fair debt collection practices act - FORECLOSURE FRAUD

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Debtor’s prison 2.0: Jail for delinquent homeowners?

Debtor’s prison 2.0: Jail for delinquent homeowners?


HSH-

Readers of Victorian novels know what debtor’s prison is–a scabrous place where distressed maidens, handsome heroes and pitiable children who owe as little as 60 cents are locked up until their debts are paid. The U.S. abolished federal imprisonment for unpaid debts in 1833, and today, most of us are pretty sure that we can’t be sent to the pokey for blowing off a creditor.

We’d be wrong.

Creditors work the system to jail debtors

While we can’t be sent to a federal prison for ignoring bills, many states allow citizens to be popped into state or local lockups for unpaid debt. Savvy collection agencies use this process to do an end run around the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Here’s how it works:

  • The collection agency sues the debtor, often in small claims court, with perhaps only a mailed summons (legal in some states, Illinois for example) or, worse, an imaginary notice referred to as “sewer service”
  • The debtor tosses the paper threat unread or misunderstands its implications. The debtor automatically loses the case because he doesn’t show up in court. He’s ordered to pay the collection agency, and the judge issues a arrest warrant for failing to appear and/or make the court-ordered payments
  • Mr. Debtor is dragged out of a PTA meeting on the outstanding warrant and goes to jail
  • He makes bail, which is (amazingly!) set at the exact amount owed
  • The bail is turned over to the creditor. Taxpayers foot the bill for arresting and jailing the “evildoer”
  • If unable to come up with the money owed, Mr. Debtor rots in jail. According to a Minnesota Star Tribune article, an Illinois man was sentenced “to indefinite incarceration” until he paid his $300 lumber yard debt

What about mortgage lenders?

[…]

[HSH FINANCIAL NEWS BLOG]

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KCSG Television – Utah Federal Judges Decisions Conflict in ReconTrust Utah Home Foreclosure Actions

KCSG Television – Utah Federal Judges Decisions Conflict in ReconTrust Utah Home Foreclosure Actions


There are some judges that get it and some that maybe still do but side the other way!

KCSG-

Utah senior federal Judges Dee Benson and Bruce Jenkins have ruled Bank of America’s foreclosure arm, ReconTrust Company, N.A. (NYSE: “BAC”) may not be qualified to perform non-judicial foreclosures in Utah. However, this week senior federal Judge David Sam ruled that ReconTrust is operating under the National Bank Act regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), is a trustee under the Texas law where ReconTrust is located rendering Utah Code 57-1-21(3) inapplicable. Ruling

The ruling comes in a case filed by attorney John Christian Barlow, in which ReconTrust is being sued by Utah homeowner Garry Franklin Garrett and accused of conducting an unlawful foreclosure sale because ReconTrust is not a qualified trustee under Utah Law.

[KCSG]

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UT Class Action Lawsuit Alleging Fair Debt Collection Violations to Proceed Against Bank of America and Recontrust Company

UT Class Action Lawsuit Alleging Fair Debt Collection Violations to Proceed Against Bank of America and Recontrust Company


KCSG-

US District Judge Dee Benson ruled Tuesday that a class action lawsuit can proceed against ReconTrust and Bank of America (NYSE: “BAC”).

.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, DISTRICT OF UTAH,

CENTRAL DIVISION

JEREMY COLEMAN, DWAYNE WATSON, SAMUEL ADAMSON, ETHNA LYNCH,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

RECONTRUST COMPANY, N.A.,

[…]

[ipaper docId=67510230 access_key=key-enk4f8ay8gbs1ez6opf height=600 width=600 /]

 

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11th Circuit Reversed/Remands “the federal court lacked jurisdiction because although the petition referenced federal laws, none of the claims relied on federal law”

11th Circuit Reversed/Remands “the federal court lacked jurisdiction because although the petition referenced federal laws, none of the claims relied on federal law”


IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

WEKESA O. MADZIMOYO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON TRUST COMPANY, N.A., f.k.a. The Bank of New York Trust Company, N.A.,
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,
GMAC MORTGAGE, LLC,
MCCURDY & CANDLER, LLC,
ANTHONY DEMARLO, Attorney,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(September 7, 2011)

Before TJOFLAT, CARNES and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Wekesa Madzimoyo, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defendants. Because we conclude that
the district court lacked removal jurisdiction, we vacate and remand.

In July 2009, Madzimoyo filed an emergency petition in state court seeking
a temporary restraining order (TRO) to stop foreclosure proceedings on his home
by defendants Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, JP Morgan Chase Bank,
McCurdy & Candler, and attorney Anthony DeMarlo. According to the petition,
none of the defendants was the original lender and there was no evidence that the
original lender had transferred its rights to any defendant. In support of his
petition, Madzimoyo submitted correspondence sent to the defendants in which he
sought to verify their rights over the mortgage. Some of the correspondence
referenced the Fair Debt Collection Practice Act (FDCPA) and Regulation Z, the
Truth-in-Lending regulations. The state court issued the TRO and scheduled a
hearing on the petition to stop the foreclosure.

The day before the scheduled hearing in state court, the defendants removed
the petition to federal district court in the Northern District of Georgia, asserting
federal-question jurisdiction because Madzimoyo had alleged violations of the
FDCPA and Regulation Z. Madzimoyo moved to remand to state court, disputing
that he raised any basis for federal jurisdiction.

The magistrate judge denied the motion to remand, finding that
Madzimoyo’s petition raised federal questions under the FDCPA and Regulation
Z. The defendants then moved for judgment on the pleadings. In a brief in
support of the motion, the defendants argued that the FDCPA and Regulation Z
claims failed because Madzimoyo had not alleged any violation of these statutes.
The magistrate judge recommended that the motion for judgment on the
pleadings be granted. The district court adopted the recommendation, over
Madzimoyo’s objections, and granted judgment on the pleadings. This appeal
followed.

On appeal, both parties address the merits of the order granting judgment on
the pleadings, and there is no discussion of the district court’s jurisdiction over
Madzimoyo’s action. Nevertheless, we are “obliged to notice any lack of
jurisdiction regardless of whether the question is raised by the parties themselves.”
Edge v. Sumter Cnty. Sch. Dist., 775 F.2d 1509, 1513 (11th Cir. 1985).

We review questions of subject-matter jurisdiction de novo. Romero v.
Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1313 (11th Cir. 2008). We consider sua sponte
whether the district court had removal jurisdiction. Cotton v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 402 F.3d 1267, 1280 (11th Cir. 2005).

Under the removal statute:
Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction
founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or
laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to the
citizenship or residence of the parties. Any other such action shall be
removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and
served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is
brought.

28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). In other words, to be removable on federal-question
jurisdiction grounds, the case must arise under federal law. See Merrell Dow
Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807-08 (1986). The “well-pleaded
complaint” rule instructs that a case does not arise under federal law unless a
federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s complaint. Id. at 808;
Kemp v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 109 F.3d 708, 712 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 11 (1983)).

A federal question is presented by the complaint when the suit relies on a
federal cause of action or where “the vindication of a right under state law
necessarily turned on some construction of federal law.” See Merrell Dow, 478
U.S. at 808. Under this latter analysis, federal question jurisdiction should be
narrowly construed. See id. at 810-14. “[T]he mere presence of a federal issue in
a state cause of action does not automatically confer federal-question jurisdiction,”
even where the interpretation of federal law may constitute an element of the state
cause of action. Id. at 813. More recently, the Supreme Court fashioned another
test for deciding whether federal courts should exercise federal question
jurisdiction over removed state court proceedings: “does a state-law claim
necessarily raise a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a
federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved
balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.” Grable & Sons Metal
Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005). “If the plaintiff
elects to bring only state law causes of action in state court, no federal question
will appear in the complaint that could satisfy the well-pleaded complaint rule, and
the case may not be removed to federal court.” Kemp, 109 F.3d at 712.

Upon review of the record, we conclude that the district court should not
have exercised federal-question jurisdiction upon the removal of this case.
Although Madzimoyo’s petition referenced federal laws in passing, none of his
causes of action relied on even the interpretation of federal law. Rather,
Madzimoyo merely asserted that he requested his loan information from the
mortgage companies in accordance with federal law to show that he had acted
diligently and merited state relief. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the
district court and remand with instructions that the district court remand the
proceeding to the state court.

VACATED AND REMANDED.

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READ | Letter from Utah Attorney General Mark Shurtleff to Bank of America President Brian T. Moynihan re: ReconTrust “ILLEGAL”

READ | Letter from Utah Attorney General Mark Shurtleff to Bank of America President Brian T. Moynihan re: ReconTrust “ILLEGAL”


“All real estate foreclosures conducted by ReconTrust in the state of Utah are not in compliance with Utah’s statutes, and are hence illegal”

[ipaper docId=56254613 access_key=key-1y6gmyihelxc0a0sczvm height=600 width=600 /]

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Montana Appeals Court Affirms $311K Award Against Law Firm, Debt Collectors. MCCOLLOUGH v. JOHNSON, RODENBURG & LAUINGER

Montana Appeals Court Affirms $311K Award Against Law Firm, Debt Collectors. MCCOLLOUGH v. JOHNSON, RODENBURG & LAUINGER


TIMOTHY MCCOLLOUGH

V.

JOHNSON, RODENBURG & LAUINGER,

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Carolyn S. Ostby, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted
July 29, 2010—Billings, Montana

Filed March 4, 2011

Before: Sandra Day O’Connor, Associate Justice,*
Sidney R. Thomas and William A. Fletcher, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Thomas
*

OPINION

THOMAS, Circuit Judge:

Debt collection law firm Johnson, Rodenburg & Lauinger
(“JRL” or “the law firm”) appeals from the entry of summary
judgment against it under the federal Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (“FDCPA”), and from a subsequent jury verdict
awarding damages under the FDCPA, the Montana Unfair
Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (“MCPA”), and
state torts of malicious prosecution and abuse of process. We
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm.

continue below…

[ipaper docId=52389142 access_key=key-11zpto6h50sqbsgxh350 height=600 width=600 /]

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OH Judge Denies MTD “FDCPA, Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act” TURNER v. Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act

OH Judge Denies MTD “FDCPA, Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act” TURNER v. Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act


TAMARA TURNER, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
LERNER, SAMPSON & ROTHFUSS, Defendant.

Case No. 1:11-CV-00056.United States District Court, N.D. Ohio.

March 4, 2011.

OPINION & ORDER

[Resolving Doc. No. 8]

JAMES S. GWIN, District Judge.

The Defendant, Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss (“Lerner”), moves the Court to dismiss this action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. [Doc. 8.] The Plaintiffs oppose the motion. [Doc. 14.] The Defendant replied. [Doc. 19.]

For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

I. Background

In this putative class action, Plaintiffs Tamara Turner, Phillip Turner, Mary Sweeney, James Unger, and Kelly Unger file suit alleging violations of state and federal consumer protection statutes. [Doc. 1-1.] The Plaintiffs bring claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. §1692, as well as a variety of Ohio state law claims, including the Ohio Consumer Sales Protection Act, O.R.C. Chapter 1345. [Doc. 1-1.]

This action stems from a number of mortgage foreclosure suits that Defendant Lerner initiated in Ohio state court. [Id.] Defendant Lerner is a law firm that prosecutes mortgage foreclosure actions. The Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Lerner engages in the widespread practice of filing and prosecuting mortgage foreclosure actions, notwithstanding the fact that many of Lerner’s clients lack proper standing to sue. [Id. at 2.] According to the Plaintiffs, the Defendant also employs individuals who regularly execute assignments of mortgages on behalf of the Mortgage Electronic Registration System (“MERS”) to their clients without proper legal authority to do so. [Id at 2.] The Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant Lerner has the practice of filing false and misleading affidavits in an effort to mislead courts into ruling that Lerner’s clients possess proper standing to prosecute foreclosure actions. [Id. at 2.] The Plaintiffs say that this practice has caused hundreds — and possibly thousands — of individuals in Ohio to defend frivolous foreclosure actions in which the Defendant’s clients lacked basic standing to sue. [Id.]

The Plaintiffs also set forth a number of allegations specific to the named Plaintiffs. First, the Plaintiffs say that Tamara and Phillip Turner resided in a home at 20526 Byron Road, Shaker Heights, Ohio, until Defendant Lerner filed a foreclosure action on behalf of Provident Funding Associates L.P. on October 16, 2009. [Id. at 5.] Tamara and Phillip Turner allege that they mistakenly believed that they only had twenty-eight days to vacate their home, and as a result, moved in with Phillip Turner’s mother. [Id. at 5.] On July 26, 2010, Defendant Lerner filed an affidavit with the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas that falsely set forth the Provident Funding was the real party in interest in the foreclosure action. [Id. at 5.] However, on November 9, 2010, the Ohio state court action against the Turners was dismissed for lacking of standing, because Defendant Lerner was unable to prove that Provident had standing as holder of the relevant mortgage note to file the foreclosure action. [Id. at 5.] Apparently, Provident Funding took no appeal from that dismissal.

Second, the Plaintiffs say that Mary Sweeney owns a home located at 315 Overlook Park, Cleveland. [Id. at 6.] On January 5, 2010, Defendant Lerner filed a foreclosure action on behalf of Bank of America, claiming that Bank of America owned a promissory note which gave it standing to institute a foreclosure proceeding against her. [Id. at 6.] The Plaintiffs say that Defendant Lerner caused one of their employees — Shellie Hill — to fraudulently execute an assignment of the relevant mortgage note from MERS to Bank of America. [Id. at 6.] The Plaintiffs allege this assignment was not valid because Shellie Hill did not have any authority from MERS to execute the assignment to Bank of America. [Id. at 6.] However, on August 24, 2010, the Ohio state court action against Sweeney was dismissed for lacking of standing, because Defendant Lerner was unable to prove that Bank of America had standing as holder of the relevant mortgage note to file the foreclosure action. [Id. at 6-7.] Apparently, Bank of America took no appeal from that dismissal.

Third, and finally, Plaintiffs say that James and Kelly Unger own a home at 3158 Morley Road, Shaker Heights, Ohio. [Id. at 7.] On May 29, 2007, Defendant Lerner served the Ungers with a foreclosure complaint by on behalf of Bank of New York. [Id. at 7.] The Plaintiffs claim that Lerner’s employee, Shellie Hill, fraudulently assigned the mortgage note on behalf of MERS to Bank of New York. [Id. at 7-8.] The Plaintiffs say this assignment was not valid because Shellie Hill did not have any authority from MERS to execute the assignment to Bank of New York. [Id. at 7-8.] On July 14, 2009, the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas dismissed the foreclosure action because the Defendant failed to prove that the Bank of New York had standing to sue. [Id. at 8.] The Ungers were again served with a foreclosure complaint in an action filed by the Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company on November 30, 2009. [Id. at 8.] This second action was dismissed on July 13, 2010; there is no allegation that Defendant Lerner directly participated in this second lawsuit. [Id. at 8.]

On January 4, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. [Id.] The Plaintiffs bring six causes of action of behalf of a putative class of all Ohio homeowners who were defendants in foreclosure actions brought by Defendant Lerner since January 5, 2006. [Id.] Specifically, the Plaintiffs bring causes of action: (1) under the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. §1692, saying the Defendant used false, deceptive, and misleading practices to prosecute foreclosure actions (Count 1); (2) under the FDCPA, saying that the Defendant’s behavior constitutes slander of credit (Count 2); (3) for abuse of process under Ohio state law (Count 3); (4) for malicious prosecution under Ohio state law (Count 4); (5) under the Ohio Consumer Sales Protection Act, O.R.C. Chapter 1345, saying the Defendant’s filing of frivolous lawsuits constitutes an “unfair, deceptive and unconscionable sales practice” (Count 5); and (6) for filing of frivolous lawsuits under Ohio Revised Code § 2323.51 (Count 6). [Doc. 1-1.]

On January 7, 2011, the Defendant removed the action to federal court. [Doc. 1.] The Court has proper subject matter jurisdiction over the claims brought under the FDCPA and supplemental jurisdiction over the claims brought under Ohio state law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331; 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d); 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The Defendant now moves to dismiss this action for failing to state a claim. [Doc. 8.]

II. Legal Standard

A court may grant a motion to dismiss only when “it appears beyond doubt” that the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45 (1957). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The plausibility requirement is not a “probability requirement,” but requires “more than a sheer possibility that the defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 provides the general standard of pleading and only requires that a complaint “contain . . . a short plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-51. (citations removed). In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a court should assume the[] veracity” of “well-pleaded factual allegations,” but need not accept a plaintiff’s conclusory allegations as true.

III. Analysis

III.A Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Count 1)

Congress enacted the FDCPA in order to eliminate “the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a). The statute is very broad, and was intended to remedy “what it considered to be a widespread problem.” Frey v. Gangwish, 970 F.2d 1516, 1521 (6th Cir.1992). “When interpreting the FDCPA, [courts should] begin with the language of the statute itself . . .” Schroyer v. Frankel, 197 F.3d 1170, 1174 (6th Cir.1999). With the purpose of the FDCPA in mind, the Court will proceed to the substance of the Plaintiffs’ claims.

i. Equitable Tolling

Claims brought under the FDCPA are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). The claims brought by Plaintiffs James and Kelly Unger are not timely, since the last action alleged to be taken by the Defendant occurred in July, 2009. Therefore, unless equitable tolling applies to their claim, it must be dismissed as untimely.

The Sixth Circuit has not ruled on whether equitable tolling applies to claims under the FDCPA. Whittiker v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., 605 F.Supp.2d 914, 917 (N.D. Ohio 2009). Nonetheless, since the Sixth Circuit has held that equitable tolling applies to claims brought under the Truth in Lending Act, district courts in this Circuit generally also apply equitable tolling principles to claims brought under the FDCPA. See, e.g., Zigdon v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 2010 WL 1838637 at *6-12 (N.D. Ohio, Apr. 23, 2010); Whittiker, 605 F. Supp.2d at 917; Foster, et al. v. D.B.S. Collection Agency, 463 F.Supp.2d 783, 799 (S.D. Ohio 2006).

To benefit from equitable tolling, a plaintiff must show that she has been pursuing her rights diligently and that some extraordinary circumstance stood in her way. Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 335 (2007). Equitable tolling is “available only in compelling circumstances which justify a departure from established procedures.” Puckett v. Tennessee Eastman Co., 889 F.2d 1481, 1488 (6th Cir. 1989). Sixth Circuit case law has consistently held that the circumstances which will lead to equitable tolling are rare. Souter v. Jones, 95 F.3d 577, 590 (6th Cir. 2005). Moreover, the plaintiff has the burden of persuading the court that she is entitled to equitable tolling. Allen v Yukins, 366 F.3d 396, 401 (6th Cir. 2004). The following factors are generally considered when the issue of equitable tolling arises: (1) lack of notice of the filing requirement, (2) lack of constructive knowledge of the filing requirement, (3) diligence in pursuing one’s rights, (4) absence of prejudice to the defendant, and (5) the plaintiff’s reasonableness in remaining ignorant of the particular legal requirement. Chavez v. Carranza, 559 F.3d 486, 492 (6th Cir. 2009).

The Plaintiffs say that the claims of James and Kelly Unger should be subject to equitable tolling since another law firm attempted to foreclose on the Ungers’ home in 2010 on behalf of the Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company. The Plaintiffs allege that the firm which brought the second suit attempted to use the assignment of mortgage previously executed by one of Defendant Lerner’s employee as evidence of standing. [Doc. 14 at 9.] This second foreclosure action was ultimately dismissed on July 13, 2010, also for want of standing to sue. [Id.] There is no allegation that Defendant Lerner participated in this second action or otherwise was connected to it.

The Court does not find this sufficient reason to justify equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. The Ungers do not allege any circumstances that would have prevented them from filing this action within the one-year statute of limitations. The Ungers do not allege or proffer any evidence showing that they have been diligently pursuing their legal rights or that Defendant Lerner concealed their alleged wrongdoing or tricked them into not exercising rights. SeeMezo v. Holder, 615 F.3d 616, 620 (6th Cir. 2010); Barry v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 721, 724 (6th Cir. 2008). Indeed, the Ungers were free to bring all claims related to the first lawsuit prior to or during the pendency of the second lawsuit. If anything, the Ungers are alleging an ongoing violation that did not end until July, 2010. However, this argument also fails, because there is no allegation that Defendant Lerner filed or otherwise participated in the second foreclosure action that was filed against the Ungers.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Defendant’s motion to dismiss all claims brought by Plaintiffs James and Kelly Unger under the FDCPA.

ii. Violation of FDCPA

The Court will now proceed to the claims brought by Plaintiffs Tamara Turner, Phillip Turner, and Mary Sweeney, all of which are brought within the one-year statute of limitations.[1]

Section 1692e of the FDCPA generally prohibits a debt collector from using false, deceptive or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of a debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.[2] Section 1692f prohibits debt collectors from using “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f.[3] In the Sixth Circuit, a false statement that is not deceptive under the objective “least sophisticated consumer” test is not a violation of the FDCPA. See Lewis v. ACB Business Services, Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 401-02 (6th Cir. 1998). In Count 1, the Plaintiffs allege Defendant Lerner violated the FDCPA in the underlying foreclosure actions by misrepresenting who owned Plaintiffs’ mortgage notes at the time the underlying foreclosure actions were filed, thus concealing the fact that its clients lacked capacity to bring the suits. [Doc. 14 at 5.]

Simple inability to prove present debt ownership at the time a collection action is filed does not constitute a FDCPA violation. Harvey v. Great Seneca Financial Corporation, 453 F.3d 324, 331-33 (6th Cir.2006). Courts in the Sixth Circuit applying the FDCPA to lawsuits brought to collect a debt have generally found, however, that where a plaintiff alleges that the plaintiff in an underlying debt collection action says that it was the owner of a debt, “all the while knowing that they did not have means of proving the debt,” that a FDCPA complaint will survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See, e.g., Delawder v. Platinum Financial Services, 443 F. Supp.2d 942, 945 (S.D. Ohio 2005)[4] (false affidavit attached to complaint “all the while knowing that they did not have means of proving the debt”).

Here, not only do the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant filed the foreclosure actions knowing that it did not have the means of proving the ownership of the debt; they also allege that the Defendant knowingly executed misleading affidavits and unauthorized assignments of the notes to their clients. [Doc. 1-1.] The Court finds that this conduct, if proven true, would be actionable under the FDCPA under both Sections 1692e and 1692f. See Hartman v. Asset Acceptance Corp., 467 F. Supp.2d 769, 779 (S.D. Ohio 2004) (holding that a representation that defendant was a “holder in due course” of a debt is actionable as a representation concerning the “legal status” of the debt, if the representation is false and if the defendant does not satisfy the bona fide error defense); Kline, 2010 WL 1133452, at *8; Lee v. Javitch, Block & Rathbone, LLP, 484 F. Supp.2d 816, 820 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (“Section 1692f of the FDCPA . . . has been described as a `backstop’ in the statute, intended to cover actionable debt collection practices that may not be expressly addressed in Sections 1692d and 1692e”).[5]

Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Defendant’s motion to dismiss Count 1 of the complaint as to Plaintiffs Tamara Turner, Phillip Turner, and Mary Sweeney.

III.B Slander of Credit (Count 2)

The Plaintiffs next bring a cause of action for “slander of credit” under the FDCPA, saying that instituting a legal action based upon manufactured or false evidence constitutes slander of credit. [Doc. 1-1.] The Plaintiffs fail to explain the basis for this claim, other than saying they are bringing the claim under the FDCPA. The Court finds, given this paucity of explanation, that the Plaintiffs fail to allege a valid cause of action for slander of credit. A claim will not survive a motion to dismiss where a plaintiff simply lists causes of action, but neglects to make any plausible factual allegations related to them.

There are several theories under which “slander of credit” could be actionable. However, the Plaintiffs do not allege factual circumstances that would constitute possible violations. For example, the Plaintiffs fail to allege that the Defendant made a negative report to a credit reporting agency or that the Defendant threatened to report the Plaintiffs to a credit agency related to the mortgages in question. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681h; 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8). The Court does not have the duty to imagine or devise theories of recovery, and accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Defendant’s motion to dismiss Count 2 of the complaint.[6]

III.C Abuse of Process (Count 3)

The Plaintiffs also bring a claim for abuse of process under Ohio state law. Under Ohio law, the elements of a claim for abuse of process are that: “(1) that a legal proceeding has been set in motion in proper form and with probable cause; (2) the proceeding has been perverted to attempt to accomplish an ulterior purpose for which it was not designed; and (3) direct damage has resulted from the wrongful use of process.” Voyticky v. Village of Timberlake, Ohio, 412 F.3d 669, 676 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Yaklevich v. Kemp, Schaeffer, & Rowe Co. et. al., 626 N.E.2d 115, 116 (Ohio 1994)). “The tort action termed `abuse of process’ has developed for `cases in which legal procedure has been set in motion in proper form, with probable cause, and even with ultimate success, but nevertheless has been perverted to accomplish an ulterior purpose for which it was not designed.'” Yaklevich, 626 N.E.2d at 118 (quoting Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts (5th ed.1984) 897, Section 121). Thus, “there is no liability [for abuse of process] where the defendant has done nothing more than carry out the process to its authorized conclusion, even though with bad intentions.” Id. at 118 n. 2 (citing Prosser & Keeton, supra, at 898). Rather, in an abuse of process case, “[t]he improper purpose usually takes the form of coercion to obtain a collateral advantage, not properly involved in the proceeding itself, such as the surrender of property or the payment of money, by the use of the process as a threat or a club.” Robb v. Chagrin Lagoons Yacht Club, Inc., 662 N.E.2d 9, 14 (Ohio 1996).

Here, even accepting the Plaintiff’s allegations as true, their claim for abuse of process fails. In support of their claim, Plaintiffs say that “the very act of attempting to force people out of their homes when their client does not have the proper paperwork to prove ownership constitutes malice.” [Doc. 14 at 16.] However, the Plaintiffs own allegations negate several of the elements of this cause of action.

On the first element — a legal proceeding initiated in proper form and with probable cause — the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants did not have the proper standing or evidence needed to initiate their foreclosure actions. In claiming that the Defendant’s clients did not have probable cause to sue, the Plaintiffs seek to prove the exact opposite of this element of the abuse of process claim. Similarly, on the second element of the abuse of process claim — the proceeding has been perverted to attempt to accomplish an ulterior purpose for which it was not designed — the Plaintiffs own allegations again negate this element. The Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants initiated foreclosure actions without standing in the hope that it could nonetheless force the residents out of their homes. [Doc. 1-1 at 2-3; Doc. 14 at 16.] However, the proper purpose of a foreclosure action is to force people out of their homes; the Plaintiffs are alleging not that the Defendant used a foreclosure action for an improper purpose, but that the Defendants instituted foreclosure actions without reasonable hope of success.

Indeed, “`abuse of process differs from malicious prosecution in that the former connotes the use of process properly initiated for improper purposes, while the latter relates to the malicious initiation of a lawsuit which one has no reasonable chance of winning.'” Clermont Environmental Reclamation Co. v. Hancock, 474 N.E.2d 357, 362 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984); see also Avco Delta Corp. v. Walker, 258 N.E.2d 254, 257 (Ohio Ct. App. 1969) (“the malicious abuse of process is the employment of a process in a manner not contemplated by law, or to obtain an object which such a process is not intended by law to effect”). Here, rather than using the lawsuit to obtain a collateral advantage, the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant filed the appropriate type of action for their ultimate goal — foreclosure of a home — but filed that action without proper probable cause. See Havens-Tobias v. Eagle, 2003 WL 1601461, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App., Mar. 28, 2003).

Accordingly, since the Plaintiffs’ allegations do not make out a claim for abuse of process, the Court GRANTS the Defendant’s motion to dismiss on this claim.

III.D Malicious Prosecution (Count 4)

The Plaintiffs also assert a claim of malicious civil prosecution. [Doc. 1-1 at 10.] To assert a claim for malicious prosecution under Ohio law, a plaintiff must prove: “(1) malicious institution of prior proceedings against the plaintiff by defendant . . . (2) lack of probable cause for the filing of the prior lawsuit, . . . (3) termination of the prior proceedings in plaintiff’s favor, . . . and (4) seizure of plaintiff’s person or property during the course of the prior proceedings.” Robb, 662 N.E.2d at 13 (citing Crawford v. Euclid Nat’l Bank, 483 N.E.2d 1168, 1171 (Ohio 1985)).

Under the first element, malicious institution of prior proceeding, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs’ allegation satisfy this element. The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant filed the foreclosure actions with malice since the Defendant knew that its clients did not have proper standing to sue. [Doc. 1-1 at 2.] This allegation, if proven true, would sufficiently satisfy the malice element of a claim of malicious prosecution. See Eberhart v. Paintiff, 2005 WL 1962993 at *6 (Ohio Ct. App., Aug. 17, 2005) (“malice may be inferred from the absence of probable cause”);

On the second element, the Plaintiffs also adequately allege that the Defendant lacked probable cause for the filing of this lawsuit. In the complaint, the Plaintiffs say that the Defendant’s clients lacked basic standing to bring the lawsuit since their clients were not the proper holders of the mortgage notes and that Defendant knew of this lack of standing. [Doc. 1-1 at 2.] Therefore, this element is satisfied for purposes of a motion to dismiss.

As to the third element — termination of the prior proceeding in favor of the plaintiff — the Plaintiffs allege that all of the underlying foreclosures were terminated in their favor due to a lack of standing. This allegation, if proven true, would satisfy the third element. See Vitrano v. CWP Lmtd. Partnership, 1999 WL 1261151, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App., Dec. 22, 1999).

The Plaintiffs here, though, fail to adequately allege the fourth element — seizure of plaintiff’s person or property during the course of the prior proceedings. None of the Plaintiffs allege that their property was seized due to the actions of the Defendant, which is fatal to their claim of malicious prosecution. Ohio courts have emphasized that the seizure element is a necessary component of a claim for malicious civil prosecution and that the claim cannot survive without a seizure of property. See Robb, 662 N.E.2d at 14.

Indeed, a claim for malicious civil prosecution does not lie simply because a previously filed claim is meritless, but rather, only in cases “where there is a prejudgment seizure of property, i.e., where there essentially has been a judgment against, and a concomitant injury suffered by, a defendant before he has had a chance to defend himself.” Id.See, e.g., Aames Capital Corp. v. Wells, 2002 WL 500320 at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2002) (“damage to a person’s credit, however, does not constitute seizure of property with regard to a malicious prosecution claim”); Clauder v. Holbrook, 2000 WL 98218 at *2 (Ohio Ct. App., Jan. 28, 2000) (holding that rendering a title to land unmarketable during pendency of a lawsuit is not a seizure for purposes of malicious prosecution); Ahlbeck v. Joelson, 1997 WL 458460, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App., Aug. 8, 1997) (freezing of assets during bankruptcy proceedings caused by suit does not satisfy seizure element). Thus, because none of the Plaintiffs allege that their property was seized during the course of the foreclosure proceedings instituted against them, the Court finds that they do not adequately plead this cause of action. at 14. This element of the cause of action has been strictly interpreted to apply only to seizures of actual real or personal property.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Defendant’s motion to dismiss this claim.

III.E Ohio Consumer Sales Protection Act, Chapter 1345 (Count 5)

Next, the Plaintiffs allege a violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Protection Act, Chapter 1345. Specifically, the Plaintiffs say that the conduct of the Defendant “commenc[ed] foreclosure proceedings when their clients lack standing [which] are unfair, deceptive and unconscionable sales practices under O.R.C. §§ 1345.02 and 1345.03.

Ohio Revised Code section 1345 makes it unlawful for a supplier to engage in an unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable act or practice in regard to a consumer transaction. O.R.C. § 1345.02. The OCSPA defines a “supplier” as a “person engaged in the business of effecting or soliciting consumer transactions, whether or not he deals directly with the consumer.” O.R.C. § 1345.01(B). The statute has been generally interpreted as applying to the collection of debts associated with consumer transactions by attorneys. See Celebrezze v. United Research, Inc., 482 N.E.2d 1260, 1262 (Ohio 1984); see also Schroyer v. Frankel, 197 F.3d 1170, 1177 (6th Cir. 1999). Thus, the Court concludes that the debt collection activities of Defendant Lerner fall within the purview of the statute. The Ohio Consumer Protection Statute provides generally that “[n]o supplier shall commit an unfair or deceptive act or practice in connection with a consumer transaction.” O.R.C. § 1345.02(A). Although a somewhat unresolved issue, other courts have held that a law firm collecting a debt on behalf of a mortgagee may be amenable to suit under this Act. See Delawder, 443 F. Supp.2d at 953; Havens-Tobias v. Eagle, 2003 WL 1601461, at *4-5 (Ohio Ct. App. March 28, 2003). Indeed, “[g]iven the [Ohio Consumer Protection Act’s] purpose to protect consumers from deceptive acts and practices, and Ohio courts’ recognition that debt collection falls within [its] ambit, the Court believes Ohio courts would recognize a cause of action under Section 1345.02(B)(10) for all deceptive debt collection practices, including a supplier’s deceptive lawsuit to collect a debt.” Delawder, 443 F.2d at 953. This Court now finds the rationale of the court in DelawderSee, e.g., Becker v. Montgomery, Lynch, 2003 WL 23335929, at *2 (N.D. Ohio, Feb. 26, 2003) (holding that conduct which violates the FDCPA also violates the Ohio Consumer Protection Staute); Lee, 484 F. Supp.2d at 821 (holding that Ohio Consumer Protection Act applies to debt collection practices of law firms). persuasive, and also finds that the filing of deceptive lawsuits violates the Ohio Consumer Protection Act.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs’ allegations, if proven true, would be actionable under the Ohio Consumer Protection Act. The Plaintiffs here allege that the Defendant knowingly brought deceptive lawsuits and also made fraudulent assignments of mortgage notes to support standing to sue. The Court, therefore, DENIES the Defendant’s motion to dismiss this Count.[7]

III.F Frivolous Lawsuits — Ohio Revised Code Section 2323.51

Finally, the Plaintiffs bring a claim under Ohio Revised Code Section 2323.51, saying that they are entitled to “sanctions, including attorney fees,” since they argue that the Defendant filed frivolous lawsuits against them. [Doc. 1-1 at 11; Doc. 14 at 18.] The Defendant says this claim must be dismissed as untimely. [Doc. 9 at 18-19.]

Under Section 2323.51, a litigant may receive an award of attorney’s fees where their opponent has been found to have engaged in “frivolous conduct,” which is defined, inter alia, as conduct that is meant “merely to harass or maliciously injure” or “is not warranted under existing law [or] cannot be supported by a good faith argument,” as making “allegations or other factual contentions that have no evidentiary support,” or as denials “or factual contentions that are not warranted by the evidence.” O.R.C. § 2323.51(A)(2)(a)(i)-(iv).

Although the alleged conduct of the Defendant would seem fall within the purview of the statute, the Plaintiffs claim under the this statute fails for several reasons. First, the proper forum for a motion brought under O.R.C. Section 2323.51 would be the original state court foreclosure actions that the Defendant filed against the Plaintiffs. Indeed, the “[r]elief under R.C. 2323.51 is obtained by filing a motion in a pending case,” and not in a later separate civil action. Gevedon v. Gevedon,855 N.E.2d 548, 553 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006); see also Roo v. Sain, 2005 WL 1177940, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005). In that regard, Section 2323.51 is quite similar to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which itself does not create a separate cause of action, but rather, creates a means of punishing misconduct in a pending action. SeeSawyer v. Sinkey, 610 N.E.2d 1219, 1223 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992). Thus, the Plaintiffs attempt to improperly use that statute in this suit and any claims brought under that Section in this Court must be dismissed.

Second, even if that claim could be brought in this Court, the statute of limitations on the claim has run. Under the plain language of O.R.C. § 2323.51, any claim for attorney’s fees brought under that statute must be filed “not more than thirty days after the entry of final judgment in a civil action or appeal.” O.R.C. § 2323.51. Since more than thirty days have passed since the final judgment in each of the underlying state court foreclosure actions, the claims brought under that Section are not timely and must be dismissed. The Court, therefore, GRANTS the Defendant’s motion to dismiss this claim.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the Defendant’s motion to dismiss Counts 2, 3, 4, and 6 of the complaint against all Plaintiffs and Count 1 of the complaint as to Plaintiffs James and Kelly Unger; the Court DENIES the Defendant’s motion to dismiss Count 1 of the complaint as to Plaintiffs Tamara Turner, Phillip Turner, and Mary Sweeney and Count 5 of the complaint as to all Plaintiffs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

[1] As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that the Defendant is a “debt collector” under FDCPA. The Supreme Court has held that the FDCPA “applies to attorneys who `regularly’ engage in consumer-debt-collection activity, even when that activity consists of litigation.” Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 299 (1995). Under the FDCPA, a “debt collector” is “any person who uses any instrum entality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principle purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or assessed to be owed or due to another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (emphasis added).

[2] The sections of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e at issue provide in relevant part:

§ 1692e. False or misleading representations

A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section:

(2) The false representation of — (A) the character, am ount, or legal status of any debt; or . . .

(5) The threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken . . .

(10) The use of any false representations or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer.

[3] The relevant sections of 15 U.S.C. § 1692f provide:

§ 1692f. Unfair practices

A debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section:

(1) The collection of any amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.

[4] See also Whittiker, 650 F. Supp.2d at 931 (holding that filing of foreclosure action while knowing that one lacks ability to prove ownership of debt is actionable under the FDCPA); Kline v. Mortgage Electronic Sec. Systems, 2010 WL 1133452, at *8 (S.D. Ohio, Mar. 22, 2010) (holding that an inability to prove a debt at the time of filing a collection lawsuit does not violate the FDCPA, but stating suing in court with false attachments in an attempt to prove debt would violate the FDCPA.); Williams v. Javitch, Block & Rathbone, LLP, 480 F. Supp.2d 1016 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (knowledge that information in affidavit is false as to specifics of debt violates FDCPA).

[5] The Court also notes that it concurs with the thoughtful analysis set forth in Hartman v. Asset Acceptance Corp., in which that court found that the common law immunity for statements and pleadings made in court is abrogated by the FDCPA. 467 F. Supp.2d 769 (S.D. Ohio 2004).

[6] As this case will proceed, this Court has authority to consider a motion to amend the complaint to reassert this claim if plaintiffs can more specifically allege a cause of action. Rule 54(b) provides:

“When an action presents more than one claim for relief []the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay. Otherwise, any order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.

[7] The Court need not yet consider whether a class action under Chapter 1345 may be validly brought. This issue may more appropriately be resolved in a motion for class certification.

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BLOOMBERG | BofA Unit’s Utah Foreclosures Violate Law, State Says

BLOOMBERG | BofA Unit’s Utah Foreclosures Violate Law, State Says


A Bank of America Corp. unit is breaking the law by foreclosing on homeowners in Utah because it doesn’t meet state requirements, the state attorney general’s office said in a federal appeals court case.

ReconTrust Co., a subsidiary of Bank of America, the biggest U.S. lender by assets, isn’t a member of the state bar or a title insurance company and is unqualified to carry out trustee foreclosures, Utah Attorney General Mark Shurtleff wrote in court papers filed yesterday with the U.S. Court of Appeals in Denver.

“ReconTrust Co. N.A. is a non-depository national bank initiating approximately 4,000 home foreclosures in Utah each year in violation of Utah law,” the attorney general’s office said.

The court filing was made in a homeowner’s lawsuit against ReconTrust and Bank of America.

“National banks must abide by state law,” said John Christian Barlow, an attorney for the homeowner, Peni Cox. “ReconTrust just wants to foreclose, period,” he said.

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GUEST POST | “Affidavits Do Tell Dead Tales” Portfolio’s Martha Kunkle

GUEST POST | “Affidavits Do Tell Dead Tales” Portfolio’s Martha Kunkle


Dear folks:

I would review a case that has surfaced in Montana Federal District Court (Great Falls Div),  Cole v. Portfolio Recovery Associates”, docket no CV-08-036-GF.   This is a case here the debt collector/debt buyer “Portfolio” filed suit against Cole on a credit card debt, and inserted an “Affidavit” of one Martha Kunkle in a Motion for Summary Judgment in an effort to steamroll the Case to Judgment.  The Affidavit was dated May 24, 2007.

Unfortunately for both the debt collector [Portfolio] AND their collection attorneys, Cole did some checking, found other examples of the signature, and Motioned the State Court that the affidavit was dubious.  The State Court Judge ORDERED that Portfolio produce Kunkle, whose signature was notarized in Texas [see attached pdf], to appear in Montana for deposition.  Kunkle never showed up.  Turns out Martha Kunkle was dead, having died 12 years earlier, in 1995.  (Sanctions are pending in the State Court case).

Cole by counsel filed a FDCPA suit in USDC [above cite], in which Portfolio in essence denied they were bad boys, and as an affirmative defense claimed that Cole had not done act to “mitigate her damages.”  How a consumer mitigates damages when confronted with the Affidavit of a dead person is not explained.

In the USDC Final Order and Judgment, a class-action settlement was approved by the Court roughly $178,000 was paid to identified members of the Classes [3 classes of claimants] and $212,500 in attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses.

An expensive affidavit of a dead person.

While these are not directly “mortgage debt” controversies, the affidavit was furnished by agents of our friends at WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, from which the moral:  do not assume any signature of any “affidavit” [or anything else].  the affiant may well have been dead for over a decade!

Jan van Eck

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OHIO CLASS ACTION: FMR AG Files Class Action Against Law Firm TURNER v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss (“LS&R”)

OHIO CLASS ACTION: FMR AG Files Class Action Against Law Firm TURNER v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss (“LS&R”)


CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
PURSUANT TO RULE 23 OF THE
OHIO RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, FAIR DEBT
COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT,
SLANDER OF CREDIT, ABUSE OF
PROCESS AND MALICIOUS
PROSECUTION

continue to complaint…

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NY Judge Gives Green Light On RICO Class Action Against Law Firm in ‘Sewer Service’ Case SIKES v. MEL HARRIS & ASSOCIATES

NY Judge Gives Green Light On RICO Class Action Against Law Firm in ‘Sewer Service’ Case SIKES v. MEL HARRIS & ASSOCIATES


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

MONIQUE SYKES et al.,
Plaintiffs,

– against –

MEL HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES, LLC,
-et al.,
Defendants

APPEARANCES: (See last page)

CHIN, Circuit Judge:

In this case, eight plaintiffs allege that a debt buying
company, a law firm, a process service company, and others
engaged in a “massive scheme to fraudulently obtain default
judgments against them and more than 100,000 other consumers in
state court. Plaintiffs allege that defendants did so by
engaging in “sewer servicer” — the practice of failing to serve a
summons and complaint and then filing a fraudulent affidavit
attesting to service. When the debtors failed to appear in court
because they did not have notice of the lawsuits, defendants
obtained default judgments against them.

Plaintiffs sue on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated. Their second amended complaint (the
“Complaint”) asserts claims under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (the “FDCPA”)1,5 U.S.C. 5 1692 et sea., the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18
U.S.C. 5 1961 et sea., New York General Business Law (“GBL”) §
349, and New York Judiciary Law 5 487. Plaintiffs seek
injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and damages.
Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to
Rules 9 (b) , 12 (b) (1) , and 12 (b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, challenging the sufficiency of every claim and the
subject matter jurisdiction of this Court. For the reasons that
follow, the motions to dismiss are denied in part and granted in
part.

Continue below to the decision…

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UTAH: Two Judges Recuse Themselves From The Class Action Against ReconTrust, MERS, BofA et al

UTAH: Two Judges Recuse Themselves From The Class Action Against ReconTrust, MERS, BofA et al


Class Action ReconTrust/Bank of America Case Lands in Federal Judge Dale Kimball’s Court

by Morgan Skinner, KCSG News

(Salt Lake City, UT) – US District Chief Judge Tena Campbell recused [Recusal order] herself in the class action lawsuit against ReconTrust and Bank of America (NYSE: “BAC”), Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (“MERS”), Countrywide Home Loans, HSBC Bank (NYSE: “HSBC”), Wells Fargo Bank (NYSE: “WFC”), U.S. Bank (NYSE: “USB”), Bank of New York/Mellon (NYSE: “BK”), KeyBank (NYSE: “KEY”) filed in Utah federal court Friday, November 5, 2010, alleging violations of the, Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act (FDCPA), Unlawful Foreclosures, and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

Upon Judge Campbell recusal from the case [Class Action Complaint] it was sent to Judge Clark Waddoups who has the Peni Cox case pending in his court against ReconTrust and Bank of America. The case is also on appeal to the 10th Circuit Court in Denver, Colorado.

KCSG News has learned from court records filed Thursday that Judge Waddoups has recused himself. [Recusal order] Why did Judge Waddoups recuse himself in the class action matter? He didn’t recuse himself in the Peni Cox case pending in his court on the same issues against the same defendants, ReconTrust and Bank of America.

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INDIANA APPEALS COURT “Abusive Debt Collection Practices”; LUCAS v. US BANK N.A, LITTON

INDIANA APPEALS COURT “Abusive Debt Collection Practices”; LUCAS v. US BANK N.A, LITTON


IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

MARY BETH LUCAS and PERRY LUCAS,
Appellants-Defendants,

vs.

U.S. BANK, N.A., As Trustee For THE
C-BASS MORTGAGE LOAN ASSET-BACKED
CERTIFICATES, SERIES, 2006-MH-1,
Appellee-Plaintiff,

and

LITTON LOAN SERVICING, LP,
Appellee-Third-Party Defendant

INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL FROM THE GREENE SUPERIOR COURT
Honorable Dena Benham Martin, Judge

Excerpt:

Likewise, the Lucases assert third-party claims against Litton for breach of contract and breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing. In addition, the Lucases maintain that Litton violated FDCPA, RESPA, and that they are entitled to relief under the Civil Damages Statute because Litton committed conversion.

Congress enacted FDCPA because “[t]here is abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors. Abusive debt collection practices contribute to the number of personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a). Accordingly, these consumer protection statutes exist not only to make the consumer whole, but also to deter practices and behavior that negatively impacts society. In light of the nature of the claims, the rights and interests involved, and the majority of the relief requested, we cannot say that the essential features of this cause are equitable.

The judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded with instructions to grant the Lucases’ motion for a jury trial on their legal claims.

Continue below…

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NY CLASS ACTION | MENASHE v. STEVEN J. BAUM, P.C.

NY CLASS ACTION | MENASHE v. STEVEN J. BAUM, P.C.


JACOB MENASHE

against

STEVEN J. BAUM, P.C.

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UTAH CLASS ACTION: COLEMAN v. BofA, ReconTrust, MERS, Wells Fargo, HSBC, US Bank, Keybank, BNY Mellon

UTAH CLASS ACTION: COLEMAN v. BofA, ReconTrust, MERS, Wells Fargo, HSBC, US Bank, Keybank, BNY Mellon


E. Craig Smay #2985
174 E. South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
ecslawyer@aol.com, cari@smaylaw.com
Telephone Number (801) 539-8515
Fax Number (801) 539-8544

John Christian Barlow
40 N 300 E #101
St. George UT 84771
jcb@JohnChristianBarlow.com
435-634-1200
Attorneys for Plaintiffs


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

JEREMY COLEMAN, DWAYNE WATSON, SAMUEL ADAMSON, ETHNA LYNCH,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

RECONTRUST COMPANY, N.A., MORTGAGE
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION
SYSTEMS, INC., BANK OF AMERICA,
N.A. AS SUCCESSOR TO COUNTRYWIDE
HOME LOANS, INC., BAC HOME
LOAN SERVICING LP, HSBC BANK
USA, N.A., WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,
U.S. BANK N.A., BANK OF NEW YORK
MELLON, KEYBANK, N.A. and Does 1-
10, Defendants.

CLASS ACTION
COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF
FAIR DEBT COLLECTION
PRACTICES ACT, UTAH
PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL
AUTHORITY ACT
JURY DEMANDED

Case No. 2:10-cv-02099-TC

Judge Tena Campbell

Plaintiffs Jeremy Coleman, Dwayne Watson, Samuel Adamson, and Ethna Lynch, individually and on behalf of others Similarly Situated (“Plaintiffs”) bring this action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 USC §§ 1692-1692p, and Utah state law, including, without limitation, §§ 76-10-1602, 76-10-1603, and 76-10-1605(1), (2), UCA (1953), and allege as follows:

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Fair Debt Collection Practices Act § 803. § 812. [15 USC 1692a/j]

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act § 803. § 812. [15 USC 1692a/j]


§ 1692a.

(6) The term “debt collector” means any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another. Notwithstanding the exclusion provided by clause (F) of the last sentence of this paragraph, the term includes any creditor who, in the process of collecting his own debts, uses any name other than his own which would indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect such debts. For the purpose of section 1692f (6) of this title, such term also includes any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the enforcement of security interests. The term does not include—

(F) any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another to the extent such activity

  • (iii) concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person;

[15 USC 1692j]

Furnishing Certain Deceptive Forms

(a) It is unlawful to design, compile, and furnish any form knowing that such form would be used to create the false belief in a consumer that a person other than the creditor of such consumer is participating in the collection of or in an attempt to collect a debt such consumer allegedly owes such creditor, when in fact such person is not so participating.

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in fdcpa, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, foreclosures, MERS, MERSCORP, mortgage, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC., note, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (0)

US Supreme Court Massive FDCPA Ruling to Send Shock Waves to ‘Mills’

US Supreme Court Massive FDCPA Ruling to Send Shock Waves to ‘Mills’


[ipaper docId=34131633 access_key=key-1cl6ts15rgmwltbooj5a height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in fdcpa, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, foreclosures, Supreme CourtComments (1)

Tear Down these Foreclosure Mill WALLS…SUPREME COURT!!

Tear Down these Foreclosure Mill WALLS…SUPREME COURT!!


Keep ExPosing NET WORTH!!!

Tear Down these Foreclosure Mill WALLS…SUPREME COURT!!

SPECIAL THANK YOU…to Matt Weidner’s Blog “this man is a saint to many”.  

While we were busy railing away in front of the Florida Supreme Court yesterday…THE SUPREME COURT….the US SUPREME COURT issued a massive ruling that will send shock waves through all foreclosure mills.  This April 21, 2010 decision found that foreclosure mill law firms are subject to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.  The full decision is found here.  The mills can ignore the itty bitty ‘ole Florida Supreme Court, but what about the “Real” Supreme Court?

JERMAN v. CARLISLE, MCNELLIE, RINI, KRAMER & ULRICH LPA ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
No. 08–1200.  Argued January 13, 2010—Decided April 21, 2010

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U. S. C. §1692  et seq., imposes civil liability on “debt collector[s]” for certain prohibited debt collection practices.  A debt collector who “fails to comply with any [FDCPA] provision . . . with respect to  any person is liable  to such person” for “actual damage[s],” costs, “a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court,” and statutory “additional damages.” §1692k(a).  In addition, violations of the FDCPA are deemed unfair or deceptive acts or practices under the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), §41 et seq., which is enforced by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).  See §1692l.  A  debt collector who acts with “actual knowledge or knowledge  fairly implied on the basis of  objective circumstances that such act is [prohibited under the FDCPA]” is subject to civil penalties enforced by the FTC.  §§45(m)(1)(A), (C).  A debt collector is not liable in any action brought under the FDCPA, however, if it “shows by a preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.”  §1692k(c).

Held: The bona fide error defense in §1692k(c) does not apply to a violation resulting from a debt  collector’s mistaken interpretation of the legal requirements of the FDCPA.  Pp. 6–30. a) A violation resulting from a debt collector’s misinterpretation of the legal requirements of the FDCPA cannot be “not intentional” under §1692k(c).  It is a common maxim that “ignorance of the law will not excuse any person, either civilly or criminally.”  Barlow v. United States, 7 Pet. 404, 411.  When Congress has intended to provide a mistake-of-law defense to civil liability, it has often done so more explicitly than  here.   In particular, the administrative-penalty provisions of the  FTC Act, which are  expressly incorporated into the FDCPA, apply only when a debt collector acts with “actual knowledge or knowledge  fairly implied  on the basis of objective circumstances” that the FDCPA prohibited its action.  §§45(m)(1)(A), (C).  Given the absence of similar language in §1692k(c), it is fair to infer that Con gress permitted injured consumers to recover damages for “intentional” conduct, including violations resulting from a mistaken interpretation  of  the  FDCPA,  while reserving the  more  onerous administrative penalties for debt collectors whose intentional actions.

Posted in concealment, conspiracy, corruption, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure millsComments (0)


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