Abigail Field raises an excellent point in her latest article titled Why the Foreclosure Mess Settlement Proposal Can’t Fix the Damage. She states
You can’t sell real estate when you can’t establish that you own it — banks won’t loan money for purchasers to buy the property. That’s because the bank wants to be sure that if it forecloses, it will get good title to the property. (Yes, this issue practically oozes irony.) That’s why banks won’t approve a mortgage for a property if a title insurance company won’t insure its title. And title insurance companies won’t do that if they know the title is clouded.
A few months ago, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court issued its Ibanez decision, which made it clear that the banks’ foreclosure practices — and indeed, the standard securitization deal — violated longstanding basic Massachusetts real estate law, and thus, many completed Massachusetts foreclosures were invalid. The foreclosing banks, which had either since sold the properties or still “owned” them, had no right to foreclose, and therefore had never owned those properties. So who owns them now? Well, the fact that it’s a question is the very definition of “clouded title.”
One thing that it is important to stress: that the abuses to established real estate transfer and recording processes were not inherent to the securitization model. I’m not a fan of securitization but the sad reality is that no one is prepared to go back to the more costly in terms of equity required, model of on-balance sheet banking (it would result in a shrinkage of credit that every respectable economist would recommend against and hence will never happen). But no one (except the FDIC, which keeps being ignored) is thinking seriously enough about what it would take to make securitization safer.
Everyone, from the bank originators to the investment bank packagers, got hooked on the easy profits, and kept pushing for ways to streamline the process, to both increase their profits and increase the size of the potential market. The biggest problems result from cutting corners, including the failure of the deal sponsors to adhere to their own agreements with investors, that led to this mess. Securitization had existed since the 1970s; MERS, one of the biggest culprits in the uncertainties over title, did not become a serious player until 1999. The widespread failure to convey notes (the borrower IOU) to securitization trusts appears not to have started until sometime between 2002 and 2004.