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CoreLogic’s New Credit Score Exposes Even More of Your Financial Life – NYTimes.com

CoreLogic’s New Credit Score Exposes Even More of Your Financial Life – NYTimes.com


NYTIMES-

There’s no hiding now.

Anyone who has recently applied for a mortgage knows that lenders are already looking much more closely at your financial affairs. But soon, they’ll be able to easily delve into the deepest recesses of your financial life, accessing information that never before appeared on your credit report.

[NEW YORK TIMES]

image: smallbiztrends

© 2010-15 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



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FULL TRANSCRIPT: Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Public Hearings, September 24, 2010

FULL TRANSCRIPT: Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Public Hearings, September 24, 2010


Excerpt:

How to report? One of the things we strongly recommend is that you look at the MISMO standards, the Mortgage Industry Standards Maintenance Organization, for definitions, for format, and I think this might address issues, for example, with HUD reported credit score. That if you like at the MISMO, we don’t simply look at one field for credit score. There’s a field for a number. There’s also then a field of whether it’s a vantage score, whether it comes from FICO, what vendor reported the score. So that there are a number of variables then that are really behind it, and if you simply then pick up all of these variables associated with the credit score the way we do, you can then use the information internal to then generate whatever percentile or whatever calculation you would like to do, but that that would not be put back on the lender to reenter data, to rekey it, but instead use what’s already out there in the industry. Also it would provide for easier changes later on, if any additions are needed.

What about a universal mortgage identifier? That has been brought up. We would strongly recommend that you look at the mortgage identification number that’s been put out by the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, MERS. It allows us to track mortgages throughout the system from application all the way to sale of servicing, sales of the secondary market and I think for these purposes it would allow us to really sort of track some of the under coverage that we do see in the HMDA data. We did some analysis and found that by throwing out all the correspondent loans, we are eliminating a number of loans that had no counterpart in the retail broker data.

What to make public? Well, we really think that’s your decision. In a sense that there are a number of data elements here that we would very much not want to make public as companies because of the limitations we face, but that certainly that’s an issue that the bureau and the Fed will have to face going forward is the tradeoff between risks of identity theft associated with some of these elements and that, but that’s really your decision to make rather than the industry, and to some degree, we would benefit, I think, in terms of what would explain what’s going on in the industry with a greater data release.

Finally on multifamily, we did an analysis and we think that HMDA already covers about 95 percent of the multifamily loans that are made. In contrast, though, it covers only about 60 percent or so of the dollar amount of the loans. So that if you look then at the average loan amount that’s in HMDA, it’s about $1.7 million for a multifamily loan. If you look at the average loan size of what’s missing, it’s about $19 million. So we don’t know how much effort really should be put into trying to capture this remaining 5 percent of really high dollar loans that are done for just an entirely different set of investors out there. So I think you really ought to look at what do you really want to do with the multifamily data? Do you really want to expand it or is there a questionable usefulness of what’s already there? Thank you.

[ipaper docId=42211905 access_key=key-2llkeixrro0fj9v82nv6 height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-15 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



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MBA Testifies on Potential Revisions to The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA)

MBA Testifies on Potential Revisions to The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA)


WASHINGTON, D.C. (September 24, 2010) – Jay Brinkmann, Chief Economist and Senior Vice President of Research and Economics for the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA), testified today before the Federal Reserve Board of Governors at a hearing entitled, “Potential Revisions to Regulation C – Implementing the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA).”

Below is Mr. Brinkmann’s oral statement before the committee, as prepared for delivery.

“My name is Jay Brinkmann and I am the Chief Economist and head of research at the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA). I very much appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing of the Federal Reserve Board on potential revisions to its Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) requirements.

I would like to address essentially five questions or areas that need to be addressed. First, what data should be required? Second, how should the data be reported? Third, what should be used as the universal mortgage identifier? Fourth, what data should be made public? Finally, I will address some issues regarding multifamily data.

What data should be required?

Dodd-Frank already requires a significant expansion of the required data elements, although some are left to the discretion of the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB). In addition, we understand the Federal Reserve is looking at some potential additions beyond what is in Dodd-Frank. We have no objection to an expansion of the HMDA data elements as long as that expansion is consistent with the stated purposes of HMDA, the elements are consistent with what is already collected, and the changes would not pose unnecessary burdens on lenders. It should be understood, however, that no matter how many additional data elements are required they will not serve as a reliable proxy for the range of credit models or credit decisions given the sequential nature of the credit decision, variations in decision-making processes among lenders, as well as variations in shopping behavior and self-selection of credit terms by borrowers.

One issue the Fed must keep in mind in determining what data elements to collect is that HMDA requirements should not turn into a safe harbor of allowable credit variables to be considered when making a loan. Freezing credit models into an official sanctioned set of variables would have a deleterious impact on credit availability going forward, limiting the growth of lenders who believe they have a better idea of how to do things. For example, over the years some lenders have come to believe that credit scores are not as important as the number of times a potential borrower has been late with housing-related payments. Some lenders now will simply refuse to make a loan to a borrower who has walked away from a previous mortgage, or appears to be positioning himself or herself for such behavior. None of these considerations are captured in any of the proposed HMDA data elements, nor should they be.

How to report?

In determining definitions and file formats for potential data items, the Fed should use the standard and uniform definitions developed over the last ten years by the Mortgage Industry Standards and Maintenance Organization, Inc. (MISMO®). Reliance on MISMO definitions would greatly reduce the regulatory compliance burden by allowing lenders and vendors furnishing HMDA compliance services to pull from existing MISMO-compliant databases to report under HMDA. This would reduce the errors associated with entering data a second time for HMDA purposes and reduce the phase-in period for trying to interpret and then implementing new HMDA definitions. In addition, MISMO standards have already been adopted by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

Reliance on the MISMO dictionary and standards would also help deal with the ambiguity surrounding some of the data elements specified in Dodd-Frank. For example, Dodd-Frank requires that credit scores be reported. MISMO recognizes that there is no such thing as a single credit score, so while it has a field for the score, it also has a field for the credit score vendor (such as Vantage Score or FICO), and the reporting agency. Rather than asking lenders to map multiple fields into a single number to be reported to the Fed, a number that likely would not appear in any credit file nor be used in the credit or loan pricing decision, the Fed could simply ask for the multiple fields dealing with credit scores and do its own mapping depending on whether it is doing a company-level or industry-level analysis.

I cannot stress enough the extent of the regulatory burden that HMDA and other reporting and compliance requirements place on the industry. The largest shares of investments in technology today are going to reporting and compliance needs, with no direct benefit to the companies or their customers. I would hope that the Fed would keep this burden and its costs in mind and minimize future changes in HMDA once these changes are made. Relying on MISMO would not only minimize costs but it would allow minor tweaking of data requirements in the future with less burden.

What to use as the universal mortgage identifier?

The industry already has a uniform mortgage identification number that is issued through the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS). This MERS number is used by a very high percentage of lenders and is integral to numerous origination and secondary market functions. It would cause considerable confusion and unnecessary implementation expense to impose a new mortgage identification protocol on the industry. Reliance on the MERS Mortgage Identification Number (MIN) allows loans to be tracked from origination through sale in the secondary market and subsequent servicing, and is valuable in identifying and preventing mortgage fraud.

For the Fed’s purposes, a further advantage of using the MERS MIN is that it would help prevent double counting or the failure to count loans altogether. For example, the current practice of eliminating loans purchased as closed loans from correspondent banks lowers the apparent coverage level of HMDA. In an effort to see what was missing from HMDA, the MBA several years ago did a matched-pair analysis of correspondent loans and found that a large percentage did not have a matching loan in the retail/broker data. Use of the MERS MIN would largely solve the problem of estimating coverage levels because it would permit an explicit matching between retail/broker originations and correspondent originations, it would provide a matching of loans originated in one calendar year and sold in another, and it allow loan data to be double checked against other data sources like Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae.

What to make public?

Federal Reserve staff have developed considerable expertise in the analysis and interpretation of HMDA data. Their annual article in the Federal Reserve Bulletin is the source of information on HMDA for most analysts. In recent years, Fed staff have gone the extra mile to conduct analyses beyond the HMDA data to answer topical policy questions.

However, while it is proper and customary for a firm’s regulator to have access to confidential data, care needs to taken before those data are made public. While we see tremendous risk of widespread identity theft if all of the HMDA data elements were to be released in their collected form, particularly when those data are combined with other publicly available data, under Dodd-Frank, decisions on such release now lie with the Board and later the CFPB. The lending industry has poured tremendous resources into safeguarding the private information of our customers, and we have paid large fines for lapses. No doubt we would face the potential of additional fines and public recrimination were we to make the proposed HMDA data elements available to the public at large. That is why any liability associated with the collection and release of these data pursuant to Board rules should lie with the Fed. Moreover, the Board should provide guidance on how lenders should deal with requests that come directly to them for these data.

To a certain degree, we would support a greater release of credit data in some form. While it still would not solve all of the statistical problems associated with trying to mimic credit models with these data, it would go a long way to putting to rest once and for all charges of racism that have been hurled at the industry by various groups over the years that have no basis in fact. The econometric problems of omitted variables, multicolinearity and spurious correlation would still remain, but sufficient data would be available in the public domain to refute most of these charges.

What multifamily data should be reported?

MBA estimates that the 2008 HMDA data contained information on 95 percent of the multifamily loans made that year based on the number of loans, but covered only about 61 percent of their dollar amount. The average multifamily loan in HMDA was about $1.7 million while the average missing loan was about $18.9 million. We question the benefit of expanding the reporting requirements to include a relative small number of high-dollar multifamily projects.

Clearly, the data elements associated with single-family lending are not applicable to any but the smallest multifamily projects. Variables like race and credit score do not apply to limited partnerships, corporations or real estate investment trusts. We suggest that the Fed should examine the usefulness of the multifamily data it collects now with an eye to scaling back the requirement rather than going to large lengths to expand the reporting requirements to cover a small number of large dollar projects.

In conclusion, in making changes to the required data elements of HMDA, the Fed should look carefully at what is needed considering the new data requirements under Dodd-Frank and their costs, integrating the data requirements with what is already being collected, and using data definitions and identifiers that are already in common use. In addition, the Fed should be very concerned with the privacy related issues that would attend a wholesale public release of the new required data elements.”

###

The Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) is the national association representing the real estate finance industry, an industry that employs more than 280,000 people in virtually every community in the country. Headquartered in Washington, D.C., the association works to ensure the continued strength of the nation’s residential and commercial real estate markets; to expand homeownership and extend access to affordable housing to all Americans. MBA promotes fair and ethical lending practices and fosters professional excellence among real estate finance employees through a wide range of educational programs and a variety of publications. Its membership of over 2,200 companies includes all elements of real estate finance: mortgage companies, mortgage brokers, commercial banks, thrifts, Wall Street conduits, life insurance companies and others in the mortgage lending field. For additional information, visit MBA’s Web site: www.mortgagebankers.org.

© 2010-15 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



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Your Social Security Number May Not Be Unique to You

Your Social Security Number May Not Be Unique to You


Via: Comcast

Editor’s Note: This post by Tom Barlow originally appeared on August 12 on WalletPop.com.

How many times do companies use your Social Security number as the unique identifier for you? You doctor, bank, employer, all depend on the number for billing and recording transactions. A troubling new study by ID Analytics, Inc. found that, according to the wide-ranging company and government records it has access to, millions of Americans have more than one Social Security number, and millions of Social Security numbers are shared by more than one person.

Just how many? Out of the 280 million Social Security numbers the firm studied across its network of databases,

– More than 20 million people have more than one number associated with their name.
– More than 40 million numbers are associated with more than one person.
– More than 100,000 Americans have 5 or more numbers associated with their name.
– More than 27,000 Social Security numbers are associated with 10 or more people.

How does this happen? Many are doubtless due to bad memories, careless record-keeping or data input errors. Others are due to identity theft.

The company offers to check your identity for identity fraud free at MyIDScore.com; however, it wasn’t able to verify me (and I’m very verifiable) and the personal information you share is collected in an opt-out manner. That is, you’ll have to send the company an e-mail to stop it from using your data to “make our fraud prevention tools better.”

There is a method to the assignment of Social Security numbers which can help a little bit in spotting frauds. The first three digits are determined by where you lived when you received your number; 596 to 599, for example, are issued to residents of Puerto Rico (yes, it’s part of the United States). The higher the number, the further west you lived at the time you received your number. There are no Social Security numbers starting with 900-999.

The middle two digits identify when the card was issued; 184-50 was issued in Pennsylvania in 1973, for example. There are no numbers with the middle two digits of 00.

The final four digits are assigned in numerical order.

Check yours with this handy decoder.

Do you share a Social Security number with someone else? What are your biggest concerns? Sound off here.

WalletPop.com is one of the leading consumer finance sites on the Web. Find the latest deals, bargains, consumer protection and personal finance information quickly. The opinions expressed are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Comcast.


© 2010-15 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



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Are Lenders digging into noncredit proprietary databases such as those maintained by Papa John’s or Victoria’s Secret legally?

Are Lenders digging into noncredit proprietary databases such as those maintained by Papa John’s or Victoria’s Secret legally?


Lenders’ data mining goes deep

Mortgage makers are going beyond tax returns and bank statements to determine whether you’re a good risk. They’re checking such things as where you have pizza delivered and where you shop online.

By Lew Sichelman
July 18, 2010

Reporting from Washington —
That pizza you had delivered the other night could mean the difference between whether you are approved for a mortgage or rejected.

There’s a big stretch between making a house payment and paying for a pizza. But it’s not what you pay for carryout that matters, at least not in the eyes of lenders. It’s where the food was delivered.

Ordering takeout proves that you live where you say you do, and that helps lenders uncover the crook who claims to live in the property he is trying to refinance when he really lives hundreds of miles away. Or expose the 35-year-old who says he has a $1,200-a-month apartment when he really lives rent-free with Mom and Dad.

When you order food online, you become part of a vast database that lenders might tap to help them determine whether you are a good risk. Moreover, all sorts of these data reservoirs exist, and none of them is off-limits to lenders who are coming off the worst financial debacle since the Great Depression.

“If the data is available and it can be obtained legally, I’m going to test it,” says Alex Santos, president of Digital Risk, an Orlando, Fla., analytics firm that works with lenders and investors to build better underwriting mousetraps. “If it is inexpensive and makes my credit model better, I’m going to use it.”

Digital Risk is just one of numerous risk-management companies that are continuously probing for ways to help clients quantify their risk, prevent fraud and otherwise ensure the quality of their loans. And they’re going to extraordinary lengths to do so.

For example, they might peek into your online-buying habits. After all, the reasoning goes, someone who buys his shirts from a Brooks Brothers catalog may have more disposable income than someone who shops at JCPenney.

“At least that’s a theory we can test,” Santos says. “We’re looking for any type of data source that you can plug into a computer. It takes only a month of trial and error to determine whether the information can help [determine credit risk] or not. We have a hypothesis, push a button, and the computer tells us whether the data is predictive or not.”

This sort of data mining goes way beyond your credit score, that financial snapshot that measures your ability and willingness to repay your debt. And, Santos says, “there’s a tremendous amount of this kind of analytics going on right now.”

Lenders are still checking credit histories, not just when you apply for a mortgage but also a second time a day or two before the loan closes. But your credit score — known as a FICO score for the name of the company that created the scoring formula — is now considered “too broad.” Consequently, it has moved down in the hierarchy of tests that lenders are using to make certain that someone isn’t hoodwinking them.

First and foremost, lenders are pulling copies of your tax returns directly from Uncle Sam.

Don’t be alarmed. You give the lender permission to do that when you sign Form 4506-T. The idea here is to make sure that you haven’t altered the copy of your last two years’ tax returns that you provided when you signed your loan application. Lenders want to know if you might have exaggerated how much you earned.

Continue reading….LA Times
© 2010-15 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



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Should You Be Told if Your Bad Credit Affects Your Car Insurance Rates?

Should You Be Told if Your Bad Credit Affects Your Car Insurance Rates?


By DinSFLA

What does Car Insurance and Credit Scores have in common? DISCRIMINATION!

If the government does not step up with a plan to make sure this does not continue, other crisis will begin to brew.

AMERICA will take the roads uninsured because they cannot afford the rates and they still need to get to work and shop for food!

Once our survival instincts kick in nothing else matters but food, clothes and shelter. Get my point?

So this being said and with the high rate of foreclosures out there. Who is going to have stellar credit for car insurance?

The same goes with Employers and Home Insurance!

Enough is Enough…We are suppose to be the Land of The Free not The Controlled and Abused!

THIS NEEDS TO BE EVALUATED IMMEDIATELY! THIS AFFECTS EVERYONE!

Arkansas and Oregon Lead the Way

The attorneys general of Arkansas and Oregon have both filed suits against a leading car insurance company for failing to disclose “adverse actions” taken against customers based on their credit. Five other states have joined them in seeking national clarification on the matter. But this begs the question, “Why would car insurance companies not tell you that your credit was impacting your rates?”

The answer is simple: Every car insurance company treats its customers’ credit differently. A study by Consumer Reports showed a nearly forty percent difference between how two car insurance companies viewed the same bad-credit customer. And that’s two car insurance companies that actually use credit reports – some don’t. In that case, you could save up to forty-seven percent on your car insurance rates!

© 2010-15 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in concealment, conspiracy, credit score, fair isaac corporation, fico, foreclosure, foreclosures, insurance, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (0)

Awwwe Man… OUR CREDIT SCORE SUCKS Y’ALL!!!

Awwwe Man… OUR CREDIT SCORE SUCKS Y’ALL!!!


DinSFLA here: Before you read into this *new* PR move and get all wound up…you MUST read the post I made FAIR ISAAC CORPORATION aka FICO: Now Worthless…

These banks knew all to well where we were heading and they could have stopped this a long time ago!

Don’t fall into their credit trap to make you think you are worth a stupid number! Just know how to survive and work around it. Yes places like employers and insurance companies now rate you by this but you know what? It is what it is. Your health and your mind will not suffer from this… They want you to live, breathe their credit!

More Americans’ credit scores sink to new lows

By EILEEN AJ CONNELLY (AP) –

NEW YORK — The credit scores of millions more Americans are sinking to new lows.

Figures provided by FICO Inc. show that 25.5 percent of consumers — nearly 43.4 million people — now have a credit score of 599 or below, marking them as poor risks for lenders. It’s unlikely they will be able to get credit cards, auto loans or mortgages under the tighter lending standards banks now use.

Because consumers relied so heavily on debt to fuel their spending in recent years, their restricted access to credit is one reason for the slow economic recovery.

“I don’t get paid for loan applications, I get paid for closings,” said Ritch Workman, a Melbourne, Fla., mortgage broker. “I have plenty of business, but I’m struggling to stay open.”

FICO’s latest analysis is based on consumer credit reports as of April. Its findings represent an increase of about 2.4 million people in the lowest credit score categories in the past two years. Before the Great Recession, scores on FICO’s 300-to-850 scale weren’t as volatile, said Andrew Jennings, chief research officer for FICO in Minneapolis. Historically, just 15 percent of the 170 million consumers with active credit accounts, or 25.5 million people, fell below 599, according to data posted on Myfico.com.

More are likely to join their ranks. It can take several months before payment missteps actually drive down a credit score. The Labor Department says about 26 million people are out of work or underemployed, and millions more face foreclosure, which alone can chop 150 points off an individual’s score. Once the damage is done, it could be years before this group can restore their scores, even if they had strong credit histories in the past.

On the positive side, the number of consumers who have a top score of 800 or above has increased in recent years. At least in part, this reflects that more individuals have cut spending and paid down debt in response to the recession. Their ranks now stand at 17.9 percent, which is notably above the historical average of 13 percent, though down from 18.7 percent in April 2008 before the market meltdown.

There’s also been a notable shift in the important range of people with moderate credit, those with scores between 650 and 699. The new data shows that this group comprised 11.9 percent of scores. This is down only marginally from 12 percent in 2008, but reflects a drop of roughly 5.3 million people from its historical average of 15 percent.

This group is significant because it may feel the effects of lenders’ tighter credit standards the most, said FICO’s Jennings. Consumers on the lowest end of the scale are less likely to try to borrow. However, people with mid-range scores that had been eligible for credit before the meltdown are looking to buy homes or cars but finding it hard to qualify for affordable loans.

Workman has seen this firsthand.

A customer with a score of 679 recently walked away from buying a house because he could not get the best interest rate on a $100,000 mortgage. Had his score been 680, the rate he was offered would have been a half-percent lower. The difference was only about $31 per month, but over a 30-year mortgage would have added up to more than $11,000.

“There was nothing derogatory on his credit report,” Workman said of the customer. He had, however, recently gotten an auto loan, which likely lowered his score.

Studies have shown FICO scores are generally reliable predictions of consumer payment behavior, but Workman’s experience points to one drawback of credit scoring: lenders can’t differentiate between two people with the same score. Another consumer might have a 679 score because of several late payments, which could indicate he or she is a bigger repayment risk.

On a broader scale, some of the spike in foreclosures came about because homeowners were financially irresponsible, while others lost their jobs and could no longer pay their mortgages. Yet both reasons for foreclosures have the same impact on a borrower’s FICO score.

In the past too much credit was handed out based on scores alone, without considering how much debt consumers could pay back, said Edmund Tribue, a senior vice president in the credit risk practice at MasterCard Advisors. Now the ability to repay the debt is a critical part of the lending decision.

Workman still thinks credit scores alone play too big a role. “The pendulum has swung too far,” he said. “We absolutely swung way too far in the liberal lending, but did we have to swing so far back the other way?”

© 2010-15 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in CONTROL FRAUD, fair isaac corporationComments (0)

After foreclosure: How long until you can buy again? CNNMoney

After foreclosure: How long until you can buy again? CNNMoney


Again, FAIR ISAAC CORPORATION aka FICO: Now Worthless……It’s another scam taken over by wallstreet/mba to make us *think* we are worth a number!

By Les Christie, staff writerMay 28, 2010: 7:58 AM ET

NEW YORK (CNNMoney.com) — Walking away from a mortgage you can still afford to pay has consequences; everyone knows that. Your credit score is shot and it can be impossible to get credit.

Some homeowners, no doubt, believe that the credit score hit is worth getting out from a deeply underwater mortgage. They may owe, say, $500,000 when their house value is only valued at $350,000. And, they figure, there’s no way it will ever be worth what they owe so it’s better to get out from underneath the burden.

After default, they reason, they can raise their FICO scores by paying all their bills on time and eventually finance another home purchase.

Don’t count on it.

While homeowners who default due to economic hardship, such as a job loss or divorce, normally must wait two to five years before buying a home again, walkaways may face double that time.

“It could be well over seven or eight years before [walkaways] are able to obtain a mortgage to buy a home again,” said Jay Brinkmann, chief economist for the Mortgage Bankers Association.

How foreclosure impacts your credit score
“Credit scores are only one component of a complete credit decision,” Brinkmann said. “[In these cases] credit scores are not a good indicator of their willingness to continue to pay their mortgage.”

But future underwriters will scrutinize their records very closely, and if they find no precipitating factors leading to the defaults — no job loss, no health issues –the repaired credit score won’t overshadow the black mark of a walkaway.

“If you made a strategic decision to default on paying your mortgage, it will work against you,” said Bill Merrell of the National Association of Review Appraisers and Mortgage Underwriters.

Merrell, who teaches underwriting, said banks are looking at several factors in determining whether to grant mortgages: the amount of money borrowers have in the bank; employment histories; payment history.

However, banks may be far more lenient if the default resulted from factors somewhat beyond the borrower’s control, such as from local economic problems. “They’ll give you more consideration if it’s job related,” he said. But, he added, banks look at strategic defaults “very negatively.”

That said, it’s not impossible to get a loan. Banks still want to make interest payments, so they might be willing to gamble with a walkaway.

“It might be a little more difficult for them to borrow, but [banks’] drive for market share — to profit from making loans — will trump that caution,” said Keith Gumbinger, of the mortgage information publisher HSH Associates. “I don’t think we’ll see a full denial.”

It’s hard to foresee the state of mortgage lending six or seven months from now, let alone seven or eight years into the future. So lenders may look at applications from one-time strategic defaulters and say, “Yes, they walked away but it’s a whole different market now,” according to Gumbinger.

Even so, lenders may require more from borrowers who walked away than those who didn’t.

“To the extent they could get a mortgage,” said Brinkmann, “they can count on needing a heavy down payment.”

The lenders may ask for 30% down or more. That would provide enough collateral cushion that the bank could get all or most of its money back in a foreclosure.

Strategic defaulters might also be charged higher interest rates, even above the levels other borrowers with similar credit scores would receive.

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FAIR ISAAC CORPORATION aka FICO: Now Worthless…

FAIR ISAAC CORPORATION aka FICO: Now Worthless…


By DinSFLA

Yep, just another way for bankers to rate our credit worthiness. As we  begin to witness all this garbage happening with banks these days, why even bother to save your credit? Save your cash and buy in cash. The higher the credit score the more we are worth to them. It makes no sense what so ever now. We are living our lives based on stupid silly numbers. If you want to purchase a home…go at it and be creative, ask for owner financing.

If we eliminate the banks “middle men” we will learn to live free with no strings attached. Don’t get all strung out because your score has gone way down. It’s only a number!

Keep in mind if you are in an illegal foreclosure you are only 3 months late…The non-creditors that are reporting you have nothing to do with your debt. If you care about this “FICO” score then write your bureau and demand that they delete any derogatory findings the non-creditor has filed with them!

Lets take a look at FICO:

Company milestones

  • 1958: Fair Isaac starts building credit scoring systems.
  • 1970: First credit card scoring system delivered.
  • 1975: First behavior scoring system to predict credit risk related to existing customers.
  • 1981: Introduction of Fair Isaac credit bureau try to scores.
  • 1986: IPO, stock listed at NASDAQ.
  • 1991: Introduction of TRIAD, a credit card management system.
  • 1996: Stock moves from NASDAQ to NYSE.
  • 1997: The American Bankers Association honors Bill Fair and Earl Isaac with Distinguished Service Award for their pioneering work in credit scoring. AHA… you see I knew they were involved some how! Right about the time they were planning our future.
  • 1999, the average FICO score of the top prime issuers of 30-year mortgage pools (privately issued non-GSE mortgage-backed securities) was 721 compared to a 605 average FICO score for subprime issuers of fixed-rate pools.
  • Under another classification, a 580 FICO score has been used to describe the minimum credit score acceptable for “A-minus” credit. Still, the lower grade subprime borrowers are characterized by a history of more delinquencies on their credit obligations. Under one classification, “B” and “C” borrowers can have a minimum FICO score of 540 and may have four late mortgage payments in the past twelve months. See Jess Lederman, Tom Millon, Stacy Ferguson, and Cedric Lewis, “A-minus Breaks Away from Subprime Loan Pack,” in Secondary Market Executive.
  • 2002: Merger with HNC Software, Inc., adding fraud detection to their arsenal with the $100 million Falcon product line and strengthening their analytics offerings in the insurance and telecommunications markets.
  • 2003: Fair, Isaac and Company is renamed Fair Isaac Corporation. Here too …they were on to something.
  • 2004: Acquisition of London Bridge Software, expanding services to credit collections and recovery software. Opens a new analytic consulting and product development center in Bangalore, India targeted primarily at Asia Pacific markets.
  • 2005: Acquisition of RulesPower, bringing Rete III algorithm to Blaze Advisor.
  • 2006: Celebrates 50th anniversary.
  • 2008: Fair Isaac released Debt Manager 7
  • 2009: Company name changed from Fair Isaac, to FICO (FICO means Fair Isaac Corporation). Website changed to fico.com

 

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