Florida | FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA - Part 2

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Former staff at closed David J. Stern law firm to receive settlement

Former staff at closed David J. Stern law firm to receive settlement


Sun-Sentinel-

Former employees of Plantation attorney David J. Stern agreed to a preliminary $502,000 settlement after he fired them without giving the required 60-day notice as business at his foreclosure law firm began to dry up.

U.S. District Judge Robert N. Scola Jr. found the settlement “sufficiently fair, reasonable, adequate and in the best interests” of the former workers, according to a preliminary order. There will be a June 8 final hearing.

Workers in the class-action settlement now have until May 3 to opt out of the settlement, while papers in support of it should be filed by May 29.

[SUN-SENTINEL]

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YVES SMITH: The Legal Lie at the Heart of the $8.5 Billion Bank of America and Federal/State Mortgage Settlements

YVES SMITH: The Legal Lie at the Heart of the $8.5 Billion Bank of America and Federal/State Mortgage Settlements


H/T Abigail – If you had any doubts about whether ‘your’ federal gov’t works for you or BofA, read Yves Smith’s latest:

One in a while, you can discern a linchpin lie on which other important lies hinge. We can point to quite a few in America: the notion of a permanent war on terror, which somehow justifies vitiating not just the Constitution, but even the Magna Carta, or the idea of an imperial executive branch.

Now the apparently-to-be-filed-in-court-today Federal/state attorneys general mortgage settlement is less consequential than matters of life and limb. But it still show the lengths to which the officialdom is willing to go to vitiate the law in order to get its way.

HUD Secretary Donovan, the propagandist in chief for the Federal/state mortgage pact, has claimed he has investor approval to do the mortgage modifications that are a significant portion of the value of the settlement. We’ll eventually see what is actually in the settlement, but the early PR was that “no less than $10 billion” of the $25 billion headline total was to come from principal reductions. Modifications of mortgages not owned by banks, meaning in securitized trusts, are counted only 50% and before Donovan realized he was committing a faux pas, he said he expected 85% of the mods to be from securitizations, so that means $17 billion.

[NAKED CAPITALISM]

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Massachusetts, Florida Look to Wrap Up Foreclosure Due Process

Massachusetts, Florida Look to Wrap Up Foreclosure Due Process


HUNDREDS of YEARS gone in SECONDS!


FDL-

As much as state and federal officials want to describe the foreclosure fraud settlement as a beginning, in many respects it was most certainly an ending. Analysts invested in the meme that “uncertainty” was crippling the housing market now are heavily invested in saying that the clearing of this uncertainty through the settlement will speed up the foreclosure machine. Diana Olick gives a version of that today which makes absolutely no sense, because all the data comes from the fourth quarter of 2011.

But nevertheless, she’s on to something. With state AGs releasing liability for foreclosure fraud, legislators in some key states are picking up where they left off, removing additional barriers to foreclosure, shutting down due process and subverting the implications of judicial rulings.

For example, in Massachusetts, lawmakers have introduced a bill to indemnify buyers of foreclosed properties from title defects that have been exposed by the Ibanez case.

The bill, if approved, will amend the state foreclosure laws to validate a foreclosure, even if it’s technically deficient under the Ibanez ruling, so long as the previously foreclosed owner does not file a legal challenge to the validity of the foreclosure within 90 days of the foreclosure auction.

The bill has support from both the community/housing sector and the real estate industry. Indeed, the left-leaning Citizens’ Housing and Planning Association (CHAPA), non-profit umbrella organization for affordable housing and community development activities in Massachusetts, has filed written testimony in support of the bill.

Properties afflicted with Ibanez title defects, in worst cases, cannot be sold or refinanced. Homeowners without title insurance are compelled to spend thousands in legal fees to clear their titles. Allowing such foreclosed properties to sit and languish in title purgatory is a huge drain on individual, innocent home purchasers and the housing market itself.

[FIRE DOG LAKE]

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2nd Circuit greenlights novel vehicle for BofA’s MBS settlement

2nd Circuit greenlights novel vehicle for BofA’s MBS settlement


Alison Frankel-

Way back in June, a day or so after Bank of America announced its proposed $8.5 billion settlement with Countrywide mortgage-backed securities investors, I wrote about the very peculiar vehicle through which the bank was seeking judicial approval of the arrangement. The settlement was filed by the Countrywide MBS trustee, Bank of New York Mellon, under Article 77 of the New York state code. Article 77, which allows a trustee to seek a judicial endorsement of trust-related decisions, is usually invoked in garden-variety trust disputes, not in an $8.5 billion deal affecting thousands of beneficiaries in 530 trusts. But the law offered distinct advantages for BofA, BNY Mellon, and the group of 22 institutional investors that negotiated the Countrywide MBS settlement. Under New York trust law, trustees have broad discretion to make decisions on behalf of the trusts they oversee. As long as the judge presiding over an Article 77 proceeding determines that the trustee has acted reasonably and hasn’t abused its discretion, the trustee’s decision gets a stamp of judicial approval. Anyone who disagrees with the trustee — and the banks and institutional investors that negotiated the BofA proposed settlement knew that there would be many investors who didn’t like it — bears the heavy burden of proving that the trustee acted outside the bounds of reason.

[REUTERS LEGAL]

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SB 1890: Bill to streamline foreclosures moves one step closer to Florida law

SB 1890: Bill to streamline foreclosures moves one step closer to Florida law


Palm Beach Post-

For the first time since the real estate crash crippled Florida’s economy and battered struggling homeowners, a bill to hasten foreclosures through the courts is headed to the full House and Senate.

A narrow 6-4 vote Monday in a specially scheduled meeting of the Senate Banking and Insurance Committee was the final hurdle for the proposal (SB 1890) to be heard by both chambers. The plan aims to reduce the amount of time a bank can pursue a homeowner for unpaid mortgage debt, while speeding foreclosures on abandoned homes and in cases where homeowners have no legitimate defenses.

Bill opponents fear borrowers will get caught up in a quickie foreclosure wheel without time to question bank documents, and argue that not only are portions of the plan unconstitutional, but that the overall proposal is unnecessary.

“Most of this bill is just totally useless,” said Sarasota-based attorney Henry Trawick, an expert on Florida’s judicial rules and author of Trawick’s Florida Practice and Procedure. “The courts already have the ability to do virtually everything they want to do here.”

[PALM BEACH POST]

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WILLIAMS v. WELLS FARGO | ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT, AND GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO CERTIFY CLASS ACTION

WILLIAMS v. WELLS FARGO | ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT, AND GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO CERTIFY CLASS ACTION


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 11-21233-Civ-SCOLA

RAY WILLIAMS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

vs.

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., et al.,
Defendants.

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HABER v. DEUTSCHE BANK | FL 4DCA “failed to show that it provided appellant with the requisite notice and opportunity to cure, not entitled to a final SJ”

HABER v. DEUTSCHE BANK | FL 4DCA “failed to show that it provided appellant with the requisite notice and opportunity to cure, not entitled to a final SJ”


OMAR HABER, Appellant,

v.

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE CERTIFICATE HOLDERS FOR ARGENT SECURITIES, INC., ASSET-BACKED PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-W2, Appellee.

 No. 4D10-4458.

 District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

  February 22, 2012.

Lionel Barnet of the Law Offices of Lionel Barnet, P.A., Miami, for appellant.

Debra Rescigno of Robertson, Anschutz & Schneid, P.L., Boca Raton, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Omar Haber appeals the trial court’s entry of a final summary judgment of foreclosure in favor of Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (the bank). He argues that summary judgment was improper because the bank lacked standing to file the foreclosure suit and failed to refute his affirmative defense that the bank did not provide him with the requisite notice and opportunity to cure required an the mortgage agreement. We affirm as to the standing issue without discussion, but we reverse the final summary judgment because the bank failed to refute appellant’s affirmative defense regarding notice and opportunity to cure.

The mortgage agreement states, in pertinent part:

Lender shall give notice to Borrower prior to acceleration following Borrower’s breach of any covenant or agreement in this Security Instrument . . . The notice shall specify: (a) the default; (b) the action required to cure the default; (c) a date, not less than 30 days from the date the notice is given to Borrower, by which the default must be cured; and (d) that failure to cure the default on or before the date specified in the notice may result in acceleration of the sums secured by this Security Instrument, foreclosure by judicial proceeding and sale of the Property.

There is no evidence within the record showing that the bank provided appellant with the requisite notice and opportunity to cure.

An order granting summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Allenby & Assocs., Inc. v. Crown St. Vincent Ltd., 8 So.3d 1211, 1213 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (citation omitted). In order to be entitled to summary judgment, a mortgagor must refute all of the affirmative defenses of the mortgagee or show that they are legally insufficient. Woodrum v. Wells Fargo Mortg. Bank, N.A., 73 So.3d 873, 874 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (citing Frost v. Regions Bank, 15 So.3d 905 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)). Because the bank failed to show that it provided appellant with the requisite notice and opportunity to cure, it was not entitled to a final summary judgment of foreclosure.

Affirmed in part, Reversed in part and Remanded.

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Beaumont v. BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON | FL 5DCA “BONY failed to prove who lost the note and when it was lost, …and produced no evidence of ownership”

Beaumont v. BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON | FL 5DCA “BONY failed to prove who lost the note and when it was lost, …and produced no evidence of ownership”


MARC D. BEAUMONT, Appellant,
v.
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, etc., Appellee.

Case No. 5D10-3471.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Opinion filed February 17, 2012.

Marc D. Beaumont, Port Orange, pro se.

Todd A. Armbruster of Moskowitz, Mandell, Salim & Simowitz, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Marc D. Beaumont appeals a final summary judgment entered by the trial court on a claim to foreclose a residential mortgage and recover on a promissory note executed in connection with the mortgage. We reverse.

The final summary judgment in this case was entered in favor of Novastar Home Mortgage, Inc. (“Novastar”), a nonparty to the suit because of its prior withdrawal from the case. It is fundamental error to enter judgment in favor of a nonparty. Beseau v. Bhalani, 904 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); Rustom v. Sparling, 685 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). The defect, which is jurisdictional, can be raised by this Court sua sponte. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Garcia, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D1664b (Fla. 3d DCA Aug. 3, 2011).

The judgment would also have to be reversed even if entered in favor of appellee, The Bank of New York Mellon, as Successor Trustee Under Novastar Mortgage Funding Trust 2005-3 (“Mellon”). Mellon sought in the complaint to reestablish the note and recover on it. See § 673.3091, Fla. Stat. (2010). This required Mellon to show it was entitled to enforce the note when it lost the instrument, or that it directly or indirectly acquired ownership from a person who was entitled to enforce the instrument when loss of possession occurred. § 673.3091(1), Fla. Stat.[1] Mellon failed to prove who lost the note and when it was lost, offered no proof of anyone’s right to enforce the note when it was lost, and produced no evidence of ownership, due to the transfer from Novastar to Mellon.[2] See Duke v. HSBC Mortg. Servs., LLC, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D2569a (Fla. 4th DCA Nov. 23, 2011). The trial court was also required to address the issue of providing adequate protection to Beaumont against loss that might occur by reason of a claim by another person to enforce the instrument. § 673.3091(2), Fla. Stat. If Mellon has, in fact, found the note, it must produce it prior to judgment. Gee v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 72 So. 3d 211, 212 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011); Perry v. Fairbanks Capital Corp., 888 So. 2d 725, 726 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); see also Feltus v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 37 Fla. L. Weekly D253a (Fla. 2d DCA Jan. 27, 2012).

Mellon also argues that Beaumont has waived the lack of “standing” to enforce the note because of the failure to assert this as an affirmative defense. Generally, the failure to raise standing as an affirmative defense operates as a waiver. Kissman v. Panizzi, 891 So. 2d 1147, 1150 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (holding lack of standing is an affirmative defense that must be raised by defendant and failure to raise it generally results in waiver). Standing involves the right to enforce the note and must exist when suit is filed. See, e.g., McLean v. JP Morgan Chase Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D2728a (Fla. 4th DCA Dec. 14, 2011); Taylor v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 44 So. 3d 618 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010). There is no evidence showing that Beaumont was on notice prior to the time his answer was filed that ownership of the note had been transferred from Novastar to Mellon. In fact, the claimed transfer, alleged to have occurred on the day suit was filed, was either concealed by Novastar for more than three years while it continued to pursue the action, or Novastar backdated the assignment it finally produced on July 23, 2010, as justification for substituting Mellon as plaintiff. Under these circumstances, Beaumont may raise lack of standing when suit was filed as a defense. See Boston Hides & Furs, Ltd. v. Sumitomo Bank, Ltd., 870 F. Supp. 1153, 1161 n.6 (D. Mass. 1994) (holding banks were not precluded from raising affirmative defense of fraud for first time on summary judgment in action alleging wrongful dishonor of letter of credit, where banks did not discover information suggesting fraud until almost one year of discovery). Furthermore, Mellon must prove its right to enforce the note as of the time the summary judgment is entered, even if Beaumont had waived the right to challenge the bank’s standing as of the date suit was filed. Venture Holdings & Acquis. Group, LLC v. A.I.M. Funding Group, LLC, 75 So. 3d 773 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). Its failure to do so would require this Court to reverse the summary judgment entered on the note and mortgage, even if judgment had been entered in favor of Mellon.

REVERSED.

TORPY, PALMER and COHEN, JJ., concur.

[1] A negotiable instrument is enforceable by: (1) the holder of the instrument, (2) a nonholder in possession who has the rights of a holder, or (3) a person not in possession of the instrument who is entitled to reestablish a lost, destroyed or stolen instrument pursuant to section 673.3091, or who has paid or accepted a draft by mistake as described in section 673.4181. § 673.3011, Fla. Stat.

[2] The record contains a copy of an assignment of the note from Novastar to Mellon, but the document was never offered into “evidence,” by being attached to an affidavit for purposes of authentification. As such, it is not competent evidence of the assignment and cannot be considered in ruling on Mellon’s motion. See, e.g., Morrison v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 66 So. 3d 387, 387 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (reversing summary judgment of foreclosure where defendant asserted she had not received a notice of default as required by mortgage, and bank had simply filed an unauthenticated notice letter).

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IN RE: BALDERRAMA | 2nd allonge includes an endorsement from RFC (Judy Faber) to Deutsche that did not exist in the first allonge…3 different Promissory Notes

IN RE: BALDERRAMA | 2nd allonge includes an endorsement from RFC (Judy Faber) to Deutsche that did not exist in the first allonge…3 different Promissory Notes


**Judy Faber has a history on this site and named in some important cases…check it out!

 

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION

In re
MARIA RENEE BALDERRAMA
Debtor.

CARLA P. MUSSELMAN, TRUSTEE
Plaintiff,

vs.

DEUTSCHE BANK TRSUTE COMPANY
AMERICAS, in trust for Residential
Accredit Loans, Inc. Mortgage Asset-
Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2007-QH5,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION PARTIALLY GRANTING AND
PARTIALLY DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

EXCERPT:

In response, the trustee filed her own cross motion for summary judgment arguing the
various documents Deutsche has provided to support its position, including three different
versions of the note and two versions of the allonge, were ineffective to transfer any interest to
Deutsche and evidence Deutsche‘s bad faith in purporting to own the note.17 The trustee‘s
argument primarily is based on the second allonge provided by Deutsche upon the Court‘s order
compelling discovery. The second allonge includes an endorsement from RFC to Deutsche that
did not exist in the first allonge, and, according to the trustee, Deutsche caused this endorsement
to be made fraudulently to meet the needs of litigation.18 The trustee urges the Court to find
Deutsche has not adequately explained the discrepancies between the two allonges, has not met
its burden to prove it is the legitimate owner of the note, and title to the Property should vest in
the trustee.

[...]

Neither version of the allonge, however, includes dates of the alleged transfers as stated
by Ms. Faber. Even assuming she had the authority to endorse the note to Deutsche, Ms. Faber
does not explain why RFC initially failed to produce the second allonge with the RFC
endorsement in its motion to lift stay, even though it allegedly existed at that time. These ?holes?
present substantial questions of fact as to Deutsche‘s good faith and the second allonge‘s
authenticity. The Court cannot avoid suspecting that the second allonge indeed was created
solely to rebut the trustee‘s assertions in this litigation and did not previously exist. If so, the
Court suggests Deutsche and Ms. Faber individually consider the possible consequences of
propounding potentially false evidence and perjured testimony to the Court.

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A valentine from Chief United States, Bankruptcy Court Middle Dist. of Florida Judge Karen S. Jennemann on Feburary 14, 2012

A valentine from Chief United States, Bankruptcy Court Middle Dist. of Florida Judge Karen S. Jennemann on Feburary 14, 2012


A valentine from Chief United States Bankruptcy Judge Karen S. Jennemann on Feburary 14, 2012:

The Court cannot avoid suspecting that the second allonge indeed was created solely to rebut the trustee‘s assertions in this litigation and did not previously exist. If so, the Court suggests Deutsche and Ms. Faber individually consider the possible consequences of propounding potentially false evidence and perjured testimony to the Court. Muselman v. Deutsche Bank, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division, Case No. 6:10-bk-07828-KSJ. Document 67, page 8.

As gratifying as this recognition of fraudulent documents may be, it does raise the question: just what are the consequences of propounding false evidence and perjured testimony to the Court. With the exception of a few judges and a few decisions, there have been no consequences whatsoever.

FRAUD DIGEST by Lynn E. Szymoniak, ESQ.

 

NOTE:

I would like to make a note of this because as soon as I posted this IN RE BALDERRAMA | FL BK Court “Deutsche Bank, Not proven to either the trustee or the Court that it holds a validly endorsed promissory note evidencing its purchase of the debt on the disputed property”, it went completely missing from the site! See for yourself and it’s still missing and not sure why some cases go missing.

 

451 B.R. 185 (2011)

In re Maria Renee BALDERRAMA, Debtor.
Carla P. Musselman, as Chapter 7 Trustee, Plaintiff,

v.

Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas, in trust for Residential Accredit Loans, Inc. Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-QH5, Defendant.

Bankruptcy No. 6:10-bk-07828-KSJ. Adversary No. 6:10-ap-00245-KSJ.
United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida, Orlando Division.
May 4, 2011.
186*186 Seldon J. Childers, Childers Law LLC, Gainesville, FL, for Plaintiff.

Daniel A. Miller, Broad and Cassel, West Palm Beach, FL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION PARTIALLY GRANTING AND PARTIALLY DENYING TRUSTEE’S AMENDED AND RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DEUTSCHE BANK

KAREN S. JENNEMANN, Bankruptcy Judge.

In this adversary proceeding the Chapter 7 trustee, Carla Musselman, seeks to quiet title and to value at zero dollars defendant Deutsche Bank’s alleged secured interest in debtor Maria Balderrama’s non-homestead real property. As part of discovery, the trustee served interrogatories and document production requests seeking information about the bank’s purchase of the promissory note and mortgage on the disputed property.[1] Deutsche Bank resists producing any discovery related to the purchase history of the note and the chain of title of the mortgage arguing that, under Florida law, it has established its secured interest in the property merely by alleging it holds the original promissory note endorsed specially in its favor.[2] The trustee disputes Deutsche Bank’s characterization of Florida law and notes that neither the Court nor the trustee has seen the original endorsed note. She now requests the Court 187*187 compel the bank to produce the requested information.[3]

Although Deutsche Bank is correct that under Florida law if it holds a validly endorsed original note it may be deemed equitably also to own the mortgage, the bank first must establish its actual possession of the original note. As such, the trustee’s discovery requests pertaining to Deutsche Bank’s status as holder of the note, including the authenticity and authority of the signatures endorsing the note, are relevant. All other requests, including any requests for information regarding the prior ownership history of the note or the mortgage, are irrelevant and overbroad under Florida law. Accordingly, the Court will grant in part and deny in part the trustee’s motion and direct Deutsche Bank to respond to interrogatory number 5 and document request numbers 7 and 30 on or before June 3, 2011. The trustee’s motion to compel otherwise is denied, and the objections raised by the bank are sustained as to all other interrogatories and production requests.

On September 28, 2010, the trustee initiated this adversary proceeding to value Aurora Loan Services’ secured claim at $0.00 pursuant to § 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code[4] and to quiet title in property owned by the debtor located in Rockledge, Florida. Aurora is the servicing agent on the mortgage, and it previously has moved for relief from stay to foreclose on the mortgage,[5] which this Court denied without prejudice for lack of evidentiary support.[6] On October 18, 2010, the trustee served her first set of interrogatories and first requests for production of documents on Aurora. On November 17, 2010, Aurora filed its objections to the trustee’s discovery requests,[7] objecting to certain requests seeking information about the history of the ownership of the subject note and mortgage. Aurora’s objections are based on its position that under Florida law the holder of a promissory note may equitably own and enforce a mortgage, even without a written assignment of the mortgage, and, accordingly, that the trustee’s requests seeking information regarding chain of ownership are irrelevant and overbroad.

On December 16, 2010, at a pretrial conference before this Court, the parties discussed Aurora’s objections to the trustee’s discovery, and the trustee made an ore tenus motion to amend the complaint to name Deutsche Bank as the real defendant in interest as the alleged holder of the original promissory note, which the Court granted.[8] At the hearing, the trustee also agreed to file an amended motion to compel Deutsche Bank to respond to the discovery requests served on Aurora, and Deutsche Bank has agreed for purposes of resolving the amended motion to compel and its/Aurora’s objections to the trustee’s discovery that it will step into Aurora’s position and stipulate for convenience that the discovery served on Aurora properly was served on it.[9]

188*188 Accordingly, on January 4, 2011, the trustee amended her complaint to change the name of the defendant from Aurora to Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas, in trust for Residential Accredit Loans, Inc. Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-QH5.[10] On January 18, 2011, Deutsche Bank filed its answer to the amended complaint.[11] On January 28, 2011, the trustee filed her amended motion to compel defendant’s response to trustee’s first interrogatories and request for production of documents and an associated memorandum of law.[12] On February 25, 2011, Deutsche Bank filed its memorandum in response to the trustee’s motion to compel.[13]

The trustee’s amended complaint argues Deutsche Bank cannot provide sufficient evidence of its purchase of either the note or the mortgage to assert a secured claim to the disputed property. The trustee now seeks to compel production of information from Deutsche Bank regarding its purchase of the underlying debt and mortgage, and especially whether the note and mortgage were properly assigned.

In response to the motion to compel, Deutsche Bank reiterates Aurora’s previous position, arguing certain interrogatories and production requests regarding chain of title are irrelevant and overbroad because, under Florida law, it need only show it holds the original note evidencing its purchase of the debt underlying the mortgage for it to equitably own the mortgage, too.[14] Essentially, the bank argues that, in Florida, a mortgage travels equitably with the underlying debt in the absence of a formal written assignment of the mortgage. Because the bank allegedly holds the note specially endorsed in its favor, Deutsche Bank maintains it already has established its security interest in the property.

The Court largely agrees with Deutsche Bank’s legal argument. Under applicable Florida law,[15] a mortgage, even without a written assignment, may travel equitably to the holder of the underlying debt, i.e., to the entity holding the original, properly executed and endorsed promissory note. Thus, if Deutsche Bank establishes it is the holder of a validly endorsed note, it, in turn, will establish its equitable ownership of the mortgage securing the note. This general rule of Florida law (the “General Rule”) was stated best in 1938 by the Florida Supreme Court in the seminal case Johns v. Gillian, as follows:

… a mortgage is but an incident to the debt, the payment of which it secures, and its ownership follows the assignment of the debt. If the note or other debt secured by a mortgage be transferred without any formal assignment of the mortgage, or even a delivery of it, the mortgage in equity passes as an incident to the debt, unless there be some plain and clear agreement to the contrary, if that be the intention of the parties.[16] 189*189 Johns goes on to say that “[t]he transfer of the note or obligation evidencing the debt… operates as an assignment of the mortgage securing the debt, and it is not necessary that the mortgage papers be transferred, nor, in order that the beneficial interest shall pass, that a written assignment be made.”[17] Johns concluded that “if there had been no written assignment, Gillian would be entitled to foreclose in equity upon proof of his purchase of the debt.”[18] Finding that Gillian had sufficiently proven his purchase of the debt through his in-court testimony, the court held that Gillian was the “equitable owner of the mortgage” entitled to foreclose, even though no formal assignment of the mortgage was executed.

The General Rule is alive and well in Florida.[19] In Riggs v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC,[20] Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeals held Aurora was entitled to summary judgment in a foreclosure action when it produced the original mortgage, a promissory note endorsed in blank, and affidavits that stated Aurora was the proper holder of the note and mortgage. Aurora did not submit a written assignment of the mortgage, and Aurora was not the original mortgagee. Nonetheless, the court found Aurora was the holder of the note entitled to enforce its terms under Fla. Stat. § 673.3011, and thus could foreclose on the mortgage, because it provided sufficient evidence of its purchase of the debt underlying the mortgage: possession of the original note endorsed in blank.[21]

Likewise, in another decision, the Fourth District Court of Appeals reversed and remanded a dismissal of a foreclosure action because the lower court failed to consider application of the General Rule.[22] In that case, WM Specialty filed a foreclosure complaint on December 3, 2002, and later, in response to a motion to dismiss, filed an assignment of mortgage dated January 3, 2003. The assignment, however, reflected that the mortgage was transferred to WM Specialty prior to the complaint date on November 25, 2002. The lower court found the complaint was void ab initio because WM Specialty did not hold the note and mortgage as of the date of filing the complaint. In reversing the lower court, the appellate court instructed the lower court to consider on remand whether WM Specialty acquired an equitable interest in the mortgage before execution of the written assignment by virtue of the prior transfer of the note and mortgage to WM Specialty. The court quoted Johns favorably at length for the proposition that “the mortgage in equity passes as an incident to the debt,” and indicated the lower court had failed to consider this General Rule.

In reaching its conclusion, WM Specialty Mortgage distinguished the facts before it from Jeff-Ray Corp. v. Jacobson,[23] another Fourth District Court of Appeals case the Chapter 7 trustee relies on in attempting to establish an exception to the General Rule. Jeff-Ray held that a trial court erred in not dismissing a foreclosure complaint for failure to state a cause of 190*190 action because it relied upon an assignment that was not in existence when the complaint was filed. There, the complaint was filed on January 4, 1988, supported by an alleged assignment of mortgage dated in 1986, which was not attached to the complaint. When the plaintiff later produced the assignment, it was dated April 18, 1988, four months after the complaint was filed. The plaintiff’s actions therefore led the appellate court to conclude that plaintiff had lied to the court by stating it held an assignment of mortgage from 1986 when in fact it held no assignment at all. Moreover, the court in Jeff-Ray did not discuss the General Rule or consider whether equitable transfer of the mortgage occurred prior to filing the foreclosure complaint because the plaintiff had not alleged any facts that might have indicated such transfer occurred (e.g. purchase of the underlying debt or any indication the plaintiff held possession of the mortgage in 1986).

These recent Florida appellate court cases all support Deutsche Bank’s position that proof of ownership of the debt underlying a mortgage is sufficient under Florida law to equitably convey the mortgage to the debt holder. Moreover, these cases suggest a note specifically endorsed to a foreclosure plaintiff is sufficient proof of purchase of the debt underlying a mortgage to equitably convey such mortgage. Indeed, Riggs indicates the holder of a note endorsed in blank may hold an equitable interest in the mortgage securing the note.[24]

The trustee disputes this legal analysis and, in response, argues that an exception to the General Rule applies.[25] She interprets Johns[26] to create an exception to the General Rule that if a foreclosure plaintiff lacks a written assignment of the mortgage he must prove his purchase of the debt beyond merely establishing he is the holder of the note underlying the mortgage. The trustee relies on this sentence: “Or if there had been no written assignment, Gillian would be entitled to foreclose in equity upon proof of his purchase of the debt.” Noticeably absent from this sentence and the Johns decision, however, is any statement that a creditor’s proof of its status as holder of a promissory note is not proof of purchase of the debt. The trial court in Johns required testimony of Gillian to establish he purchased the mortgage debt because there were factual issues raised concerning the timing of the purchase of the note.[27] But nothing in Johns or the more recent Florida appellate court cases can credibly be construed as establishing an exception to the General Rule that would require a note holder to prove its purchase of the debt beyond simply establishing that it is indeed the note holder. Proof of a creditor’s status as holder of a note underlying a 191*191 mortgage is proof of purchase of the debt, and the previous ownership history of the note and mortgage is irrelevant.

The trustee’s argument also relies on a decision from the Massachusetts Supreme Court, applying Massachusetts law, to argue that Florida state courts require more than the original note to convey equitable title to a mortgage.[28] Because Massachusetts law treats the equitable assignment of mortgages very differently than Florida law, a Massachusetts court’s interpretation of the law of their state is irrelevant to this proceeding. Ibanez sums up well how Massachusetts law deals with equitable transfer of mortgages as follows:

In Massachusetts, where a note has been assigned but there is no written assignment of the mortgage underlying the note, the assignment of the note does not carry with it the assignment of the mortgage. [] Rather the holder of the mortgage holds the mortgage in trust for the purchaser of the note, who has an equitable right to obtain an assignment of the mortgage, which may be accomplished by filing an action in court and obtaining an equitable order of assignment.[29]

These procedures are quite different than Florida’s procedures and its General Rule. Unlike Massachusetts, Florida law does allow the assignment of a note to carry with it the implicit assignment of the mortgage. Indeed, Ibanez distinguishes Massachusetts law from such other states’ laws that provide for equitable assignment of a mortgage.[30] Massachusetts law simply differs from Florida law and, as such, cannot create any type of exception to the still valid Florida General Rule. A creditor who holds a validly endorsed promissory note is deemed to hold an equitable lien arising from the related mortgage, without any requirement to have a separate valid assignment of the mortgage.[31]

Deutsche Bank, however, still has not proven to either the trustee or the Court that it holds a validly endorsed promissory note evidencing its purchase of the debt on the disputed property. Therefore, Deutsche Bank cannot rely on the General Rule to avoid responding to the trustee’s discovery requests pertaining to the authenticity of the note. The trustee has raised in her complaint doubts concerning the authenticity and effectiveness of the endorsements on the allonge to the note. The copies of the note and mortgage attached as an exhibit to its response therefore are insufficient to establish Deutsche Bank’s status as holder of the note.

Because the trustee has raised issues concerning the authenticity of and authority to endorse the note and allonge, the Court will overrule Deutsche Bank’s objection and compel its response to interrogatory number 5, seeking the names and addresses of “each person whose signature appears on any endorsements on the Note or any allonge.” The Court similarly will overrule Deutsche Bank’s objections and 192*192 compel its response to requests for production numbers 7 and 30. These requests seek documents and information related to Deutsche Bank’s purchase of the note and the authority of the individual who signed the endorsement. The inquiries are relevant to whether Deutsche Bank is the holder of a properly endorsed note.

The Court will sustain Deutsche Bank’s objections to every other interrogatory[32] and document production request,[33] finding such requests are irrelevant and overbroad in light of the General Rule. In particular, information on the chain of title of the mortgage, which parties have ever held an interest in the note or mortgage, and the electronic records related to this mortgage is irrelevant to the question of whether Deutsche Bank now holds the original validly endorsed note.

Accordingly, the Court will partially grant and partially deny the trustee’s motion to compel and direct defendant Deutsche Bank to respond to certain of the trustee’s first set of interrogatories and document production requests on or before June 3, 2011, as specified above. A further pretrial conference is set in this adversary proceeding for 2:00 p.m. on June 22, 2011.

A separate order consistent with this memorandum opinion will be entered simultaneously.

DONE AND ORDERED.

[1] As discussed below, the trustee’s discovery requests actually were served on Deutsche Bank’s predecessor to this adversary proceeding, Aurora Loan Services. Deutsche Bank has stipulated for purposes of this motion to compel that such requests were served on it, too. The Court similarly assumes that Deutsche Bank is authorized to prosecute the objections to the trustee’s discovery requests previously articulated by Aurora Loan Services and, for purposes of this motion, the interest of Deutsche Bank and Aurora Loan Services are identical.

[2] Defendant’s Response to Trustee’s Amended and Renewed Motion to Compel Defendant’s Response to Trustee’s First Interrogatories and Trustee’s First Request for Production of Documents and Incorporated Memorandum of Law (Doc. No. 25). A list of defendant’s specific objections to particular interrogatories and production requests is attached to its Response as Exhibit B.

[3] Trustee’s Amended and Renewed Motion to Compel Defendant’s Response to Trustee’s First Interrogatories and Trustee’s First Request for Production of Documents (Doc. No. 23).

[4] All references to the Bankruptcy Code are to Title 11 of the United States Code.

[5] Doc. No. 22 in the Main Case.

[6] Doc. No. 36 in the Main Case.

[7] Doc. Nos. 7, 8.

[8] Doc. No. 15.

[9] Fn. 4 of Defendant’s Response (Doc. No. 25). Deutsche Bank has adopted Aurora’s objections by incorporating them as Exhibit B to its Response.

[10] Doc. No. 17.

[11] Doc. No. 19.

[12] Doc. Nos. 23, 24.

[13] Doc. No. 25.

[14] Doc. No. 25 and Ex. B thereto set forth the bank’s specific objections.

[15] Paragraph 16 of the copy of the mortgage attached as Exhibit A to Defendant’s Response (Doc. No. 25) states the applicable law is the “law in which the property is located.” The property is located in Rockledge, Florida, and neither party disputes that Florida law applies.

[16] Johns v. Gillian, 134 Fla. 575, 184 So. 140, 143 (1938) (citations omitted).

[17] Id. (quoting 41 C.J., Mortgages, Sec. 686, p. 677) (quotations omitted).

[18] Id. at 143-44 (citing Pease v. Warren, 29 Mich. 9, 18 Am.Rep 58).

[19] Riggs v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC, 36 So.3d 932 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (per curiam); WM Specialty Mortgage, LLC, v. Salomon, 874 So.2d 680, 682-3 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).

[20] 36 So.3d at 933-34.

[21] Id.

[22] WM Specialty Mortgage, 874 So.2d at 682-3.

[23] 566 So.2d 885, 886 (Fla 4th DCA 1990).

[24] 36 So.3d at 933-34.

[25] Doc. No. 24.

[26] 184 So. at 143.

[27] Specifically, one of the main issues in Johns was whether a possibly dissolved corporation properly transferred its ownership of a mortgage. Because factual issues arose as to the timing of the corporation’s assignment of the mortgage, the purported purchaser of the note and mortgage testified in court as to his purchase of the debt. Johns makes no mention of the lack of a written assignment of the mortgage as the reason for the purported note holder’s testimony. The trustee’s interpretation of Johns as establishing a requirement under Florida law that without a written assignment of mortgage a purported note holder must go beyond proof of its status as note holder to establish the purchase of the debt, including chain of title and the entire ownership history of the note, therefore is strained and unsupported by the facts of the case.

[28] U.S. Bank N.A. v. Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637, 941 N.E.2d 40, 53-4 (2011).

[29] Id. (citations omitted).

[30] Id. (citing Barnes v. Boardman, 149 Mass. 106, 114, 21 N.E. 308 (1889) and quoting within the citation “In some jurisdictions it is held that the mere transfer of the debt, without any assignment or even mention of the mortgage, carries the mortgage with it, so as to enable the assignee to assert his title in an action at law … This doctrine has not prevailed in Massachusetts….”).

[31] The trustee also argues the Florida U.C.C. has abolished the General Rule. This proposition has no support in either the Florida U.C.C. or, as demonstrated by the recent Fourth D.C.A. decisions discussed above, in Florida case law.

[32] In particular, the objections are sustained as to interrogatory numbers: 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, 13, 16, 17.

[33] In particular, the objections are sustained as to requests for production numbers: 8, 9, 10, 11, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23.

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Other details on HB/SB213 The Florida (un)Fair Foreclosure Act background

Other details on HB/SB213 The Florida (un)Fair Foreclosure Act background


By: Dawn Rapoport, Esq.

Subject: Background and some case law

The predecessor to this section dates back to 1993 and, in short, it effectively provided that a show cause hearing could be had for the benefit of the creditor for the purpose of determining whether the debtor could be forced to pay rent as a condition to maintaining its defense in a foreclosure suit.  A couple of bright attorneys challenged the statute as being unconstitutional on the grounds that it was a denial of procedural due process and that it unconstitutionally allowed the legislature to prescribe procedure which is an area reserved by the Constitution to the courts, thereby violating the separation of powers provision. (The version of the statute they attacked is attached above.)  The third DCA bought into the argument, but the Supreme Court reversed while having no problem in concluding that since the procedural aspects of the statute were directly intertwined to its remedial purpose, there was no separation of powers violation.  (See Caple v. Tuttle).  Based upon the strong negative case law concerning this issue, there is almost no chance of the defense bar likely winning a separation of powers argument.  The supreme court also dismissed the procedural due process arguments for reasons which are not that germane to the pending legislation.

Nevertheless, while we thought it might be worth speaking to the bright lawyers who initially prevailed in the 3rd DCA; one attorney is now a sitting judge on the 3rd DCA and out of bounds for purposes of discussion, the other, currently employed by Grey-Robinson. 

Which still leaves us with the question does the procedure provided by the pending legislation render it unconstitutional as a violation of procedural due process.  For those not familiar with the body of procedural due process law, the devil is always in the details.  First of all well over 99% of the law in this area involves state action where the government; be it Federal, State or local is one of the litigants.  The courts allow much wider latitude to the conduct of private parties so we start with a very uphill battle. Very rarely have the courts concluded that private actors have not been provided with procedural due process when it has been demonstrated that the allegedly aggrieved party was given notice of the hearing and the opportunity to present evidence.

However, we do think the facts of the foreclosure crisis coupled with some of the language available concerning procedural due process keeps us in the ballgame.

Subject: Draft to Start Public Awareness – Position Statement Bullet Points and Stats

Draft to Start Public Awareness on HB213:

Stats found at www.frauddigest.com by Lynn Szymoniak, Esq.

There are at least 5 legislators with a solid background in real estate transactional work.  Most Legislators and the Public think: 1) they have time to wait for a more consumer friendly bill before they have to take action and 2) they think that if these houses get back on the market then the market will turn around.  They are wrong.

During the course of the session, those legislators with a real estate background should be extremely amenable to persuasive arguments on title integrity being totally undermined by a judicial process which has minimal concern for ferreting out the truth.  They need to share their heightened awareness with their colleagues.

The Bill is past the point of making it more consumer friendly.  In light of the evidence that has surfaced regarding foreclosure abuses by banks, robo-signing, securitization, fraud (in the inducement too) our legislature should not even consider such a bill.  While the public in general feels that there are a lot of people milking the system and living two years or more for free, it is not because of the consumer, but the bank’s conduct.

The proposed legislation is bad for the common good.

As we see it:

·        If the Banks and HOAs get everything they wanted from the Legislature this spring there would be economic chaos, because the real estate markets would be flooded with more properties, driving prices down another 25% or more, thereby driving tax rolls way down and bankrupting local governments;

·        FACT: 95% of the foreclosure cases are not contested;

·        FACT: Yet, it still takes over 600 days for the average foreclosure case to wind its way through the court system;

·        The reality demonstrates that banks are the ones who numerically and statistically are the ones most responsible for the slowness in which foreclosure cases move through the system, and the legislation is completely unnecessary;

·        The process is already in place, if they followed it, they could have a foreclosure done in 75 -90 days;

·        Wholesaling our constitutional rights is not the answer; this creates a summary proceeding, it’s totally unnecessary if the procedures already in place were used properly;

·        The procedure provided by the pending legislation makes it unconstitutional as a violation of procedural due process;

·        Unfortunately, well over 99% of the law in the area of procedural due process involves state action where the government; be it Federal, State or local is one of the litigants.  The courts allow much wider latitude to the conduct of private parties so homeowners start off with an uphill battle. Very rarely have the courts concluded that private actors have not been provided with procedural due process as long as it has been demonstrated that the allegedly aggrieved party was given notice of the hearing and the opportunity to present evidence;

·        The facts of the foreclosure crisis, robo-signing, securitization, servicing problems, and fraud, coupled with some of the language available concerning procedural due process keep consumers in the ballgame;

·        Every case currently being litigated is under assault with this legislation;

TWO KEY FACTORS IN THE PENDING LEGISLATION THAT CONSUMERS SHOULD BE OUTRAGED AT:

·        Section 7 of the legislation provides:

Section 7. The amendments to ss. 702.10, Florida Statutes,  and the creation of s. 702.13, Florida Statutes, are remedial in  nature and shall apply to causes of action pending on the  effective date of this act. Sections 702.11 and 702.12, Florida  Statutes, created by this act, apply to cases filed on or after July 1, 2012.

·        Make no mistake about it paragraph (1)(a)5 is the dagger.  It provides:

State that, if any defendant files defenses by a motion, a verified or sworn answer, affidavits, or other papers or appears personally or by way of an attorney at the time of  the hearing, the hearing time shall be used to hear and consider the defendant’s motion, answer, affidavits, other papers, and other evidence and argument as may be presented by any defendant or any defendant’s counsel, and the court shall  then make a determination as to whether a preponderance of the evidence and the arguments presented support entry of a final judgment of foreclosure, and if so, the court shall enter a final judgment of foreclosure ordering the clerk of the court to  conduct a foreclosure sale.

STATISTICS OF BANK OWNED HOMES – as of January 28, 2012 by Lynn Szymoniak, Esq. on Fraud Digest – Evidence the banks owning more properties is not changing anything

·         Home ownership in Florida’s 33 counties with population of 100,000 or greater as of January 24, 2012 is partially set forth here. The 34 counties with populations under 100,000 have a combined population of 1,278,080, approximately the population of Hillsborough County. The home ownership of Hillsborough has been used to approximate the ownership in the 34 counties, you can find the stat on each county at www.frauddigest.com

·         FLORIDA HOMES OWNED BY 8 LARGEST BANKS: 22,112

·         FLORIDA HOMES OWNED BY FANNIE & FREDDIE: 7,170

·         FL HOMES OWNED BY BANK OF AMERICA: 5,143

·         FL HOMES OWNED BY WELLS FARGO: 4,727

·         FL HOMES OWNED BY DEUTSCHE BANK: 3,114

·         FL HOMES OWNED BY BANK OF NEW YORK: 2,855

·         In January, 2012, in Palm Beach County, Florida, for example, 11 banks, FANNIE and FREDDIE and one mortgage servicer were the biggest homeowners, with 2,907 homes owned in total. Palm Beach County is the third largest county, by population, in Florida.

·         The banks and servicer owned 2,284 homes; FANNIE & FREDDIE owned 623 homes.

·         Three of the banks, Bank of America, Wells Fargo and Deutsche Bank, owned more homes than FANNIE.

·         Wells Fargo (including Wachovia) was the largest homeowner, owning 551 homes.

·         Bank of America and Deutsche Bank were close second and third largest, owning 496 homes and 454 homes, respectively. (The Bank of America total represents homes owned by Bank of America, BAC Home Loans Servicing and Countrywide.)

·         FANNIE owned 441 homes; FREDDIE owned 182 homes.

·         1 – MIAMI-DADE COUNTY (pop. 2,496,435)
HOMES OWNED BY 8 MAJOR BANKS, FANNIE & FREDDIE

o   BANK OF AMERICA: 650
BANK OF NEW YORK: 367
CHASE: 254
CITIBANK: 222
DEUTSCHE BANK: 676
FANNIE: 515
FREDDIE: 213
HSBC: 324
U.S. BANK: 121
WELLS FARGO: 579
BANKS: 3,193/F & F: 728

·         2 – BROWARD COUNTY (pop. 1,748,066)
HOMES OWNED BY 8 MAJOR BANKS, FANNIE & FREDDIE

o   BANK OF AMERICA: 624
BANK OF NEW YORK: 479
CHASE: 157
CITIBANK: 99
DEUTSCHE BANK: 445
FANNIE: 712
FREDDIE: 188
HSBC: 205
U.S. BANK: 489
WELLS FARGO: 493
BANKS: 2,991/F & F: 900

·         3 – PALM BEACH COUNTY (pop. 1,320,134)
HOMES OWNED BY 8 MAJOR BANKS, FANNIE & FREDDIE

o   BANK OF AMERICA: 497
BANK OF NEW YORK: 338
CHASE: 180
CITIBANK: 111
DEUTSCHE BANK: 454
FANNIE: 441
FREDDIE: 182
HSBC: 175
U.S. BANK: 196
WELLS FARGO: 551
BANKS: 2,502/F & F: 623

·         4 – HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY (pop: 1,229,226)
HOMES OWNED BY 8 MAJOR BANKS, FANNIE & FREDDIE

o   BANK OF AMERICA: 220
BANK OF NEW YORK: 116
CHASE: 40
CITIBANK: 30
DEUTSCHE BANK: 152
FANNIE: 265
FREDDIE: 83
HSBC: 84
U.S. BANK: 138
WELLS FARGO: 197
BANKS: 977/F & F: 348

·         5 – ORANGE COUNTY (pop. 1,145,956)
HOMES OWNED BY 8 MAJOR BANKS, FANNIE & FREDDIE

o   BANK OF AMERICA: 278
BANK OF NEW YORK: 31
CHASE: 102
CITIBANK: 49
DEUTSCHE BANK: 130
FANNIE: 500
FREDDIE: 126
HSBC: 83
U.S. BANK: 120
WELLS FARGO: 216
BANKS: 1,009/F & F: 626

·         6 – PINELLAS COUNTY (pop. 916,542)
HOMES OWNED BY 8 MAJOR BANKS, FANNIE & FREDDIE

o   BANK OF AMERICA: 166
BANK OF NEW YORK: 99
CHASE: 16
CITIBANK: 28
DEUTSCHE BANK: 113
FANNIE: 47
FREDDIE: 0
HSBC: 40
U.S. BANK: 143
WELLS FARGO: 181
BANKS: 786/F & F: 47

·         Bank of New York, the trustee for hundreds of Countrywide trusts, owned 338 homes.

·         U.S. Bank, the trustee for many Bear Stearns trusts, owned 196 homes

·         HSBC bank, the trustee for almost all of the Deutsche Bank Securities trusts, owned 175 homes.

·         JP Morgan Chase, including the homes owned by Chase Mortgage, and the Chase subsidiaries, Homesales, Inc. and Homesales of Delaware, Inc., owned a relatively low 174 homes.

·         Aurora Loan Services, keeper of most of the Lehman Brothers loans, was in 10th place among the large homeowners, with 149 homes.

·         Citibank, including Citimortgage, was the only other bank owning over 100 homes, with 111 homes.

·         Suntrust owned 82 homes; IndyMac/OneWest owned 54 homes; and GMAC owned 31 homes.

THE HB 213 BILL Pending Below

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Bondi says court ruling puts foreclosure fraud investigations in jeopardy

Bondi says court ruling puts foreclosure fraud investigations in jeopardy


As if she didn’t know this…hmm

Miami Herald-

An appeals court has denied Attorney General Pam Bondi‘s request to allow the state Supreme Court to review a ruling she says limits her ability to fight foreclosure fraud. Because of this decision, seven pending cases are now threatened, Bondi said Thursday.

In December, the state’s 4th District Court of Appeals ruled that Bondi does not have the authority to investigate a law firm for alleged fraud under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act because attorneys’ work on behalf of lenders did not constitute trade or commerce. She asked the court to certify that its decision in the  Law Offices of David Stern, P.A. v. State of Florida case passes upon a question of great public importance so that she could appeal to the Supreme Court.

[MIAMI HERALD]

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Attorney General Lisa Madigan files lawsuit against Nationwide Title Clearing (NTC) for filing faulty documents with Illinois county recorders

Attorney General Lisa Madigan files lawsuit against Nationwide Title Clearing (NTC) for filing faulty documents with Illinois county recorders


More proof FL AG Pam Bondi is not doing her job!

 

MADIGAN FILES SUIT OVER FAULTY MORTGAGE ASSIGNMENTS FILED WITH COUNTY RECORDERS

Attorney General Alleges Faulty Practices in Foreclosing on
Homeowners in Crisis

Chicago — Attorney General Lisa Madigan today filed a lawsuit against Nationwide Title Clearing for filing faulty documents with Illinois county recorders. Nationwide Title Cleaning Inc. (NTC) is a Florida-based company that prepares documents for mortgage servicers to use against borrowers who are in default, foreclosure or bankruptcy.

“The practices that NTC used were a key contributor to the mortgage crisis by undermining the integrity and accuracy of the mortgage servicing and foreclosure process,” Attorney General Madigan said.

NTC provides a range of mortgage loan services to eight of the top 10 lenders and mortgage servicers in the country. NTC specializes in creating, processing and recording mortgage assignments, which are often used for a lender to foreclose on a borrower.

The lawsuit, filed in Cook County Circuit Court, alleges numerous violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act and the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Madigan is asking the court to require NTC to review and correct all documents it unlawfully created and recorded in Illinois, and pay back all revenues, profits and gains achieved in whole or in part due to unlawful practices. The suit also asks the court to impose civil penalties against the company.

[illinoisattorneygeneral.gov]

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AN OPEN LETTER TO MICHIGAN AG BILL SCHUETTE FROM REG. Of DEEDS CURTIS HERTEL JR.

AN OPEN LETTER TO MICHIGAN AG BILL SCHUETTE FROM REG. Of DEEDS CURTIS HERTEL JR.


Via The American Independent -

AN OPEN LETTER TO BILL SCHUETTE

The Honorable Bill Schuette
Attorney General of Michigan

Mr. Schuette –

I have the utmost respect for you and your office, and I wish to commend your hard work
on the recent mortgage robo-signing crisis. The challenges we have faced in Michigan
concerning property fraud have been unlike anything we have ever seen before, and you
have been actively engaged in this fight with myself and the other Michigan Registers of
Deeds.

As you know, the deadline for Michigan to sign on to the 50-state mortgage fraud
settlement is February 3rd. I recognize that this is a difficult decision, and that there
are many factors to consider.

I am writing to ask that you stand firm, and refuse to add Michigan to any settlement
that would give criminal immunity to the defendants. Our ongoing investigations have
demonstrated that the major banks in this settlement, and their hired document mills,
were engaged in the practice of robo-signing. Hundreds of residents here in Ingham
County, and thousands of residents across the state, were illegally foreclosed upon
because of this practice.

These illegalities have stolen due process from our own citizens, and robbed them of
precious time that could have been used to recover and resume their mortgages, or obtain
a modification. A family who is facing a foreclosure is already vulnerable; this
practice insured that they could not possibly reclaim their home.

We have even received information in recent days that shows LPS, a document mill included
in the proposed settlement, specifically requested to have this criminal investigation
converted to a civil lawsuit. It seems clear that they are aware of their vulnerability
to these charges, and are attempting to save their company’s stock price by avoiding
responsibility.

All I am asking is that we treat the banks in the same way we would treat our own
citizens. If a person in Michigan were to commit fraud and forgery, and use these
practices to take someone’s property, that person would go to jail. I respectfully
request that we leave that same possibility open for the banks and corporations that have
committed those same crimes here in our state.

Sincerely,
Curtis Hertel
Ingham County Register of Deeds

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