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REO PROP CO. vs. JEFFERS | Ohio CT Common Pleas “Servicer mgr testified REO Properties Corp. – a wholly owned sub of a wholly owned sub of Deutsche Bank did not own the note

REO PROP CO. vs. JEFFERS | Ohio CT Common Pleas “Servicer mgr testified REO Properties Corp. – a wholly owned sub of a wholly owned sub of Deutsche Bank did not own the note


IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO

REO PROPERTIES CORP.,
Plaintiff,

vs.

THOMAS E. JEFFERS, et al,

EXCERPT:

11. Regarding the above letter, Degneau testified on cross-examination:

Q. . . . [H]ave you ever seen these three entities [DB Structured Products,
Inc., Green Tree SerVertis Acquisition LLC and U.S. Bank National
Association, not in its individual capacity, but solely as trustee for
SerVertis REO Pass-Through Trust I] listed as owners [of the note and
mortgage] or having been owners in a succession?

A. Not listed as owners . . . Green Tree services the loan for a group that’s
identified as SerVertis so its kind of an internal. . . classification.

Q. SerVertis is a trust is it not?

A. It’s not necessarily a trust. It’s sort of an investment group. . ..

Q. So that investment group owns the notes and mortgages in [a] pool [of
loans]?

A. In the pool yes. . . . But as far as in this case actually being the owner of
record [given] the status of the account at the time of conversion it was a
business decision not to change the owner of record at the time because
the action has already been started.

Q. [By the magistrate] Is this loan now owned by SerVertis?

A. The owner of record is REO Properties Corp.

Q. I understand the owner of record . . . I want to know who owns it now.. .?

A. Green Tree services the loan for SerVertis who in a pool of loans
purchased [the subject loan]. .. and Green Tree services for them now.
REO Properties is still the record owner.

Q. I understand that. I want to know who is the actual owner and according
to this [letter of November 18, 2009], it’s SerVertis Trust, is that accurate?

A. Well based on this I don’t think I can say yes to that because based on this
it says ‘the transfer of the ownership of your loan will be formally
recorded in the real property records of the county in which your mortgage
was originally recorded’. It was not recorded as SerVertis Pass-Through
Trust.

On redirect examination Degneau testified further:

Q. Can you tell the Court why ownership was not changed from REO
Properties to any other entity? . . .

A. There’s a legal action in place and the decision was made to . . . not
change the owner of record until.. the situation was resolved. It’s my
assumption that after the action . . . there will be a new recording.

Q. At the present time there has been no internal assignment or anything that
has been done to transfer ownership?

A. No, there has been no other internal transfers at all.

12. No other entities other than Ocwen, Green Tree and REO have attempted to
collect this debt from the Jeffers.

[…]

In this case, the note in question is endorsed in blank. Thus, REO would have
been the holder of the note and entitled to enforce the note at the time the case was filed
only if it possessed the note when the case was filed. See R.C. Sec. 1303.21(B); Vitols v.
Citizens Banking Co., 10 F.3d at 1235.

The original note was produced at trial. Off the record, REO’s counsel indicated
that the note came from “the vault”. The location or the owner of the vault was not
disclosed. There is no direct testimony regarding who was in actual possession of the
note either at the time of filing of the case or at the time of trial. Degneau, an employee
of Green Tree, testified that he was familiar with the note and was able to identify it.
Based on this testimony, it is likely that Green Tree possessed the note as servicing agent
on behalf of the party for whom it was servicing. As detailed above, it is more likely than
not that Green Tree was servicing this loan for DB Structured Products, Inc., not REO,
when this case was filed. Therefore, at that time, Green Tree possessed the note as agent
of DB Structured Products, Inc. REO was not in possession of the note when the case
was filed. Consequently, REO has filed to prove it was the “holder” of the note when the
case was filed and was not a party who is entitled to enforce the note as a holder. See Id.;
R.C. Sec.1303.31.

[…]
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[VIDEO] NH Supreme Court Oral Argument of DEUTSCHE BANK v. KEVLIK

[VIDEO] NH Supreme Court Oral Argument of DEUTSCHE BANK v. KEVLIK


Via: Mike Dillon

Excerpt:

Judge: I went through the material that you attached and I was very confused about IndyMac’s role and how we ended up with a foreclosure deed that didn’t reflect IndyMac’s role…can you explain?

Attorney Sheridan for the Kevlik’s  replies… There’s nothing in the record that explains MERS’ role! […] No power to assign… What happened to OneWest bank???

Go on to the link to video below…

  • 2010-0249

[View Video/Audio]

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co.
OM
(John T. Precobb)
(15 min.)
v. James Kevlik & a.
William C. Sheridan
(15 min.)

After you watch the video come back and read…

New Hampshire Supreme Court Reversal “Plaintiff has not carried its burden to show ownership of the property” DEUTSCHE BANK v. KEVLIK

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New Hampshire Supreme Court Reversal “Plaintiff has not carried its burden to show ownership of the property” DEUTSCHE BANK v. KEVLIK

New Hampshire Supreme Court Reversal “Plaintiff has not carried its burden to show ownership of the property” DEUTSCHE BANK v. KEVLIK


DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY

v.

JAMES KEVLIK & a.

No. 2010-249.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Argued: February 17, 2011.

Opinion Issued: April 28, 2011.

Orlans Moran, PLLC, of Boston, Massachusetts (John T. Precobb on the brief and orally), for the plaintiff.

William C. Sheridan, of Londonderry, on the brief and orally, for the defendants.

CONBOY, J.

The defendants, James Kevlik, Catherine Kevlik, and Patricia Durgin, appeal an order of the Derry District Court (Coughlin, J.) denying their motion to dismiss and granting judgment to the plaintiff, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, in its action for possession of real estate located in Chester. See RSA 540:12 (2007). We reverse.

The following facts are supported by the record or are undisputed. Through its attorney, the plaintiff filed a landlord and tenant writ, alleging that: (1) the plaintiff was entitled to possession of the property; (2) the defendants had been provided with an eviction notice; and (3) the defendants had refused to deliver the property. In the eviction notice, attached to its writ, the plaintiff alleged that it was the current owner of the property “as a result of the foreclosure of a [m]ortgage, which foreclosure sale was held at the [p]roperty on June 12, 2009.” On the day of the merits hearing, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss asserting that a foreclosure sale had never taken place.

At the merits hearing, the Kevliks appeared without counsel. Defendant Durgin did not appear. The plaintiff’s attorney appeared without his client and proffered copies of the landlord and tenant writ with an “affidavit of ownership,” a foreclosure deed with an attached statutory affidavit, and a mortgage assignment, all of which the trial court allowed into evidence over the defendants’ objection. The assignment, dated on January 25, 2009, indicates a transfer of a mortgage executed by defendant Patricia Durgin from Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (as nominee of SouthStar Funding, LLC) to IndyMac Bank F.S.B. The July 20, 2009 foreclosure deed purports to describe a sale of the property from One West Bank, F.S.B., to the plaintiff at a June 12, 2009 foreclosure auction.

At the hearing, the plaintiff’s attorney admitted that the foreclosure and assignment documents were not certified and that he could not attest to their authenticity. Plaintiff’s attorney acknowledged that his firm had not handled the foreclosure sale and that he did not know what the mortgage payments had been. Until the hearing, he was not aware that the Kevliks were related to Patricia Durgin, the mortgagor, and did not know what, if any, rental agreement they had. When asked by the trial court to name a reasonable rent for the property, plaintiff’s attorney suggested five hundred dollars per month. When questioned further on that point by the trial court, he admitted he was “not from this area.”

The Kevliks argued that they had videotape evidence that no foreclosure sale had occurred. The trial court, however, refused to consider this evidence, characterizing the defendants’ argument as contesting title to the property. The trial court told the Kevliks that they would have to pay “recognizance” to the plaintiff of $348.84 per week pending their entry of an action in superior court.

The Kevliks told the trial court they did not wish to pursue the matter in superior court, but requested a continuance in order to consult with counsel. Plaintiff’s attorney did not oppose this request, stating that, “in the interest of fairness, they should have an attorney here.” However, the trial court denied the motion to continue as well as the motion to dismiss, and took the matter under advisement. Subsequently, the trial court ordered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. In its order, the trial court also stated that, “One week after the [h]earing on the [m]erits . . .[,] the tenants paid $348.84 into the Court and the Court accepted the payment. However, the Court accepted said payment with regards to an appeal to the New Hampshire Supreme Court regarding the Landlord/Tenant action and not a plea of title transfer to the Superior Court.”

The defendants moved for reconsideration, again asserting that a foreclosure sale had not, in fact, taken place. They explained that the auctioneer arrived thirty minutes late for the scheduled sale, sat in his car for five minutes, and then drove away. No buyer or anyone else appeared. The defendants argued that the plaintiff could not have purchased the mortgage at the foreclosure sale and therefore did not have standing to evict the defendants. The court denied this motion.

On appeal, the defendants argue that the plaintiff failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that it was the owner of the property, and, thus, the plaintiff is not entitled to judgment. Specifically, the defendants maintain that the documents submitted by the plaintiff’s attorney were insufficient to establish ownership because the evidence was based on “incompetent and unauthenticated hearsay.” Further, the defendants assert, the trial court should have permitted them to challenge the plaintiff’s “offer[s] of proof.”

The issue before us presents a question of statutory interpretation. We are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole. Kenison v. Dubois, 152 N.H. 448, 451 (2005). We first examine the language of the statute, and, where possible, we ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings to the words used. Id. We review the trial court’s interpretation of a statute de novo. Id.

RSA 540:17 (2007) provides:

If the defendant shall plead a plea which may bring in question the title to the demanded premises he shall forthwith recognize to the plaintiff, with sufficient sureties, in such sum as the court shall order, to enter his action in the superior court for the county at the next return day, and to prosecute his action in said court, and to pay all rent then due or which shall become due pending the action, and the damages and costs which may be awarded against him.

Although the statute requires title issues to be resolved in superior court, it does not relieve a possessory plaintiff of the obligation to establish ownership of the subject property. Possessory actions are authorized by RSA 540:12, which provides that, “[t]he owner, lessor, or purchaser at a mortgage foreclosure sale of any [property] may recover possession thereof from a lessee, occupant, mortgagor, or other person in possession . . . after notice in writing to quit the same . . . .” In Liam Hooksett, LLC v. Boynton, 157 N.H. 625 (2008), we addressed the required ownership element of a possessory action brought pursuant to RSA 540:12. In that case, the defendants asserted that an individual other than the plaintiff actually owned the property. Liam Hooksett, 157 N.H. at 627. At the hearing, the plaintiff’s manager appeared on its behalf, but she did not testify that the plaintiff was the owner of the property. Id. at 628. Rather, she presented to the court an “Affidavit of Ownership/Tenancy” that purported to “certify” that the plaintiff was the owner, but the document was not notarized, signed under oath, or admitted into evidence. Id. On that record, we agreed that the plaintiff had not carried its burden to demonstrate that it was the actual owner of the property. Id. “The plaintiff filed a writ seeking possession of the property. Thus, to prevail in this action, the plaintiff was required to prove that it was the `owner, lessor, or purchaser at a mortgage foreclosure sale’ of the property.” Id. The same is true here.

Here, the plaintiff’s attorney presented, as proof of ownership, uncertified copies of a foreclosure deed and affidavit and a mortgage assignment. He did not, however, have first-hand knowledge as to the authenticity of the documents and presented no other proof of their authenticity. The rules of evidence provide that a copy of a public record is admissible only when it is either: (1) certified as correct by a custodian or other authorized person; or (2) accompanied by the testimony of a witness who has compared it to the original and found it to be correct. See N.H. R. Ev. 902(4), 1005. Because the plaintiff satisfied neither requirement, the trial court erred in admitting and relying upon these documents.

Plaintiff’s attorney also submitted a copy of the landlord and tenant writ and attachments, including an “affidavit of ownership.” This “affidavit” stated that plaintiff’s attorney was “certifying” that the plaintiff was the owner of the subject property, but the purported affidavit was not notarized or signed under oath. Further, the initials next to the name on the signature line indicate that it was actually signed by another individual, “C.M.S.” Thus, it was error for the trial court to admit and rely on that document. See Liam Hooksett, 157 N.H. at 628.

On this record, we conclude that the plaintiff has not carried its burden to show ownership of the property. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s decision to grant judgment to the plaintiff.

We note the limited nature of our holdings herein. Had the plaintiff proffered authenticated documents, with supporting testimony if necessary, regarding the foreclosure sale, or other proof of its ownership of the property, the trial court could have properly ruled on the issue of the plaintiff’s entitlement to possession because the defendants stated they did not wish to file a title action in superior court. The defendants would not have been able to pursue their challenge to the plaintiff’s title in the district court. See Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Cataldo, 161 N.H. 135 (2010).

Reversed.

DALIANIS, C.J., and DUGGAN, HICKS and LYNN, JJ., concurred.

[ipaper docId=54491996 access_key=key-2jnepmgcez51v8fnnqp8 height=600 width=600 /]

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[NYSC] JUDGE SCHACK TAKES ON ROBO-SIGNER ERICA JOHNSON SECK: ONEWEST BANK v. DRAYTON (3)

[NYSC] JUDGE SCHACK TAKES ON ROBO-SIGNER ERICA JOHNSON SECK: ONEWEST BANK v. DRAYTON (3)


STRIKE 1, STRIKE 2,

STRIKE 3…below

.

2010 NY Slip Op 20429

ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B., Plaintiff,
v.
COVAN DRAYTON, ET AL., Defendants.

15183/09.Supreme Court, Kings County.

Decided October 21, 2010.Gerald Roth, Esq., Stein Wiener and Roth, LLP, Carle Place NY, Defendant did not answer Plaintiff.

ARTHUR M. SCHACK, J.

In this foreclosure action, plaintiff ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B. (ONEWEST), moved for an order of reference and related relief for the premises located at 962 Hemlock Street, Brooklyn, New York (Block 4529, Lot 116, County of Kings), upon the default of all defendants. The Kings County Supreme Court Foreclosure Department forwarded the motion papers to me on August 30, 2010. While drafting this decision and order, I received on October 14, 2010, in the midst of the present national media attention about “robo-signers,” an October 13, 2010-letter from plaintiff’s counsel, by which “[i]t is respectfully requested that plaintiff’s application be withdrawn at this time.” There was no explanation or reason given by plaintiff’s counsel for his request to withdraw the motion for an order of reference other than “[i]t is our intention that a new application containing updated information will be re-submitted shortly.”

The Court grants the request of plaintiff’s counsel to withdraw the instant motion for an order of reference. However, to prevent the waste of judicial resources, the instant foreclosure action is dismissed without prejudice, with leave to renew the instant motion for an order of reference within sixty (60) days of this decision and order, by providing the Court with necessary and additional documentation.

First, the Court requires proof of the grant of authority from the original mortgagee, CAMBRIDGE HOME CAPITAL, LLC (CAMBRIDGE), to its nominee, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. (MERS), to assign the subject mortgage and note on March 16, 2009 to INDYMAC FEDERAL BANK, FSB (INDYMAC). INDYMAC subsequently assigned the subject mortgage and note to its successor, ONEWEST, on May 14, 2009.

Second, the Court requires an affidavit from Erica A. Johnson-Seck, a conflicted “robo-signer,” explaining her employment status. A “robo-signer” is a person who quickly signs hundreds or thousands of foreclosure documents in a month, despite swearing that he or she has personally reviewed the mortgage documents and has not done so. Ms. Johnson-Seck, in a July 9, 2010 deposition taken in a Palm Beach County, Florida foreclosure case, admitted that she: is a “robo-signer” who executes about 750 mortgage documents a week, without a notary public present; does not spend more than 30 seconds signing each document; does not read the documents before signing them; and, did not provide me with affidavits about her employment in two prior cases. (See Stephanie Armour, “Mistakes Widespread on Foreclosures, Lawyers Say,” USA Today, Sept. 27, 2010; Ariana Eunjung Cha, “OneWest Bank Employee: Not More Than 30 Seconds’ to Sign Each Foreclosure Document,” Washington Post, Sept. 30, 2010).

In the instant action, Ms. Johnson-Seck claims to be: a Vice President of MERS in the March 16, 2009 MERS to INDYMAC assignment; a Vice President of INDYMAC in the May 14, 2009 INDYMAC to ONEWEST assignment; and, a Vice President of ONEWEST in her June 30, 2009-affidavit of merit. Ms. Johnson-Seck must explain to the Court, in her affidavit: her employment history for the past three years; and, why a conflict of interest does not exist in the instant action with her acting as a Vice President of assignor MERS, a Vice President of assignee/assignor INDYMAC, and a Vice President of assignee/plaintiff ONEWEST. Further, Ms. Johnson-Seck must explain: why she was a Vice President of both assignor MERS and assignee DEUTSCHE BANK in a second case before me, Deutsche Bank v Maraj, 18 Misc 3d 1123 (A) (Sup Ct, Kings County 2008); why she was a Vice President of both assignor MERS and assignee INDYMAC in a third case before me, Indymac Bank, FSB, v Bethley, 22 Misc 3d 1119 (A) (Sup Ct, Kings County 2009); and, why she executed an affidavit of merit as a Vice President of DEUTSCHE BANK in a fourth case before me, Deutsche Bank v Harris (Sup Ct, Kings County, Feb. 5, 2008, Index No. 35549/07).

Third, plaintiff’s counsel must comply with the new Court filing requirement, announced yesterday by Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman, which was promulgated to preserve the integrity of the foreclosure process. Plaintiff’s counsel must submit an affirmation, using the new standard Court form, that he has personally reviewed plaintiff’s documents and records in the instant action and has confirmed the factual accuracy of the court filings and the notarizations in these documents. Counsel is reminded that the new standard Court affirmation form states that “[t]he wrongful filing and prosecution of foreclosure proceedings which are discovered to suffer from these defects may be cause for disciplinary and other sanctions upon participating counsel.”

Background

Defendant COVAN DRAYTON (DRAYTON) executed the subject

mortgage and note on January 12, 2007, borrowing $492,000.00 from CAMBRIDGE. MERS “acting solely as a nominee for Lender [CAMBRIDGE]” and “FOR PURPOSES OF RECORDING THIS MORTGAGE, MERS IS THE MORTGAGEE OF RECORD,” recorded the instant mortgage and note on March 19, 2007, in the Office of the City Register of the City of New York, at City Register File Number (CRFN) XXXXXXXXXXXXX. Plaintiff DRAYTON allegedly defaulted in his mortgage loan payment on September 1, 2008. Then, MERS, as nominee for CAMBRIDGE, assigned the instant nonperforming mortgage and note to INDYMAC, on March 16, 2009. Erica A. Johnson-Seck executed the assignment as a Vice President of MERS, as nominee for CAMBRIDGE. This assignment was recorded in the Office of the City Register of the City of New York, on March 24, 2009, at CRFN XXXXXXXXXXXX. However, as will be discussed below, there is an issue whether MERS, as CAMBRIDGE’s nominee, was authorized by CAMBRIDGE, its principal, to assign the subject DRAYTON mortgage and note to plaintiff INDYMAC. Subsequently, almost two months later, Ms. Johnson-Seck, now as a Vice President of INDYMAC, on May 14, 2009, assigned the subject mortgage and note to ONEWEST. This assignment was recorded in the Office of the City Register of the City of New York, on May 22, 2009, at CRFN XXXXXXXXXXXXX. Plaintiff ONEWEST commenced the instant foreclosure action on June 18, 2009 with the filing of the summons, complaint and notice of pendency. On August 6, 2009, plaintiff ONEWEST filed the instant motion for an order of reference. Attached to plaintiff ONEWEST’s moving papers is an affidavit of merit by Erica A. Johnson-Seck, dated June 30, 2009, in which she claims to be a Vice President of plaintiff ONEWEST. She states, in ¶ 1, that “[t]he facts recited herein are from my own knowledge and from review of the documents and records kept in the ordinary course of business with respect to the servicing of this mortgage.” There are outstanding questions about Ms. Johnson-Seck’s employment, whether she executed sworn documents without a notary public present and whether she actually read and personally reviewed the information in the documents that she executed.

July 9, 2010 deposition of Erica A. Johnson-Seck in the Machado case

On July 9, 2010, nine days after executing the affidavit of merit in the instant action, Ms. Johnson-Seck was deposed in a Florida foreclosure action, Indymac Federal Bank, FSB, v Machado (Fifteenth Circuit Court in and for Palm Beach County, Florida, Case No. 50 2008 CA 037322XXXX MB AW), by defendant Machado’s counsel, Thomas E. Ice, Esq. Ms. Johnson-Seck admitted to being a “robo-signer,” executing sworn documents outside the presence of a notary public, not reading the documents before signing them and not complying with my prior orders in the Maraj and Bethley decisions. Ms. Johnson-Seck admitted in her Machado deposition testimony that she was not employed by INDYMAC on May 14, 2009, the day she assigned the subject mortgage and note to ONEWEST, even though she stated in the May 14, 2009 assignment that she was a Vice President of INDYMAC. According to her testimony she was employed on May 14, 2010 by assignee ONEWEST. The following questions were asked and then answered by Ms. Johnson Seck, at p. 4, line 11-p. 5, line 4:

Q. Could you state your full name for the record, please.

A. Erica Antoinette Johnson-Seck.

Q. And what is your business address?

A. 7700 West Parmer Lane, P-A-R-M-E-R, Building D, Austin, Texas 78729.

Q. And who is your employer?

A. OneWest Bank.

Q. How long have you been employed by OneWest Bank?

A. Since March 19th, 2009.

Q. Prior to that you were employed by IndyMac Federal Bank, FSB?

A. Yes.

Q. And prior to that you were employed by IndyMac Bank, FSB?

A. Yes.

Q. Your title with OneWest Bank is what?

A. Vice president, bankruptcy and foreclosure.

Despite executing, on March 16, 2009, the MERS, as nominee for CAMBRIDGE, assignment to INDYMAC, as Vice President of MERS, she admitted that she is not an officer of MERS. Further, she claimed to have “signing authority” from several major banking institutions and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The following questions were asked and then answered by Ms. Johnson-Seck, at p. 6, lines 5-21:

Q. Are you also an officer of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems?

A. No.

Q. You have signing authority to sign on behalf of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems as a vice president, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Are you an officer of any other corporation?

A. No.

Q. Do you have signing authority for any other corporation?

A. Yes.

Q. What corporations are those?

A. IndyMac Federal Bank, Indymac Bank, FSB, FDIC as receiver for Indymac Bank, FDIC as conservator for Indymac, Deutsche Bank, Bank of New York, U.S. Bank. And that’s all I can think of off the top of my head.

Then, she answered the following question about her “signing authority,” at page 7, lines 3-10:

Q. When you say you have signing authority, is your authority to sign as an officer of those corporations?

A. Some.

Deutsche Bank I have a POA [power of attorney] to sign as attorney-in-fact. Others I sign as an officer. The FDIC I sign as attorney-in-fact. IndyMac Bank and IndyMac Federal Bank I now sign as attorney-in-fact. I only sign as a vice president for OneWest. Ms. Johnson-Seck admitted that she is not an officer of MERS, has no idea how MERS is organized and does not know why she signs assignments as a MERS officer. Further, she admitted that the MERS assignments she executes are prepared by an outside vendor, Lender Processing Services, Inc. (LPS), which ships the documents to her Austin, Texas office from Minnesota. Moreover, she admitted executing MERS assignments without a notary public present. She also testified that after the MERS assignments are notarized they are shipped back to LPS in Minnesota. LPS, in its 2009 Form 10-K, filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, states that it is “a provider of integrated technology and services to the mortgage lending industry, with market leading positions in mortgage processing and default management services in the U.S. [p. 1]”; “we offer lenders, servicers and attorneys certain administrative and support services in connection with managing foreclosures [p. 4]”; “[a] significant focus of our marketing efforts is on the top 50 U.S. banks [p. 5]”; and, “our two largest customers, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., each accounted for more than 10% of our aggregate revenue [p. 5].”LPS is now the subject of a federal criminal investigation related to its foreclosure document preparation. (See Ariana Eunjung Cha. “Lender Processing Services Acknowledges Employees Allowed to Sign for Managers on Foreclosure Paperwork,” Washington Post, Oct. 5, 2010). Last week, on October 13, 2010, the Florida Attorney-General issued to LPS an “Economic Crimes Investigative Subpoena Duces Tecum,” seeking various foreclosure documents prepared by LPS and employment records for various “robo-signers.” The following answers to questions were given by Ms. Johnson-Seck in the Machado deposition, at p. 116, line 4-p. 119, line 16:

Q. Now, given our last exchange, I’m sure you will agree that you are not a vice president of MERS in any sense of the word other than being authorized to sign as one?

A. Yes.

Q. You are not —

A. Sorry.

Q. That’s all right. You are not paid by MERS?

A. No.

Q. You have no job duties as vice president of MERS?

A. No.

Q. You don’t attend any board meetings of MERS?

A. No.

Q. You don’t attend any meetings at all of MERS?

A. No.

Q. You don’t report to the president of MERS?

A. No.

Q. Who is the president of MERS?

A. I have no idea.

Q. You’re not involved in any governance of MERS?

A. No.

Q. The authority you have says that you can be an assistant secretary, right?

A. Yes.

Q. And yet you don’t report to the secretary —

A. No.

Q. — of MERS. You don’t have any MERS’ employees who report to you?

A. No.

Q. You don’t have any vote or say in any corporate decisions of MERS?

A. No.

Q. Do you know where the MERS’ offices are located?

A. No.

Q. Do you know how many offices they have?

A. No.

Q. Do you know where they are headquartered?

A. No.

Q. I take it then you’re never been to their headquarters?

A. No.

Q. Do you know how many employees they have?

A. No.

Q. But you know that you have counterparts all over the country signing as MERS’s vice-presidents and assistant secretaries?

A. Yes.

Q. Some of them are employees of third-party foreclosure service companies, like LPS?

A. Yes.

Q. Why does MERS appoint you as a vice president or assistant secretary as opposed to a manager or an authorized agent to sign in that capacity?

A. I don’t know.

Q. Why does MERS give you any kind of a title?

A. I don’t know.

Q. Take me through the procedure for drafting and — the drafting and execution of this Assignment of Mortgage which is Exhibit E.

A. It is drafted by our forms, uploaded into process management, downloaded by LPS staff in Minnesota, shipped to Austin where we sign and notarize it, and hand it back to an LPS employee, who then ships it back to Minnesota, up uploads a copy and mails the original to the firm.

Q. Very similar to all the other document, preparation of all the other documents.

A. (Nods head.)

Q. Was that a yes? You were shaking your head.

A. Yes.

Q. As with the other documents, you personally don’t review any of the information that’s on here —

A. No.

Q. — other than to make sure that you are authorized to sign as the person you’re signing for?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. As with the other documents, you signed these and took them to be notarized just to a Notary that’s outside your office?

A. Yes.

Q. And they will get notarized as soon as they can. It may or may not be the same day that you executed it?

A. That’s true. Further, with respect to MERS, Ms. Johnson-Seck testified in answering questions, at p. 138, line 2-p. 139, line 17:

Q. Do you have an understanding that MERS is a membership organization?

A. Yes, yes.

Q. And the members are —

A. Yes.

Q. — banking entities such as OneWest?

A. Yes.

Q. In fact, OneWest is a member of MERS?

A. Yes.

Q. Is Deutsche Bank National Trust Company a member of MERS?

A. I don’t know.

Q. Most of the major banking institutions in the Untied States, at least, are members of MERS, correct?

A. That sounds right.

Q. It’s owned and operated by banking institutions?

A. I’m not a big — I don’t, I don’t know that much about the ins and outs of MERS. I’m sorry. I understand what it’s for, but I don’t understand the nitty-gritty.

Q. What is it for?

A. To track the transfer of doc — of interest from one entity to another. I know that it was initially created so that a servicer did not have to record the assignments, or if they didn’t, there was still a system to keep track of the transfer of property.

Q. Does it also have a function to hold the mortgage separate and apart from the note so that note can be transferred from entity to entity to entity, bank to bank to bank —

A. That sounds right.

Q. — without ever having to rerecord the mortgage?

A. That sounds right.

Q. So it’s a savings device. It makes it more efficient to transfer notes?

A. Yes.

Q. And cheaper?

A. Yes. Moreover,

Ms. Johnson-Seck testified that one of her job duties was to sign documents, which at that time took her about ten minutes per day [p. 11]. Further, she admitted, at p. 13, line 11-p. 14, line 15, that she signs about 750 documents per week and doesn’t read each document.

Q. Okay. How many documents would you say that you sign on a week on average, in a week on average?

A. I could have given you that number if you had that question in there because I would brought the report. However, I’m going to guess, today I saw an e-mail that 1,073 docs are in the office for signing. So if we just — and there’s about that a day. So let’s say 6,000 a week and I do probably — let’s see. There’s eight of us signing documents, so what’s the math?

Q. Six thousand divided by eight, that gives me 750..

A. That sounds, that sounds about right.

Q. Okay. That would be a reasonable estimate of how many you sign, you personally sign per week?

A. Yes.

Q. And that would include Lost Note Affidavits, Affidavits of Debt?

A. Yes.

Q. What other kinds of documents would be included in that?

A. Assignments, declarations. I can sign anything related to a bankruptcy or a foreclosure.

Q. How long do you spend executing each document?

A. I have changed my signature considerably. It’s just an E now.

So not more than 30 seconds.

Q. Is it true that you don’t read each document before you sign it?

A. That’s true. [Emphasis added]

Ms. Johnson-Seck, in the instant action, signed her full name on the March 16, 2009 MERS, as nominee for CAMBRIDGE, assignment to INDYMAC. She switched to the letter E in signing the May 14, 2009 INDYMAC to ONEWEST assignment and the June 30, 2009 affidavit of merit on behalf of ONEWEST. Additionally. she testified about how LPS prepares the documents in Minnesota and ships them to her Austin office, with LPS personnel present in her Austin office [pp. 16-17]. Ms. Johnson-Seck described the document signing process, at p. 17, line 6-p. 18, line 18:

Q. Take me through the procedure for getting your actual signature on the documents once they’ve gone through this quality control process?

A. The documents are delivered to me for signature and I do a quick purview to make sure that I’m not signing for an entity that I cannot sign for. And I sign the document and I hand it to the Notary, who notarizes it, who then hands it back to LPS who uploads the document so that the firms know it’s available and they send an original.

Q. “They” being LPS?

A. Yes.

Q. Are all the documents physically, that you were supposed to sign, are they physically on your desk?

A. Yes.

Q. You don’t go somewhere else to sign documents?

A. No.

Q. When you sign them, there’s no one else in your office?

A. Sometimes.

Q. Well, the Notaries are not in your office, correct?

A. They don’t sit in my office, no.

Q. And the witnesses who, if you need witnesses on the document, are not sitting in your office?

A. That’s right.

Q. So you take your ten minutes and you sign them and then you give them to the supervisor of the Notaries, correct?

A. I supervise the Notaries, so I just give them to a Notary.

Q. You give all, you give the whole group that you just signed to one Notary?

A. Yes. [Emphasis added]

Ms. Johnson-Seck testified, at p. 20, line 1-p. 21, line 4 about notaries not witnessing her signature:

Q. I’m mostly interested in how long it takes for the Notary to notarize your signature.

A. I can’t say categorically because the Notary, that’s not the only job they do, so.

Q. In any event, it doesn’t have to be the same day?

A. No.

Q. When they notarize it and they put a date that they’re notarizing it, is it the date that you signed it or is it the date that they’re notarizing it?

A. I don’t know.

Q. When you execute a sworn document, do you make any kind of a verbal acknowledgment or oath to anyone?

A. I don’t know if I know what you’re talking about. What’s a sworn document?

Q. Well, an affidavit.

A. Oh. No.

Q. In any event, there’s no Notary in the room for you to

A. Right.

Q. — take an oath with you, correct?

A. No there is not.

Q. In fact, the Notaries can’t see you sign the documents; is that correct?

A. Not unless that made it their business to do so?

Q. To peek into your office?

A. Yes. [Emphasis added]

As noted above, I found Ms. Johnson-Seck engaged in “robo-signing” in Deutsche Bank v Maraj and Indymac Bank, FSB, v Bethley. In both foreclosure cases I denied plaintiffs’ motions for orders of reference without prejudice with leave to renew if, among other things, Ms. Johnson-Seck could explain in affidavits: her employment history for the past three years; why she was a Vice President of both assignor MERS and assignee Deutsche Bank National Trust Company in Maraj; and, Vice President of INDYMAC in Bethley. Mr. Ice questioned Ms. Johnson-Seck about my MarajMaraj decision as exhibit M in the Machado deposition. The following colloquy at the Maraj deposition took place at p. 153, line 15-p. 156, line 9. decision and showed her the

Q. Exhibit M is a document that you saw before in your last deposition, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. It’s an opinion from Judge Schack up in New York —

A. Yes.

Q. — correct? You’re familiar with that?

A. Yes.

Q. In it, he says that you signed an Assignment of Mortgage as the vice president of MERS, correct —

A. Yes.

Q. — just as you did in this case? Judge Schack also says that you executed an affidavit as an officer of Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And is that true, you executed an affidavit for Deutsche Bank in that case?

A. That is not true.

Q. You never executed a document as an officer of Deutsche Bank National Trust Company in that case, Judge Schack’s case?

A. Let me just read it so I can — I have to refresh my memory completely.

Q. Okay.

A. I don’t remember. Most likely.

Q. That you did?

A. It sounds reasonable that I may have. I don’t remember, and since it’s not attached, I can’t say.

Q. And as a result, Judge Schack wanted to know if you were engaged in self-dealing by wearing two corporate hats?

A. Yes.

Q. And the court was concerned that there may be fraud on the part of the bank?

A. I guess.

Q. I mean he said that, right?

A. Oh, okay. I didn’t read the whole thing. Okay.

Q. Okay. The court ordered Deutsche Bank to produce an affidavit from you describing your employment history for the past three years, correct?

A. That’s what this says.

Q. Did you do that?

A. No, because we were never — no affidavit ever existed and no request ever came to produce such a document. The last time we spoke, I told you that in-house counsel was reviewing the whole issue and that’s kind of where — and we still haven’t received any communication to produce an affidavit.

Q. From your counsel?

A. From anywhere.

Q. Well, you’re reading Judge Schack’s opinion. He seems to want one. Isn’t that pretty clear on its face.

A. We didn’t get — we never even got a copy of this.

Q. Okay. But now you have it —

A. And —

Q. And you had it when we met at our deposition back in February 5th.

A. And our in-house counsel’s response to this is we were never — this was never requested of me and it was his recommendation not to comply.

Q. What has become of that case?

A. I don’t know.

Q. Was it settled?

A. I don’t know. After a break in the Machado deposition proceedings, Mr. Ice questioned Ms. Johnson-Seck about various documents that were subpoenaed for the July 9, 2010 deposition, including her employment affidavits that I required in both Maraj and Bethley. Ms. Johnson-Seck answered the following questions at p. 159, line 19-p. 161, line 9:

Q. So let’s start with the duces tecum part of you notice, which is the list of documents. No. 1 was: The affidavit of the last three years of deponent’s employment provided to Judge Schack in response to the order dated January 31st, 2008 in the case of Deutsche Bank National Trust Company vs. Maraj, Case No. 25981-07, Supreme Court of New York. We talked about that earlier. There is no such affidavit, correct?

A. Correct.

Q. By the way, why was IndyMac permitted to bring the case in Deutsche Bank’s name in that case?

A. I don’t — I don’t know. Now, errors have been made.

Q. No. 2: The affidavit of the deponent provided to Judge Schack in response to the order dated February 6th, 2009 in the case of IndyMac Bank, FSB vs, Bethley, New York Slip Opinion 50186, New York Supreme Court 2/5/09, “explaining,” and this is in quotes, “her employment history for the past three years; and, why a conflict of interest does not exist in how she acted as vice president of assignee IndyMac Bank, FSB in the instant action, and vice president of both Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems, Inc. and Deutsche Bank in Deutsche Bank vs. Maraj,” and it gives the citation and that’s the case referred to in item 1 of our request. Do you have that affidavit with you here today?

A. No.

Q. Were you aware of that second opinion where Judge Schack asks for a second affidavit?

A. Nope. Where is Judge Schack sending these?

Q. Presumably to your counsel.

A. I wonder if he has the right address. Maybe that’s what we should do, send Judge Schack the most recent, and I will gladly show up in his court and provide him everything he wants.

Q. Okay. Well, I sent you this back in March. Have your or your counsel or in-house counsel at IndyMac pursued that?

A. No. [Emphasis added] Counsel for plaintiff ONEWEST has leave to produce Ms. Johnson-Seck in my courtroom to “gladly show up . . . and provide [me] . . . everything he wants.”

Discussion

Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) § 1321 allows the Court in a foreclosure action, upon the default of the defendant or defendant’s admission of mortgage payment arrears, to appoint a referee “to compute the amount due to the plaintiff.” In the instant action, plaintiff ONEWEST’s application for an order of reference is a preliminary step to obtaining a default judgment of foreclosure and sale against defendant DRAYTON. (Home Sav. of Am., F.A. v Gkanios, 230 AD2d 770 [2d Dept 1996]). Plaintiff’s request to withdraw its application for an order of reference is granted. However, to allow this action to continue without seeking the ultimate purpose of a foreclosure action, to obtain a judgment of foreclosure and sale, makes a mockery of and wastes the resources of the judicial system. Continuing the instant action without moving for an order of reference is the judicial equivalent of a “timeout.” Granting a “timeout” to plaintiff ONEWEST to allow it to re-submit “a new application containing new information . . . shortly” is a waste of judicial resources. Therefore, the instant action is dismissed without prejudice, with leave granted to plaintiff ONEWEST to renew its motion for an order of reference within sixty (60) days of this decision and order, if plaintiff ONEWEST and plaintiff ONEWEST’s counsel can satisfactorily address the various issues previously enumerated. Further, the dismissal of the instant foreclosure action requires the cancellation of the notice of pendency. CPLR § 6501 provides that the filing of a notice of pendency against a property is to give constructive notice to any purchaser of real property or encumbrancer against real property of an action that “would affect the title to, or the possession, use or enjoyment of real property, except in a summary proceeding brought to recover the possession of real property.” The Court of Appeals, in 5308 Realty Corp. v O & Y Equity Corp. (64 NY2d 313, 319 [1984]), commented that “[t]he purpose of the doctrine was to assure that a court retained its ability to effect justice by preserving its power over the property, regardless of whether a purchaser had any notice of the pending suit,” and, at 320, that “the statutory scheme permits a party to effectively retard the alienability of real property without any prior judicial review.” CPLR § 6514 (a) provides for the mandatory cancellation of a notice of pendency by:

The Court, upon motion of any person aggrieved and upon such notice as it may require, shall direct any county clerk to cancel a notice of pendency, if service of a summons has not been completed within the time limited by section 6512; or if the action has been settled, discontinued or abated; or if the time to appeal from a final judgment against the plaintiff has expired; or if enforcement of a final judgment against the plaintiff has not been stayed pursuant to section 551. [emphasis added] The plain meaning of the word “abated,” as used in CPLR § 6514 (a) is the ending of an action. “Abatement” is defined as “the act of eliminating or nullifying.” (Black’s Law Dictionary 3 [7th ed 1999]). “An action which has been abated is dead, and any further enforcement of the cause of action requires the bringing of a new action, provided that a cause of action remains (2A Carmody-Wait 2d § 11.1).” (Nastasi v Nastasi, 26 AD3d 32, 40 [2d Dept 2005]). Further, Nastasi at 36, held that the “[c]ancellation of a notice of pendency can be granted in the exercise of the inherent power of the court where its filing fails to comply with CPLR § 6501 (see 5303 Realty Corp. v O & Y Equity Corp., supra at 320-321; Rose v Montt Assets, 250 AD2d 451, 451-452 [1d Dept 1998]; Siegel, NY Prac § 336 [4th ed]).” Thus, the dismissal of the instant complaint must result in the mandatory cancellation of plaintiff ONEWEST’s notice of pendency against the subject property “in the exercise of the inherent power of the court.”

Moreover, “[t]o have a proper assignment of a mortgage by an authorized agent, a power of attorney is necessary to demonstrate how the agent is vested with the authority to assign the mortgage.” (HSBC Bank, USA v Yeasmin, 27 Misc 3d 1227 [A], *3 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2010]). “No special form or language is necessary to effect an assignment as long as the language shows the intention of the owner of a right to transfer it [Emphasis added].” (Tawil v Finkelstein Bruckman Wohl Most & Rothman, 223 AD2d 52, 55 [1d Dept 1996]). (See Suraleb, Inc. v International Trade Club, Inc., 13 AD3d 612 [2d Dept 2004]). MERS, as described above, recorded the subject mortgage as “nominee” for CAMBRIDGE. The word “nominee” is defined as “[a] person designated to act in place of another, usu. in a very limited way” or “[a] party who holds bare legal title for the benefit of others.” (Black’s Law Dictionary 1076 [8th ed 2004]). “This definition suggests that a nominee possesses few or no legally enforceable rights beyond those of a principal whom the nominee serves.” (Landmark National Bank v Kesler, 289 Kan 528, 538 [2009]). The Supreme Court of Kansas, in Landmark National Bank, 289 Kan at 539, observed that: The legal status of a nominee, then, depends on the context of the relationship of the nominee to its principal. Various courts have interpreted the relationship of MERS and the lender as an agency relationship. See In re Sheridan, 2009 WL631355, at *4 (Bankr. D. Idaho, March 12, 2009) (MERS “acts not on its own account. Its capacity is representative.”); Mortgage Elec. Registrations Systems, Inc. v Southwest,La Salle Nat. Bank v Lamy, 12 Misc 3d 1191 [A], at *2 [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 2006]) . . . (“A nominee of the owner of a note and mortgage may not effectively assign the note and mortgage to another for want of an ownership interest in said note and mortgage by the nominee.”) The New York Court of Appeals in MERSCORP, Inc. v Romaine (8 NY3d 90 [2006]), explained how MERS acts as the agent of mortgagees, holding at 96: In 1993, the MERS system was created by several large participants in the real estate mortgage industry to track ownership interests in residential mortgages. Mortgage lenders and other entities, known as MERS members, subscribe to the MERS system and pay annual fees for the electronic processing and tracking of ownership and transfers of mortgages. Members contractually agree to appoint MERS to act as their common agent on all mortgages they register in the MERS system. [Emphasis added] 2009 Ark. 152 ___, ___SW3d___, 2009 WL 723182 (March 19, 2009) (“MERS, by the terms of the deed of trust, and its own stated purposes, was the lender’s agent”);

Thus, it is clear that MERS’s relationship with its member lenders is that of agent with principal. This is a fiduciary relationship, resulting from the manifestation of consent by one person to another, allowing the other to act on his behalf, subject to his control and consent. The principal is the one for whom action is to be taken, and the agent is the one who acts.It has been held that the agent, who has a fiduciary relationship with the principal, “is a party who acts on behalf of the principal with the latter’s express, implied, or apparent authority.” (Maurillo v Park Slope U-Haul, 194 AD2d 142, 146 [2d Dept 1992]). “Agents are bound at all times to exercise the utmost good faith toward their principals. They must act in accordance with the highest and truest principles of morality.” (Elco Shoe Mfrs. v Sisk, 260 NY 100, 103 [1932]). (See Sokoloff v Harriman Estates Development Corp., 96 NY 409 [2001]); Wechsler v Bowman, 285 NY 284 [1941]; Lamdin v Broadway Surface Advertising Corp., 272 NY 133 [1936]). An agent “is prohibited from acting in any manner inconsistent with his agency or trust and is at all times bound to exercise the utmost good faith and loyalty in the performance of his duties.” (Lamdin, at 136). Therefore, in the instant action, MERS, as nominee for CAMBRIDGE, is an agent of CAMBRIDGE for limited purposes. It can only have those powers given to it and authorized by its principal, CAMBRIDGE. Plaintiff ONEWEST has not submitted any documents demonstrating how CAMBRIDGE authorized MERS, as nominee for CAMBRIDGE, to assign the subject DRAYTON mortgage and note to INDYMAC, which subsequently assigned the subject mortgage and note to plaintiff ONEWEST. Recently, in Bank of New York v Alderazi,Lippincott v East River Mill & Lumber Co., 79 Misc 559 [1913]) and “[t]he declarations of an alleged agent may not be shown for the purpose of proving the fact of agency.” (Lexow & Jenkins, P.C. v Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp., 122 AD2d 25 [2d Dept 1986]; see also Siegel v Kentucky Fried Chicken of Long Is. 108 AD2d 218 [2d Dept 1985]; Moore v Leaseway Transp/ Corp., 65 AD2d 697 [1st Dept 1978].) “[T]he acts of a person assuming to be the representative of another are not competent to prove the agency in the absence of evidence tending to show the principal’s knowledge of such acts or assent to them.” (Lexow & Jenkins, P.C. v Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp., 122 AD2d at 26, quoting 2 NY Jur 2d, Agency and Independent Contractors § 26). Plaintiff has submitted no evidence to demonstrate that the original lender, the mortgagee America’s Wholesale Lender, authorized MERS to assign the secured debt to plaintiff. Therefore, in the instant action, plaintiff ONEWEST failed to demonstrate how MERS, as nominee for CAMBRIDGE, had authority from CAMBRIDGE to assign the DRAYTON mortgage to INDYMAC. The Court grants plaintiff ONEWEST leave to renew its motion for an order of reference, if plaintiff ONEWEST can demonstrate how MERS had authority from CAMBRIDGE to assign the DRAYTON mortgage and note to INDYMAC. Then, plaintiff ONEWEST must address the tangled employment situation of “robo-signer” Erica A. Johnson-Seck. She admitted in her July 9, 2010 deposition in the Machado case that she never provided me with affidavits of her employment for the prior three years and an explanation of why she wore so-many corporate hats in Maraj and Bethley. Further, in Deutsche Bank v Harris, Ms. Johnson-Seck executed an affidavit of merit as Vice President of Deutsche Bank. If plaintiff renews its motion for an order of reference, the Court must get to the bottom of Ms. Johnson-Seck’s employment status and her “robo-signing.” The Court reminds plaintiff ONEWEST’s counsel that Ms. Johnson-Seck, at p. 161 of the Machado deposition, volunteered, at lines 4-5 to “gladly show up in his court and provide him everything he wants.” Lastly, if plaintiff ONEWEST’S counsel moves to renew its application for an order of reference, plaintiff’s counsel must comply with the new filing requirement to submit, under penalties of perjury, an affirmation that he has taken reasonable steps, including inquiring of plaintiff ONEWEST, the lender, and reviewing all papers, to verify the accuracy of the submitted documents in support of the instant foreclosure action. According to yesterday’s Office of Court Administration press release, Chief Judge Lippman said: We cannot allow the courts in New York State to stand by idly and be party to what we now know is a deeply flawed process, especially when that process involves basic human needs — such as a family home — during this period of economic crisis. This new filing requirement will play a vital role in ensuring that the documents judges rely on will be thoroughly examined, accurate, and error-free before any judge is asked to take the drastic step of foreclosure. 28 Misc 3d at 379-380, my learned colleague, Kings County Supreme Court Justice Wayne Saitta explained that: A party who claims to be the agent of another bears the burden of proving the agency relationship by a preponderance of the evidence (

(See Gretchen Morgenson and Andrew Martin, Big Legal Clash on Foreclosure is Taking Shape, New York Times, Oct. 21, 2010; Andrew Keshner, New Court Rules Says Attorneys Must Verify Foreclosure Papers, NYLJ, Oct. 21, 2010).

Conclusion

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED, that the request of plaintiff ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B., to withdraw its motion for an order of reference, for the premises located at 962 Hemlock Street, Brooklyn, New York (Block 4529, Lot 116, County of Kings), is granted; and it is further

ORDERED, that the instant action, Index Number 15183/09, is dismissed without prejudice; and it is further

ORDERED, that the notice of pendency in the instant action, filed with the Kings County Clerk on June 18, 2009, by plaintiff ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B., to foreclose a mortgage for real property located at 962 Hemlock Street, Brooklyn, New York (Block 4529, Lot 116, County of Kings), is cancelled; and it is further

ORDERED, that leave is granted to plaintiff, ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B., to renew, within sixty (60) days of this decision and order, its motion for an order of reference for the premises located at 962 Hemlock Street, Brooklyn, New York (Block 4529, Lot 116, County of Kings), provided that plaintiff, ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B., submits to the Court: (1) proof of the grant of authority from the original mortgagee, CAMBRIDGE CAPITAL, LLC, to its nominee, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., to assign the subject mortgage and note to INDYMAC FEDERAL BANK, FSB; and (2) an affidavit by Erica A. Johnson-Seck, Vice President of plaintiff ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B., explaining: her employment history for the past three years; why a conflict of interest does not exist in how she acted as a Vice President of assignor MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., a Vice President of assignee/assignor INDYMAC FEDERAL BANK, FSB, and a Vice President of assignee/plaintiff ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B. in this action; why she was a Vice President of both assignor MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. and assignee DEUTSCHE BANK in Deutsche Bank v Maraj, 18 Misc 3d 1123 (A) (Sup Ct, Kings County 2008); why she was a Vice President of both assignor MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. and assignee INDYMAC BANK, FSB in Indymac Bank, FSB, v Bethley, 22 Misc 3d 1119 (A) (Sup Ct, Kings County 2009); and, why she executed an affidavit of merit as a Vice President of DEUTSCHE BANK in Deutsche Bank v Harris (Sup Ct, Kings County, Feb. 5, 2008, Index No. 35549/07); and (3) counsel for plaintiff ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B. must comply with the new Court filing requirement, announced by Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman on October 20, 2010, by submitting an affirmation, using the new standard Court form, pursuant to CPLR Rule 2106 and under the penalties of perjury, that counsel for plaintiff ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B. has personally reviewed plaintiff ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B.’s documents and records in the instant action and counsel for plaintiff ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B. confirms the factual accuracy of plaintiff ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B.’s court filings and the accuracy of the notarizations in plaintiff ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B.’s documents.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

[ipaper docId=40499638 access_key=key-1n9ja8i2jfczxnt1epea height=600 width=600 /]

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Assured Guaranty Sues Deutsche Bank Over Mortgages

Assured Guaranty Sues Deutsche Bank Over Mortgages


By Shannon D. Harrington and Karen Freifeld – Oct 25, 2010 6:55 PM ET
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A unit of Assured Guaranty Ltd. sued affiliates of Deutsche Bank AG over $312 million of mortgage- backed securities that the bond insurer guaranteed and says were “plagued by rampant fraud and misrepresentations.”

Assured Guaranty Corp. is asking a judge to force the bank to repurchase the loans, on which the insurer has already paid almost $60 million in loss claims and sees the potential for tens of millions of dollars more, according to a complaint filed today in New York state Supreme Court against DB Structured Products Inc. and ACE Securities Corp. The bond insurer, backed by billionaire Wilbur Ross, is also seeking reimbursement for the claims paid and for future losses.

“The entire pools of loans that Deutsche Bank securitized (and to a large degree originated) in the transactions are plagued by rampant fraud and misrepresentations and an abdication of sound origination and underwriting practices,” Assured said in the complaint.

Repurchases of home loans from buyers and insurers of mortgage securities originated before U.S. housing prices began to tumble in 2007 have already cost the four biggest U.S. lenders $9.8 billion, according to Credit Suisse Group AG.

Assured said more than 83 percent of 1,306 defaulted loans examined in one of the transactions, ACE’s Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2007-SL2, breached Deutsche Bank’s representations and warranties. In the second deal, Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2007-SL3, 86 percent of the 1,774 loans breached the agreements, Assured said.

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FL 4th DCA COURT OF APPEALS REVERSES SUMMARY JUDGMENT: ALEJANDRE v. DEUTSCHE BANK TRUST COMPANY

FL 4th DCA COURT OF APPEALS REVERSES SUMMARY JUDGMENT: ALEJANDRE v. DEUTSCHE BANK TRUST COMPANY


JUDITH ALEJANDRE and SERGIO TERRON, Appellants,
v.
DEUTSCHE BANK TRUST COMPANY AMERICAS

f/k/a BANKER’S TRUST COMPANY, as TRUSTEE
and CUSTODIAN FOR NATIXIS 2007-HE2, Appellee.

No. 4D09-2280.

October 13, 2010 –

Joshua Bleil and Jessica Ticktin of The Ticktin Law Group, P.A.,
Deerfield Beach, for appellants.

No brief filed for appellee.

Judith Alejandre and Sergio Terron (Alejandre) appeal the summary judgment of foreclosure in favor of Deutsche Bank Trust Company. Alejandre asserts that the trial court erred in granting the summary judgment and that they had asserted affirmative defenses which were not denied by Deutsche, dealt with during the hearing on the motion for summary judgment or addressed in the final judgment. We agree and reverse.

Deutsche filed an amended complaint with the necessary documentation alleging that it was entitled to foreclose on the property in question. In Alejandre’s answer to the amended complaint, they asserted as affirmative defenses, the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), and unclean hands. In moving for summary judgment, Deutsche attached an affidavit stating that it had advanced to Alejandre, and is owed by Alejandre, the sum of $337,567.26. In its motion, however, it did not address any of the pending affirmative defenses. Nonetheless, the trial court granted Deutsche’s motion for summary judgment, prompting this appeal.

“The standard of review of the entry of summary judgment is de novo.” Craven v. TRG-Boynton Beach, Ltd.,925 So.2d 476, 479 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). Further, [t]he law is well settled in Florida that a party moving for summary judgment must show conclusively the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, and the court must draw every possible inference in favor of the party against whom a summary judgment is sought.” Id. at 479-80. “Summary judgment cannot be granted unless the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with affidavits, if any, conclusively show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Frost v. Regions Bank,15 So.3d 905, 906 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).

When a party raises affirmative defenses, “[a] summary judgment should not be granted where there are issues of fact raised by [the] affirmative defense[s] which have not been effectively factually challenged and refuted.” Cufferi v. Royal Palm Dev. Co.,516 So.2d 983, 984 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). Thus, “`[i]n order for a plaintiff . . . to obtain a summary judgment when the defendant asserts affirmative defenses, the plaintiff must either disprove those defenses by evidence or establish the legal insufficiency of the defenses.’” Id. (quoting Bunner v. Fla. Coast Bank of Coral Springs, N.A.,390 So.2d 126, 127 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)). In such instances, “[t]he burden is on the plaintiff, as the moving party, to demonstrate that the defendant could not prevail.” Id.

In Frost, a bank/mortgagee filed a foreclosure claim against a mortgagor. In response to that complaint, the mortgagors filed an answer that contained the affirmative defense of notice and opportunity to cure. The bank filed a motion for summary judgment. In opposition to that motion, the mortgagors did not file any papers or affidavits. At the hearing, the mortgagors contended that summary judgment was improper because the bank failed to address their affirmative defense. The trial court granted the bank’s motion for summary judgment. Frost, 15 So. 3d at 906.

On appeal, this court reversed. We stated that the bank failed to refute the mortgagors’ affirmative defense of lack of notice and opportunity to cure. The bank failed to meet this requirement because “[n]othing in the bank’s complaint, motion for summary judgment, or affidavits indicate that the bank gave the [mortgagors] the notice which the mortgage required. The bank also did not establish that the [mortgagors’] lack of notice and opportunity to cure defense was legally insufficient.” Id. at 906. This Court held that “[b]ecause the bank did not meet its burden to refute the [mortgagors’] lack of notice and opportunity to cure defense, the bank is not entitled to final summary judgment of foreclosure.” Id. at 906-07.

In the instant case, as in Frost, the trial court’s entry of summary judgment was improper. Here, as in Frost, Deutsche moved for summary judgment, but in that motion, it failed to address affirmative defenses raised by the mortgagor, Alejandre. Because Deutsche failed to address Alejandre’s affirmative defenses, it did not carry its burden on summary judgment. Therefore, the trial court’s entry of summary judgment was erroneous. We do not pass upon the merits of the affirmative defenses, as that is a matter to be addressed in further proceedings.

Reversed and Remanded for Further Proceedings Consistent with this Opinion.

TAYLOR and CIKLIN, JJ., concur.

ALEJANDRE v. DEUTSCHE BANK TRUST COMPANY

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Posted in deutsche bank, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosures, reversed court decisionComments (3)

ONEWEST BANK ‘ERICA JOHNSON-SECK’ ‘Not more than 30 seconds’ to sign each foreclosure document

ONEWEST BANK ‘ERICA JOHNSON-SECK’ ‘Not more than 30 seconds’ to sign each foreclosure document


OneWest Bank employee: ‘Not more than 30 seconds’ to sign each foreclosure document

The recent announcements by J.P. Morgan Chase and Ally Financial that they were freezing some foreclosures because of paperwork irregularities raises a key question: How many more mortgage companies employed “robo-signers?”

In a sworn deposition in July, Erica Johnson-Seck, an Austin, Tex.,-based vice president for bankruptcy and foreclosure for OneWest Bank, said she and her team of seven others sign 6,000 documents a week or about 24,000 a month without reading all of them.

Johnson-Seck estimated that she spent no more than 30 seconds to sign each document.

She explained that while she does not check everything, she does check some information, “which is why I said 30 seconds instead of two seconds.”

Continue reading…WASHINGTON POST

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Posted in chain in title, CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, deed of trust, eric friedman, erica johnson seck, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, foreclosures, indymac, investigation, Law Offices Of David J. Stern P.A., MERS, MERSCORP, mortgage, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC., robo signers, roger stotts, stopforeclosurefraud.com, TrustsComments (1)

INDYMAC’S/ONEWEST FORECLOSURE ‘ROBO-SIGNERS’ SIGNED 24,000 MORTGAGE DOCUMENTS MONTHLY

INDYMAC’S/ONEWEST FORECLOSURE ‘ROBO-SIGNERS’ SIGNED 24,000 MORTGAGE DOCUMENTS MONTHLY


Please welcome Ericka Johnson Seck to the ROBO-SIGNER Hall of Sham!

MERS & LPS once again the “Common Thread”

Here is a list of her many Corporate Hats:

  • Vice President of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. (MERS)
  • Vice President of Deutsch Bank National Trust
  • Vice President of Bank of New York
  • Attorney in Fact of IndyMac
  • Attorney in Fact of ONEWEST
  • Attorney in  Fact of FDIC

I must confess, she was my first study because she signed two assignments for “one” of my properties using “two” different employers. 🙂 ‘<blush> I even created my very first youtube video in her honor (see below)!

Thanks to Judge Arthur Schack and Tom Ice from Ice Legal in Palm Beach County, we all became familiar with Erica for wearing too many corporate hats.

She is the “Robo-Signer” Judge Schack called out in three particular cases in NY and made her an instant foreclosure household name. I don’t think she ever emerged in NY soon after this. Also see the  HSCB v. Yasmin case.

Excerpt of DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST v. HARRIS

The Court is perplexed as to why the assignment was not executed in Pasadena, California, at 46U Sierra Madre Villa, the alleged “principal place of business” for both the assignor and the assignee. In my January 3 1, 2008 decision (Deutsche Bank National Tr (1st Canpuny v Maraj, – Misc 3d – [A], 2008 NY Slip Op 50176 [U]), I noted that Erica Johnson-Seck, claimed that she was a Vice President of MERS in her July 3,2007 INDYMAC to DEUTSCHE BANK assignment, and then in her July 3 1,2007 affidavit claimed to be a DEUTSCHE BANK Vice President. Just as in Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v Maraj, at 2, the Court in the instant action, before granting itn application for an order of reference, requires an affidavit from Ms. Johnson-Seck, describing her employment history for the past three years.

Further, the Court requires an explanation from an officer of plaintiff DEUTSCHE BANK as to why, in the middle of our national subprime mortgage financial crisis, DEUTSCHE BANK would purchase a non-perferforming loan from INDYMAC, and why DEUTSCHE BANK, INDYMAC and MERS all share office space at 460 Sierra Madre Villa, Pasadena, CA 91 107.

24,000 Monthly Documents executed by her team

Now Lets move on to this below… according to this deposition her office signs 24,000 mortgage related documents out of the this figure she signed about “750” a week making it approximately 3000 mortgage documents used in foreclosure cases. Anything from Affidavits of Debt, Lost Note Affidavits, Assignment of Mortgages, Declarations pretty much anything having to deal with Bankruptcy and Foreclosures.

This is what she signs without any notary present.

DEPOSITION OF ERICA JOHNSON SECK

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Below is a sale that happened in DC all in 1 single day! It appears she also puts properties in her name with her co-employees Roger Stotts and  Eric Friedman.

ROGER STOTTS  signs these as well and according to the depo above Indymac/Onewest is “NOT” the custodian as defined below. Why do they commit fraud?


FIRST VIDEO MADE OF DAVID J. STERN, ERICA JOHNSON-SECK BACK IN FEBRUARY 2010

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Posted in assignment of mortgage, bogus, CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, deposition, deutsche bank, erica johnson seck, fdic, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, foreclosures, Former Fidelity National Information Services, investigation, judge arthur schack, Law Offices Of David J. Stern P.A., lis pendens, MERS, MERSCORP, Moratorium, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC., notary fraud, note, onewest, robo signers, roger stotts, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD, stopforeclosurefraud.comComments (12)

NY JUDGE SPINNER DENIES Deutsche & MERS for NOT Recording Mortgage, Make up Affidavit and Assignment!

NY JUDGE SPINNER DENIES Deutsche & MERS for NOT Recording Mortgage, Make up Affidavit and Assignment!


MERS ‘QUIET TITLE’ FAIL

NY SUPREME COURT: SUFFOLK COUNTY

INDEX NO. 09-3 1067

Excerpts:

MERS alleges that the mortgage was never recorded, and upon information and belief, has been lost or inadvertantly destroyed. MERS commenced this action on August 1 1, 2009, with the filing of the summons, verified complaint, and notice of pendency.

Also, in support of its cross motion, MERS submits, inter alia, copies of the alleged note and mortgage, and the affidavit of John Burnett ( “Burnett”), a Vice President of Deutsche Bank National Trust Company as Trustee for the MLMI Trust Series 2007-MLNI (“Deutsche Bank”) who alleges that Deutsche Bank is the current owner and holder of the mortgage that is the subject of this action. Burnett claims that MERS’ mortgage has been assigned to Deutsche Bank by an unrecorded assignment of the mortgage acknowledged on September 4,2009, a copy of which has been submitted to the court. Burnett states that the assignment will be recorded once the mortgage has been established of record. Further, Burnett alleges that out of the loan proceeds that were secured by the mortgage, $641,441.54 was paid to Downey Savings and Loan to satisfy a prior mortgage Torr had given on the property, and the amount of $34,833.22 was paid directly to Torr. Burnett submits a copy of the alleged HUD- 1 A Settlement Statement from Torr’s closing.

Additionally, Burnett asserts that it has been discovered that the original mortgage was never recorded, cannot be located, and is presumed to be lost or inadvertantly destroyed. He claims that the original mortgage is not in Deutsche Bank’s files, and only a copy has been located. Burnett states that Interactive Abstract (“Interactive”) a title abstract company, presided over the November 17, 2006 closing of the mortgage and took the executed original for the purpose of recording it in the Suffolk County Clerk’s Office. He states that, upon information and belief, the mortgage was lost, misplace or destroyed while in Interactive‘s possession or after it had been submitted to the Clerk’s Office for recording. Burnett alleges that he has been advised that Interactive has ceased operating as a title abstract company and is out of business.

MERS alleges that by submitting the affidavit of Burnett, and copies of the affidavits of service, together with the relevant documentary evidence, it has satisfied the proof required by CPLR 321 5 setting forth the facts constituting the claim against Torr and establishing his default. Moreover, MERS alleges that the relief sought herein, a declaratory judgment, is necessary to enable it to realize the security interest in the property that was bargained for when MLN made its $695,000.00 loan to Torr and Torr gave the mortgage to secure the loan. MERS requests that the court render a judgment declaring that the plaintiff is the holder of a mortgage encumbering the premises under the terms and conditions set forth in the unrecorded plaintiffs mortgage, and directing the Suffolk County Clerk’s Office to record such a declaratory judgment, together with a copy of the plaintiffs mortgage.

As to Torr’s motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, MERS has established that such motion is untimely. Torr was served by two different methods of service. One of the affidavits of service submitted indicates that Torr was served pursuant to CPLR 308(2) on September 2, 2009, by leaving the summons and verified complaint with a person of suitable age and discretion; mailing them to Torr’s residence on September 8,2009; and then filing proof of service with the Suffolk County Clerk’s Office on September 18, 2009. Therefore, under this method of service, Torr would have had to have served an answer or a notice of appearance by October 28,2009 (see CPLR 308[2]; CPLR 320; and CPLR 3012). The other affidavit of service submitted indicates that Torr was served pursuant to CPLR 308( 1) on September 2,2009, by personal delivery of the summons and verified complaint, and then fiIing proof of service with the Suffolk County Clerk’s Office on September 10, 2009. Thus, under this method of service, Torr would have had to have served an answer or a notice of appearance by September 22, 2009 (see CPLR 320 and CPLR 30 12). Furthermore, this motion to dismiss the complaint was made by Torr on December 2 1,2009, the date upon which it was served (see CPLR 221 1). Inasmuch as this motion was not interposed within the time required for service of responsive pleadings (see CPLR 32 1 1 [e]), no matter which of the two afl’ldavits of service submitted herein is used, the motion is untimely. Therefore, Torr’s motion to dismiss is denied.

As to MERS’ cross motion, it is well settledl that when applying for a default judgment, a plaintiff must submit evidence sufficient to demonstrate a prima facie case (see CPLR 32 lS[fl; Silberstein v Presbyterinn Hosp. in the City of New York, 96 AD2d 1096,463 NYS2d 254 [1983]). Thus, if a court finds that the allegations in a complaint or affidavit of facts fail to establish a prima facie case, a movant is not entitled to the requested relief; even on default (Dyno v Rose, 260 AD2d 694,687 NYS2d 497 [1999]; Green v Dolplzy Construction Co., Inc., 187 AD2d 635, 590 NYS2d 238 [1992]). Consistent with the foregoing, and upon review of t.he papers submitted, the court finds MERS’ application for a default judgment to be deficient.

An action to compel the determination of a claim to real property may be maintained where a plaintiff claims an estate or interest in real property (RPAPL § 150 I [ 11). Although the interest had by a mortgagee of real property or its successor in interest is an “interest in real property”(RPAPL tj 150 1 [ 5 ] ) , here MERS has failed to meet its burden by demonstrating that it has standing to maintain this action to quiet title (see Soscin v Soscin, 35 AD3d 841, 829 NYS2d 543 [2006]). MERS has failed to make a prima facie showing that it was the owner or holder of the note and the mortgage at the time this action was commenced (cc Mortgnge Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v Conkley, 41 AD3d 674, 838 NYS2d 622 [2007]). In addition, the purported mortgage describes MERS as the nominee of MLN, and that for purposes of recording the mortgage, MERS is the mortgagee of record. Thus, MERS as nominee, is the agent of MLN, for limited purposes, “and has only those powers which are conferred to it and authorized by” MLN (Bank of New York v Aldernzi, 201 0 NE’ Slip Op. 20 167,900 NYS2d 82 1, 823 [Sup Ct, Kings County, 20101). There is no evidence that MLN, who is not a party herein, authorized MERS to bring this action’.

Moreover, the effectiveness of the assignment dated September 4, 2009, is unclear as there is no evidence that MLN ever directly assigned the note to MERS or expressly gave MERS the authority to act as MLN’s authorized agent to assign the subject note to Deutsche Bank (see In re Stralern, 303 AD2d 120, 758 NYS2d 345 [2003]; Teitz v Goettler, 191 AD 924, 181 NYS 956 [1920]).Without an effective transfer of MLN’s interest in the note to MERS or express authorization from MLN for MERS to assign the note on its behalf, the assignment of the mortgage is a nullity (see Kluge v Fugazy, 145 AD2d 537, 536 NYS2d 92 [1988]). Thus, it is also iinclear whether Deutche Bank’s Vice President had the authority to act in terms of satisfying the proof of facts constituting this claim (see CPLR 3215[fl; Wells Fargo Barzk, NA v Davilmar, 16 Misc3d 1 13 3A, 847 NYS2d 906 [2007]).

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Posted in chain in title, conflict of interest, conspiracy, deutsche bank, dismissed, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosures, MERS, MERSCORP, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC., note, quiet title, rmbs, servicers, stopforeclosurefraud.com, trustee, Trusts, Wall StreetComments (0)

Dual Role in Housing Deals Puts Spotlight on Deutsche

Dual Role in Housing Deals Puts Spotlight on Deutsche


By CARRICK MOLLENKAMP And SERENA NG

Federal probes of the collapsed mortgage-bond boom are shedding light on how Wall Street firms sometimes created securities and sold them to one set of investors, while advising others to bet against them.

One firm that was a major player in mortgage securities, Deutsche Bank AG, illustrates a pattern investigators are looking at. While creating and selling mortgage securities to some of its clients, the big German bank was not only advising other clients to bet the other way, but also sometimes doing so itself.

A Deutsche trader helped create an index that made it easy to bet against housing, and the bank itself then used the index to do just that.

After the collapse of mortgage securities led to a costly bailout of the firm that insured many such securities—American International Group Inc.—some of the federal cash that was sunk into AIG flowed to Deutsche, to cover bearish bets by its hedge-fund clients.

Deutsche’s actions are a vivid example of potential conflicts on Wall Street—the way big financial firms play both sides of the fence with investors. The issue became more extreme during the mortgage bubble and subsequent bust because of the size of the bets on Wall Street and subsequent losses on Main Street.

Regulators now are grappling with whether the business-as-usual conduct at financial firms merely looks bad in hindsight, or whether there were misrepresentations or other legal issues that need to be further investigated and guarded against in the future. “This is a gray area that we need more investigation into,” says Andrew Lo, a finance professor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a hedge-fund manager.

Deutsche says that helping investors bet either way—either for or against an asset—is part of doing business for a securities firm.

“Some clients sought more exposure to the housing market, while others sought less,” a spokesman for Deutsche said. “We served clients whatever their investment objective, but only after being satisfied that they had arrived at their view after thorough consideration.”

Continue reading …The Wall Street Journal

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Posted in concealment, conspiracy, deutsche bank, investigation, mbs, mortgageComments (1)

DEUTSCHE BANK drops Foreclosure Case on Two Florida Candidates!

DEUTSCHE BANK drops Foreclosure Case on Two Florida Candidates!


What I want to now know is how this happened extremely fast when there is thousands trying to work out the same? In my recent post I wrote about this controversy in which I question the validity of Deutsche Bank’s standing

Foreclosure case against two Fla. candidates dropped

Deutsche Bank files, dismisses suit with Marco Rubio and David Rivera over mortgage

Katherine Concepcion • Staff Writer • June 28, 2010 Tallahassee.com

A 1,228-square foot home off Apalachee Parkway was the subject of recent controversy within the Florida political scene.

On June 14, the Deutsche Bank National Trust Company initiated a foreclosure filed in the Leon County Circuit Court against Marco Rubio and David Rivera, owners of the property in question. The lawsuit has since been dropped; a notice of voluntary dismissal and release of lis pendens was filed on June 23.

The Law Offices of Marshall C. Watson, who represented Deutsche Bank, declined to comment.
Rubio, former Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives, is running for the Republican seat currently occupied by George LeMieux in the U.S. Senate. Rep. Rivera, who serves District 112 of the Florida House, is campaigning as a Republican Congressional candidate in Florida’s 25th District. The two men purchased the house for $135,000 in 2005. The property is currently under contract pending sale.

Rivera delivered a cashier’s check for $9,525 to the plaintiffs on Thursday, June 17, prompting Rubio spokesperson Alex Burgos, who did not return calls for comment, to issue a statement that the men “took action right away to get this [matter] resolved.”

Court records reveal a debt of around $136,000 on the property, including late charges and accumulated interest. Mortgage payments had not been made since February because of an alleged dispute over how the adjustable rate mortgage would be calculated once the interest-only period expired.

This is not the first financial battle Rubio has been embroiled in.

During his tenure as House speaker, Rubio was questioned about his failure to disclose receiving a $135,000 home-equity loan, and charging $16,000 in personal expenses, including grocery bills and car repairs, to a Florida GOP credit card.

Continue reading …

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RELATED STORY:

US Senate candidate MARCO RUBIO Facing Foreclosure…NOT SO FAST, Lets TAKE A LOOK!

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Posted in deutsche bank, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, investigation, law offices of Marshall C. Watson pa, lawsuitComments (1)

US Senate candidate MARCO RUBIO Facing Foreclosure…NOT SO FAST, Lets TAKE A LOOK!

US Senate candidate MARCO RUBIO Facing Foreclosure…NOT SO FAST, Lets TAKE A LOOK!


Edit: These images below keep going missing!

Question for Mr. Rubio is, exactly who is Foreclosing on you??

Where are the following assignments from  the Original Lender to MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS (MERS) to DEUTSCHE NATIONAL TRUST?

Take a look at the Original Mortgage:

See the arrow it clearly states the Lender is AMERIFIRST FINANCIAL, so where are the missing Assignments of the Mortgage that gives DBNT legal standing to file this Lis Pendens??

It is clear that from the face of these documents and a search in Leon County, FL records that there is none!

Law Office of Marshall C. Watson is the foreclosure mill handling this case. Lets see when they plan on filing the missing assignments….we’ll be back!

 

 

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Posted in deutsche bank, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, investigation, law offices of Marshall C. Watson pa, MERS, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC.Comments (2)

[NYSC] JUDGE SCHACK TAKES ON ROBO-SIGNER ERICA JOHNSON SECK: DEUTSCHE BANK v. HARRIS (2)

[NYSC] JUDGE SCHACK TAKES ON ROBO-SIGNER ERICA JOHNSON SECK: DEUTSCHE BANK v. HARRIS (2)


Excerpt:

Plaintiffs affidavit, submitted in support of the instant application for a default judgment, was executed by Erica Johnson-Seck, who claims to be a Vice President of plaintiff DEUTSCHE BANK. The affidavit was executed in the State of Texas, County of Williamson (Williamson County, Texas is located in the Austin metropolitan area, and its county seat is Georgetown, Texas). The COURT is perplexed as to why the assignment was not executed in Pasadena, California, at 46U Sierra Madre Villa, the alleged “principal place of business” for both the assign1,)r and the assignee. In my January 3 1, 2008 decision (Deutsche Bank National Trust company v Maraj, – Misc 3d – [A], 2008 NY Slip Op 50176 [U]), I noted that Erica Johnson-Seck, claimed that she was a Vice President of MERS in her July 3,2007 INDYMAC to DEUTSCHE BANK assignment, and then in her July 3 1,2007 affidavit claimed to be a DEUTSCHE BANK Vice President. Just as in Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v Maraj, at 2, the Court in the instant action, before granting itn application for an order of reference, requires an affidavit from Ms. Johnson-Seck, describing her employment history for the past three years.

Down Load PDF of This Case

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[NYSC] JUDGE SCHACK TAKES ON ROBO-SIGNER ERICA JOHNSON SECK: DEUTSCHE BANK v. MARAJ (1)

[NYSC] JUDGE SCHACK TAKES ON ROBO-SIGNER ERICA JOHNSON SECK: DEUTSCHE BANK v. MARAJ (1)


2008 NY Slip Op 50176(U)
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY As Trustee under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement Series Index 2006-AR6, Plaintiff,
v.
RAMASH MARAJ A/K/A RAMISH MARAJ, ET AL., Defendants.
25981/07.

Supreme Court of the State of New York, Kings County.
Decided January 31, 2008.

Plaintiff: Kevin M. Butler, Esq., Eschen Frenkel Weisman & Gordon, De Rose & Surico, Bayside NY.

Defendant: No Opposition submitted by defendants to plaintiff’s Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale.

ARTHUR M. SCHACK, J.

Plaintiff’s application, upon the default of all defendants, for an order of reference for the premises located at 255 Lincoln Avenue, Brooklyn, New York (Block 4150, Lot 19, County of Kings) is denied without prejudice, with leave to renew upon providing the Court with a satisfactory explanation to various questions with respect to the July 3, 2007 assignment of the instant mortgage to plaintiff, DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY AS TRUSTEE UNDER THE POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT SERIES INDEX 2006-AR6 (DEUTSCHE BANK). The questions deal with: the employment history of one Erica Johnson-Seck, who assigned the mortgage to plaintiff DEUTSCHE BANK, and then subsequently executed the affidavit of facts in the instant application as an officer of DEUTSCHE BANK; plaintiff DEUTSCHE BANK’s purchase of the instant non-performing loan; and, why INDYMAC BANK, F.S.B., (INDYMAC), Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), and DEUTSCHE BANK all share office space at Building B, 901 East 104th Street, Suite 400/500, Kansas City, MO 64131 (Suite 400/500).

Defendant RAMASH MARAJ borrowed $440,000.00 from INDYMAC on March 7, 2006. The note and mortgage were recorded in the Office of the City Register, New York City Department of Finance on March 22, 2006 at City Register File Number (CRFN) XXXXXXXXXXXXX. INDYMAC, by Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), its nominee for the purpose of recording the mortgage, assigned the note and mortgage to plaintiff DEUTSCHE BANK, on July 3, 2007, with the assignment recorded on September 5, 2007 at CRFN XXXXXXXXXXXXX.

According to plaintiff’s application, defendant MARAJ’s default began with the nonpayment of principal and interest due on March 1, 2007. Yet on July 3, 2007, more than four months later, plaintiff DEUTSCHE BANK accepted the assignment of the instant non-performing loan from INDYMAC. Further, both assignor MERS, as nominee of INDYMAC, and assignee DEUTSCHE BANK list Suite 400/500 on the July 3, 2007 Assignment as their “principal place of business.” To compound corporate togetherness, page 2 of the recorded Assignment, lists the same Suite 400/500 as the address of INDYMAC.

The Assignment by MERS, on behalf of INDYMAC, was executed by Erica Johnson-Seck, Vice President of MERS. The notary public, Mai La Thao, stated in the jurat that the assignment was executed in the State of Texas, County of Williamson (Williamson County is located in the Austin metropolitan area, and its county seat is Georgetown, Texas). The Court is perplexed as to why the assignment was not executed in Kansas City, the alleged “principal place of business” for both the assignor and the assignee.

Twenty-eight days later, on July 31, 2007, the same Erica Johnson-Seck executed plaintiff’s affidavit submitted in support of the instant application for a default judgment. Ms. Johnson-Seck, in her affidavit, states that she is “an officer of Deutsche Bank National Trust Company as Trustee under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement Series INDX 2006-AR6, the plaintiff herein.” At the end of the affidavit she states that she is a Vice President of DEUTSCHE BANK. Again, Mai La Thao is the notary public and the affidavit is executed in the State of Texas, County of Williamson. The Erica Johnson-Seck signatures on both the July 3, 2007 assignment and the July 31, 2007 affidavit are identical. Did Ms. Johnson-Seck change employers from July 3, 2007 to July 31, 2007, or does she engage in self-dealing by wearing two corporate hats? The Court is concerned that there may be fraud on the part of plaintiff DEUTSCHE BANK, or at least malfeasance. Before granting an application for an order of reference, the Court requires an affidavit from Ms. Johnson-Seck, describing her employment history for the past three years.

Further, the Court requires an explanation from an officer of plaintiff DEUTSCHE BANK as to why, in the middle of our national subprime mortgage financial crisis, DEUTSCHE BANK would purchase a non-performing loan from INDYMAC, and why DEUTSCHE BANK, INDYMAC and MERS all share office space in Suite 400/500.

With the assignor MERS and assignee DEUTSCHE BANK appearing to be engaged in possible fraudulent activity by: having the same person execute the assignment and then the affidavit of facts in support of the instant application; DEUTSCHE BANK’s purchase of a non-performing loan from INDYMAC; and, the sharing of office space in Suite 400/500 in Kansas City, the Court wonders if the instant foreclosure action is a corporate “Kansas City Shuffle,” a complex confidence game. In the 2006 film, Lucky Number Slevin, Mr. Goodkat, (a hitman played by Bruce Willis), explains (in memorable quotes from Lucky Number Slevin, at www.imdb.com/title/tt425210/quotes).

A Kansas City Shuffle is when everybody looks right, you go left . . .

It’s not something people hear about. Falls on deaf ears mostly . . .

No small matter. Requires a lot of planning. Involves a lot of people. People connected by the slightest of events. Like whispers in the night, in that place that never forgets, even when those people do.

In this foreclosure action is plaintiff DEUTSCHE BANK, with its “principal place of business” in Kansas City attempting to make the Court look right while it goes left?

Conclusion

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED, that the application of plaintiff, DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY AS TRUSTEE UNDER THE POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT SERIES INDEX 2006-AR6, for an order of reference for the premises located at 255 Lincoln Avenue, Brooklyn, New York (Block 4150, Lot 19, County of Kings), is denied without prejudice; and it is further

ORDERED, that leave is granted to plaintiff, DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY AS TRUSTEE UNDER THE POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT SERIES INDEX 2006-AR6, to renew its application for an order of reference for the premises located at 255 Lincoln Avenue, Brooklyn, New York (Block 4150, Lot 19, County of Kings), upon presentation to the Court, within forty-five (45) days of this decision and order, of: an affidavit from Erica Johnson-Seck describing her employment history for the past three years; and, an affidavit from an officer of plaintiff

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY AS TRUSTEE UNDER THE POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT SERIES INDEX 2006-AR6, explaining why (1) plaintiff purchased a nonperforming loan from INDYMAC BANK, F.S.B., (2) shares office space at Building B, 901 East 104th Street, Suite 400/500, Kansas City, MO 64131 with Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and INDYMAC BANK, F.S.B., and (3), claims Building B, 901 East 104th Street, Suite 400/500, Kansas City, MO 64131 as its principal place of business in the Assignment of the instant mortgage and yet executed the Assignment and affidavit of facts in this action in Williamson County, Texas.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

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Follow the Trail —Don’t get lost in the documents

Follow the Trail —Don’t get lost in the documents


Posted on March 25, 2010 by Neil Garfield

I THOUGHT THIS COMMENT WAS WORTHY OF MAKING INTO A POST.

See for Deutsch bank references Prospectus offered all over the world: Anyone who had a Deed of Trust with: Indymac, Wells Fargo, Countrywide, GMAC, Ocwen, American Home, Residential Funding Company, Washington Mutual Bank, BofA, and many others you might want to check this link out.

Editor’s Note: The only thing I would add is that the obligation arose when the borrower executed a note, but the creditor got a securitized bond with different terms, deriving its value from your note and thousands of others. Once you realize that the obligation is NOT the same as the Note, which is only EVIDENCE of the obligation, and that the MORTGAGE is NOT the obligation, it is only incident to the note, THEN you will understand that following the money means following the obligation, not the note or the mortgage. And figuring out what effect there was on the obligation at each step that the note was transferred, bought or paid, is the key to understanding whether the note became a negotiable instrument, and if it did, if it retained that status as a negotiable instrument.

FROM Jan van Eck
dutchman4753@gmail.com

to foreclosurefight:

What you are missing in your attempt to analyze this is that you are trying to follow the “mortgage,” not the Note. the reason you are doing this is that only the “mortgage,” as the Security Instrument, is being recorded on the land records – so it is all you get to see.

the reason your adversaries, whoever they really are, “withdrew” from the relief from Stay Motion in the BK Court is that they do not have the Note. Somebody else does. And you have no clue as to who that is.

You have to start by determining what has happened to the Note, and how the Indorsements on the Note flow. And you have not seen the Note, not in years, so the raw truth is that you have no clue.

the “mortgage” never went into any “Trust.” Mortgages do not go into trusts. Only the Note (“maybe”) went into a trust – and only if it had proper Indorsement. Since Deutsche is involved, you can safely bet that it did not. Deutsche is NOTORIOUS for perpetrating fraud on the Courts and by fabricating documents. You may assume that EVERYTHING that Deutsche shows up with is a fraud, and has been fraudulently fabricated, typically in their offices on Liberty Street in Downtown Manhattan NY.

What is missing in your convoluted chain of title is that there was a ton of other parties involved in setting up that “Trust”, including some Delaware sham entity known as the “Depositor,” and then another sham known as the “Seller,” and more. When you burrow through that Prospectus you will find those entities listed. Now you have to dig out the Note, and find if those entities are individually and sequentially listed on the Note by consecutive Indorsements. Since Deutsche had their sticky fingers in the pie, you already know that they did not.

What State are you in? Yes, you need new counsel. You should never have gotten into this with old counsel.

You can still defeat them, but you probably will have to go file in District (Federal ) Court. You will have to sue Deutsche. Think in terms of suing them in the USDC for the Sou.Distr. NY, in White Plains, NY. Now you are not tangled up in the State-Fed politics of your local judges.

You cannot ask for Quiet title as you are asking for that in the State Court. You have to go in with entirely new grounds or they will not hear your case. So you sue them for fraud in interstate commerce. Try the “Commerce Clause” in the US Constitution (Amendment 16? I forget), to try to get “jurisdiction.” You get “venue” easily as Deutsche Bank is in NY. You do not need to show up; you just file and do your papers by mail. If yo ask for enough money, e.g. 40 million, then DB has something to start worrying about.

Right now, DB has no downside. If they lose, all they lose is some paper on some worthless piece of property in some state that is flooded with empty foreclosed houses that nobody can sell. So what do they care? DB probably does not even know or care that your lawsuit is going on; you are just dealing with lawyers that are running up their tab with DB, and DB has so many tabs that they do not try to keep track of it all. So you have to expose them to some serious hurt. A gigantic lawsuit is a good place to start.

You may assume that everything DB and those attys produce is utterly fraudulent. I have seen documents produced where the entire Trust Agreement was fabricated, and notarized by a notary who did not even get his first commission until two years after he swore that the parties were standing in front of him. Welcome to Wall Street banks – the international predator banks.

Besides Deutsche, Credit Suisse is also notorious for this type of flagrant fraud upon our Courts.

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