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SEC could file civil fraud charges against some credit-rating agencies

SEC could file civil fraud charges against some credit-rating agencies


REUTERS-

(Reuters) – U.S. regulators could file civil fraud charges against some credit-rating agencies for their role in developing mortgage-bond deals that helped bring about the financial crisis, the Wall Street Journal reported, citing people familiar with the matter.

The Journal said the Securities and Exchange Commission was reviewing the conduct of companies including McGraw Hill’s Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s Investors Service owned by Moody’s Corp on at least two mortgage-bond deals.

continue reading [REUTERS]

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Lenders Unload Mortgages to Collection Agencies

Lenders Unload Mortgages to Collection Agencies


What we were discussing this morning…

dcbreidenbach, on April 26, 2010 at 9:51 am Said:in a prior posting it was stated that defense attys press people to be concerned about deficiency judgements unnecessarily. This advice may be practical for some homeowners but is extremely dangerous for borrowers generally. The current practice of most collectors is to press foreclosure on the mortgage–ignoring the note. This is an inverted approach that enables the collection agency to acquire the property and proceeds of its disposition without ever demonstrating who holds the note, or possession of the note. The collector obtains the home today, settling the mortgage, but is fully capable of selling the note deficiency balance collection rights to an even worse collection agency. The collectors are legally able to lay in the weeds for as much as 5-10 years depending on state laws and the facts of the case. When the homeowner is “back on his feet” with a good job, restored credit and other assets accumulated, the collector shows up with the old note and deficiency judgment and makes the claim plus interest accrued in the meantime. Just when the homeowner thought it was over-he/she is drawn back into the horror. another opportunity for them exists; they know you owe a deficiency amount-they record it and wait for you to die ——-then they come after your estate for proceeds of your life insurance and pension payouts that you thought were to help your family! Be wary of advice that says “dont worry-be happy” ; these people feed on deception, its a way of life to them. Beware disinformation—find attornies if you have deficiencies–force the collectors to warrant that the deficiency is waived. And get a warranty from an employee of one of the big name banks at the minimum that you will not be pursued. Trust them not.
Given any opportunity to screw you they will!

Lenders Unload Mortgages to Collection Agencies

19 April 2010 @ 05:11 pm EDT

Lenders are selling second mortgages and home-equity lines in default to collection agencies that have the right to collect this money potentially for decades.

“It’s a big business, and investors are coming out of the woodwork,” says Sylvia Alayon, a vice president for Consumer Mortgage Audit Center, which analyzes mortgage documents for lenders, advocacy groups, and attorneys.

Real estate professionals will be doing their short-sale clients a big favor if they urge them to get professional advice before they sign agreements, Alayon says.

A new government short-sale program, which takes effect Monday, aims to prevent banks from reselling this debt. Sellers covered under the program will receive notice that secondary lien holders have received part of the proceeds of the sale “in exchange for release and full satisfaction of their liens.”

 Reprinted from REALTOR® Magazine Online with permission of the NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS®. Copyright 2009. All rights reserved.

Related Story:

FORENSIC AUDIT (FMI) & Securitization

FORENSIC MORTGAGE AUDITS AS TOOLS TO SAVE FORECLOSURE HOMES

Why Your Lawyer May Threaten You With a Deficiency Judgment After Foreclosure

Posted in concealment, conspiracy, foreclosure fraud, forensic mortgage investigation audit, nina, note, respa, short sale, siva, tilaComments (1)

TILA Statute of Limitations

TILA Statute of Limitations


Source: Livinglies

Editor’s Note: Judges are quick to jump on the TILA Statute of Limitations by imposing the one year rule for rescission and damages. But there is more to it than that.

First the statute does NOT cut off at one year except for items that are apparent on the face of the closing documentation; so for MOST claims arising under securitization where almost every real detail of the transaction was hidden and intentionally withheld, the one year rule does not apply.

Second, the statute of limitations does not BEGIN to run until the date that the violation is revealed. In most cases this will be when the homeowner knows or should have known that the loan was securitized. Since the pretender lenders are so strong on the point that securitization does not affect enforcement, the best point in time for the statute to run is when a forensic analyst or expert tells the homeowner that TILA violations exist.

And THEN, in those cases where the information was hidden, the statute of limitations is three years from the date the information was revealed.

So when you go after undisclosed fees, profits and other compensation of any kind, you are not cut off by one year because — by definition they were not disclosed. The only way the other side can get out of that is by admitting the existence of the fee, and then showing that it WAS disclosed — presumably through yet another fabricated document, signed by a non-existent person with non existent authroity with non- existent witnesses and notarized by someone three thousand miles away (whose notary stamp and forged signature was applied to hundreds of pages of blank documents for later use). [Brad Keiser was the one who discovered this tactic by doing what most forensic analysts don’t do — actually reading every piece of paper sent by the pretender lender and every piece of paper provided by the homeowner. Case law shows that where the notary was improperly applied — and there are many ways for it to be improperly applied, the notary is void. If the statute requires recording the document in the public records, then the document so notarized shall be considered as NOT being in the public records and is ordered expunged from those records].

This comment from Rob elaborates:

Regarding the TILA Statute of Limitations:

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
When a violation of TILA occurs, the one-year limitations period applicable to actions for statutory and actual damages begins to run. U.S.C. § 1641(e).
A TILA violation may occur at the consummation of the transaction between a creditor and its consumer if the transaction is made without the required disclosures.
A creditor may also violate TILA by engaging in fraudulent, misleading, and deceptive practices that conceal the TILA violation occurring at the time of closing. Often consumers do not discover any violation until after they have paid excessive charges imposed by their creditors. Consumers who later learn of the creditor’s TILA violations can allege an equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. When the consumer has an extended right to rescind or
pursue other statutory remedies because a violation occurs, the statute of limitations for all the damages the consumers seek extends to three years from the date the violation is revealed.
McIntosh v. Irwin Union Bank & Trust Co., 215 F.R.D. 26, 30 (D. Mass. 2003).

© 2010-15 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in forensic mortgage investigation audit, tilaComments (0)

After ongoing INVESTIGATIONS: Lender Processing Services (LPS) closed the offices of its subsidiary, Docx, LLC, in Alpharetta, Georgia

After ongoing INVESTIGATIONS: Lender Processing Services (LPS) closed the offices of its subsidiary, Docx, LLC, in Alpharetta, Georgia


Mortgage Fraud

American Home Mortgage Servicing
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company
Docx, LLC
Lender Processing Services

Action Date: April 13, 2010
Location: Jacksonville, FL

On April 12, 2010, Lender Processing Services closed the offices of its subsidiary, Docx, LLC, in Alpharetta, Georgia. That office was responsible for pumping out over a million mortgage assignments in the last two years so that banks could foreclose on residential real estate. The law firms handling the foreclosures were retained and largely controlled by Lender Processing Services, according to a Sanctions Order entered by U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Diane Weiss Sigmund (In re Niles C. Taylor, EDPA, Case 07-15385-sr, Doc. 193). Lender Processing Services, the largest “default management services company” in the country, has already made at least partial admissions that there were faults in the documents produced by the Docx office – although courts and homeowners were never notified. According to Lender Processing Services, over 50 major banks use their default management services. The banks that especially need the services provided by Lender Processing Services include Deutsche Bank, Citibank, Wells Fargo and U.S. Bank, acting as trustees for mortgage-backed securitized trusts. These trusts, in the rush to securitize mortgages and sell them to investors, often ignored the critical step of obtaining mortgage assignments from the original lenders to the securities companies to the trusts. Now, years later, when the companies “servicing” the trusts need to foreclose, they retain Lender Processing Services to draft the missing documents. The mortgage servicers, including American Home Mortgage Services, Saxon Mortgage Services, and American Servicing Company, never disclose that the trusts are missing essential documents – they just rely on Lender Processing Services to “fix” the problems. Although the Alpharetta office has been closed, Lender Processing Services continues to mass produce “replacement” assignments from its Jacksonville, Florida, and Dakota County, Minnesota offices. Law firms retained by Lender Processing Services also often use their own employees, posing as officer of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, to produce the needed Assignments. Since the vast majority of homeowners do not retain counsel in foreclosure proceedings, this flawed system has worked very effectively for the last few years, with courts all over the country rarely questioning why so many mortgage companies had officers in Alpharetta, Georgia, or why Trusts that closed in 2005 and 2006 were just obtaining Mortgage Assignments in 2009 and 2010. Most courts never even questioned why companies long-dissolved, such as Option One, could still be executing documents years after the dissolution. While the closing of the Alpharetta office may be a sign that these fraudulent activities will finally be exposed and addressed, for the time being, it is just a matter of an unsatisfactory end of one small facet of an enormous and far-reaching problem.

© 2010-15 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in chain in title, DOCX, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, foreclosures, Lender Processing Services Inc., LPS, Lynn Szymoniak ESQ, MERS, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC.Comments (8)

HARVARD LAW AND ECONOMIC ISSUES IN SUBPRIME LITIGATION 2008

HARVARD LAW AND ECONOMIC ISSUES IN SUBPRIME LITIGATION 2008


This in combination with A.K. Barnett-Hart’s Thesis make’s one hell of a Discovery.

 
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES IN
SUBPRIME LITIGATION
Jennifer E. Bethel*
Allen Ferrell**
Gang Hu***
 

Discussion Paper No. 612

03/2008

Harvard Law School Cambridge, MA 02138

 

 ABSTRACT

This paper explores the economic and legal causes and consequences of recent difficulties in the subprime mortgage market. We provide basic descriptive statistics and institutional details on the mortgage origination process, mortgage-backed securities (MBS), and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). We examine a number of aspects of these markets, including the identity of MBS and CDO sponsors, CDO trustees, CDO liquidations, MBS insured and registered amounts, the evolution of MBS tranche structure over time, mortgage originations, underwriting quality of mortgage originations, and write-downs of investment banks. In light of this discussion, the paper then addresses questions as to how these difficulties might have not been foreseen, and some of the main legal issues that will play an important role in the extensive subprime litigation (summarized in the paper) that is underway, including the Rule 10b-5 class actions that have already been filed against the investment banks, pending ERISA litigation, the causes-of-action available to MBS and CDO purchasers, and litigation against the rating agencies. In the course of this discussion, the paper highlights three distinctions that will likely prove central in the resolution of this litigation: The distinction between reasonable ex ante expectations and the occurrence of ex post losses; the distinction between the transparency of the quality of the underlying assets being securitized and the transparency as to which market participants are exposed to subprime losses; and, finally, the distinction between what investors and market participants knew versus what individual entities in the structured finance process knew, particularly as to macroeconomic issues such as the state of the national housing market. ex ante expectations and the occurrence of ex post losses; the distinction between the transparency of the quality of the underlying assets being securitized and the transparency as to which market participants are exposed to subprime losses; and, finally, the distinction between what investors and market participants knew versus what individual entities in the structured finance process knew, particularly as to macroeconomic issues such as the state of the national housing market. 

 continue reading the paper harvard-paper-diagrams

 
 

 

Posted in bank of america, bear stearns, bernanke, chase, citi, concealment, conspiracy, corruption, credit score, Dick Fuld, FED FRAUD, G. Edward Griffin, geithner, indymac, jpmorgan chase, lehman brothers, mozillo, naked short selling, nina, note, scam, siva, tila, wachovia, washington mutual, wells fargoComments (1)

Michael Lewis’s ‘The Big Short’? Read the Harvard Thesis Instead! “The Story of the CDO Market Meltdown: An Empirical Analysis.”

Michael Lewis’s ‘The Big Short’? Read the Harvard Thesis Instead! “The Story of the CDO Market Meltdown: An Empirical Analysis.”


March 15, 2010, 4:59 PM ET

Michael Lewis’s ‘The Big Short’? Read the Harvard Thesis Instead!

By Peter Lattman

Deal Journal has yet to read “The Big Short,” Michael Lewis’s yarn on the financial crisis that hit stores today. We did, however, read his acknowledgments, where Lewis praises “A.K. Barnett-Hart, a Harvard undergraduate who had just  written a thesis about the market for subprime mortgage-backed CDOs that remains more interesting than any single piece of Wall Street research on the subject.”

A.K. Barnett-Hart

While unsure if we can stomach yet another book on the crisis, a killer thesis on the topic? Now that piqued our curiosity. We tracked down Barnett-Hart, a 24-year-old financial analyst at a large New York investment bank. She met us for coffee last week to discuss her thesis, “The Story of the CDO Market Meltdown: An Empirical Analysis.” Handed in a year ago this week at the depths of the market collapse, the paper was awarded summa cum laude and won virtually every thesis honor, including the Harvard Hoopes Prize for outstanding scholarly work.

Last October, Barnett-Hart, already pulling all-nighters at the bank (we agreed to not name her employer), received a call from Lewis, who had heard about her thesis from a Harvard doctoral student. Lewis was blown away.

“It was a classic example of the innocent going to Wall Street and asking the right questions,” said Mr. Lewis, who in his 20s wrote “Liar’s Poker,” considered a defining book on Wall Street culture. “Her thesis shows there were ways to discover things that everyone should have wanted to know. That it took a 22-year-old Harvard student to find them out is just outrageous.”

Barnett-Hart says she wasn’t the most obvious candidate to produce such scholarship. She grew up in Boulder, Colo., the daughter of a physics professor and full-time homemaker. A gifted violinist, Barnett-Hart deferred admission at Harvard to attend Juilliard, where she was accepted into a program studying the violin under Itzhak Perlman. After a year, she headed to Cambridge, Mass., for a broader education. There, with vague designs on being pre-Med, she randomly took “Ec 10,” the legendary introductory economics course taught by Martin Feldstein.

“I thought maybe this would help me, like, learn to manage my money or something,” said Barnett-Hart, digging into a granola parfait at Le Pain Quotidien. She enjoyed how the subject mixed current events with history, got an A (natch) and declared economics her concentration.

Barnett-Hart’s interest in CDOs stemmed from a summer job at an investment bank in the summer of 2008 between junior and senior years. During a rotation on the mortgage securitization desk, she noticed everyone was in a complete panic. “These CDOs had contaminated everything,” she said. “The stock market was collapsing and these securities were affecting the broader economy. At that moment I became obsessed and decided I wanted to write about the financial crisis.”

Back at Harvard, against the backdrop of the financial system’s near-total collapse, Barnett-Hart approached professors with an idea of writing a thesis about CDOs and their role in the crisis. “Everyone discouraged me because they said I’d never be able to find the data,” she said. “I was urged to do something more narrow, more focused, more knowable. That made me more determined.”

She emailed scores of Harvard alumni. One pointed her toward LehmanLive, a comprehensive database on CDOs. She received scores of other data leads. She began putting together charts and visuals, holding off on analysis until she began to see patterns–how Merrill Lynch and Citigroup were the top originators, how collateral became heavily concentrated in subprime mortgages and other CDOs, how the credit ratings procedures were flawed, etc.

“If you just randomly start regressing everything, you can end up doing an unlimited amount of regressions,” she said, rolling her eyes. She says nearly all the work was in the research; once completed,  she jammed out the paper in a couple of weeks.

“It’s an incredibly impressive piece of work,” said Jeremy Stein, a Harvard economics professor who included the thesis on a reading list for a course he’s teaching this semester on the financial crisis. “She pulled together an enormous amount of information in a way that’s both intelligent and accessible.”

Barnett-Hart’s thesis is highly critical of Wall Street and “their irresponsible underwriting practices.” So how is it that she can work for the very institutions that helped create the notorious CDOs she wrote about?

“After writing my thesis, it became clear to me that the culture at these investment banks needed to change and that incentives needed to be realigned to reward more than just short-term profit seeking,” she wrote in an email. “And how would Wall Street ever change, I thought, if the people that work there do not change? What these banks needed is for outsiders to come in with a fresh perspective, question the way business was done, and bring a new appreciation for the true purpose of an investment bank – providing necessary financial services, not creating unnecessary products to bolster their own profits.”

Ah, the innocence of youth.

Here is a copy of the thesis: 2009-CDOmeltdown

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