Compensation | FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA

Tag Archive | "compensation"

A New Theory of the Role of the GSEs in the Housing Bubble – Adam Levitin

A New Theory of the Role of the GSEs in the Housing Bubble – Adam Levitin


What we do know for certain is… there was massive fraud and massive cover-ups from the inception.

Credit Slips-

Bill Black has an interesting new take on the role of Fannie and Freddie in the housing bubble. He sees their investment in non-prime mortgages as being driven by executive compensation, rather than a fight for market share against investment bank securitization conduits or govt affordable housing policy. The government affordable housing policy point has been repeatedly debunked (and Susan Wachter and I have a new paper that adds to this debunking via an examination of the commercial real estate bubble, where there was no government involvement whatsoever). Black is not, however, able to disprove the market share theory. What he does point to is that the GSE’s involvement with nonprime mortgages was as whole loans kept in portfolio, rather than securitized (and also via purchases of MBS), which he says was a move to increase the short-term yield for the GSEs and thus maximize short-term executive compensation.

[CREDIT SLIPS]

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Fannie, Freddie Execs Face Questions on Bonuses, Expenses

Fannie, Freddie Execs Face Questions on Bonuses, Expenses


Even though Fannie and Freddie rely on taxpayers, they act no different than those at Wall Street and are full of fraud.

If you lay down next to dirty dogs, you’ll eventually get their fleas. Double dip in 3, 2, 1…

Let’s not kid ourselves, wall street really controls them.

Bloomberg-

The U.S. Senate Banking Committee will hold a hearing on bonuses paid to executives of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as congressional lawmakers increase scrutiny of the two government-controlled companies.

In the House, Republican Randy Neugebauer of Texas has demanded information on the companies’ spending, including almost $842 million in Fannie Mae salaries and benefits budgeted for 2011.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac continue to suffer losses three years after being taken under government conservatorship. Today, Freddie Mac reported a $4.4 billion, third-quarter loss and said it will seek $6 billion from the U.S. Treasury Department to eliminate a net-worth deficit. Combined, the two companies have required about $145 billion in taxpayer aid since 2008.

[BLOOMBERG]

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IN RE: EXEC. COMPENSATION INVESTIGATION BANK OF AMERICA -MERRILL LYNCH DEPOSITION OF KEN L. LEWIS

IN RE: EXEC. COMPENSATION INVESTIGATION BANK OF AMERICA -MERRILL LYNCH DEPOSITION OF KEN L. LEWIS


EXCERPTS:

Q. At the point in time of this board
meeting, though, you were relating to the board
that you felt you had a commitment from the Fed and
the Treasury to make good on whatever harm is
caused by the increased losses at Merrill Lynch; is
that right?

A. I had verbal commitments from Ben
Bernanke and Hank Paulson that they were going to
see this through, to fill that hole, and have the
market perceive this as a good deal.

MR. CORNGOLD: Isn’t the only way to
fill that hole, though, to give you money,
not to give you money that you would have to
pay back at some interest rate with some
potential equity interest, too?

THE WITNESS: No. I think you have to
separate the fact that, yes, there is still
some short-term paying -it’s more
short-term paying now than we would have had
had all this not happened, but longer term we
still see a strategic benefit. So we saw it
as a short term versus a long term impact on
the company.

MR. CORNGOLD; When you entered into the
initial contract with Merrill Lynch did you
get a fairness opinion about the transaction?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

MR. CORNGOLD: From whom?

THE WITNESS; Chris Flowers something.

MR. CORNGOLD: And did you get a
fairness opinion from anyone about the
transaction that you entered into with the federal government and the Fed?

THE WITNESS: No. MR. CORNGOLD: Did you consider whether you had a legal obligation to do that? THE WITNESS: I would rely on the advice of the general counsel for that.

MR. CORNGOLD: But when you say that, does that mean that you asked and got advice, or that you didn’t ask but relied
THE WITNESS: I would rely on somebody bringing that question forth, and nobody did.

Q. Did you ask anyone to look into whether the oral, verbal commitments from the Fed and Treasury were enforceable?

A. No. I was going on the word of two very respected individuals high up in the American government.

Q. Wasn’t Mr. Paulson, by his instruction, really asking Bank of America shareholders to take a good part of the hit of the Merrill losses?

A. What he was doing was trying to stem a financial disaster in the financial markets, from his perspective.

Q. From your perspective, wasn’t that one
of the effects of what he was doing?

A. Over the short term, yes, but we still
thought we had an entity that filled two big
strategic holes for us and over long term would
still be an interest to the shareholders.

Q. What do you mean by “short term”?

A. Two to three years.

Q. So isn’t that something that any
shareholder at Bank of America who had less
than a three-year time horizon would want
to know?

A. The situation was that everyone felt
like the deal needed to be completed and to be able
to say that, or that they would impose a big risk
to the financial system if it would not.

MR. LAWSKY: When you say “everyone,”
what do you mean?

THE WITNESS: The people that I was
talking to, Bernanke and Paulson.

MR. LAWSKY: Had it been up to you would
you made the disclosure?

THE WITNESS: It wasn’t up to me.

MR. LAWSKY: Had it been up to you.

THE WITNESS: It wasn’t.

MR. CORNGOLD: Why do you say it wasn’t
up to you? Were you instructed not to tell
your shareholders what the transaction was
going to be?

THE WITNESS: I was instructed that “We
do not want a public disclosure.”

MR. CORNGOLD: Who said that to you?

THE WITNESS: Paulson.

MR. CORNGOLD: When did he say that to
you?

THE WITNESS; Sometime after I asked Ben
Bernanke for something in writing.

Q. When did that occur?

A. Which one?

Q. When did Mr. Paulson state that he did
not want a public disclosure?

A. It was sometime late in the year. I
think it’s actually in the minutes.

MR. LIMAN: If you have the next set of
minutes it might help the witness.

Q. What’s your best recollection of what

Mr. Paulson said to you on that point?

A. That was the conversation that I
mentioned that I went to Bernanke to ask the
question, and he didn’t call me back but Hank did.
The request was for a letter stating what they
would do, and he had those two elements in there.
But the thing that we’re talking about is that he
said “We do not want a public disclosure.”

Q. A public disclosure of what?

A. Of what they were going to be doing for us until it was completed.

[…]

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© 2010-15 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



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Review of Foreclosure Fraud Is Set

Review of Foreclosure Fraud Is Set


Sorry to interrupt. But here it goes because “WE” have trust issues.

Exactly what qualifications do these “third-party companies” have? What if the servicer is not one of the 14? What will happen to deficiency judgements, in case they try to come after you? Because as I picture it, those of you who “may” get pocket change thrown at you might get hit with a DJ before the change lands in your hands. Then here goes the beauty of this article

“It hasn’t been determined whether borrowers that accept restitution would have to agree to surrender related legal claims.”

Think about this one and what it all means. It’s the same type of garbage they were trying to throw at NY AG Schneiderman.

But it don’t matter because they’re moving “full-steam ahead” with a settlement with or without participating AG’s.

WSJ-

Millions of current and former homeowners will have a chance to get their foreclosure cases examined to determine whether they should be compensated for banks’ mistakes, under a wide-ranging review being planned by federal regulators.

The review process, which could be unveiled in the next few weeks, will be open to borrowers who were in some stage of foreclosure in 2009 or 2010. Estimates prepared by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, which will oversee the review, indicate that 4.5 million borrowers could be eligible for review.

[WALL STREET JOURNAL]

© 2010-15 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



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FHFA Seeks Comments: Alternative Mortgage Servicing Compensation Discussion Paper

FHFA Seeks Comments: Alternative Mortgage Servicing Compensation Discussion Paper


How can the FHFA change the fee structure for mortgage servicers before the industry knows what it’s being paid to do?

If you’re suing them why are you discussing rewarding bad service?

 

Servicing Compensation Initiative
pursuant to FHFA Directive

 

.

Alternative Mortgage Servicing Compensation
Discussion Paper

September 27, 2011

[ipaper docId=66757085 access_key=key-cfycb67010nleyi1rye height=600 width=600 /]

 

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Open Letter To FDIC Chair Sheila Bair From Lynn E. Szymoniak, Esq.

Open Letter To FDIC Chair Sheila Bair From Lynn E. Szymoniak, Esq.


April 16, 2011

Sheila C. Bair, Chairwoman, FDIC
550 17th Street, NW, Room 6028
Washington, D.C. 20429

Re: Fixed-Rate, Low-Rate Mortgages As An Element of Compensation for Foreclosure Fraud

Dear Chairwoman Bair:

I write to you regarding fraud by banks in foreclosures. I previously wrote to you in January, 2010, regarding massive foreclosure fraud.

I am the woman who was featured on the 60 Minutes segment on April 3, 2011 on foreclosure fraud. That segment brought the wrath of Deutsche Bank and American Home Mortgage Servicing down upon me, but I have no regrets. You were also interviewed by Scott Pelley in this segment.

One proposal you recommend for holding the banks accountable for frauds and abuses in foreclosures is to create a fund to make reparations to victims. I support such a fund. An inquiry into whether the victims have been compensated is a traditional part of white collar criminal law. Such compensation is not made, of course, in place of criminal sanctions, but as an important part of such sanctions.

The fraud is so pervasive that twenty or thirty billion dollars will not begin to compensate the victims, and the banks certainly know this, even as they are setting aside as little as one to two billion for such relief.

I am writing to suggest to you that real compensation will include the opportunity for victims to have another mortgage.

Many victims of foreclosure fraud have been left with ruined finances, no credit and deficiency judgments. A one-time cash payout will not repair this damage.

The banks need to be required to offer victims of foreclosure fraud fixed rate, low-rate (3% – 4%) traditional 30-year mortgages, with a 5% down payment.

Such relief should be offered in every case where the lenders have filed forged and fabricated documents in official county records and court cases.

This relief should also be offered wherever a mortgage payment was incorrectly “adjusted” by mortgage servicers, including the tens of thousands of cases where the servicers attempted to justify their actions as a permitted increase in the escrow fund for taxes or insurance.

Such relief should also be offered wherever banks foreclosed while telling homeowners they were considering their eligibility for HAMP.

Such relief should also be offered wherever banks “lost” the homeowners’ HAMP applications and supporting documents three or more times.

Many victims of foreclosure fraud sold their homes, often at a loss, to avoid foreclosure. These victims also need to be compensated. These homeowners were very regularly told that mortgage-backed trusts owned their mortgages and would foreclose, even as the bank trustees knew that the documents demonstrating such ownership, the properly endorsed notes and assigned mortgages, were never held by the trusts.

Not every victim would choose another mortgage because many individuals will never trust another bank. There will, however, be tens of thousands of victims who are willing to become homeowners again.

Communities with a 40% rate of abandoned, vacant homes would benefit from such relief. County and state budgets would also benefit.

Please consider mortgage availability as an integral part of any plan to compensate victims of foreclosure fraud.

Please call upon me if I can be of assistance.

Yours truly,
Lynn E. Szymoniak, Esq. (szymoniak@mac.com)

[ipaper docId=53228852 access_key=key-1bu5jkqn32r49aidjzvc height=600 width=600 /]

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