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STOP! You Must Read The Florida Appeal Transcript of PINO v. BANK OF NEW YORK

STOP! You Must Read The Florida Appeal Transcript of PINO v. BANK OF NEW YORK


courtesy of IceLegal

excerpts:

JUDGE POLEN: I’m afraid I’m not following
that. David Stern’s client at the time was BNY
Mellon Bank, right?

MR. NIEVES: Yes.

JUDGE POLEN: Okay. And that’s evidence of
what, an assignment to a bank?

MR. NIEVES: Basically, the law firm
manufactured evidence for the client’s case.

JUDGE POLEN: Okay.

MR. NIEVES: It was signed and executed by
Cheryl Samons, who works for David Stern, and
executed the assignment solely for the litigation,
and, in the assignment, posed as an officer of a
different entity.

<SNIP>

MS. GIDDINGS: Well, Your Honor, if you look at
the allegations that they have made, almost all of
those allegations pertain to a different case.
They’re not this particular case. I don’t know what
that document — what occurred in that document. But
I think this court is probably going to have a number
of cases that come up before it where that issue
is — it may be at issue in subsequent proceedings.
And when you reopen — if you’re going to reopen
those cases, you have to make sure that you’re
reopening it for something that is material.

JUDGE FARMER: Fraud on the Court is not
material?

MS. GIDDINGS: Your Honor, fraud on the
Court —

JUDGE FARMER: Publishing false documents is
not material?

<SNIP>

MS. GIDDINGS: Because there was no affirmative
relief obtained in this case, Your Honor. And, in
fact, the relief was that Mr. Pino has been living in
the house for a long time, apparently without making
any payments.
And I understand your concerns, Your Honor.
But I’m urging you to consider this case in the grand
scheme of things. If you allow courts to go back and
open up all of these cases, when it’s clear on the
face that there was no affirmative relief obtained,
or that the affirmative relief would not have been
material, then you’re going to create chaos in the
court system.

JUDGE FARMER: So, are you suggesting that this
fraud has been that widespread that it —

MS. GIDDINGS: Your Honor, I’m not
acknowledging that any fraud occurred. I think that
there is — we all know —

JUDGE FARMER: Why would we shrink — as a
court system, why would we shrink, no matter how many
cases it might involve, from looking out for attempts
to defraud courts to publish and utter and use false
instruments? Why wouldn’t we be most vigilant?

To View Video of The Oral Argument Go HERE

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NY Emergency Order To Show Cause, HSBC Stayed CO-OP Auction Shares

NY Emergency Order To Show Cause, HSBC Stayed CO-OP Auction Shares


According to records:
Attorney/Firm For Defendant: STEVEN J. BAUM, P.C.

Attorney Type: Attorney Of Record Atty. Status: Active

220 NORTHPOINTE PKWY SUITE G
AMHERST, NEW YORK 14228
716-204-2400

excerpt…

NOW, IT IS ORDERED THAT EXECUTION OF ANY PUBLIC SHARES OF PLAINTIFF’S PROPERTY, LOCATED AT 135 OCEAN PARKWAY, UNIT 16-D, BROOKLYN, NEW YORK, 11218, SHALL BE STAYED PENDING THE HEARING OF THIS MOTION, AND SPECIFICALLY THAT DEFENDANT HSBC BANK USA, N.A. BE STAYED FROM EXECUTING A PUBLIC SALE OF PLAINTIFF’S SHARE OF STOCK ON JANUARY 13, 2011 at 2:OO P.M.

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[NYSC] Judge Restrains EMC MTG, MERS From Foreclosing For FRAUDULENT ASSIGNMENTS

[NYSC] Judge Restrains EMC MTG, MERS From Foreclosing For FRAUDULENT ASSIGNMENTS


Helene Hamilton and Sheikh Bey,
Plaintiff( s)

-AGAINST

EMC MORTGAGE CORPORATION, AND
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION
SYSTEMS, INC., (“MERS”) AS NOMINEE FOR:
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF ARIZONA,
Patricia M. Esdinsky, Esq., as an individual,
Janan Weeks, as an individual,

Excerpt:

WHY an Order should not be made and entered herein:

1. Granting Plaintiff Stay, restraining order and vacatur of foreclosure action due to
the lack of standing associated with Assignments of FRAUD. The Defendants did not have
assignment rights to foreclose on the property. The Defendants received foreclosure sale
subject to presentment of Assignments, but failed to address the fact that the Assignments must
precede the filing of the Complaint of the subject property. The Referee sale would not have
taken place if Plaintiffs had discovered this FRAUD earlier.

<SNIP>

ORDERED, that until such time as this matter is heard  that defendants, their agents or attorneys’ actions are restrained from moving forward from pursuing further foreclosure proceedings under Index No. 93 19/03

Read the complete order below…


[ipaper docId=46420291 access_key=key-1j970so6de2vk6ge5u20 height=600 width=600 /]

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John O’Brien, the Essex County register of deeds, isn’t buying it, and neither should you

John O’Brien, the Essex County register of deeds, isn’t buying it, and neither should you


Our View: Avoiding another mortgage mess

The Salem News Thu Dec 16, 2010, 06:00 AM EST

They did such a good job depressing the housing market and sending the economy into a tailspin, why not trust the banking cabal with keeping track of all property titles?

John O’Brien, the Essex County register of deeds, isn’t buying it, and neither should you.

O’Brien, of Lynn, is in the forefront of a national effort to challenge the policies and practices of the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. (MERS). The agency was established in 1995 by a group of banking conglomerates including Bank of America, Countrywide Home Loans and Wells Fargo, to keep track of loans issued against property titles — a task previously performed by the public registries of deeds.

In a Nov. 18 letter to Attorney General Martha Coakley, O’Brien alleged that MERS “has failed to pay the proper recording fees required under Massachusetts statute when a lender assigns a mortgage to another entity.” And this week Coakley announced that she will join her colleagues in several other states in an investigation to see whether MERS is skirting laws regarding such transactions.

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[NYSC] Judge Orders JPMorgan Chase “TO SHOW CAUSE”: JPMORGAN CHASE v. SCISSURA

[NYSC] Judge Orders JPMorgan Chase “TO SHOW CAUSE”: JPMORGAN CHASE v. SCISSURA


JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.,

-against-

Carlo Scissura

Excerpt:

why an Order should not be granted directing plaintiff:

(a) to comply with this Court’s Order dated September 8, 2010;

(b) to immediately file a Stipulation of Discontinuance;

(c) to immediately file a consent to vacate the lis pendens lien
filed against 8024 13‘h Avenue, Brooklyn, New York and
defendants Carlo Scissura a/k/a Carlo A. Scissura and/or
Sinagra Management, Inc.;

(d) to issue the final loan modification documents;

(e) imposing sanctions against the plaintiff, pursuant to 22
NYCRR 130-1.1; and

(9 whatever and further relief the Court may deem just and
proper.

Continue below…

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[NYSC] JUDGE SCHACK Tears up WaMU’s Counsel For “Defective Verification, Phony NY House Counsel” WAMU v. PHILLIP

[NYSC] JUDGE SCHACK Tears up WaMU’s Counsel For “Defective Verification, Phony NY House Counsel” WAMU v. PHILLIP


Washington Mut. Bank v Phillip
2010 NY Slip Op 52034(U)
Decided on November 29, 2010
Supreme Court, Kings County
Schack, J.

Excerpts:

Further, the verification of the complaint was not executed by an officer of WAMU, but by Benita Taylor, a “Research Support Analyst of Washington Mutual Bank, the plaintiff in the within action” a resident of Jacksonville, Florida, on June 4, 2008. This is the same day that Ms. Maio claims to have communicated with “Mark Phelps, Esq., House Counsel.” I checked the Office of Court Administration’s Attorney Registry and found that Mark Phelps is not now nor has been an attorney registered in the State of New York. Moreover, the Court does not know what “House” employs Mr. Phelps. [*5]

Both Mr. Phelps and Ms. Maio should have discovered the defects in Ms. Taylor’s verification of the subject complaint. The jurat states that the verification was executed in the State of New York and the County of Suffolk [the home county of plaintiff’s counsel], but the notary public who took the signature is Deborah Yamaguichi, a Florida notary public, not a New York notary public. Thus, the verification lacks merit and is a nullity. Further, Ms. Yamaguchi’s notarization states that Ms. Taylor’s verification was “Sworn to and subscribed before me this 4th day of June 2008.” Even if the jurat properly stated that it was executed in the State of Florida and the County of Duval, where Jacksonville is located, the oath failed to have a certificate required by CPLR

<SNIP>

Ms. Maio should have consulted with a representative or representatives of plaintiff WAMU or is successors subsequent to receiving my November 9, 2010 order, not referring back to an alleged June 4, 2008 communication with “House Counsel.” Affirmations by plaintiff’s counsel in foreclosure actions, pursuant to Chief Administrative Judge Ann t. Pfau’s October 20, 2010 Administrative Order, mandates in foreclosure actions prospective communication by plaintiff’s counsel with plaintiff’s representative or representatives to prevent the widespread insufficiencies now found in foreclosure filings, such as: failure to review files to establish standing; filing of notarized affidavits that falsely attest to such review, and, “robosigning: of documents.

Continue below…

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The Big Lie: MERS Mortgages in Massachusetts by Jamie Ranney, Esq.

The Big Lie: MERS Mortgages in Massachusetts by Jamie Ranney, Esq.


by Jamie Ranney, Esq.
Jamie Ranney, PC
4 Thirty Acres Lane
Nantucket, MA 02554
jamie@nantucketlaw.pro
508-228-9224

This memo will focus on MERS-designated mortgages in Massachusetts.

In this author’s opinion two (2) things are evident after a survey of Massachusetts law.

First, MERS cannot be a valid “mortgagee” under Massachusetts law and thus MERS designated mortgages are invalid in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

This is because MERS-designated mortgages by definition “split” the security instrument (the mortgage) from the debt (the promissory note) when they are signed. This “split” invalidates the mortgage under Massachusetts law. Where the security interest is invalid upon the signing of the mortgage, MERS cannot occupy the legal position of a “mortgagee” under Massachusetts law no matter what language MERS inserts into their mortgages that purports to give them the legal position of “mortgagee”. Since MERSdesignated mortgages are invalid at their inception, it follows logically therefore that MERS mortgages are not legally capable of being recorded in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts by its Registers of Deeds.

Second, even if a MERS-designated mortgage were found to be a valid security instrument in Massachusetts, each and every assignment of the mortgage and note “behind” a MERS-designated mortgage must be recorded on the public land records of the Commonwealth in order to comply with the Massachusetts recording statute at M.G.L. c. 183, s. 4 which requires that “conveyances of an estate” be recorded to be valid. A mortgage is a “conveyance of an estate” under Massachusetts law. Since MERS-designated mortgages exist for the primary purpose of holding “legal” title on the public land records while the “beneficial” interest is transferred and sold multiple times (and a mortgage cannot exist without a note under Massachusetts law), MERS-mortgages unlawfully avoid recording fees due the Commonwealth for the transfer(s) of interests under MERS-designated mortgages.

“If you tell a lie that’s big enough, and you tell it often enough, people will believe you are telling the truth, even when what you are saying is total crap.”1

Continue reading below…

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ARIZONA BK COURT ORDERS BONY MELLON TO PRODUCE ORIGINAL CUSTODIAN DOCUMENTS

ARIZONA BK COURT ORDERS BONY MELLON TO PRODUCE ORIGINAL CUSTODIAN DOCUMENTS


UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Minute Entry

Hearing Information:

Debtor: ANDREW C BAILEY
Case Number: 2:09-bk-06979-RTBP Chapter: 11
Date / Time / Room: TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 09, 2010 10:00 AM 7TH FLOOR #701
Bankruptcy Judge: SARAH SHARER CURLEY
Courtroom Clerk: WANDA GARBERICK
Reporter / ECR: ANDAMO PURVIS

Matter:

ADV: 2-09-01728
ANDREW C. BAILEY vs THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, FKA THE BAN

HEARING RE Motion to Dismiss Complaint Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss, With Prejudice, Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint To Determine The Validity, Priority or Extent Of a Lien or Other Interest in Real Property and Petition For Injunctive Relief filed by KYLE S. HIRSCH of BRYAN CAVE LLP on behalf of BAC HOME LOANS SERVICING
R / M #: 50 / 0

Appearances:

ANDREW C BAILEY

KYLE S. HIRSCH, ATTORNEY FOR THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, FKA THE BANK

Proceedings:

Mr. Hirsch goes over the background of the complaints that have been filed, and notes that this is the fourth amended complaint with no basis. Mr. Bailey gives his statements to the court on the note.

COURT: THE COURT FINDS THAT AT THIS TIME MR. BAILEY HAS NO SUPPORT FOR HIS CLAIMS. MR. HIRSCH IS DIRECTED TO GET THE ORIGINAL CUSTODIAL FILE FROM NEW YORK FOR THE COURT TO REVIEW. HE SHOULD ALSO GET AN AFFIDAVIT FROM THE INDIVIDUAL GETTING THE FILE, THAT THERE HAS NOT BEEN ANY CHANGES SINCE 2006. IT IS ORDERED CONTINUING THIS HEARING TO JANUARY 13, 2011 AT 10:00 A.M.

Case 2:09-ap-01728-SSC Doc 61 Filed 11/09/10 Entered 11/09/10 15:07:05

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In re: WILSON: Louisiana BK Court, Sanctions, The Boles Law Firm, LPS, Option One, False Affidavit

In re: WILSON: Louisiana BK Court, Sanctions, The Boles Law Firm, LPS, Option One, False Affidavit


UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

—————————————————— x
Case No. 07-11862

In re:
RON WILSON :
LaRHONDA WILSON, :
: Chapter 13
:
Debtors. :
——————————————————x
STIPULATION AND ORDER

R. Michael Bolen, the United States Trustee for Region 5 (“United States Trustee”) and
The Boles Law Firm APC, (“Boles”), hereby enter into a consensual resolution resolving the
United States Trustee’s inquiry and litigation against Boles in this case. The parties have agreed
to the terms of the instant stipulation and order (the “Stipulation”), establishing protocol for
procedures to be employed by Boles prior to filing motions seeking relief from the automatic
stay, proofs of claims, and other papers (collectively referred to as a “Pleading” or “Pleadings”)
filed in bankruptcy courts including the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District
of Louisiana. The United States Trustee and Boles consent and agree as follows:

[ipaper docId=41730388 access_key=key-t7wf2d2bqx78m0e02gy height=600 width=600 /]

http://www.scribd.com/doc/40757070/Various-Signatures-of-Dory-GOEBEL

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[NYSC] JUDGE SCHACK TAKES ON ROBO-SIGNER ERICA JOHNSON SECK: ONEWEST BANK v. DRAYTON (3)

[NYSC] JUDGE SCHACK TAKES ON ROBO-SIGNER ERICA JOHNSON SECK: ONEWEST BANK v. DRAYTON (3)


STRIKE 1, STRIKE 2,

STRIKE 3…below

.

2010 NY Slip Op 20429

ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B., Plaintiff,
v.
COVAN DRAYTON, ET AL., Defendants.

15183/09.Supreme Court, Kings County.

Decided October 21, 2010.Gerald Roth, Esq., Stein Wiener and Roth, LLP, Carle Place NY, Defendant did not answer Plaintiff.

ARTHUR M. SCHACK, J.

In this foreclosure action, plaintiff ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B. (ONEWEST), moved for an order of reference and related relief for the premises located at 962 Hemlock Street, Brooklyn, New York (Block 4529, Lot 116, County of Kings), upon the default of all defendants. The Kings County Supreme Court Foreclosure Department forwarded the motion papers to me on August 30, 2010. While drafting this decision and order, I received on October 14, 2010, in the midst of the present national media attention about “robo-signers,” an October 13, 2010-letter from plaintiff’s counsel, by which “[i]t is respectfully requested that plaintiff’s application be withdrawn at this time.” There was no explanation or reason given by plaintiff’s counsel for his request to withdraw the motion for an order of reference other than “[i]t is our intention that a new application containing updated information will be re-submitted shortly.”

The Court grants the request of plaintiff’s counsel to withdraw the instant motion for an order of reference. However, to prevent the waste of judicial resources, the instant foreclosure action is dismissed without prejudice, with leave to renew the instant motion for an order of reference within sixty (60) days of this decision and order, by providing the Court with necessary and additional documentation.

First, the Court requires proof of the grant of authority from the original mortgagee, CAMBRIDGE HOME CAPITAL, LLC (CAMBRIDGE), to its nominee, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. (MERS), to assign the subject mortgage and note on March 16, 2009 to INDYMAC FEDERAL BANK, FSB (INDYMAC). INDYMAC subsequently assigned the subject mortgage and note to its successor, ONEWEST, on May 14, 2009.

Second, the Court requires an affidavit from Erica A. Johnson-Seck, a conflicted “robo-signer,” explaining her employment status. A “robo-signer” is a person who quickly signs hundreds or thousands of foreclosure documents in a month, despite swearing that he or she has personally reviewed the mortgage documents and has not done so. Ms. Johnson-Seck, in a July 9, 2010 deposition taken in a Palm Beach County, Florida foreclosure case, admitted that she: is a “robo-signer” who executes about 750 mortgage documents a week, without a notary public present; does not spend more than 30 seconds signing each document; does not read the documents before signing them; and, did not provide me with affidavits about her employment in two prior cases. (See Stephanie Armour, “Mistakes Widespread on Foreclosures, Lawyers Say,” USA Today, Sept. 27, 2010; Ariana Eunjung Cha, “OneWest Bank Employee: Not More Than 30 Seconds’ to Sign Each Foreclosure Document,” Washington Post, Sept. 30, 2010).

In the instant action, Ms. Johnson-Seck claims to be: a Vice President of MERS in the March 16, 2009 MERS to INDYMAC assignment; a Vice President of INDYMAC in the May 14, 2009 INDYMAC to ONEWEST assignment; and, a Vice President of ONEWEST in her June 30, 2009-affidavit of merit. Ms. Johnson-Seck must explain to the Court, in her affidavit: her employment history for the past three years; and, why a conflict of interest does not exist in the instant action with her acting as a Vice President of assignor MERS, a Vice President of assignee/assignor INDYMAC, and a Vice President of assignee/plaintiff ONEWEST. Further, Ms. Johnson-Seck must explain: why she was a Vice President of both assignor MERS and assignee DEUTSCHE BANK in a second case before me, Deutsche Bank v Maraj, 18 Misc 3d 1123 (A) (Sup Ct, Kings County 2008); why she was a Vice President of both assignor MERS and assignee INDYMAC in a third case before me, Indymac Bank, FSB, v Bethley, 22 Misc 3d 1119 (A) (Sup Ct, Kings County 2009); and, why she executed an affidavit of merit as a Vice President of DEUTSCHE BANK in a fourth case before me, Deutsche Bank v Harris (Sup Ct, Kings County, Feb. 5, 2008, Index No. 35549/07).

Third, plaintiff’s counsel must comply with the new Court filing requirement, announced yesterday by Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman, which was promulgated to preserve the integrity of the foreclosure process. Plaintiff’s counsel must submit an affirmation, using the new standard Court form, that he has personally reviewed plaintiff’s documents and records in the instant action and has confirmed the factual accuracy of the court filings and the notarizations in these documents. Counsel is reminded that the new standard Court affirmation form states that “[t]he wrongful filing and prosecution of foreclosure proceedings which are discovered to suffer from these defects may be cause for disciplinary and other sanctions upon participating counsel.”

Background

Defendant COVAN DRAYTON (DRAYTON) executed the subject

mortgage and note on January 12, 2007, borrowing $492,000.00 from CAMBRIDGE. MERS “acting solely as a nominee for Lender [CAMBRIDGE]” and “FOR PURPOSES OF RECORDING THIS MORTGAGE, MERS IS THE MORTGAGEE OF RECORD,” recorded the instant mortgage and note on March 19, 2007, in the Office of the City Register of the City of New York, at City Register File Number (CRFN) XXXXXXXXXXXXX. Plaintiff DRAYTON allegedly defaulted in his mortgage loan payment on September 1, 2008. Then, MERS, as nominee for CAMBRIDGE, assigned the instant nonperforming mortgage and note to INDYMAC, on March 16, 2009. Erica A. Johnson-Seck executed the assignment as a Vice President of MERS, as nominee for CAMBRIDGE. This assignment was recorded in the Office of the City Register of the City of New York, on March 24, 2009, at CRFN XXXXXXXXXXXX. However, as will be discussed below, there is an issue whether MERS, as CAMBRIDGE’s nominee, was authorized by CAMBRIDGE, its principal, to assign the subject DRAYTON mortgage and note to plaintiff INDYMAC. Subsequently, almost two months later, Ms. Johnson-Seck, now as a Vice President of INDYMAC, on May 14, 2009, assigned the subject mortgage and note to ONEWEST. This assignment was recorded in the Office of the City Register of the City of New York, on May 22, 2009, at CRFN XXXXXXXXXXXXX. Plaintiff ONEWEST commenced the instant foreclosure action on June 18, 2009 with the filing of the summons, complaint and notice of pendency. On August 6, 2009, plaintiff ONEWEST filed the instant motion for an order of reference. Attached to plaintiff ONEWEST’s moving papers is an affidavit of merit by Erica A. Johnson-Seck, dated June 30, 2009, in which she claims to be a Vice President of plaintiff ONEWEST. She states, in ¶ 1, that “[t]he facts recited herein are from my own knowledge and from review of the documents and records kept in the ordinary course of business with respect to the servicing of this mortgage.” There are outstanding questions about Ms. Johnson-Seck’s employment, whether she executed sworn documents without a notary public present and whether she actually read and personally reviewed the information in the documents that she executed.

July 9, 2010 deposition of Erica A. Johnson-Seck in the Machado case

On July 9, 2010, nine days after executing the affidavit of merit in the instant action, Ms. Johnson-Seck was deposed in a Florida foreclosure action, Indymac Federal Bank, FSB, v Machado (Fifteenth Circuit Court in and for Palm Beach County, Florida, Case No. 50 2008 CA 037322XXXX MB AW), by defendant Machado’s counsel, Thomas E. Ice, Esq. Ms. Johnson-Seck admitted to being a “robo-signer,” executing sworn documents outside the presence of a notary public, not reading the documents before signing them and not complying with my prior orders in the Maraj and Bethley decisions. Ms. Johnson-Seck admitted in her Machado deposition testimony that she was not employed by INDYMAC on May 14, 2009, the day she assigned the subject mortgage and note to ONEWEST, even though she stated in the May 14, 2009 assignment that she was a Vice President of INDYMAC. According to her testimony she was employed on May 14, 2010 by assignee ONEWEST. The following questions were asked and then answered by Ms. Johnson Seck, at p. 4, line 11-p. 5, line 4:

Q. Could you state your full name for the record, please.

A. Erica Antoinette Johnson-Seck.

Q. And what is your business address?

A. 7700 West Parmer Lane, P-A-R-M-E-R, Building D, Austin, Texas 78729.

Q. And who is your employer?

A. OneWest Bank.

Q. How long have you been employed by OneWest Bank?

A. Since March 19th, 2009.

Q. Prior to that you were employed by IndyMac Federal Bank, FSB?

A. Yes.

Q. And prior to that you were employed by IndyMac Bank, FSB?

A. Yes.

Q. Your title with OneWest Bank is what?

A. Vice president, bankruptcy and foreclosure.

Despite executing, on March 16, 2009, the MERS, as nominee for CAMBRIDGE, assignment to INDYMAC, as Vice President of MERS, she admitted that she is not an officer of MERS. Further, she claimed to have “signing authority” from several major banking institutions and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The following questions were asked and then answered by Ms. Johnson-Seck, at p. 6, lines 5-21:

Q. Are you also an officer of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems?

A. No.

Q. You have signing authority to sign on behalf of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems as a vice president, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Are you an officer of any other corporation?

A. No.

Q. Do you have signing authority for any other corporation?

A. Yes.

Q. What corporations are those?

A. IndyMac Federal Bank, Indymac Bank, FSB, FDIC as receiver for Indymac Bank, FDIC as conservator for Indymac, Deutsche Bank, Bank of New York, U.S. Bank. And that’s all I can think of off the top of my head.

Then, she answered the following question about her “signing authority,” at page 7, lines 3-10:

Q. When you say you have signing authority, is your authority to sign as an officer of those corporations?

A. Some.

Deutsche Bank I have a POA [power of attorney] to sign as attorney-in-fact. Others I sign as an officer. The FDIC I sign as attorney-in-fact. IndyMac Bank and IndyMac Federal Bank I now sign as attorney-in-fact. I only sign as a vice president for OneWest. Ms. Johnson-Seck admitted that she is not an officer of MERS, has no idea how MERS is organized and does not know why she signs assignments as a MERS officer. Further, she admitted that the MERS assignments she executes are prepared by an outside vendor, Lender Processing Services, Inc. (LPS), which ships the documents to her Austin, Texas office from Minnesota. Moreover, she admitted executing MERS assignments without a notary public present. She also testified that after the MERS assignments are notarized they are shipped back to LPS in Minnesota. LPS, in its 2009 Form 10-K, filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, states that it is “a provider of integrated technology and services to the mortgage lending industry, with market leading positions in mortgage processing and default management services in the U.S. [p. 1]”; “we offer lenders, servicers and attorneys certain administrative and support services in connection with managing foreclosures [p. 4]”; “[a] significant focus of our marketing efforts is on the top 50 U.S. banks [p. 5]”; and, “our two largest customers, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., each accounted for more than 10% of our aggregate revenue [p. 5].”LPS is now the subject of a federal criminal investigation related to its foreclosure document preparation. (See Ariana Eunjung Cha. “Lender Processing Services Acknowledges Employees Allowed to Sign for Managers on Foreclosure Paperwork,” Washington Post, Oct. 5, 2010). Last week, on October 13, 2010, the Florida Attorney-General issued to LPS an “Economic Crimes Investigative Subpoena Duces Tecum,” seeking various foreclosure documents prepared by LPS and employment records for various “robo-signers.” The following answers to questions were given by Ms. Johnson-Seck in the Machado deposition, at p. 116, line 4-p. 119, line 16:

Q. Now, given our last exchange, I’m sure you will agree that you are not a vice president of MERS in any sense of the word other than being authorized to sign as one?

A. Yes.

Q. You are not —

A. Sorry.

Q. That’s all right. You are not paid by MERS?

A. No.

Q. You have no job duties as vice president of MERS?

A. No.

Q. You don’t attend any board meetings of MERS?

A. No.

Q. You don’t attend any meetings at all of MERS?

A. No.

Q. You don’t report to the president of MERS?

A. No.

Q. Who is the president of MERS?

A. I have no idea.

Q. You’re not involved in any governance of MERS?

A. No.

Q. The authority you have says that you can be an assistant secretary, right?

A. Yes.

Q. And yet you don’t report to the secretary —

A. No.

Q. — of MERS. You don’t have any MERS’ employees who report to you?

A. No.

Q. You don’t have any vote or say in any corporate decisions of MERS?

A. No.

Q. Do you know where the MERS’ offices are located?

A. No.

Q. Do you know how many offices they have?

A. No.

Q. Do you know where they are headquartered?

A. No.

Q. I take it then you’re never been to their headquarters?

A. No.

Q. Do you know how many employees they have?

A. No.

Q. But you know that you have counterparts all over the country signing as MERS’s vice-presidents and assistant secretaries?

A. Yes.

Q. Some of them are employees of third-party foreclosure service companies, like LPS?

A. Yes.

Q. Why does MERS appoint you as a vice president or assistant secretary as opposed to a manager or an authorized agent to sign in that capacity?

A. I don’t know.

Q. Why does MERS give you any kind of a title?

A. I don’t know.

Q. Take me through the procedure for drafting and — the drafting and execution of this Assignment of Mortgage which is Exhibit E.

A. It is drafted by our forms, uploaded into process management, downloaded by LPS staff in Minnesota, shipped to Austin where we sign and notarize it, and hand it back to an LPS employee, who then ships it back to Minnesota, up uploads a copy and mails the original to the firm.

Q. Very similar to all the other document, preparation of all the other documents.

A. (Nods head.)

Q. Was that a yes? You were shaking your head.

A. Yes.

Q. As with the other documents, you personally don’t review any of the information that’s on here —

A. No.

Q. — other than to make sure that you are authorized to sign as the person you’re signing for?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. As with the other documents, you signed these and took them to be notarized just to a Notary that’s outside your office?

A. Yes.

Q. And they will get notarized as soon as they can. It may or may not be the same day that you executed it?

A. That’s true. Further, with respect to MERS, Ms. Johnson-Seck testified in answering questions, at p. 138, line 2-p. 139, line 17:

Q. Do you have an understanding that MERS is a membership organization?

A. Yes, yes.

Q. And the members are —

A. Yes.

Q. — banking entities such as OneWest?

A. Yes.

Q. In fact, OneWest is a member of MERS?

A. Yes.

Q. Is Deutsche Bank National Trust Company a member of MERS?

A. I don’t know.

Q. Most of the major banking institutions in the Untied States, at least, are members of MERS, correct?

A. That sounds right.

Q. It’s owned and operated by banking institutions?

A. I’m not a big — I don’t, I don’t know that much about the ins and outs of MERS. I’m sorry. I understand what it’s for, but I don’t understand the nitty-gritty.

Q. What is it for?

A. To track the transfer of doc — of interest from one entity to another. I know that it was initially created so that a servicer did not have to record the assignments, or if they didn’t, there was still a system to keep track of the transfer of property.

Q. Does it also have a function to hold the mortgage separate and apart from the note so that note can be transferred from entity to entity to entity, bank to bank to bank —

A. That sounds right.

Q. — without ever having to rerecord the mortgage?

A. That sounds right.

Q. So it’s a savings device. It makes it more efficient to transfer notes?

A. Yes.

Q. And cheaper?

A. Yes. Moreover,

Ms. Johnson-Seck testified that one of her job duties was to sign documents, which at that time took her about ten minutes per day [p. 11]. Further, she admitted, at p. 13, line 11-p. 14, line 15, that she signs about 750 documents per week and doesn’t read each document.

Q. Okay. How many documents would you say that you sign on a week on average, in a week on average?

A. I could have given you that number if you had that question in there because I would brought the report. However, I’m going to guess, today I saw an e-mail that 1,073 docs are in the office for signing. So if we just — and there’s about that a day. So let’s say 6,000 a week and I do probably — let’s see. There’s eight of us signing documents, so what’s the math?

Q. Six thousand divided by eight, that gives me 750..

A. That sounds, that sounds about right.

Q. Okay. That would be a reasonable estimate of how many you sign, you personally sign per week?

A. Yes.

Q. And that would include Lost Note Affidavits, Affidavits of Debt?

A. Yes.

Q. What other kinds of documents would be included in that?

A. Assignments, declarations. I can sign anything related to a bankruptcy or a foreclosure.

Q. How long do you spend executing each document?

A. I have changed my signature considerably. It’s just an E now.

So not more than 30 seconds.

Q. Is it true that you don’t read each document before you sign it?

A. That’s true. [Emphasis added]

Ms. Johnson-Seck, in the instant action, signed her full name on the March 16, 2009 MERS, as nominee for CAMBRIDGE, assignment to INDYMAC. She switched to the letter E in signing the May 14, 2009 INDYMAC to ONEWEST assignment and the June 30, 2009 affidavit of merit on behalf of ONEWEST. Additionally. she testified about how LPS prepares the documents in Minnesota and ships them to her Austin office, with LPS personnel present in her Austin office [pp. 16-17]. Ms. Johnson-Seck described the document signing process, at p. 17, line 6-p. 18, line 18:

Q. Take me through the procedure for getting your actual signature on the documents once they’ve gone through this quality control process?

A. The documents are delivered to me for signature and I do a quick purview to make sure that I’m not signing for an entity that I cannot sign for. And I sign the document and I hand it to the Notary, who notarizes it, who then hands it back to LPS who uploads the document so that the firms know it’s available and they send an original.

Q. “They” being LPS?

A. Yes.

Q. Are all the documents physically, that you were supposed to sign, are they physically on your desk?

A. Yes.

Q. You don’t go somewhere else to sign documents?

A. No.

Q. When you sign them, there’s no one else in your office?

A. Sometimes.

Q. Well, the Notaries are not in your office, correct?

A. They don’t sit in my office, no.

Q. And the witnesses who, if you need witnesses on the document, are not sitting in your office?

A. That’s right.

Q. So you take your ten minutes and you sign them and then you give them to the supervisor of the Notaries, correct?

A. I supervise the Notaries, so I just give them to a Notary.

Q. You give all, you give the whole group that you just signed to one Notary?

A. Yes. [Emphasis added]

Ms. Johnson-Seck testified, at p. 20, line 1-p. 21, line 4 about notaries not witnessing her signature:

Q. I’m mostly interested in how long it takes for the Notary to notarize your signature.

A. I can’t say categorically because the Notary, that’s not the only job they do, so.

Q. In any event, it doesn’t have to be the same day?

A. No.

Q. When they notarize it and they put a date that they’re notarizing it, is it the date that you signed it or is it the date that they’re notarizing it?

A. I don’t know.

Q. When you execute a sworn document, do you make any kind of a verbal acknowledgment or oath to anyone?

A. I don’t know if I know what you’re talking about. What’s a sworn document?

Q. Well, an affidavit.

A. Oh. No.

Q. In any event, there’s no Notary in the room for you to

A. Right.

Q. — take an oath with you, correct?

A. No there is not.

Q. In fact, the Notaries can’t see you sign the documents; is that correct?

A. Not unless that made it their business to do so?

Q. To peek into your office?

A. Yes. [Emphasis added]

As noted above, I found Ms. Johnson-Seck engaged in “robo-signing” in Deutsche Bank v Maraj and Indymac Bank, FSB, v Bethley. In both foreclosure cases I denied plaintiffs’ motions for orders of reference without prejudice with leave to renew if, among other things, Ms. Johnson-Seck could explain in affidavits: her employment history for the past three years; why she was a Vice President of both assignor MERS and assignee Deutsche Bank National Trust Company in Maraj; and, Vice President of INDYMAC in Bethley. Mr. Ice questioned Ms. Johnson-Seck about my MarajMaraj decision as exhibit M in the Machado deposition. The following colloquy at the Maraj deposition took place at p. 153, line 15-p. 156, line 9. decision and showed her the

Q. Exhibit M is a document that you saw before in your last deposition, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. It’s an opinion from Judge Schack up in New York —

A. Yes.

Q. — correct? You’re familiar with that?

A. Yes.

Q. In it, he says that you signed an Assignment of Mortgage as the vice president of MERS, correct —

A. Yes.

Q. — just as you did in this case? Judge Schack also says that you executed an affidavit as an officer of Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And is that true, you executed an affidavit for Deutsche Bank in that case?

A. That is not true.

Q. You never executed a document as an officer of Deutsche Bank National Trust Company in that case, Judge Schack’s case?

A. Let me just read it so I can — I have to refresh my memory completely.

Q. Okay.

A. I don’t remember. Most likely.

Q. That you did?

A. It sounds reasonable that I may have. I don’t remember, and since it’s not attached, I can’t say.

Q. And as a result, Judge Schack wanted to know if you were engaged in self-dealing by wearing two corporate hats?

A. Yes.

Q. And the court was concerned that there may be fraud on the part of the bank?

A. I guess.

Q. I mean he said that, right?

A. Oh, okay. I didn’t read the whole thing. Okay.

Q. Okay. The court ordered Deutsche Bank to produce an affidavit from you describing your employment history for the past three years, correct?

A. That’s what this says.

Q. Did you do that?

A. No, because we were never — no affidavit ever existed and no request ever came to produce such a document. The last time we spoke, I told you that in-house counsel was reviewing the whole issue and that’s kind of where — and we still haven’t received any communication to produce an affidavit.

Q. From your counsel?

A. From anywhere.

Q. Well, you’re reading Judge Schack’s opinion. He seems to want one. Isn’t that pretty clear on its face.

A. We didn’t get — we never even got a copy of this.

Q. Okay. But now you have it —

A. And —

Q. And you had it when we met at our deposition back in February 5th.

A. And our in-house counsel’s response to this is we were never — this was never requested of me and it was his recommendation not to comply.

Q. What has become of that case?

A. I don’t know.

Q. Was it settled?

A. I don’t know. After a break in the Machado deposition proceedings, Mr. Ice questioned Ms. Johnson-Seck about various documents that were subpoenaed for the July 9, 2010 deposition, including her employment affidavits that I required in both Maraj and Bethley. Ms. Johnson-Seck answered the following questions at p. 159, line 19-p. 161, line 9:

Q. So let’s start with the duces tecum part of you notice, which is the list of documents. No. 1 was: The affidavit of the last three years of deponent’s employment provided to Judge Schack in response to the order dated January 31st, 2008 in the case of Deutsche Bank National Trust Company vs. Maraj, Case No. 25981-07, Supreme Court of New York. We talked about that earlier. There is no such affidavit, correct?

A. Correct.

Q. By the way, why was IndyMac permitted to bring the case in Deutsche Bank’s name in that case?

A. I don’t — I don’t know. Now, errors have been made.

Q. No. 2: The affidavit of the deponent provided to Judge Schack in response to the order dated February 6th, 2009 in the case of IndyMac Bank, FSB vs, Bethley, New York Slip Opinion 50186, New York Supreme Court 2/5/09, “explaining,” and this is in quotes, “her employment history for the past three years; and, why a conflict of interest does not exist in how she acted as vice president of assignee IndyMac Bank, FSB in the instant action, and vice president of both Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems, Inc. and Deutsche Bank in Deutsche Bank vs. Maraj,” and it gives the citation and that’s the case referred to in item 1 of our request. Do you have that affidavit with you here today?

A. No.

Q. Were you aware of that second opinion where Judge Schack asks for a second affidavit?

A. Nope. Where is Judge Schack sending these?

Q. Presumably to your counsel.

A. I wonder if he has the right address. Maybe that’s what we should do, send Judge Schack the most recent, and I will gladly show up in his court and provide him everything he wants.

Q. Okay. Well, I sent you this back in March. Have your or your counsel or in-house counsel at IndyMac pursued that?

A. No. [Emphasis added] Counsel for plaintiff ONEWEST has leave to produce Ms. Johnson-Seck in my courtroom to “gladly show up . . . and provide [me] . . . everything he wants.”

Discussion

Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) § 1321 allows the Court in a foreclosure action, upon the default of the defendant or defendant’s admission of mortgage payment arrears, to appoint a referee “to compute the amount due to the plaintiff.” In the instant action, plaintiff ONEWEST’s application for an order of reference is a preliminary step to obtaining a default judgment of foreclosure and sale against defendant DRAYTON. (Home Sav. of Am., F.A. v Gkanios, 230 AD2d 770 [2d Dept 1996]). Plaintiff’s request to withdraw its application for an order of reference is granted. However, to allow this action to continue without seeking the ultimate purpose of a foreclosure action, to obtain a judgment of foreclosure and sale, makes a mockery of and wastes the resources of the judicial system. Continuing the instant action without moving for an order of reference is the judicial equivalent of a “timeout.” Granting a “timeout” to plaintiff ONEWEST to allow it to re-submit “a new application containing new information . . . shortly” is a waste of judicial resources. Therefore, the instant action is dismissed without prejudice, with leave granted to plaintiff ONEWEST to renew its motion for an order of reference within sixty (60) days of this decision and order, if plaintiff ONEWEST and plaintiff ONEWEST’s counsel can satisfactorily address the various issues previously enumerated. Further, the dismissal of the instant foreclosure action requires the cancellation of the notice of pendency. CPLR § 6501 provides that the filing of a notice of pendency against a property is to give constructive notice to any purchaser of real property or encumbrancer against real property of an action that “would affect the title to, or the possession, use or enjoyment of real property, except in a summary proceeding brought to recover the possession of real property.” The Court of Appeals, in 5308 Realty Corp. v O & Y Equity Corp. (64 NY2d 313, 319 [1984]), commented that “[t]he purpose of the doctrine was to assure that a court retained its ability to effect justice by preserving its power over the property, regardless of whether a purchaser had any notice of the pending suit,” and, at 320, that “the statutory scheme permits a party to effectively retard the alienability of real property without any prior judicial review.” CPLR § 6514 (a) provides for the mandatory cancellation of a notice of pendency by:

The Court, upon motion of any person aggrieved and upon such notice as it may require, shall direct any county clerk to cancel a notice of pendency, if service of a summons has not been completed within the time limited by section 6512; or if the action has been settled, discontinued or abated; or if the time to appeal from a final judgment against the plaintiff has expired; or if enforcement of a final judgment against the plaintiff has not been stayed pursuant to section 551. [emphasis added] The plain meaning of the word “abated,” as used in CPLR § 6514 (a) is the ending of an action. “Abatement” is defined as “the act of eliminating or nullifying.” (Black’s Law Dictionary 3 [7th ed 1999]). “An action which has been abated is dead, and any further enforcement of the cause of action requires the bringing of a new action, provided that a cause of action remains (2A Carmody-Wait 2d § 11.1).” (Nastasi v Nastasi, 26 AD3d 32, 40 [2d Dept 2005]). Further, Nastasi at 36, held that the “[c]ancellation of a notice of pendency can be granted in the exercise of the inherent power of the court where its filing fails to comply with CPLR § 6501 (see 5303 Realty Corp. v O & Y Equity Corp., supra at 320-321; Rose v Montt Assets, 250 AD2d 451, 451-452 [1d Dept 1998]; Siegel, NY Prac § 336 [4th ed]).” Thus, the dismissal of the instant complaint must result in the mandatory cancellation of plaintiff ONEWEST’s notice of pendency against the subject property “in the exercise of the inherent power of the court.”

Moreover, “[t]o have a proper assignment of a mortgage by an authorized agent, a power of attorney is necessary to demonstrate how the agent is vested with the authority to assign the mortgage.” (HSBC Bank, USA v Yeasmin, 27 Misc 3d 1227 [A], *3 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2010]). “No special form or language is necessary to effect an assignment as long as the language shows the intention of the owner of a right to transfer it [Emphasis added].” (Tawil v Finkelstein Bruckman Wohl Most & Rothman, 223 AD2d 52, 55 [1d Dept 1996]). (See Suraleb, Inc. v International Trade Club, Inc., 13 AD3d 612 [2d Dept 2004]). MERS, as described above, recorded the subject mortgage as “nominee” for CAMBRIDGE. The word “nominee” is defined as “[a] person designated to act in place of another, usu. in a very limited way” or “[a] party who holds bare legal title for the benefit of others.” (Black’s Law Dictionary 1076 [8th ed 2004]). “This definition suggests that a nominee possesses few or no legally enforceable rights beyond those of a principal whom the nominee serves.” (Landmark National Bank v Kesler, 289 Kan 528, 538 [2009]). The Supreme Court of Kansas, in Landmark National Bank, 289 Kan at 539, observed that: The legal status of a nominee, then, depends on the context of the relationship of the nominee to its principal. Various courts have interpreted the relationship of MERS and the lender as an agency relationship. See In re Sheridan, 2009 WL631355, at *4 (Bankr. D. Idaho, March 12, 2009) (MERS “acts not on its own account. Its capacity is representative.”); Mortgage Elec. Registrations Systems, Inc. v Southwest,La Salle Nat. Bank v Lamy, 12 Misc 3d 1191 [A], at *2 [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 2006]) . . . (“A nominee of the owner of a note and mortgage may not effectively assign the note and mortgage to another for want of an ownership interest in said note and mortgage by the nominee.”) The New York Court of Appeals in MERSCORP, Inc. v Romaine (8 NY3d 90 [2006]), explained how MERS acts as the agent of mortgagees, holding at 96: In 1993, the MERS system was created by several large participants in the real estate mortgage industry to track ownership interests in residential mortgages. Mortgage lenders and other entities, known as MERS members, subscribe to the MERS system and pay annual fees for the electronic processing and tracking of ownership and transfers of mortgages. Members contractually agree to appoint MERS to act as their common agent on all mortgages they register in the MERS system. [Emphasis added] 2009 Ark. 152 ___, ___SW3d___, 2009 WL 723182 (March 19, 2009) (“MERS, by the terms of the deed of trust, and its own stated purposes, was the lender’s agent”);

Thus, it is clear that MERS’s relationship with its member lenders is that of agent with principal. This is a fiduciary relationship, resulting from the manifestation of consent by one person to another, allowing the other to act on his behalf, subject to his control and consent. The principal is the one for whom action is to be taken, and the agent is the one who acts.It has been held that the agent, who has a fiduciary relationship with the principal, “is a party who acts on behalf of the principal with the latter’s express, implied, or apparent authority.” (Maurillo v Park Slope U-Haul, 194 AD2d 142, 146 [2d Dept 1992]). “Agents are bound at all times to exercise the utmost good faith toward their principals. They must act in accordance with the highest and truest principles of morality.” (Elco Shoe Mfrs. v Sisk, 260 NY 100, 103 [1932]). (See Sokoloff v Harriman Estates Development Corp., 96 NY 409 [2001]); Wechsler v Bowman, 285 NY 284 [1941]; Lamdin v Broadway Surface Advertising Corp., 272 NY 133 [1936]). An agent “is prohibited from acting in any manner inconsistent with his agency or trust and is at all times bound to exercise the utmost good faith and loyalty in the performance of his duties.” (Lamdin, at 136). Therefore, in the instant action, MERS, as nominee for CAMBRIDGE, is an agent of CAMBRIDGE for limited purposes. It can only have those powers given to it and authorized by its principal, CAMBRIDGE. Plaintiff ONEWEST has not submitted any documents demonstrating how CAMBRIDGE authorized MERS, as nominee for CAMBRIDGE, to assign the subject DRAYTON mortgage and note to INDYMAC, which subsequently assigned the subject mortgage and note to plaintiff ONEWEST. Recently, in Bank of New York v Alderazi,Lippincott v East River Mill & Lumber Co., 79 Misc 559 [1913]) and “[t]he declarations of an alleged agent may not be shown for the purpose of proving the fact of agency.” (Lexow & Jenkins, P.C. v Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp., 122 AD2d 25 [2d Dept 1986]; see also Siegel v Kentucky Fried Chicken of Long Is. 108 AD2d 218 [2d Dept 1985]; Moore v Leaseway Transp/ Corp., 65 AD2d 697 [1st Dept 1978].) “[T]he acts of a person assuming to be the representative of another are not competent to prove the agency in the absence of evidence tending to show the principal’s knowledge of such acts or assent to them.” (Lexow & Jenkins, P.C. v Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp., 122 AD2d at 26, quoting 2 NY Jur 2d, Agency and Independent Contractors § 26). Plaintiff has submitted no evidence to demonstrate that the original lender, the mortgagee America’s Wholesale Lender, authorized MERS to assign the secured debt to plaintiff. Therefore, in the instant action, plaintiff ONEWEST failed to demonstrate how MERS, as nominee for CAMBRIDGE, had authority from CAMBRIDGE to assign the DRAYTON mortgage to INDYMAC. The Court grants plaintiff ONEWEST leave to renew its motion for an order of reference, if plaintiff ONEWEST can demonstrate how MERS had authority from CAMBRIDGE to assign the DRAYTON mortgage and note to INDYMAC. Then, plaintiff ONEWEST must address the tangled employment situation of “robo-signer” Erica A. Johnson-Seck. She admitted in her July 9, 2010 deposition in the Machado case that she never provided me with affidavits of her employment for the prior three years and an explanation of why she wore so-many corporate hats in Maraj and Bethley. Further, in Deutsche Bank v Harris, Ms. Johnson-Seck executed an affidavit of merit as Vice President of Deutsche Bank. If plaintiff renews its motion for an order of reference, the Court must get to the bottom of Ms. Johnson-Seck’s employment status and her “robo-signing.” The Court reminds plaintiff ONEWEST’s counsel that Ms. Johnson-Seck, at p. 161 of the Machado deposition, volunteered, at lines 4-5 to “gladly show up in his court and provide him everything he wants.” Lastly, if plaintiff ONEWEST’S counsel moves to renew its application for an order of reference, plaintiff’s counsel must comply with the new filing requirement to submit, under penalties of perjury, an affirmation that he has taken reasonable steps, including inquiring of plaintiff ONEWEST, the lender, and reviewing all papers, to verify the accuracy of the submitted documents in support of the instant foreclosure action. According to yesterday’s Office of Court Administration press release, Chief Judge Lippman said: We cannot allow the courts in New York State to stand by idly and be party to what we now know is a deeply flawed process, especially when that process involves basic human needs — such as a family home — during this period of economic crisis. This new filing requirement will play a vital role in ensuring that the documents judges rely on will be thoroughly examined, accurate, and error-free before any judge is asked to take the drastic step of foreclosure. 28 Misc 3d at 379-380, my learned colleague, Kings County Supreme Court Justice Wayne Saitta explained that: A party who claims to be the agent of another bears the burden of proving the agency relationship by a preponderance of the evidence (

(See Gretchen Morgenson and Andrew Martin, Big Legal Clash on Foreclosure is Taking Shape, New York Times, Oct. 21, 2010; Andrew Keshner, New Court Rules Says Attorneys Must Verify Foreclosure Papers, NYLJ, Oct. 21, 2010).

Conclusion

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED, that the request of plaintiff ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B., to withdraw its motion for an order of reference, for the premises located at 962 Hemlock Street, Brooklyn, New York (Block 4529, Lot 116, County of Kings), is granted; and it is further

ORDERED, that the instant action, Index Number 15183/09, is dismissed without prejudice; and it is further

ORDERED, that the notice of pendency in the instant action, filed with the Kings County Clerk on June 18, 2009, by plaintiff ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B., to foreclose a mortgage for real property located at 962 Hemlock Street, Brooklyn, New York (Block 4529, Lot 116, County of Kings), is cancelled; and it is further

ORDERED, that leave is granted to plaintiff, ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B., to renew, within sixty (60) days of this decision and order, its motion for an order of reference for the premises located at 962 Hemlock Street, Brooklyn, New York (Block 4529, Lot 116, County of Kings), provided that plaintiff, ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B., submits to the Court: (1) proof of the grant of authority from the original mortgagee, CAMBRIDGE CAPITAL, LLC, to its nominee, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., to assign the subject mortgage and note to INDYMAC FEDERAL BANK, FSB; and (2) an affidavit by Erica A. Johnson-Seck, Vice President of plaintiff ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B., explaining: her employment history for the past three years; why a conflict of interest does not exist in how she acted as a Vice President of assignor MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., a Vice President of assignee/assignor INDYMAC FEDERAL BANK, FSB, and a Vice President of assignee/plaintiff ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B. in this action; why she was a Vice President of both assignor MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. and assignee DEUTSCHE BANK in Deutsche Bank v Maraj, 18 Misc 3d 1123 (A) (Sup Ct, Kings County 2008); why she was a Vice President of both assignor MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. and assignee INDYMAC BANK, FSB in Indymac Bank, FSB, v Bethley, 22 Misc 3d 1119 (A) (Sup Ct, Kings County 2009); and, why she executed an affidavit of merit as a Vice President of DEUTSCHE BANK in Deutsche Bank v Harris (Sup Ct, Kings County, Feb. 5, 2008, Index No. 35549/07); and (3) counsel for plaintiff ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B. must comply with the new Court filing requirement, announced by Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman on October 20, 2010, by submitting an affirmation, using the new standard Court form, pursuant to CPLR Rule 2106 and under the penalties of perjury, that counsel for plaintiff ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B. has personally reviewed plaintiff ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B.’s documents and records in the instant action and counsel for plaintiff ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B. confirms the factual accuracy of plaintiff ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B.’s court filings and the accuracy of the notarizations in plaintiff ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B.’s documents.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

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Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (3)

GMAC, MERS & STEVEN J. BAUM PC…THE COURT IS AT LOSS ON A PURPORTED “CORRECTIVE ASSIGNMENT”

GMAC, MERS & STEVEN J. BAUM PC…THE COURT IS AT LOSS ON A PURPORTED “CORRECTIVE ASSIGNMENT”


I go through hundreds of cases each week and I have been saving this one for a rainy day. We’ll it’s raining today.

SUPREME COURT – STATE OF NEW YORK I.A.S. PART XXXVI SUFFOLK COUNTY PRESENT: HON. PAUL J. BAISLEY, JR., J.S.C.

DATED: MAY 10. 2010

The Court is at a loss to understand how a purported “correcting assignment” can be executed eight days before the assignment it is purporting to correct. Moreover, the Court is at a loss as to the identity of the true holder of the mortgage at the time of the commencement of the action (irrespective of any arguments regarding the validity of the purported assignment(s) by MERS as nominee of the original mortgagee; see, for example, US Bank, N.A. II Collymore, 200 NY Slip Op 09019 [2d Dept 2009]), While it is well established that any issues as to a plaintiff’s standing to commence a foreclosure action are waived by the defendant-mortgagor’s failure to appear and answer (HSBC Bank v Dammond, 59 A03d 679 l2d Sept 2009]), the contradictory and conflicting submissions on this motion implicate far more than the more issue of “standing.” Indeed, the submissions appear to have been drafted with utter disregard for the facts, or for counsel’s responsibilities as an officer of the Court, and border on the fraudulent.

In the the circumstances, the motion, which is unsupported either factually or legally, is denied in all respects. Moreover, in light of the failure of the movant to establish that any party was in fact the holder of the mortgage (and the underlying note, see KLuge v Fugm:y, 145 AD2d [2d Sept 1988J) at the time of the commencement of this action – an omission that in the circumstances may not be corrected by mere amendment — the Court, on its own motion, hereby directs the plaintiff to show cause why the complaint should not be dismissed; and further directs Steven J. Baum, P.c. and Heather A. Johnson, Esq., the attorney of record for the plaintiff in this action and the scrivener of the affirmation referred to above, to appear before the undersigned on June 24, 2010 at II :00 a.m. to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed on plaintiff and/or its attorney(s) for frivolous conduct pursuant to 22 NYCRR §130-1.1 (c).

Dated: May 10. 2010

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Posted in assignment of mortgage, bogus, concealment, conflict of interest, conspiracy, CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, foreclosures, Law Office Of Steven J. Baum, MERS, MERSCORP, mortgage, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC., Mortgage Foreclosure Fraud, note, RICO, Steven J Baum, Supreme Court, Susan Chana Lask, TrustsComments (1)

FORECLOSURE MILLS: SHAPIRO & FISHMAN V. LAW OFFICES OF DAVID J. STERN

FORECLOSURE MILLS: SHAPIRO & FISHMAN V. LAW OFFICES OF DAVID J. STERN


For those who may not know both David J. Stern and Cheryl Samons both were former employees of Shapiro & Fishman prior to Mr. Stern and Mrs. Samons departing from Shapiro & Fishman…“thats all“. <grin>————————–>

180 PAGES!

PROTECTIVE ORDER? Lender Processing Services? Specialized Loan Servicing? American Home Mortgage Servicing? DEPOS? SUBPOENAS?

DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE!

Florida Rules of Civil Procedure
1.420 Dismissal of Actions

(a) Voluntary Dismissal.

(1) By Parties. Except in actions in which property has been seized or is in the custody of the court, an action may be dismissed by plaintiff without order of court

(B) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action. Unless otherwise stated in the notice or stipulation, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits when served by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court an action based on or including the same claim.

Many thanks to Foreclosure Hamlet for the documents.

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Posted in Barry S. Fishman, conspiracy, dismissed, foreclosure, foreclosure mills, foreclosures, investigation, Law Offices Of David J. Stern P.A., lawsuit, mortgage, note, shapiro & fishman pa, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD, tew cardenasComments (3)

FL Judge N. James Turner ‘Inter Alia’ with David J. Stern, ESQ. on His Mother’s Foreclosure

FL Judge N. James Turner ‘Inter Alia’ with David J. Stern, ESQ. on His Mother’s Foreclosure


INQUIRY CONCERNING A JUDGE NO. 09-01 and 09-578
RE: JUDGE N. JAMES TURNER SC09-1182

Illegal Practice of Law

As a sitting judge, Turner was prohibited from engaging in the practice of law. However, he knowingly acted as his mother’s lawyer in a foreclosure proceeding in Dade County.

THE FLORIDA JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS COMMISSION’S SECOND
INTERROGATORIES TO JUDGE N. JAMES TURNER states:

JUDGE MOTHER STERNFiled_05-05-2010_JQC_Second_Interrogatories

INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Please specifically itemize and describe the source of funds (in excess of $42,000) that you reported as loans from you to your campaign.

ANSWER:

INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Please specifically itemize and describe all funds, however characterized, you received from your mother (Mignon Gordon) which were used for the campaign for the office you now hold, including, the date(s) any such funds were received, the specific amounts of such funds, and the total of such funds.

ANSWER:

INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Please specifically describe the agreement, arrangement or understanding you had with your mother regarding the funds you received from her which were used in the campaign for the office you now hold.

ANSWER:

INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Please describe all communications (written or parole) you had with David J. Stern, Esquire regarding your mother or the foreclosure litigation brought against her by Citimortgage, Inc. in Dade County, Florida, including the nature, substance and approximate dates of all such communications.

ANSWER:

INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Please describe all communications (written or parole) you had with any person other than David J. Stern, Esquire regarding your mother or the foreclosure litigation brought against her by Citimortgage, Inc. in Dade County, Florida, including the nature, substance and approximate dates of all such communications.

ANSWER:

NOTICE OF THIRD AMENDED CONSOLIDATED
FORMAL CHARGES
states:

JUDGE STERN2Filed_06-18-2010_Amended_Formal_Charges

7. During the campaign for the office you now hold, you knowingly accepted and received a very substantial campaign contribution made for the purpose of influencing the results of the election, whether characterized as a gift or loan, far in excess of the $500 limit established by Ch. 106, Florida Statutes, from your mother (Mignon Gordon) which you used to pay for your campaign, in violation of Chapter 106, Florida Statutes, and Canons 1, 2A and 7C(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

8. As a sitting circuit court judge, on or about November 20, 2009, you knowingly filed a notice of appearance in pending litigation in Dade County, Florida (CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Gordon, Case No. 2009-74992-CA- 01) where you purported to appear to represent your mother in foreclosure proceedings brought against her therein, in violation of Canons 1, 2A and 5G of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

9. As a sitting circuit court judge, you knowingly represented and acted as litigation counsel for your mother in the foreclosure proceeding in Dade County, Florida described above by, inter alia, communicating with counsel for the mortgagee on her behalf, in Osceola County, Florida, in violation of Canons 1, 2A and 5G of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in citimortgage, concealment, conflict of interest, conspiracy, CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, discovery, djsp enterprises, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, foreclosures, investigation, Law Offices Of David J. Stern P.A., mortgage, Real Estate, settlement, ViolationsComments (2)

RESTRAINED |’MERS’ and any of its attorneys, agents, successors and assignees by NY SUPREME COURT

RESTRAINED |’MERS’ and any of its attorneys, agents, successors and assignees by NY SUPREME COURT


Supreme Court of the State of New York, held
in and for the County of KINGS, at
the Courthouse located at 360 Adams
Street, Brooklyn, NY on the 2nd day of
June, 2010

“WHY an order should not be made dismissing the within action due to Plaintiffs lack of standing; together with such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and equitable;”

ORDERED, that pending the hearing . . of this motion, the Plaintiff Mortgage Electronic Registration System as Nominee for US Bank, N.A., and any of its attorneys, agents, successors and assignees, be and are hereby restrained from implementing or any way pursuing the closing of title on any third party sale of the premises known as 81 Woodbine Street, Brooklyn, NY 11221; and Plaintiff Mortgage Electronic Registration System as Nominee for US Bank, N.A., and any of its attorneys, agents, successors and assignees be and are hereby restrained from evicting Liborio Munoz and his family and any other occupants from the premises known as 81 Woodbine Street, Brooklyn, NY 11221.

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© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in auction, CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, dismissed, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, foreclosures, lawsuit, MERS, MERSCORP, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC., STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD, TRO, trustee, trustee sale, TrustsComments (0)

FORECLOSURE FRAUD Personally CAUGHT by JUDGE SCHACK! Dismissed with PREJUDICE!

FORECLOSURE FRAUD Personally CAUGHT by JUDGE SCHACK! Dismissed with PREJUDICE!


2010 NY Slip Op 51482(U)

ARGENT MORTGAGE COMPANY, LLC, Plaintiff,
v.
DAPHINE MAITLAND, ET. AL., Defendants.

41383/07.

Supreme Court, Kings County.

Decided August 19, 2010.

Melissa A Sposato, Esq., Law Offices of Jordan Katz, PC, Melville NY, Plaintiff.

No Appearances, Defendant.

ARTHUR M. SCHACK, J.

In this mortgage foreclosure action, plaintiff’s motion for an order of reference for the premises located at 732 Hendrix Street, Brooklyn, New York (Block 4305, Lot 22, County of Kings) is denied with prejudice. The complaint is dismissed. The notice of pendency filed against the above-named real property is cancelled. Plaintiff’s successor in interest, AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE SERVICING, INC. (AHMSI), lacks standing to continue this action because the instant mortgage was satisfied on April 26, 2010. Plaintiff’s counsel never notified the Court that the mortgage had been satisfied and failed to discontinue the instant action with prejudice. I discovered that the mortgage had been satisfied by personally searching the Automated City Register Information System (ACRIS) website of the Office of the City Register, New York City Department of Finance. AHMSI’s President and Chief Executive Officer or its Executive Vice President, Chief Legal Officer and Secretary Jordan D. Dorchuck, Esq., its counsel, Melissa A. Sposato, Esq. and her firm, Jordan S. Katz, P.C., will be given an opportunity to be heard as to why this Court should not sanction them for making a “frivolous motion,” pursuant to 22 NYCRR §130-1.1.

Background

Defendant DAPHINE MAITLAND (MAITLAND) borrowed $392,000.00 from original plaintiff ARGENT MORTGAGE COMPANY, LLC (ARGENT), on August 4, 2006. The loan was secured by a mortgage, recorded by ARGENT, at the Office of the City Register of the City of New York, New York City Department of Finance, on August 23, 2006, at City Register File Number (CRFN) XXXXXXXXXX. Defendant MAITLAND allegedly defaulted in her mortgage loan payments with her June 1, 2007 payment. ARGENT commenced the instant action with the filing of the summons, complaint and notice of pendency with the Kings County Clerk on November 8, 2007. Plaintiff’s counsel, on April 14, 2009, filed the instant motion for an order of reference with the Court’sForeclosure Department. After reviewing the papers, the Foreclosure Department forwarded the instant motion to me on August 16, 2010.

On August 16, 2010, I searched ACRIS and discovered that AHMSI, the successor in interest to plaintiff ARGENT, executed a satisfaction of the instant mortgage almost four months ago, on April 26, 2010. The satisfaction was executed in Idaho Falls, Idaho, by Krystal Hall, Vice President of “AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE SERVICING, INC., AS SUCCESSOR TO CITI RESIDENTIAL LENDING, INC. AS SUCCESSOR TO ARGENT MORTGAGE COMPANY, LLC,” and the satisfaction was recorded at the Office of the City Register of the City of New York, on May 10, 2010, at CRFN XXXXXXXXXXXXX.

Successor plaintiff AHMSI is one of several companies controlled by billionaire investor Wilbur L. Ross, Jr. through his firm, W. L. Ross & Company. Louise Story, in her April 4, 2008 New York Times article, “Investors Stalk the Wounded of Wall Street,” described Mr. Ross as “a dean of vulture investing.” She wrote:

Almost two centuries ago, as Napoleon marched on Waterloo, a scion of the Rothschilds is said to have declared: The time to buy is when blood is running in the streets.

Now as red ink runs on Wall Street, the figurative heirs of the Rothschilds — bankers, traders, hedge fund gurus and takeover artists — are plotting to profit from today’s financial upheaval. These market opportunists — vulture investors in the Wall Street term — have begun to swoop. They are buying up mortgages of hard-pressed homeowners, the bank loans of cash-short businesses, and companies that seem to be hurtling to bankruptcy. And they are trying to buy them all on the cheap. . . .

“The only time you really know you’ve reached the bottom is when you’re back on the other side and things are going back up,” said Wilbur L. Ross, Jr., a dean of vulture investors, who made a fortune buying steel companies when no one else seemed to want them.

Such caution aside, his firm, W. L. Ross & Company, recently spent $2.6 billion for two mortgage servicers [AHMSI and Option One] and a bond insurance company. He said he planned to buy more as hedge funds and other investor sell at bargain prices.

Moreover, ACRIS revealed that defendant MAITLAND sold the premises to 732 HENDRIX STREET, LLC for $155,000.00, with the deed executed on April 5, 2010 and recorded on April 14, 2010, at the Office of the City Register of the City of New York, at CRFN XXXXXXXXXXXXX.

Plaintiff’s counsel never had the courtesy or professionalism to notify the Court that the instant mortgage was satisfied and file a motion to discontinue the instant action. The Court is gravely concerned that it: expended scarce resources on an action that should have been discontinued; and, would have signed an order that could have possibly damaged the credit rating of defendant MAITLAND and put an unfair cloud on the title to the subject premises now owned by 732 HENDRIX STREET, LLC, causing both defendant MAITLAND and 732 HENDRIX STREET, LLC much time and effort to correct an error caused by the failure of successor plaintiff AHMSI and plaintiff’s counsel to exercise due diligence. If successor plaintiff AHMSI is a responsible lender, not a vulture investor looking to profit “when blood is running in the streets,” it should have notified the Court that the subject mortgage had been satisfied.

Discussion

It is clear that successor plaintiff AHMSI lacked standing to proceed in the instant action since some time prior to April 26, 2010, when the satisfaction for defendant MAITLAND’s mortgage was executed. The exact date is probably April 5, 2010, when defendant MAITLAND likely paid off the subject mortgage loan as part of her closing with 732 HENDRIX STREET, LLC, for the sale of the subject mortgaged premises. “To establish a prima facie case in an action to foreclose a mortgage, the plaintiff must establish the existence of the mortgage and the mortgage note, ownership of the mortgage, and the defendant’s default in payment.” (Campaign v Barba (23 AD3d 327 [2d Dept. 2005]). The instant mortgage was satisfied months before the instant motion for an order of reference was forwarded to me by the Foreclosure Department. The satisfaction, dated April 26, 2010, states that “AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE INC. AS SUCCESSOR TO CITI RESIDENTIAL LENDING, INC. AS SUCCESSOR TO ARGENT MORTGAGE COMPANY, LLC . . . does hereby certify that a certain indenture of mortgage . . . to secure payment of the principal sum of $392,000.00, and interest, and duly recorded . . . document no. 2006000477619 on the 23rd day of August 2006, is PAID, and does hereby consent that the same be discharged of record.” (See Household Finance Realty Corp. of New York v Wynn, 19 AD3d 545 [2d Dept. 2005]; Sears Mortgage Corp. v Yahhobi, 19 AD3d 402 [2d Dept. 2005]; Ocwen Federal Bank FSB v Miller, 18 AD3d 527 [2d Dept. 2005]; U.S. Bank Trust Nat. Ass’n Trustee v Butti, 16 AD3d 408 [2d Dept 2005]; First Union Mortgage Corp. v Fern, 298 AD2d 490 [2d Dept 2002]; Village Bank v Wild Oaks, Holding, Inc., 196 AD2d 812 [2d Dept 1993]).

The Court of Appeals (Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v Pataki, 100 NY2d 801, 812 [2003], cert denied 540 US 1017 [2003]) declared that “[s]tanding to sue is critical to the proper functioning of the judicial system. It is a threshold issue. If standing is denied, the pathway to the courthouse is blocked. The plaintiff who has standing, however, may cross the threshold and seek judicial redress.”

In Caprer v Nussbaum (36 AD3d 176, 181 [2d Dept 2006]) the Court held that “[s]tanding to sue requires an interest in the claim at issue in the lawsuit that the law will recognize as a sufficient predicate for determining the issue at the litigant’s request.” If a plaintiff lacks standing to sue, the plaintiff may not proceed in the action. (Stark v Goldberg, 297 AD2d 203 [1st Dept 2002]).

Since AHMSI executed the satisfaction for the instant mortgage, the Court must not only deny the instant motion, but also dismiss the complaint and cancel the notice of pendency filed by ARGENT with the Kings County Clerk on November 8, 2007. CPLR § 6501 provides that the filing of a notice of pendency against a property is to give constructive notice to any purchaser of real property or encumbrancer against real property of an action that “would affect the title to, or the possession, use or enjoyment of real property, except in a summary proceeding brought to recover the possession of real property.” Professor David Siegel, in NY Prac, § 334, at 535 [4th ed] observes about a notice of pendency that:

The plaintiff files it with the county clerk of the real property county, putting the world on notice of the plaintiff’s potential rights in the action and thereby warning all comers that if they then buy the property or lend on the strength of it or otherwise rely on the defendant’s right, they do so subject to whatever the action may establish as the plaintiff’s right.

The Court of Appeals, in 5303 Realty Corp. v O & Y Equity Corp. (64 NY2d 313, 315 [1984]), commented that “[a] notice of pendency, commonly known as a lis pendens,‘ can be a potent shield to litigants claiming an interest in real property.” The Court, at 318-320, outlined the history of the doctrine of lis pendens back to 17th century England. It was formally recognized in New York courts in 1815 and first codified in the Code of Procedure [Field Code] enacted in 1848. At 319, the Court stated that “[t]he purpose of the doctrine was to assure that a court retained its ability to effect justice by preserving its power over the property, regardless of whether a purchaser had any notice of the pending suit,” and, at 320, “the statutory scheme permits a party to effectively retard the alienability of real property without any prior judicial review.”

In Israelson v Bradley (308 NY 511, 516 [1955]) the Court observed that with a notice of pendency a plaintiff who has an interest in real property has received from the State:

an extraordinary privilege which . . . upon the mere filing of the notice of a pendency of action, a summons and a complaint and strict compliance with the requirements of section 120 [of the Civil Practice Act; now codified in CPLR § § 6501, 6511 and 6512] is required. Proper administration of the law by the courts requires promptness on the part of a litigant so favored and that he accept the shield which has been given him upon the terms imposed and that he not be permitted to so use the privilege granted that itbecomes a sword usable against the owner or possessor of realty. If the terms imposed are not met, the privilege is at an end. [Emphasis added]

Article 65 of the CPLR outlines notice of pendency procedures. The Court, in Da Silva v Musso (76 NY2d 436, 442 [1990]), held that “the specific statutorily prescribed mechanisms for implementing this provisional remedy . . . were designed with a view toward balancing the interests of the claimant in the preservation of the status quo against the equally legitimate interests of the property owner in the marketability of his title.” The Court of Appeals, quoted Professor Siegel, in holding that “[t]he ability to file a notice of pendency is a privilege that can be lost if abused’ (Siegel, New York Practice § 336, at 512).” (In Re Sakow, 97 NY2d 436, 441 [2002]).

The instant case, with successor plaintiff AHMSI lacking standing to bring this action and the complaint dismissed, meets the criteria for losing “a privilege that can be lost if abused.” CPLR § 6514 (a) provides for the mandatory cancellation of a notice of pendency by:

[t]he court, upon motion of any person aggrieved and upon such notice as it may require, shall direct any county clerk to cancel a notice of pendency, if service of a summons has not been completed within the time limited by section 6512; or if the action has been settled, discontinued or abated; or if the time to appeal from a final judgment against the plaintiff has expired; or if enforcement of a final judgment against the plaintiff has not been stayed pursuant to section 5519. [Emphasis added]

The plain meaning of the word “abated,” as used in CPLR § 6514 (a) is the ending of an action. Abatement is defined (Black’s Law Dictionary 3 [7th ed 1999]) as “the act of eliminating or nullifying.” “An action which has been abated is dead, and any further enforcement of the cause of action requires the bringing of a new action, provided that a cause of action remains’ (2A Carmody-Wait 2d § 11.1).” (Nastasi v Nastasi, 26 AD3d 32, 40 [2d Dept 2005]). Further, Nastasi at 36, held that “[c]ancellation of a notice of pendency can be granted in the exercise of the inherent power of the court where its filing fails to comply with CPLR 6501 (see 5303 Realty Corp. v O & Y Equity Corp. at 320-321; Rose v Montt Assets, 250 AD2d 451, 451-452 [1st Dept 1998]; Siegel, NY Prac § 336 [4th ed]).” AHMSI, as successor plaintiff, lacks standing to sue. Therefore, dismissal of the instant complaint must result in mandatory cancellation of the November 8, 2007 notice of pendency against the property “in the exercise of the inherent power of the Court.”

The failure of successor plaintiff AHMSI, by its President David M. Friedman or its Executive Vice President, Chief Legal Officer and Secretary Jordan D. Dorchuck, Esq., and its counsel, Melissa A. Sposato, Esq. and her firm, Jordan S. Katz, P.C., to discontinue the instant action since the April 2010 payoff of the MAITLAND mortgage appears to be “frivolous.” 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1 (a) states that “the Court, in its discretion may impose financial sanctions upon any party or attorney in a civil action or proceeding who engages in frivolous conduct as defined in this Part, which shall be payable as provided in section 130-1.3 of this Subpart.” Further, it states in 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1 (b), that “sanctions may be imposed upon any attorney appearing in the action or upon a partnership, firm or corporation with which the attorney is associated.”

22 NYCRR § 130-1.1 (c) states that:

For purposes of this part, conduct is frivolous if:

(1) it is completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law;

(2) it is undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation, or to harass or maliciously injure another; or

(3) it asserts material factual statements that are false.

It is clear that since at least April 26, 2010 the instant motion for aan order of reference “is completely without merit in law” and “asserts material factual statements that are false.”

Several years before the drafting and implementation of the Part 130 Rules for costs and sanctions, the Court of Appeals (A.G. Ship Maintenance Corp. v Lezak, 69 NY2d 1, 6 [1986]) observed that “frivolous litigation is so serious a problem affecting the proper administration of justice, the courts may proscribe such conduct and impose sanctions in this exercise of their rule-making powers, in the absence of legislation to the contrary (see NY Const, art VI, § 30, Judiciary Law § 211 [1] [b] ).”

Part 130 Rules were subsequently created, effective January 1, 1989, to give the courts an additional remedy to deal with frivolous conduct. These stand beside Appellate Division disciplinary case law against attorneys for abuse of process or malicious prosecution. The Court, in Gordon v Marrone (202 AD2d 104, 110 [2d Dept 1994], lv denied 84 NY2d 813 [1995]), instructed that:

Conduct is frivolous and can be sanctioned under the court rule if “it is completely without merit . . . and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law; or . . .

it is undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation, or to harass or maliciously injure another” (22 NYCRR 130-1.1[c] [1], [2] . . . ).

In Levy v Carol Management Corporation (260 AD2d 27, 33 [1st Dept 1999]) the Court stated that in determining if sanctions are appropriate the Court must look at the broad pattern of conduct by the offending attorneys or parties. Further, “22 NYCRR 130-1.1 allows us to exercise our discretion to impose costs and sanctions on an errant party . . .” Levy at 34, held that “[s]anctions are retributive, in that they punish past conduct. They also are goal oriented, in that they are useful in deterring future frivolous conduct not only by the particular parties, but also by the Bar at large.”

The Court, in Kernisan, M.D. v Taylor (171 AD2d 869 [2d Dept 1991]), noted that the intent of the Part 130 Rules “is to prevent the waste of judicial resources and to deter vexatious litigation and dilatory or malicious litigation tactics (cf. Minister, Elders & Deacons of Refm. Prot. Church of City of New York v 198 Broadway, 76 NY2d 411; see Steiner v Bonhamer, 146 Misc 2d 10) [Emphasis added].” Since at least April 26, 2010, and probably since April 5, 2010, the instant action is “a waste of judicial resources.” This conduct, as noted in Levy, must be deterred. In Weinstock v Weinstock (253 AD2d 873 [2d Dept 1998]) the Court ordered the maximum sanction of $10,000.00 for an attorney who pursued an appeal “completely without merit,” and holding, at 874, that “[w]e therefore award the maximum authorized amount as a sanction for this conduct (see, 22 NYCRR 130-1.1) calling to mind that frivolous litigation causes a substantial waste of judicial resources to the detriment of those litigants who come to the Court with real grievances [Emphasis added].” Citing Weinstock, the Appellate Division, Second Department, in Bernadette Panzella, P.C. v De Santis (36 AD3d 734 [2d Dept 2007]) affirmed a Supreme Court, Richmond County $2,500.00 sanction, at 736, as “appropriate in view of the plaintiff’s waste of judicial resources [Emphasis added].”

In Navin v Mosquera (30 AD3d 883 [3d Dept 2006]) the Court instructed that when considering if specific conduct is sanctionable as frivolous, “courts are required to examine whether or not the conduct was continued when its lack of legal or factual basis was apparent [or] should have been apparent’ (22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [c]).” The Court, in Sakow ex rel. Columbia Bagel, Inc. v Columbia Bagel, Inc. (6 Misc 3d 939, 943 [Sup Ct,

New York County 2004]), held that “[i]n assessing whether to award sanctions, the Court must consider whether the attorney adhered to the standards of a reasonable attorney (Principe v Assay Partners, 154 Misc 2d 702 [Sup Ct, NY County 1992]).” In the instant action, plaintiff’s Chief Legal Officer or its outside counsel is responsible for keeping track of whether the mortgage was satisfied. In Sakow at 943, the Court observed that “[a]n attorney cannot safely delegate all duties to others.”

This Court will examine the conduct of successor plaintiff AHMSI and plaintiff’s counsel, in a hearing, pursuant to 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1, to determine if plaintiff AHMSI, by its President, David M. Friedman, or its Executive Vice President, Chief Legal Officer and Secretary, Jordan D. Dorchuck, Esq., and plaintiff’s counsel Melissa A. Sposato, Esq. and her firm Jordan S. Katz, P.C. engaged in frivolous conduct, and to allow successor plaintiff AHMSI, by its President David M. Friedman or Executive Vice President, Chief Legal Officer and Secretary Jordan D. Dorchuck, Esq., and plaintiff’s counsel Melissa A. Sposato, Esq. and her firm Jordan S. Katz, P.C. a reasonable opportunity to be heard. The Court is aware that AHMSI’s Chief Legal Officer, Mr. Dorchuck, is a member of the New York State Bar. (See Mascia v Maresco, 39 AD3d 504 [2d Dept 2007]; Yan v Klein, 35 AD3d 729 [2d Dept 2006]; Greene v Doral Conference Center Associates, 18 AD3d 429 [2d Dept 2005]; Kucker v Kaminsky & Rich, 7 AD3d 39 [2d Dept 2004]).

Conclusion

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED, that the motion of successor plaintiff, AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE SERVICING, INC., for an order of reference for the premises located at 732 Hendrix Street, Brooklyn, New York (Block 4305, Lot 22, County of Kings), is denied with prejudice; and it is further

ORDERED, that because successor plaintiff, AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE SERVICING, INC., lacks standing and no longer is the mortgagee in this foreclosure action, the instant complaint, Index No. 41383/07 is dismissed with prejudice; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Notice of Pendency filed with the Kings County Clerk on November 8, 2007, by original plaintiff, ARGENT MORTGAGE COMPANY, LLC, in an action to foreclose a mortgage for real property located at 732 Hendrix Street, Brooklyn, New York (Block 4305, Lot 22, County of Kings), is cancelled; and it is further

ORDERED, that it appearing that successor plaintiff AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE SERVICING, INC., Melissa A. Sposato, Esq. and Jordan S. Katz, P.C. engaged in “frivolous conduct,” as defined in the Rules of the Chief Administrator, 22 NYCRR § 130-1 (c), and that pursuant to the Rules of the Chief Administrator, 22 NYCRR § 130.1.1 (d), “[a]n award of costs or the imposition of sanctions may be made. . . upon the court’s own initiative, after a reasonable opportunity to be heard,” this Court will conduct a hearing affording: successor plaintiff AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE SERVICING, INC., by its President David M. Friedman or Executive Vice President, Chief Legal Officer and Secretary, Jordan D. Dorchuck, Esq.; Melissa A. Sposato, Esq.; and, Jordan S. Katz, P.C.; “a reasonable opportunity to be heard” before me in Part 27, on Monday, September 13, 2010, at 2:30 P.M., in Room 479, 360 Adams Street, Brooklyn, NY 11201; and it is further

ORDERED, that because the headquarters of successor plaintiff AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE SERVICING, INC. is in Irving, Texas, Mr. Friedman or Mr. Dorchuck may appear either in person or by telephone; and it is further

ORDERED, that Ronald David Bratt, Esq., my Principal Law Clerk, is directed to serve this order by first-class mail, upon: David M. Friedman, President of successor plaintiff AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE SERVICING, INC., 4600 Regent Boulevard, Suite 200, Irving, Texas 75063; Jordan D. Dorchuck, Esq., Executive Vice President, Chief Legal Officer and Secretary of successor plaintiff AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE SERVICING, INC., 4600 Regent Boulevard, Suite 200, Irving, Texas 75063; Melissa A. Sposato, Esq., Law Offices of Jordan S. Katz, P.C., 395 North Service Road, Suite 401, Melville, New York XXXXX-XXXX; and Jordan S. Katz, P.C., 395 North Service Road, Suite 401, Melville, New York XXXXX-XXXX.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in bogus, chain in title, citi, concealment, conflict of interest, conspiracy, CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, discovery, dismissed, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, foreclosures, inc., investigation, judge arthur schack, lawsuit, mortgage, Mortgage Foreclosure Fraud, non disclosure, note, quiet title, Real Estate, scam, ViolationsComments (3)

DEUTSCHE GETS AN ARIZONA BEAT DOWN! In RE: Tarantola

DEUTSCHE GETS AN ARIZONA BEAT DOWN! In RE: Tarantola


U.S. Bankruptcy Judge EILEEN W. HOLLOWELL knew exactly where this was going and put an immediate stop to it.

Deutsche not only created the Allonge after it filed its MRS and falsely represented that it was affixed to the Original, but it also relied on the LPA authorizing the transfer of the Note when substantially identical powers of attorney have been held to be ineffective in reported decisions involving Deutsche.

Deutsche, AHMSI and counsel should, however, treat this decision as a warning. If, in the future, the court is confronted with filings as deficient and incorrect as filed in this case, the court will issue an order to show cause and consider imposing sanctions including, but not limited to, an award of fees to debtors’ counsel for having to oppose motions filed without proper evidence or worse with improper evidence.


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Posted in chain in title, citi, conflict of interest, conspiracy, CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, deutsche bank, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, foreclosures, note, originator, securitization, servicers, trusteeComments (1)

No Summary Judgment in This Foreclosure Action

No Summary Judgment in This Foreclosure Action


THE BANK OF NEW YORK TRUST
COMPANY, N.A., AS TRUSTEE FOR
CHASEFLEX TRUST SERIES 2007-3,

-vs-

DAVID J. MOSQUERA; ELIZABETH
MOSQUERA;

ICE LEGAL does it again…

Thank you to Lynn Szymoniak for her Expert Witness Affidavit used in this foreclosure case!

[ipaper docId=34155185 access_key=key-npkyn8uzzco86kisdz2 height=600 width=600 /]


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Posted in bank of new york, dismissed, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosures, ice law, Lynn Szymoniak ESQ, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (1)

CLASS ACTION FORMING relating to LAW OFFICES of DAVID J. STERN in FLORIDA

CLASS ACTION FORMING relating to LAW OFFICES of DAVID J. STERN in FLORIDA


Gath Around!

Kenneth Eric Trent, Esq.

I am a Fort Lauderdale attorney. I get it! I am organizing a class action suit on behalf of Floridians who have lost their homes to foreclosure. I am looking for class members. To potentially qualify, one must have lost one’s home to foreclosure within the last three years; the plaintiff must have been represented by the Law Office of David J. Stern; and your mortgage must have included the standard MERS language.

Email me if you want to know more! foreclosuredestroyer@yahoo.com.

MR. Trent is currently working on his site www.foreclosuredestroyer.com

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in class action, djsp enterprises, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, foreclosures, Law Offices Of David J. Stern P.A., MERS, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC.Comments (1)

MOTION FOR DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT – FORECLOSURE CONSEQUENCES

MOTION FOR DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT – FORECLOSURE CONSEQUENCES


Thank you Richard Zaretsky, Esq., for putting this out for us to review!

This is rare but one can never be too certain…

Today I received a call from one of my blog readers asking me for help with a pleading he received months ago, that is now being scheduled for a hearing in August.  This is a prime example of why Strategic Defaults or just walking away from a property can be so dangerous.  The pleading is a Motion for Deficiency Judgment from a foreclosure judgment and sale that occurred but was (like most other foreclosure sales) acquired by the lender for a nominal bid.  I and many others have been writing about this forgotten liability of borrowers.

Now here is an example of just what we said would happen, happening:

Motion for Deficiency page 1

Motion for Deficiency page 2

How the deficiency judgment hearing proof is presented to the court is discussed in my previous article on Foreclosure Deficiency Judgments and my original Back to Basics article.  The essence is that a deficiency judgment to be issued must go through a hearing where the lender submits proof (evidence) of the value of the property. The borrower has the right to refute the values. Getting to the number works like this:

To figure get the balance of the monies the bank must go back to court to ask the court to award it a “Deficiency Judgment”.  The amount is what is in question and the amount is measured using various rules.  Let’s assume the bank bid $100.  The court is not going to say that the house was worth $100 and $324,900 is still owed.  For our assumption we will say that the property is worth $200,000 and the foreclosure judgment is for $325,000.  That means the court will ask for an appraisal of the property as of the day of the foreclosure sale and the judge will likely give it that value.  So it will be the appraisal value less the judgment amount which will equal the Deficiency Judgment.  If the appraisal is $250,000, the Deficiency Judgment would be $75,000.   Now if there was real bidding at the foreclosure sale the judge could consider that bidding and instead adopt the selling price under the competitive bidding process that occurred at the foreclosure sale.  Then the Deficiency Judgment would be the difference from the foreclosure judgment and the winning bid amount. If the competitive bid was $240,000, then the Deficiency Judgment would be $85,000.

Back to the real life person with his August hearing – we suggested that before he retain us to negotiate with the lender on the deficiency amount and terms as a possible settlement without going to court, he try it himself.  We also suggested he speak with a bankruptcy attorney as there may be some planning opportunities available for him before the judgment is entered – if the negotiations don’t work.

Remember, a money judgment – that is what a Deficiency Judgment is – gives the judgment holder broad powers to collect the money, including garnishment and attachment of assets (like bank accounts).  Fraudulent Transfer Acts in the various states will block or take back transfers made to “hide” money from creditors.  See the article at CNN Money.

Copyright 2010 Richard P. Zaretsky, Esq.

Be sure to contact your own attorney for your state laws, and always consult your own attorney on any legal decision you need to make.  This article is for information purposes and is not specific advice to any one reader.

Richard Zaretsky, Esq., RICHARD P. ZARETSKY P.A. ATTORNEYS AT LAW, 1655 PALM BEACH LAKES BLVD, SUITE 900, WEST PALM BEACH, FLORIDA 33401, PHONE 561 689 6660  RPZ99@Florida-Counsel.comFLORIDA BAR BOARD CERTIFIED IN REAL ESTATE LAW – We assist Brokers and Sellers with Short Sales and Modifications and Consult with Brokers and Sellers Nationwide!  Shortsales@Florida-Counsel.com New Website www.Florida-Counsel.com.

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



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[NYSC] JUDGE SCHACK TAKES ON ROBO-SIGNER ERICA JOHNSON SECK: DEUTSCHE BANK v. HARRIS (2)

[NYSC] JUDGE SCHACK TAKES ON ROBO-SIGNER ERICA JOHNSON SECK: DEUTSCHE BANK v. HARRIS (2)


Excerpt:

Plaintiffs affidavit, submitted in support of the instant application for a default judgment, was executed by Erica Johnson-Seck, who claims to be a Vice President of plaintiff DEUTSCHE BANK. The affidavit was executed in the State of Texas, County of Williamson (Williamson County, Texas is located in the Austin metropolitan area, and its county seat is Georgetown, Texas). The COURT is perplexed as to why the assignment was not executed in Pasadena, California, at 46U Sierra Madre Villa, the alleged “principal place of business” for both the assign1,)r and the assignee. In my January 3 1, 2008 decision (Deutsche Bank National Trust company v Maraj, – Misc 3d – [A], 2008 NY Slip Op 50176 [U]), I noted that Erica Johnson-Seck, claimed that she was a Vice President of MERS in her July 3,2007 INDYMAC to DEUTSCHE BANK assignment, and then in her July 3 1,2007 affidavit claimed to be a DEUTSCHE BANK Vice President. Just as in Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v Maraj, at 2, the Court in the instant action, before granting itn application for an order of reference, requires an affidavit from Ms. Johnson-Seck, describing her employment history for the past three years.

Down Load PDF of This Case

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[NYSC] JUDGE SCHACK TAKES ON ROBO-SIGNER ERICA JOHNSON SECK: DEUTSCHE BANK v. MARAJ (1)

[NYSC] JUDGE SCHACK TAKES ON ROBO-SIGNER ERICA JOHNSON SECK: DEUTSCHE BANK v. MARAJ (1)


2008 NY Slip Op 50176(U)
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY As Trustee under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement Series Index 2006-AR6, Plaintiff,
v.
RAMASH MARAJ A/K/A RAMISH MARAJ, ET AL., Defendants.
25981/07.

Supreme Court of the State of New York, Kings County.
Decided January 31, 2008.

Plaintiff: Kevin M. Butler, Esq., Eschen Frenkel Weisman & Gordon, De Rose & Surico, Bayside NY.

Defendant: No Opposition submitted by defendants to plaintiff’s Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale.

ARTHUR M. SCHACK, J.

Plaintiff’s application, upon the default of all defendants, for an order of reference for the premises located at 255 Lincoln Avenue, Brooklyn, New York (Block 4150, Lot 19, County of Kings) is denied without prejudice, with leave to renew upon providing the Court with a satisfactory explanation to various questions with respect to the July 3, 2007 assignment of the instant mortgage to plaintiff, DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY AS TRUSTEE UNDER THE POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT SERIES INDEX 2006-AR6 (DEUTSCHE BANK). The questions deal with: the employment history of one Erica Johnson-Seck, who assigned the mortgage to plaintiff DEUTSCHE BANK, and then subsequently executed the affidavit of facts in the instant application as an officer of DEUTSCHE BANK; plaintiff DEUTSCHE BANK’s purchase of the instant non-performing loan; and, why INDYMAC BANK, F.S.B., (INDYMAC), Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), and DEUTSCHE BANK all share office space at Building B, 901 East 104th Street, Suite 400/500, Kansas City, MO 64131 (Suite 400/500).

Defendant RAMASH MARAJ borrowed $440,000.00 from INDYMAC on March 7, 2006. The note and mortgage were recorded in the Office of the City Register, New York City Department of Finance on March 22, 2006 at City Register File Number (CRFN) XXXXXXXXXXXXX. INDYMAC, by Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), its nominee for the purpose of recording the mortgage, assigned the note and mortgage to plaintiff DEUTSCHE BANK, on July 3, 2007, with the assignment recorded on September 5, 2007 at CRFN XXXXXXXXXXXXX.

According to plaintiff’s application, defendant MARAJ’s default began with the nonpayment of principal and interest due on March 1, 2007. Yet on July 3, 2007, more than four months later, plaintiff DEUTSCHE BANK accepted the assignment of the instant non-performing loan from INDYMAC. Further, both assignor MERS, as nominee of INDYMAC, and assignee DEUTSCHE BANK list Suite 400/500 on the July 3, 2007 Assignment as their “principal place of business.” To compound corporate togetherness, page 2 of the recorded Assignment, lists the same Suite 400/500 as the address of INDYMAC.

The Assignment by MERS, on behalf of INDYMAC, was executed by Erica Johnson-Seck, Vice President of MERS. The notary public, Mai La Thao, stated in the jurat that the assignment was executed in the State of Texas, County of Williamson (Williamson County is located in the Austin metropolitan area, and its county seat is Georgetown, Texas). The Court is perplexed as to why the assignment was not executed in Kansas City, the alleged “principal place of business” for both the assignor and the assignee.

Twenty-eight days later, on July 31, 2007, the same Erica Johnson-Seck executed plaintiff’s affidavit submitted in support of the instant application for a default judgment. Ms. Johnson-Seck, in her affidavit, states that she is “an officer of Deutsche Bank National Trust Company as Trustee under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement Series INDX 2006-AR6, the plaintiff herein.” At the end of the affidavit she states that she is a Vice President of DEUTSCHE BANK. Again, Mai La Thao is the notary public and the affidavit is executed in the State of Texas, County of Williamson. The Erica Johnson-Seck signatures on both the July 3, 2007 assignment and the July 31, 2007 affidavit are identical. Did Ms. Johnson-Seck change employers from July 3, 2007 to July 31, 2007, or does she engage in self-dealing by wearing two corporate hats? The Court is concerned that there may be fraud on the part of plaintiff DEUTSCHE BANK, or at least malfeasance. Before granting an application for an order of reference, the Court requires an affidavit from Ms. Johnson-Seck, describing her employment history for the past three years.

Further, the Court requires an explanation from an officer of plaintiff DEUTSCHE BANK as to why, in the middle of our national subprime mortgage financial crisis, DEUTSCHE BANK would purchase a non-performing loan from INDYMAC, and why DEUTSCHE BANK, INDYMAC and MERS all share office space in Suite 400/500.

With the assignor MERS and assignee DEUTSCHE BANK appearing to be engaged in possible fraudulent activity by: having the same person execute the assignment and then the affidavit of facts in support of the instant application; DEUTSCHE BANK’s purchase of a non-performing loan from INDYMAC; and, the sharing of office space in Suite 400/500 in Kansas City, the Court wonders if the instant foreclosure action is a corporate “Kansas City Shuffle,” a complex confidence game. In the 2006 film, Lucky Number Slevin, Mr. Goodkat, (a hitman played by Bruce Willis), explains (in memorable quotes from Lucky Number Slevin, at www.imdb.com/title/tt425210/quotes).

A Kansas City Shuffle is when everybody looks right, you go left . . .

It’s not something people hear about. Falls on deaf ears mostly . . .

No small matter. Requires a lot of planning. Involves a lot of people. People connected by the slightest of events. Like whispers in the night, in that place that never forgets, even when those people do.

In this foreclosure action is plaintiff DEUTSCHE BANK, with its “principal place of business” in Kansas City attempting to make the Court look right while it goes left?

Conclusion

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED, that the application of plaintiff, DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY AS TRUSTEE UNDER THE POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT SERIES INDEX 2006-AR6, for an order of reference for the premises located at 255 Lincoln Avenue, Brooklyn, New York (Block 4150, Lot 19, County of Kings), is denied without prejudice; and it is further

ORDERED, that leave is granted to plaintiff, DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY AS TRUSTEE UNDER THE POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT SERIES INDEX 2006-AR6, to renew its application for an order of reference for the premises located at 255 Lincoln Avenue, Brooklyn, New York (Block 4150, Lot 19, County of Kings), upon presentation to the Court, within forty-five (45) days of this decision and order, of: an affidavit from Erica Johnson-Seck describing her employment history for the past three years; and, an affidavit from an officer of plaintiff

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY AS TRUSTEE UNDER THE POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT SERIES INDEX 2006-AR6, explaining why (1) plaintiff purchased a nonperforming loan from INDYMAC BANK, F.S.B., (2) shares office space at Building B, 901 East 104th Street, Suite 400/500, Kansas City, MO 64131 with Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and INDYMAC BANK, F.S.B., and (3), claims Building B, 901 East 104th Street, Suite 400/500, Kansas City, MO 64131 as its principal place of business in the Assignment of the instant mortgage and yet executed the Assignment and affidavit of facts in this action in Williamson County, Texas.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

[ipaper docId=40494321 access_key=key-18trq6o8869pcgoq0lxh height=600 width=600 /]

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Frivilous Pleading Letter (Florida) to Law Offices Of David J. Stern P.A.

Frivilous Pleading Letter (Florida) to Law Offices Of David J. Stern P.A.


I really enjoy MR. BARNES work!

 

July 23, 2008

William Jeff Barnes, Esq. 1515 North Federal Highway
Atrium Building, Suite 300
Member of Florida and Colorado Bars Boca Raton, Florida 33432
Certified Mediator (Florida, Minnesota)
Certified Arbitrator (Florida) telephone: (561) 864-1067
telefax: (702) 804-8137
Ruth Barnes: International/Multilingual
Certified Mediator (Florida, Minnesota) e-mail: wjbarnes@cox.net
Certified Arbitrator (Florida)

July 2, 2008

VIA FAX AND MAIL
(954) 233-8333
Maria M. Solomon, Esq.
Law Offices of David J. Stern, P.A.
801 South University Drive, Suite 500
Plantation, Florida 33324

Re: Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Defendant (Key West, Florida): FORMAL STATUTORY

DEMAND TO DISMISS FORECLOSURE ACTION WITH PREJUDICE, CLEAR
TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY, REFUND MONIES PAID, AND FOR PAYMENT
OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS PURSUANT TO FLA.STAT. SEC. 57.105

Dear Ms. Solomon:
This letter is being provided to you, the Law Offices of David J. Stern, P.A., and your client Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Plaintiff in the Action identified herein) as formal notice, pursuant to the matters herein and Fla.Stat. sec. 57.105, of this Firm’s client Defendant demand that you immediately and forthwith dismiss, with prejudice, that certain civil action styled Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Defendant et al., 16th Judicial Circuit Court Case No. 2007-CA-1120-K (Key West, Florida, hereafter referred to as the “Action”); to provide clear title to the real property the subject of the Action; for refund of all monies paid by Defendant incident to the alleged “loan” the subject of the Action; and for payment of attorneys’ fees and costs which are awardable under various Federal and state statutes violated by your filing of the Action. This letter is also being sent as formal notice of Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions (copy attached hereto) which will be filed and set for hearing unless, pursuant to Fla.Stat. sec. 57.105(4), within twenty-one (21) days of today, Defendant’s demands as set forth herein are not complied with in writing confirmed by fax receipt, by this Firm, of the July 2, 2008 57.105 demand and notice to Maria Solomon, Esq. re: Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Defendant et al., page 2 of 3

necessary documents to legally effect the demands made herein. The facts supporting this demand and the attached Motion are as follows, which are admissions by you, as an agent of the Law Offices of David J. Stern, P.A., in the Complaint which you filed:

(a) On or about August 22, 2007, you, as an agent and attorney of the Law Offices of David J. Stern, P.A., caused a civil action for foreclosure and to “enforce loan documents” to be filed in the 16th Judicial Circuit in and for Monroe County, Florida, which has been assigned case number 2007-CA-1120-K;

(b) In paragraph “5.” of Count I of the Complaint, you affirmatively represent to the Court that “The Plaintiff owns and holds the Note and Mortgage”;

(c) In paragraph “4? of Count I, you affirmatively represent to the Court that the mortgage was “subsequently” assigned to the Plaintiff “by virtue of an assignment to be recorded” (that being some time in the future);

(d) In paragraph “20? of Count II, you affirmatively represent to the Court that “The Plaintiff is not presently in possession of the Note and Mortgage” and “the Plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain possession of the Note and Mortgage because THEIR whereabouts cannot be determined (original emphasis):

(e) In paragraph “22? of Count II, you affirmatively represent to the Court that “The Plaintiff will agree to the entry of a Final Judgment of Foreclosure wherein it will be required to indemnify and hold harmless the Defendant(s) [sic] Defendant, from any loss they [sic] may occur by reason of a claim by another person to enforce the lost Note and Mortgage.”;

(f) The Action thus inconsistently but affirmatively alleges, in Count I, that “Plaintiff owns and holds the Note and Mortgage” when in fact the admissions in Count II demonstrate, by the allegations of paragraphs “20? and “22? of the Complaint, that the Plaintiff DOES NOT and CANNOT legally establish possession or ownership of the Note or the Mortgage and that same is/are in the possession of an unknown party or parties;

(g) A copy of the Note is not even attached to the Complaint (only an alleged “ledger of loan”);

(h) By virtue of the admissions of the Plaintiff in paragraphs “20?, “21?, and “22? of the Complaint, the Plaintiff has actual knowledge that it never, at any time material, had possession of either the mortgage or the note as same were sold, assigned, or transferred as part of the single-transaction securitization process which resulted in the subject mortgage and/or note being sold as

July 2, 2008 57.105 demand and notice to Maria Solomon, Esq. re: Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Defendant et al., page 3 of 3

parceled obligations and becoming part of one or more tranches within a special investment vehicle;

(i) that the Plaintiff cannot establish that the subject note or mortgage is owned or controlled by the Plaintiff “indenture trustee” for unnamed holders of a series of asset-backed bonds (a copy of which are not even attached to the Complaint);

(j) As a direct and proximate result of the transaction referred to in paragraph “h” above, the Plaintiff does not and cannot establish legal standing to even institute a foreclosure action;

(k) As such, the allegation by the Plaintiff in paragraph “5? of the Complaint constitutes matters which are completely devoid of factual or legal support and are thus “frivilous” within the meaning of Fla.Stat. sec. 57.105;

(l) As the primary and threshold issue of legal standing to institute the Action cannot be satisfied (which was known to you, the Law Offices of David J. Stern, P.A., and the Plaintiff at the time that the Action was instituted), the Action is a patently frivilous claim within the meaning of Fla.Stat. sec 57.105 and the filing and prosecution thereof constitutes a fraud upon the Court.

Your client and your Firm are thus charged with actual notice of the filing of an frivilous claim, as you, your client, and the Law Offices of David J. Stern, P.A. knew or should have known that the Action was both not supported by the material (and record) facts necessary to establish the claim for foreclosure and would not (and could not) be supported by the application of then-existing law to the material (and record) facts.

As such, this Firm has been directed to file and set for hearing, after the expiration of twenty-one (21) days from today (that being Thursday, July 24, 2008), the attached Motion for Sanctions and to seek attorneys’ fees from both your client and your Firm if the demands set forth herein for immediate dismissal of the Action with Prejudice, providing of clear title to the property the subject of the action, refund of all monies paid by Defendant in connection with the original “loan” the subject of the Action, and payment of all attorneys’ fees and costs associated with this demand are not complied with in writing by the close of business (5:00 p.m.) Wednesday, July 23, 2008.

Sincerely,

Jeff Barnes, Esq.

WJB/bhs
attachment (enclosed with mailed original)
copy to: Defendant (w/attachment)

Source: foreclosuredefensenationwide.com

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