Effective December 1, 2010, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 will provide new protections and specifications for draft expert reports and certain communications between experts and attorneys. The amendments are significant because they extend work-product protection to communications and drafts that courts now consider discoverable. Current Rule 26(a)(2)(B) requires a testifying expert to disclose in a written report all “data or other information” the expert “considered” in developing his or her opinions. Courts have interpreted that language, and particularly the Rule’s reference to “other information,” to allow discovery of draft expert reports, a broad range of communications between experts and counsel, and documents an expert does not rely upon as a basis for his or her testimony. The 2010 amendments substantially alter these disclosure obligations by: (1) limiting the required disclosures in written expert reports to “facts or data” the expert considered in forming the opinions the expert will express in his testimony; (2) expressly shielding from discovery draft reports or disclosures required under Rule 26(a)(2); and (3) limiting discovery of communications between a party’s attorney and any witness required to provide a Rule 26(a)(2)(B) report unless the communications fall within at least one of three enumerated exceptions.
THIS IS NOT Intended to Be Construed or Relied upon as COMPETENT LEGAL ADVICE—Readers are urged to obtain competent legal representation to review their facts. I am not an attorney and this is not legal advice.
RIGHT ON POINT ABOUT WHAT WE WERE JUST TALKING ABOUT IN HEARING YESTERDAY!!
I appeared as expert witness in a case yesterday where the Judge had trouble getting off the idea that it was an accepted fact that the note was in default and that ANY of the participants in the securitization chain should be considered collectively “creditors” or a creditor. Despite the fact that the only witness was a person who admitted she had no knowledge except what was on the documents given to her, the Judge let them in as evidence.
The witness was and is incompetent because she lacked personal knowledge and could not provide any foundation for any records or document. This is the predominant error of Judges today in most cases. Thus the prima facie case is considered “assumed” and the burden to prove a negative falls unfairly on the homeowner.
The Judge, in a familiar refrain, had trouble with the idea of giving the homeowner a free house when the only issue before him was whether the motion to lift stay should be granted. Besides the fact that the effect of granting the motion to lift stay was the gift of a free house to ASC who admits in their promotional website that they have in interest nor involvement in the origination of the loans, and despite the obviously fabricated assignment a few days before the hearing which violated the terms of the securitization document cutoff date, the Judge seems to completely missed the point of the issue before him: whether there was a reason to believe that the movant lacked standing or that the foreclosure would prejudice the debtor or other creditors (since the house would become an important asset of the bankruptcy estate if it was unencumbered).
If you carry over the arguments here, the motion for lift stay is the equivalent motion for summary judgment.
This transcript, citing cases, shows that the prima facie burden of the Movant is even higher than beyond a reasonable doubt. It also shows that the way the movants are using business records violates all standards of hearsay evidence and due process. Read the transcript carefully. You might want to use it for a motion for rehearing or motion for reconsideration to get your arguments on record, clear up the issue of whether you objected on the basis of competence of the witness, and then take it up on appeal with a cleaned up record.
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