Deed | FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA

Tag Archive | "deed"

GA SUPREME COURT Rejects Bank’s Definition of “Duly Filed, Recorded, and Indexed” U.S. Bank v. GORDON

GA SUPREME COURT Rejects Bank’s Definition of “Duly Filed, Recorded, and Indexed” U.S. Bank v. GORDON


U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
v.
GORDON.

S10Q1564.
Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: March 25, 2011.

NAHMIAS, Justice.

The United States District Court for the North District of Georgia has certified a question to this Court regarding the 1995 Amendment to OCGA § 441-4-33. See Ga. L. 1995, p. 1076, § 1. The question is whether the 1995 Amendment

means that, in the absence of fraud, a security deed that is actually filed and recorded, and accurately indexed, on the appropriate county land records provides constructive notice to subsequent bona fide purchasers, where the security deed contains the grantor’s signature but lacks both an official and unofficial attestation (i.e., lacks attestation by a notary public and also an unofficial witness).

For the reasons that follow, we answer the certified question in the negative.

1. In October 2005, Bertha Hagler refinanced her residence through the predecessor-in-interest to U.S. Bank National Association (U.S. Bank) and granted the predecessor a first and a second security deed to her residence. The security deeds were recorded with the Clerk of the Fulton County Superior Court in November 2005, but the first security deed was not attested or acknowledged by an official or unofficial witness. According to the district court’s certification order:

Gordon, the Chapter 7 Trustee in Hagler’s bankruptcy case, sought to avoid or set aside the valid, but unattested, first security deed to the residence through the “strong-arm” power of Section 544 (a) (3) of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 544 (a) (3). Gordon argued that under the proper interpretation of § 44-14-33 of the Georgia Code, a security deed that is not attested by an official and unofficial witness cannot provide constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser even if it is recorded. U.S. Bank argued, in opposition, that a 1995 amendment to § 44-14-33 changed the law to enable an unattested security deed to provide constructive notice. Gordon argued in response that the 1995 amendment served only to recognize constructive notice from a security deed with a “latently” defective attestation, meaning an irregular attestation that appears regular on its face; a deed with a “patently” defective attestation, meaning an attestation that is obviously defective on its face, would not provide constructive notice.

The bankruptcy court ruled in Gordon’s favor, concluding that, under the 1995 Amendment, a security deed with a facially defective attestation would not provide constructive notice, while a security deed with a facially proper but latently defective attestation would provide constructive notice. See Gordon v. U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. (In re Hagler), 429 BR 42, 47-53 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2009). Concluding that the issue involved an unclear question of Georgia law and that no Georgia court had addressed the issue after the 1995 Amendment, the district court certified the question to this Court. We conclude that the bankruptcy court properly resolved the issue.

2. OCGA § 44-14-61 provides that “[i]n order to admit deeds to secure debt . . . to record, they shall be attested or proved in the manner prescribed by law for mortgages.” OCGA § 44-14-33 provides the law for attesting mortgages:

In order to admit a mortgage to record, it must be attested by or acknowledged before an officer as prescribed for the attestation or acknowledgment of deeds of bargain and sale; and, in the case of real property, a mortgage must also be attested or acknowledged by one additional witness. In the absence of fraud, if a mortgage is duly filed, recorded, and indexed on the appropriate county land records, such recordation shall be deemed constructive notice to subsequent bona fide purchasers.

The second sentence of this Code section was added by the 1995 Amendment.

3. We first address Gordon’s contention that the 1995 Amendment does not apply at all to security deeds. He contends that only the first sentence of § 44-14-33, which expressly deals with attestation, is applicable to security deeds through § 44-14-61 and that, because the 1995 Amendment addresses constructive notice, it does not apply to security deeds. We disagree. The General Assembly chose to enact the 1995 Amendment not as a freestanding Code provision but as an addition to a Code provision clearly referenced by § 44-14-61. Moreover, “[t]he objects of a mortgage and security deed . . . under the provisions of the Code are identical — security for a debt. While recognizing the technical difference between a mortgage and security deed hereinbefore pointed out, this court has treated deeds to secure debts . . . as equitable mortgages.” Merchants & Mechanics’ Bank v. Beard, 162 Ga. 446, 449 (134 SE 107)Fair v. State, 288 Ga. 244, 252 (702 SE2d 420) (2010), so the placement of the amendment makes complete sense. Indeed, no reason has been suggested why the General Assembly would want the same type of recording to provide constructive notice for mortgages but not for security deeds. Accordingly, we conclude that the 1995 Amendment is applicable to security deeds. (1926). The General Assembly is presumed to have been aware of the existing state of the law when it enacted the 1995 Amendment, see

4. Turning back to the certified question, we note that the “recordation” that is deemed to provide constructive notice to subsequent purchasers clearly refers back to “duly filed, recorded, and indexed” deeds. U.S. Bank argues that a “dulyin fact filed, recorded, and indexed, even if unattested by an officer or a witness. We disagree. filed, recorded, and indexed” deed is simply one that is

Particular words of statutes are not interpreted in isolation; instead, courts must construe a statute to give “`”sensible and intelligent effect” to all of its provisions,'” Footstar, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 281 Ga. 448, 450 (637 SE2d 692)State v. Bowen, 274 Ga. 1, 3 (547 SE2d 286) (2001). In particular, “statutes `in pari materia,’ i.e., statutes relating to the same subject matter, must be construed together.” Willis v. City of Atlanta, 285 Ga. 775, 776 (684 SE2d 271) (2009). (2006) (citation omitted), and “must consider the statute in relation to other statutes of which it is part.”

Construing the 1995 Amendment in harmony with other recording statutes and longstanding case law, we must reject U.S. Bank’s definition of “duly filed, recorded, and indexed.” Its definition ignores the first sentence of § 44-14-33, which provides that to admit a security deed to record, the deed must be attested by or acknowledged before an officer, such as a notary public, and, in the case of real property, by a second witness. See OCGA § 44-2-15 (listing the “officers” who are authorized to attest a mortgage or deed). Other statutes governing deeds and mortgages similarly preclude recording and constructive notice if certain requirements are not satisfied. See OCGA § 44-2-14 (“Before any deed to realty or personalty or any mortgage, bond for title, or other recordable instrument executed in this state may be recorded, it must be attested or acknowledged as provided by law.”); OCGA § 44-14-61 (“In order to admit deeds to secure debt or bills of sale to record, they shall be attested or proved in the manner prescribed by law for mortgages”). Indeed, U.S. Banks’ construction of the 1995 Amendment contradicts OCGA § 44-14-39, which provides that “[a] mortgage which is recorded . . . without due attestation . . . shall not be held to be notice to subsequent bona fide purchasers.”

Thus, the first sentence of § 44-14-33 and the statutory recording scheme indicate that the word “duly” in the second sentence of § 44-14-33 should be understood to mean that a security deed is “duly filed, recorded, and indexed” only if the clerk responsible for recording determines, from the face of the document, that it is in the proper form for recording, meaning that it is attested or acknowledged by a proper officer and (in the case of real property) an additional witness. This construction of the 1995 Amendment is also consistent with this Court’s longstanding case law, which holds that a security deed which appears on its face to be properly attested should be admitted to record, see Thomas v. Hudson, 190 Ga. 622, 626 (10 SE2d 396) (1940); Glover v. Cox, 137 Ga. 684, 691-694 (73 SE 1068) (1912), but that a deed that shows on its face that it was “not properly attested or acknowledged, as required by statute, is ineligible for recording.” Higdon v. Gates, 238 Ga. 105, 107 (231 SE2d 345) (1976).

We note that at the time the 1995 Amendment was considered and enacted, the appellate courts of this State had “never squarely considered” whether a security deed with a facially valid attestation could provide constructive notice where the attestation contained a latent defect, like the officer or witness not observing the grantor signing the deed. Leeds Bldg. Prods. v. Sears Mortg. Corp., 267 Ga. 300, 301 (477 SE2d 565) (1996). The timing of the amendment suggests that the General Assembly was attempting to fill this gap in our law as the Leeds litigation worked its way through the trial court and the Court of Appeals before our decision in 1996. See Gordon, 429 BR at 50. We ultimately decided in Leeds that, “in the absence of fraud, a deed which, on its face, complies with all statutory requirements is entitled to be recorded, and once accepted and filed with the clerk of court for record, provides constructive notice to the world of its existence.” 267 Ga. at 302. We noted that Higdon remained good law, because in that case the deed was facially invalid, did “not entitle [the deed] to record,” and “did not constitute constructive notice to subsequent purchasers.” Leeds, 267 Ga. at 302. Because we reached the same result as under the 1995 Amendment, we did not have to consider whether the amendment should be applied retroactively to that case. See id. at 300 n.1.

Our interpretation of the 1995 Amendment also is supported by commentators that have considered the issue. See Frank S. Alexander, Georgia Real Estate Finance and Foreclosure Law, § 8-10, p. 138 (4th ed. 2004) (stating that “[a] security deed that is defective as to attestation, but without facial defects, provides constructive notice to subsequent bona fide purchasers”); Daniel F. Hinkel, 2 Pindar’s Georgia Real Estate Law and Procedure, § 20-18 (6th ed. 2011) (without mentioning deeds with facial defects, explaining that the 1995 Amendment to § 44-14-33 and Leeds “provide that in the absence of fraud a deed or mortgage, which on its face does not reveal any defect in the acknowledgment of the instrument and complies with all statutory requirements, is entitled to be recorded, and once accepted and filed with the clerk of the superior court for record, provides constructive notice to subsequent bona fide purchasers”); T. Daniel Brannan & William J. Sheppard, Real Estate, 49 Mercer L. Rev. 257, 263 (Fall 1997) (without mentioning deeds with facial defects, stating that the 1995 Amendment to § 44-14-33 resolves “the issue that was before the court in [Leeds]”). As noted by the bankruptcy court, if Hinkel and the law review authors thought that the 1995 Amendment altered longstanding law with regard to deeds containing facial defects as to attestation, they surely would have said so. See Gordon, 429 BR at 52-53.

Finally, it should be recognized that U.S. Bank’s interpretation of the 1995 Amendment to § 44-14-33 “would relieve lenders of any obligation to present properly attested security deeds” and “would tell clerks that the directive to admit only attested deeds is merely a suggestion, not a duty,” and this would risk an increase in fraud because deeds no longer would require an attestation by a public officer who is sworn to verify certain information on the deeds before they are recorded and deemed to put all subsequent purchasers on notice. Gordon, 429 BR at 51-52. Moreover, while “it costs nothing and requires no special expertise or effort for a closing attorney, or a lender, or a title insurance company to examine the signature page of a deed for missing signatures before it is filed,” U.S. Bank’s construction would “shift to the subsequent bona fide purchaser and everyone else the burden of determining [possibly decades after the fact] the genuineness of the grantor’s signature and therefore the cost of investigating and perhaps litigating whether or not an unattested deed was in fact signed by the grantor.” Id. at 52.

For these reasons, we answer the certified question in the negative.

Certified question answered. All the Justices concur.

[ipaper docId=51955339 access_key=key-79uy6ey0yzi4364au79 height=600 width=600 /]
© 2010-15 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (0)

GA Supreme Court Affirms | Quiet Title, Forged Deeds Cannot Vest Title AURORA LOAN SERVICES, LLC v. Veatch

GA Supreme Court Affirms | Quiet Title, Forged Deeds Cannot Vest Title AURORA LOAN SERVICES, LLC v. Veatch


“[A] forged deed is a nullity and vests no title in a grantee. [Cit.] As such, even a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of a forgery cannot acquire good title from a grantee in a forged deed, or those holding under such a grantee, because the grantee has no title to convey.” Brock v. Yale Mortgage Co

AURORA LOAN SERVICES, LLC
v.
JOHN MACELRAY VEATCH, ADMR., et al.

S10A1725.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: March 18, 2011.

HINES, Justice.

In this quiet title action, the trial court entered a final order ruling that fee simple title to the subject property was vested in John Macrelay Veatch (“Veatch”), as personal representative of the estate of Raymond Wesley Veatch, Jr., unencumbered by the security deed held by Aurora Loan Services, LLC (“Aurora”), and striking various deeds from the deed records of Fulton County. Aurora appeals, and for the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Elsie Veatch owned the subject property until her death in 1974; her sole heir was Raymond Wesley Veatch, Jr., Veatch’s father, who died on March 20, 2006. After his death, two forged deeds were recorded in the Fulton County deed records, purporting to convey title to the property to Antonio Simpson. One forged deed was styled “Quitclaim Deed,” purportedly executed on May 19, 2006 by Elsie Veatch, who had then been dead for 32 years; this purported deed was recorded on October 17, 2006. The other purported deed was styled “Executors Deed,” and was purportedly executed by Raymond Wesley Veatch, Jr., on March 15, 2006, a date on which he lay in a coma; it was recorded on November 6, 2006. After these forged deeds were executed and recorded, a warranty deed purportedly from Antonio Simpson to Darryl Matthews was recorded on November 8, 2006. Matthews then executed a security deed in favor of First Magnus Financial Corporation in connection with a loan for $187,500. The security deed was eventually assigned to Aurora.

On September 5, 2007, after Veatch discovered activity on the property and applied for, and was granted, letters of administration of the estate of Raymond Wesley Veatch, Jr., he filed in the Fulton County land records an affidavit stating that the Executor’s and Quitclaim deeds were false. He then filed in the superior court the present petition to quiet title. OCGA § 23-3-40 et seq. The trial court appointed a Special Master who concluded that Aurora was a bona fide purchaser for value. See Roop Grocery Co. v. Gentry, 195 Ga. 736, 745 (1) (25 SE2d 705) (1943). However, the trial court disagreed, finding that there was record notice that the forged deeds were fraudulent, and that in any event, a forged deed is a nullity and cannot convey title.

The trial court is correct. Aurora’s interest in the property is dependent upon the forged deeds made to Antonio Simpson. As the trial court noted, such a deed cannot convey title. “[A] forged deed is a nullity and vests no title in a grantee. [Cit.] As such, even a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of a forgery cannot acquire good title from a grantee in a forged deed, or those holding under such a grantee, because the grantee has no title to convey.” Brock v. Yale Mortgage Co., 287 Ga. 849, 852 (2) (700 SE2d 583) (2010). In that opinion, this Court specifically overruled prior precedent of this Court that extended “the bona fide purchaser for value doctrine to those acquiring title under a grantee in a forged deed.” Id. at 853 (2). Accordingly, it is of no moment whether the deed records provided notice of the forgeries at the time Matthews executed the security deed on which Aurora bases its claim; there was simply no title held by Simpson, Matthews, First Magnus Financial Corporation, or any subsequent assignee. Id. Accord, Second Refuge Church &c. v. Lollar, 282 Ga. 721, 726-727 (3) (550 SE2d 128) (2007). The trial court did not err in declaring title to be vested in Veatch, as personal representative of the estate of Raymond Wesley Veatch, Jr., unencumbered by the security deed held by Aurora.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

[ipaper docId=51435183 access_key=key-1qe6bmg5azqeuq6vh099 height=600 width=600 /]
© 2010-15 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (0)

FULL DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF “SHELLIE HILL” OF LERNER, SAMPSON & ROTHFUSS LS&R

FULL DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF “SHELLIE HILL” OF LERNER, SAMPSON & ROTHFUSS LS&R


THE BANK OF NEW YORK, etc.,
Plaintiff, :

vs.

JAMES M. UNGER, et al.,
Defendants

Deposition of Shellie Hill Vol. I by DinSFLA

© 2010-15 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (2)

Promissory Notes | How Negotiability Has Fouled Up the Secondary Mortgage Market, and What to Do About It

Promissory Notes | How Negotiability Has Fouled Up the Secondary Mortgage Market, and What to Do About It


A MUST READ!

via: 83jjmack

Copyright (c) 2010 Pepperdine University School of Law
Pepperdine Law Review

Author: Dale A. Whitman*

The premise of this paper is that the concept of negotiability of promissory notes, which derives in modern law from Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, is not only useless but positively detrimental to the operation of the modern secondary mortgage market. Therefore, the concept ought to be eliminated from the law of mortgage notes.

This is not a new idea. More than a decade ago, Professor Ronald Mann made the point that negotiability is largely irrelevant in every field of consumer and commercial payment systems, including mortgages. 1 But Mann’s article made no specific recommendations for change, and no change has occurred.

I propose here to examine the ways in which negotiability and the holder in due course doctrine of Article 3 actually impair the trading of mortgages. Doing so, I conclude that these legal principles have no practical value to the parties in the mortgage system, but that they impose significant and unnecessary costs on those parties. I conclude with a recommendation for a simple change in Article 3 that would do away with the negotiability of mortgage notes.

I. The Secondary Mortgage Market

In this era, it is a relatively rare mortgage that is held in portfolio for its full term by the originating lender. Instead, the vast majority of mortgages are either traded on the secondary market to an investor who will hold them, 2 or to an issuer (commonly an investment banker) who will securitize them. Securitization …

[ipaper docId=32796250 access_key=key-n62ohszj7y8skrfnvs2 height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-15 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, note, originator, securitization, servicersComments (1)

Screw the Note, SHOW ME THE LOAN!

Screw the Note, SHOW ME THE LOAN!


SHOW ME THE LOAN

A legal doctrine developed by: John Chester; of the family Stuart

The government did not want to end prohibition. It was great for the politicians. Over a period of time, over 70,000 lawsuits were filed against prohibition. The government could not fight them anymore and got rid of prohibition.

The new concepts are based on these concepts of law which fall under contract law. Specific performance in real estate: You go to buy a house, they screw up and you don’t get the house. Under specific performance you can refuse to take another house or your money returned – you want that house. You have to go into a replevin concept where they give you some reasonable value. Those are fights that you have in contract law, which is what we want to use.

The nice aspect of it is that we have come along this far to the documentation and everything we are going to be claiming here, they have already confessed to by fighting us. Now they cannot change their minds. A lot of what kind of blackballed me from the guru aspect of this was the fact that I was right. But, they don’t need to be right. They just need to make money. A lot of it was based on the concept, in law, that most people do not really understand. It is the difference between a covenant and a contract.

There is a difference between a contract and a covenant. If you read the law and the legal definitions, they are substantially different. If you remember when you were in school, you said the Pledge of Allegiance. “I pledge allegiance to the flag of the united States of America.” Exactly what was that flag giving in return? Nothing. That is a pledge. “I pledge allegiance.” A pledge is a covenant. It’s unilateral.

When you do a covenant:
Go through your Deed of Trust, your Mortgage, etc., they use the word “covenant.” They do not use the word “contract.” There is a reason for it. They are never going to give you anything. You already have everything. It is legalese for, “I’m going to shaft you really bad and you’re going to thank me later.” You have to understand the difference between a contract and a covenant. The laws are so applicable that you enter into it believing it was a contract.

Here is the issue: We go through this whole thing, and the whole time the banks are yelling and screaming that, “We never separated the Note and the Deed of Trust.” Are they telling the truth or are they lying? They are telling the truth because those two documents were never together. That is where they have you. They were never intended to be together. They can never be together in law. The Deed of Trust got recorded and the Note went to the lender.

We have all kinds of evidence of that. The first thing they do with the Note is they give it over to someone to cash it. The first thing they do with the Deed of Trust is they run it over to the County Recorder’s Office. Did they separate them which would invalidate everything, or were they never together? They were never together to begin with. They never lied about that. They tricked us.

The Deed of Trust (Mortgage) – that contractual agreement which is truly a covenant says, “This Deed of Trust is evidenced by the Note.” There is no note. That is all a separate deal. What is the Deed of Trust evidenced by? Nothing. It does not exist in law. It is a mortgage. It is dead. You eventually bring it back to life because you send them a check or cash or money order every month. In law, if you make someone an offer, and behind that offer is written ‘in valuable consideration’ (in this instance, it would be cash) and they accept that cash, then we have brought that deal back to life.

The mortgage was dead. There were two deals. You sold them a Promissory Note, i.e., you are buying a house for $500,000. You give them a Promissory Note, they give you the $500,000 or they give it to the home builder and now you have the house. That is a fair and even exchange, lawful and legal. You are done.

Now, for some reason, you wanted to borrow $500,000 from them. That is a separate deal. This deal (Promissory Note) is done, now you want to do this other deal. If you pay them, when did you get the $500,000? There is a bit of an issue there. Here is what happened in law and in reality, and here is what the law has to say about this… Example/concept: Now that we are here and now that the banks say, “It is our note.” Okay, it is your note. You bought it fair and square.

If I sell you my car, can I come back yelling at you saying, “You can’t take the doors off it, you can’t paint it pink, you can’t do anything.” Do I have a legal right to say that? No. They can do whatever they want. They don’t even need to bring it to court.

When you sold them the Note, what did they do with it? They stamped the note: “Paid to the Order of __________ (put a third party name on it) without recourse.” According to the Federal Reserve, what is that Note now? It’s a check. Did they cash the check? It is a bearer instrument payable to the holder. Do we have a name for that? Check. It’s a bearer’s instrument. It’s a check. What is a check? A check is a bearer’s instrument. If I have a check given from you by you to me, am I the bearer of that? Yes. They cashed the check.

Do you understand what happened here? If I sell you this book for $1.00 and you go away with this book, is that all right? Yes. What does this other book have to do with that deal? Nothing. It is a separate book. We now want to make a deal over this book. How do we know this for certain?

We have to start talking about the Mortgage. You sold them the check (Note), that deal is done. Now we have to talk about the other deal. What is happening is, everyone is saying, “Show me the note.” We should be saying, “Show me the Loan.” Because you sold them your check for $500,000. You got the $500,000. That Note is completed and perfected. It’s done.

Now we are over here talking about a Mortgage – a Deed of Trust – a loan – a contract that is really a covenant where you are borrowing $500,000. You are paying them every month. When did they loan you the $500,000? They never did. Who, by law, is in default? They are. Who is responsible to inform the Court when the other party is in default? You are. If you don’t inform the Court the other party is in default, what must the Court therefore presume? They are not in default. The Court and law are very clear on these aspects. It is not the Court’s job to come and do your job for you. The Court does not know who is in default. The bank says you are in default through the non-judicial process. You don’t argue it – that’s it. In Connolly v. General Accounting and numerous other cases: acquiescence is agreement. If you don’t say anything, you are in agreement.

Credit card companies operate on this concept. They send you a note or a letter stating you owe us this much money, and you don’t respond. By the time you respond, you are already being garnished. Do you understand why? Because you never argued. Affidavits stand in law if un-rebutted. If somebody says something and you don’t rebut it, you are in agreement with it. That is not in all cases.

For instance, in this case of the last couple of weeks. I don’t deal with the plaintiff who was not at all prepared to get on trial. She gets up on the stand and says that the bank says, “Well, didn’t we loan you the money?” And, she said, “Well, yes.”

Part of learning how to do this is going to be very direct and honest. There are all kinds of maxims of law and court rulings where, if you don’t have clean hands, then they have an argument. If one side of the hands are dirty, then there is your claim. You just win by default.

They asked her a simple question: “Did you get a loan from the bank?” It was over with for her. She said “yes.”

She never got a loan from the bank. Not only is she a liar, but she destroyed her own case. If she had said, “I never got a loan from the bank. I sold them the Promissory Note, they gave me the money, I bought the house with the money and I paid them for the loan, but they never gave me loan.” That would have been it. There is one sum certain, one lump of money (in this case, $500,000). Where did it go? It’s only one lump sum. You sold them the Promissory Note.

This is about winning. It is about doing the right thing. It is very simple. You sold them the Promissory Note, they gave you the cash, you went over and bought the house. Do you all understand that? I don’t care about the Note.

There is a thing in law called res judicata. Those that are attorneys or paralegals understand res judicata. Once it’s done, once it has been decided, it is over with. Res judicata means, “Shut the hell up. Don’t bring it in my Court.”

I can give you a million arguments on this. Do you know which one of them matters? The one that proves whether or not this happened. Nothing else happened. Everything in the documents, the banks have confessed this happened. They cannot argue about this any more. They have already tried to bitch-slap us in thirty different ways to say, “This is over with.” Ok. You bought the Note. This is done.

Now we must discuss this. Did you make your payments for an extended period of time? Shannon and I have a deal. Shannon, I need to borrow $1,000. Shannon agrees and says, “I’ll tell you what. I have plenty of money. You send me $10 a week for the next two years; that’s $1,040. I will lend you the $1,000 now and I will make $40 in the two years after. I am way under the usury laws, etc.” We are both happy. How many $10 payments do I have to make before I say, give me my $1,000? None. If I made a few payments, what number of payments that I have made can I come back and take him into court if he does not give me that $1,000? One-third. That’s it. He is in total default. If I made three payments and he does not give me the money, who is in default? He is.

How many people understand there are two difference cases here? They confessed they bought the Note. This is all done. So we only have the Deed of Trust argument. On their side of the Deed of Trust it says says: “This Deed of Trust is evidenced by the Note.” What Note? It’s sold. It’s gone. So what is the Deed of Trust evidenced by? Nothing. They have no evidence. So what did you do? You paid them. Even though the Mortgage/Deed of Trust has negotiations, that deal is dead. When you pay them, under the law of acceptance (equity chancery law), when this is on the table and no one has actually picked it up. If you go ahead and you start sending them the payment, did you pick it up and hand it to them by giving them payment? In law, if they accepted by payment, what did they also accept? The check. So what must they also do? They have to give you that $500,000 loan. There is only one $500,000 lump sum.

When you look at this deal, you see what is called a “specific performance.” You had a job to do. Did the bank have a job to do? What was your job to do? Make the monthly payments. What was the bank’s job to do? Loan you. Did you specifically perform your duties in pursuance of this convenant/contract?

You performed your job. You sent them a check. They cashed it.

This whole thing is a scam. How can you tell if a bank or a lawyer or a politician is lying? There are two rabbit holes. Everyone is going down the wrong rabbit hole. You are not going to find any rabbits down there. You are going to find snakes and worms, etc. Here is the rabbit. That is what you need to argue. That is what it is all about. Inside of there is the right to take your house. In the covenant, they have all kinds of rights. You don’t have any rights. Fraud in the factum; fraud in the inducement. When you believe it is a contract because you do not understand legalese, but it was a covenant, so they really are not tied in to be punished if they fail. Isn’t that the reason they probably made it a covenant and not contract? It’s all there. They did not lie to you, verbally. They did not make a misstatement and they had a liable mission so you can use that against them.

Militia/patriot groups sprung up. The most famous being the Posse Comitatus. Posse Comitatus was an Act by Congress after the Civil War. It states the United States will never use the military against its own people. That was the United States, not the corporate entity of the United States of America. We all remember Waco. That whole Act has some issues. When the Posse Comitatus sprung up, they used the legal doctrine of filing documents which we call liens. What these different groups did was they put liens on sheriffs and judges and government employees creating a nightmare. The way the government attacked these groups through the law was under certain aspects of the law that says when you record something and it is not correct, that is a crime. They had a lot of recordings to deprive people of their property so that it fell into terrorism. They did it in mass quantities to deprive whole areas of their land.

This is important. If you look up Arizona Revised Statutes §13-2301 and read it through (D)(4)(b)45, it defines filing false documents to deprive people of their lands as terrorism. It is terrorism for a group of people to get together and file false, fraudulent or forged documents in a public office. It is defined in Arizona law as one type of criminal act: terrorism.

Under terrorist laws, they do not have to prove you are a terrorist. The onus probandi is extrapolated from the Patriot Act to all acts of terrorism. The terrorists must disprove they were a terrorist. When you get charged as a terrorist and there is any evidence therein, you have to dispute it. There are all kinds of people in Guantanamo Bay who don’t have anything to do with anything, but they had some kind of association somewhere where they got charged as terrorists. They are there waiting to dispute that they are terrorists.

The law states that if you record documents that are fraudulent, forged or false, to deprive people of property, you are a terrorist. How many people have looked at the documents that the banks have filed and recorded? How many people have found one that is not false, fraudulent or forged? It goes a prima facie evidence.

The nuclear option
There is no way, under Arizona or U.S. law, that a CEO of any bank in this country can disprove that he is not a terrorist. They cannot. The law defines every CEO of every bank in this country as a terrorist. There are judicial notices of case law in support of this. That will get posted. Read it. It shows this. The banks did this about a thousand times every day.

It is ground in legal fact. We’ve got the recorded documents and I have the laws. They cannot state they accidentally recorded it. Accident a thousand times a day throughout the country?

For all of these people, it is imprisonment for life. If you read the Posse Comitatus, the banks are following their playbook. The only difference in the laws between the bankers and the so-called terrorists that are doing life imprisonment in recording this stuff is they wore camping t-shirts and the bankers are in Armani suits. You talk about whether or not you can prove this or whether or not it is factual: they have already admitted to it. They gave us all the evidence we need. It really is this simple. They have done everything we need to do to jump over to the nuclear option and go against them. They have already said they own the note, they have already recorded the documents – all those documents are fraudulent.

The documents that they record that lead to the criminal acts that Arizona law defines as terrorism are: a substitution of trustee. In other words, this person gets to steal that property because we have a financial interest, etc. That is what the bank does. The other one is an assignment of rights where that leads to who has the rights to do what. They are going to record those documents. Some of them now they are stamping that they are recorded and not recording them. The crime happens when you record. Either way, they are still claiming it and using it to steal your property.

In criminal law, after the prosecution rests, you claim Rule 20, that they have not proved their prima facie case. They may have proved a lot of things, but they did not prove you did the act. That case gets dismissed, with prejudice.

In civil law you do not get it dismissed, but you get summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff or the defendant. That, basically, is reliant on the same concepts of the prima facie case. Then someone proves, prima facially, a certain concept. When we say, “Here is the law that says you are a terrorist and it states that if you do this, you are a terrorist.” And we put all the other with it; that is a prima facie evidence. They are a terrorist. How many times do you think we have done a prima facie case? Under the law, you only have to do it once. We have about a dozen cases.

That is the nuclear option.

There is a little confusion that I am going to clear up.

When the banks bought your Promissory Note, they did not actually give you money. When the banks bought your Promissory Note from you, they stamped it, “paid to the order of (the third party name) without recourse” and turned it into a check. They took that check and cashed it. They bought the house and you got the house. It is just the same as if you got the money. Here is the fraud: they bought everything in their name. You sold them the Promissory Note, yes, they paid you. They paid the builders, the builder gave you the house. The thing is, they bought everything in their name. That is illegal. That is a criminal act in and of itself.

If they upheld the law and did things not as a criminal enterprise – you sold them the Promissory Note, they took the money, they paid for the builder in your name, you were given the house in your name – this would not have generated the fraud. They were not supposed to purchase anything with that money using their name. They got the Promissory Note. They should have just given you the money, but they did all these little tricks to confuse everyone. They did everything in their name to make it look like they were doing the purchase, but they were using your money. They were really just an agent for you.

The money that they were supposed to give you, instead of giving it to you, they took that money and bought your old lien or bought your house with the money. It is spelled out in the handout.

Under the adjustable rate note, “In return for the loan that I have received, I promise to pay… ” Now we are playing a game of legalese: “In return for a loan that I received” is past tense, not current tense. We are talking about something that is extraneous. Whether it did or did not happen is not intrinsic to our argument.

They are playing these games and you are falling for it. You are making assumptions that you have got to get away from. What if you never had a loan before? Then that is just a fraudulent statement. What if you had a loan before? That would be what they are talking about. No where do they really claim that they were. You just read it, took it for granted, because you were doing this all at the same time. The whole thing is: where is the loan? Everyone is screaming, “Where is the Note?”, show me the loan. The loan I had received was in past tense, why are we bringing that up? That is intrinsic to the argument, but it is not substantial when we get into the case. It will be brought up. It is just evidence in the process.

Image Credit: Jerry Maguire

© 2010-15 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in conspiracy, CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, deed of trust, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosures, mortgage, note, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (3)


GARY DUBIN LAW OFFICES FORECLOSURE DEFENSE HAWAII and CALIFORNIA
Chip Parker, www.jaxlawcenter.com
Kenneth Eric Trent, www.ForeclosureDestroyer.com
Advertise your business on StopForeclosureFraud.com

Archives