canceling this Security Instrument.

In addition the Promissory Note submitted in connection with these motions contain an
undated Allonge to Promissory Note stating: “Pay to the Order of INDYMAC BANK, FSB
Without Recourse WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK”. On October 22, 2004, MERS
purportedly assigned this mortgage as nominee for WMC to Washington Mutual Bank, FA.

On November 16, 2004 the defendants executed a promissory note and mortgage in favor
of Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. in the amount of $457,050.77. Once again, the Promissory
Note submitted for consideration in connection with these motions contains an undated Allonge
to Promissory Note that states “Pay to the Order of IndyMac Bank, FSB Without Recourse
Washington Mutual Bank”. Simultaneously, the defendants executed a Consolidation, Extension
and Modification Agreement (“CEMA”) with Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. on the same day.
Exhibit A of the CEMA lists the 2003 WMC mortgage executed by the defendants as well as the
concurrently executed Washington Mutual Bank, FA mortgage as being consolidated, extended
and modified by this agreement. However, WMC was not a signatory to the November 16, 2004
CEMA.

Two years later on April 5, 2006, MERS as nominee for Washington Mutual Bank, FA
purportedly assigned the 2003 WMC mortgage and the 2004 Washington Mutual Bank, FA
mortgage to Washington Mutual Bank. A second assignment on the same day had Washington
Mutual Bank, F/K/A Washington Mutual Bank, FA purportedly made the following assignments
to MERS as nomminee for Indymac Bank, FSB:

Mortgage dated 08/26/2003 made by John A. Galli and Georgeann
Galli, Husband and Wife to Mortgage Electronic Registration
Systems, Inc. as nominee for WMC Mortgage Corporation in the
principal sum of $550,000.00 and recorded on 01/28/2004, in the
office of the CLERK of the County of RICHMOND, in Book
17109 of Mortgages, page 242.

ASSIGNMENT FROM: Mortgage Electronic Registration
Systems, Inc. as nominee for WMC Mortgage Corporation to
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as nominee for
Washington Mutual Bank, FA dated 10/22/2004 recorded
6/2/2005.

ASSIGNMENT FROM: Mortgage Electronic Registration
Systems, Inc. As nominee for Washington Mutual Bank FA to
Washington Mutual Bank dated 4/4/2006 to be recorded
concurrently.

2nd Mortgage dated 11/16/2004 recorded 6/2/2005 in document
control 48484 between John A. Galli and Georgeann Galli, aka
Georgeann Galli husband and wife and Washington Mutual Bank,
FA in the amount of $457,050.77

Consolidation, Extension, and Modification Agreement made by
John A. Galli and Georgeann Galli, aka Georeann Galli husband
and wife and Washington mutual Bank, FA dated 11/16/2004
recorded 6/2/2005 in document number 48485 consolidated
mortgages 1 & 2 to form a single lien in the amount of
$1,000,000.00

On April 14, 2006 the defendants executed another Promissory Note and Mortgage this
time in favor of IndyMac Bank, FSB in the amount of $143,595.50. Concurrently with the third
mortgage, the defendants executed a Consolidation, Extension and Modification Agreement in
favor of IndyMac Bank, FSB. Once again, neither WMC, nor Washington Mutual Bank f/k/a
Washington Mutual Bank, FA were signatories to this second CEMA.

According to the affidavit of Brian Burnett, an Assistant Vice President of OneWest
Bank, FSB (“OneWest”) that on or about July 11, 2008, IndyMac Bank, FSB failed and went into
receivership. Upon entering receivership it changed its name to IndyMac Federal Bank, FSB and
on or about March 19, 2009 merged with OneWest. According to Mr. Burnett, OneWest
acquired all of IndyMac’s assets. However, notably absent from the record is a copy of the
purchase and assumption agreement between OneWest and IndyMac.

On or about September 1, 2008 the defendants allegedly defaulted on the notes and
mortgages.

The plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment dismissing the defendants third,
fourth, sixth, seventh, eighth, tenth, twelfth, thirteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth affirmative
defenses. The defendant cross moves to dismiss the plaintiff’s action arguing that the plaintiff:
1) lacks standing; 2) lacks capacity to commence and maintain this action; and 3) failed to elect
remedies pursuant to RPAPL § 1301. In opposition to the defendants’ cross motion, the plaintiff
submits attorney certified copies of the relevant notes and mortgages encumbering 231 Douglas
Road, Staten Island, New York.

Discussion

The court will address the defendants’ cross-motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to
CPLR § 3211(a). The record in this case shows that MERS assigned the mortgage several times
before the original notes and mortgages found their way to the plaintiff in this action. Here the
court must determine whether the plaintiff in a foreclosure action must establish a clear chain of
title of the relevant notes and mortgages prior to commencing the foreclosure proceeding. This
court concludes that a foreclosing plaintiff must establish how it came to possess the relevant
notes and mortgages it wishes to foreclose.

On June 7, 2011 the Appellate Division, Second Department issued its decision in the
Bank of New York v. Silverberg case.1 In that case the court was called to resolve the issue of,
“. . . whether a party has standing to commence a foreclosure action when that party’s
assignor–in this case, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. . . . was listed as a nominee
and mortgagee for the purposes of recording, but was never the actual holder or assignee of the
underlying notes.”2 The Appellate Division, Second Department held that such a party did not
have standing to commence a foreclosure action.

In a mortgage foreclosure action, a plaintiff must be both the holder or assignee of the
mortgage and the underlying note at the time the action is commenced.3 Here, as was the case in
Silverberg, MERS purportedly transferred the WMC mortgage to Washington Mutual Bank, FA
in connection with a consolidation as nominee. In turn, MERS as the nominee of Washington
Mutual Bank, FA assigned the mortgage to Washington Mutual Bank. Subsequently,
Washington Mutual Bank assigned the mortgages, prior assignments and CEMAs to MERS as
nominee of IndyMac Bank, FSB. The Appellate Division, Second Department found in
Silverberg that “. . . as ‘nominee,’ MERS’s authority was limited to only those powers which
were specifically conferred to it and authorized by the lender.” Here, as was the case in
Silverberg, MERS lacked the authority to assign the underlying notes. Consequently, how the
plaintiff came into possession of the mortgages and notes in this case is suspect.

The plaintiff cites a multitude of cases purportedly holding that possession of the physical
notes establishes its standing to commence this action.4 But each of these cases predate the
Appellate Division, Second Department’s decision in Silverberg. Consequently, this court finds
that the initial transfer between WMC Mortgage and Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. is a nullity
and therefore the plaintiff must establish how it procured the notes and mortgages for 231
Douglas Road, Staten Island, New York.

Given this court’s decision on the cross-motion the plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment is denied.

Accordingly, it is hereby:

ORDERED, that John A. Galli and Georgann Galli’s cross-motion dismissing the
plaintiff’s complaint is granted and the complaint is dismissed without prejudice; and it is further
ORDERED, that the plaintiff’s motion to foreclose is denied.

ENTER,
DATED: March 23, 2012

Joseph J. Maltese
Justice of the Supreme Court

[ipaper docId=87290268 access_key=key-19tmms9jprudutzdbinb height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-15 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (1)

[Video] Oral Arguments; Washington Supreme Court, BAIN v. MERS and Selkowitz v. Litton Loan Servicing

[Video] Oral Arguments; Washington Supreme Court, BAIN v. MERS and Selkowitz v. Litton Loan Servicing


Counsels for Kristin Bain & Kevin Selkowitz attorneys Melissa Huelsman and Richard Jones (great voice) did a FANTASTIC, OUTSTANDING JOB!!!

BOMBSHELL: Listen and watch when they ask MERS’ counsel “Who is the holder of the note”? HE DOES NOT KNOW & CANNOT ANSWER!

Oral arguments: Bain v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Sys, et al and Selkowitz v. Little “Litton” Loan Servicing, LP, et al. (May a party be a lawful beneficiary under WA’s Deed of Trust Act if it never held the promissory note secured by the deed of trust?)

© 2010-15 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (2)

State Supreme Court to rule on legality of mortgage recording system (MERS)

State Supreme Court to rule on legality of mortgage recording system (MERS)


KOMO NEWS-

For the first time, a local homeowner’s fight to keep a house is headed to the state Supreme Court.

What happens there will effect thousands of people who’ve taken out mortgage loans in the past 10 years. If you own property, you need to know about a system known as MERS.

MERS stands for Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems. It was created by the real estate finance industry to simplify the process of transferring mortgage loans.

But struggling homeowners complain MERS also conceals the true note holder when your mortgage is sold to investors.

Kristen Bain’s comfortable condo in Tukwila is tied up in the MERS debate. First, she had to sue her mortgage broker and the lender for predatory lending and failure to provide proper documentation as required by law.

[KOMO NEWS]

© 2010-15 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (0)

Amicus Brief of Washington State Attorney General Robert M. McKenna – Bain v. Metropolitan Mortgage and Selkowitz v. Litton Loan Servicing LP “MERS”

Amicus Brief of Washington State Attorney General Robert M. McKenna – Bain v. Metropolitan Mortgage and Selkowitz v. Litton Loan Servicing LP “MERS”


SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

KRISTIN BAIN

vs

METROPOLITAN MORTGAGE GROUP INC. et al

[ipaper docId=81662045 access_key=key-24v4kd0j2bq2hhng7wkd height=600 width=600 /]

 

© 2010-15 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (0)

Bain v. MERS (Wash. Supreme Court) Amicus of Atty Shawn Newman on behalf of Organization United for Reform (OUR) – Washington

Bain v. MERS (Wash. Supreme Court) Amicus of Atty Shawn Newman on behalf of Organization United for Reform (OUR) – Washington


Bain v. Metropolitan is set for hearing on March 15. This is an amicus from attorney Shawn Timothy Newman for Organization United for Reform (OUR) – Washington.

[ipaper docId=81423312 access_key=key-1mn29xvrh9m4blp1cj9v height=600 width=600 /]

 

© 2010-15 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (0)

IN RE: MILLER | 10th Cir. Court of Appeals Reverses 10th Cir. BAP “Under the U.C.C. … Deutsche Bank failed to show that it is the current holder of IndyMac’s Note”

IN RE: MILLER | 10th Cir. Court of Appeals Reverses 10th Cir. BAP “Under the U.C.C. … Deutsche Bank failed to show that it is the current holder of IndyMac’s Note”


 United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

IN RE MILLER
In re: MARK STANLEY MILLER, also known as A Moment to Remember Photo & Video, also known as Illusion Studioz; JAMILEH MILLER, Debtors. MARK STANLEY MILLER; JAMILEH MILLER, Appellants,
v.
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, Appellee.

 No. 11-1232.

 February 1, 2012.

EXCERPT:

3. The BAP Appeal

The Millers appealed the bankruptcy court’s order granting relief from stay to the BAP. The BAP began its decision by noting that “[t]he details surrounding the assignment to Deutsche Bank are not part of the record on appeal.” Aplee. Supp. App. at 6 n.8. In particular, the record submitted to the BAP did not even contain a copy of the Note, much less the original.

In its decision, the BAP spent little time discussing the adequacy of proof that Deutsche Bank was in possession of the original Note, and the legal consequences thereof. Instead, the BAP relied on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). Though noting that the bankruptcy court had not expressly mentioned this doctrine, it concluded that the court had relied on the state court’s decision on the standing issue. The BAP further concluded that in light of this doctrine, which generally prohibits federal courts from entertaining suits by parties who have lost in state court and who seek review of state court decisions in federal court, “the bankruptcy court properly declined to revisit the state court’s decision that Deutsche Bank was an `interested person’ entitled to a Rule 120 order of sale.” Aplee. Supp. App. at 16. Armed with the state-court decision finding Deutsche Bank had standing to proceed with the foreclosure, the BAP reached a further conclusion that Deutsche Bank had standing to seek relief from stay.

[…]

We conclude that neither the Rooker-Feldman doctrine nor issue preclusion applies to prevent a federal court from determining whether Deutsche Bank is a “party in interest” entitled to seek relief from stay. Because the BAP incorrectly relied on Rooker-Feldman and because neither the bankruptcy court nor the BAP conducted a proper statutory standing analysis under § 362(d), we could simply stop our analysis here and remand for a further consideration of the standing issue. The parties, however, have presented arguments on the merits concerning standing, and the sufficiency of Deutsche Bank’s showing concerning standing in this case is a legal issue that can be resolved on appeal. We will therefore now proceed to discuss why Deutsche Bank has failed to demonstrate its standing as a “party in interest.”

4. Deutsche Bank’s Status as “Party in Interest”

We return to the key question: is Deutsche Bank a “creditor” of the Millers with standing to seek relief from stay? To answer this question, we turn to the Bankruptcy Code. According to the Bankruptcy Code, a “creditor” includes an “entity that has a claim against the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(a). A “claim” is a “right to payment.” Id. § 101(5)(A).

Does Deutsche Bank have a “right to payment” from the Millers? In examining this question, we begin with the principle that “[w]ithin the context of a bankruptcy proceeding, state law governs the determination of property rights.” In re Mims, 438 B.R. 52, 56 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010). We must therefore turn to Colorado law, in particular that state’s version of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C. or Code).

We ask first how Colorado law would classify the Note signed by the Millers. Under Colorado law, a promise or order such as the Note is payable “to order” “if it is payable (i) to the order of an identified person or (ii) to an identified person or order.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-3-109(b). The Note at issue here is payable “to the order of Lender. Lender is IndyMac Bank, F.S.B., a federally chartered savings bank[.]” Aplt. App., Vol. I at 14. Thus, the Note is payable to the “order” of IndyMac Bank under § 4-3-109(b).

But “[a]n instrument payable to an identified person [such as IndyMac Bank] may become payable to bearer if it is indorsed in blank pursuant to section 4-3-205(b).” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-3-109(c).7 Section 4-3-205(b) provides that “[i]f an indorsement is made by the holder of an instrument and it is not a special indorsement, it is a `blank indorsement.’ When indorsed in blank, an instrument becomes payable to bearer and may be negotiated by transfer of possession alone until specifically indorsed.” (emphasis added).

Deutsche Bank presented evidence that IndyMac had indorsed the Note in blank. Is proof of this indorsement sufficient under the U.C.C. requirements to establish Deutsche Bank as the successor holder of the note? As we shall see, it is not, because Deutsche Bank must also prove it has possession of the Note.

The U.C.C. identifies the requirements for “negotiation” of a note, that is, for “transfer of possession . . . to a person who thereby becomes its holder.” Id. § 4-3-201(a). This statute provides that “if an instrument is payable to an identified person, negotiation requires transfer of possession of the instrument and its indorsement by the holder.” Id. § 4-3-201(b) (emphasis added). The Official Commentary to section 4-3-201 explains that negotiation “always requires a change in possession of the instrument because nobody can be a holder without possessing the instrument, either directly or through an agent.” (emphasis added). See also Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-1-201(b)(20)(A) (defining “holder” of negotiable instrument as “person in possession” of it).

“Possession is an element designed to prevent two or more claimants from qualifying as holders who could take free of the other party’s claim of ownership.” Georg v. Metro Fixtures Contractors, Inc., 178 P.3d 1209, 1213 (Colo. 2008) (citation omitted).8 “With rare exceptions, those claiming to be holders have physical ownership of the instrument in question.” Id. (citation omitted).9 In the case of bearer paper such as the Note, physical possession is essential because it constitutes proof of ownership and a consequent right to payment.10

While Deutsche Bank has offered proof that IndyMac assigned the Note in blank, it elicited no proof that Deutsche Bank in fact obtained physical possession of the original Note from IndyMac, either voluntarily or otherwise.11 Under the U.C.C. requirements, Deutsche Bank has therefore failed to show that it is the current holder of the Note.

Colorado law does not limit enforcement of an obligation to a holder who received the instrument through negotiation. A note may also be enforced by a transferee. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-3-203. “Transfer of an instrument, whether or not the transfer is a negotiation, vests in the transferee any right of the transferor to enforce the instrument.” Id. § 4-3-203(b). But transfer requires delivery: “An instrument is transferred when it is delivered by a person other than its issuer for the purpose of giving to the person receiving delivery the right to enforce the instrument.” Id. § 4-3-203(a) (emphasis added). “Delivery” with respect to an instrument “means voluntary transfer of possession” of the instrument. Id. § 4-1-201(14). Because Deutsche Bank has failed to prove transfer of possession of the original Note it has failed to establish its status as a transferee.

Deutsche Bank also argues that it has standing because under Colorado law it can initiate a public trustee foreclosure without producing the original Note. It cites Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-38-101(1), which provides that the “holder of an evidence of debt” may initiate a foreclosure. An “evidence of debt” includes a promissory note such as the Note at issue here. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-38-100.3(8). Under certain circumstances, the “holder of an evidence of debt” can file a public trustee foreclosure without supplying the original note. See id. § 38-38-101(b)(I)-(III).

But this argument depends, first, on Deutsche Bank’s ability to show that it is a “holder of an evidence of debt.” Article 38 defines a “holder of an evidence of debt” as a person “in actual possession of” or “entitled to enforce an evidence of debt.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-38-100.3(10) (emphasis added). Section 38-38-100.3(10) lists a number of presumptive holders of a debt presumed to be the “holder of an evidence of debt.” Each of these requires possession of the evidence of debt, which Deutsche Bank has thus far failed to demonstrate. See id. § 38-38-100.3(10)(a)-(d).

Deutsche Bank appears to argue that notwithstanding its failure to prove it has actual possession of the Note, it qualifies as a “person entitled to enforce an evidence of debt” under § 38-38-100.3(10) and thus is a “holder of an evidence of debt” because (1) it holds a copy of the Note indorsed in blank and (2) it can initiate a foreclosure without presenting the original Note to the public trustee. Deutsche Bank contends that it is a “qualified holder,” see id. § 38-38-100.3(21), that would be permitted under Colorado law to foreclose without presenting the original note, see id. § 38-38-101(B)(II). But foreclosure under this provision requires either the bank or its attorney to execute a statement “citing the paragraph of section 38-38-100.3(20) under which the holder claims to be a qualified holder and certifying or stating that the copy of the evidence of debt is true and correct” and that the bank agrees to “indemnify and defend any person liable for repayment of any portion of the original evidence of debt in the event that the original evidence of debt is presented for payment to the extent of any amount, other than the amount of a deficiency remaining under the evidence of debt after deducting the amount bid at sale, and any person who sustains a loss due to any title defect that results from reliance upon a sale at which the original evidence of debt was not presented.” Id. §§ 38-38-101(b)(II), 38-38-101(2)(a). There is no evidence that Deutsche Bank or its attorneys have executed such a certification or intend to do so. We therefore reject Deutsche Bank’s claim to standing founded on these statutes.

5. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the evidence is insufficient as it currently stands to establish that Deutsche Bank is a “party in interest” entitled to seek relief from stay. The bankruptcy court therefore abused its discretion by granting Deutsche Bank relief from stay.

The Millers raise a number of other objections to the proceedings and orders in the bankruptcy court and the BAP but we need not reach any of them in light of the remand we now order. The judgment of the BAP is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED to the BAP with instructions to remand to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. The Millers’ motion for leave to file a supplemental appendix is DENIED.

[ipaper docId=80237945 access_key=key-n7zuye8tx987y499mhx height=600 width=600 /]

 

© 2010-15 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (1)

Ex-IndyMac Officials Blast FDIC Over Documentation Retention – WSJ

Ex-IndyMac Officials Blast FDIC Over Documentation Retention – WSJ


Lawyers for the IndyMac executives say the FDIC is required by law to retain all the records of a failed bank it takes over for six years.

WSJ-

A pair of former IndyMac executives being sued by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. are accusing the bank regulator of a “stunning display of incompetence” for failing to preserve some evidence when it took over receivership of the failed bank.

Lawyers for onetime midlevel IndyMac executives Kenneth Shellem and Richard Koon say the FDIC failed to collect and preserve documents and emails after taking receivership of IndyMac following the bank’s 2008 collapse, leaving the pair handicapped in mounting their defense.

[WALL STREET JOURNAL]

© 2010-15 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (1)

Ex-Countrywide/ IndyMac Angelo Mozilo Puts Up House For Sale For $3.4 Million

Ex-Countrywide/ IndyMac Angelo Mozilo Puts Up House For Sale For $3.4 Million


The Real Estalker is one of my favorite blogs and actually was one of a few that inspired me to create this site. Please check it out!

And Yes, we know Mr. Mozilo, this is just one of a few hundred you call “primary residence”. If walls could only talk in this house.

The Real Estalker-

mansion located behind the guarded gates of the well-heeled Sherwood County Clubowned as per property records–and much to our pearl clutching flabbergast–by the vastly-loathed and utterly disgraced former Countrywide Financial CEO and COB Angelo Mozilo who has the architecturally conventional (mc)mansion listed on the open market with an asking price of $3,400,000.

Mister Mozilo, a mortgage industry maverick who co-founded Countrywide in 1969 and nearly 30 years later co-founded the dramatically collapsed IndyMac Bank (now OneWest Bank), is widely regarded as one of the more Machiavellian sub-mortgage-men who helped march the U.S. (and global) economy straight off the cliff in the mid-Noughts. While Mister Mozilo and his mortgage-making army pushed and pedaled sub-prime home loans he talked up the then-flourishing company’s stock price, earned hundreds of millions in compensation, and cashed out more than $400,000,000 worth of Countrywide stock, a large portion of it during the last couple of years of his tattered tenure as the king of Countrywide.

[THE REAL ESTALKER]

listing photo: Prudential California Realty

© 2010-15 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (0)

Financial Finger-Pointing Turns to Regulators

Financial Finger-Pointing Turns to Regulators


By and

In the whodunit of the financial crisis, Wall Street executives have pointed the blame at all kinds of parties — consumers who lied on their mortgage applications, investors who demanded access to risky mortgage bonds, and policy makers who kept interest rates low and failed to predict a housing market collapse.

But a new defense has been mounted by a bank executive: my regulator told me to do it.

[NEW YORK TIMES]

© 2010-15 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (1)

Foreclosure mill getting peppered, Linked to the first criminal case brought against alleged robo-signers

Foreclosure mill getting peppered, Linked to the first criminal case brought against alleged robo-signers


In case you wish to read the transcripts from this story check it out: FULL DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF LENDER PROCESSING SERVICES “LPS” SCOTT A. WALTER PART 1 &

FULL DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF LENDER PROCESSING SERVICES SCOTT A. WALTER PART 2 “STEVEN J. BAUM, P.C.”, “O. MAX GARDNER”, “US TRUSTEE”

NY POST-

The stink is growing around the state’s largest foreclosure mill.

The Steven J. Baum law firm, which last month agreed to pay a $2 million fine to settle a federal probe into bogus foreclosure case filings, has now been barred by federal mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from getting any more referrals of home loan defaults owned by either company.

In addition, the 70-lawyer firm is linked to the first criminal case brought against alleged robo-signers.

The criminal case was brought by the Nevada attorney general against two title officers — Gary Trafford and Gerri Sheppard — charged with forging signatures on 606 foreclosure-related mortgage documents.

.
© 2010-15 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (0)

LEVITIN | Standing to Invoke PSAs as a Foreclosure Defense

LEVITIN | Standing to Invoke PSAs as a Foreclosure Defense


Make sure you catch who signed the assignment of mortgage down below… but ERICA JOHNSON-SECK!

Credit Slips-

A major issue arising in foreclosure defense cases is the homeowner’s ability to challenge the foreclosing party’s standing based on noncompliance with securitization documentation. Several courts have held that there is no standing to challenge standing on this basis, most recently the 1st Circuit BAP in Correia v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Company. (See Abigail Caplovitz Field’s cogent critique of that ruling here.) The basis for these courts’ rulings is that the homeowner isn’t a party to the PSA, so the homeowner has no standing to raise noncompliance with the PSA.

I think that view is plain wrong.  It fails to understand what PSA-based foreclosure defenses are about and to recognize a pair of real and cognizable Article III interests of homeowners:  the right to be protected against duplicative claims and the right to litigate against the real party in interest because of settlement incentives and abilities.

[CREDIT SLIPS]

ERICA JOHNSON-SECK

INDYMAC FED. BANK FSB v. GARCIA | NYSC Vacates Default JDGMT “Robo-Signer, Fraudulent Erica Johnson-Seck Affidavit”

Full Deposition Of ERICA JOHNSON SECK Former Fannie Mae, WSB Employee

[NYSC] Judge Finds Issues With “NOTE AMOUNTS”, Robo Signer “ROGER STOTTS” Affidavit: ONEWEST v. GARCIA

[NYSC] JUDGE SCHACK TAKES ON ROBO-SIGNER ERICA JOHNSON SECK: DEUTSCHE BANK v. MARAJ (1) (64.591)

[NYSC] JUDGE SCHACK TAKES ON ROBO-SIGNER ERICA JOHNSON SECK: DEUTSCHE BANK v. HARRIS (2) (70.24)

[NYSC] JUDGE SCHACK TAKES ON ROBO-SIGNER ERICA JOHNSON SECK: ONEWEST BANK v. DRAYTON (3)

Wall Street Journal: Foreclosure? Not So Fast

ONEWEST BANK ‘ERICA JOHNSON-SECK’ ‘Not more than 30 seconds’ to sign each foreclosure document

INDYMAC’S/ONEWEST FORECLOSURE ‘ROBO-SIGNERS’ SIGNED 24,000 MORTGAGE DOCUMENTS MONTHLY

WM_Deposition_of_Erica_Johnson-Seck_Part_I

Deposition_of_Erica_Johnson-Seck_Part_II

Thank you to Mike Dillon for pointing and providing this crucial piece below

[ipaper docId=61704717 access_key=key-16i71qddg7jbehlsos7g height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-15 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (1)

COMPLAINT | FDIC v. MICHAEL PERRY “Former IndyMac CEO Sued For $600 Million”

COMPLAINT | FDIC v. MICHAEL PERRY “Former IndyMac CEO Sued For $600 Million”


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

F’EDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION, AS RECEIVER FOR
INDYMAC BANK, F.S.B.
,
Plaintiff,

V.

MICHAEL PERRY,
Defendant.

[…]

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

3. Between at least April and October 2007, defendant Michael Perry (“Perry”), chief executive officer (“CEO”) of IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. (“Bank” or “IndyMac”), negligently permitted, and presided over, and failed to suspend, limit or stop, the production of a pool of more than $ 10 billion in risþ, residential loans intended for sale into a secondary market that at the time was admitted by Perry to be increasingly unstable, unpredictable, and illiquid due to increasing concerns about the credit quality of loans (including IndyMac’s loans). Perversely, instead of enforcing credit standards, Perry chose to roll the dice in an aggressive gamble to increase market share while sacrificing credit standards, even though a reasonable banker of a depository institution would have suspended, limited, or stopped the production of these risky loans during this time of known, unprecedented, and escalating risks. Unable to sell these loans as intended into an illiquid secondary market, Perry lost his gamble and IndyMac was forced by the fourth quarter of 2007 to transfer the loans into IndyMac’s investment portfolio where the loans ultimately generated substantial Bank losses in excess of $600 million. At the time of this transfer in the fourth quarter of 2007, IndyMac itself projected,that lifetime losses for these loans would exceed at least $600 million.

[…]

[ipaper docId=59836760 access_key=key-7p2mgpw2twn44je0dm7 height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-15 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (0)

INDYMAC FED. BANK FSB v. GARCIA | NYSC Vacates Default JDGMT “Robo-Signer, Fraudulent Erica Johnson-Seck Affidavit”

INDYMAC FED. BANK FSB v. GARCIA | NYSC Vacates Default JDGMT “Robo-Signer, Fraudulent Erica Johnson-Seck Affidavit”


2011 NY Slip Op 31748(U)

INDYMAC FEDERAL BANK FSB, Plaintiff,

v.

WILFREDO GARCIA, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., AS NOMINEE FOR INDYMAC BANK F.S.B., CRIMINAL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION AND FINANCE, CITY OF NEW YORK ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL BOARD, CITY OF NEW YORK PARKING VIOLATIONS BUREAU, and John Doe, Jane Doe, Defendants.

20049/08, Motion Cal. No. 12, Motion Seq. No. 5.

Supreme Court, Queens County.

June 23, 2011.

BERNICE D. SIEGAL, Judge.

EXCERPTS:

Approximately ten months after the stipulation was entered into, Plaintiff set a new sale date of February 18, 2011. Defendant Garcia now moves for an order seeking to vacate the terms of the stipulation, vacate the default judgment and renew the original order to show cause, predominantly upon the grounds that the Affidavit of Amount Due is signed by Erica A. Johnson-Seck, (hereinafter Johnson-Seck”) Vice-President, an alleged “Robo-Signer.”

[…]

Garcia moves for an order to renew its original order to show cause which sought to vacate the default judgment based on alleged fraud on behalf of the plaintiff. (CPLR §5015(a)(3).) Garcia asserts that the recent discovery of alleged fraud in the preparation of Plaintiff’s affidavit to secure the Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale is sufficient basis to renew it’s prior order to show cause to vacate the default judgment.

Garcia asserts that Johnson-Seck is a confirmed robo-signer as evidenced by recent published decisions. (See Onewest Bank, F.S.B. v Drayton, 29 Misc 3d 1021 [Sup.Ct. Kings County 2010]; see also Indymac Bank, FSB v. Bethley, 22 Misc.3d 1119(A) [Sup.Ct. Kings County 2009].) “A `robo-signer’ is a person who quickly signs hundreds or thousands of foreclosure documents in a month, despite swearing that he or she has personally reviewed the mortgage documents and has not done so.” (Onewest Bank, F.S.B. v Drayton, 29 Misc 3d 1021 [Sup.Ct. Kings County 2010].)

Plaintiff, in opposition, does not refute defendant’s assertion that Johnson-Seck is a “robo-signer,” rather, Plaintiff asserts that accusations regarding Johnson-Seck were made public prior to the execution of the aforementioned stipulation, dated March 24, 2010, and therefore any alleged fraud or mistake was known or knowable to defendant’s attorney. “The requirement that a motion for renewal be based upon newly-discovered facts is a flexible one, and a court, in its discretion, may grant renewal upon facts known to the moving party at the time of the original motion.” (Karlin v. Bridges, 172 A.D.2d 644 [2nd Dept 1991].) Even if the court assumes that Garcia’s counsel, David Fuster, Esq., should have known of Johnson-Seck’s “robo-signing,” it is still not a complete defense to Garcia’s motion. Accordingly, Garcia’s motion to renew is granted.

Vacate Default Judgment and Stipulation

Upon renewal this court vacates the prior default judgment dated February 23, 2009, and the stipulation dated March 24, 2010.

CPLR § 3215(f) states:

On any application for judgment by default, the applicant shall file … proof of the facts constituting the claim, the default and the amount due by affidavit made by the party.

Plaintiff submits a “reverified” Affidavit of Charlotte Warwick (hereinafter “Warwick”) attesting that the principal amount due on Garcia’s loan is $472,326.52. Plaintiff contends that the Warwick affidavit cures the fraudulent Affidavit of Amount Due submitted by Johnson-Seck. However, the Judgment of Foreclosure and aforementioned Stipulation, dated March 24, 2010, where all signed under the assumption that the plaintiff had originally submitted non-fraudulent documentation. So while the fraudulent Affidavit of Amount Due may be a curable defect, the court cannot ignore the fact that the papers supporting the Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale and aforementioned stipulation were fraudulent.

In addition, a default judgment obtained through “extrinsic fraud,” which is “a fraud practiced in obtaining a judgment such that a party may have been prevented from fully and fairly litigating the matter” does not require the defendant to prove a reasonable excuse for such default. (Bank of New York v. Lagakos, 27 A.D.3d 678 [2nd Dept 2006] citing Shaw v. Shaw, 97 A.D.2d 403 [2nd Dept 1983].)

Furthermore, the court is concerned by Plaintiff’s position that the “events he (Garcia) complains of… make no factual difference to the amount he owes on his mortgage.” The statement is alarming as it implies that the court should ignore fraud when the fraud may not be directly relevant to the outcome of the particular case. The court requires an Affidavit of Amount Due and that requirement cannot be satisfied by submitting a fraudulent affidavit. (Indymac Bank, FSB v. Bethley, 22 Misc.3d 1119 [Sup.Ct. Kings County 2009] [prior to granting an application for an order of reference, the Court required an affidavit from Ms. Johnson-Seck, describing her employment history for the past three years].) Plaintiff has failed to deny defendant’s contention that the Johnson-Seck document was fraudulent. Therefore, the Plaintiff failed to submit “proof of the facts constituting the claim, the default and the amount due by affidavit made by the party” as required by CPLR §3215(f).

However, before the judgment on default can be vacated, the settlement stipulation must be vitiated.”Only where there is cause sufficient to invalidate a contract, such as fraud, collusion, mistake or accident, will a party be relieved from the consequences of a stipulation made during litigation” (Hallock v. State, 64 N.Y.2d 224 (1984.) “It is the party seeking to set aside the stipulation … who has the burden of showing that the agreement was the result of fraud.” (Sweeney v. Sweeney, 71 A.D.3d 989 [2nd Dept 2010].) As noted earlier, the fraud perpetrated by the Plaintiff had a domino effect that lead Garcia ultimately to enter into the stipulation. Garcia entered into the agreement on March 24, 2010 to avoid an immediate foreclosure he believed was obtained legally. Accordingly, Garcia has sufficiently established his burden by showing that he would not have entered the stipulation had he known that the Affidavit in support of the default judgment (vacated herein) was fraudulent.

Based on the foregoing, Garcia’s motion is granted to the extent of granting renewal and upon renewal granting the order to show cause dated August 27, 2009 vacating the default judgment of foreclosure and sale entered by this court on or about February 23, 2009 and the stipulation dated March 24, 2010 is declared null and void.

[…]

After you read the brief below, check out more on Ms. Johnson-Seck

Full Deposition Of ERICA JOHNSON SECK Former Fannie Mae, WSB Employee

[NYSC] Judge Finds Issues With “NOTE AMOUNTS”, Robo Signer “ROGER STOTTS” Affidavit: ONEWEST v. GARCIA

[NYSC] JUDGE SCHACK TAKES ON ROBO-SIGNER ERICA JOHNSON SECK: DEUTSCHE BANK v. MARAJ (1) (64.591)

[NYSC] JUDGE SCHACK TAKES ON ROBO-SIGNER ERICA JOHNSON SECK: DEUTSCHE BANK v. HARRIS (2) (70.24)

[NYSC] JUDGE SCHACK TAKES ON ROBO-SIGNER ERICA JOHNSON SECK: ONEWEST BANK v. DRAYTON (3)

Wall Street Journal: Foreclosure? Not So Fast

ONEWEST BANK ‘ERICA JOHNSON-SECK’ ‘Not more than 30 seconds’ to sign each foreclosure document

INDYMAC’S/ONEWEST FORECLOSURE ‘ROBO-SIGNERS’ SIGNED 24,000 MORTGAGE DOCUMENTS MONTHLY

WM_Deposition_of_Erica_Johnson-Seck_Part_I

Deposition_of_Erica_Johnson-Seck_Part_II

Yep, she signs for FDIC too!


[ipaper docId=59328304 access_key=key-2b848aadh4jpp9xz8vzi height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-15 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (0)

DEUTSCHE BANK NATL. TRUST CO. v TURNER | NY Civil Court “Dismissed on the basis of failure to name a necessary party”

DEUTSCHE BANK NATL. TRUST CO. v TURNER | NY Civil Court “Dismissed on the basis of failure to name a necessary party”



Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County


Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., AS TRUSTEE OF THE INDYMAC INDX MORTGAGE TRUST 2006-AR25, MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-AR25 UNDER THE POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT DATED JULY 1, 2006, Petitioner,

against

Elaine Turner, PERCIVAL TURNER, YVETTE JEFFRIES, JOHN DOE, JANE DOE, RICHARD ROE, CORA COE, Respondent.

EXCERPT:

Petitioner may not designate a party as “John Doe” or “Jane Doe” when there is actual knowledge of the party’s identity. “If none of the name is known, then a completely fictitious name may be utilized. However, such a designation can only be made if the designating party does not know all or part of the other party’s name; otherwise, the party must be identified to the extent that his or her name is known.” First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Rochester v. Souto, 158 Misc 2d 219; 601 N.Y.S. 2d 43 (Civ. Ct. New York Co., 1993). Further, “a petition naming the respondent as John Doe’ or Jane Doe’ is subject to dismissal if the true identity of the respondent is known to the petitioner when the proceeding is commenced.” Varveris v. Infante, N.Y.L.J. Sept. 15, 1993, p. 25, col. 3 (Civ. Ct. Queens Co.), citing ABKCO Industries v. Lennon, 52 AD2d 435; Capital Resources Corp. v. “John Doe” and “Jane Doe”, N.Y.L.J. June 17, 1992, p. 25, col. 6 (Civ. Ct. Kings Co.).

In the instant case, there has been no evidence or testimony presented to suggest that Petitioner had actual knowledge of the presence or identity of Gerda Southwell. However, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that any effort, let alone a diligent effort, was made to determine the identity(ies) of the occupant(s) of the premises. “It is clearly implicit in CPLR 1024 that the unusual authority it sanctions should not be availed of in the absence of a genuine effort to learn the true name of the party.” Chavez v. Nevell Mgmt. Co., Inc., 69 Misc 2d 718; 330 N.Y.S. 2d 890 (Civ. Ct. New York Co., 1972); 2 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, New York Civ. Prac., par. 1024.04. “Petitioner by means of the CPLR is duty bound not to proceed with or to permit an eviction proceeding to go forward in the name of a John Doe or Jane Doe’ when they could with diligence find out the true name, or actually have knowledge of the true name or names.” Green Point Savings Bank v. John and Jane Doe, N.Y.L.J. July 12, 1995, p. 31, col. 2; See Teachers College v. Walterding, 351 N.Y.S. 2d 587 (App. Term, 1st Dept, 1974) and Chavez v. Nevell Mgmt. Co., supra. Petitioner must further establish that a diligent effort has been made to ascertain the identity of the party. “It must be demonstrated that the persons named as unknown are actually unknown. To make that showing, counsel should present an affidavit [*4]stating that a diligent inquiry has been made to determine the names of such parties.” Capital Resources Corp. v. John Doe, 154 Misc 2d 864; 586 N.Y.S. 2d 706 (Civ. Ct. Kings Co., 1992); Chavez v. Nevell Mgmt. Co., supra; 2 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ. Prac., par. 1024.04.

Petitioner has presented no evidence or testimony to demonstrate a diligent effort was made to ascertain the identity(ies) of the occupant(s). This is a two-family dwelling where the respondent has resided consistently since October 2008. In a two-family home the identity of any occupants’ could have been ascertained with a minimal amount of effort. Petitioner could have knocked on Ms. Southwell’s door, asked the prior owners if anyone else resided in the building, or checked the names on the mailboxes. Petitioner produced no evidence that any effort was made at all. “A diligent effort to learn the party’s name is a condition precedent to the use of CPLR §1024, which should therefore be turned to only as a last resort.” George Tut & Company v. Jane Doe, 2008 Slip Op 28264; 20 Misc 3d 815; 862 N.Y.S. 2d 428 (Civ. Ct. Kings Co., 2008); Siegel, NY Prac. §188 at 304 (3d ed). “If a petitioner knows a party’s name, or fails to demonstrate that diligent efforts were made to learn a party’s name, then use of a fictitious name is not authorized by CPLR 1024 and the petition is rendered fatally defective as to that party.” Pinnacle Bronx East v. Bowery Residents Committee Inc., 2006 NY Misc. LEXIS 4025; 235 N.Y.L.J. 60 (Civ. Ct. Bronx Co., 2006), citing Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Auth. v. Wimpfheimer, 165 Misc 2d 584; 633 N.Y.S. 2d 695 (App. Term, 1st Dept. 1995); First Fed. Savings and Loan Assoc. of Rochester v. Souto, 158 Misc 2d 219; 601 N.Y.S. 2d 43 (Civ. Ct. New York Co., 1993). Accordingly, respondent’s motion is granted and the petition is dismissed without prejudice. As the proceeding is dismissed on the basis of failure to name a necessary party, the court need not address the additional grounds raised for dismissal.

This is the decision and order of the Court.

[ipaper docId=58946023 access_key=key-18mlbl9k9l3ztxqx9caj height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-15 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (0)

FALSE STATEMENTS: In re Jessie M. Arizmendi, Bk. No. 09-19263-PB13, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of California

FALSE STATEMENTS: In re Jessie M. Arizmendi, Bk. No. 09-19263-PB13, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of California


By FRAUD DIGEST

False Statements

Brian Burnett
Freddie Mac
IndyMac Bank, FSB
MERS
OneWest Bank, FSB

Action Date: June 27, 2011
Location: San Diego, CA

California Bankruptcy Judge Laura Stuart Taylor has joined the ranks of judges who will not tolerate fraudulent documents produced by banks to foreclose. Judge Taylor entered an Order To Show Cause why OneWest Bank, FSB, should not incur “a significant coercive sanction intended to deter any future tender of misleading evidence to any court of this district.” Judge Taylor ordered OneWest to appear before her on July 29, 2011, to show cause as to why it should not be subject to compensatory and/or coercive sanctions, in the case In re Jessie M. Arizmendi, Bk. No. 09-19263-PB13, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of California. The case involves a motion for relief from stay filed by OneWest supported with a declaration of Brian Burnett, who declared under penalty of perjury that OneWest was the real party in interest in connection with the Motion because OneWest was the current beneficiary under the terms of a promissory note and Deed of Trust.

According to the Burnett declaration, OneWest received its interest in the Trust Deed pursuant to an Assignment from MERS. The assignment of the Trust Deed and the Note showed the transfer from MERS as nominee for the original lender directly to OneWest in 2010.

At trial, however, OneWest’s witness, Charles Boyle, testified that the beneficiary of the loan was actually Freddie Mac. Based on this conflict, the Court required post-trial briefings.

According to the Court, “OneWest, in its post-trial brief, provided a standing argument based on a new version of the Note, which attached an allonge dated July 24, 2007 evidencing a transfer from Original Lender to IndyMac Bank, FSB and bore an endorsement in blank from IndyMac Bank, FSB. This was new information not presented in the OneWest Declaration and this note was not identical to the note authenticated by the OneWest Declaration and attached to the OneWest Proof of Claim.

This Court is concerned, thus, that OneWest provided false or misleading evidence to the Court and that OneWest did so willfully, maliciously, in bad faith, and/or for an inappropriate purpose.”

According to research by Fraud Digest, Brian Burnett has used many different job titles when signing mortgage-related documents for OneWest, often using different titles on the same day, including:

- Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for Acoustic Home Loans;

- Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for Aegis Wholesale Corporation;

- Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for American Brokers Conduit;

- Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for Beach First National Bank;

- Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for Credit Suisse Financial Corp.;

- Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for CTX Mortgage Company, LLC;

- Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for DHI Mortgage Company, Ltd.;

- Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for Express Capital Lending;

- Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for Finasure Home Loans, LLC;

- Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for First Magnus Financial Corporation;

- Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for First Meridian Mortgage;

- Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for Flick Mortgage Investors, Inc.;

- Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for Home Loan Center, Inc. d/b/a LendingTree Loans;

- Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for Impac Funding Corp., d/b/a Impac Lending Group;

- Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for IndyMac Bank, FSB;

- Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for LoanCity;

- Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for MortgageIt, Inc.;

- Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for NetBank, a Federal Savings Bank;

- Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for New American Funding, a California Corporation;

- Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for Opteum Financial Services, LLC;

- Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for OneWest Bank, FSB;

- Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for Quicken Loans, Inc.;

- Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for Sloan Mortgage Group, Inc.;

- Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for Taylor, Bean & Whitaker;

- Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for TM Capital, Inc.

- Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for d/b/a Fedfirst Mortgage Corporation; and

- Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for UBS AG.

July 29, 2011, may be the day that Brian Burnett and OneWest are held accountable for the thousands of mortgage assignments – with false statements regarding the history and ownership of mortgages – presented to courts to foreclose.



© 2010-15 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (0)

IN RE ARIZMENDI | CA Bank. Court Denies Stay, Order to Show Cause “Contempt, Sanctions, (2) ONEWEST Notes; 1 Endorsed, 1 Unendorsed” “MERS Assignment”

IN RE ARIZMENDI | CA Bank. Court Denies Stay, Order to Show Cause “Contempt, Sanctions, (2) ONEWEST Notes; 1 Endorsed, 1 Unendorsed” “MERS Assignment”


In re: Jessie M. Arizmendi, Debtor.
OneWest Bank FSB, its assignees and/or successors, Moving Party,
v.
Jessie M. Arizmendi, Debtor; Thomas H. Billingslea, Chapter 13 Trustee; and Indymac Mortgage Services, Junior Lien, Respondents.

Bk. No. 09-19263-PB13, RS No. CNR-2.

United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. California.

May 26, 2011.

Not for Publication

MEMORANDUM DECISION

LAURA S. TAYLOR, Bankruptcy Judge


EXCERPTS:

Additional Briefing.

At the trial, the Court carefully considered the demeanor of the various witnesses and the testimony provided. In connection with the trial, the Court also reviewed all other evidence and argument appropriately before the Court. Notwithstanding, however, significant questions continued, and the Court required additional briefing in connection with several issues as outlined in the Order Setting Briefing Schedule, Outlining Preliminary Determinations, and Establishing Procedures for Final Resolution of Issues (Dkt. No. 56) (the “Briefing Order”).

OneWest’s post-trial documents provided the analysis and argument required by the Briefing Order. But, these documents also contained factual assertions inconsistent with the OneWest Declaration and the Claim. OneWest now provided a standing argument based on a new version of the Note (the “Endorsed Note”).[3] The Endorsed Note attached an allonge dated July 24, 2007 evidencing a transfer from Original Lender to “IndyMac Bank, FSB” and bore an endorsement in blank from IndyMac Bank F.S.B. OneWest argued in connection therewith that it had enforcement rights under the Endorsed Note as a holder notwithstanding the admittedly accurate testimony at trial indicating that OneWest is a servicer for Freddie Mac and not the secured creditor. The OneWest post-trial memorandum also references a separate agreement with Freddie Mac, but fails to further evidence or discuss this agreement. The OneWest post-trial memorandum, finally, bases a standing argument on physical possession of the Endorsed Note and OneWest’s alleged status as a trust deed beneficiary based on the Assignment.

[…]

But, there are key assumptions that the Court must make in order for this set of facts to withstand scrutiny. And they are that OneWest, in fact, holds the Endorsed Note and held the Endorsed Note at all appropriate points in time. Frankly, the Court is not willing to make such assumptions at this time. OneWest attached the Unendorsed Note to both its Proof of Claim and the Declaration. The Declaration stated under penalty of perjury, that the Unendorsed Note was a true and accurate copy of the Note held by OneWest. The Proof of Claim implicitly stated the same and OneWest, of course, is obligated to provide only accurate information in connection with its Proof of Claim. The problem is that the Unendorsed Note does not bear the endorsement or attach the allonge found on the Endorsed Note, a document produced only after trial and the close of evidence. One West, thus, leaves the Court with the quandary of guessing which promissory note OneWest holds, whether and when One West held the Endorsed Note, and what the explanation is for the failure to provide the Endorsed Note prior to the close of evidence.[10]

A further evidentiary anomaly arises on account of the Assignment; MERS executed this document as a nominee for the Original Lender. But the allonge to the Endorsed Note makes clear that the Original Lender assigned its interests in the Note more than three years prior to execution of the Assignment. And rights under the Trust Deed follow the Note. Polhemas v. Trainer, 30 Cal. 686, 688 (1866). Thus, MERS’ purported assignment of the Trust Deed and the related note as nominee for the Original Lender and without a reference to either IndyMac Bank, FSB or Freddie Mac appears designed to disguise rather than to illuminate the facts.

And finally, even if OneWest’s second post-trial discussion of standing and submission of evidence were accurate, one thing remains clear: OneWest failed to tell the true and complete story in the OneWest Declaration and in the Claim.

The Court is concerned, as a result, that OneWest does not hold the Endorsed Note. But, perhaps more significantly, the Court is concerned that OneWest has determined that business expediency and cost containment are more important than complete candor with the courts. On these points, Ms. Arizmendi has a right to be heard, and the Court has a right to explanation.

Further, this is not the first time that OneWest has provided less than complete information in the Southern District of California. See “Memorandum Decision Re Motion to Vacate Clerk’s Entry of Default and Motion to Dismiss Complaint; Order to Show Cause for Contempt of Court”, docket no. 39, Adv. Pro. 10-90308-MM (In re Doble; Bk. Case No. 10-11296) (Defendants, including OneWest, were neither candid nor credible in explaining failure to respond timely to complaint and submitted multiple and different notes as “true and correct”); “Order to Show Cause Why OneWest Bank, FSB and Its Attorneys Law Offices of Randall Miller and Christopher Hoo Should Not Appear Before the Court to Explain Why They Should Not Be Held in Contempt or Sanctioned”, docket no. 47, In re Carter, Bk. Case No. 10-10257-MM13 (among other things OneWest provides inconsistent evidence as to its servicer status); and “Order After Hearing to Show Cause Why Indymac Mortgage Services; OneWest Bank, FSB; Randall S. Miller & Associates, P.C.; Christopher J. Hoo; Barrett Daffin Frappier Treder & Weiss, LLP; and Darlene C. Vigil Should Not Appear Before the Court to Explain Why They Should Not Be Held in Contempt or Sanctioned”, docket no. 47, In re Telebrico, Bk. No. 10-07643-LA13 (Court concerned that OneWest provided evidence that was either intentionally or recklessly false).

The curious thing about these cases is that OneWest likely would prevail in each of them if it completely and candidly explained the basis for its motion and its standing in connection therewith. Undoubtedly, however, doing so is more costly than using a form declaration that is not customized as to the facts on a case by case basis and that is signed by an uninformed declarant. OneWest perhaps assumes that it really does not matter if the Court provides relief based on erroneous information. But, OneWest should remember an earlier theme in this decision and that is that the law is the law, rules are rules, and both must be obeyed. And, when it becomes clear that OneWest did not obey the rules, the Court can and, indeed, must act.

In short, the Court will not participate in a process where OneWest increases its profits by disobeying the rules of this Court and by providing the Court with erroneous information. The Court, thus, will take two steps. First, the Court will deny the Stay Motion without prejudice based first on the evidentiary problems that make it impossible for the Court to determine that OneWest is properly before the Court and that render evidence critical to OneWest’s prima facie case unreliable and second based on the Court’s inherent authority to regulate and control proceedings. Next, the Court hereafter will issue an order to show cause why One West should not be held in contempt and/or otherwise sanctioned. In connection therewith, the Court will consider a compensatory sanction to include a recovery of any costs Ms. Arizmendi would not have incurred but for OneWest’s improper actions. The compensatory sanction, frankly, could be quite limited. But, the Court also believes that a coercive sanction may well be appropriate. Given the orders to show cause that pre-date the one this Court will issue, it appears that the Court must create an economic disincentive for OneWest that will counter balance the economic benefit of a lack of complete candor. Further detail on the Court’s sanctions considerations will be set forth in the order to show cause and will not be further discussed here.

The Court finally notes that the order to show cause will issue only as to OneWest and possibly as to MERS. OneWest uses a variety of law firms. The Court was in a position to observe the demeanor of the lawyers handling this matter when the witness stated that OneWest was a mere servicer. The Court concludes based on this observation that they were unaware of this fact and unaware that OneWest supplied questionable documentary evidence. And frankly, there is nothing to be gained in pursuing the individual attorneys who must regularly appear in front of this Court. OneWest can simply change counsel and then be less than candid with a new set of attorneys.[11] The Court is interested in modifying OneWest’s behavior at an entity level, and any coercive sanction will be designed to achieve the same.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Stay Motion is denied without prejudice to the right of OneWest to refile a stay relief motion. In so doing, OneWest must provide declaratory evidence that explains when and how it obtained physical possession of the Endorsed Note and/or Unendorsed Note and that otherwise provides case specific evidence of standing given its servicer status.

[ipaper docId=57567731 access_key=key-22ffgxbli042xfmdtz1o height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-15 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (4)

[VIDEO] NH Supreme Court Oral Argument of DEUTSCHE BANK v. KEVLIK

[VIDEO] NH Supreme Court Oral Argument of DEUTSCHE BANK v. KEVLIK


Via: Mike Dillon

Excerpt:

Judge: I went through the material that you attached and I was very confused about IndyMac’s role and how we ended up with a foreclosure deed that didn’t reflect IndyMac’s role…can you explain?

Attorney Sheridan for the Kevlik’s  replies… There’s nothing in the record that explains MERS’ role! […] No power to assign… What happened to OneWest bank???

Go on to the link to video below…

  • 2010-0249

[View Video/Audio]

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co.
OM
(John T. Precobb)
(15 min.)
v. James Kevlik & a.
William C. Sheridan
(15 min.)

After you watch the video come back and read…

New Hampshire Supreme Court Reversal “Plaintiff has not carried its burden to show ownership of the property” DEUTSCHE BANK v. KEVLIK

© 2010-15 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (0)

MERS VP | 27 Job Titles for Brian Burnett of IndyMac

MERS VP | 27 Job Titles for Brian Burnett of IndyMac


Brian Burnett has signed mortgage documents using the job titles listed below during the approximate same period of time. All of these were notarized in Travis County, Texas, where IndyMac Mortgage Services is located. IndyMac Mortgage Services is now a division of One West Bank.

A certified signer for Mortgage electronic Registration Systems, Inc. was authorized to sign on behalf of the affiliated mortgage entity that employed him. Burnett, for example, would have been authorized to sign as an officer of MERS, as nominee for IndyMac Bank.

MERS signers were never authorized to sign on behalf of all other lenders.

[ipaper docId=53758521 access_key=key-vakbq9sniymd894p23c height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-15 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (0)

Opposition To MERS Demurrer To Fourth Amended Complaint With Requests For Judicial Notice

Opposition To MERS Demurrer To Fourth Amended Complaint With Requests For Judicial Notice


Via Brian Davies:

CALIFORNIA OPPOSITION TO MERS DEMURRER WITH FILINGS OF REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICES.

[ipaper docId=51728402 access_key=key-26y5bos82bpula1dkdzi height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-15 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (1)

Keller Rohrback L.L.P. Announces Investigation of Bank of America Corp. and JPMorgan Chase & Co. Regarding Force-Placed Insurance

Keller Rohrback L.L.P. Announces Investigation of Bank of America Corp. and JPMorgan Chase & Co. Regarding Force-Placed Insurance


Keller Rohrback’s investigation focuses on alleged abuses by Bank of America and JPMorgan Chase, among others, such as: failing to pay for hazard insurance out of the borrower’s escrow funds, charging homeowners for unnecessary insurance, backdating policies providing coverage retroactively, utilizing their own subsidiaries to provide the hazard insurance, and purchasing policies from companies who share fees or profits with the servicers—often without disclosing this information to the borrower. Keller Rohrback is also investigating the force-placed insurance practices of the following mortgage loan servicers:

Aurora Loan Services IndyMac Mortgage Services
Downey Savings & Loan Litton Loan Servicing LP
EMC Mortgage Corp. Nationstar Mortgage LLC
Financial Freedom PennyMac
GMAC Mortgage, Inc. Saxon
HSBC SunTrust Mortgage, Inc.

Source: Keller Rohrback L.L.P.

© 2010-15 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (1)

Anonymous Posts FAQ’s on How Balboa Hid Documents For Indymac and Aurora

Anonymous Posts FAQ’s on How Balboa Hid Documents For Indymac and Aurora


Anonymous via his source post crucial information that has been known but not in detail.

Attorneys and Attorney Generals nationwide have been working diligently against the banks in order to keep their clients in their homes. You must keep in mind that there are several levels of indiscriminate behavior going on, keeping these efforts at bay. For now, however, I will give you a general overview of how some of the tracking systems interact and how the reporting works, so that those with the power to subpoena documents for their clients know where to find the correct documentation to support their individual cases, because as Abigail Fields points out, “It would certainly be provable/disprovable by subpoenaing documents.”

In order to do that, however, an attorney would need to know where to look. If you were to only subpoena generic loan information, you will only be provided with the System of Record (SOR) data, which previous posts have clearly proved do not show the full picture as there are several common ways of removing information from the system of record both individually and en masse. As the email trail clearly shows, there is always an audit trail in the back end if you know what to ask for.



© 2010-15 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (0)

GARY DUBIN LAW OFFICES FORECLOSURE DEFENSE HAWAII and CALIFORNIA
Chip Parker, www.jaxlawcenter.com
Kenneth Eric Trent, www.ForeclosureDestroyer.com
Advertise your business on StopForeclosureFraud.com

Archives