NYT-

In February, JPMorgan Chase donated a home to an Iraq war veteran in Bucoda, Wash., and Bank of America waived the $140,000 debt that a Florida man still owed after the sale of his foreclosed home. Over the last year, Wells Fargo has demolished about a dozen houses in Cleveland.

Banks do things like this — real estate transactions that do nothing to prevent foreclosure — all the time. But beginning this month, they can count such activities as part of their new commitment to help people stay in their homes.

 That commitment comes under the landmark $25 billion foreclosure abuse settlement between the government and five major banks announced last month. The settlement promises that of the $25 billion, the banks will give $17 billion “in assistance to borrowers who have the intent and ability to stay in their homes,” according to a summary of the settlement. But more than half of that money can be used in ways that will not stop foreclosures, including some activities that are already standard bank practices.

For example, the banks can wipe out more than $2 billion of their obligation by donating or demolishing abandoned houses. Almost $1 billion can be used to help families that have already defaulted move out.

[NEW YORK TIMES]

“Hunger Games”

Palm Beach Post-

The pool guy, plumber and lawn man for a Palm Beach Gardens homeowner who recently won an $18 million settlement in a foreclosure-related lawsuit are being sought for questioning by the bank still seeking to repossess her home.

Lynn Szymoniak, a 63-year-old attorney who specializes in white collar crime, shot to national fame last year when she was featured on the CBS news show 60 minutes for her role in uncovering widespread mortgage and foreclosure fraud after finding it in her own 2008 case.

This month, it was announced she would receive $18 million from a whistle-blower lawsuit filed under the federal False Claims Act, which allows the government to bring civil actions against entities that knowingly use or cause the use of false documents to obtain money from the government.

[PALM BEACH POST]

Lets not confuse the word “Flaw” with “Fraud”…There is a major difference!

HW-

John Walsh, acting Comptroller of the Currency, said the recent $25 billion mortgage servicing settlement reached between the big banks and state attorneys general does not conflict or double-up on requirements servicers have to follow in consent agreements banks signed with the OCC and other regulators last year. 

In 2010, regulators, including the OCC, examined 14 large federally regulated mortgage servicers and thrifts.

Last year, the agencies issued enforcement orders against all 14 institutions forcing them to take steps to review their foreclosure review processes and to offer aid to borrowers who suffered from flawed foreclosure practices.

[HOUSING WIRE]

LOL…according to Tom Miller.

Good Luck!

HW-

If the top five mortgage servicers begin to abuse bond investors under the foreclosure settlement write-downs, the attorneys general would consider some protections, according to Iowa AG Tom Miller.

Miller faced down banking executives and analysts during a panel at the REthink Symposium Thursday. The $25 billion settlement signed in March forces servicers to meet roughly $10 billion in principal reductions, which could swell higher because in some instances the full dollar written down will not be credited.

Servicers will get full credit for reducing principal on loans they hold on their own portfolio but receive 45 cents for every dollar written down on mortgages held in private securities.

“To try principal reduction in a targeted way and find out if it works is good for the housing market,” Miller said. “We know what (the banks’) plans are. Two have said they wouldn’t do write-downs on private securities. But we could have some discussions about something to reassure investors.”

[HOUSING WIRE]

WSJ-

Bank of America Corp. is launching a pilot program that will allow homeowners at risk of foreclosure to hand over deeds to their houses and sign leases that will let them rent the houses back from the bank at a market rate.

While the initial scope of the “Mortgage to Lease” program is small—the bank began sending letters Thursday offering leases to 1,000 homeowners in Arizona, Nevada and New York—it represents a big change in the way banks deal with borrowers who can’t afford their mortgages.

Until now, banks have focused the bulk of their borrower outreach on modifying mortgages, usually by reducing the monthly payments. When that doesn’t work, most foreclosure alternatives require homeowners to leave their house, typically through a short sale, in which the bank approves the sale for less than the amount owed. Banks often insert clauses forbidding the new owner from renting the property back to the former owner.

[WALL STREET JOURNAL]

Naples Daily-

Political opponents of a Naples state legislator running for re-election have found ammunition in her fast-track foreclosure bill, which brewed statewide controversy before it died earlier this month.

Rep. Kathleen Passidomo, the Republican incumbent in the state House of Representatives, said she isn’t sure whether she will resurrect the bill in the 2013 legislative session. She first introduced the bill last year, but it failed then, too.

Now a Libertarian challenger, Peter Richter, is making it a campaign issue. He said the proposal, known as the Florida Fair Foreclosure Act, left discontent among homeowners he says would have been hurt by the measure.

“It died last year, as well, and every year this keeps coming back,” said Richter, 35, a Naples information technology consultant.

[NAPLES DAILY]

Abigail C. Field-

Let’s be clear why there’s a mortgage deal: the banks broke the law. Several laws in fact, in ways that appear criminal as well as civil. Limiting their liability is the only reason the banks did a deal.

In this post I’m going to look at what the banks could be held liable for; how much liability “their” money persuaded law enforcers to ignore will be the next post. But one important kind of peace has not been bought: criminal. So as I detail the wrong doing exposed by the deal, I highlight the crimes our law enforcers seem to allege the bankers committed. After all, a liability release isn’t simply what it says, it’s what law enforcers do with their remaining freedom to act. If crimes were committed, and indictments don’t follow, the release is much broader than its text.

A close read of the complaint and the related language that precedes the releases (see Exhibits F and G) reveals:

continue reading [REALITY CHECK]

HuffPO-

The consent agreements the bailed-out bankers (B.O.B.s), the feds and the states are largely as had been promised. One big surprise, however, is that the B.O.B.s would now be allowed to systematically overcharge borrowers and steal their homes. Seriously. Who cares about $1 million or $5 million penalties if horrible damage can be inflicted without punishment?

To see what I’m talking about, you need to look at Exhibit E-1. (It’s in all the consent agreements; here’s Chase‘s.) Exhibit E-1 is a 14 page table titled “Servicing Standards Quarterly Compliance Metrics.” That is, it’s a table that details what, precisely, law enforcers will check to make sure that the B.O.B.s are meeting the very pretty servicing standards in the deal. (See Exhibit A)

(Note: You may want to print out table E-1 while reading this, or at least keep it open in another browser window; what I have to say may be hard to believe and you’ll want to be able to double check that I’m telling you the truth.)

Now, the table doesn’t come right out and say, ‘we, the federal and state governments of the United States of America do hereby bless the institutionalization of servicer abuse,’ but it should. To understand why, you need to keep your eye on how the table’s columns are defined. For most issues, the critical columns are C “Loan Level Tolerance for Error” and D “Threshold Error Rate.” Later I’ll talk about the problems in Column F, the “Test Questions.”

When Error Isn’t Error…

[HUFFINGTON POST]

Decided on March 16, 2012

3523/10

Plaintiff Attorney: Dacia C Cocariu, Esq.

Sills Cummis & Gross

Defense Attorney: Kirk P. Tzandies, Esq

Yvonne Lewis, J.

Defendant Van Brunt Properties, LLC (Van Brunt) and defendant Sutter Avenue Management, LLC (Sutter) collectively move for an order, pursuant to [*2]Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) §602(a), to consolidate the foreclosure action of Citibank, N.A. v Sutter Avenue Management, LLC., Midwood Lumber & Mill Work, Inc., et al. (Index No. 354/10), into the foreclosure action of Citibank, N.A. v Van Brunt Properties, LLC, et al. (Index No. 3523/10). Upon consolidation, the defendants seek an order, pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel, declaring that this court’s March 4, 2011 order in the Van Brunt action is equally binding on the Sutter action. The defendants further move for equitable relief in the Sutter action based on their assertion that Citibank acted unconscionably and in bad faith during the protracted period of settlement negotiation. Finally the defendants seek an order terminating the temporary receivership imposed on the Sutter property.

Citibank cross-moves for an order striking all references to conduct and statements made during settlement negotiations, including a pre-negotiation agreement (signed by all three parties), which together form much of the basis of the defendants’ claims for equitable relief, in the Van Brunt action under CPLR § 4547. Citibank also cross-moves, pursuant to CPLR §1018, to substitute Wells Fargo as the plaintiff in the Van Brunt action, and, pursuant to CPLR §3025, to correspondingly amend the case caption. Finally, Citibank cross-moves for an order clarifying the portion of this court’s March 4th order which requires Van Brunt to commence making monthly payments to Citibank.

Background and Procedural History

Sutter is the legal and equitable owner of premises located at 529 Sutter Avenue in Brooklyn. On October 29, 2007, Citibank entered into a mortgage loan in the principal amount of $2,610,000.00 with Sutter. Van Brunt is the legal and equitable owner of premises located at 252-254 Van Brunt Street, also in Brooklyn, which is encumbered by a mortgage in the amount of $950,000.00 financed by Citibank, dated March 21, 2007. Roland Dib is a managing member of both Sutter and Van Brunt. Both the defendants began to have difficulty meeting their mortgage obligations and assert that attempts were made in late 2008 and early 2009 to negotiate with Citibank for a modification of the interest rate so that the requisite payments could be made. The defendants assert that they expended substantial sums to attract new tenants to the properties.

Commencing on July 1, 2009, Van Brunt failed to make its required monthly payments.. Citibank contends that on December 16,2009, it notified Van Brunt that it was in default and advised that if the default was not cured, Citibank reserved its right to exercise all of its rights and remedies. Citibank initiated a foreclosure proceeding against Van Brunt on February 5, 2010.On August 9, 2010, Citibank moved for summary judgment on its foreclosure action against Van Brunt and sought dismissal of Van Brunt’s answer and affirmative defenses and the appointment of a temporary receiver. Van Brunt cross-moved for an order determining that Citibank was not entitled to: any interest on the principal balance of the mortgage loan, late charges, advances, attorneys’ fees, prepayment penalties, commissions and all other costs and expenses. On October 15, 2010, Citibank transferred all interest in the note and mortgage, as well as the other loan documents, to LSREF2 Nova Investments, LLC (“Nova”). On December 10, 2010, all interest in the note and mortgage , together with the other loan documents, were transferred to Wells Fargo. On June 24, 2011, Citibank moved to substitute Wells Fargo into the action as the plaintiff.

In an order dated March 4, 2011, this Court denied that branch of [*3]Citibank’s motion seeking the appointment of a receiver, and denied without prejudice that branch of the motion seeking substitution and for summary judgment. The order granted Van Brunt’s cross motion to the extent of ordering that Citibank is not entitled to any interest from the date of the alleged default to and through March 31, 2011 and found that Citibank is not entitled to any default interest or expenses, including attorneys fees and prepayment penalties. Van Brunt was directed to pay the principal and interest due under the loan commencing on April 1, 2011. In addition, it was directed to pay to Citibank by April 1, 2011, the principal only from the date of default to March 31, 2011, which would be applied to the reduction of the principal.

As regards Sutter, beginning October 2009 it failed to make its required monthly payments under the mortgage. By letter dated December 16, 2009, Citibank maintains that it advised Sutter that it was in default and that failure to cure could result in Citibank exercising its right to accelerate the indebtedness. On February 5, 2010, Citibank filed a separate foreclosure action against the Sutter property. On February 24, 2010, a receiver was appointed to manage the Sutter property.On May 26, 2011, Citibank moved for summary judgment on its foreclosure action and to dismiss Sutter’s answer and affirmative defense. On October 15, 2010, Citibank transferred all interest in the note and mortgage, as well as the other loan documents, to LSREF2 Nova Investments, LLC (“Nova”). On December 10, 2010, all interest in the note and mortgage , together with the other loan documents, were transferred to Wells Fargo. On April 11,2011, Citibank moved to substitute Wells Fargo into the action as the plaintiff.

Consolidation

The defendants move to consolidate the Van Brunt and Sutter actions arguing that both actions involve common questions of law and fact and arise from the same facts and circumstances and assert the identical legal theories and defenses, in accord with the direction of §602(a) of the CPLR. If successful on the issue of consolidation, the defendants then seek an order, pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel, declaring that this court’s March 4, 2011 order in the Van Brunt action is equally binding on the Sutter action. The defendants further move for equitable relief in the Sutter action based on their assertion that Citibank acted unconscionably and in bad faith during the protracted period of settlement negotiation. Finally the defendants seek an order terminating the temporary receivership imposed on the Sutter property.They further contend that the resolution of both cases will involve the same documents and witnesses and thus, such overlap, necessitates consolidation to avoid unnecessary costs, delays and inconsistent judgments. Finally, they contend that there would be no prejudice to Citibank if the actions were consolidated arguing that both actions are in the same pre-discovery stage.

The defendants assert that Citibank treated the two mortgages as a package from the moment of default, noting for example, that Citibank alleges that it notified both properties of default on the same day and that all renegotiation’ efforts were done with both properties and as a package. The defendants note that every transfer of the property – October 15, 2010 to Nova and December 10, 2010 to Wells Fargo – was packaged as well. They argue that both of the defendants’ theory of the case is that foreclosure should be denied due to the bad faith and unconscionable behavior of Citibank throughout the course of said joint negotiations. They allege that they were jointly induced [*4]to make substantial personal investments in the respective properties at issue, based on an implied promise by Citibank that this show of good faith on the defendants’ part would result in a renegotiation of both mortgages, thereby avoiding default. The defendants conclude that the substance and legal theories of both cases are identical, will require the same testimony and evidence to be presented to the court, and should therefore be consolidated to avoid unnecessary costs, delay and inconsistent judgments.In opposition, Citibank argues that Van Brunt and Sutter are foreclosure actions filed separately by Citibank on February 5th, 2010 against two different commercial borrowers, namely Van Brunt Properties LLC, et al. and Sutter Avenue Management, LLC, et. al., each of whom holds a mortgage on a distinct property. They further point out that the circumstances under which each loan was made, the loan documents, and the defaults differ from one another. Moreover, Citibank avers that the receivership status and procedural posture of each case differs. Citibank maintains that consolidation should be denied inasmuch as the two actions do not have the requisite common issues of law and fact. Citibank also argues that it would be prejudiced by consolidation since consolidation would delay the resolution while both actions were aligned with one another. Finally, Citibank claims that the defendants are only seeking consolidation in an attempt to obtain a more favorable outcome, noting that there was no motion for consolidation until, this court’s ruling favorable to Van Brunt in the Van Brunt action.

Discussion

Section 602(a) of the CPLR gives a court discretion to consolidate actions where common questions of law or fact are present. Consolidation is preferred where these commonalities exist, absent proof that consolidation will prejudice a substantial right of the party opposing the motion (Best Price Jewelers.Com, Inc. v Internet Data Stor. & Sys., Inc., 51 AD3d 839 [2008]; Beerman v Morhaim, 17 AD3d 302 [2005]; Progressive Insurance Co. v Vasquez, 10 AD3d 518, 519 [2004]; Zupich v Flushing Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 156 AD2d 677, 677 [1989]). Further, consolidation is appropriate where it will avoid unnecessary duplication of trials, save unnecessary costs and expense, and prevent an injustice which would result from divergent decisions based on the same facts (see Zupich, 156 AD2d at 677). The defendants assert that their respective actions raise identical factual and legal issues, that the two properties have been dealt with as a package since they defaulted, that there will be little delay as the result of consolidation, that there would be no substantial prejudice to the plaintiff and therefore consolidation is required. The plaintiff does not dispute that the two properties were dealt with as a package during the period of renegotiation of their mortgages, but opposes the consolidation of these actions primarily on the ground that substantial prejudice would result from the delay that such a consolidation would cause. It avers that each action has an independent mortgage related to a separate and distinct parcel of land, that consolidation will unduly and additionally delay resolution and that the defendants’ motion is an attempt to forum shop in order to get a more favorable outcome in both actions

Absent a showing of prejudice to a substantial right the existence of common questions of law or fact justifies the grant of a motion for consolidation. (Lamboy v. Inter Fence Co., 196 AD2d 705, 601 N.Y.S.2d 619 (1st Dept.1993).However, a delay which would prevent a trial from taking place for “some time to come” has justified the denial of such a motion, Mulligan v. Farmingdale Union Free School District No. 22, 133 AD2d 617, 519 N.Y.S.2d [*5]725 (2d Dept.1987). In the instant actions, there are, as the plaintiff suggests, different procedural postures but these differences are not likely to cause such a delay as would substantially prejudice the plaintiff. The plaintiff does argue that it will be so prejudiced, but the arguments consist of conclusory self-serving statements that prejudice would occur if consolidation were ordered. The plaintiff suggests that there will be a delay “while the actions [are] brought in line with each other.” The major delay , appears to be caused by the appeals this Court’s March 4, 2011 Order, and the appeal of the instant motion, regardless of the out come. The plaintiff’s counsel says, “[t]rying to bring these actions in line with each other, so that they can proceed together, would only create undue delay and confusion, allowing defendant to prolong the proceedings and avoid judgement to Plaintiff’s severe prejudice.” Counsel does say not how the plaintiff is prejudiced nor what the prejudice is. There is no showing of prejudice to a substantial right of the plaintiff. “[A] and mere delay of the trial is not a sufficient basis upon which to deny a motion for consolidation or a joint trial (see Alsol Enters., Ltd. v. Premier Lincoln—Mercury, Inc., 11 AD3d 494, 783 N.Y.S.2d 620; Zupich, 156 AD2d at 677).” (Whiteman v Parsons Transportation Group of New York, Inc, et al. 72 AD3d 677, 900 N.Y.S.2d 87 ( 2d Dept 2010)

” Although a motion pursuant to CPLR 602 (a) to consolidate two pending actions is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, consolidation is favored by the courts in serving the interests of justice and judicial economy (see, Zupich v Flushing Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 156 AD2d 677). As both actions clearly involve similar issues of fact and law, it [would be] an improvident exercise of discretion to deny consolidation….” (Flaherty v RCP Assoc., 208 AD2d 496, 616 N.Y.S.2d 801,[ 1994]). In the case at bar, there are issues, with regard to whether the plaintiff and or its assigns have acted in good faith, which necessarily must be decided prior to a determination of whether the foreclosure of the defendants’ properties should go forward.These actions arise from the same factual events, involve virtually identical legal theories and defenses; they feature nearly the same principal parties. ” Where common questions of law or fact exist, a motion pursuant to CPLR 602(a) to consolidate … should be granted absent a showing of prejudice to a substantial right of the party opposing the motion (see Mas—Edwards v. Ultimate Servs., Inc., 45 AD3d 540, 845 N.Y.S.2d 414; Perini Corp. v. WDF, Inc., 33 AD3d 605, 606, 822 N.Y.S.2d 295; Nationwide Assoc. v. Targee St. Internal Med. Group, P.C. Profit Sharing Trust, 286 AD2d 717, 730 N.Y.S.2d 349).

Collateral Estoppel

The defendants seek an order, pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel, declaring that this Court’s March 4, 2011 order in the Van Brunt action is equally binding on the Sutter action. They urge the utilization of the doctrine of issue preclusion which is part of Collateral Estoppel. In order for a court’s ruling to be dictated by the decision made in a prior action under the doctrine of issue preclusion, “the identical issue necessarily must have been decided in the prior action and be decisive of the present action, and second, the party to be precluded from relitigating the issue must have had a full and fair opportunity to contest the prior determination” (Kaufman v Eli Lily and Co., 65 NY2d 449, 455 [1985]; Allied Chemical v Niagra Mohawk Power, 72 NY2d 271, 276 [1988]. When a court decides whether issue preclusion applies in a given case “the party seeking the benefit of collateral estoppel bears the initial burden of demonstrating that an issue in the present litigation is identical to an issue decided in the prior determination” (Lewis v City of New York, 17 Misc 3d [*6]537, 544 [2007]. The defendants further move for equitable relief in the Sutter action based on their assertion that Citibank acted unconscionably and in bad faith during the protracted period of settlement negotiation and that Citibank treated Van Brunt and Sutter identically during the course of said negotiation. For which reason, the defendants believe that Sutter is entitled to the relief granted to Van Brunt in this Court’s March 4, 2011 order.

Citing Halyalkar v. Board of Regents of the State of NY, 72 NY2d 261,268, the plaintiff, argues in opposition, that collateral estoppel is inapplicable unless the matter has been “actually litigated” The plaintiff’s counsel buttresses Citibank’s argument with a reminder that the actions “involve, among other things, different loan transactions and different parties. Most notably, the Sutter Loan Documents and the circumstances of Sutter’s default have never even been before this Court.” In sum, the argument is that collateral estoppel cannot be applied herein because there has been no actual litigation of the foreclosure in the Sutter action. Halyalkar,defines actually litigated’ as follows: “To satisfy the identicality requirement, the question must have been actually litigated and, therefore, it must have been properly raised by the pleadings or otherwise placed in issue and actually determined in the prior proceeding.” Halyalkar, supra at 261.

This Court’s March 4, 2011order in the Van Brunt action was issued after consideration of the papers and after oral argument on several motions which were before the Court. The motions and cross motion were before the court on March 4th and they were heard together. The plaintiff’s motions sought a temporary receiver, substitution and summary judgement on the foreclosure. The relief requested was denied with express permission to re-file both as to substitution and summary judgement. The motion for a temporary receiver can be made anew at anytime during the course of the proceeding where new facts arise. The defendants cross motion sought equitable relief; the plaintiff responded with opposition and oral argument was heard on the motion. The March 4th Order resulted from a full presentation by the parties on the issues before the court. As relevant to the collateral estoppel, the order addresses the behavior of the parties in that action and the consequences of that behavior with regard to the period following the “default” and renegotiation efforts made by the parties. It is not a permanent determination with regard to the foreclosures of the subject properties, rather it is the imposition of an equity equalizer put in place in recognition of the fact that Citibank and its assigns, as determined on papers and after oral argument, did actively prolong these proceeding with such lack of good faith as to require that they should forfeit any interest that would have otherwise been owning to them under the terms of the agreement they had with the borrowers. All of the renegotiation efforts were made with both Van Brunt and Sutter and at all the same times and places. Citibank had a full and fair opportunity to contest the prior determination; the issues were actually litigated in the Van Brunt action. In as much as the behavior of the lenders in the Van Buren action were identical, both in substance and in time, to the behavior of the lenders in Sutter, this Court cannot see how any different outcome for the Sutter action can fail to be an inconsistent result and a waste of judicial resources.

Finally the defendants seek an order terminating the temporary receivership imposed on the Sutter property. This Court is without sufficient information to make a determination as to wether or not the temporary receiver should be removed. Upon consolidation, and in as much as the papers are already before the Court, defendant Sutter may request a [*7]conference/argument with the plaintiff on the appropriateness/lack of need for the receiver.

Citibank’s Cross Motion.

Citibank cross-moves for an order finding that all conduct and statements over the course of settlement negotiations entered into between Citibank and the defendants, including the pre-negotiation agreement signed by all three parties, be ruled inadmissable in the Van Brunt action, pursuant to CPLR § 4547. Citibank also cross moves for an order seeking to substitute Wells Fargo as the plaintiff in the Van Brunt action and that the case caption be amended accordingly. Finally, Citibank cross-moves for clarification of two rulings contained in this court’s March 4, 2011 order.

In opposition to Citibank’s cross motion, the defendants argue that the cross motion and opposition papers should not be considered as such submissions were untimely and defective. On the issue of timeliness, the court notes that CPLR §2215 pertinently provides that “[a]t least three days prior to the time at which the motion is noticed to be heard, or seven days prior to such time if demand is properly made pursuant to subdivision (b) of rule 2214, a party may serve upon the moving party a notice of cross-motion demanding relief, with or without supporting papers . . .” Here, the defendants motion was served upon the plaintiff on April 6, 2011. The cross motion was not served until June 20, 2011, a full seventy-five days later.

The defendants further argue that the plaintiff’s papers are defective and should not be considered by the court. Specifically, it is argued that the papers are defective because they are submitted in reliance upon an affidavit of Marisa K. McGuaghey, who describes herself as an “authorized representative of Hudson Americas LLC” and bases her authority to submit her affidavit on behalf of Wells Fargo pursuant to an undated, uncertified copy of a Limited Power of Attorney. A power of attorney presented to the Court must be an original or a copy certified by an attorney, pursuant to CPLR §2105. Section 2105 of the CPLR states, inter alia, that “an attorney admitted to practice in the court of the state may certify that it has been compared by him with the original and found to be a true and complete copy” (see Security Pacific Nat. Trust Co. v Cuevas, 176 Misc 2d 846 [1998]). Here, there is nothing in the record indicating that the plaintiff’s attorney has performed this comparison (see Lasalle Bank N.A. v Smith, 26 Misc 3d 1239A [2010]; United States Bank Natl. Assn. v White, 22 Misc 3d 1112A [2009]; U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. v Bernard,18 Misc 3d 1130A [2008]). Additionally, the court notes that the fact that the limited power of attorney is undated is a further defect (see Ameriquest Mortgage Co., v Basevich, 16 Misc 3d 1104A [2007]. Based upon the foregoing, the court finds that the plaintiff’s papers are defective and therefore will not address the merits, or lack thereof, of the plaintiff’s cross motion.

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

E N T E R,

____________________________

yvonne lewis, JSC

Scribd

The never ending settlement… because those in DC are doing their best to make sure their bankers are A-OK.

Reuters-

Mortgage-backed securities investors who are convinced that banks intend to shift the cost of the $25 billion national mortgage settlement onto their shoulders are “evaluating their legal options,” according to Chris Katopis, executive director of the Association of Mortgage Investors (and a former clerk on the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals). The private investors, as I’ve reported, are outraged at the terms of the settlement, which sets no limit on the percentage of securitized mortgages the settling banks — Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, and Ally Financial — are permitted to modify to reach their $17 billion target for reducing the principal balance owed by struggling borrowers. Mortgage-backed noteholders believe the deal terms encourage banks to write down investor-owned first liens, rather than second lien mortgages in bank-owned portfolios. That incentive, they say, shifts the cost of the deal from the banks to mortgage-backed bondholders.

Their argument is gaining traction. The New York Times editorialized Sunday on the bank-friendly details of …

[REUTERS LEGAL]

Rolling Stone-

Here’s yet another form of hidden bailout the federal government doles out to our big banks, without the public having much of a clue.

This is from the WSJ this morning:

Some of the biggest names on Wall Street are lining up to become landlords to cash-strapped Americans by bidding on pools of foreclosed properties being sold by Fannie Mae…

While the current approach of selling homes one-by-one has its own high costs and is sometimes inefficient, selling properties in bulk to large investors could require Fannie Mae to sell at a big discount, leading to larger initial costs.

In con artistry parlance, they call this the “reload.” That’s when you hit the same mark twice – typically with a second scam designed to “fix” the damage caused by the first scam. Someone robs your house, then comes by the next day and sells you a fancy alarm system, that’s the reload.

In this case, banks pumped up the real estate market by creating huge volumes of subprime loans, then dumped a lot of them on, among others, Fannie and Freddie, the ever-ready enthusiastic state customer. Now the loans have crashed in value, yet the GSEs (Government Sponsored Enterprises) are still out there feeding the banks money through two continuous bailouts.

[ROLLING STONE]

Economic Musings-

 The wounds on past and present homeowners are still fresh from the housing crisis.  As Jonathan Laing points out in this weekend’s Barron’s cover story, “five million of the country’s 76million mortgage holders have lost their homes to foreclosure or lender ordered short sales since 2006, and an estimated 14million more own more on their homes than their properties are currently worth.  In all, some $7.4 trillion in homeowners’ equity has been destroyed according to Mark Zandi…”  

 Cries for Accountability

 Details of the $25bil Settlement (in the words of HUD) & Public Lauding

“On February 9, the Department of Justice …

[ECONOMIC MUSINGS]

by USRepMarcyKaptur

www.kaptur.house.gov

h/t NYE LAVALLE

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

GARY STUBBS,
Plaintiff,

v.

BANK OF AMERICA, BAC HOME
LOANS SERVICING, LP, and
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE
ASSOCIATION,
Defendants.

EXCERPT:

Plaintiff has alleged facts making it plausible that Fannie Mae was in fact
the secured creditor at the time of the foreclosure and has alleged that no
assignment to Fannie Mae was filed prior to the time of sale as required by
O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162(b). Therefore, based on the allegations in the amended
complaint, BAC evaded the most substantive requirements of Georgia’s
foreclosure statute in that (1) it was not the secured creditor entitled to foreclose
despite providing a notice letter affirmatively representing it was the creditor;
and (2) it failed to file the assignment of the security deed to the secured creditor
in the county deed records prior to the foreclosure. See O.C.G.A. § 162(b);
Weems v. Coker, 70 Ga. 746, 749 (Ga. 1883); Cummings v. Anderson, 173 B.R.
959, 963 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994).3 The Court accordingly DENIES the motion to
dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for wrongful foreclosure based on failure to comply with
Georgia foreclosure law.

For whatever reason scribd download is not permitting this to be downloaded.

Please use this link to download Stubbs_v._Bank_of_America

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